BOARD OF INQUIRY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. B. N. EVANS, MSD, FIC
PRESIDENT

MAJOR A. MOHAMMED, FIC
MEMBER

MAJOR T. R. GUCAKE, FASC
MEMBER

WARRANT OFFICER CLASS ON J. H. MACOMBER, FIC
MEMBER

INTO

FIJI

THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE FIRST MERIDIAN SQUADRON IN THE ILLEGAL TAKE-OVER OF PARLIAMENT ON 19 MAY 2000 AND THE SUBSEQUENT HOLDING OF HOSTAGES
LAND FORCE COMMAND

Headquarters

LT COL J.N. EVANS
MAJ A. MOHAMMED
MAJ T. GUCAKE
WOI H. MACOMBER


References:
A. Army Act 1955
B. Board of Inquiry (Army) Rules 1956
C. Queens Regulation for the Army

General

1. A Board of Inquiry will assemble at QEB on Wed 16 Aug 00, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the involvement of members of the 1st Fiji Meridian Squadron, Counter Revolution Warfare Unit, in the illegal takeover of Parliament on 19 May 2000 and the subsequent holding of hostages at the Parliamentary Complex, Veiuto from 19 May to 13 July 2000.

Composition

2. The Board shall be made up of:
   a. President - LT COL J.N. EVANS,
   b. Member - MAJ A. MOHAMMED
   c. Member - MAJ T. GUCAKE, and
   c. Member - WOI H. MACOMBER.

Terms of Reference

3. The Board is to summon witnesses, take evidence on oath and report their opinion and findings to the Convening Officer NLT 27 Sept 00:
a. Who gave the orders for the members of the 1FMS to seize Parliamentarians on 19 May?

b. When were these orders given?

c. Who was present when these orders were given?

d. Who were involved in the initial takeover on 19 May 2000?

e. How many men were involved in the initial takeover?

f. How were the weapons, ammunition and equipments taken out of the 1FMS Armoury?

g. How were these weapons, ammo, etc taken out of QEB?

h. Were any more weapons taken to the Parliamentary complex after this and if so, who authorised it and how were these taken across?

i. How did other members of the 1FMS join the group that initially took over Parliament?

j. How did George Speight get involved with the members of the 1FMS?

k. Who was the link-man between Mr Speight and the 1FMS?

l. Were any members of the RFMF, other than members of the 1FMS, involved in the planning of the overthrow of the Government on 19 May 2000?

m. Were any members of the Disciplined Forces involved in the planning of the takeover, and if so, who were they?

n. Who initiated the operational plans?

o. How long before the takeover were the members of the 1FMS aware of such an operation?

p. How long did the 1FMS take in preparation for this operation and what did the preparations involve?

q. Were there any disagreement/objections raised by any service/personnel/1FMS member on the issue of 1FMS involvement in such an operation?

r. If there was any disagreements/objections, who raised them?

s. Was the reaction of the Commander and the institution as a whole
t. Were members of the 1FMS ever guaranteed the back up of the RFMF?

u. If yes, who gave that guarantee?

v. Were any ex CRW members positively involved in the build-up to the May 19 operation?

w. If so, who were they?

x. Are any of these members still in the Regular Forces.

y. Where were your training conducted?

z. Was the 1FMS expecting shipment of arms and ammo from overseas?

aa. If so, from which country and who organised such an activity?

bb. Were members of 1FMS promised any financial reward of any kind from the organisers of this operation?

cc. Was anyone ever pressured to the extent of being forced to participate in this operation?

dd. Have all arms and ammunition being accounted for?

e. Any other relevant matters.

A. TUATOKO
Colonel
Cmnd LFC

Ext: 351

9 Aug 00
COMD LFC


References:
A. Army Act 1955
B. Board of Inquiry (Army) Rules 1956
C. Queens Regulation for the Army, 1972

General

1. The Board of Inquiry into the involvement of the First Meridian Squadron in the illegal take over of parliament on 19 May 2000 and the subsequent holding of the hostages until 13 July 2000, was convened at the Republic of Fiji Military Forces Officers Training Centre at Vatuwaqa from 21 August 2000 to 24th October 2000. In the course of its inquiry, the Board interviewed and recorded evidence from a total of one hundred and twelve, both military and civilian witnesses. The Board also acknowledges the immense assistance given by the Hansard Reporters, Fiji Law Reform Society, Ministry for Information, Government Printing...
Press and all those members of the Fiji Police Force and RFMF that contributed to the Board in the course of its inquiry.

Information and assistance were sought from the following:

Fiji Times, Fiji Post, Fiji Sun, Fiji TV Ltd, Ministry of Information, various sections of the Republic of Fiji Police Force, the Republic of Fiji Prison Services, various units within the RFMF, the Legislature Department, Vitia Architects and many Non Governmental Organisations. The Board also visited the following: those individuals held at Korovou Prison and Nukulau Island on relevant charges concerning the events of May 19, the Parliament Complex, the IFMS Unit Complex and the LSU armoury to inspect the recovered IFMS weapons from the Parliament Complex. With the urgency in having this report submitted the Board was deprived of the opportunity to gather more information, because there are several witnesses who are currently on tour of duties to East Timor.

2. On several occasions, the Board encountered difficulty in gathering information from witnesses. This was due to the fact that they had already been charged for a criminal offence and were not in a position to make further statement which would have been inconsistent with a prior statement made to the Police. There were also cases where soldiers were reluctant to make statements or release information, using the excuse of "compliance to IFMS Standing Procedures and Code of Conduct". The inconsistency of statements given to the Board at times led to delays in piecing together the events of May 19 and the subsequent events. Despite these setbacks, the
Board was able to corroborate relevant testimonies from other witnesses, thus enabling it to provide the answers to the terms of references.

3. **Aim**

The aim of this inquiry is to record the findings and opinion concerning the involvement of the First Meridian Squadron in the illegal takeover of Parliament on May 19 and the subsequent holding of hostages until 14 July, 2000.

4. **Scope**

   (a) Terms of Reference
   (b) Summary of Events
   (c) Findings
   (d) Conclusion
   (e) Recommendations
   (f) Witnesses Statements
   (g) Exhibits

5. **Terms of Reference**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q.</th>
<th>Who gave the orders for the members of 1FMS to seize Parliamentarians on 19 May?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Major Ligairi</td>
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   | References | 2nd Witness | 48th Witness | 51st Witness |
   |------------|-------------|--------------|

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Q.</th>
<th>When were these orders given?</th>
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<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>At approximately 1015 hours at the Maritime Complex, Laucala Bay.</td>
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(c) Q. Who was present when these orders were given?

A. WO1 F. Ravai  
   Sgt V. Tikotani  
   Cpl P. Naduaniwai  
   Cpl A. Alava  
   Cpl K. Vosavere  
   LCpl L. Buadromo  
   Pte J. Soko  
   Pte U. Saukuru  
   Pte W. Liganivai  
   Pte E. Qicatabua  
   Pte K. Ratu  
   George Speight  
   Jim Speight  
   Apenisa Rovutiqica (res)  

12th Witness  
13th Witness  
49th Witness  
50th Witness  
51st Witness  
52nd Witness  
62nd Witness

(d) Q. Who were involved in the initial takeover on 19 May 2000?

A: This question is best answered in two portions. As 5(c) above

Those that went into the Parliament Chambers:

1. George Speight  
2. Jim Speight  
3. Sgt. Tikotani  
4. Cpl. Naduaniwai  
5. Cpl. Alava
7. Pte Qicatabua
8. Pte W. Liganivai; and

Secondly, those that provided security outside:

1. WO1 Ravai
2. Pte Saukuru
3. Pte Soko
4. Cpl Vosavere
5. Pte Ratu
6. Pte Rovutiqica (Res)

There is a possibility that there were other civilian and military personnel involved but because of the insistence that the inquiry be conducted quickly, the Board was unable to get enough evidence to provide all names. Major Ligairi and Lt. Baleinamau entered the Parliament back gate with the above personnel. They only observed the troops initial deployment into the Complex, and then boarded Major Ligairi’s vehicle for QEB to brief the Acting Commander, Col Tuatoko

(e) Q. How many men were involved in the initial takeover?
A. The exact figures cannot be fully ascertained
at this point in time, however, the Board has been able to verify the participations of persons mentioned at para (d) above. From the evidence gathered, the Board is led to believe there is a possibility that more civilians and other military personnel could have been involved with the initial takeover group named above.

(f) Q. How were the weapons, ammunition and equipments taken out of the 1FMS Armoury?  
A. The removal of weapons, ammunitions and equipment out of 1FMS armoury had to have the authority of the OC, Lt. Baleinamau. Lt. Baleinamau is requested to authorise the Armourer or duty storeman for the issue of the said items. In the absence of such authorisation by the OC, the duty officer is the issuing authority. The mode of transportation and personnel responsible for removing specific consignment of arms and ammunition is addressed in paragraph (g) below.

(g) Q. How were these weapons, ammo, etc taken out of QEB in the May 19 events?  
A. The dates, times and personnel who took weapons out of the 1FMS Armoury and subsequently out of QEB are as follows:
(i) 18 May 2000 - Pistol, MP5 and ammunition taken to Makuluva Island by Lt. Dakuiga, Sgt. Naika And Pte Ratu. These weapons were taken out of QEB by Sgt Tikotani and Cpl Naduaniwai. This was supposedly returned on the morning of Friday 19 May 2000.

(ii) At approximately 0930hrs on 19 May, approximately 16 weapons which included Uzi’s, pistol’s and MP5’s were taken in para bags in Jim Speight’s blue pickup van from the 1FMS Unit’s front gate. Cpl Alava, Cpl Naduaniwai, LCpl Buadromo and Jim Speight were said to have been involved in the loading and removal of these weapons from camp.

(iii) Sgt Naika’s assault team (Pte Baro, Pte Ledua) with Ssgt Vakadrau driving, left QEB with assault bags containing MP5’s and pistols.

(iv) Sometime during the night of Friday May 19, weapons were taken out via
the 1FMS back gate through to Sukanaivalu Road. The movement involved weapons taken out in "para" bags, loaded in two vans driven by WO1 Ravai and Sgt. Vakadranu. Cpl Naiduwi and other 1FMS personnel assisted in the loading. These weapons were probably cached then taken at intervals into the Parliament Complex as reported by Mr. Inoke Sikivou i.e.

(a) Saturday 20 May 2000 - 1200hrs 61st Witness
(b) Sunday 0900 hrs - 1000 hrs - Weapons taken to GVP office and Battery Hill.

(v) At approximately 1400 hrs on 20 May 2000, 45 weapons were loaded into the 1FMS truck GL015 from Sukanaivalu Road via the 1FMS back gate. Weapons loaded were:

(a) 1 Sub Machine Gun MP5 A3
(b) 10 Pistol automatic 9mm HP
(c) 3 Pistol automatic 9mm Browning 19A1
(d) 3 M16 A2 Carbine 5.56 mm
(e) 8 Rifle M16 A1

83rd Witness
These weapons were placed in 4 boxes and some duffel bags and were taken to Bilo Battery Area. The weapons were off loaded there and the vehicle returned to Suva. The driver of the truck was Ssgt. Kaumaitotoya. Those that remained with the weapons were Ssgt Bonefasio, Pte Tamani, Pte Tuiwailevu, and Pte Leweniqila, Others that assisted in securing the weapons on a rotational basis were Lcpl Buadromo, Ssgt Todua and Cpl Gaunavinaka. It was on Capt. Steven's initiative that the weapons were taken away from Bilo in a truck loaned from the Engineer Unit. For security reasons, the weapons were constantly moved between Nadroga and Nabukavesi.

(vi) On 19 May at approximately 2100 to 2200 hours, Sgt. Celeasiga left for the Parliament Complex with his .45 colt. Ssgt Vakadranu was the driver.

(vii) On 10 July 00, Sgt Cakaunitabua and
Pte Rere took two rifles (M16A2 Srl Nos. 800 2052 and 820 7121) and two pistols (Srl Nos - 315327 and 315316) to Levuka to reinforce Sgt Lotawa.

(viii) On Thursday 18 May at 1400 hrs weapons contained in 4 x black bags were off loaded and placed in the Fijian Association Party photocopying room at the Parliament Complex by Mr. Timoci Silatolu. Mr. Silatolu had asked Mr. Inoke Sikivou, the Research Officer of the FAP, if he could place the said bags there for safekeeping. Mr. Sikivou was told that the bags contained "yams and yaqona". Mr. Timoci Silatolu brought the 4 bags in a white twin cab and was accompanied by two other persons. On Friday 19 May at approximately 1900 hrs, these bags were opened in front of Mr. Sikivou and the weapons were handed out to 1FMS personnel. The Board could not find corroborating evidence to this movement and storage of weapons. The event, however, in considering other relevant evidence seems quite possible. The Board also could not ascertain which military personnel(s) was responsible for taking the arms and ammunitions out of QEB.
(ix) There is a possibility that individuals moved other weapons out of QEB. Although there is no evidence to substantiate this contention, the likelihood of it happening cannot be ruled out.

(h) Q. Were any more weapons taken to the Parliamentary complex after this and if so, who authorised it and how were these taken across?
A. Answers as per para (f) and (g) above.

(i) Q. How did other members of the 1FMS join the group that initially took over Parliament?
A. Most of the 1FMS personnel that later joined were directed by Lt. Baleinamau to do so. 6th Witness
   Others joined on their own accord. The understanding within the 9th Witness
   1FMS Unit during the initial stage of the takeover, was that the Army was supporting the takeover by the logistic and administrative support given.

(j) Q. How did George Speight get involved with the members of the 1FMS?
A. George Speight and Sgt. Tikotani belonged to the same Seventh Day Adventist Church. The Board could not substantiate whether George

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Speight and Sgt. Tikotani had meetings prior to 19 May, however, it confirmed that George Speight called Sgt. Tikotani and briefed him on the Fijian aspirations and the "Cause". He then requested Sgt. Tikotani to get some weapons for a takeover of Parliament. Sgt. Tikotani was convinced but indicated that he would have to obtain Major Ligairi's approval. Sgt. Tikotani then called Major Ligairi at approximately 0845 hrs to come to an RV at the USP Maritime slipway where George Speight convinced him (Major Ligairi) about the so called "Cause". Major Ligairi gave the directive to Sgt. Tikotani to call Lt. Balcinamau for the men to come down with their weapons and kits.

(k) Q. Who was the linkman between Mr. Speight and the 1FMS?
A. Initially, Sgt. Tikotani was the link but as the crisis developed, Major Ligairi took over.

(l) Q. Were any members of the RFMF, other than members of the 1FMS, involved in the planning of the overthrow of the Government on 19 May 2000?
A. There had been a lot of meetings in private or over lunch's and dinner's, and gatherings of RFMF personnel with civilians where a
possible coup or the overthrow of the Government was the major topic of discussions. Throughout the whole of Fiji, reports had been widespread that a lot of indigenous Fijians were talking about a coup and how the Chaudhry Government was impinging on their rights and aspirations. The Board in its deliberations, did not find any evidence to directly link any other RFMF personnel outside the 1FMS in the planning or involvement of what took place on 19 May 2000. However, there are indications that certain RFMF officers knew of and had been approached to participate in the events of 19 May including the takeover of Parliament. Exhibit F is an intelligence report that indicates that Lt Col Baledrokadroka was approached but the officer indicated that no such offer was made to him. Also Lt Col Tarakini\textsuperscript{kini} may have had prior knowledge because of the unusual phone call to WO1 Bainimoli twice on the morning of 19 May prior to the coup.

(m) Q. Were any members of the Disciplined Forces involved in the planning of the takeover, and if so, who were they?

A. This BOI Directive is only for an internal investigation within the RFMF of the 1FMS involvement in the whole takeover. The Board was placed under a lot of pressure
by the leadership of the RFMF to finish this BOI within the stipulated time. The magnitude of this BOI did not allow it to be completed in a short period. The BOI was not given the time and mandate to conduct investigations of other Disciplined Forces.

(n) Q. Who initiated the operational plans?
A. Sgt. Tikotani initiated the plans with the consent of Major Ligairi. However, it is apparent that no detailed planning as to the actual conduct of the operations was ever made. The 1FMS went into the Complex without rehearsals and the appropriate training.

(o) Q. How long before the takeover were the members of the 1FMS aware of such an operation?
A. From what was ascertained, Sgt. Tikotani was aware of the operation on 16 May 2000. Cpl Naduaniwai knew of the operation on 18 May. Lt Dakuliga, Sgt Naika, Cpl Tawake together with some members of 1FMS who were on exercise "Blue Lagoon" knew of the operation on 18 May. Other 1FMS members were only made aware after being briefed at the Maritime complex on the morning of 19 May after, which, they went into the Parliament Complex.
(p) Q. How long did the 1FMS take in preparation for this operation and what did the preparations involve?

A. It is apparent that there was no detailed preparation for the operation other than some weapons being pre-packed prior to 19 May.

(q) Q. Were there any disagreements/objections raised by any service personnel/1FMS member on the issue of 1FMS involvement in such an operation?

A. Prior to 19 May, objections were raised by members of 1FMS on exercise "Blue Lagoon" on Makuluva Island. The objections were directed towards their participation in the possible overthrowing of the government. On 19 May, similar objections or concerns were raised by Lt. Tuivunavou, Lt. Dakuliga and Sgt. Naika. Captain Steven and Sgt. Bonefasio also raised reservations towards the participation of the 1FMS personnel in the May 19 events. Lt Col Seruvakula, other officers and other ranks also raised objections of 1FMS involvement.

(r) Q. If there was any disagreements/objections, who raised them?

A. Answer as per para (q) above.
What was the reaction of the Commander and the institution as a whole?

As to the Commander RFMF's reaction to the events of May 19, the question cannot be answered because the Board was unable to interview him. As for the reaction of the institution, the RFMF stood firm in trying to resolve the crisis, despite the airing of personnel views.

Were members of the 1FMS ever guaranteed the back up of the RFMF?

No the RFMF as an institution never guaranteed its support. However certain decisions, actions and positions adopted by RFMF were interpreted by the 1FMS personnel involved and other RFMF personnel that the RFMF seemed to be in support. This came in the form of logistics and administrative support that was provided to the 1FMS personnel in Parliament by those 1FMS personnel that remained in QEB. Another indication was the numerous visits of all ranks of the RFMF to the Complex. These visits were both official and casual but it sent the wrong signals.

If yes, who gave the guarantee?
A. As para (t) above.

(v) Q. Were any ex CRW members positively involved in the build-up to the May 19 operation?
A. The Inquiry was not able to ascertain any prior involvement of EX CRW members to the events of May 19. It has been established that during the crisis Capt Jone Maivalili, a former member of the 1FMS, had been quite active in supporting the other members involved in the takeover of the Parliamentary Complex and Sukanaivalu Barracks. He had contacted Sgt. Sireli Lewalau, a 1FMS operative in Lautoka, to get 100 K2 Rifle firing pins from Lautoka (5FIR).
Furthermore, Capt Maivalili has come into possession of military documents and files belonging to the 1FMS, which had been removed by Lt Baleinamau. It is essential for the RFMF to make efforts to retrieve these documents from Capt Maivalili’s residence in Lami.

111th Witness

(w) Q. If so, who were they?
A. As per para (v) above.

(x) Q. Are any of these members still in the Regular Forces?
A. The Board could not ascertain whether or not any Ex-CRW members was involved in the buildup to the May 19 event.

(y) Q. Where were your training conducted?
A. There was no training conducted concerning the build up to the May 19 events.

(z) Q. Was the 1FMS expecting shipment of arms and ammo from overseas?
A. There is no evidence to substantiate any offshore shipment of arms and ammunition into the country.

(aa) Q. If so, from which country and who organised such an activity?
A. N/A

(bb) Q. Were members of 1FMS promised any financial reward of any kind from the organisers of this operation?
A. This cannot be confirmed. All 1FMS members involved have denied any such offer being made to them.

(cc) Q. Was anyone ever pressured to the extent of being forced to participate in this operation?
A. Yes. Those that did not go into the Parliament Complex after the first

8th Witness
12th Witness
few days received threatening phone calls. The threat was directed at them and their familier for their refusal to join the other 1FMS members in Parliament. Also, Lt Balcinamau’s actions in "recruiting" 1FMS personnel for Parliament could be deemed as an act of coercion.

(dd) Q. Have all arms and ammunition being accounted for?
A. 25 weapons are listed to be missing as contained in Exhibit A. The Board in the course of its investigation discovered that 5 Colts and 1HP Pistol that were listed missing by the LSU records have, according to Capt Stevens, been returned to the LSU. This would then leave a figure of 19 weapons still missing. Of this 19 missing weapons from the 1FMS, both the LSU and Capt Stevens could not confirm if the weapons were missing from the Parliament batch or had been missing earlier from the 1FMS Unit.

(ec) Q. Any other relevant matters?
A. As per our Findings, Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations below.

6. Summary of Events
The following is a summary of events on the illegal takeover of Parliament and its subsequent events:

(a) 2 weeks prior to 19 May 00, George Speight lobbying for support in bid to overthrow Government.

(b) Thu 16 May 2000
- Sgt Vilimoni Tikotani of 1FMS, meet and has lunch with Peceli Vuniwa of the Fijian Nationalist Party in Suva City.

(c) Wed 17 May 2000
- Sgt Vilimoni Tikotani, Peceli Vuniwa and Maciu Vakasunau meet at Colo-i-Suva and plan to assassinate Mahendra Chaudhry. Plan changed to coup d'état, on the same day after meeting with Iliesa Duvuloco, Major Joseva Savua, and some other persons. This latter meeting was held at Ratu Epenisa Cakobau's residence.

(d) Thu 18 May 2000
- Timoci Silatolu stores 4 Sports Bags of Yaqona and Yams in the FAP Office inside Parliamentary Complex. Allegedly same bags were opened on Fri 19 May 00 from where weapons were distributed.

- Weapons taken from 1 FMS Armoury in sandbags, mainly pistols and Uzi's given to Lt Charles Dakuliga at School of Maritime, Lauca Bay, by Sgt Tikotani and Cpl Naduaniniwai, for preparation and issue to 1 FMS personnel on Exercise "Blue Lagoon" at Makuluva Island. Weapons conveyed to Makuluva
Island by Lt Dakuliga, Sgt Naika and Pte Ratu, on a 1 FMS zodiac dinghy.

(e) Fri 19 May 2000

- 0230hrs Lt Col Filipo Tarakinikini calls 1 FMS from home telephone number 383779 wanting to speak with WO1 Bainimoli.

- No clear direction from Lt. Charles Dakuliga to 1FMS members on Exercise "Blue Lagoon" at Makuluva Island. Weapons returned to Armoury after rendezvous (RV) at Rifle Range Vatuwaqa for extraction to QEB.

- Message for Sgt. Vilimoni Tikotani that his mother was sick for him to call telephone number 450142.

- 0800hrs message for Sgt. Tikotani to RV with George Speight at the School of Maritime Complex, Lauca Bay.

- At approximately 0845hrs Major Ilisoni Ligairi meets up with George Speight and Sgt. Tikotani at School of Maritime. "Green Light" given by Maj. Ligairi and Sgt. Tikotani calls Lt. Baleinamau at 1FMS Unit complex. This happened at approximately 0845 hrs.

- Approximately between 0900 - 1000hrs Lt Baleinamau briefs 1FMS pers on VIP protection exercise and herds them towards Sukanaivalu Road where civilian minibus and twin cabs were available to transport troops to the School of Maritime complex.
- At approximately 0930hrs Jim Speight's vehicle uplifts weapons from 1 FMS compound and takes it to the School of Maritime.

- At approximately 1030hrs move to Parliamentary Complex where George Speight, Jim Speight, Sgt Vilimoni Tikotani, Cpl Peni Nadiuaniwai, Cpl Alikisio Alava, Tpr Qicatabua and Tpr Liganivai enter the Chambers to execute the coup d'etat. WO1 Ravai, Cpl Vosavere, Tprs Soko, Sankuru, Ratu, Pte (res) Rovutiqica, etc, secure the gates, corridors and outer perimeter.

- Business in central Suva are looted and shops burned as news of the takeover spreads.

- George Speight declares himself Head of State.

- President, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara declares a state of emergency, assumes executive authority and maintains that the Constitution is still intact.

(f) Saturday, May 20:
- Bau chief Ratu Jope Seniloli is sworn-in as President.

- Speight proclaims himself Prime Minister.

- Army and Police pledge their support for Ratu Sir Kamisese.

(g) Sunday, May 21:
George Speight releases 20 hostages and five MPs are later allowed to go.

Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara snubs George Speight, who sought a meeting through former Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka.

George Speight warns he will start executing hostages if police or military attacked.

(i) Monday, May 22:
- Rebels hold gun to Mr. Chaudhry's head when supporters trying to enter the complex were mistaken as a rescue attempt.

(h) Tuesday, May 23:
- The Great Council of Chiefs backs Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara and calls for the release of hostages.
- The European Union calls off the June 8 signing in Fiji of a new agreement to replace Lome.

(i) Wednesday, May 24:
- The GCC calls for a change in government and reaffirms support for President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara.

(j) Thursday, May 25:
- Despite earlier assurances that he would abide by GCC's wishes, George Speight rejects the chiefs' resolution and demands that Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara step down.
(k) Friday, May 26:
- Armed rebels confront soldiers manning a checkpoint near Parliament.

(l) Saturday, May 27:
- Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara relieves the Chaudhry Government of executive authority and takes control of the running of the country.
- Two soldiers, Lt Rokoura and Pte Qerei and a British journalist are shot and wounded after confrontation between rebels and officers manning a roadblock outside Parliament.

(n) Sunday, May 28:
- A policeman (Constable Seavula) is killed and a security officer dies from heart attack after coup supporters go on a rampage across Suva.
- Armed men trashed Fiji TV and rampage across Suva.
- Fiji Hardwood Corporation Office Complex burnt to the ground.

(o) Monday, May 29:
- Army Chief, Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama declares martial law and announces take-over of executive authority from President.
- Troops in Suva are given "shoot to kill" orders to enforce a curfew.
Thursday, June 1:
• Talks between the military and rebels decide to leave decision of governance to the GCC.

Saturday, June 3:
• Talks between George Speight and Military collapses when George Speight Group issues a new set of demands, including a transfer of all executive power to the GCC.

• West looks at secession.

Monday, June 5:
• Commodore Bainimarama gives coup-makers an ultimatum to lay down arms and release the hostages before talks continue.

Wednesday, June 7:
• Fiji partially suspended from Commonwealth.

• Military and George Speight supporters in firefight but no casualties reported.

Friday, June 9:
• Merchant Bank chief Laisenia Qarase co-opted into Military Council as adviser on finance.

• 2000 lose jobs as crisis worsens.

Monday, June 12:
Soldiers at a military checkpoint near Parliament open fire on two vehicles, one in which George Speight is travelling. Nobody is hurt.

(v) Wednesday, June 14:
- The military says talk with George Speight were "back on track" after Ratu Ilotau agrees to mediate.

(w) Sunday, June 18:
- Talks between rebels, military and Tui Vuda on the membership of an interim Cabinet and a Constitution review commission begins.

(x) Wednesday, June 21:
- Drafting of the final list of people who will be included in the new interim government by the military.
- No talks at Muainikau because the military took the whole day to draft Accord.

(y) Saturday, June 24:
- The release of the hostages is imminent following a major breakthrough in talks leading to a planned signing of the agreement.
- Talks fail after the rebels bring last-minute demands.

(z) Sunday, June 25:
- The rebels release four female hostages under the cover of
darkness. The women undergo trauma therapy and many attend church service with their families.

(aa) Wednesday, June 28:
- The army gives hostage takers at Parliament last chance until midnight today to sign the Accord agreed to last Friday.

(bb) Friday, June 30:
- Rebels held 16 journalists for two hours at the Parliament Complex the previous night.
- Army considers declaring the area around Parliament a military zone.

(cc) Saturday, July 1:
- Army Commander, Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama says issues concerning Fijian interests and aspirations would be given priority in response to questions on the delay in the appointment of an Interim Government.

(dd) Sunday, July 2:
- Former coup leader, Sitiveni Rabuka claims that there are other key players behind the illegal takeover of the Chaudhry Government.

(ee) Tuesday, July 4:
- An Interim Cabinet headed by banker and former Senator
Laisenia Qarase is sworn in and it will be tasked with preparing a
draft terms of reference of a Constitution review and propose
membership for a Constitution Commission.

(ff) Wednesday, July 5:
- Five rebels including Cpl Vosavere (1FMS) and Kolinio Tabua,
wounded and 14 others are in police custody after a shooting
incident between rebels and soldiers outside Parliament. No
soldiers hurt.

(gg) Thursday, July 6:
- Head of State, Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama declares
vicinity around Parliamentary complex a Military Exclusive
Zone until midnight the next day.

(hh) Friday, July 7:
- Landowners disrupted major power supply on Viti Levu by
stopping the flow of water into the main station at Wailoa Power
Station.
- Some Macuata chiefs want Commodore Bainimarama to step
down as Army Commander.

(ii) Saturday, July 8:
- Naivucini villagers in Naitasiri threaten to cut off access to
Monasavu for military and Fiji Electricity Authority personnel
unless advised by their advisor, Iliesa Duvuioico.
- Rebel supporters under the leadership of Varinava Tiko seize
Korovou Town and took soldiers and police officers hostage.

(jj) Sunday, July 9:
- Rebel group leader George Speight on behalf of hostage takers and Army Commander Commodore Bainimarama signed the Muanikau Accord, which would allow the release of deposed Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry and his Cabinet on Thursday.
- Villagers seized Savusavu Police Station and Army barracks

(kk) Monday, July 10:
- Interim Government head, Laisenia Qarase plans on reversing policies introduced by the Coalition Government affecting indigenous people.

(ll) Tuesday, July 11:
- George Speight refuses to name a date when hostages within the parliamentary complex would be released.

(nn) Thursday, July 13:
- Coup leader, George Speight declines a nomination to the interim civilian administration.
- Chiefs and people of Sabeto resolve to close the Queens Highway and Sabeto Police Station.
- Remaining 18 hostages are released after 56 days in captive.
Friday 14 July:
- Major Ligairi gives orders for 1FMS bodyguards to retain pistols.

Tuesday 18 July:
- Burial of Kolinio Tabua inside Parliamentary grounds.
- George Speight Group torch vehicles in the Parliamentary Complex.
- George Speight Group depart for Kalabu School.
- George Speight Group loots market vendors at the markets at Bailey and Laqere Bridge.

7. Findings
In the course of its inquiry, the Board has come up with the following additional findings:

(a) The Role and Organisation of 1FMS

(i) Background. In May 1987, the then Commander of the RFMF, Major-General Sitiveni Rabuka, had established within the RFMF a Unit known as Sierra Company. This Unit had its operatives conducting surveillance tasks on dissidents and those suspects who were capable of destabilising the then Interim Government. The promotion of Ilisoni Ligairi a former Senior non
Commissioned Officer (SNCO), in the British Special Air Service (SAS), who had no formal officer training, to the rank of Major, herald the change from Sierra Company to the Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit (CRW). For it was Major Ilisoni Ligairi who guided, trained and molded the unit to try and fit into an image of the famous British Army Unit which he had once belonged to. CRW, for political reasons, was later changed to 1st Fiji Meridian Squadron (1FMS), which the unit is known by to date. From the very beginning the unit has been answerable only to Commander RFMF.

(ii) **Role.** The 1997 Defence White Paper, under the heading The Internal Threat, paragraph 7.14 states:

"Presently in Fiji the Force assigned to study, train and conduct counter terrorist operations is the Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit of the RFMF. It is equipped to carry out specialised aspects of the national counter terrorist operation at times when conventional police capabilities are no longer appropriate and in rare emergencies, only after specific authorisation by Cabinet".

Major Ilisoni Ligairi's background ensured that the unit was modeled around the British SAS, which had the CRW task rotated amongst its troops. Hostage rescue is probably the main responsibility of those in the CRW. In the British SAS, a team is permanently on standby, ready to respond to any terrorist or similar incidents where hostage rescue would be required.

The fact that 1FMS was the unit that the nation depended upon as "the force assigned to study, train and conduct counter terrorist operations," must be highlighted. There is no doubt whatsoever that members of 1FMS were very conversant with their roles, as articulated in the 1997 Defence White Paper. When members of this Unit, on 19 May 2000 assisted in the takeover of the Parliamentary Complex and subsequent holding hostage of government
Members of Parliament, they conducted an act that was not only illegal but also one in total contradiction with their perceived role. Instant obedience and blind loyalty, in a situation where authority is never questioned, led the majority of those that initially went into Parliament and those that reinforced them, to not only compromise 1FMS as a unit but also the very role it existed for.

(iii) SOP. 1FMS, from its very inception, had very much conducted most of its activities on verbal discussions between Major Ilisoni Ligairi, with the Officer Commanding (OC) and SNCO's of the unit. None of these discussions nor the results were ever written as instructions or orders. It has been mentioned to the Board that the unit has Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), one very much derived from the British SAS. However, in the course of its inquiry, the Board was not able to obtain a copy of this SOP. It was quiet evident that Lt Baleinamau had access to this document but was reluctant to produce it to the Board, together with those other documents he had removed from the 1FMS complex. The unit so called "Code of Conduct" is very much based on the British SAS SOP. In its implementation by 1FMS this SOP was not tailored to cater for the great differences in the social and cultural environment, levels and types of conflicts and theatres likely to be employed in, levies and types of training, availability of resources, finance etc which exists. These facts of life, though harsh, should have been realised by Major Ligairi and 1FMS should have been informed accordingly and continuously of this. Some new members of 1FMS were blindly led to believe that divulgence of information to the Board was against the Unit SOP or "Code of Conduct". This "Code of Conduct" really came to the fore when the British SAS were conducting covert operations in Northern Ireland and was only relevant to a similar situation. Furthermore, the confusion is between war and peace. In times of war the "Code of
Conduct" dictates that only authorised information can be released to the enemy if a unit member is captured. During the inquiry some 1FMS members were reluctant to divulge information and the fear of breaching 1FMS SOP and Code of Conduct was used as an excuse. The Board has deduced that it was due to situational confusion and for the mere reason that they would incriminate themselves for actions they took during the whole crisis. Major Ligairi, when questioned, confirmed that it was only applicable in times of conflict. He further stated if members of 1FMS were using it as an excuse to withhold information, than "it is good practice for the boys." This statement indirectly encourages the non-divulgence of information. It further indicates the mentality of a person who sadly cannot differentiate between a training situation and reality.

(iv) Organisation. The Board, in the course of its inquiry, has come across three different 1FMS organisational structures, which do not correspond nor relate to each other. All these are articulated as Exhibit Q of this report. Furthermore, the board has not been able to confirm the actual 1FMS authorised organisational structure. It is now quite apparent, with nothing written and activities based on verbally issued instructions and orders, that their was no clear direction for and from those in command within the Unit. The OC conducted activities in an ad hoc manner and it is questionable whether Commander RFMF, whom the unit was directly responsible to, was ever privy to any 1FMS activity. Furthermore, it could not be ascertained whether there was any direction at all to the unit from Commander RFMF. 1FMS was very much a private army, with its own agenda, answerable only to Commander RFMF.

(b) The 1FMS Bond and Code of Conduct
It is normal for any military orientated unit to have a bond that exists
between its members. This bond is forged by years of facing hardships together. In comparison to a conventional military unit, the bond is perceived to be stronger within Special Forces because of the nature and degree of training and hardships, which they encounter. Time is also a multiplier and the longer members of this unit operate together the stronger their bond becomes. The Board concurred that even though there were allegiances to individuals and groups within the Unit, a bond still existed amongst members of IFMS.

Most of the SNCO’s and the then OC Lt. Penaia Baleinamau had been in the unit when Major Ilisoni Ligairi started it in 1987. Thirteen years together is more than enough time to strengthen such a bond. Major Ligairi was a warrant officer in the British SAS and has never had any formal officer training. It is thus understandable that Major Ilisoni Ligairi and the unit SNCOs would blend and form a clique. This so called SNCO clique together with the then OC Lt Baleinamau, was apparently running IFMS activities and other unit members especially officers had to adapt or face rejection or even posting out of the Unit. In reality, there were certain groupings and allegiances which existed within IFMS. Firstly, the clique of SNCOs together with Major Ilisoni Ligairi and Lt Penaia Baleinamau. Secondly, Lt. (now Captain) Shane Stevens who was the training officer together with Lt. Sake Tuivanavou, Sgt. Bonefasio and Sgt. Tocua. Thirdly, we had the JNCOs and the Troopers who were never really aligned with any of the two groups above but were just waiting to obey orders, irrelevant of the origin. On top of all this, is the fact that those that came from Vanua Levu were quite predominant in the Unit. It was difficult for the Board to ascertain which group Lt. Charles Dakuliga belonged to. He was very much an officer who was new and trying to establish himself within the unit. His actions or the lack of it, on the evening of Thursday 18
May 2000 paints a picture of an officer who was trying to ensure that his actions should not jeopardize the unit and his position within the unit. He did not try to disrupt or foil the plan to takeover Parliament and he did not warn the RFMF nor the relevant authorities.

Even though a bond existed within the unit, allegiance dictated stances taken by unit members prior to the takeover, during the takeover and after the takeover. If the bond was as strong as 1FMS members make it out to be, than all unit members who were in Fiji at that particular time, should have been involved. Furthermore death threats would not have been made to those that stayed out of Parliament. It was therefore not the Bond that took people to Parliament. It was allegiance, instant obedience to orders and the knowledge not to question authority. Peer pressure also cannot be ruled out, for the majority of those involved were members of the unit who had passed selection together in 1999.

(c) The Effectiveness of 1FMS

The founder of the British SAS, Colonel David Stirling laid down the principles under which this elite regiment still operates to. Some of these firmly held tenets relevant to 1FMS are:

1. The unrelenting pursuit of excellence;
2. Maintaining the highest standards of discipline in all aspects of the daily life of the SAS soldier; and
3. Humility and humor.

The first tenet, the unrelenting pursuit of excellence, should ensure that all 1FMS activities whether training or operational should be conducted in a manner most professional, with thorough planning and forethought to ensure success. However, as it will be highlighted later, there was no pursuit of excellence at all in the actual conduct of the activities of 19 May. Tenet two
SIXTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 25706 CPL MACIU TAWAKE

Cpl Tawake, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows.

Q1: Corporal Tawake, can you give us a brief description of your service with the RFMF?
A: I was enlisted in the army in 1987 on the 1987 recruitment. That same year, I joined the CRW. I went to the Middle East twice until today.

Q2: Your events on 19th May, 2000, can you give a brief description of your involvement prior to the events of 19th May and after in regards to the hostage take-over in Parliament, and also the holding of the hostages after the take-over?
A: I went to Parliament on Tuesday as a sentry until the 13th.

Q3: Were you involved in any training and planning prior to the take-over on the 19th?
A: Prior to the take-over, we were preparing for the conference that was supposed to be held in Suva. I was one of the guys that went to Vanua Levu. We had continuous training at Makuluva up until the take-over.

Q4: What type of training was done in Vanua Levu?
A: It was general training, long-range exercises and amphibious.

Q5: Who was involved in the training in Vanua Levu?
A: The OC.

Q6: Who is the OC?
A: The OC was in charge of the training.

Q7: Who is the OC?
A: Lt. Baleinamau and Mr. Ravai.

Q8: You indicated that you entered the Parliament Complex on Tuesday for sentry duty?
A: Yes.

Q9: Parliament was taken over on the 19th, do you mean the Tuesday of the week following?
A: Yes.
Q10: Tuesday, 23rd?
A: Yes.

Q11: You went down to Parliament under whose direction or order?
A: The OC.

Q12: So the OC ordered you to go down to the Parliament Complex?
A: Yes.

Q13: In the Parliament Complex, what were your duties there?
A: We were mainly controlling the people.

Q14: Controlling what people in the Complex?
A: The supporters.

Q15: So your job was to control the supporters?
A: Yes.

Q16: In the Parliament Complex, were you or anyone else, to your knowledge, involved with or in contact with any personnel outside Parliament, whether civilian or military?
A: No.

Q17: Were you or anyone else in the Parliament Complex in contact with anyone in the IMS at QEB?
A: Our Admin was always coming there with the administration or whatever for the boys.

Q18: Were you aware of any weapons being taken after the events of the 19th of May? Weapons being taken from QEB down to the Parliament Complex?
A: On the 19th, I took a leave pass in the early morning so that I could go home. That is why I do not know who took over the weapons. Then I came back on Monday and they sent me down on Tuesday.

Q19: Were you aware of the plan to take over the Parliament Complex?
A: As I said before, Sir, we were preparing for the Suva one.

Q20: I know you were preparing for the Suva one, but my question is directed to you. Were you aware of the take-over of Parliament Complex?
A: I was not aware of the take-over, Sir.
Q21: When you entered the Parliament Complex on the 23rd of May, were you aware of any weapons being taken out of QEB (1MS Unit) into Parliament Complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q22: Apart from the 1MS, were you aware of any other contacts made to any other officers or personnel within the RFMF?
A: No, Sir.

Q23: You indicated that on your return on the 13th of July after the pull-out from Parliament Complex, you stayed home until you were arrested. Upon leaving the Complex, did you or anyone else take weapons home or anywhere else?
A: No, Sir.

Q24: Prior to 19th May, what was your appointment in the 1FMS? What were your responsibilities?
A: I was Patrol Commander.

Q25: How many men were you commanding?
A: Four.

Q26: Am I correct to say that this is a team we are talking about?
A: Yes.

Q27: The exercise in Vanua Levu, how many teams participated?
A: Maybe five.

Q28: Where did the exercise start from?
A: From Macuata (just at the coast). Then from Labasa to Nadogo, then we crossed to Vanua Levu, from this side to that side to Cakaudrove, then along the other coast from Natawa Bay, right up to Drekeniwal. Then we boarded the boat back to Suva from Savusavu.

Q29: What boat is this?
A: The civilian boat – SOFE.

Q30: Were there any officers present in this exercise?
A: The OC.

Q31: Mr. Baleinamau?
A: Yes.
Q32: Were there any other officers, the Director?
A: He was in the village.

Q33: Which village is this?
A: Naibalebale.

Q34: Were there any visitors that came to witness this exercise? Any civilians?
A: Only the villagers.

Q35: You said there was an exercise conducted in Makuluva. How many teams were involved there?
A: About three.

Q36: When did this exercise finish?
A: Thursday afternoon.

Q37: Were you involved in that exercise?
A: Yes.

Q38: What was used in that exercise?
A: The objective was for sea survival.

Q39: What form of transportation did you have from Makuluva?
A: We were using the rubber boats – dinghy.

Q40: What weapons were used in that exercise?
A: Our personal rifles - M16(1 and II).

Q41: On completion of the exercise, your team returned to QEB?
A: Yes.

Q42: Those men that were involved on the 19th of May, were they the same individuals that conducted the exercise in Vanua Levu and Makuluva?
A: Some, Sir.

Q43: Going back to Tuesday when you reported back to duty at the camp, were you dressed in uniform when you went to take up sentry duty?
A: When I returned to QEB, some were dressed in uniform and some in civilian. I was in civilian.

Q44: Was there someone else who accompanied you to the Parliamentary Complex on that day for your duty?
A: I cannot recall.
Q45: How did you travel to the Complex?
A: My own way.

Q46: Did you have any weapons from the camp taken to the Complex?
A: No.

Q47: When you took over the sentry duty at the Complex, were you issued a weapon?
A: Yes.

Q48: What weapon were you using?
A: MP5.

Q49: How did you come to possess these weapons?
A: I was there and they had the weapons in the Complex.

Q50: Where were the weapons in the Complex?
A: They were with Mr. Ravai.

Q51: Who gave you the weapons?
A: Mr. Ravai.

Q52: Were you given any ammunition?
A: Only one magazine.

Q53: Was the mag. loaded? How many rounds? Was it a full magazine?
A: Yes, I think so.

Q54: Did you have a relief system in your duties at the Complex?
A: Yes.

Q55: How were the weapons secured after relieving your duties?
A: Someone was there to look after the weapons full-time.

Q56: So Mr. Ravai was not there, but who was there to receive the weapons?
A: Our CQ.

Q57: Who is that?
A: Someone who had finished his sentry duty and came back took over.

Q58: Who was the CQ?
A: Bukasila.
Q59: Was there any register or something to account for the weapons returned?
A: Yes. Whenever we took over, we often signed it and when we returned it, we signed it too.

Q60: What type of register? Was it on a piece of paper or a book?
A: It was a book.

Q61: Did you, on any occasion, sign for the weapons?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q62: Were you made to sign for the weapons every time you withdrew or passed the weapons back?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q63: Could you see the place where the weapons were kept in the Complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q64: How many weapons were there?
A: I cannot recall.

Q65: What weapons did you see stored in here?
A: MP5.

Q66: Pistols?
A: Pistols.

Q67: Machine guns?
A: Yes.

Q68: Were there any directives given to you as to the rules of the engagement?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q69: What were you briefed on?
A: As I said before, we were there to control the crowd.

Q70: What were your instructions, if any, if you were fired upon?
A: I think the last intention of us going there was to kill someone.

Q71: I understand that, but were you briefed as to what your rules of engagement was in the Complex?
A: Sir, as we are trained soldiers, we know it.
Q72: Did you engage in any discharge of the weapons? Did you fire any shots?
A: No, Sir.

Q73: Corporal Tawake, the weapons in the Complex, was in the possession of only military personnel or did the civilians hold them also?
A: I can recall that it was only for the military personnel.

Q74: But were there any civilians who had weapons in the Complex?
A: No.

Q75: There had been reports in the newspapers that civilians had weapons and were conducting trainings. Did you see some of this?
A: No, Sir.

Q76: It is general knowledge. The Complex is a very small place. Did you see the weapons training going on in the camp?
A: I cannot recall, Sir.

Q77: Were you there in the Complex the day the police officer was shot?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q78: Can you tell us where the shots came from?
A: I do not know, Sir.

Q79: Where were you located on that day the police officer was shot?
A: On that day I was at the top of Battery Hill.

Q80: And what was situated at the back?
A: Only some of us and the civilians.

Q81: From the 19th of May up until the day the people left the Complex, you say you did not fire any weapons, were you involved with any of the groups that went out and had incidents with the military?
A: No, Sir.

Q82: Were you told who fired the shots that killed that police officer?
A: I do not know, Sir.

Q83: But did you hear of anything in the Complex?
A: No, Sir.
Q84: Were you briefed as to what was happening in the Complex? In the military routine, we always have a O-Group. Was there any O-Group conducted in the Complex?
A: There was no O-Group because we were in small numbers and we were here as sentries.

Q85: What did you hear about that shooting of the police officer?
A: I came to know about it in the papers.

Q86: Who was the 1MS person involved in the events of the 19th of May?
A: As I said before, on the morning of the 19th I had gone home. I do not know who the initial persons were.

Q87: Where were the weapons kept in the Complex?
A: In the security room.

Q88: On Tuesday, the day you went to Parliament House, did you see the weapons that were kept in this security room?
A: The day I went there, I was rostered straightaway as a security (sentry).

Q89: Did you see the weapons in the room that day or the day after?
A: They issued a weapon for me and then I went for my duty.

Q90: You went for your duty, did you bring the weapon back to where that weapon was kept?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q91: Did you see the number of weapons that were in the room?
A: Some of the weapons were kept in black duffel bags.

Q92: You are talking about Tuesday?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q93: When were you arrested? The days you were in the Complex, you said that you was part of the security, did you at any time (from the 19th until the 13th) leave the Complex? If so, for what reasons?
A: During the length of time from the 19th to the 13th of July, I went home once. I went home because, as I said before, I went to get my change (clothes).

Q94: So you left the Complex only once?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q95: Once in eight weeks you left the Complex?
A: Yes, Sir,

Q96: And only to get your change from home?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q97: No other reason?
A: No.

Q98: Were you in contact with personnel from QEB also in Parliament House?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q99: Tell us who were these people you were communicating with?
A: With the boys at the Complex, up there at QEB.

Q100: Who are these boys?
A: Our Warrant Officer Class I, Mr. Bainimoli.

Q101: Any other person? When you joined the individuals in the Parliament Complex, after that were there any member of 1FMS that joined you in the Complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q102: Can you name the persons that joined you in the Complex?
A: All, Sir?

Q103: What do you mean “all”?
A: All the boys that joined me?

Q104: When you went to the Complex on Tuesday, what were the names of the individuals that came and joined you later?
A: The boys were there. I think I was the last one that joined the group at Parliament.

Q105: The directive that was given to you by Lt. Baleinamaau, what did he tell you? What were his instructions to you?
A: To go down there and relieve the sentry. They were less in number.

Q106: Were you arrested by the RFMF personals and put into a cell?
A: No, Sir.

Q107: You had not been arrested?
A: No, Sir.
Q108: So after the 13th of July, you remained at home?
A: Yes.

Q109: When did you start duty? Before that, what unit are you presently in?
A: 3FIR.

Q110: When did you start duty with 3FIR?
A: About 2-3 weeks ago, I cannot recall.

Q111: After you left the Complex on the 13th of July, you stayed at home?
A: Yes.

Q112: When did you come back to QEB?
A: One week after the raid at Kalabu.

Q113: Why?
A: I came back to know what was happening and what was going on at the camp.

Q114: You came back to the 1FMS?
A: When I came back, the boys told me that there was a posting order and I saw my name.

Q115: Corporal Tawake, are you aware of any other person that was given the same instruction given to you on Tuesday?
A: Some of the new boys were there too.

Q116: Were you aware that they were only there because of the task given to them by Lt. Baleinamau?
A: As I said before, it was up to the individual. The choice was ours whether to go on leave or join the boys.

Q117: Just on that note, if Lt. Baleinamau had not told you to go down to the Complex to relieve the security personnel, would you have personally gone down on your own accord?
A: Yes, Sir. Having said that, I think we have a bond that is not seen in any other area. If the unit was involved, so was I.

Q118: That bond applies to all individuals in 1FMS?
A: I think so.

Q119: You think so, or is it true it applies to 1FMS?
A: It applies to everyone.

Q120: Then why is it that some individuals went to the Complex and some did not?
A: As I said before, I had joined the unit now for 13 years. We know that bond.

Q121: When you were inside, did you hear or see if anymore weapons were brought into Parliament?
A: I did not hear or see anymore weapons being brought in.

Q122: You mentioned that because of the number of sentries, you could not get any O-Groups or briefs, but before you went down to relieve the sentries, were you briefed by OC or told that by doing this you guys might get the support of the RFMF, or did you already have the support of the RFMF? Can you repeat the question?
A: OC told you to go down to Parliament and relieve the guards, did he tell you anything else?
A: He told me to relieve the guards.

Q124: You indicated earlier that your support came from 1FMS; you were talking to them about rations and all. 1FMS in Parliament or those up at the QEB?
A: (Silence)

Q125: To your knowledge, were you aware of any other support that came from anywhere else within the 1FMS?
A: No.

Q126: There was a mention of civilians being given weapons. You said that no civilians were given weapons.
A: I did not know, Sir.

Q127: You did not know if any civilians were given weapons?
A: No.

Q128: Were you involved in any VIP escorts within the Complex?
A: No.
Q129: Were any other individuals (Speight, Dukarau) assigned any weapons? Did you see any weapons on them?
A: No.

Q130: Corporal Tawake, the Board is done with you this morning. Should we require any more points of clarification we will recall you. In the meantime, what you need to do is to go back to your unit until we require you again. Do you wish to add anything further?
A: No, Sir.

Recalled on 12/09/00:

Cpl Tawake, after having been duly reminded of oath earlier taken, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q131: Dua na taro; o iko a lako e na training i Vanua Levu, o a tiko talega e na kena koya a caka mai Makuluva?
A: Sir.

Q132: Na gauna a deploy-taki kina na cycle training qo, tamata taucoko a kauta na nona M16; e donu oya?
A: Sir.

Q133: Na bogi ni Lotulevu, a kau eso na i yaragi era tawa tiko ena loma ni taga; e dina oya?
A: Sir.

Q134: Na i yaragi cava oya?
A: Pistol kei na MP5.

Q135: O cei a lai pick-taka?
A: O neitou training officer ena bogi, o Mr Dakuliga.

Q136: A lai pick-taki mai vei?
A: Sega ni macala, o keitou a tu ga yani i yanuyanu, o rau a lako mai vanua.
Q137: O kila nai naki ni yaragi? A cava a tukuni vei kemudou?
A: Tukuna o rau me vakayagataki e na ka e yaco e na May 19th.

Q138: O cei a solia na brief oya?
A: O rau ga rau a qai mai tukuna vei keitou.

Q139: O rau o cei?
A: Okoya vata kei Sgt Naika.

Q140: O Sgt Naika, Ratu vata kei Dakuliga eratou a lai pick-taka na ka oya?
A: Sir.

Q141: Raua na vica na kaloko oya?
A: Raua na 2000 hrs.

Q142: Vica na kaloko qai yaco tale i Makuluva na waqa?
A: Rauta ni oti e dua veimama na aua.

Q143: O kila e vica na pistol, e vica na MP5?
A: Au sa guilecava saka.

Q144: A tu e loma ni taga?
A: Sir.

Q145: A soli vei kemudou e dua na brief?
A: Segi.

Q146: Tawa sara na magazine?
A: Segi.

Q147: A tukuna o Dakuliga se o cei a solia na orders oya?
A: A tukuna okoya ni a solia na orders o Sgt Tikotani.

Q148: A solia na order mai vei, i na Unit?
A: Segi ni macala, e dua ga na vanua i wai.

Q149: I na Maritime?
A: Sir.
Q150: O cei a kauta mai na i yaragi mai na Unit mai cake?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q151: Na i yaragi ko ya a qai mai soli vei Dakuliga e na Maritime?
A: Tukuna ga oko ya ni o Sgt Tikotani.

Q152: Oti mai Nukulau, a caka na beach landing i vei?
A: Keitou pick-up e na Range.

Q153: Oti mai na Range, dou lesu cake tale i na Unit?
A: Keitou tu e kea, keitou sa sega ni duavata e na ka me caka, keitou sa vaqiriti iratou na neitou e na command level.

Q154: Dou qiri vei cei?
A: A sagai me tarai o Director, o Sgt Tikotani ni keitou sega ni duavata kei na ka e dodonu me yaco. E yaco tiko o ya me yacova sara na mataka lailai, lako yani na pick-up, we brought it back with us.

Q155: Na cava?
A: Keitou kauta lesu tale mai na i yaragi and everyone; suka lesu tale i na keba.

Q156: Mai na gauna o ya, na veimama ni walu ki na ciwa e na bogi, dou a tiko i vei; dou a tiko ga e wai se e na Range?
A: Keitou a tiko ga yani i wai, o rau ga e rau a lako mai ena dua na boto, rau suka lesu tale yani.

Q157: O cei a vodo waqa?
A: O Dakuliga kei Sgt Naika.

Q158: Oti o ya dou tikoga e kea - Makuluva?
A: Sir.

Q159: Me yacova na gauna cava?
A: Nodrau lesu tale yani, keitou sa qai lako mai, mai sobu o Dakuliga me saga me contact-taki iratou na command level.

Q160: Kena vo?
A: Kena vou keimami wawa tu ga i wai, kele ciri tu ga i wai.
Q161: Tawake, just reconfirming, from Makuluva you head to the landing just off Rewa Point, on the other side?
A: Sir.

Q162: From there then you came down to the landing on the Range?
A: Sir.

Q163: In between, at one point, did you leave the weapons that were brought over stored under-water?
A: No.

Q164: It was not cached anywhere?
A: No.

Q165: When you returned to camp, you started reconditioning your weapons from your stores; true?
A: Sir.

Q166: Where were the weapons which were taken to Makuluva?
A: We brought it back with us.

Q167: Did you take it back to the armoury?
A: We took it back to the armoury.

Q168: At that point in time in the morning, Friday, there were some weapons loaded into our blue pick-up truck in front of the Unit Complex; did you see that?
A: I only see that it was parked there.

Q169: Did you see who the driver was?
A: No, Sir.

Q170: Who were the Int Operatives who were in the Complex that morning?
A: As I said before, I went home.

Q171: But did you see the Int Operatives there in the Complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q172: Did you help in packing any weapons in the Unit?
A: No, Sir.
Q173: In Makuluva, all the senior NCOs and Mr Dakuliga had a discussion, is that true?
A: No, Sir.

Q174: One of the discussion was to take part in the events of May 19th, was there any other issues discussed?
A: No, Sir.

Q175: Was there any mention of who was going to lead the coup?
A: No, Sir.

Q176: Was there any mention of the involvement of RFMF?
A: We were asked to takeover in uniform, I do not know what was behind it.

Q177: Who asked you that?
A: When Mr Dakuliga briefed us - to be in uniform.

Q178: Na zava mada na vuna o qai lako sobu kina i na Complex e na siga Tusiti, o sega ni lako ena siga Vakaraubuka, siga Vakarauwai, Siga Tabu se siga Moniti?
A: Me vaka ni dua na macawa na neitou tu mai wai, au lai raici iratou na noqu matavuva, o au ga au sign-taka tiko na neitou bank account, na veika keitou bula kina e na veisiga.

Q179: Na nomu lako sobu e na siga Tusiti a sega ni tukuna vei kemudou nomudou OC e na gauna o ya, o Mr Baleinamau mo dou lako sobu dou lai reinforce i ra?
A: Moniti a mai vosa vei keitou o Commander. Tukuna oko ya, na ka sa yaco qo, vakitaui vei kemudou; dou livi, take part so stay in camp, tikoga vei iratou na 3FIR. O aq, na noqu nanumi iratou ga na taci keitou eratou sa tu i ra o ya, ko ya ga o ya sa kauri au sobu.

Q180: Na sogi ni Lotulevu mai Nukulau, na gauna dou sa vakaciriciri tiko kina i wai, dou sa qai gole i na ucuna ka dua mo dou lai vakasigasiga tu kina. Nomudou lai wawa ena siga o ya, a sega ni so na i yaragi a sobu i vanua i kea se bau dua e sobu?
A: Segia.

Q181: Segia ni dua e sobu?
A: Sir.

Q182: If Major Ligairi was not in the Parliament Complex, would you have gone to assist the IFMS there, if you had not seen Major Ligairi there?
A: Come again, Sir?
Q183: What I am asking you is, take for granted that Major Ligairi was not seen in the Parliament Complex; would you have gone to join the other IFMS personnel?
A: Sir.

Q184: You still would have?
A: Sir.

[ M. TAWAKE]
Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS] [A. MOHAMMED] [T. GUCAKE]
Lieutenant Colonel Major Member
President

[H. MACOMBER]
WO1 Member
SEVENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 28487 CPL Juluicake

Cpl Juluicake, after having been duly sworn on the Bible, hereby states:

Au a curu ena mataivalu ena 1991 me yacova saka tiko mai na gauna oqo.

Q1: Vakamacalataka mada na cava ko a vakaitavitaki iko tiko kina ni se bera na vuaviri.
A: Au tiko ga ena tabana ni draiva ni neitou lori ka levu na gauna ni dau leqa neitou lori au sa dau tu ga kina.

Q2: Ni se bera na vuaviri, ko a bau vakaitavi ena so na vuli vaka i valu?
A: E sega.

Q3: Ko a bau vakaitavi ena kena vakaraautaki na vuaviri?
A: Segas

Q4: A cava na nomu i tutu ena unit?
A: Au qarava ga na tabana ni lori.

Q5: Ko a vakaitavi ena i ka 19th ni siga?
A: Segas

Q6: Gauna cava ko a qai lako kina ena loma ni complex?
A: Ni oti e macawa dua.

Q7: E dua a tukuna vei iko mo lako e loma ni complex, ko a lako vakacava e loma?
A: Au a tiko ena march-in ni East Timor, ena gauna sa vakayacori kina na vuaviri sa tukuni me keimami sa duo march in tale ena neimami duo units. Au lesu ga mai na siga ya ka lako sara kina noqu unit. Tukuni vei au na ka sa yaco kei ira na sa tiko mai ra.

Q8: E dua e tukuna vei iko mo lako i ra se ko kauti iko ga?
A: Au kauti au saka ga.

Q9: Ena gauna ko sa tiko kina ena loma ni complex, ko bau veitaratara kei ira na tu e tuba se ena keba?
A: Au sega ni bau kila e dua na veitaratara.

Q10: O cei na nomu i liuliu ena complex?
A: O Baleinamau ga e a tiko kina.

Q11: O cei a nomu i liuliu ena Parliamentary Complex?
A: O Na Qase – Ligairi

Q12: Na cava na nomu i tavi ena loma ni complex?
A: Na nodratou security na hostage mai vei na lewe ni vanua. Au a body guard tale ga nei Na Qase.

Q13: Na cava sara mada na nomu cakacaka?
A: E a rerevaki ni ra tiko e loma na lewe ni vanua; e sega ni rawarawa na qaravi ira na civilians E levu na i rogorogo e levu na ka e yaco tiko e tautuba ka na vakavuna na nodratou via tarai ira. Kei na bula nei Na Qase ni ra dau sega ni duavata kei na so na ka e dau vakatulewa kina.

Q14: Vakamacalataka mada na organisation e loma ni complex?
A: Na ka ga e matata vei au na security.

Q15: Vakacava ko ira na lewe ni vanua; o cei e liutaki ira?

Q16: O cei e raica tiko na ka era vakayacora tiko na veiyasana e 14 oqo?
A: Au sega ni kila baleta au sega ni dau veimaliwi vata kei ira.

Q17: Ena nomu a tiko e loma ni complex, o a bau lako mai tuba ena dua na gauna?
A: Au a tu ga vakadua e loma, au sega ni bau curu e tuba.

Q18: Ko bau rogoca se raica e so na i yaragi e kau mai na keba ki na loma ni complex?
A: Sega

Q19: Did you have any weapons with you in the complex?
A: Yes.

Q20: What weapons did you have?
A: Pistol and MP5.

Q21: How many magazines did you have?
A: 4 mags.

Q22: What was your instructions as to the rules of engagement? On the use of arms, was the rule of engagement clear?
A: It was clear. From the briefing we had every morning, it was emphasised not to use arms. It was just there to frighten civilians.

Q23: When did you move out of the Parliamentary Complex?
A: After the arms were returned and the Fijian ceremony was done.

Q24: Where did you go when you moved out?
A: I went home.

Q25: Did you get in contact with other members of the unit after that?
A: Yes.

Q26: What was your form of communication?
A: By telephone.

Q27: Were you arrested?
A: Yes, at Kalabu.

Q28: Were you in the school or checkpoint?
A: Inside the school.

Q29: What were you doing at Kalabu?
A: I was not doing anything because there were only a few of us. We went there to do some Fijian ceremony of *qusi ni loaloa*. That is why I was there on Wednesday.

Q30: What was your role in 1MS prior to 19th May; what do you normally do?
A: Our main role was mainly on training.

Q31: In 3FIR there are certain appointments; in 1MS there are certain appointments – what was your appointment?
A: Our work involves all of us; we do everything.

Q32: There is a specific line of instruction; either you are in the Transport, OC, 2IC, member of a team?
A: Section 2IC.

Q33: Prior to May 19th, were you part of the training conducted in the Northern Division?
A: I went to Labasa but the aim of the training was for endurance training.

Q34: How long was the training for?
A: One week.
Q35: Did you take part in the training in Makuluva?
A: No, because that was when I was with the East Timor squad.

Q36: Weapons in the Parliamentary complex; what was the procedure of applying and returning weapons?
A: The weapon are personal issues. I am not aware that some of them had the weapons but I took my personal issue.

Q37: The weapon that you had, where was it issued from?
A: When I went to the complex it was there.

Q38: Who issued it to you?
A: It was issued by Bukasila who was at the complex.

Q39: Did you see George Speight and Bukaru carry weapons?
A: No.

Q40: Did you see any arms that did not belong to 1MS in the complex?
A: No.

Q41: Every morning you were briefed on what to do?
A: Yes.

Q42: On the civilians who had arms, information was given to them when you were inside?
A: I do not know which civilians were armed because I went in during the second week.

Q43: Why did you leave the draft training for East Timor you had marched-in?
A: Yes.

Q44: Did you complete the draft training?
A: It had not finished when the coup took place. We were told to return to our units.

Q45: When you were at the complex, did you see any military training done in there and who was involved?
A: The only training I saw was the march.

Q46: Your men were involved?
A: Yes.
Q47: No weapon training done?
A: I did not see it but some of us were mixing around with the civilians.

Q48: What made you join those other members in the Parliament?
A: I am a member of the unit and my mates were there. I went there to support them. There is a special bond within the unit. No one sent me, I went in because my unit was there.

Q49: Do you know that what was happening there was unlawful?
A: I do not know that but because my unit was there that is why I went in.

[ J. ULUICAKE]
Corporal

[ J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
WO1
Member
EIGHTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 23303 SGT V LOTAWA

Sgt Lotawa, after having been duly sworn on Bible hereby states:

I joined the Army in the early '80s at the Trade Training School, then I was transferred to IFIR the following year till the 1987 coup. I was with the 3FIR then I joined the CRW Unit in early 1996.

Q1: Sgt. Lotawa, the events of 19th May on the takeover of the Parliament Complex, can you explain to the Board your involvement in the events prior to the 19th of May, on the 19th of May and after the 19th of May until such time when you came back into QEB?
A: I was away on the 19th. I was back into the country on the 5th. I marched into camp straight after I got back from Australia. I was in camp mostly during the crisis then I was in Levuka till the 13th.

Q2: Did you, at any time, go into the Complex when you returned?
A: Once.

Q3: For what purpose?
A: It was approved by our CO 3 and Ops Officer, Mr. Tokorairuku to escort some members of the Unit. Keitou lai bose keitou lesu tale mai. A escort-taki keitou o Mr. Rokorairuku on that particular day, au sa guilecava na tiki ni siga.

Q4: O a gole i na Complex mo lai bose. Na bose cava o tukuna tiko qo o iko?
A: Au sega ni attend-taka na bose, na nodratou bose na neitou Operations. I was just driving. Au ya yo ki na Muanikau Checkpoint and Mr. Rokorairuku was there, sa qai dolava na Checkpoint, au sa qai drive-taki iratou na neitou. Sa oti na bose, we came back on the same route.

Q5: Dou lai bose i vei?
A: I na Parliament Complex.

Q6: Vata kei cei?
A: O iratou ga na Operations, o iratou na involve tiko e na loma ni Parliament. I was just driving, au a drive-taki iratou ga.

Q7: O cei o iratou na lewe ni bose oya e na nomudou lako i loma oya; o ratou o Capt. Rokorairuku?
A: Sega o koya e sega ni yaco sara ikeya. Okoya e escort-taki keitou ga yaco i Muanikau Checkpoint.
Q8: O cei soti e ra lewe ni bose o ya, koya e ra lai bose vata kei iratou i loma o ya?
A: Au a sega ni attend taka na bose. Keitou ga na lakof yani, o iratou ga na neitou keitou a tiko vata e na loma ni keba.

Q9: O rawa ni tukuna mai o cei so?
A: Sgt. POSCU, Sgt. Tuilawa sa tiko mai East Timor kei Cpl Buadromo.

Q10: Vakamatata taka - o a draivataki Sgt. Ben, Sgt. Tuilawa vata kei Cpl Buadromo i na Complex kei laki vakayacori i kea e dua na bose.
A: Na ka ga au rogoça ni tiko e dua na misunderstanding mai vei iratou na tiko e na Complex vata kei keitou na tiko e na keba, au sega ni taura rawa se cava sara, ia e rairai e dua na veicacati ka sa sega tiko ni keitou veitalanoa se dua na ka va o ya beka e yaco, mani caka na bose me ratou vakadodonutaka ka me kakua ni dua na ka e yaco. O koya beka ga o ya na vu ni bose.

Q11: O ya na i naki ni bose o ya?
A: O ratou laki kerea beka vei CO 3 ke rawa niu draivataki iratou.

Q12: Na i naki ni bose?
A: Au sega ni taura sara na kena matata.

Q13: Na gauna o tiko kina e na QEB, bau dua na gauna o veitaratara vata kei ira na tiko e loma ni Complex, mo talevoni se dua tale na gaunisala?
A: Sega.

Q14: O a tukuna ni o a gole i Levuka. Na cava o laki cakava i Levuka?
A: Baleta au lako ga i noqo koro mani yaco na veika e yaco mai Levuka, au sa veilewai tiko beka kina i tuba. Sa lai yaco na ka o ya i Levuka, levu na orders a soli vei au ka relate vata kei na political crisis e yaco tiko.

Q15: Dua na ka o se qai tukuna ga qo - e dua na order a soli vei iko mo laki vakayacori i kea; o cei a solia vei iko na order o ya?
A: E ratou a solia ga vei au o iratou na neitou Operations.

Q16: Satini Lotawa, o iko, sega ni o keitou na Board, a vosa bubului e na i Vola Tabu. Keitou dabe tiko na Turaga ni Valu qo, keitou vaqara tiko na i tukutuku me baleta na ka e vakayacori. E matata vinaka sara na i naki ni dabe tiko ni Board qo. E matata e levu na ka, ia na evidence e tiko e levu na ka e vakayacori. O iko sa i ka walu ni tamata me mai dabe i loma qo. E vica vata na i tukutuku baleta na ka e vakayacori sa matata, sa tiko eke.
Na nomu vosa bubului e na i Vola Tabu o iko na kilu na bibi ni vosa bubului e na i Vola Tabu se sega. Moa vakamatatataka, e na loma ni IMS e tiko na kena code of conduct, ka oka kina ni tabu ni ko dau talanoataka e dua na ka. E tiko qo e dua na pepa ka soli vei keitou na galala me keitou mai dabe me keitou vakatarogi kemudou baleta e dua ga na tamata e rawa ni tari-gi kemudou; nae liuliu ga ni Mataivalu baleta na ka e yaco, sa soli kina ki na Board qo na veivakadonui me rawa ni keitou dabe ka tari-gi iko e na so na ka. O iko o sa i ka walu ni tamata me mai soli i tukutuku. Na i wiliwili ni tamata e na mai dabe ike e rawa ni yacova na drou se vica vata na drou. E matata vei iko na ka e yaco. E matata sara ga. E rawa ni o muriia na gaunisala o via muriia mo kakua ni talanoataka e dua na ka se o talanoa vakadodonu baleta sa matata oti na ka e yaco. Dua na tare su na tari-gi iko kina. Ke sega ni dabe na Board qo, e dua tale e na dabe eke. Ke tou veisautaka, mataka e dua tale e dabe ike. E na dabe ga na Board.

Na ka e vakayacori e na i ka 19 ni siga, o vinakata se sega na veivaqaqai e na lako tikoga. Oqo e sa i ka 8 ni Board of Inquiry e dabe. E vica vata e dabe i tuba. Sa dua na cacakaka dredre. Ke da na dabe tiko vaqo, dua na ka dredre me da dabe da tari-gi tale e dua na sotia, vakabibi ni o keda vata ga, da buno vata, da tagi vata, daveta vata na dra mai Lepanoni kei Sinai, e matata sara ga oya, ia e must dua e cakava. E maroro i kina na Mataivalu, na vanua vata kei na kawa tamata. Ni yalovinaka, kakua ni vakadredretaka na cacakaka qo. Dua na tare; o cei e solia na order mo lako i Levuka?

A: O iratou na tiko e na Operations.

Q17: Na Operations mai cake qo se mai na Complex?
A: Mai na Complex.

Q18: O sa vosa bubului oti e na i Vola Tabu, right now you have just contradicted yourself. E nae matai ni nodatou veita-lanoa o kaya ni ko sega ni veita-rata o iko lako ga. Raica na liga qo, qo na liga ni tamata, e sega sara ni dua na kaukauwa e tiko ike, na liga ni Kalou o vosa bubului kina, vakatau sara ga vei iko. O cei a solia vei iko na order mai na Complex?
A: O Major Ligairi, Sergeant Major Waqa-aniboro vata kei na so tale eratou qai mai advise tiko yani.

Q19: Ke o rawa ni vakamatatataka o cei na nomu i liuliu e na Parliament Complex, o Major Ligairi; sa matata o ya o ira na kena vo e ra soli advise tiko ga vei iko e na nomu tiko mai loma; donu?
A: Io.
Q20: O Waqaniboro, o oei tale?
A: (Silence)

Q21: Dua na taro, sa i ka vica ni yabaki na nomu tiko e na CRW, IMS?
A: Four and a half years. Au recall-taka ga ni levu ga na gauna e advise tiko yani o rau o Major Ligairi vata kei Waqaniboro. E rau qai dau qiriti au tikoga e na talevoni, rau taroga tikoga yani na cava e yaco tiko.

Q22: Ka lima ni siga au lesu mai Australia - e dina?
A: Io saka.

Q23: O yani na siga Moniti. Na siga cava o qai lako mo lai report yani ki na keba - siga Moniti vata tiko ga oya, se siga Tusiti?
A: Au sega ni taura vinaka saka tiko, au kila na Friday beka keitou sobu mai kina, na i ka 5 ni siga - na date au sega i taura rawa tiko na kena matara but the following Monday, au a report-in kina i na keba.

Q24: O sa qai kauri iratou na i lala oya me ratou lai bose. Bau dua tale na gauna o curu kina e loma ni Complex?
A: Sega, levu ga na gauna au pasi va oya, au kila ni levu na checkpoint e ra dau report-taki au baleta niu tikoga e Naese. Levu na gauna au mai vakatarogi kina e na keba.

Q25: Bau dua tale na gauna o curu kina e loma ni Complex?
A: Sega.

Q26: E na gauna o tiko kina ena keba, o iko se dua e loma ni Unit e vakaitavi e na kena kau kina e so tale na i yaragi e loma ni Complex, se sega?
A: Au sega ni kila.

Q27: Na gauna e yaco tiko kina na veika kece qo, o bau kila tale e dua, o iko drau veitaratara vata kei dua tale se o rogoca se o kila, e dua tale e loma ni mataivalu e vakaitavi e na ka kece e vakayacori tiko?
A: Sega.

Q28: Au na sega ni gadreva mo talanoataka na ka e yaco mai Levuka, e matata vei iko, sa caka tiko na ena veilewai. E sega ni dau rogoci vakadua e dua na kisi. O se qai talanoataka oti ni gauna o tiko kina mai Levuka, veita talanoa tiko vata kei iko o Na Qase kei Waqaniboro. Na gauna o tiko kina i ke ni bera ni o deploy i Levuka, bau dua na order e lako mai vei Na Qase se ko Waqaniboro se dua mai na Complex me dua na ka mo cakava e na keba, se dua na vanua i Suva, se sega?
A: Sega.

Q29: Are you aware of the incident where the police officer got shot in the Complex?
A: No, I was not aware of that till later.

Q30: Where were you then?
A: I was at home that night.

Q31: Do you know who shot the policeman?
A: No, Sir.

Q32: You attended the funeral, did you not?
A: Yes, we are related.

Q33: What was your reaction to the shooting?
A: (Silence)

Q34: How did you feel?
A: Because he was related to me, you can imagine how I feel.

Q35: What was your instruction when you went to Levuka?
A: (Silence)

Q36: What you say in this Board is privilege. It does not incriminate you in any way. What you say here cannot be used in court, you have to be mindful of that. It is not like the civil police, go and make a statement and it is used in court, and you have already been charged on that. What we want is, I am not going to dwell on that. What we want is, what instruction did you get from the Complex, what you were to do in Levuka?

A: Na instructions, Sir, e na gain-taki na support vei ira sa tu vei ira na vakasama vakapolitiki ni crisis sa yaco tiko, me keitou qai vakayagataka me keitou support-taka na political crisis e yaco tiko qo i Parliament. Na vanua e kilai ni rawa ni support-taki kina na kena rawa ni hold-taki na PAFCO. That was the instruction.

Q37: Which village do you come from?
A: Lovoni.

Q38: Did any other personnel from IMS accompany you to Levuka?
A: Yes, two came after Monday.
Q39: Who are they?
A: Cpl Rere and Sgt Cakau.

Q40: What was it that they were to do there?
A: They told me that they were sent from Parliament to support me.

Q41: How did you travel to Levuka?
A: I went by the normal ferry - Patterson Brothers Shipping Services.

Q42: Did you take any arms or ammunitions with you?
A: No, I did not take any weapons with me.

Q43: Was any arms and ammunitions brought over to Levuka?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q44: Who brought it over?
A: Those two who came to support me in there were sent from Parliament.

Q45: What did they bring with them?
A: Two pistols and two rifles.

Q46: Do you have the details of these weapons?
A: Yes, when they came, I took the serial nos.

Q47: Can you read the serial nos. to us?
A: Serial Nos. of the pistols - 315327 and 315316.

Q48: What made are they?
A: Browning.

Q49: Were there any rifles brought across?
A: Yes - M16s; Serial Nos. 8002652; 8207121.

Q50: Were any other weapons brought over?
A: No.

Q51: How many ammunitions did you have?
A: Two magazines each.

Q52: Two magazines per pistol?
A: 2 x M16 and 2 x pistol.

Q53: Full mags?
A: Yes.

Q54: What happened to these weapons after you returned?
A: They were brought in back to the Complex.

Q55: Which Complex?
A: To our Headquarters.

Q56: The takeover of the PAFCO; were there some other personnel that joined you there? You said there were 3; you and 2 others... Were there any other people that supported you there?
A: The people from the Tikina.

Q57: Which Tikina?
A: The Tikina of Lovoni.

Q58: Was there any police officer with you?
A: They came to the main gate after Monday, Tuesday, then they went back.

Q59: To do what?
A: I think to join us but I saw them, they were in uniform.

Q60: The weapons that were stored in the Unit at QEB, what was the security arrangements of those weapons? From the time you arrived, what did you observe as to the security arrangements of the weapons?
A: It was safe under normal security arrangements. But there were only a few weapons there. I saw one SLR, 60 milimetre mortar.

Q61: When did you leave Australia?
A: Early May.

Q62: Were you involved in the exercise in Vanua Levu?
A: No.

Q63: Were you aware of that exercise?
A: Yes.

Q64: What was your appointment prior to May 19th?
A: Platoon Sergeant.

Q65: You had indicated earlier that the weapons that were taken to Levuka are now in QEB. When was it brought in to the Camp and given to who?
A: It was returned to our Complex soon after we came back from Levuka, most probably on the 21st, 22nd.

Q66: Who were the weapons returned to?
A: To the Complex, Sir, weapons were returned by Sgt. Cakau on that day. He went up and returned it to the Complex.

Q67: In QEB?
A: Yes.

Q68: What sort of equipment did you use for communication purposes; did you use any equipment for communication purposes?
A: Telephones.

Q69: Normal telephones or mobile phones?
A: Normal telephones.

Q70: What number were you calling? Who was calling who? You were calling the Complex or what?
A: They called me through No. 308424.

Q71: That was the number you were to call?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q72: What number were you on?
A: I was at the PAFCO’s main line, it was 440055.

Q73: You said you drove Buadromo and some others, which vehicle did you use?
A: The Unit vehicle, Sir -BV 917.

Q74: Did you get a clearance from Operations before you left the Camp?
A: Yes, before we left.

Q75: Your going to Levuka was it within your scope of duties from the Meridian Squadron? Was it part of your duties?
A: (Silence)

Q76: Before you left for Levuka, most of your CRW personnel were occupying the Parliament Complex. Did you know that what they were doing was illegal?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q77: Knowing that, why did you continue to take instructions from Major Ligairi?
A: Sir, me vaka ni ratou sa involve tiko kina na noqu Unit, e na sega ni rairai vinaka me ra vala tiko beka o ira na noqu comrades, o koya beka oya na vuna au sa mani rairai involve-taki au kina ena ka e yaco.

Q78: Does your loyalty extend to do an illegal act?
A: I cannot answer that, Sir.

Q79: My next question is very much direct. In the Meridian Squadron Unit, there are a lot of individuals who did not take part. How do you explain their stance when it comes to loyalty?
A: (Silence)

Q80: You were arrested, were you not, Sgt. Lotawa?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q81: Did they give you a reason for your arrest?
A: That week, we were supposed to march into camp, we came were sent back home. They said to come back on Friday morning. So we all went back home, then I was arrested on Thursday night. When they came to pick me, they said, "HQ wants you to come up." So I came and they sent me to the cell.

Q82: Where were you arrested?
A: At home.

Q83: Were you subsequently given a reason for your arrest?
A: No, Sir.

Q84: Were you receiving normal pay during the period of your arrest?
A: No.

Q85: Have you been compensated for that pay?
A: No, nothing.

Q86: Lotawa, e na gauna qo, o iko veisaumi tiko e na Mataivalu?
A: Sega, noqu qai lako ga mai qo sa qai tukuni mai tuba ni dua vei keitou sa lai rai i na baqe, sa rairai qai tekivu veisaumi tale - sa qai ni kua sara beka ga, au se bera ni check-taka.

Q87: Bau tukuni vei iko na vuna o sega ni veisaumi tu kina?
A: Sega, au sega talega ni se vakataroga.
Q88: A cava na dede ni gauna o vesu tu kina?
A: 15 days.

Q89: Did they tell you why they arrested you, whether you were going to be charged with something?
A: After the police came, they came and questioned me, then they said that I was being charged soon after their investigations.

Q90: Lotawa, otioti ni noqu taro vei iko; o iko bau kila se ratou lewe vica, se o cei soti e vakaitavi sara ga e na i matai ni gauna e ratou vesu kina na hostage i Parliament?
A: Au rogo i talanoataka ga ni ratou lewe ono se vitu se walu, ia e na loma mada ga ni Unit au saga meu kila, e sega ni dua e matata vei au meu kila ni vakaitavi. Dua ga au raica e na i taba au rawa ni identify-taki koya, o Ravai baleta ni sa qai lako tiko mai nai talanoa ni o koya a dua. Ia na veitalanoa ga o ya, au sega ni taura rawa o cei tale.

Q91: This is concerning the arms that are not accounted for. Do you know of any weapon that was taken out of your Unit after you returned?
No Sir, the only weapon I took note of was this one. When I came back and saw the instruction of the missing weapons, I confirmed that the weapons with these serial numbers have been returned.
Cpl Kolikoli, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: What you need to do is to give us a brief outline of your background with the military service. When you joined, your overseas appointment and when you joined 1FMS.
A: I was recruited in 1989. I went to Sinai. I joined the 1FMS in 1991 until now.

Q2: Cpl. Kolikoli, the events leading up to the 19th of May, were you involved in any activities before 19th of May within the Unit?
A: What type of activities?

Q3: Whether it is the planning of activities or training for the 19th of May.
A: No.

Q4: Where were you that time?
A: I was with the East Timor operations.

Q5: Were you aware of the planning that was done before the 19th of May or the events of 19th of May?
A: No.

Q6: Can you explain the events after the 19th of May and your involvement in the events at the Parliament Complex?
A: I was in the jungle. After 1 week we came back and were told to return to our Unit. We went back to the Unit and our OC told us to go to Parliament.

Q7: Who was your OC?
A: Mr. Baleinamau.

Q8: What was the directive given?
A: He just told us to go to Parliament.

Q9: Can you recall the date that you went down to Parliament?
A: After 1 week.

Q10: Can you give us a brief outline of your activities of what happened in Parliament?
A: I cannot recall but we were tasked with the duties in the complex.
Q11: Who is the person in command, your immediate Commander or superior Commander in the complex?
A: Mr. Raval.

Q12: Who was your overall Commander in the complex?
A: It was Na Qase.

Q13: During your stint in the Parliament Complex, did you or any other members leave the Parliament Complex at any time?
A: While in Parliament?

Q14: Did you or anyone that you are aware of in contact with anyone within the IFMS still based at QEB?
A: I do not know.

Q15: Are you aware of anyone within the RFMF that were involved with those that were in the Parliament Complex?
A: Col. Tarakinikini.

Q16: Can you give us a brief outline on his involvement?
A: I saw him many times when he visited Parliament.

Q17: The reasons?
A: I do not know.

Q18: Was there anyone else within the military that was in contact with you and those in the Parliament Complex whether on talking terms or through fax, letters etc. You indicated here - Col. Tarakinikini. Most of the time I was tasked to do duties.
A:

Q19: From the time you joined those in the complex until the time they vacated the complex, did you at any time leave the complex?
A: No.

Q20: Did you at any time whilst in the complex or before you went in the complex aware of any weapons taken out of the CRW or the IFMS from QEB into the complex?
A: No.

Q21: The weapons in the complex. Are you aware or are you involved in any of the weapons taken outside the complex or any reason whatsoever?
A: No.
Q22: When did you come back into QEB?
A: The afternoon after the incident at Kalabu.

Q23: You were in Kalabu?
A: I was not there that morning.

Q24: After 30th July when they vacated the Parliament Complex, where did you go?
A: I went back home.

Q25: Explain the time you came in.
A: After the 13th of July I went home and was told by Mr. Stevens that we should be at QEB on Thursday 20th. They changed the date again and I went in to camp on Friday the following week.

Q26: When did you come back to QEB?
A: On Monday.

Q27: You returned to 1FMS?
A: Yes.

Q28: What date was this?
A: After the storming on Thursday at Kalabu, the following Monday.

Q29: Where do you live?
A: At Raiwaqa.

Q30: What is your level of education?
A: Form 5.

Q31: Did you pass?
A: Yes.

Q32: Did you do Form 6?
A: I went to FIT.

Q33: When you reported for duties at the Parliament Complex, who briefed you?
A: Mr Ravai.

Q34: Were you issued with arms and ammunition?
A: Yes.
Q35: What weapons were issued to you?
A: MP5.

Q36: You were given ammunition?
A: Yes.

Q37: How many rounds?
A: 4 Mags.

Q38: What was your instructions if you are fired at?
A: Warning shots.

Q39: If they continue to fire?
A: Continue warning shots.

Q40: If they fail to stop?
A: Shoot from the waist down.

Q41: What if you were fired at?
A: Run up to the complex.

Q42: Would you fire in return?
A: I would return fire.

Q43: The weapon that was issued to you, was it the same weapon issued to you at the QEB?
A: No.

Q44: Where were you housed in the Parliament Complex?
A: On the first building.

Q45: Were the civilians housed on the same area?
A: On the other side.

Q46: Were you accommodating only military personnel there?
A: Yes.

Q47: Am I correct in saying that the members of your unit are housed in that area?
A: Yes.

Q48: What were the arrangements for ration?
A: We do not know about meals because we had food supplied from inside.
Q49. How did you get your food?
A: From the supporters.

Q50. So you went there and got your meals?
A: Yes.

Q51. When you left the complex on 13th July, did you at any time go to the Kalabu school where other members were camping?
A: No.

Q52. You did not go there at all?
A: Yes.

Q53. Were you in contact with any other members of the Unit after the 13th.
A: Yes.

Q54. What was the form of contact?
A: By phone.

Q55. What was the weapon issued to you, was it a personal issue in the complex or was it returned back after duty?
A: Returned back.

Q56. Who was responsible for the accounting of the weapons?
A: Mr. Ravai.

Q57. Was anyone else present when Mr. Ravai was not there?
A: Mr. Ravai was there all the time.

Q58. Were you briefed as to the role IFMS had while they were there in the complex?
A: No.

Q59. Do you know why they were there?
A: Yes.

Q60. Can you explain why?
A: Because of the cause.

Q61. What was the cause, can you explain?
A: It was not explained to me but from my own knowledge I was there because of the cause.
Q62: Could I be correct in saying you were there because the rest of the Unit was there?
A: Yes.

Q63: Were you or any member of the IFMS promised any financial reward or promised any finance for services rendered?
A: No, Sir.

Q64: Did you continue to receive your pay whilst in the complex?
A: Yes.

Q65: And continue to do so until today?
A: Yes.

Q66: Did you know what happened after you left the complex?
A: I was told to return to the QEB.

Q67: Were you at any time asked to go down to the complex or did you go in your own accord?
A: In my own accord.

Q68: Also the activities within the complex, were you pressured to do your duty or you did it in your own accord?
A: At my own accord.

Q69: Whilst in the complex, did you mix with the civilians?
A: Yes.

Q70: Did you come to know of them?
A: Yes.

Q71: Were you there when the police officer got shot in the complex?
A: I was inside the complex.

Q72: Did you know who shot the police officer?
A: No.

Q73: Did you hear of any rumours or stories of what transpired?
A: No.
Q74: Cpl Kolikoli, you told us that OC told you to go to the Parliament Complex and join the rest of the Unit. Was there any disagreement between any of the members of the unit?
A: What kind of disagreement?

Q75: Did OC instruct you to go and join the rest of the Unit?
A: No.

Q76: You said that Col. Taranikini visited the complex a couple of times.
A: Yes.

Q77: Did you see whom he spoke to?
A: I do not know.

Q78: Did he go to the Director or the civilians?
A: I do not know.

Q79: When you saw Col. Taranikini, where were you at that time?
A: Main gate.

Q80: The one at Vuya Road or the other one.
A: Vuya Road.

Q81: Was Col. Taranikini alone or accompanied by any other military personnel?
A: I just saw him alone.

Q82: Did you see any other member of the RFMF go into the complex?
A: No.

Q83: You were not part of a group and not part of RFMF personnel in the complex?
A: No.

Recalled on 12/09/00:

Pte Kolikoli, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q84: Vakamacalataka; o tiko e vei e na macawa ni vuaviri?
A: Keitou a march-in tiko; keitou a meca tiko vei iratou na Officer Cadet ni Mataivalu ni Niusiladi mai Savu.
Q85: Lesu mai o ya, o sa rogoca na i tukutuku ni vuaviri, o vakamacalataka talega o iko ni a tukuna o OC Baleinamau mo gole sobu ki na Palimedi ni sa oti e dua na macawa. Nomu dau yadra tiko mai na Parliament Complex, o yadra tiko i vei; i matamata se e na perimeter?
A: Au dau yadra saka tiko e na perimeter.

Q86: O iko a rogoca na directive koya a solia o Major Ligairi ena kena suka na i yaragi, o ratcu ga na body-guards me ratou maroroya na nodratou pistol?
A: Sega saka.

Q87: A soli vei iko nomu MP5 mai kea, bau dua na i yaragi se magazine e tiko vei iko e na gauna qo se o cache-taka tiko?
A: Sega saka.

[ S. KOLIKOLI]
Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class I
Member
TENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 29426 PTE U SAUKURU

Pte Saukuru, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Private Saukuru, just give us a brief outline of your service within the RFMF until May this year.
A: I was recruited in 1994 and stayed as a reservist. I entered the unit last year, 1999.

Q2: Prior to the events of 19th May, what was your involvement in the 1FMS? What were you doing in the unit?
A: I was at home that day and I heard on the news that the unit was involved.

Q3: That was on the 19th of May?
A: Yes.

Q4: Prior to the 19th of May, what was your involvement? Can you clarify what prior means?
A: Before the 19th of May, you were in the unit?
A: Yes.

Q5: What were you doing in the unit well before this? When did you join the unit?
A: In 1999.

Q6: What month?
A: 1st of July.

Q7: You are just roughly under a year?
A: Yes. I had just gone through selection.

Q8: You went through the selection initially. After selection, what were your duties in the unit?
A: I was doing normal guard duties in the afternoon.

Q9: What was your appointment in the unit?
A: Trooper.

Q10: Trooper in a team?
A: Yes.
Q12: Are you aware or involved in any of the planning stages of the take-over of the Parliament Complex? Just give us a brief outline of when you were made aware of the take-over at Parliament?
A: I heard that the unit was committed that afternoon so I just went inside because my unit was inside. We have a bond and are committed so I went in that afternoon.

Q13: Did someone give you the directive to go into the Complex or did you go in on your own accord?
A: I just went in on my own.

Q14: Who was your superior in the Complex? Who gave you the commands or orders?
A: I received my orders from our SSM, Mr. Raviai.

Q15: Who was the overall Commander of the 1FMS within the Complex?
A: It was the Director, Mr. Ligairi.

Q16: On your involvement in the Parliament Complex, what were your duties inside?
A: I mainly performed guard sentry duties.

Q17: Guard sentry for what?
A: I was mostly involved in guarding the gate and the security of the hostages.

Q18: Within the Complex?
A: Yes.

Q19: Were you involved in any other activities outside the Complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q20: Were you involved or aware of any contacts made by those of you inside the Complex with those 1FMS that remained in QEB?
A: No, I have no knowledge of that.

Q21: Were you aware or involved in contacts with other members of the RFMF?
A: No.

Q22: On the 13th of July, the Complex was vacated. Can you give us a brief description of what happened after that?
A: On the 13th of July, I left the Complex soon after the Accord was signed.
Q23: Where did you go?
A: I went straight home.

Q24: How long did you stay at home? From home, what brought you back into camp?
A: We were told that we were to march in again to camp and that the Commander had to talk to us.

Q25: Private Saukuru, did you continue receiving your pay whilst you were in Parliament?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q26: After the 15th of July, were you arrested by military personnel and locked up?
A: No.

Q27: Were you arrested at any time and locked up?
A: No.

Q28: Did you have any tour of duty to the Middle East?
A: Just one.

Q29: To?
A: Sinai.

Q30: Which year was that?

Q31: What is your level of education?
A: I reached Form 6 level.

Q32: In earlier questions, you said the responsibilities in the Complex were sentry duties and security of the hostages. This question is directed to the security of the hostages. From whom were you securing the hostages?
A: We were mainly worried about the life of the hostages from the civilians inside the Complex.

Q33: Were you armed in the Complex?
A: Yes.

Q34: What weapon did you have?
A: One MP-5.
Q35: How much ammunition did you have?
A: Two full magazines.

Q36: Did you have any side arms?
A: No.

Q37: Pistols?
A: No.

Q38: What were your rules of engagement?
A: I had to fire two warning shots and if the retaliation is still strong, then I had to shoot, but not shoot-to-kill. I had to shoot the leg or thigh just to slow the movement of the enemy.

Q39: Did you, at any time, fire your weapon?
A: No.

Q40: Where were you on the day the police officer got shot?
A: In the Complex?

Q41: There was a policeman that got shot outside the gate?
A: I was inside Parliament.

Q42: Do you know who fired that shot?
A: No.

Q43: The weapons that were issued in the Complex, were there any civilians carrying arms?
A: I do not know.

Q44: What was the arrangement of the weapons in the Complex? Was there anyone issuing or accepting weapons other than Mr. Ravai?
A: No.

Q45: The weapons issued to you, was it your personal weapon that was allocated to you in the 1FMS unit?
A: No.

Q46: Were you given the same weapon when you went back on duty?
A: Sometimes because people just came and took the weapons. At one stage, no, but most of the time I had that weapon back.
Q47: Was there any O-Group conducted in the Complex?
A: Our O-Group?

Q48: Did you have any O-Groups done in the Complex?
A: Yes.

Q49: Was it done daily?
A: Yes.

Q50: Who used to conduct these O-Groups?
A: Mr. Ravai.

Q51: Were you, at any time, called of the purpose of the 1FMS in the Parliament Complex while they were there?
A: I was just told that I was there to conduct security inside the Complex.

Q52: What was the reason for you to enter Parliament and join the other members of the 1FMS?
A: I just saw that the unit was committed so I went in.

Q53: Are you aware of the training that was conducted in Vanua Levu?
A: Yes.

Q54: Did you take part in that training?
A: Yes.

Q55: What did the training encompass? What did it involve?
A: The training was the final exercise. That was the end of our training cycle. We had to combine jungle and amphibious exercise so we just went there to conduct our amphibious. We started from the sea, went inland for jungle training and then returned to the sea.

Q56: Which team did you belong to in the 1FMS?
A: Jungle group.

Q57: Who is your team leader?
A: My team commander?

Q58: Yes.
A: Overall or troop?

Q59: Troop.
A: Corporal Tawake.
Q60: Were you at the training conducted at Makuluva?
A: Yes.

Q61: What time did that training finish in Makuluva?
A: It was in the morning, but I do not recall the date.

Q62: The morning of the day of the take-over at Parliament?
A: I do not think so. It was not the morning of the day of take-over.

Q63: On the morning before the day of the take-over?
A: It was two days before the take-over.

Q64: Are you aware of any weapon being taken out of the Parliamentary Complex after the 13th of July?
A: No.

Q65: Who was responsible for accounting for all the weapons in the Complex?
A: Just Mr. Ravai.

Q66: You said “sentry duty at the gate”. What were you doing? Were you physically checking for people taking weapons or bringing weapons inside?
A: Yes.

Q67: You were doing that?
A: Yes.

Q68: Was there any register kept to take account of these things?
A: No, we were just physically checking.

Q69: Whilst on duty, did you encounter any persons attempting to take weapons outside?
A: No.

Q70: Are you aware of any weapons being brought into the Complex after you had entered the Complex?
A: No. I have no knowledge.

Q71: You said you left the Complex on the 13th of July and went home, how did you leave for home? What form of transportation did you take?
A: I just went by taxi.
Q72: Did you, at any time, visit the personnel that assembled at Kalabu?
A: Yes.

Q73: You did?
A: Yes.

Q74: How many visits did you make?
A: I just made the visit on Wednesday and Thursday morning they were stormed.

Q75: Where do you live?
A: Kinoya.

Q76: Were you told what would happen after you moved out of Parliament?
A: No.

Q77: You mentioned that after the events on May 13th, you were told to report to QEB because the Commander RFMF wanted to speak to you?
A: Yes.

Q78: Did he actually speak to you?
A: He did not turn up.

Q79: And were you informed of the reasons why he did not turn up?
A: No.

Q80: While on guard duty in front of the Parliamentary Complex, did you come across any RFMF personnel coming into the Complex (RFMF personnel that were allegedly not involved with your lot)?
A: I just saw Col. Tarakinikini once.

Q81: Was he in uniform or civilian clothes?
A: He was in uniform.

Q82: Private Saukuru, during your sentry at the gates, were there orders given for cars to be hijacked at the gates?
A: No.

Q83: Were you present at any time at the gates when cars were hijacked at the gates of Parliament?
A: No.

Q84: You were not given any orders to hijack cars?
A: No.

Q85: Private Saukururu, do you have anything further to say?
A: No.

Q86: Were you, at any time, promised any financial benefits or rewards for your services in the Complex at any time at all?
A: No.

Recalled on 8/9/06:

Pte Saukururu, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q87: Pte Saukururu, rawa ni o talanoataka tale mada vei keitou na gauna cava o dou biubiu kina mo dou lai amphibious exercise i Makuluva, siga cava dou lako kina, yaragi cava dou kauta - tekitu mai na nomoudou lai exercise, lesu mai me yacova sara na gauna o curu kina ki na Palimedi?
A: Au sa sega ni vakasamataka saka na siga kei na tiki ni siga. Au vakasamataka rawa ga na neitou a biubiu me keitou lako e na “sea survival exercise” i Makuluva. Na exercise qo e da lako ga i waitui, sega ni kau e dua na kakan. Au a tukuna saka ni vo tu e rua na siga, au a taurimate saka o au. Na sagaqu kecskece qo a blister. Au a biubiu rawa mai o au ni se bera ni call-off na exercise. Na dakai ga au kauta mai o au na noqu personal weapon, M16.

Q88: E na gauna o lako mai kina o iko, o cabe mai vei, o pick-up mai vei?
A: Au lako ga mai e na vanua ni Resup-taki ni yaya ni comms. mai na Maritime.

Q89: Na vanua e kele mai kina mai na Maritime, o cei e tavaki iko tu ike?
A: O neitou storeman, o Corporal Gaunavinaka vata kei neitou draiva.

Q90: O cei nomoudou draiva?
A: O Vakadranu.

Q91: Oya e na siga Vukelulu?
A: Au sa guilecava saka na siga kei na tiki ni siga, ia au vakasamataka ga niu a liu mai o au, o au saka au a mavoa.

Q92: Na gauna o liu mai kina o ya o iko, e sa tu evei na nomoudou dinghy?
A: A sa tu saka ga mai yanuyanyu baleta ni a se bera ni oti na exercise au sa lako mai. A lako saka ga mai e dua na dingy koya a lako mai me mai kauta na batiri ni comms. baleta ni a re-supply tiko na batiri ni comms. Na cici saka mai na admin. run oya au a vodo saka mai kina.
Q93: O sobu oya o lako sara ivey?
A: Au sa lako saka ga mai oya, au sa vakadua sara i vale. Au sa davo tiko mai vale au sa qai rogoca ni sa caka na vuaviri koya au sa qai gole mai kina e na yakavi.

Q94: Yakavi ni siga?
A: Yakavi ni siga koya e caka kina na vuaviri.

Q95: Nomu yaco mai e na nomudou Unit, talanoataka mada na veika a yacova sara na gauna o gole sobu kina?
A: Au a direct saka ga mai vale, au gole sara i na Palimedi.

Q96: Rauta na vica na kaloko o sa yaco i na Palimedi?
A: Au sa sega ni vakasamataka rawa, viavia lima ki na ono na kaloko e na yakavi.

Q97: Dua na i tukutuku keitou taura ni o iko a dua vei ira na i matai ni lako sobu i Palimedi - e rawa ni o vakadninataka oya?
A: Sega saka, baleta o au a gole saka ga mai vale, au lako saka mai oya.

Q98: Vica na kaloko o biubiu mai vale, Saukuru?
A: Au sega ni vakateditaka na gauna, au kila ga ni sa viavia 5.00 tiko se 6.00 na kaloko ena yakavi, o ya au vakadeditaka.

Q99: O qai lai kauta mai vakacava na nomu dakai mai na loma ni Palimedi?
A: Au curu yani i loma, ratou sa tu kina e vica na noqui tokani.

Q100: O lai tomika mai vei na nomu dakai? (Map shown to witness) E na loma ni Complex, vanua cava e lai issue kina vei iko na nomu dakai?
A: I ke saka (indicating), Int. Room.

Q101: O cei a solia vei iko na nomu dakai?
A: Rava.

Q102: Saukuru, sa oti na ka kece qo, bau dua na gauna o a vesu, o lai tu e na cell mai cake?
A: Na gauna saka ga a caka kina na storm mai Kalabu au a vesu kina.

Q103: O iko a vesu mai Kalabu?
A: Sir.

Q104: Na gauna o vesu tiko kina oya, drau bau veitalanoa kei Tuivanuvou?
A: Segs saka.
Q105: A sega ni dua na gauna a tu ga mai tuba o Mr Tuivamuavou, qai vosa tiko mai vei iko mai na katuba leka?
A: Dua ga na gauna a vayadr a mai kina, au lako sara mai keirau mai veitalanoa sara.

Q106: Rawa ni o talanoataka mada ki na Board se cava drau veitalanoataka?
A: Lako saka ga mai o koya mai taroga, "Sa vakacava tiko?" Keitou tukuna, "Keitou se vesu tu ga qo."

Q107: Sega ni tukuna o koya vei iko e dua na ka e baleta na i yaragi; me kakua ni tukuni e dua na ka e baleta na i yaragi?
A: Sega saka.

Q108: Na gauna sa issue kina vei iko na nomu MP5, ena bogi oya o a yadra i vei, o yadra e na perimeter se o yadra e na passage way, se i matamata?
A: Au biu saka i ra vei iratou na kaidia.

Q109: Nomu tiko ikeea ena bogi ni Vakaraubuka, o bau rogoa e dua na veitalanoa ni sa vakarau kaba yani na mataivalu?
A: Au sega ni vakadeitaka saka ni matai ni siga baleta ni sa via oti tokae ruva se tolu na siga au sa qai rogoa ni sa vakarau kaba tiko yani na Mataivalu.

Q110: Na cava sa qai tukuni mo dou vakayacora?
A: Na gauna saka oya sa tukuni saka vei au meu tiko saka ga e loma, me keitou guard saka tiko ga tiko vakavakarau.

Q111: The day your admin. came to Makuluva; who was in that boat?
A: Trooper Nawaqa was there

Q112: Getting back to the Parliament Complex, you said you were issued with weapons; what weapons did you carry - MP5, did you carry any other weapons in there?
A: To my knowledge, I just carried the MP5.

Q113: Were you issued with any other weapons other than the MP5?
A: No, Sir.

Q114: Are you sure?
A: I am sure, Sir.

Q115: The reason why I asked you that is because I have a register here which shows all the weapons that were issued in Parliament. It has got the signatures, names, type of weapon, butt number, and it even shows here that you were issued with colts and all those weapons, grenade launcher, M203?
A: No, I just carried the MP5.
Q116: Saukuru, vakadeitaka mada, e na veigauna taucoko dou dau lesu mai kina e na sea survival, dou dau cabe tikoga mai na Maritime, sega tale ni dua na vanua?
A: Sir.

Q117: Ni dou dau lako i wai, dou dau biubiu mai vei?
A: Keitou dau biubiu saka ga mai e na Maritime. Keitou biubiu ga ike a keitou lako, keitou lesu mai keitou na mai cabe talega i na Maritime.

Q118: O sa dede i kea, o cei soti o raica vei iratou na snipers ni coba tiko nodratou scope?
A: Sir, na gauna saka au tiko kina ike a, au sega ni vakasamataka ni dua na neitou sniper a tiko ike a, koya me vaka scope tiko.

Q119: E na loma ni Parliament?
A: Sir, baleta o au, na vanua au yadra tiko kina, keitou vaka MP5 kece ga, e sega ni dua au raica me vaka scope.

Q120: When you went for the exercise in Makuluva, did you have a briefing before you went?
A: Sir, the only briefing given to us was that we were going for a sea survival exercise, and we all knew what we would face in that exercise where we do not take any food with us.

Q121: The day of leaving for Makuluva; who brought you to the Maritime?
A: Nawaqa.

Q122: What vehicle was he driving?
A: The army truck.

Q123: Who was driving?
A: Staff Vakadranu.

Q124: O iko o curu ike ena yakavi ni Vakaraubuka. O bau raica e dua na lori ni a gole yani ike ena siga Vakarauwai, vakasobu kit-bags se para-bags?
A: Sega saka.

Q125: Rauta na ciwa ki na tini?
A: Sega saka.

Q126: Vakacava e na Siga Tabu, e dua na twin-cab vulavula?
A: Sega saka, na lori saka ga au raica ni curu tiko yani i loma, na neitou lori damudamu ni Unit, koya saka ga oya au notice-taka saka tiko.
Q127: Qoi na cava, na motoka - BV?
A: Io saka.

Q128: O bau raica na kena kau nai yaragi e na sigma Vakarauwai?
A: Sega.

Q129: Sigatabu?
A: Sega.

[Signature]
[U. SAKURU]
Private

[Signature]
[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[Signature]
[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[Signature]
[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[Signature]
[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member

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TENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 29128 PTE WALUSIO LIGANIVAI

Pte Liganivai, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Pte. Liganivai, give us a brief outline of your service with RFMF?

Q2: What year was the selection?
A: In 1999.

Q3: Are you aware of any activities that happened before the 19th of May within the unit? Were you involved in any of the planning prior to the 19th?
A: No.

Q4: When you were aware of the takeover of the Parliamentary complex?
A: I was at home when I heard that the coup had taken place and I reported to the camp. When I arrived there it was empty and I heard that they were at the complex.

Q5: What were you doing at home?
A: I was just staying home.

Q6: Were you on leave, what were you doing? You said you were involved in training last year.
A: I was not at work.

Q7: Why?
A: I was a bit sick.

Q8: You went straight to the camp after you heard of the coup?
A: I went to the camp.

Q9: Who did you report to at the complex?
A: When I went to the complex it was empty.

Q10: The unit was empty?
A: Yes.

Q11: Then you went to the complex?
A: Yes.
Q12: Who did you report to?
A: It was empty and I heard that the unit was at the Parliamentary complex and I went there.

Q13: You went there and then what happened?
A: I wanted to see whether they were really there. I saw them there and went in.

Q14: What were you doing at the complex?
A: Security.

Q15: Security for what?
A: For the gate.

Q16: When you were there at the complex, did you contact the IMS at the camp?
A: No.

Q17: At the complex, did you see any officer there?

Q18: Who was your leader at the Parliamentary complex?

Q19: He is the overall leader of the group, who was your leader at the complex?
A: I cannot mention names.

Q20: Who did you listen to?
A: To HQ.

Q21: When you were at the complex, did you every go outside?
A: No.

Q22: When did you go outside?
A: On the 13th when the arms were returned.

Q23: How long were you at the Parliamentary complex?
A: When I went in until the 13th when the arms were returned.

Q24: From 19th of May till 13th July?
A: Yes.

Q25: You said within this period the only person from RFMF you saw in the complex was Lt. Col. Tarakinikini?
A: Yes.
Q26: Only one officer?
A: Yes.

Q27: You did not see any other military person enter the complex?
A: No.

Q28: Did any other 1MS member enter the complex at any time?
A: I do not know.

Q29: Did you discuss with any other member of your unit your testimony to be given to this Board?
A: No.

Q30: On the 19th of May you were sick, did you see a doctor?
A: No.

Q31: Are you required in the MS to produce sick sheets if you are sick?
A: No, but to call.

Q32: Who did you call?
A: I did not call.

Q33: When you came into QEB, was there any other member present in your unit?
A: No, I did not see anyone.

Q34: What time did you arrive at the camp?
A: I cannot remember.

Q35: Morning, lunch, afternoon?
A: About 1.00pm.

Q36: What if I tell you that we have heard evidences here that there were members of your unit present there at the time. You are the 7th witness we have heard today; we have heard witnesses come to say that they were present in the unit at the time you said there was no one there. What do you have to say?
A: There was no one there.

Q37: What time did you leave the camp for Parliament Complex?
A: In the afternoon.

Q38: About what time?
A: About 2.00pm.
Q39: How did you go to Parliament
A: By bus.

Q40: When you reached the complex, who did you speak with? Who was the first person you spoke to?
A: I did not talk to anyone.

Q41: When you reached the complex, what time was it?
A: I cannot remember the time.

Q42: It was in the afternoon, was it still light or dark?
A: It was still light.

Q43: Before 6.00 o'clock?
A: I cannot remember.

Q44: When you arrived at the complex, what did you do?
A: I saw the guards at the gate.

Q45: Who was there on duty at the gate?
A: Some boys.

Q46: Who?
A: I cannot mention names.

Q47: Who was on duty at the gate?
A: I cannot remember.

Q48: You do not want to say or you do not know?
A: I do not know.

Q49: Were they members of your unit?
A: No.

Q50: Were they armed?
A: No.

Q51: Did they allow you to go into the complex?
A: Yes.

Q52: Did you tell them who you were?
A: No.
Q53: Who was the first person you spoke to in the complex?
A: Those at the gate.

Q54: What did you tell them?
A: I asked them to go in.

Q55: Who was the next person you spoke to?
A: No one else.

Q56: You did not speak with anyone until the 13th of July?
A: I spoke to some people.

Q57: Who was the military person you spoke to at the complex?
A: Ravai.

Q58: What did you tell him?
A: I told him that I was there.

Q59: What was his response?
A: He told me to come in.

Q60: Were you assigned any responsibility in the complex?
A: Security.

Q61: Were you issued weapons?
A: Yes.

Q62: What weapons?
A: M.6.

Q63: A1 or A2?

Q64: Were you given magazines?
A: Yes, two.

Q65: Any side arms?
A: No.

Q66: What duties were you assigned?
A: Security.
Q67: Where at?
A: The gate and the complex surroundings.

Q68: What was your rules of engagement?
A: Warning shots.

Q69: Who gave you those rules?
A: I know them.

Q70: Where did you know them from?
A: From the camp.

Q71: Were you involved in the training in Vanua Levu?
A: Yes.

Q72: Who was your team commander?
A: Our OC.

Q73: Who was your team leader?
A: I cannot remember.

Q74: Which team did you belong to?
A: Team 2.

Q75: Were you part of the team that went for training in Makuluva?
A: No.

Q76: After 13th July did you meet with other members of your unit?
A: No.

Q77: Did you go to Kalabu where the gathering was taking place?
A: On the 26th in the afternoon.

Q78: Were there any CRW persons in Kalabu?
A: I only know of myself.

Q79: Did you meet Pte. Saukuru at Kalabu on the 26th?
A: No, we met in the morning when we were arrested.

Q80: You were one of those arrested in Kalabu?
A: Yes.

Q81: How often did you have O-Groups at the Parliamentary complex?
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A: I did not attend any.

Q82: Where were you the day the police officer got shot at the complex?
A: I was inside.

Q83: Were you on duty?
A: I was on duty inside.

Q84: Where did the shots come from?
A: I do not know.

Q85: Did you subsequently hear that the police officer was shot?
A: I heard it the next morning.

Q86: What was said about the police officer?
A: It was said that one person has died.

Q87: Nothing was said in the complex about the police officer?
A: No, I heard it in the radio.

Recalled on 13/09/00:

Private W. Liganivai, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q88: Private Liganivai, daru lesuva tale mada na nomu statement ko a solia i liu, o vakaraitaka kina o iko ni ka 19 ni siga ni vula o Me, na siga ka vakayacori kina na vuaviri ena loma ni Palimedi, o tukuna o iko ena i matai ni nomu statement ni o tauvimate. Ko a tiko ga mai vale, e dina o ya se sega?
A: E cinaka saka.

Q89: E ra i ka 18 ni siga ni vula o Me, na siga Lotulevu, ko a tiko e vei?
A: Au a tiko ena complex.

Q90: O a bau vakaitavi ena exercise e caka mai Makuluva?
A: E sega saka.

Q91: Na yahaki cava o curu kina ena 1MS?

Q92: O curu ena 1999, vakasamataka ena vula o Me, e wase rua na i lala e tiko ena loma ni unit, dua na kena i wase e vakaitavi ena selection mai yaasaya vaka Ra, o ira na tiko mai e organise taka o Lieutenant Dakuliga e dua na exercise “Sea Survival” mai
Makuluva. Na Sea Survival exercise oya, eratou vakaitavi kece kina o iratou dou a curu vata ena IMS? E donu oya?
A: E donu saka.

Q93: Na cava o qai sega ni lako kina i Makuluva?
A: Ye sega ni vinaka tu na i tuvaki ni yagoqu, au sa mani kerekere meu kua ni lako.

Q94: Ena i ka 19 ni siga ni vula o Me e tukuni vei keitou mai vei ira na mai soli tukutuku eke e tukuni ni o iko e dua na i matai ni curu ena Palimi?
A: E sega saka.

Q95: Ogeri na nomu vosa, au vakadewataka ga na ka e mai tukuni vei keitou. E vakaraitaki na komu i taba, ni ko iko a curu ena loma ni Palimi. O iko, o Tikotani, Naduaniwai kei Qicatabu. E tukuni tale tiko g a iko a dua vei ira na veivesu tiko, o iko kei Qicatabu. E dina o ya se sega?
A: E sega saka.

Q96: O koya e soli tukutuku vei keitou e dua saraga e dabe tu ena loma ni Palimi. O kaciviti tale mai ni kua me mai vakamatatatataki se o tiko e loma o ya se sega?
A: E sega saka.

Q97: Na nomu i tukutuku o iko ni siga Vakaraubuka tiko g a ya o gole kina ina Palimi?
A: Io saka.

Q98: Na nomu tauvimate ogo, o ED, e dua na nomu sick sheet?
A: E sega saka. Au a cakacaka tiko g.

Q99: Ena siga Vakaraubuka?
A: Ena siga Vakaraubuka ga au bera mai.

Q100: Na nomu i tukutuku o iko e tukuni ni ko tauvimate?
A: Au tauvimate au mani bera mai.

Q101: Na nomu tauvi mate o ya, e sega ni vakavuna na nomu taravi iko mai na nomu lako sobu kina Palimi?
A: E sega saka.

Q102: E taravi iko na mai cakacaka, e sega ga ni taravi iko na lako sobu ki na Palimi?
A: E sega, au a bera ga mai ena sega Vakaraubuka.

Q103: Ko a sega ni tiko ena brief mai na Maritime, ka brief kina o Na Qase kei George Speight?
A: E sega saka.
Q104: O sega sara ga ni curu ena Chambers ena siga o ya mo veivesu?
A: E sega saka, au qai lako ga ena yakavi sara.

Q105: E na mataka laialai ni siga o ya, o sega ni curu ena loma ni Chambers?
A: E sega saka.

Q106: E dua na nomu i vakadinadina?
A: E sega saka.

Q107: Ena nomu lako sobu ena yakavi o ya, o cei a talai iko sobu?
A: O au ga, au a gole sobu.

Q108: O iko ga vakataki iko se o direct taki mai vei L.t. Baleinamau?
A: Au a gole sobu ga.

Q109: Ena gauna o gole sobu kina ena siga Vakaraubuka, o curu ena loma ni Chambers?
A: Au a curu i loma.

Q110: E rauta na vica na kaloko na nomu curu i loma o ya?
A: Sa yakavi saka.

Q111: E rauta na vica na kaloko?
A: Au sega saka ni tara rawa e vica na kaloko.

Q112: E se siga tiko na vanua se sa bogi?
A: Sa via yakavi saka.

Q113: Ena gauna o curu kina ena loma ni Chambers, o vakaitavi ena kena strap taki na ligadra na hostages?
A: E sega saka.

Q114: Ena gauna o curu kina i loma, sa vesu tu na ligadra se se bera ni vesu?
A: Au sega ni raica e vesu tu na ligadra se sega. Au duri tu ga i katuba, au rai tu yani e loma oti ga e sogo tale.

Q115: I Private Liganivai, ena siga oya e tukuna vei kemudrau o Tikotani, o iko kei Qicatabua mo drau veitomani vei ira na curu ena loma ni Palimedi?
A: E sega saka.

Q116: O dau sota kei Satini Tikotani ena siga Vakaraubuka na i ka 19 ni siga ni vula o Me?
A: Au jai raici koya ga ena gauna au lako yani kina ena loma ni Chambers.
Q117: O sega ni sotavi koya ena nomudou unit?
A: E sega saka.

Q118: Ena bogi ni Lotulevu na i ka 18 ni siga ni vula o Me o tiko e vei?
A: Au tiko mai vale.

Q119: O sega ni wavoki mai ena nomudou unit?
A: E sega saka.

Q120: E dua tale na ka o via vakamacalata eke?
A: E sega, vinaka vakalevu

Kanivai
[W. LIGANIVAI]
Private

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class 1
Member
TWELFTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 29433 LT JONE SAKE TUVANUAVOU

Lt Tuvanuavou after having been duly sworn on Bible hereby stated:

I was recruited in 1994 and was posted to 3FIR as an officer cadet. In 1995, I went to Canberra to attend the Military College in Dunroon and I completed that in December when I returned to Fiji in December, 1996, I started work at 3FIR in January, 1997.

I did the Selection course in April, completed that in May and I went on tour of duty to the Middle East in June, 1997 and returned in June, 1998. When I returned, I was posted to ATG until October, 1999 when I went back and did the selection right through 1999 to 2000.

Q1: You joined the CRW, 1MS in 1999?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q2: Lt. Tuvanuavou, do you understand the reason behind this Board of Inquiry and what we-want you to do now is to give us your knowledge in your involvement in the events prior to the take over at Parliament, events leading up to the take over and also the take over, after the take over and until the present time.
A: On Friday morning, 19th May, I went to work and we reported at work at 9 o’clock because we had PT in the morning. We went to change after PT and reported back at 9 o’clock. From there, we were briefed to go back and change into civilians because we were going to have an exercise. When I questioned, what exercise? We were told, it was just an exercise. I went back, changed and reported back at 10 o’clock.

When we reported back at 10 o’clock, we were briefed that there will be a minibus which would pick us up to go down for our exercise brief. I questioned that but we were told; “just go”. When the minibus came, we all got in and as I looked around, I saw the twin-cab that was leading us. I questioned who the guys in the minibus were and who the guys in the twin-cab were. No one knew them so, I said to myself that I never know of an exercise to be conducted in civilians. As we got to the junction, I opened the door and got out and got the other guys to get out. We then went back to the Unit.

Q3: Which junction was this?
A: The junction from Sukanaivalu and Ratu Mara Road which is opposite RSMS. We went back to the Unit and on our way up, we stopped and yelled about who those guys were and no one seemed to know them, the guys in the twin cab or the driver. So, we just decided to go back to the Unit. We went back to the Unit and when we got in, the telephone rang and this was Col. Tuatoko requesting that one of the officers to come up and see him. I went up to see Col. Tuatoko and he told me to get the guys ready for the hostage situation because Parliament had been taken over.
I went back to those guys. As I came downstairs, I went past OC Baleinamau and Major Ligairi who were on their way up to see Col. Tuatoko. I went down to the Unit and gave the order for standby which is to prepare the kit ready for any hostage situation.

As we were getting things ready, Baleinamau and the old man, upon return from Col. Tuatoko, Baleinamau came down and the old man left. Baleinamau told me to tell the guys to call the standby off; to stop preparing whatever that was prepared and things were under control. As I saw them going up to Col. Tuatoko, I assumed that the orders were from above.

From there, I went to the Mess for lunch and when I came down, the guys that had gotten off with me were not in the complex. When I asked of their whereabouts, I was told that they had gone to provide security. I asked what was the security for. I was told that the security for the VIPs that were being held. We just waited around for any other order but there was nothing and nothing seemed to progress from the standby.

Later that evening when the selection team arrived from Nadi for the last phase of the selection course, we all got together and discussed what had happened earlier that day. They were briefed and then we asked why the guys went down, they said they had gone to provide security. We then asked the difference between the security then those guys who stormed Parliament. They said that those who stormed Parliament were wearing balaclava and the ones who were not were the ones providing security. The guys who went down thought that they were going to provide security.

Later that evening, I overheard someone on the phone saying that there was going to be a vehicle to be parked at the back gate to take down the weapons for the guys that were providing security. I called up Lt. Stevens and informed him what was about to happen. I told him that they were coming to take the weapons, I did not know what for and the guys who went down, did not even know what they were there for. All they thought of was security, they were coming to take the weapons and they did not even know what it was for.

Lt. Stevens told me to hold on to the key for the armouries and magazine, which I did and he would go and clarify that with Col. Tuatoko. He went up and spoke to Col. Tuatoko and he called me back and said in his words; “I do not know what is happening but I have been told by Col. Tuatoko to let the weapons go. From then on he said; “No one is listening to us up here, no one is listening to us down there, just get your stuff let us go home. I then left the camp and went home.
While being at home, I was speaking to Lt. Stevens and we were getting worried about the control of our arms. He called me up and asked me to go and pick up those guys that were told to look after those arms. We went and met with these guys and asked them what they were doing there. From their reply, we assume that they had been briefed in such a manner which they themselves looked lost.

We then requested an engineer's truck, we took the weapons that they have been keeping and I assumed that it was for the Parliament. We took those weapons and loaded it into the engineers' truck and went in hiding.

We reported it to the Commander and we told him that part of the weapons that were taken out had been recovered by us and we had it with us. We really did not know what it was for and he told us to keep it with us and not to return it to camp until he say so.

The reason for that, we assume that maybe someone was plotting something against the Commander and if anyone was to request anything, we have told the Commander that we had the weapons there and should he need our help, we would be there to assist him. We stayed out until he gave us the verbal order to come back and we brought the weapons with us. That is my statement.

Q4: Lt. Tuivaniuavou, which junction were you referring to?
A: The Sukanaivalu and Ratu Mara roads junction.

Q5: Did you recognise the civilians who were sitting in the front?
A: I have never seen him before. All I knew that they were not members of the military.

Q6: To this date, after the events of the 19th May?
A: There was only one person that I know, I do not even know his name but I just know him by the tattoo on his forehead. He was in the twin-cab. He looked like a criminal.

Q7: We will provide you with photographs of the operation, your Unit and also the photograph of some of the ex convicts. The other question is who gave the directives for the exercise to go down? When you were told to do an exercise at 0100 hours; you went home and changed, who actually gave the directives for the exercise?
A: It was Baleinamau.

Q8: Those CRW or 1MS that went down, could you give me their names?
A: I would not be able to give you their names.
Q9: You are not aware of the names?
A: Because they all went down in different lots. From the time, they started going down, I left.

Q10: What we are interested to hear is the names of those that initially went down. The second lot went down for security and you were made aware of it. After you heard about the take over, are you aware of the names of the lot that initially went down?
A: No, I am not aware of that.

Q11: Any of the names, personnel from 1MS?
A: I am not aware of the different groups, the first group or the second group.

Q12: Are you aware of the number of weapons that were taken down?
A: When the weapons went down before they left the Unit, as soon as Lt. Stevens told me that Col. Tuatoko had said to let them take it because at that time, when we say something in the Unit, no one was really listening, when we went up to the Mess to speak to those that were there, they were sort of treating us as the enemies.

Q13: Who was not listening, is it within the Unit?
A: Yes, within the Unit because the OC at that time was Baleinamau. They would just listen to the OC so I could not really do anything there.

Q14: Your first knowledge of the take over was when you heard from Col. Tuatoko. You have no knowledge of the events prior to that?
A: No, Sir.

Q15: After the events of the 19th of May, do you have any knowledge of anyone within the Unit maintaining contact with those in Parliament?
A: It was Bainimoli and Baleinamau.

Q16: Can you recall on how many occasions?
A: I am sorry, I cannot recall because most of the time we were out in the bush.

Q17: Did you or anyone within the Unit maintain contact with anyone outside the Unit or with any other RFMF personnel about the events happening or activities in the Parliament Complex?
A: When Commander posted us out to the bush, our aim was to get all those who were in Parliament that did not want to get involved to go out and stay in the bush until the whole thing was over. The only information we got about what was happening in Parliament is when we came into camp to get rations for those guys hiding in the bush.

Q18: Were you aware of any activities within the Unit prior to the 19th of May that were directly involved to the events leading up to the 19th of May.
A: No, Sir.

Q19: Can you recall any activities before that actually happened or had a link to the actual takeover?
A: No, I do not.

Q20: Any prior planning, prior meetings or prior discussions in the Unit?
A: No, Sir.

Q21: As reported in the media, they had a meeting on the 14th of May, they had a Church service on the 14th of May. Were you present there?
A: I was present, Sir.

Q22: Can you give me a rough indication of what transpired during that?
A: It was basically a Church service to commemorate 14th May 1987 and which also commemorate the day the Unit was established. It was the Church service, morning tea, grog and home.

Q23: Did anytime on the 14th of May, can you recall of any discussion that actually leads to the event of the 19th of May? Even during the grog session or anytime during the discussions throughout the whole day?
A: No, Sir.

Q24: You are not aware of any weapons that were taken out prior to the 19th of May. On the 19th of May, a batch was taken down on the authority of Col. Tuatoko.
A: Yes, Sir.

Q25: Are you aware of the numbers that were taken out?
A: No, Sir.

Q26: How many were taken out and the calibres of the weapons?
A: I do not know, Sir.

Q27: Who was responsible for maintaining the record of that? Can you recall who was responsible for those? When things moved in the military circle, they are recorded, drawn up, signed for and moved. Can you recall whose area was that?
A: I cannot recall that. That's OC, Sir.

Q28: You are not aware of any other people in that?
A: No, Sir.

Q29: Are you aware of the amount?
A: No, Sir.
Q30: The lot that was delivered, who was actually responsible for the loading of the weapons?
A: Sir, when the weapons went out, I had left. When Lt. Stevens told me that Col. Tuatoko said that to let them take it (excuse my language) I said; "I do not know what this Army is" and left.

Q31: You had indicated that a batch of those weapons that were taken out, you have it recovered with Lt. Stevens, you relocated them and hid them in a separate location?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q32: When did this transpire? Was it within the Unit or outside?
A: Outside the Unit.

Q33: Where outside the Unit?
A: At Bilo in the Veisari area.

Q34: Before you get to Bilo, can you just recap a little? You were away when the weapons were taken out of the Unit?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q35: You went home?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q36: From home, your movement from there to Bilo, from Bilo to whatever location that you went to, just take that angle and run with it.
A: Friday night I went home and then on Monday, Shane called me up and informed me that one of the guys in the Unit had called him up and told him that he was really worried about what was happening because what they were briefed at the start was not what actually happened. He told Shane where the guys had gone and Shane called me up and said that we should go and get them before we get any more involved without knowing what actually was happening.

Shane went to the camp and asked where some guys had gone and was told that they had no idea. One of the guys overheard Lt. Stevens being informed and being lied to, that was when he called him up and told him that those guys in the Unit were lying to him that the guys he was looking for were at Bilo and were told to go there by 3aleinamau. That was when we took the truck and Shane told me to come in and get a truck and get those guys out of Bilo, relocate them so that they do not get involved with those guys in Parliament.

Q37: The guy that Shane spoke to on the telephone, who was he?
A: He is our Chief Clerk at this present time.

Q38: His name?
A: Nazagilevu.
Q39: What is his rank?
A: Corporal.

Q40: You moved with Lt. Stevens to Bilo? Whereabout in Bilo were the weapons located?
A: At the military installation cite at Bilo, the one similar to the one in Battery Hill.

Q41: I am aware of that. Is it the underground range?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q42: The weapons were taken there at Bilo.
A: Yes, Sir.

Q43: How many weapons were there, that you recovered from there?
A: I would not know the number but there were quite a lot.

Q44: The members of the CRW (1MS) that were in Bilo, can you give us their names, which you picked them and posted them in the bush.
A: Bonefasi, Tamani, Leweniqila and Naqamu. That is all, Sir.

Q45: What was the purpose of the weapons that were moved there and those people that were in Bilo? There is one lot that we have now in this scenario, one lot is based at the Parliament Complex and there was another lot down at Bilo. Did you gather the purpose of those after talking to them?
A: No.

Q46: At the time you indicated, where was Cpl. Nacagilevu?
A: He was in the Unit.

Q47: Where was he at that time? When did he make that phone call?
A: I do not know.

Q48: Where were the weapons taken after Bilo?
A: We took it up to Nabukavesi. We stayed on one of the side roads.

Q49: What did you do with the weapons there?
A: We kept them on the truck.

Q50: How long was this for, the duration of this?
A: Until the time when the Commander gave us the order to come back.

Q51: All the time the weapons were kept on the truck?
A: Yes, Sir. After we removed it from Bilo, we just stayed between Navua and Suva. We just kept moving, every night we kept on changing our location. And then until the time we assumed that we were followed and would be cornered one day and we decided to take it all the way up to Sigatoka.

We off loaded the weapons there and returned the truck and left it in Deuba for about a week before we returned it. We returned the truck on Tuesday and Commander told us to return the weapons on Thursday. We returned all the weapons in the morning on a Friday. I am sorry I cannot recall the dates, Sir.

Q52: From Navua to Nabukavesi then it was moved to Sigatoka?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q53: Where were the weapons stored in Sigatoka?
A: Up at Balenabelo.

Q54: Who secured the weapons in Balenabelo?
A: The same lot that were with us.

Q55: For the whole duration, the weapons remained secured by this lot: Bonefasio, Tamani, Leweniqila and Naqamau?
A: And then we got Buadromo, Todua, Tuiwailevu. Those guys were the ones that rotated with the lot.

Q56: Can we just go back, were you aware of the initial lot that went in?
A: No.

Q57: Lt. Tuivanuavou, can you go back to the time you were going out of the minibus; which minibus you were talking about, the RFMF or the civilian minibus.
A: It was the civilian minibus.

Q58: Was it hired by the Unit?
A: I do not have a clue whether it was hired.

Q59: Can you describe this minibus?
A: It was white with the blue stripe on the side or from the side that I got on from.
Q60: Is it common for the minibus to run around Suva and Nausori? This is like the green minibus that we have in the military?
A: It was like any other minibus.

Q61: Who were the members of your Unit inside this minibus?
A: I cannot quite recall all of them but I just remembered Lt. Dakuliga who was with me, Sgr Naka and Baleinamau.
Q62: Who were all the individuals that got off in the minibus with you?
A: All I can recall is when we got off the minibus, only Baleinamau and I think it was Nawaqa was the other guy that stayed on with OC.

Q63: How many from IMS got off the bus?
A: About 11, there were quite a lot. The minibus was full and when we got off there were only two left.

Q64: Were there any civilians in the minibus?
A: The civilians were all sitting in the front seat, we all sat at the back.

Q65: Who was driving the minibus, a military person or a civilian?
A: He was a civilian.

Q66: Was there any brief conducted inside the minibus?
A: No, there was no brief.

Q67: Why did you get off?
A: I got off because when I looked at the driver, I knew he was not in the military and then I looked across and saw the guy with the tattoo on his forehead, I questioned Sgt. Naika what this civilian was doing if we were to go for an exercise. He just shook his head and asked whether we should get off and I said, yes. As soon as the minibus stopped at the junction waiting for the road to be cleared, I opened the door and got off.

Q68: Which route did you take to QEB when you got off the minibus?
A: We walked up Sukanaivalu and stopped near the Soqosoqo Vakamararama building and we were asking each other what that was for and if anyone knew and no one really know.

Q69: When you got off this bus, where was the other vehicle?
A: It was in front of us.

Q70: What colour was it?
A: It was a red twin cab.

Q71: Can you tell us the number?
A: No.

Q72: Did you see the pick-up truck park in front of the guard room at QEB?
A: Yes, that is a newer vehicle, this was an old one.

Q73: Lt. Tuivanuvou, my first question is were any of the civilians that you saw in the minibus or in the twin-cab armed?
A: No, not that I am aware of.
Q74: When you left the minibus like you mentioned at the junction of Sukanaivalu and Ratu Mara roads, did Lt. Baleinamau proceed on the minibus together with the twin-cab to wherever they were going to?
A: Yes, he did.

Q75: While you were securing these weapons that you managed to get hold of from Bilo, were you in contact with someone in RFMF for the duration that you were out between Navua and Sigatoka?
A: We were in contact with Commander, Col. Seruvakula and Col. Tuatoko.

Q76: The other question is when you came down the stairs, in your statement, you mentioned that on the 19th of May, Col. Tuatoko called you and spoke to you and briefed you to prepare the Unit for a hostage situation, you passed Lt. Baleinamau and Major Ligairi on the stairs. Did you talk to any of them?
A: No, I ran out and they were so quick, before I would notice, they had gone past. I turned back and kept going heading towards the Unit.

Q77: My last question is, when you boarded the minibus for this so called exercise, were any of you armed?
A: No, we were not.

Q78: Where did you board the minibus from? Is it from the back where you always board from?
A: Yes, we did.

Q79: Is this from the Soqosoqo Vakamarana or inside the camp?
A: From the Soqosoqo Vakamarana and not inside the camp.

Q80: Is OC the only person that can authorise the removal of weapons out of the camp or does it have to come from the Commander Land Force?
A: I would not know the answer to that question.

Q81: What is your procedure when you want to take the weapon out?
A: Normally, it is the OC.

Q82: Can you tell us a bit about the so-called bond that exists within your Unit?
A: I would say that the guys in the Unit are very close and experienced, the bond that they have in that unit is not the same as in the other Units that I have been in for example 3FIR or ATG. I suppose it is because of the selection course and the things that we go through.

Q83: Why do you think that this bond did not take the rest of the guys to the Parliamentary complex?
A: Because most of the guys did not know anything about it. I assumed that if all the
guys were briefed and knew what was about to happen. From the start they would
have probably gone in but I do think a lot of the guys did not know what was
happening. A lot of guys basically found out the real story of what was happening
when they were inside the Parliament Complex.

Q84: What is your understanding on the chain of command within the IMS up to
Commander?
A: From the troop member to the troop sergeant, the troop commander then the OC
then up to the Commander if it is operation. The admin side goes to CO LFC.

Q85: Where does the Director come in?
A: I am sorry it comes in after the OC, Sir.

Q86: Where does this come from?
A: It comes from the OC.

Q87: In June this year you came back from the Middle East?
A: I came back from Lebanon in June 1998 and I was in ATG from September, 1998
until about June, 1999. From there I joined the Unit in June, 1999.

Q88: Since June, 1999, how many times did Major-General Rabuka visit the location?
Can you recall or are you aware of any?
A: Just once on that Church service on the 14th of May.

Q89: This year, can you recall how many times the Director visit your location?
The Director left in November, (I think it was) and I am not sure of the date but he
left the Army in November, 1999 and he returned on the 1st of May.

Q90: When the instruction came from Col. Tuatoko to release the weapons, you said you
held the keys, whom did you release the key to?
A: I just put them back in the place where it is normally stored.

Q91: When you returned the weapons you brought back from Sigatoka, where were these
weapons stored?
A: We brought it back down to the Unit.

Q92: Did you take part in any training that was conducted in Vanua Levu?
A: No, I was not.

Q93: What about Makuluva?
A: No, I did not take part.

Q94: What was your appointment in the Unit prior to the 19th of May?
I was the Admin officer.

What is the link while you were taking the weapons to the Western Division, what was the contact for with CO 3FIR?

Most of the admin requirements we requested was through CO 3FIR, rations et cetera.

Do you wish to say anything else?

Sir, I just like to say that from the beginning of this situation, the soldiers went in under orders, for instance they were told that they were going in to provide security. When we asked what is the difference we were told that the guys who stormed Parliament were wearing balaclava and you guys are not.

That is why most of the guys that were pictured without balaclava and holding weapons they at that time thought that they were just in there providing security. When they realised that they were in the wrong, they tried to come out and that is when they thought it was too late because they had been pictured in the paper or appeared on TV, et cetera.

Would you know who the persons in balaclavas were?

No, I do not.

Were you told that those in balaclavas could be members of 1MS?

I was told that they could be members of the Unit.

When did you come to know about this?

Shane told me that they could have been members of the Unit because that is why they used our guys to go in. That would give them the chance to take off their balaclavas and just fit in with the rest of the guys that went in after. In other words, the guys that went in used to cover them up.

From your knowledge, after hearing that there were a lot of things in the Unit, what weapons were they using, the initial people that took over the hostage?

I would not know.

Should you at any stage wish to give any information to the Board, make it known to the Board members and we will recall you. However, as the investigation progress, we may be required to call you again to answer further questions. You can return to the Unit and we will recall you if and when the need arise to do so.

Another matter that we need to do is tomorrow you need to appear here. In the meantime, we will show you the photos of one of the suspect. We will bring the photos and you can identify if the person is there. We will provide you with some
other photos and also we will send you down to SB branch to look at the photos of the civilians that were in the minibus and also the twin cab.
A: Sir, I do not think, I would be able to recognise any other because the only guy that stood up is the guy with the tattoo.

Q102: Okay, we will just do that, we do not need to go around further. We will bring that tomorrow and you can look at the photos. Should you recognise the person then we will recall you.
A: Sir.

Recalled on 13/09/03:

Lt Tuivanauvou, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q103: Where were you on the week of the coup; from the 15th to the 19th of May?
A: I was at work at the Camp - QEB.

Q104: Right through out?
A: Sir.

Q105: You were not part of the Makuluva Training team or the Western Selection Team?
A: No, Sir.

Q106: Just a point of clarification; those that went down to the Western Division were part of the new recruits going through the selection?
A: Last phase of the selection.
Q107: And those in Makuluva were just part of the normal cyclic training within the Unit?
A: Sir.

Q108: Dakuliga headed the training in Makuluva?
A: Sir.

Q109: Capt Stevens headed the training team down the Western Division?
A: Sir.

Q110: Throughout that whole week, were you aware of any weapons that were moved out of the complex prior to the movement on Saturday, 20th?
A: No, Sir.

Q111: Were you aware or were you involved or heard about any other weapons being moved prior to Saturday?
A: No, Sir.

Q112: Were you aware of the weapons that were moved down initially on Friday for the takeover on Friday morning?
A: No, Sir.

Q113: Were you aware of any personnel who went to draw the weapons in your armoury that morning?
A: No, Sir.

Q114: Can you recall who was on duty at the Unit on the night of Thursday, 18th?
A: I was the duty officer.

Q115: The exercise that was conducted in Makuluva, we have heard evidence that they were given hot box meals from the camp. Bearing in mind that that was a sea survival exercise, why was such arrangements made?
A: I do not know, Sir, that was the request of the person in command, Mr Dakuliga.

Q116: Were you aware of the weapons that were taken out (in bags) on Thursday night and taken to Makuluva?
A: No, Sir.

Q117: Who was the duty storeman on that day - Thursday, Gaunavinaka, Sgt Vuki?
A: I think it was Vosavere.

Q118: Do you recall the IFMS persons who were arrested and locked up in the main guard room after the events of May 19th at QEB?
A: Sir.
Q119: At any time did you visit those personnels in the guard room?
A: Yes, we did, Sir.

Q120: Can you tell us the nature of your conversation with those personnel? Did you give the directive to Saukuru, he came in from the side window and gave the directive not to give any information about the Unit and about the weapons?
A: No, Sir.

Q121: Did you come in from the window and give that directive?
A: No, Sir.

Q122: Lt Tuivamavou, as the duty officer within your Unit, what are your responsibilities?
A: We just mount the guards, and we are the stand-by team for anything that happens.

Q123: How about the security within your Unit in terms of armoury, in terms of the orderly room, what are your responsibilities to those?
A: The guards have to secure our complex because of the armoury.

Q124: Do you normally hold the keys to the armoury?
A: No, Sir.

Q125: Where is it kept?
A: It is normally kept in the storeroom.

Q126: Who has access to the storeroom?
A: Storeman, Sir.

Q127: Can we clarify a point; before anyone can open the armoury, and remove weapons from the armoury should the duty officer be aware of this or shouldn’t the duty officer give the approval for this?
A: There are certain timings the weapons are drawn out daily, and that is at 1600 hours.

Q128: Weapons for what?
A: For the guard personnel.

Q129: What about if weapons are drawn out after 1630hrs, who is responsible for that?
A: Sorry, Sir!

Q130: If weapons are to be drawn out after the weapons for the guard have been drawn out, who is responsible for that?
A: The duty officer, Sir.
Q131: On the night of Thursday, 18th May, were you aware of any weapons being drawn out from the armory after the guards' weapons were drawn?
A: No, Sir.

Q132: Who else was in your Unit after the guard was mounted?
A: Just the guard person.

Q133: Where was the duty storeman or the duty armorer?
A: He was on duty, also as a guard person.

Q134: So Vosavere was there?
A: Sir.

Q135: Did you see Lt Baleinamau?
A: No, Sir.

Q136: Did you see Nduaniwai?
A: He was on duty also, Sir.

Q137: Do you recall the names of all the personnel that were on duty?
A: Naisara, Bainimoli, Vosavere, Nduaniwai.

Q138: This is on Thursday night?
A: Yes, and Tikou, Sir.

Q139: On the same night Lt Tuivanuavou, are you aware of the run that was made down to the Maritime School to deliver the hot box?
A: No, Sir.

Q140: What is the normal procedure for vehicles leaving your Unit?
A: The duty officer should sign the RI.

Q141: So the night of Thursday 18th, did you sign any RIs?
A: No, Sir.

Q142: Were you aware of a hot-box being delivered?
A: No, Sir.

Q143: Were you aware of any vehicles from your Unit leaving the Unit that night?
A: No, Sir.

Q144: Also within the Unit, is it standard practice that when you people go and exercise that the RI is signed for the whole exercise - open signing?
A: I am not aware of that, Sir.

Q145: Where is the duty officer supposed to be when he is on duty in QEB?
A: In QEB, Sir.

Q146: So he does not have to be in the Unit?
A: No, Sir.

Q147: What is the means of communication the duty officer has with the personnel in the Unit?
A: Mobile phone, Sir. I have got a mobile phone on me.

Q148: No beeper, nothing else?
A: No beeper, Sir.

Q149: What time did you leave your Unit that night?
A: I left the Unit at about 10.00 o'clock.

Q150: That is 10.00 in the morning?
A: No, 2200 hrs, Sir.

Q151: At what time did you return to your Unit?
A: I returned the following morning.

Q152: Do you know the time?
A: 0900 hrs.

Q153: On Friday the 19th?
A: Sir.

Q154: On the morning of Friday the 19th, when you are a duty officer at night, do you take the day-off the next day?
A: No, we do not, Sir.

Q155: On Friday morning, did you see a blue twin cab that came to your Unit and uplift weapons?
A: No, Sir.

Q156: Belonging to Jim Speight?
A: No.

Q157: In the morning when you went through the back-gate or the back of the Unit and boarded the mini bus, did you encourage Mr Dakuliga to get out of the mini bus?
A: When I got off, I told the guys, who all wanted to go on this, it is your call but I am getting off, if you wanna come to get off. I said it generally, but I did not speak to one person in particular.

Q158: So you got off the mini-bus?  
A: Sir.

Q159: The persons you said were on duty on Thursday; Naduaniwai, Naisara, Tikotani, Vosavere, was Ravai also on duty?  
A: No, he was not.

Q160: In Ravai's statement, he indicated that he was the duty officer from Thursday night to Friday morning?  
A: I think I was the duty officer.

Q161: What was Ravai; he had indicated in his statement that he was the duty officer from Thursday and it rounds off on Friday morning? What was he in the Complex?  
A: I do not think he was on duty because I was on duty.

Q162: He said he was on duty and he received a number of calls on Friday morning. He had indicated in his statement that he was the duty officer on Thursday to be completed on Friday; were you aware of that?  
A: No, Sir.

Q163: He had indicated that he was the duty officer from the 18th to the 19th, surprising we have two duty officers. Was Alava also present there on Thursday night?  
A: No, Sir.

Q164: Two people are saying that they were duty officers on Thursday?  
A: I still say that I was the duty officer and he was not.

Q165: Did you see him in the Unit Complex that Thursday night?  
A: No, I do not recall seeing him.

Q166: What about on Thursday, during the day?  
A: Yes, I recall seeing him.

Q167: During the night, where did you go?  
A: I went up to the Mess.

Q168: So you went up to the Mess?  
A: Yes, I slept up in my room at the Mess.
Q169: Wha: time did you return back for duty on Friday morning?
   A: We played a game of touch-rugby in the morning and then we report to work at 0900 hrs.

Q170: Did you play touch-rugby on Friday morning?
   A: Sir.

Q171: What time was it?
   A: That was about 6.00 o'clock.

Q172: Was Ravai there?
   A: I cannot recall that, Sir.

Q173: Where were you on Saturday during the day?
   A: I think I would have been at home.

Q174: Saturday - that is the day after the coup?
   A: I went home on Friday night. I did not come to work on Saturday.

Q175: You indicated that you got a call from Stevens on that Saturday about the weapons being taken out?
   A: Sir.

Q176: Who handed over to you the duties or who was on duty prior to you coming on duty?
   A: I think it was Ravai, he would have been on duty before me.

Q177: Is that the normal way the roster goes?
   A: It is normally just the guys on the ground and at the time, we were short because some guys had gone to Makuluva and some had gone to the West so we just shuffle the duty persons.

Q178: Why are you so sure that Ravai would have been on duty before you?
   A: Because there were only two duty officers, two groups of duties, he would have been on one day, and I would have been on the other.
Q179: Is it normal for you to be on duty with Bainimoli, Tikotani, Naduaniwai, Vosaveoru?
A: No, it isn't.

Q180: What was the role that Tikotani was playing in the Unit?
A: He is the Ops Clerk.

Q181: Prior to Thursday 18th, was he operating within the Unit or was he operating outside?
A: Within the Unit.

Q182: Where was Naduaniwai operating from?
A: He was operating within the Unit.

Q183: Do you ever recall any of these people, coming in for your Unit training when you were there?
A: No, Sir, these guys only come for any sports break but for normal physical training and stuff, they do not normally join in.

Q184: Could you please elaborate on that, why they do not do it and who are these people in particular?
A: They were always on Ops tasking under the command of Baleinamau.

Q185: Was it normal for them, since they are normally out there on operational tasking to be on duty on the night of Thursday?
A: Yes, they are rostered for duty.

Q186: Whenever they go on duty they always go on duty together?
A: That was one of the first times that happens, Sir.

Q187: The weapons that were taken out on Saturday, 20th, were you aware of who packed the weapons, or made aware at a later date?
A: Yes, I was made aware of it later. Stevens just told me that he is taking the weapons out so that they do not take it down to Parliament.
Q188: The weapons were already packed and put there in the Lecture Room before it was taken out but were you made aware of who actually packed those weapons?
A: No, Sir.

[ S. TIVANUA VCU]
Lieutenant

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
CONFIDENTIAL

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THIRTEENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 28066 CPL PENI NADUANJWAI

Cpl Naduaniwai, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation hereby states:


Q1: Cpl Naduaniwai, e rawa ni o vakamacalataka mada na nomu vakaitavitaki iko e na veika e yaco e na vakavakarau ni vuaviri e na i ka 19 ni siga, na veika e yaco e na i ka 19 ni siga kei na veika kece e yaco ni oti na i ka 19 ni siga; na veika a yaco mai na gauna oya ki na gauna o kau lesu tale mai kina i loma ni keba; vakamacalataka mada?

A: Ni se berana i ka 19, au kila ni a duty tikoga e na Complex. Au sega ni a lako e na exercise mai Navala, i Vanua Levu, me yacova mai na i ka 19 ni siga, au a sega ni kila e na dua na ka. Au kila ga o au me'u a lako i Suva ena ka ni maji. Au sa tu mai Suva, au sa rogoca ni sa yaco na vuaviri. Ia au sega ni kila ni sa commit tu ike na Unit. Niu sa kila ni ra commit tu i kea o ira na cauravou ia na noqi i tutu va-Kovula, au sa raica ni sa commit tu i kea na Unit kei ira na cauravou, au sa mani tomani iratou talega i loma.

Sa mai oti na i ka 13 ni Julai, au qiri mai na Complex, me extend noqu leave meu lako i na koro, ni sa suta kece na dakai, ratou sa release-taki na hostages. Mai kea au sa qiri mai na Complex me extend na noqu leave, au sa lako sara ga i na koro. Noqu lesu mai na koro e na siga Lotulelu, ratou sa qiri yani na noqu matavuvala. Ratou tukuna, kakua ni lako mai, keitou sa threaten-taki tiko qo, ia na noqu personal safety kei na abuse-taki ni human rights niu sa rogoca na levu na mokomoku, sa levu na mavo, keitou sa mani tiko ga e na vale nei Jo Nata. O au, o Mr. Dakai, o Vakalalabure, o Jim Speight vata kei Leweniqilia. Sa qai veikau o Mr Dakai. Tukuna o Dakai, "Okay, tou lako i noqu koro, i Vunaniu". Baleta o ya ni keitou sa qarauna tiko na neitou personal safety. Mai Vunaniu, eratou sa lako tale mai o Jim Speight ratou sa lako mai i Suva, keitou sa mani tu i veikau, keitou sa split. Oti o ya au sa mani tu mai veikau, macawa dua veimama na noqu survival tu mai veikau, oti au sa toso mai vavoleka i Deuba. O ya e na mataka lai lai ni Siga Tabu. Au sa qai wilika e na pepa e na siga Moniti ni caka na vanavana mai Sawani, au rogoca ni sa mate e dua na sotia o Blood, vanua sara ga o ya sa noqu turning point. Sa mani qiri mai o Salabogi, au sa tukuna vei Salabogi me lako mai me mai pick-taki au, meu lako yani i na keba baleta niu sa raica kina na yacaq, sa tukuni talega ni sa involve kina na Unit, qai sa tukuni talega na Sniper, au sa tukuna sara ga vei Mr. Salabogi me lako mai me mai pick-taki au. O ya e na Siga Vukelulu. Lako mai o Mr. Salabogi, mai raica sara ga na vanua au tiko kina me vakadinadinataka, au tiko mai Deuba i kea. Oti o ya lesu tale, lai

Monti sa tukuni meu march-in mai ki na keba, au mai raici Mr. Steven. Mr. Steven sa qai qiri vei Col Raduva. Sa qai tukuna o Col Raduva, "Okay, se sogo tu mada ga mo vakamuria mada ga na procedure koya e ratou a vesu kina na nomudou i lala me yacova sara ga mai na gauna oqo.

Q2: Sa vinaka, e vica na taro. Matai, na tayabe koya a caka i Suva, o a tiko kina. Sa oti o ya o lesu tale mai. Mai kea o lesu tale i nomu unit i na QEB. Mai kea, o qai lai gole vakacava i na Parliamentary Complex?

Q3: Na taro qo; dua e tukuna vei iko mo gole sobu e ra se o kauti iko ga vakataki iko i ra?
A: Au sa kauti au sara ga vakataki au.

Q4: Na gauna o sa lako kina i ra, o sa lai curu sara i na loma ni complex. Na cava na nomu i tavi i loma o ya?
A: Au se kila ga sa soli vei keitou na dakai, au sa taura na dakai, sa tukuni na ka qo sa aprove-taki mai cake, sa kil a mataivalu na ka qo, au sa mani commit-taki au.

Q5: Na cava na nomu i tavi mai na complex?
A: Yadavi ira tu ga na hostages.

Q6: Na gauna o sa tiko kina mai ra, mai na complex, o bau veitaratara tale kei iratou na lewe ni 1FMS i na keba?
A: Sega.

Q7: O iko se o bau rogoca ni caka na veitaratara vata kei na nomudou unit mai cake, e na talsvoni, se na fax?
A: Sega.

Q8: O bau kilia e dua tale e na loma ni mataivalu a veitaratara vata kei ira na tiko e loma ni complex, e sega ni tiko e na loma ni IFMS unit?
A: Au raica ga e so na turaga ni valu era lako yani.

Q9: O cei soti?
A: Col Tarakinikini, o kemuni saka (referring to President), Col Naivalurua, lako tale yani e so ena veisiko, o Mr. Suliano kei iratou na nona lewe ni Platoon se lewe ni Section koya eratou yadra tiko e yasani Parliament kadua, keitou lai taqomaki iratou talega.

Q10: O kilai iratou na vakaitavi e na i matai ni siga ni vuaviri e na loma ni Complex?
A: Sega saka.

Q11: O sega ni kilia o iko o cei e vakaitavi?
A: E sega saka.

Q12: Noma curu yani i loma ni Complex, o bau lai rai i loma?
A: Sega saka.

Q13: E na gauna o sa lai tu kina i loma, o bau kilia o iko na kena kau nau yaragi mai na Unit i cake me kau sobu i na Complex?
A: Sega.

Q14: O sega ni raica, o sega ni vakaitavi?
A: Sega.

Q15: O sega ni kilia e dua na ka e baleta?
A: Sega saka ni kilia.

Q16: O cei nomu i liuliu i ra i na Complex? O cei e solia vei kemudou na order e na nom: dou garavi tavi tiko i ra ena Complex?
A: O ratou ga na officers. Keitou sa na vakamuria saka ga na neitou SOP, o koya ga na SPT Commander kei iratou na veilutaki.

Q17: O cei na SPT Commander?
A: E na gauna o ya au raici Ravai ga.

Q18: O cei na nomudou i liuliu na IMS taucoko i ra i na Complex; dou vakarorogo tiko vei cei?
A: O Na Qase.
Q19: E na siga cava o a curu kina i loma - na i ka 19 ni siga o a curu kina i loma ni Complex?
A: E na kena yakavi.

Q20: E na gauna o tiko kina i loma, e na gauna sa vakalalai kina na vanua o ya ena i ka 13 ni Jiulai, bau dua na gauna o ya o biuta na location mo lako i na dua na vanua, i vale se dua tale na vanua?
A: Au lako ga mai vale, au mai qiri i na Complex au sa tukuna kina niu sa lako i na koro, au sa lako sara ga i na koro.

Q21: Na siga cava o biuta mai kina na Complex?
A: Oti sara ga mai na i ka 13 ni siga.

Q22: Na gauna sa lala mai kina na vanua ya?
A: I o.

Q23: O sa qai gole i vale?
A: Io

Q24: Na gauna o tiko kina i loma, na dakai cava o vakayagataka i loma o ya?
A: Na support weapon.

Q25: Nonu na support weapon?
A: Sir.

Q26: Na dakai cava o vakayagataka tiko e na gauna ya?
A: Na light machine gun.

Q27: Na calibre?
A: 5.56

Q28: O bau vanataka vakadua na dakai?
A: Sega sara ga.

Q29: O bau vakaitavi e na dua na ka e yaco i tuba?
A: Sega.

Q30: E vica vata na incidents a yaco i tuba, tabaki tu e na pepa ka da kila taukoko tu. Bau dua na gauna o vakaitavi e na dua na incident ya?
A: Sega.

Q31: Where were you when you heard of the overthrow of the Government in Parliament?
A: I was in Suva.

Q32: Where in Suva?
A: I was in the march.

Q33: Which part of Suva?
A: Flea Market.

Q34: How did you go to camp on Monday?
A: I went by bus.

Q35: When you arrived in Camp you went to your Unit?
A: Yes.

Q36: Did you meet any of your personnel from the 1FMS in the Unit?
A: Yes.

Q37: Who were they?
A: Mr Bai.

Q38: Anyone else?
A: And the new guys.

Q39: You know Private Saukuru?
A: Yes.

Q40: You know Private Liganivai?
A: Yes.

Q41: Did you meet them there?
A: No.

Q42: Approximately what time did you leave camp?
A: After lunch.

Q43: It will be 12.00 to 1.00; 1.00 to 2.00; which of the two?
A: Between 1.00 to 2.00.

Q44: Did you go direct to the Complex from the camp?
A: Yes.

Q45: How did you travel?
A: I travelled again by bus.
Q46: When you arrived at the Complex, you said you were issued with a weapon. Who issued you with the weapon?
A: No one issued me any weapon. I just went and picked a weapon up.

Q47: So you saw a weapon there?
A: Yes, it was there.

Q48: How many weapons were there?
A: I cannot recall it.

Q49: Can you tell us the weapons that were there?
A: Yes.

Q50: What were they?
A: Uzis, MP5, pistols.

Q51: Were they stacked up or in duffel bags?
A: I just know that they were there.

Q52: How many ammunitions did you have?
A: I could not recall it.

Q53: What specific duties did you have in the Complex? You said you had to guard the hostages?
A: Yes.

Q54: What duties in particular?
A: The safety of the hostages was my responsibility. Noqu i tavi meu protect-taki iratou na hostages.

Q55: Which part of the Complex was your post?
A: Outside.

Q56: Did you see any civilians carrying weapons?
A: No.

Q57: Do you recall the police officer that got shot outside the Complex? Where were you on that day?
A: I was inside the Complex.

Q58: Did you hear about the shooting?
A: I heard about it after the shooting incident.
Q59: What did you hear?
A: That a policeman was shot.

Q60: Were you told who shot the policeman?
A: No.

Q61: Were there any inquiries made as to who shot the policeman?
A: No.

Q62: You said that on the 13th you rang the Camp. Who did you speak with?
A: Mr. Salabogi and Corporal Bonafasio.

Q63: When you arrived at the Complex on that afternoon on the 19th, did you see any individuals with balaclava on?
A: No.

Q64: How were they dressed?
A: Same as the one I am wearing now.

Q65: Did you have the same dress till the 13th of July?
A: No.

Q66: Did you get a resupply of your dress?
A: (Silence)

Q67: Did you change your clothes?
A: Yes.

Q68: Where did you get your change from?
A: From inside.

Q69: Inside where?
A: Inside the complex.

Q70: Was it your own clothes?
A: Yes.

Q71: Who brought it to you inside the Complex?
A: My wife.

Q72: You said that the weapons were lying there and you picked on up. Was there any security measures there for the drawing and returning of weapon?
A: I do not know.

Q73: When you picked up your weapon, were any other personnel from 1FMS present? No.

Q74: The place where the weapon was kept, is it easily accessible? Can you get in there easily? Where was the weapons kept? In one of the rooms.

Q75: In the top part of the Complex or the bottom one? In one of the rooms below.

Q76: How did you get in touch with Lt. Dakai and Jim Speight when you returned from the village? How did you get in contact with them? Mobile phone.

Q78: Dua noqu taro - o vakaraitaka ni o yaco yani i na Parliamentary Complex, sa vakaraitaki oti vei iko e sa kila tiko na Mataivalu mai cake, sa ratou solia talega mai na nodratou veivakadonui. O rawa ni vakaraitaka mada vei keitou o cei e vakaraitaka vei iko na i tukutuku ya? E tukuni ga vei au ni sa qiritaki mai cake, sa kilai mai cake na kena kau mai na i yaragi. O au noqu qai rogoa ga ya, au sa kila, na Mataivalu sa tiko mai muri.

A: O cei a tukuna sara mada ga vei iko? O tukuna tiko qori ni dua a tukuna vei iko, o cei a tukuna vei iko?

A: Au kila ga ni dua ga na turaga ni valu mai cake, e dua ga vei keitou.

Q80: O koya a tukuna vei iko ni sa vakadonui na ka e vakayacori tiko o ya?

A: Io.

Q81: O naquma se o cei na yacana?

A: Au kila o Mr. Tuivavanavou.

Q82: E tukuna o koya vei iko mai vei?

A: O ya na ka e tukuna vei iratou na cauravou.

Q83: Nomu qai yaco yani ki na Parliament Complex na ka o ya sa ratou vakadewataka mai vei iko na cauravou?

A: Io.

Q84: Ia e sega ni dua na turaga ni valu e tukuna mai vakadodonu vei iko?

A: Io, e sega.
Q85: Karua ni taro, Kovula; na i tavi cava mada o qarava tiko e na loma ni Unit?
A: E na loma ni Unit o au na Sniper.

Q86: Na gauna dou bera ni lako kina e na maji e na i ka 19 ni siga ena mataka laitai, dou na must brief-taki na vu ni nomudou lako mo sobu mo dou laki tiko e na maji, e na tukuni vei kemudou na vanua mo dou laki tu kina?
A: E dodonu me keitou lai observe-taka tu ga na maji.

Q87: Sega tale ni dua na ka?
A: Sega.

Q88: Ia, dou a bui lakolako sobu e na nomudou lako sobu, se o ni a kau sobu ni lai bia i ra?
A: Sega.

Q89: Na gauna dou sa tiko kina i loma, sa oti e dua na macawa, iko a vakaraitaka e liu ni o qai lako yani o sa sega ni raica me dua e va-balaclava tu. E dua a va-balaclava tiko eke, a tiko va na Unit qo se lako mai tuba?
A: Au sega sara ga ni kila.

Q90: Rawa ni o tukuna mada se cava na vuna e kau kina vakalevu vakaoya na i yaragi kei ra i yaya e tu i loma o ya, o bau rogo ca se dua e tukuna vei iko na vu ni kena kau kina vakalevu na i yaragi?
A: Au sega saka niu taura rawa.

Q91: Kovula, dua tale na taro; e na i ka 19 ni siga o sa vakaraitaka oti vei keitou ni o a duty tikoga e na loma ni nomudou Unit mai cake. O a tiko i vei?
A: Sega, au a tiko mai Suva e na maji e na i ka 19 ni siga.

Q92: Ni se bera ni o gole sobu e na Maji, e na vica na kaloko o a gole sobu kina e na Maji i Suva?
A: E na mataka laitai.

Q93: O biuta mai nomudou vale, o vakadodonu sara i Suva se o biubiu mai e na Unit?
A: Mai vale ga i Suva.

Q94: Ia, ni se bera na i ka 19 ni siga, o bau rogo ca vakacaca tiko ni na dua na exercise dou na vakaitavitaki kemudou kina se so mai na nomudou Unit e ratou na vakaitavitaki iratou kina e na i ka 19 ni siga?
A: Sega.

Q95: In the Parliamentary Complex, did you have O-Groups?
A: No.
Q96: Were you briefed by anyone?
A: No.

Q97: Were you told what was happening in the Complex?
A: No, we just know our individual duties.

Q98: You said you were protecting the hostages, protecting them from who?
A: From the civilians.

Q99: Were they threatening the hostages?
A: The possibility, yes.

Q100: Was there any act done to threaten the civilians?
A: No, we were there.

Q101: When you were there in the city of Suva, you heard that the Government was overthrown? Did you hear who had overthrown the Government?
A: No, I just heard that the Government was taken over.

Q102: When you arrived in the camp, were you told who had overthrown the Government?
A: From there, I heard from the boys that the Unit was committed.

Q103: What do you mean by saying “committed”?
A: That the boys were in Parliament.

Q104: Doing what?
A: They were inside the Parliament.

Q105: But were you told what the boys were doing inside the Parliament?
A: I thought it was an exercise, I was not sure.

Q106: Despite not being sure what the boys were doing in Parliament, you still went ahead and entered Parliament?
A: I just wanted to confirm.

Q107: You went to confirm?
A: Yes.

Q108: When you went inside Parliament, did you confirm what the boys were doing inside there?
A: Yes, from there I know.
Q109: What were they doing?
A: I know that it was not an exercise.

Q110: What was it?
A: Just ....

Q111: Just what?
A: They just told me, there has been a takeover.

Q112: Did they tell you who had taken over?
A: No.

Q113: Did you feel right being there in Parliament?
A: I do not know.

Q114: What was the reaction of the soldiers when the policeman was shot?
A: I do not know.

Q115: What was your reaction?
A: I felt sorry.

Q116: Was there anything you could have done to stop it?
A: (Silence)

Q117: You were in charge of the security, were you not?
A: I was just tasked with the security of the hostages.

Q118: You were outside the complex.
A: I was inside.

Q119: Cpl Naduaniwai, se bera ni tou toso, kevaka e dua tale na ka o via vakamacalataka se dua na ka e lutu ka o vakasamataka tiko e na gauna oqo, e rawa ni ko tukuna mai: E dua tale na ka o via tukuna?
A: Au via tukuna ga ni neitou tu i kea, keitou tu sara ga ena muri lewa. Ni keitou sa rogoça ga ni sa kilai mai cake, sa ra involve tu kina e so na kanala lelevu, baleta levu na gauna dau lako o OC i cake, lai brief vei iratou i cake, au qai vakasamataka ni sa mai yaco na velika o ya, qo sara ga o ratou na veiliutaki.

Ia, ni sa toso tiko sa tukuni tale ni sa sega ni involve na Mataivalu, keimami sa veilecayaki tale o au kei ira na cauravou. Me da kila ni o keimami tamata vakarorogo, keimami vakarorogo tu ga vei ira na veiliutaki, ia au sa sega ni kila na vanua e medre kina. Sa i koya saka ga o ya.
Q120: E dua tale na taro e tiko, o vakamacalataka o iko ni lako vakavica o OC vei Col Tarakinikini me rau lai veitlanoa. O cei o OC - nomudou OC o kemudou?
A: Baleinamau.

Q121: O bau kila a lako vakavica vei Col Tarakinikini, a caka i vei na bose se na veitalanoa?
A: Dau levu na gauna ni oti toka na morning tea, se oti toka na veimama ni walu.

Q123: Me vaka o se qai vakamacalataka, e levu tu na kanala e ra involve ena ka qo se e dua, o iko talega o a lako o lai brief i cake?
A: Io.

Q124: E rawa ni o cavu yacataka mada e vica na colonel o lai brief-taka i cake? Col Naivalurua, Col Baledrokadroka, Commander Lesi, Major Vunidaiga, Major Ligairi, tiko talega kina o Col Raduva kei Lt. Dakai.
A: 

Q125: O cei e dau lai brief-taki?
A: Dau brief-taki mai vei keitou.

Q126: Dau brief-taki mai vei kemudou?
A: Sir.

Q127: Mo dou lai brief-taki ira na i lala Turaga ni Valu?
A: Sir, koya na brief o ya baleta e kaya o Col Naivalurua me dua mada na briefing.

Q128: Me dau caka e na veisiga?
A: Sega, koya ga e na siga o ya.

Q129: Dua ga na siga?
A: Sir.

Q130: Mo lako cake o iko mo lai brief-taki ira?
A: Sir.

Q131: O ya sa oti na vuaviri
A: Sega, se bera na vuaviri qo.

Q132: Na vula?
A: Na February beka, se bera ni lako kina o Col Naivalurua.

Q133: Na brief qo e baleta na cava, e rawa ni o vakamatatataka mada?
A: Qo na briefing ga ni nei toul Unit kei na nei toul role sara ga.
Q134: A caka ga vakadua?
A: Io.

Q135: Cpl, there was an ultimatum put out by Commander for those solders that were in the Complex to return back to the camp. Did you receive that message?
A: No.

Q136: You said you were following orders but later realised what was happening, why then did you not return to camp? What was holding you back?
A: Because we were told that the military has been committed, that the military is behind this.

Q137: Did you continue to receive your pay whilst you were at the Complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q138: Cpl Naduaniwai, vinaka vakalevu. Kevaka e dua tale na ka o vakasamataka, yakavi ni kua se mataka se dua tale na gauna o sega ni tukuna rawa e na nodatou veitalanoa qo, yalovinaka qai tukutuku ga mai vei dua vei iratou na lewe ni Board mo qai kacivi tale. Kevaka o na gadrevi tale mo mai dabe ena loma ni Board qo, keitou na qai kacivi iko tale, o sa rawa ni lesu tale. O tiko i vei e na gauna qo?
A: Au se sogo tiko e na cell mai cake.

Recalled on 11/09/00:

Cpl. P. Naduaniwai, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q139: Au na via vakaditaka ena matai ni gauna o solia na nomu i tukutuku o solia ena solemn affirmation. E so na ka e laurai tiko eke, it is not tying up with us. Other IMS are saying other things and you are saying a different thing. Keitou sa interview taki George Speight, eso na former Parliamentarians, those that were inside the chambers, keitou na qai raica talega na tapes.

Au ra tarogi iko tale ena vica na taro. O iko a kila na ka e baleta na vuaviri ni se bera na i ka 19 ni siga?
A: E sega.

Q140: Were you involved in the packing of weapons prior to the 19th?
A: No.

Q141: O iko a matai ni curu ena complex ena take over?
A: E sega.
E vica na tamata era a tiko e kea, o George Speight, Tikotani kei na kena i katolu o
iko. Even the IMS are saying that. O curu ena i matai ni gauna se sega?
A: Au a tu saka ga ena unit.

E dua na ka au via vakamacalatalaka vei iko. Na Board of Inquiry oqo, e dua ga na
tamata e rawa ni direct taka me caka na Board of Inquiry, na i liulii ni Mataivalu.
Na i liulii ni Matai valu e vakacakacakataki kemudou. Na ko tukuna tiko oqori, na
nomudou code of conduct, me kua ni dau soli na information, details of operation,
naiquiry oqo sa authorise taki, o iko na Kouvula e dodo mo kila vinaka. Na code
of conduct e apply taki ena gauna o lako kina ena buca ni valu. Na gauna o vesu
kina, mo kua ni solia na i tukutuku. Eya sucu na IMS i cake mai na British SAS.
Ena loma ni SAS, ena gauna e vakayacori kina na official inquiry, e vakatarai me
soli ra i tukutuku. Au kurabui kevaka o sega ni vakabauti au. Au kila na code of
conduct oqori, na cava na kena code of conduct, we have the old man on tapes,
keitou tarogi Na Qase. In fact, o Major Aziz, eya tarogi Na Qase.

E rua ga na tamata e rau sega ni via solia na i tukutuku. Keitou qai tarogi koya
baleta na code of conduct me vakamatatataka. We have been authorised to ask these
questions. We are bound by the employment oaths to get this inquiry otherwise no
one enquires into anything in such a unit like this. No one knows, the only person
knows is the RFMF. You understand what has happened. The Commander has now
directed us to do this investigation, otherwise we would not have done it. I think
you are confused with this. O iko a curu ena 1991, I am sure you should know
better. Various statements of Warrant officers and lieutenants who have been there
including the old man. They have given their statements, and they have given much
information, you are not giving what you should be giving. E rua na ka e rawa ni
yaco vei iko, o iko na kila vinaka. We basically know, there is proof, tapes,
witnesses, oti oqo keitou na qai tarai Mahendra Chaudhry kei ira na dabe tiko e
loma, o ira era raica na ka e yaco. Some people were present in there, they know
you. Ni soli na i tukutuku, e laurai saraga na tamata e lasu. Ni keitou yacova na
stage oqo, e matata saraga na ka e yaco.

Au na tarogi iko tale. O cei eya solia vei kemudou na briefing? Ko a lako i exercise
i Makuluva se sega?
A: E sega saka.

Q144: Ko a lako i exercise kina yasayasa vaka Ra vata kei iratou na training, ko a tiko mai
na keba? O cei a solia na briefing mai na keba me caka na vuaviri?
A: Au a sega saka ni tiko ena keba.

Q145: Ko dou a lako i sota ena Maritime vata kei Na Qase kei George Speight?
A: A qiritaki saka yani.
Q146: Ko a tiko e vei ena gauna oya?
A: An a tiko saka ena unit.

Q147: Mai kea dou qai laki sota taukoko e kea vata kei Na Qase kei George Speight? O dou qai vodo ena lori mo dou gole sobu ena Parliament Complex? E donu oya? Mai na Maritime, dou vodo, vica vata na twin cab, minibus vulavula, e liu o Na Qase. O qo na ka eya yaco ena mataka na i ka 19 ni siga?
A: Io saka.

Q148: Dou a curu sara i loma ni complex, sobu o Na Qase e wawa tikoga e kea. Liu sara o George i loma, e dua na kau e vakababa tiko ena loma ni chamber, ladeva na kau o George, karua o Tikotani ka i katolu o iko. E donu oya se cala?
A: Domu saka.

Q149: O dou tikoga e kea sa lako na veitalanoa, lako na ka kece, o Tikotani e vanataka na nona pistol. E rua na pistols e tiko vua, e biuta tale, taura tale e dua ka vanataka. E rua na shots e vanataka o Tikotani, e donu oya se sega?
A: E donu saka.

Q150: Ena nona tiko e loma o Tikotani, vakalailai e a curu yani o Na Qase, it could have been an hour or two, cawiri ga vakalailai, yali tale. E donu oya se sega?
A: E donu saka.

Q151: Oti oya qai curu tale yani o Major-General Rabuka, veitalanoa vata kei George Speight, rau veitalanoa ga vakalailai, gutuwa tale i tuba o koya. O rogoca na nodrau veitalanoa vata kei George Speight?
A: E sega saka. Au raiça ga ni rau veitalanoatakua e dua ka na, lesu i tuba qai lesu tale mai sa veisau tale. Na ka ga au rogoca; “are you people happy, are you people eating.”

Q152: Oqo e taroga o Rabuka?
A: Io, e tarogi iratou na lewe ni Palimedi, tarogi keitou, “are you people happy”, qai smile ga mai ka lako sara ki tuba.

Q153: O cei e kaba cake i cake?
A: Au sega saka ni raica.

Q154: Sa oti oya, qai curu yani o Jone Naisara, e veitaba wawoki tiko ena video camera, qai dua e dodoka vua na dakai, e dua ga vei kemudou me vakaga ni a vesu mai tuba. E donu ya se sega?
A: E doru. Au nanuma ga de dua mai na TV.

Q155: E ya mai curu i loma me veitaba tiko ena video camera i loma? E donu ya se sega.
E donu saka.

Q156: Na siga Vakarauwai ena 12 na kaloko, o bau raica na kena sobu na i yaragi ena loma ni complex?
A: E sega.

Q157: Vakacava ena siga Tabu, rauta na 7 na kaloko kina 9 na kaloko ena matakai lailai, o bau raica na kena sobu na i yaragi?
A: E sega saka.

Q158: O bau kila se o cei e kauta na i yaragi, na loading party se o cei e nona i tavi na kena laki kau mai?
A: E sega saka.

A: O Ticotani.

Q160: Ko a tiko e vei ena gauna oya?
A: Au a tiko mai Suva.

Q161: Ena maji. Ena gauna o kacivi kina, dou mai sota e kea, tu kina o George Speight, o Na Qase. Ni se bera ni dou sota, ko ya sa rogoca oti se o kila na kena plan taki na vaavari? Ena i matai ni gauna o rogoca kina ena gauna o dou brief taki kina ena Maritime?
A: Io saka.

Q162: E dua na ka au via confirm taka, o cei eya solia na briefing; o Na Qase se o George, se o rau ruarua?
A: O rau ruarua saka.

Q163: O George e vosa vei cei, vei kemudou taucoko?
A: Io saka.

Q164: Oti cya sa qai vosa o Na Qase?
A: Io saka.
Q165: O rawa ni vakamacalataka na ka e tukuna o koya?
A: Ni sa na take over taki na Palimedi.

Q166: O iko edua vei ira na operatives?
A: E sega saka, au tu saka ga i loma.

Q167: Na nomu training, o iko e dua vei ira na operatives, e donu oya?
A: Io saka.

Q168: Lesu tale mada, ena gauna o kauta yani kina na dakai i loma ni chambers, o ira na kena vo era vaka pistols, o iko ga o vaka MP5, e donu oya?
A: E sega saka.

Q169: Na daka cava eya tiko vei iko?
A: Na Uzis.

Q170: O ira na kena vo era vaka pistols, oya na i matai ni curu?
A: Io saka.

Q171: Just go back to the camp on the morning of the 19th, this is what has been told to us. That before the meeting at the maritme, the weapons were loaded from the armcury in a blue pick up truck which was driven by Jim Speight. Is that true that you were one of the people that were loading the weapons into the truck? This is the pistol that was issued to you, 315321, and the Uzis number is 7220612? That is your personal issue. When you were in the chambers, George Speight in the front, Tikotani and you. You were inside the bar?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q172: Is it true that Qicatabua was on this side and Vosavere came from the outside with the balaclavas?
A: Its true, Sir.

Q173: Who was covering you from the back?
A: I did not see him, Sir.

Q174: Who were the people with you in the minibus?
A: I did not know them.

Q175: The team in the minibus, were they members of IMS?
A: I only know Ravai, myself, Tikotani and Na Qase.

Q176: Do you know Liganivai from Mokani?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q177: Was he in the vehicle with you?
A: No, Sir.

Q178: Did you remember the day the TV station was broken into? Did you escort the civilian staff to the TV station?
A: No, Sir.

Q179: Did you at any time carry a sniper rifle with you?
A: No, Sir.

Q180: Do you know the person who was carrying the sniper rifle?
A: No, Sir.

Q181: E rawa ni ko vakamatata taka mada na cava na nomu relationship vata kei Mr. Baleinamau?
A: O koya na noqu officer commanding.

Q182: Kemudrau veikilai?
A: Io keirau veikilai, keirau a tu vata mai ATG, keitou ROSB vata, keitou cadet vata.

Q183: Ena gauna oqo e drau se veivolekati tikoga kei Mr. Baleinamau?
A: Au sa sega tu mada ga ni raici koya.

Q184: Dou vesu tu, dou bau rogoca e dua na ka baleti koya?
A: Au kila ni sa vesu tu ga.

Q185: O dou bau loma tarotaro se cava e se vesu tuga kina o koya?
A: Au sega ni kila na cava se vesu tikoga kina, na ka ga au kila ni o keimami na tiko e ra, we just obey orders. Keimami tamata ga ni vakarorogo.

Q186: In your unit are officers expected to stand up for their members?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q187: Do you now feel that some of the officers are not standing up for you?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q188: Officers like your previous OC?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q189: Kovula, ena Bogi ni Lotulevu na i ka 18 ni siga, ko a tiko e vei?
A: Au a tiko e vale.
Q190: Ko a sega ni wavoki mai na complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q191: Ko a sega ni lako kina Maritime?
A: E sega saka.

Q192: Ko bau kila na sea survival exercise?
A: Io, au kila.

Q193: O kila o cei soti ka lako?
A: Oratou o Mr. Dakuliga.

Q194: E tiko kina o Sokiveta?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q195: Ogo e vakatau vei iko, o via sauma se sega? Ena gauna ogo kevaka e tukuna o Mr. Baleinamau mo cakava e dua na ka, o na cakava?
A: E sega.

Q196: O Vosavere, was he a member of the team that went into the Chambers?
A: E sega saka.

Q197: Ena gauna dou sa tu kina ki loma, qai curu mai o koya?
A: Au kilga keitou sa tu e loma e qai curu mai o koya.

Q198: So, he did not go in with the team that went in?
A: Au sega ni kila, au qai raica koya ga e kea.

Q199: O iko a vaka balaclava ena nomu curu i loma se sega?
A: E sega saka.

Q200: O Vosavere eya vaka balaclava tiko?
A: Io saka.

Q201: Ena i ka 27 ni siga, e a lauvana kina e dua na 2\textsuperscript{nd} lieutenant, o Mr. Rokoura ena checkpoint. A tukuni ni lauvana mai vua e dua na sniper. Au kila ni o iko o sniper, o Ceaesiga kei na so tale. O bau kiliga o cei e vanai Mr. Rokoura?
A: E sega saka.

Q202: E sega ni o Tikotani?
A: E sega saka. As a soldier, au sega ni rawa ni vana tale e dua na noqu comrade.

Q203: Ena sga oya e so na civilians era vakaiyaragi tiko?
A: Au sega ni kilo sakal.

Q204: Eso vei kemudou e kilai iratou na TFs kei na Reserves, e so vei ira a mai tukuni vei keitou ni sa mai soli vei ira na i yaragi mera veivuke ena yadra. Ena macawa oya sa continue tu ga mai nomudou yadra, dou sega ni vakacegu, eya sega ni soli vei ira eso nai laa oqo na i yaragi.
A: Au sega sara ga ni kilo.

Q205: Go back to the 19th, ena gauna o dou lako sobu kina ki na Maritime slipway, were you told to draw your personal weapon or were you told by OC to draw weapon before you go down for this exercise? Ena gauna o dou lako sobu kina, dou sa vakaiyaragi tiko.
A: Keitou lako ga yani sa tu na dakai.

Q206: Dou qai lako sobu, dou sa draw taka nomudou personal weapons?
A: Keitou qai lako ga yani sa kauta mai o OC.

Q207: Kena: balebale dou qai lako sobu dou sa kau i yaragi tiko?
A: Io sakal.

Q208: E dua na tamata o bau sotava i loma ena i matai ni macawa, na yacana o Taufa. Eya turaga ni ovisa qai vakasakei koya o Commissioner Savua. Au sega ni kilo na i matai ni yacana, e turaga ni Lavu.
A: E sega sakal.

Q209: Na nomu tiko era unit, ena dua na gauna ni o dou deploy ena exercise vaka oqo, dou lako yani dou sota, brief, dou qai sota. E bau dua na gauna mo dou curu ena dua na vanua ka dou sega ni vakatovoto vo. Se ni se bera ni dou cakava e dua na ka, dou sa cakava na plan, exercise, dou sa qai toso?
A: Io sakal.

Q210: Keyaka e dina na ka o tukena tiko oqori, you must have been surprised when you went down and was briefed at the Maritime?
A: Yes, I was so surprised.

Q211: What made you move?
A: I was commanded.

Q212: Kea sega e kea o Na Qase, would you have gone?
A: E sega sakal.

Q213: Are you still receiving your pay?
A: It has been ceased, Sir.
Q214: Wher?
A: The day we came here.

Q215: Ena gauna o tiko kina e loma, o sainitaka e dua na Leave App?
A: Io saka.

Q216: O cei e kauta yani?
A: O Vuki kei Caucau.

Q217: Drau bau veitalanoa kei Col. Caucau?
A: E rau veitalanoa kei Na Qase, o koya e lako ga mai e mai lulu vei keitou.

Q218: Na cava e tukuna vei iko ni sa solia vei iko na Leave App?
A: Sainitaka na nomudou leave me cover taka na nomudou tiko e loma.

Q219: O veisaumi tu ga mai loma?
A: Na noqu tiko oya, au veisaumi tiko ga.

Q220: Ena gauna o yali tu kina, o veisaumi tuga?
A: Io saka, e sa qai mai cease ga eke.

Q221: E dua tale na ka o via vakamacalataka?
A: Au via vakamacalataka saka ga ni keitou muria saka na i vakaro.

[P/Naduaniwai]
Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class 1
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member
FOURTEENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 24562 PRIVATE MAIKELI BUKASILA

Private Bukasila, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Private Bukasila, ni se bera ni o talanoataka na ka e yaco, e rawa ni o vakamacalataka na nomu military service?

Q2: Ena gauna cavà o curu kina ki na 1M5?

Q3: E rawa ni o vakamacalataka na ka o vakaitavitaki ikon kina ena ka e yaco ena i 19 ni siga ni vula o Me? E bau tale ga kina na vakavakarau ni se bera na i ka 19 ni siga me yacova na gauna o lesu tale mai kina?

Q4: Eya yaco na coup ena siga Vakarabuka na i ka 19 ni siga ena kena macawa ka tarava na i ka 26 ni siga o qai curu kina ena Palimedi?
A: Io saka.

Q5: Ni se bera o ya, o a gole tu i vei?
A: Au a gole saka tu ena veibulu vei noqu Na.

Q6: Ni se bera na i ka 19 ni siga ko a tiko e vei?
A: Au a tiko saka ga e na keba.

Q7: E naik 19 ni siga, e rawa ni o talanoataka na ka eya yaco ena loma ni Unit?
A: Au sega saka ni kila. Au sega ni rawa ni’u talanoataka baleta ni’u sega saka ni kila.

Q8: O sega ni kila baleta niko a sega ni tiko e kea se ko a tiko e kea?
A: Au a sga saka ni tiko e kea, au a yali.

Q9: Ko a tiko e vei?
A: Au a gole saka tu ki Vanua Levu ena veibulu vei noqu Nana.

Q10: Ko a lako ena i ka vica ni siga ena veibulu koya?
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A: Ena siga Lotulevu na i ka 18 ni siga ni vula ko Me.

Q11: Ko a bau kilo e dua na ka ena kena vakarautaki na vuaviri; e dua na vili vakaivalu se cava ko bau vakaitavi kina?
A: E sega saka.

Q12: Talanoataka mada na siga ko a curu kina ena Complex ena i ka 26 ni siga ni vula ko Me? O cei drau a sota kei nai tavi cava o laki qarava?
A: Au a gole saka ga yani ka'u laki veivuke tu ena yadra kei iratou na noqu i tokani eratou tiko mai Palimedi.

Q13: O cei e a brief taki iko ena nomu a gole'yan i kea?
A: E sega ni dua e brief taki au saka. Ni'u rogoca ga eratou sa tiko e kea na noqu i tokani au sa gole sara ki kea.

Q14: E dua na briefing e a caka vei iko ena loma ni Palimedi?
A: E sega saka.

Q15: E sega ni dua e solia vei iko na brief mo lako i yadra?
A: E sega saka.

Q16: Ena gauna o tiko kina ena loma ni complex o bau veitaratara kei ira na security.
A: E sega saka.

Q17: Ena gauna ko a tiko kina ena complex bau vakadua na nomu biuta na complex mo gole ki tuba?
A: E sega saka.

Q18: E na nomu tiko ena complex, o bau vanataka vakadua na dakai?
A: E sega saka.

Q19: Ena loma ni complex ko bau veitaratara kei na dua ena talevoni se fax, dua na turaga ni valu se dua e lewe ni RPAP?
A: E sega saka.

Q20: Na i tavi cava o dau qarava tiko ena loma ni nomudou Unit?
A: Au diver saka tiko.

Q21: Ni se bera ni o gole i Vanua Levu ena leqa nei tinamu ko a bau vakaitavi ena dua na exercise e a vakayacora na nomu i liuliu?
A: E sega saka.

Q22: E sega ni dua na exercise i Nukulau ko a bau vakaitavi kina.
A: E sega saka.

Q23: Ena gauna ko ya gole kina ki Palimedi mo laki yadra, nai yaragi cava ea soli vei iko kei cei ea solia vei iko na i yaragi?
A: Na MP5 saka. Ea tuga e kea au lako ga yani au sainitaka.

Q24: O sainitaka vei cei?
A: E a tu saka ga e kea nai vola, au gole ga yani au sainitaka.

Q25: E a dua e bau yadrava tu na i yaragi?
A: E sega saka.

Q26: Ena nomu raica na i yaragi ena kena biu tu, e rawa ni gole ga yani e dua ka sega ni sotia me taura na dakai?
A: Na i yaragi saka era sa dui tara saka tu ga o ira e nodra.

Q27: Na nomu o iko ko a sainitaka o qai taura?
A: Io saka.

Q28: O raica na vanua e tu kina na dakai ni secure?
A: Io saka.

Q29: E a yadravi tu?
A: E sega saka ni dua e tiko kina, e a loka tu na rumu.

Q30: E soli ga vei iko na ki o taura mai?
A: Io saka.

Q31: Private Bukasila, kenai balebale e rawa ga ni dua e taura na ki ka taura na dakai?
A: Au sega saka ni rawa ni saurna na taro oqori?

Q32: O bua raica ni soli na i yaragi vua e dua na civilian?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q33: O bua rogoca na ovisa ka lauvana mai vei ira mai na Palimedi?
A: Au rogoca saka.

Q34: O kila o cei e vana?
A: E sega saka niu kila.

Q35: Private Bukasila, when you went to the complex, what responsibility were you given in the Parliament?
A: Au yadra saka.
Q36: Were you ever given the responsibility of looking after the weapons?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q37: Who was looking after the weapons before you?
A: Au sega saka ni'u kila o cei e incharge tiko ena gauna o ya ena dakai ena rumu e sogo tiko kina.

Q38: Do you know one Sgt. Celeasiga?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q39: Did you meet him in the complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q40: What was he doing in the Parliament Complex?
A: O ko ya e dau yadra tale saka tiko ga.

Q41: Was he in charge of the weapons before you?
A: Io saka.

Q42: You said you were looking after the weapons and issuing it? Did you give the weapons to any civilians any time?
A: E sega saka.

Q43: Where is the register that you used for signing the weapons?
A: Na noqi i vola saka oqori e yali saka ena noqi kato mai Kalabu.

Q44: When Col. Evans asked you earlier which day you left the Parliament, you said 13th July. Is it incorrect that you left the Parliament on the 14th?
A: No, Sir, au a biuta saka mai na Palimedi na ena i ka 14.

Q45: Why did you leave on the 14th?
A: Baleta saka ga na veisolisolisi saka ga ni yaragi oko ya a tukuni me lako vata tiko kei iratou na mataivalu.

Q46: Whom did you handover the weapons to?
A: Eratou sa lako saka ga yani oiratou o Lt. Stevens kei iratou o Lt. Misivono.

Q47: Did you have a list of all the weapons that you had in the Parliament Complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q48: You said the weapons were assigned to individual persons?
A: E rawa ni lesu tale nomuni taro saka?
Q49: The weapons you have in the armory in the complex, were the weapons assigned to each CRW persons?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q50: Could one CRW person borrow the weapon which belongs to another?
A: Au sega saka mada ni kilo oqori.

Q51: You were in charge of the armory?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q52: For example, myself and Major Gucake, if I come to you and ask for weapon, would you give me Major Gucake's weapon?
A: Au sega saka mada ni kilo.

Q53: Me vakamatatataki, na dakai kece e tiko ena Palimedi e personal issue se pool issue?
A: E personal issue saka.

Q54: E kena i balebale na personal issue na nomu laki vakaitavitaki iko ena ka vakaivalu, ena armory na issue taki ni dakai vua e dua na tamata ena issue tu ga vei koya ena gauna kece sara? E sega ni pool issue, individually?
A: E dau mai maroroi ga ni ra lako ga mai era sa dui kauta tale na nodra dakai.

Q55: Do you know of the weapons that went missing in the complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q56: Did you account for all the weapons from the register that you have?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q57: Were there any weapons missing?
A: E sega saka.

Q58: No weapons was missing from the register?
A: E sega saka.

Q59: When you left the complex on 14th July, where did you go to?
A: I vale saka.

Q60: Did you go up to Kalabu?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q61: When was that?
A: E na siga e tarava.
Q62: That would be the 15th?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q63: Did you meet the other CRW personnel there?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q64: Why did you go to Kalabu?
A: Au lako saka ki kea ni a tukuni me laki caka na i quisi ni loaloa.

Q65: Can you tell the court what happen in Kalabu?
A: Au qai yadra mai ena mataka lailai esa tukuni era sa tu e matamata na sotia ka mani tukuni me keimami sa lako mai tuba. Na vuni noqu lako mai tuba ni sa lako na vanavana, sa kautu au mai tuba na gas ka vanataki yani ki loma. Au lako mai ki tuba sa vakadavori au ga na i caq, na i vacu, au qai laki vakilai au saka ga i valenibula levu. O koya saka ga oya na ka au rawa ni vakamacalataka.

Q66: O qai curu ena Palimedi ena i ka 26 ni siga ni vula o Me?
A: Io saka.

Q67: E na i ka 26 ni siga e a soli tale ga kina vei iko mo armorer.
A: E sega e sa soli saka ga vei au.

Q68: E mata ta vei ko na siga?
A: Au sega saka ni taura rawa.

Q69: E tiko vei iko e dua na register?
A: Na noqu i vula saka e yali vata kei na noqu kato mai Kalabu.

Q70: Ena gauna ni raid ena mataka lailai?
A: Io saka, e a tu ga ena loma ni noqu kato.

Q71: Ena gauna a soli kina vei iko na tavi oya, na armorer, na i yaragi taukoko e tiko ena list oya. Na i yaragi taukoko oya ea count taki ka soli vei Lt. Stevens ena i ka 14 ni siga?
A: Io saka.

Q72: O cei e a qarava tiko na i tavi oya ni o se bera ni take over?
A: E a tara saka tiko o Satini Celeasiga.

Q73: E a armorer tu e liu o Satini Tony Celeasiga?
A: Io saka.
Q74: Can you explain to us when you arrived at Kalabu Fijian School, the ceremony that took place there? What happened at the school?
A: E a sega saka ni dua na ka e a caka tu kina. E a nanumi saka ga ni laki caka kina na i quisi ni loaloa. Ia e a mani sega ni caka.

Q75: Na cava e qai caka tiko mai Kalabu?
A: Au saka au lako ga yani sa sega ga, au sa lesu tale i vale.

Q76: Na cava e caka tiko e kea?

Q77: Is it true that you remained at Kalabu until you were arrested?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q78: Did you meet 1FMS soldiers at Kalabu?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q79: Can you give us the names of the soldiers?
A: Naduaniwai, Mr. Baleinamau, Soki, Nawaqa, Ligani, Raivalu and Ratu. O koya saka ga oya au nanuma rawa.

Q80: Did you continue to receive your pay whilst in the Parliament House?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q81: What injury did you sustain in Kalabu?
A: Na uluqo saka, na sareqo, o koya saka ga oya.

Q82: Ena gauna oqo o tiko ena Unit cava?
A: Au tiko saka ena Land Force Command.

Q83: O a luarai vakavuniwai ena nomu mavo ka sa volai kece tu na ka e yaco?
A: Ena CWM Hospital, saka.

Q84: O bau: kila ni dua na copy ni nomu mavo e tiko ena nomu file?
A: E se tera saka.

Q85: Tekivu na gauna o tiko kina ena Palimedi yacova na nomu lako ki Kalabu, e a musu mada ena dua na gauna na kemu i sau.
A: E sega saka.

Q86: Na nomu tiko ena Palimedi o bau rogoca e dua na veitalanoa baleta na vei ka e vakayacori tiko oya e veitokoni kina na mataivalu?
A: E sega saka niu rogoca.

Q87: Private Bukasila, e dua tale na ka o vinakata ke ko via vakamacalataka?
A: Au ke-ekere saka ga ke rawa ni laurai e dua na gaumisala me laurai tale mai kina na noqu i yaya, na noqu kato e vuqa na i sulu e tu e loma era sa yali. Sa kena levu saka.

Recalled on 13/09/00:

Pte. Bukasila, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q89: Private Bukasila, o raica na ka e tu i matamu qori, na weapons register, qori na nomu weapon register na vakayagataka tiko i Palimedi?
A: Io saka.

Q90: Okoya qori ea sega ni tauri mai Kalabu, dou a biuta ga mai na complex, e pick-taki mai na complex. O iko a tukuna e liu ni a tu ena nomu kato, ia o iko a guilecava mai na complex.
A: Sir, e dua saka na ka au via tukuna, e dua saka na noqu notebook lai'ai au a copy-taka mai kina, okoya au biuta saka tiko ena noqu bag, au a tukuna saka tiko ya.

Q91: Na yaya kece mai Kalabu ena tiko ga vei iratou na ovisa. Ni sa na oti kece na kisi taucooko esa na qai rawa ni suka na nomudou yaya. Na ka kece ya e vakayagataki tiko me evidence.
A: Sir.

Q92: Private Bukasila, you were there when all the stores were returned on the 14th of July?
A: Sir.

Q93: There were some pistols that were kept by the bodyguards, is that true?
A: Au sega saka ni taura rawa.

Q94: E dua na directive e solia o Na Qase, e solia o Na Qase e vica vata na statements esa tu qo, a tukuna o Na Qase nona directive, confirm o Private Soko, confirm talega o Sergeant-Major Waqaniboro, e vica vata na tamata era confirm-taka nia tukuni me suka taucooko na dakai, na pistols ga e tiko vei iratou na bodyguards me tiko ga.
A: Au sega saka ni taura na directive saka qori.

Q95: Ena gauna o takeover, e dua na list ni dakai ea tiko?
A: Sir.
Q96: Ivei na list ya?
A: O koya saka ga au sa lavetaka saka mai ena i lavelave saka qo.

Q97: Koya evei?
A: Okoya sa kau saka yani.

Q98: Qo na weapons register ga, e record-taka na kena soli na yaragi. E tiko e dua na nomu list koya e tiko kina na levu ni dakai e tiko ikeia?
A: Okoya saka ga qori au tekivu cakacaka saka kina.

Q99: Qo na weapons register ga, ea tiko vei iko e dua na list ni dakai ea tiko mai vei iko mai ra?
A: Sega saka.

Q100: Na armoury, o kila na back gate mai na complex?
A: Sir.

Q101: Raica na vanua e dusi tiko kina o Sergeant-Major Macomber (indicating), ya na vanua e tiko kina na armoury, koya ga na vale balavu, e tiko i ra. Na armoury e tiko ena karua ni room?
A: Sir.

Q102: O dou vakayagataka ruarua, na rumu ya vata kei na adjourning room?
A: Sega saka, okoya saka ga na rumu ya.

Q103: E dua ga na rumu ya, e maroroi tu kina na dakai?
A: Sir.

Q104: E maroroi tiko ena cava, ena kisi se cava?
A: E lokataki saka tu ga i loma ya.

Q105: E maroroi tu vakacava i loma ya, ena kena kisi, se duffel bags, para bags?
A: Ena so na para bags.

Q106: Ena gauna qo o tiko ivei?
A: Au sa attach saka tiko vei iratou na MP.

Q107: Private Bukasila, can I just show you these? These are the names of people who drew weapons. What is this signature for?
A: That is my signature.

Q108: When it was returned?
A: Sir.
Q109: Are these weapons still missing?
A: Sir, esa suka saka mai.

Q110: Did you have parker hales (sniper rifles) in the complex?
A: Sir, na M16 A2, sniper.

Q111: With the telescopic sight?
A: Sir.

Q112: Private Bukasila, from what you heard and saw in the Parliament Complex, ena gauna qo, o kila tiko na vanua e maroroi tiko kina eso na dakai, e 25 na dakai e yali tiko?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q113: Eso na dakai e tiko ena loma ni register qo, ea sega ni suka, o sign-taka e soli?
A: Sir, koya saka na dakai au kila niu a tiko kina esa suka saka.

Q114: Ia, eso era sega ni sign-on taka tale?
A: Sega, baleta e dua saka na ka au via tukuna ena tikina ya, baleta keirau dau veivuke saka tiko kei WARRANT OFFICER CLASS 1 Ravai, ena so na gauna niu dau yadra, esa dau in-charge tokia mai okoya.

Q115: E dua tale na ka o via vakamacalataka ni se bera ni soli vei iko na galala mo lako?
A: Sega saka.

Q116: Just one question, the weapons were left in the armoury in the para bags, was there any occasion where one member of the 1MS was going on duty would come to the armoury and there was no one there? Would he be able to sign the register and just draw the weapon?
A: Sega saka.

Q117: There was always someone there in the armoury?
A: Sir.

Q118: Na key ea maroroi tiko ivei?
A: Na key e dau tiko saka ga vei au.

Q119: Ena gauna ga o lako, e soli vei Ravai?
A: Sir.
Q120: E dua na ka e tukuna o Warrant Officer Class 1 Ravai, na gauna mo lako kina ena dua na vanua, e dau relieve taki iko, e sega ni dau sign-on se sign-off taka na dakai, e donu ya?
A: Sega saka. E dau so na gauna e sign-off taka talega okoya.

Q121: E dua na ka o via vakamacalataka?
A: Esa sega saka.

[M. BUkasila]
Private

[J. N. B. Evans]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. Mohammed]
Major
Member

[H. Macomber]
Warrant Officer Class 1
Member

[T. Gucake]
Major
Member
CONFIDENTIAL

FIFTEENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 25003 PTE EMOSI SERUKASARI

Pte Serukasari, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Private Serukasari, give us an outline of your military service.

Q2: When did you join the 1FMS?
A: I was appointed in August last year.

Q3: Pte Serukasari, can you give us a brief outline of your activities prior to the events of 19th May, the activities after the events of 19th takeover until the 13th of July up to the certain time when you were came or brought back to the Camp?
A: Ni se bera na i ka 19 keitou a exercise tiko ga, ia sa oti na i ka 19 ni siga au sa qai lako i loma ni Palimedi. Au tu mai kina me yacova na i ka 13. Au lesu tale i vale au sa qai lako ga mai i na keba ni oti oya. Gauna qo au sa post-taki i na 3FIR.

Q4: Were you involved in any of the training or planning of the take-over of the Complex?
A: Au ki a e sega ni dua na planning keitou cakava me plan-taki kina na takeover.

Q5: When did you actually go into the Complex?
A: E na yakavi ni Vakaraubuka.

Q6: Were you involved in the initial take-over of the Parliament Complex?
A: Sega.

Q7: What were your duties in the Complex?
A: Au secure-taki iratou tu ga na hostages.

Q8: Can you explain?
A: Au vakaitavi tu ga e na nodratou protect-taki tu ga kei na nodratou welfare.

Q9: Protect the hostages from what?
A: From the civilians vata kei na nodratou maroroi tikoga e na loma ni Complex.

Q10: At any point in time, were you aware of any contacts made by you or any other members in the Complex with 1FMS back at QEB?
A: Sega.
Q11: Were you aware or involved of contacts made by any other personnel, apart from 1FMS, at QEB whether by telephone, fax or any other mode of communication? 
A: Sega.

Q12: Who was your overall Commander in the Complex? 
A: Na Qase.

Q13: Did you, at any time, leave the Complex? 
A: E na gauna ga au sa lako kina i vale.

Q14: On the 13th of July you left the Complex when it was vacated? 
A: Sir.

Q15: At any time did you fire your weapon while in the Complex? 
A: Sega.

Q16: There are various structures within the Complex; the military wing, Vanua wing and the political wing. Who was the overall Commander of the military wing? 
A: Na Qase.

Q17: Who was the overall Commander of the political wing? 
A: Au sega ni kila.

Q18: The Vanua wing? 
A: Au sega ni kila.

Q19: Private Serukasari, where were you on the 18th of May? 
A: Makuluva.

Q20: What time did you return? 
A: I cannot remember exactly. I think it was on Friday morning.

Q21: What time did you return? 
A: I cannot tell exactly.

Q22: Was it dark or light? 
A: It was early light.

Q23: How did you travel from Makuluva to the main island? 
A: In a dinghy.

Q24: Where did you land?
A: At the Range.

Q25: How many teams were taking part in the training?
A: Only one team.

Q26: That was the team you were in?
A: Yes.

Q27: Who was the leader of your team?
A: Lt. Dakuliga.

Q28: When you arrived at the Range, where did you go from there?
A: To the Barracks.

Q29: What did you do when you arrived at the Barracks?
A: Just reconditioned our stores, cleaned up and then put them back in our stores.

Q30: After you cleaned up the stores and put the weapons back, what did you do next?
A: We went back home.

Q31: Where do you live?
A: In Narere, Sir.

Q32: Do you live with your family?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q33: Was your family home when you arrived?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q34: What time did you come back to camp?
A: I did not go back to camp, I went straight to Parliament.

Q35: How did you hear of the take-over?
A: Over the news.

Q36: When you arrived at the Complex, where did you go to?
A: Only at the gates.

Q37: Was there anyone at the gate you knew?
A: They were all civilians.

Q38: Were they checking people who went into Parliament?
A: No.
Q39: Anyone could walk in?
A: Sir.

Q40: Did you walk into Parliament?
A: Sir.

Q41: Wheres did you go to next?
A: I went to my group, they were there.

Q42: Wheres were they in Parliament?
A: In one of the complex.

Q43: What were they doing?
A: They were just standing around mixing with people.

Q44: What people are you talking about?
A: I do not know them.

Q45: Were they civilians?
A: Yes.

Q46: How were they dressed?
A: In normal clothes.

Q47: Did they have a neck-tie on?
A: No.

Q48: The personnals from your unit, were they armed?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q49: Can you identify the persons you spoke with?
A: Some of them.

Q50: Can you name them to this Board?
A: Keitou sa vosa bubului oti saka vua na neitou SOP, keitou sa na vakamuria saka ga. Na soli saka ni yaca me sa qai solia saka ga na neitou Commander.

Q51: Nomudou bubului, o cei e solia vei kemudou nomudou oath?
A: Commander saka.

Q52: O cei e direct-taka na Board of Inquiry qo?
A: Commander saka.
Q53: O ratou na nomudou turaga ni valu e ra sa mai soli tukutuku oti ike, o iko na i matai ni tamata o sega ni solia na yaca, ia sa vakatau sara ga vei iko, o na mai dabe tale e na Board qo. Na taro e tiko, nomu curu e na loma ni Complex o sa sota vata kei ira na i lala CRW, o cei o iratou na i lala oya?
A: Ben, Vosavere ....

Q54: Ben, Vosavere, o cei tale?
A: Sokiveta, Liganivai, Ravai.

Q55: Did you talk to them?
A: Yes.

Q56: What was said?
A: That we were taking over the Government.

Q57: Who said that to you?
A: My fellow ....

Q58: Anyone in particular said that?
A: I cannot recall.

Q59: Were any of these persons dressed in balaclava?
A: Some of them.

Q60: Who?
A: I cannot remember.

Q61: But he is the same person that you were speaking with here?
A: No.

Q62: Then?
A: It was Sokiveta.

Q63: He was dressed in balaclava?
A: No.

Q64: Then?
A: He was the person I spoke to.

Q65: Did you see Major Ligaiti (the Director) there?
A: Yes.
Q66: Where was he?
A: He was in one of the rooms?

Q67: What was he doing?
A: Just sitting on one chair.

Q68: Was there someone with him in the room?
A: No.

Q69: Where was Mr. Baleinamau?
A: I did not see him.

Q70: Where was Lt. Dakuliga?
A: I did not see him.

Q71: When you joined your colleagues at the Parliament Complex on the 19th of May, at any time did you see Lt Baleinamau enter the Complex?
A: No.

Q72: On your entering the Complex until your departure from the Complex, you did not see Baleinamau at all?
A: No.

Q73: Did you see any CRW/1FMS personnel, who was not part of the group inside the Complex, enter the Complex for any meeting or discussion?
A: No.

Q74: Did you see any other member of the RFMF not part of your unit enter the Complex?
A: I only saw Col Wong and Rabuka.

Q75: O sega ni matai ni tamata e cavu yaca tiko. Na vei witness taukoko e cavuyaca, au vola tiko, sa dua na cakacaka levu, e sega ni ka rarawa. Bau dua tale na turaga ni vaI. o raica e na loma ni Palimedi?
A: Au sega saka ni raica.

Q76: The 1FMS weapons taken out of QEB; were you or anyone else involved in the weapons being taken out of QEB to the Complex?
A: Sega.

Q77: Were you aware of the weapons being taken out?
A: Sega.
Q78: What was your responsibility in the Complex?
A: To secure the full complex, the civilians inside and the hostages.

Q79: Am I correct in saying that your responsibility surrounded the buildings or the perimeters?
A: Yes.

Q80: Which of the two, the perimeter or the buildings?
A: The perimeter and the building.

Q81: Do you recall the day the police officer got shot?
A: I cannot recall the exact day, but I know he got shot.

Q82: Where were you on that day?
A: Inside the Complex?

Q83: Were you on duty that day?
A: Yes.

Q84: What were you doing?
A: I was at one end of the Pte.

Q85: Which part of the Pte were you when the shots were fired?
A: I cannot say exactly.

Q86: Did you hear the gunshots?
A: No, I did not.

Q87: Did you hear who fired the shots?
A: No.

Q88: The weapons you carried, how did you draw them out? Did you have to fill in a register?
A: No, just pick anyone.

Q89: Where were these weapons kept?
A: In one of the rooms at the Complex.

Q90: How many weapons were in the room?
A: I did not count.

Q91: One, two or a lot of them?
A: They were all piled.
Q92: What was the security arrangement like? Were there locks or was it open?  
A: One of us used to stay there.

Q93: So every time you went to draw a weapon, there was always someone there?  
A: Yes.

Q94: When you went to draw a weapon, who was the person that issued you with the weapon?  
A: Mr. Ravai.

Q95: Was there anyone there when Mr. Ravai was absent?  
A: I do not know—but there must be someone when he goes out.

Q96: Who else used to be there?  
A: Most of the time it was always him.

Q97: Was there any occasion when he was not there that you went to draw the weapons?  
A: No.

Q98: Every time you went, he was there?  
A: Yes.

Q99: Did you sign for any weapons?  
A: No.

Q100: Do you know Private Bukasila?  
A: Yes.

Q101: What was his role in the Complex?  
A: He guarded the place around with us.

Q102: Was he also responsible for issuing weapons?  
A: Yes, sometimes I see him inside.

Q103: Did you draw weapons from him at any time?  
A: No.

Q104: Do you know Sergeant Celeasiga?  
A: Yes.

Q105: What was his responsibility in the Complex?
A: The same as mine.

Q106: Was he also responsible for issuing weapons?
A: No.

Q107: After you left the Complex, did you go up to Kalabu?
A: No.

Q108: Which day did you leave the Complex?
A: I cannot say exactly.

Q109: Was it the same day as others left the Complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q110: Where did you go to?
A: I went home.

Q111: Were you arrested?
A: No.

Q112: Whilst in the Complex, did you continue receiving your pay?
A: Yes.

Q113: Whilst guarding the hostages, what were your instructions?
A: To secure them from anyone who wants to come in.

Q114: Were you to secure them from going out?
A: Yes.

Q115: Who gave you these instructions?
A: The Sargeant.

Q116: And who was this Sargeant?
A: Sergeant Ravulo.

Q117: Can you just tell us how many teams took part in the exercise on the 18th until the early morning of the 19th?
A: E va teka; 4-men teams.

Q118: E na gauna sa oti kina na nomudou exercise, o tukuna o iko ni nomu timi e cabe ga ena Range. A so tale na vanua a cabe kina na vo ni timi?
A: Keitou cabe taucoko mai na Range.
Q119: Sega ni dua e cabe mai na Hanger makawa mai Laucala?
A: Sega.

Q120: Nomudou tala mai na Range, o cei a waraki kemudou mai na Range?
A: Keitou sobu ga mai kea, rau sa advance sara ga o Mr. Dakuliga vata kei Ratu.

Q121: Dou lako vakacava mai na Range ki na nomudou Complex?
A: A qiritaki na neitou lori levu - Renault.

Q122: E na gauna sa oti kina na nomudou savata na nomudou I yaya, dou a veisukayaki i vale se a soli tale vei kemudou e dua na brief e na dua na exercise me vakayacori tale e na mataka oya?
A: Keitou veisukayaki i vale.

Q123: Dou a sega ni gole tale e na dua na exercise a vakayacori tale e na mataka ni siga Vakarubuka oya?
A: Sega.

Q124: O tukuna o iko ni gauna taucoko o vakayagataka kina na dakai, e sega ni dua na siga o lako i loma?
A: E tiko ga e na rumu o koya e secure-taki tiko na dakai.

Q125: Ia o koya ga oya e issue-taka tiko na dakai?
A: Keitou lako ga yani keitou taura ga na dakai keitou lesu.

Q126: E loka tiko na rumu e tiko kina na dakai?
A: E sega.

Q127: E dola tu ga?
A: Dola t1 ga.

Q128: E sega ni dua e tu i kea me receive-taka mai na dakai?
A: Sega.

Q129: E na gauna cava o dou vakasuka lesu kina na dakai? Se matai ga ni siga sa tu sara tu ga vei iko me yacova na gauna e suka tale kina ki na Mataivalu na i yaragi?
A: So ga na gauna kevaka au sega ni via maroroya, au rawa ni biuta tu mada ike, oti au qai tara tale.

Q130: What time did you leave camp on the 19th to go home?
A: In the afternoon.
Q131: You came back from the exercise at Makuluva, reconditioned your stores, did you earlier say that you went home after that?  
A: Yes.

Q132: What time was that?  
A: About mid-day.

Q133: Where do you live?  
A: In Narere.

Q134: What place in Narere?  
A: I do not know the name of the street.

Q135: You do not know the name of the street you live in?  
A: I just moved there two weeks before May 19th.

Q136: Do you live there with your family?  
A: Yes.

Q137: Were your family home when you arrived?  
A: Yes.

Q138: Who all were at home when you arrived?  
A: All my family.

Q139: Wife and children?  
A: Yes.

Q140: When you left, were your family at home?  
A: Yes.

Q141: Would they vouch for you that you arrived home at that time?  
A: Yes.

Q142: What time did you leave home?  
A: In the afternoon.

Q143: How did you go to the Complex?  
A: I went by bus.

Q144: Is there a bus servicing your street or did you walk a distance to catch your bus?  
A: There is a bus servicing that area.
Q145: Private Serukasari, we have gone through a long session with you. Is there anything else you wish to give to the Board?
A: Sega.

Q146: Should we again require your presence before the Board on a point of clarification or questioning, we will recall you at a later date. In the meantime, you are free to go back to your unit.
A: Sir.

Recalled on 12/09/09:

Pte Serukasari, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q147: Vakaditaka mada e vica na taro: matai, o iko a tiko mai Makuluva e na cycle training; donu?
A: Donu saka.

Q148: Na cycle training mai Makuluva ena macawa ni vuaviri?
A: Sir.

Q149: Vakaditaka mada, e na siga Lotulevu a kauta yani o Dakuliga, Naika vata kei Pte Ratu e uplift-taka e so na dakai tawa tu e loma ni taga; na MP5 vata kei na pistol, a pick-taka mai na Maritime; e donu oya?
A: Au sega ni kilia.

Q150: E na gauna dou a veitalanoa kina e na nomudou tiko mai Makuluva, a vakaracalatakina kina vei kemudou na ka e baleta na vuaviri, na ka e na yaco e na siga ka tarava; na i ka 19, dou a sega ni duavata; donu oya?
A: Au sega ni taura rawa saka.

Q151: Serukasari, sa vica vata na tamata e ra tukuna na i tukutuku oya. Dua qo e se qai vakaradaku ga, sa matata na ka e yaco. Sa matata okoya e vakaitavi i vei, na ka kece, e rawa ni o vakarawarawataka kina Board qo, ke sega e na vakatau sara ga vei iko. Na Board qo e raica na yasana taucoko. Na ka e yaco, a caya na vuna e yaco kina na veika sa yaco, e raica ruarua. E rawa ni recommend-taka na Board na ka me caka; e sega tale ni dua. Na ovisa e raica ga na crime e commit-taki, e sega ni raica na yasana ruarua. Nomu team leader o Lt Dakuliga, e donu oya se sega?
A: E vakasaka kina.

Q152: Okoya me overall in-charge?
A: Sir.
Q153: Kemudou a cabe mai vei?
A: Mai na Range.

Q154: Mai na Range dou a gole i vei?
A: Keitou a gole saka i na keba.

Q155: O iko a tiko ena veitalanoa mai Makuluva ni sa tukuni na siga ka tarava e na caka na vuaviri, bogi ni Lotulevu a kau na i yaragi, a caka na veitalanoa ni na vakayagataki ena vuaviri e na siga ka tarava na i ka 19 ni Me. A caka e dua na veiba i kea, ratou sa tukuna, “keitou sa sega ni duavata”. Lesu yani o Dakuliga via lai qiri tale, sagai Na Qase vata kei Tikotani, sega ni rawa rau mani tawana tale na i yaragi, loma ni taga tikoga oya, kau lesu tale kina Unit; e donu oya?
A: Au sega ni nanuma saka qori.

Q156: O iko a tiko ena veitalanoa oya mai Makuluva. Na gauna e sa lai brief kina o Lt Dakuliga, sa lai vakamacalataka, na i yaragi sa tiko qo e na vakayagataki e na vuaviri ni mataka, o iko a tiko e na brief oya?
A: Au a tiko ga e na brief ni exercise.

Q157: Qo na bogi ni Lotulevu?
A: Au sa sega saka ni kila na gauna.

Q158: O iko a raica na dakai koya a tawa e loma ni taga ena gauna dou sa sobu kina ena Range mo dou vakarau vodo lesu tale e na lori, dou lesu tale i na Unit?
A: Na neitou personal weapon saka ga.

Q159: Na personal weapon (M16) a kau ni se qai tekivu na exercise; o iko a raica na i vovo ni yaragi koya a tawa e loma ni taga?
A: Au sega ni kila saka na vo ni yaragi.

Recalled on 13/09/00:

Pte. Serukasari, after having been duly reminded of oath earlier taken, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q160: Ena ka e record-taki ike, oiko a sega ni via soli tukutuku ena matai ni gauna ona soli tukutuku ike ena ka 23 ni siga ni vula o Okosita. Au na vakatarogi iko ena so na ka ea yaaco, kevaka ona sega ni via soli tukutuku, tou na muduka ga ike na nodatou interview, keitou na record-taka ga nio sega ni via soli tukutuku.

Kenai matai, o iko a involve ena vuli vakaivalu ea caka mai Makuluva, e dina oya?
A: Io saka.

Q161: Mai Makuluva, ena bogi ni Lotulevu, na admin run ena bogi, ea kau mai eso na yaragi, e tawa mai ena loma ni sand bag, e dina ya se sega?
A: Au sega ni kila saka.

Q162: Na bogi ga ni Lotulevu, dou a biubiu mai kea, dou vakaciriciri i wai, e caka na veiba, dou a vakaitavi ena vuaviri se sega, e caka na brief. O a tiko ena brief ena gauna dou brief-taki kina ena bogi ni Lotulevu mo dou vakaitavi ena vuaviri ena siga Vakarubuka, oa tiko ena brief ya?
A: Au sega ni taura rawa saka.

Q163: O a tiko ena brief ya se sega?
A: Na brief saka ni exercise.

Q164: Sega na brief ea caka ena bogi ni Lotulevu, ea veitalanoataki tiko na ka ena yaco ena siga Vakarubuka, na vakaitavi ena vuaviri, oa tiko ena veitalanoa ya, nomudou veitalanoataki tiko mai Makuluva?
A: E sega ni macala saka vei au.

Q165: Mai Makuluva dou a cabe ivei?
A: Na range.

Q166: Ocei soti dou a cabe ena range?
A: E rua na dinghy.

Q167: Ocei ea tiko ena nomudou dinghy?
A: Au kilia saka ga e rua na neitou team.

Q168: Ocei ea tiko ena nomu team?
A: O Ratu kei Nawaqa.

Q169: Ocei tale?
A: O rau sakia ga ya keitou team vata.

Q170: E vica na tamata e tiko ena dua na team?
A: E viavi tolu saka.

Q171: E tolu se va?
A: Au sa sega ni taura rawa saka na kenai ka va ni tamata.

Q172: Na training qo ea tekivu ena yabaki sa oti, e donu?
A: Sir.
Q173: Oiko a selection ena 1999, yabaki sa oti?
A: Sir.

Q174: E dua na gauna balavu o tiko vata kei ira na tamata ena loma ni Unita ya, mo qai tukuna ni dua na four-men team o sega ni kila nai ka va ni tamata. Esa dua na macawa nomudou training vata tiko i wai ya, o qai sega ni kila nai ka va ni tamata.
A: Sir, ese oti saka qo e dua na gauna balavu.

Q175: Ni o tukuna tiko o Ratu e dua na lewe ni nomudou team, dou a cabe mai na range, o Ratu cava qo? O Ratu mai Nabouvalu se o Ratu lailai?
A: Ratu lailai, Sir.

Q176: vakacava keu tukuna vei iko nio Ratu lailai e tukuna ike okoya ni a sega ni tiko ena nomu team, ni okoya a sega ni cabe mai na range, e dua tani tale na vanua ea cabe mai kina okoya, na cava o rawa ni tukuna ikea?
A: Au kilu saka ga ni keitou team vata ka keitou vodo mai ena dua na dinghy.

Q177: Kenai balebale ya, kevaka dou vodo vata mai ena dua na dinghy, na cava e qai duidui kina na vanua dou dui cabe mai kina?
A: Au kilu saka ga ni keitou vodo vata saka.

Q178: Ia o iko cabe mai vei?
A: Na range saka.

Q179: O Ratu e tukuna okoya ni cabe mai na maritime. Kenai balebale ya, e lako tu ga mai na dinghy ya, dou qai musuka nuarua na dinghy, e veimama lako na Maritime, e veimama e lako na range?
A: E sega saka ni clear vei au qori.

Q180: O Seru ea tiko ena nomudou team?
A: O Seru?

Q181: O taura rawa tiko na ka au tukuna tiko se sega? Na ka e lasa gona kina baleta ni tukuni ike nomudou cabe mai na maritime, o iko qai tukuna tiko na range. O cabe mai vei Serukasari?
A: Mai na range.

Q182: Nomu cabe mai na range, o cei e waraki iko tiko kina?
A: E qai lako saka yani na truck me lai pick-taki keitou mai.

Q183: Na truck cava e lai tomi k temudou mai?
A: Na renaul.
Q184: Na renaul mai vei?
A: Na renaul saka ni Unit.
Q185: Vakacava keu tukuna vei iko na renaul ni Unit ena gauna ya ea tiko mai ena selection mai Nadi?
A: Na renaul mai ....
Q186: Na renaul cava?
A: Na ka saka ga au kila ni lako mai na Keba.
Q187: Na ka gona qori mo tukuna mai, mo kakua ni tukuna mai ni renaul ni Unit baleta na renaul ni Unit ea sega ni tiko ikeia. Ocei ea draiva tiko ena renaul?
A: Esa sega ni matata vei au.
Q188: Ocei e dau draiva tiko ena nomudou renaul ni Unit?
A: E levu sara.
Q189: O rawa ni tukuna mai e rua na yaca?
Q190: Ena mataka ni siga ya, o sega ni raici Staff Paul ena vanua dou sobu mai kina, ni kauta yani na renaul ya?
A: Au sega ni sure-taka.
Q191: Ena gauna ya, ea tu kina ivei o nomudou troop commander, o Mr. Dakuliga?
A: Keitou a vodo vata.
Q192: Dou a vodo vata ena truck ena siga ya?
A: Sir.
Q193: I Private Serukasari ni o se bera ni lako mai na Board qo, esa dua o drau veitalanoataka oti se e dua e talanoa mai vei iko e tuba mo kakua ni mai tukuna na veika esa vakayacori mai Makuluva?
A: Seg, au tukuna saka ga na ka e clear vei au.
Q194: Ia vakacava qo, e bau dua na gauna e bau clear tu kina vei iko ena gauna o veiraiyaki kina mai Palimedi o rai va qo nio kemudou ga na ka vou, dou exercise mai Makuluva dou sa tu i loma ya, oira na ka makawa era sa yali kece tu. E bau dua na gauna e bau clear tu kina vei iko mai Palimedi?
A: Au sega ni vakasamataka.
Q195: O iko bau raica nai taba kece ni veika kece e yaco tu mai PaliMedi Serukasari, ona raica nio kemudou ga na exercise mai Makuluva dou taba tu vakalevu ike, o kemudou ga dou se qai pass out ena yabaki sa oti. O ira na tuakamudou ko ya era dodonu me tiko i loma ya vei kemudou, e sega saraga ni bau dua vei ira e laurai, o bau raica tu ya se sega?
A: Sir.

Q196: When you left Makuluva that morning to come back to the mainland, was Lt. Dakuliga in your dinghy?
A: I am not sure.

Q197: Private Serukasari, o iko o dua vei ira keitou record-taka tiko ike ni sega ni via soli tutuku. Au vakabauta O iko tamata vufi vinaka, o vakaritaka tiko nio va ga o sega ni kila e levu na ka. E dredre me vakabauta na Board, O iko yacova na form vica?
A: Form 6 saka.

Q198: Ni dua na tamata e qai Form 6 esa tamata tiko vinaka na nona vakasama kei na ka kece. E record-taki tiko ike nio sa sega ni via soli tukutuku, e dua tale na ka o via vakamacalata ike?
A: Sega saka.

Q199: E sa na report-taki ni o sega ni via soli tukutuku, you are reluctant to give information.
A: (Silence)

[E. SERUKASARI ]
Private

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class 1
Member
SIXTEENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 29200 PTE BENIAMEN SOKIVETA

Pte Sokiveta, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, hereby states:


Koya sara ga na selection e na yabaki sa oti, au sa qai curu kina e na CRW se na First Meridian Squadron koya e sa vakatokai tiko kina ni kua.

Q1: Pte Sokiveta, can you explain your involvement prior to the events of the 19th of May? Was there any training or planning for the events of the 19th of May then after the 19th of May until such time when you were brought back or when you returned to camp; can you explain?
A: Me baleta ga na nomuni taro, au sega sara ga ni kila e dua na plan me baleta na veika a yacc e na i ka 19 ni siga. E dina ga na exercise koya a caka wavoki tiko, au sega sara ga ni kila e dua na ka me baleta na ka e yaco e na i ka 19 ni siga. Se bera ni yabak: dua na noqu qai mui tiko ena Unit, au se wili tikoga vakavuli. Vo tiko e dua na mazawa, keitou a lai exercise i Makuluva. Keitou lai macawa dua toka mai kina, mai na i ka 15 ki na mataka lai lai ni ka 19 ni siga. Keitou lesu ga mai oya sa caka sara na de-brief, keitou sa gole sara i vale.

Q2: O cei a vakaitavi e na de-brief?
A: Au sa sega ni nanuma rawa toka o cei a cakava.

Q3: O cei vei ratou; Dakuliga, Baleinamau, Steven, Ravai?
A: Au sa guilecava o cei a cakava na de-brief.

Q4: Na cava a tukeni vei kemudou e na debrief?
A: Na malumahumu ga keitou sotava e na exercise kei na veika va oya.

Q5: Private Sokiveta, o se curu sara e na 1999. E vica na tamata e tiko e na loma ni Unit?
A: Au sega mada ga ni tara vinaka nai wiliwili ni tamata e tiko e na loma ni Unit.

Q6: Na selection phase e dau vica na vula?
A: E dau yabaki dua.
Q7: O vakaitavi vata kei ira na nomu instructors ena loma ni yabaki dua, o qai sega ni kila na yacadra? E caka vei cei, keimami sega ni gone lalai keimami dabe tiko qo. Na code of conduct ni nomu Unit e sega ni wili ike. Na code of conduct qori au sa cakava oti talega o au, e sega ni wili ike. Koya e solia na order na i Liuliu ni Mataivalu ni Viti. Na ka e caka e na i ka 19 ni siga e vakavuna me caka na veivacaqai qo. Kevaka o vinakata me keitou macawa dua vata kei iko, e rawa, se vula dua se mani yabaki dua, ia e vakatau tikoga vei iko. E vica oti na ka e sa tabaki oti e na pepa, sa tiko vei ira na ovisa o ira na vakaitavi, qo sa i ka walu ni board of inquiry e dabe. Na oti qo e na levu tale na board of inquiry e dabe, e da sega ni kila. Au kila e sega beka ni matata vei iko na i naki ni board qo. Dua ga na tamata e rawa ni task-taka na nomudou Unit, dua ga - na i Liuliu ni Mataivalu. Na taro qo e dodona me keitou tarogi kemudou kina. Ke o qai tukuna ni o vuli vakaivalu e na loma ni dua na yabaki ena loma ni Unit laulai na (1FMS) koya e sega ni rauta na 100 na lewena, o qai sega ni kila na instructor, au sa sega sara ga ni kila.

O sega ni kila ocei a debrief-taki kemudou e na final exercise?
A: (Silence)

Q8: Keitou sa kila oti ike. E vicavata na tamata koya dou a exercise vata sa ra interview-taki oti. O sega ni kila?
A: Au sa guilecava saka.

Q9: Dua na yabaki o vakaitavi e na Unit oya, e dua ga na timi e train-taki iko, loma ni dua na yabaki o sega ni kila na yacadra. O ira na tamata e ra cakava na brief, era kovalg ga lako cake. E vica na kovula e tiko e na dua na timi?
A: (Silence)

Q10: E na gauna cava o sa qai lako sobu kina mo lai curu e na loma ni Palimedi?
A: Au gole sobu e na siga vata tikoga oya, ni sa rauta toka beka na 1.00 na kaloko. Keitou lesu ga mai na exercise, au gole i vale, au sa qai gole sobu i na Palimedi.

Q11: O cei a tukuna vei iko mo gole sobu i na Parliament Complex?
A: (Silence)

Q12: O cei a direct-taki iko mai na Unit mo lako sobu i na Complex?
A: Keitou: sa rogoca saka ga ni sa vakaitavi kina na Unit.

Q13: O rogoca vei cei?
A: Au a rogoca e na noqu lako tiko i vale ni sa caka na vuaviri ni so na mataivalu e vakaitavi kina. Na ka ga au kila ni Mataivalu e vakaitavi kina. Au sa lako tiko i vale, au vodo tiko e na basi, sa kacivaki tiko na tayabe. Oti sa rogo sara ni sa caka na vuaviri ni vakaitavi kina na Mataivalu, oti au sa gole sara i na Unit.
Q14: O cei mai na Unit drau veitalanoa vata, se o cei a direct-taki iko mo lako sobu i na Palimedi?
A: O au ga, au rogoca ga ni ratou sa tiko mai ra na lewe ni Unit, au sa mani gole sobu, o au vakataki au sara ga.

Q15: O iko ga vakataki iko o kauti iko sobu?
A: Mai?

Q16: Mai na loma ni Palimedi?
A: O au vata kei na vica tale. Keitou vodo e na dua na van, keitou lako sobu sara i na Complex baleta niu sa rogoca sa tiko kina na Unit.

Q17: Na van cava ko a veikau i na Complex?
A: Dua ga na van e nona e dua na civilian.

Q18: Koya a kele i tuba?
A: Sega.

Q19: A tiko i vei na van oya?
A: I gaunisala levu.

Q20: Gaunisala levu i vei?
A: Koya ga na van e dau cici tu ga vaqo.

Q21: Mini-bus?
A: Mini-bus.

Q22: O vodo e na mini-bus, vakadua sara i na Complex?
A: Complex.

Q23: Na mini-bus oya e kauti iko i na Complex?
A: Sega, Suva, au qai gole vaya.

Q24: O sa yaco i na Complex, bau dua drau veitalanoa; o sota vata kei cei, o cei a brief-taki iko, a cava nomu i tavi i loma oya?
A: Au yaco yani, niu kila era sa tiko na lewe ni Unit i loma, au sa mani curu ga yani au lai tu sara tu i loma.

Q25: Na cava nomu i tavi i loma oya?
A: Na maroro'iri tikoga na tauri vakavesu.

Q26: O cei nomu i liuli i loma oya; koya e solia vei iko na cakacaka, na briefing?
A: Na i liuli ga o Na Qase.
Q27: Bau dua na gauna e loma oya o curu tale i tuba? O curu vani e na i ka 19 ni siga, bau dua tale na gauna oya o talai mo lai qarava kina e dua na i tavi i tuba?
A: Sega.

Q28: E levu na ka a yaco i Suva, na vakamakama, so na rape, o a lako ena dua na mission va oya se sega?
A: Sega.

Q29: Gauna cava o qai biuta kina na Complex?
A: Au qai biuta na Complex e na i ka 13 ni siga.

Q30: E na gauna o vakaitavitaki iko kina ena loma ni Complex, bau dua na gauna o lai tiko kina e na loma ni Operation Room se na Int. Room?
A: Sega.

Q31: O a yadra i kea?
A: Sega, e sega ni dua na noqu i tavi i kea, me vaka ga niu se ka vou, au tu ga i ra.

Q32: O cei a vakaitavi tiko ena Operation Room?
A: Na ka ga au kila ni o Na Qase ga.

Q33: O raica e dua se so na turaga ni valu se dua mai na 1FMS Unit, koya a sega ni curu i loma, bau so na gauna era a curu i loma, veitalanao se so na bose me lai caka i loma?
A: Sega.

Q34: Bau dua na lewe ni Mataivalu, sega ni lewe ni 1FMS o raica ni curu i loma?
A: O kerruni saka, Col Saubulinauyau, Col Tara, Col Naivalurua, Col Caucau kei Col Volavola (okoya a sa qai lako cake mai).

Q35: Dua tale?
A: Lt Çakobau, koya e rua na kalokalo.

Q36: Dua tale?
A: Mr Rayawa.

Q37: Rayawa cava, Kavetani, Rayawa levulevu?
A: Rayawa levulevu; koya saka beka ga oya au raica.

Q38: Bau dua na gauna nomu tiko e loma ni keba o bau veivosaki se veitarata e na talevoni se na fax se e na dua tale na gaunisala vata kei ira na tiko mai na keba?
A: Sega.
Q39: Na kena kau na i yaragi mai na loma ni keba ki na loma ni Palimedi, o vakaitavi e na kena kau na i yaragi?
A: Sega.

Q40: O bau kila na gauna a kau kina na i yaragi?
A: Sega.

Q41: O sega ni kila e dua na i tukutuku baleta na kena a kau?
A: Sega.

Q42: Vakadeitaka mada; e vica na timi a vakaitavi tiko e na exercise mai Makuluva ni se bera ni mai cava na exercise e na mataka lailai ni ka 19 ni siga?
A: E dua tiko beka ga na timi koya a lako oya i Makuluva.

Q43: Dua ga na 4-men team, e sega ni va?
A: E tolu.

Q44: E na gauna sa cava kina na exercise mai Makuluva, e vei na vanua dou a cabe mai kina?
A: Keitou a cabe mai na Range.

Q45: Dou cabe mai na Range, o cei a tavaki kemudou tu mai na Range?
A: O Staff Vakadrau.

Q46: Gauna dou cabe mai kina mai na Range, a tiko vata kei kemudou o Pte Ratu vata kei Lt Dakuliga?
A: A tiko vata kei keitou.

Q47: Na gauna sa oti kina na nomudou de-brief mai cake, dou a bau rogoca talega e dua na veitulanoa ni dua tale na exercise e vakarau caka ena mataka tikoga ni siga oya, e na i ka 19 ni siga?
A: Sega.

Q48: Drau bau sota kei Mr Baleinamau ena mataka lailai ni ka 19 ni siga ni oti mai nomudou exercise?
A: Sega.

Q49: Drau bau sota kei Mr Baleinamau e na siga taucoko oya ni se bera nomu curu i loma ni Palimedi?
A: Sega.

Q50: You said you left the camp at about midday for home on the 19th, what time did you leave camp for home?
A: It was about 8.00 o'clock in the morning.

Q51: How did you go home; what form of transportation did you take?
A: I just caught a taxi and it took me down to the main road because I had a lot of dirty clothes to take home to be washed, then I caught the bus to Nausori.

Q52: Are you married?
A: Married, Sir.

Q53: Are you staying with your family?
A: Sir.

Q54: When you arrived home, were members of your family home?
A: No, they had gone to Vanua Levu.

Q55: Was there anyone at home when you arrived?
A: No.

Q56: Did you meet anyone beside your home when you arrived there?
A: No, Sir.

Q57: Where do you stay?
A: Nausori.

Q58: Is there someone who can vouch your going home on that day?
A: Unit members.

Q59: I am not talking about Unit members, I am talking about someone in Nausori who may have seen you going home or you may have talked to that morning upon arriving in Nausori.
A: I do not remember, Sir.

Q60: When you came back into camp, when you heard of the overthrow of Parliament, what is the normal contingency in the CRW now known as 1FMS? What are your orders if you hear of a hostage crisis or a takeover?
A: We have to report to camp immediately.

Q61: When you arrived in camp, did you report to someone there?
A: I came to the dormitory in the complex then I went right down.

Q62: But did you report to any of your superiors?
A: No, I did not see anyone around there.
Q63: Was anyone in the complex?
A: Maybe they were inside but I did not see anyone there. Almost all Unit members were down at the Complex so I just found my way down.

Q64: You said you went to the accommodation, where is this accommodation located in the camp?
A: What we call the 1-West.

Q65: From 1-West did you go to your headquarters, the main block?
A: No.

Q66: When you arrived in Parliament House, did you report to someone there?
A: The Old Man.

Q67: Where was he?
A: With the hostages.

Q68: Did you speak with him?
A: No.

Q69: Did you say anything to him?
A: No.

Q70: Did you speak with anyone after that?
A: No, Sir.

Q71: What did you do there?
A: Securing the hostages.

Q72: Were you given any instructions by someone to secure the hostages?
A: (Silence)

Q73: Who told you to secure the hostages?
A: We have undergone training that in that kind of situation, we have to secure the hostages, so the Unit members were securing the hostages.

Q74: Just by looking, could you tell they were securing the hostages?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q75: If they had been taking the hostages themselves, how would you know the difference?
A: Can you come again, Sir?
Q76: Who were the other members of your Unit with you there at that time?
A: I cannot recall.

Q77: Kevaka o rai mai vao i cake, e sega sara ga ni dua na kalasi dua e tiko i cake qo. Kevaka o curu e na dua na Unit, dua na yabaki na nomu vakaitavi tu kina, gauna o sa curu kina i loma o qai sega ni kila o cei a tiko i loma oya, dua na lomatarotaro levu keitou na taroga, vakavo beka ga ke o vakamatavulo se o bobo tiko.

Na cacacaka qo keimami sega ni via cacava, mo ni mai tarogi tale tiko na sotia, sa dua na cacakaka dredre.

Nomu curu i loma ni Complex, o tukuna o iko ni dua na i wase levu ni tamata dou a vuli vata, vakaitavi vata ena ICFMS Unit. Tukuna o iko ni lala na nomudou Unit ni ra lako sobu i ra, ia na gauna o lai curu kina i na Complex, tukuna o iko ni o sega ni kila e dua i loma oya, se o sa guiilecava na yacadora; e dina oya?
A: Sir, na SOP au tiko kina, au sega ni tukuna rawa e dua na ka ena gauna qo. Sa na rawa beka ni qai tarogi kina o Na Qase.

Q78: O cei na nomudou boso?
A: O Na Qase.

Q79: O cei a task-taki Na Qase, na i liuli ni Mataivalu ni Viti; o cei a task-taki keitou me keitou mai cacava na ka qo?
A: Au na sega ni tukuna rawa tale e dua na ka. Ke rawa ni qai tarogi beka ga o Na Qase.


Gole e na yakavi ni kua, lai consult-taki Na Qase se o cei, qai nomu ga. Mataka lailai ni mataka, lako tale mai kevaka e so tale na ka o via tukuna. Kevaka e sega kua ni basika mai. Sa soli vei iko na galala.

Dua na ka meu tukuna vei iko ike; okoya na tamata e na sega ni solia nai tukutuku (o iko qai karua ni tamata) drau qai curu ga e na Unit e na yabaki sa oti e na selection. Na tamata sa interview oti, era solia e levu na information - Balcinamau, Bainimoli (e levu sara na i tukutuku solia okoya), Waseroma, vakatau sara ga vei iko. Ke sa vaka tu oya na rai, na ka keitou rawa ni biuta na lewe ni Board, eso vei ira na i lala qo era na totoji beka e na ka era na cacava, eso era na sega ni totoji baleta ni ra muria ga na lewa, a sega ni bale vei ira.
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Ia, kevaka sa vaka tu oya na nomu rai o iko, sa rawa ni dua na gaunisala e muria na Board; koya na tamata qo, e sega ni via muria na lawa, na lawa e oka kina o keda qo e solia na Mataivalu - undisciplined, untrustworthy, does not want to pass on information to the Board, we can recommend your discharge.

Na Inquiry qo, e sega ni caka ga eke, ena Mataivalu ni Viti. E caka ena SAS, na vanua e sucu mai kina na Unit qori. Na SAS ni caka na internal inquiry, people must release the information. Lako, lai wilika mada vakavinaka nomu history. E na veivana e tiko kina na SAS; mai Australia, Niusiladi, Special Force ni America kei na vei special forces, e tiko na gauna e rawa ni ra release-taka kina na i tukutuku; qo e dua vei ira. Na lako e na buca ni valu e sega ni ra soli tukutuku, ia na authorised investigations vaqo, that is where you can release information. Lako lai vakasamataka mada. Lai taroga nomu OC kevaka e dodonu mo talanoataka na yaca kei na veika va oya, lai vaqara counselling; e dodonu se sega ni dodonu. Sa vinaka, tou sa na cegu ni kua; kevaka o via mai soli i tukutuku tale, soli vei iko na galala e na 8.00 na kaloko ni mataka, kevaka e sega kua ni basika mai; sà donu oya?

A: Sa donu saka.

Recalled on 28/08/00:

Pte Sokivet, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q81: Privates Sokivet, e dua tale na ka o via tukuna, baleta ni volai tiko qo ni o dau sega ni via soli tukutuku o iko. O sa gadreva o iko mo mai soli tukutuku, e dua na ka o via vakamacalataka mada ena nomu vakaitavi?
A: Koya saka ga au sa tukuna tiko ena siga oya, keu rawa ni refer tiko ga ena noqu statement au vakaraitaka ena siga oya.

Q82: E dua tale na ka o via tukuna?
A: Na ka ga au via tukuna baleta na ka na Unit e vakaraitaka toka me baleta na code of conduct ni a vakaraitaka tiko ena mataka nikua. Ena ka mada ga au kila vakaivalu, sega tale niu a vulica e dua na SOP me vaka na noqu kila na SOP ni Unit. Na ka ga au kila, ni kevaka e dua na orders e biu mai, se kevaka me dua na kena veitarorologi mena caka, ena tarogi beka ga o iratou na veiliutaki vei keitou.

Q83: E tou na lesuva mada na nomu i tukutuku o a solia i mada. O iko a yadra tiko ena loma ni complex, o security tiko vei Na Qase. O cei a liulu ni security ena loma ni complex?
A: E liulu ni security ga o Na Qase.

Q84: E bau dua na gauna o tu ena loma ni complex, o curu i tuba ena dua na incident? O lako na checkpoint, lako ena patrol, o curu vakavica i tuba?
E dua na gauna au a gole i vale, au sega ni kila na siga cava.

Q85: E bau dua na gauna o a vanataka kina na nomu dakai, na gauna o a tiko kina i Palimedi?

A: Sega.

Q86: Na yaragi cava o a vakaitavitaki iko tiko kina, koya a soli vei iko mo yadra tiko kina e Palimedi?

A: Au taura tiko na yaragi na MP5.

Q87: A bau dua na gauna e rua na yaragi a tiko vei iko, na MP5 qori kei na dua tale na yaragi?

A: E dua na gauna e rua, au kila o ni raica beka enai taba, au kila ni vuni nomudou taro. Ito, okoya beka ga qori na rua na dakai au taura.

Q88: Na cava na karua ni dakai o a vakayagataka tiko?

A: Na LMG.

Q89: Na nomu duri tu ya oa sega ni vana tiko?

A: Sega.

Q90: Did you have the M72s in the complex?

A: No idea, Sir.

Q91: Pte. Sokiveta, ena gauna dou a tiko kina i loma oya, a caka tiko e loma ya na weapon training vei ira na lewe ni vanua?

A: Ka mcada au kila ni sega.

Q92: O bau raica e dua na vuli vakaivalu e caka i loma?

A: Sega.

Q93: Vakacava na drill?

A: Na ka qori au a sega ni vakaitavitaki au kina. Ia au a rogo ca ga nira vakaitavi tiko ena drill baleta na vanua era vakaitavi kina e tu tani mai ena vanua keitou tu kina, na ka ga au rogo ca ni ra vakaitavi kina, ia au sega ni kila.

Q94: O cei a tukuna me caka na vuli drill?

A: Au sega ni rawa ni tukuna, au sega ni kila.

Q95: Pte. Sokiveta, e sega saraga ni yaga nomu mai tukutuku tale qo baleta ni o vakaraitaka eke ni o via tukutuku. E sega ni dua tale na ka o via vakaraitaka?

A: Sega saka.
Q96: E sa na volai ga eke na nomu statement “Very reluctant to give information”, vinaka.
A: (Silence)

Recalled on 11/09/00:

Pte Sokiveta, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:


A: E vica vata na taro, na kenai matai, oiko a lako ena final phase i Makuluva?

Q98: Mai Makuluva, e dua na macawa nomudou tiko mai kea, na dua na macawa, tekivu mai na siga Tusiti se na Vukelulu, esa tekivu lako tiko na idinicavu, lesu tale tiko ena maritime. Ea lesu tale tiko o Lt. Dakuliga, o vakila se o nanuma lesu, vakasamataka na nons lesu tiko o Dakuliga, o raici koya nons lesu tiko ena vebogi, ni caka tiko na veitalanoa, caka na meivac?

A: Sega.

Q99: O kila na kena lesu tiko na nomudou idinicavu?
A: Au kila ga ni lako tiko ena admin run.

Q100: Ia na bogi ese tekivu mai na Vukelulu se Lotulevu, na bogi esa biubiu mai Makuluva o nomudou team leader, o Dakuliga, e gole va ya i na maritime, o vakasamataka ya?

A: Sega.

Q101: Ena siga cava dou a cabe kina mai na maritime?
A: Ena mataka ni Vakaraubuka.

Q102: Dou a cabe mai na maritime se na range?
A: Na range.

Q103: Ocei soti ea tiko ena nomu team, dou a cabe mai na range? O Dakuliga?
A: Io.

Q104: O Ratu, Nawaqa, Saukur, Qicatabua, Liganivai (Mokani), Soko, Naika, e donu ya?
A: Au sega ni rawa ni tukuna e dua na ka.

Q105: O sega ni rawa se o sega ni via tukuna?
A: Au sega ni rawa ni tukuna kina e dua na ka.

Q106: Mai kea dou a lako na Unit, e donu?
A: Donu.

Q107: Mai na Unit, dou a sava yaya, oti ya e dua na brief a soli vei kemudou, mo dou vakatotolo, ea brief o Baleinamau (OC), mo dou lako sobu kina na maritime, e donu, mo dou lako ena exercise?
A: Segu.

Q108: O iko a gole vata kei ira nau lala era a gole sobu ena maritime?
A: Segu.

Q109: O iko a tiko ena brief ena matakai laiala ni siga Vakaraubuka, ko brief kina o OC ena loma ni Unit?
A: Au na sega ni rawa ni tukuna kina e dua na ka.

Q110: E dua na ka au via tukuna vei iko ike, e vakatau saraga vei iko, qo na mataivalu, e mai vavaqa na ovisa na ka kece me veilewaitaka na tamata. O keitou via taura taucoko na ka kece, baleta qo na ka tou na cakava qo, kevaka ena raica na board ni bale ga vei iko, nai naki ni board qo, e dabe e taura na yasana ruana taucoko na ka e yaco. Na Board qo e rawa ni vukey iko se rawa ni vakavuna na nomu leqa, kevaka o sega ni talanoa, oiko ga o rawa ni vakavuna na nomu leqa, sega ni o keitou. Esa matata na ka e yaco. Ia na via va beka qo, ena veigaina e dau yaco kina na ka, ni dau dabe e dua na Board, e raica okoya na pros and cons, na ka e yaco, na cava na vuna e yaco kina e so na ka, oya na qai vakatulewa kina. Kevaka o vunitaka eso na ka, e levu na ka keitou sa kila oti, oiko ga o rawa ni vakavuna ga na nomu leqa. Ni ra dabe na ovisa, era sega ni kauwaitaka e dua na yasana ni nomu tukutuku. E dabe tiko qo na tamata e vakaitavi ena mataivalu, na nomu forum ga qo e rawa ni vukey iko kevaka o innocent, if you are innocent, no one else.

A: Sir, baleta na vuni noqo ariha kina eliu qo, ni vosota baleta na noqo mai regular tu na mataivalu qo, au curu ga mai ena Unit, vakavo me keirau veitalanoa mada vata kei dua vei iratou Na Qase se oce. Keitou a lakova na ka ni veitarogi ....
Q111: Au sa curuma oti na ka qori, au kila vinaka na code of conduct. O au talega au cakava na kena training, au cakava sara i cake, nomu O iko i ra vakalailai, o au i cake sara. Keitou sa interview-taki Na Qase, ea taroga o Major Aziz, au na vakamacakataka tale. Na interrogation e dau caka tiko ena gauna e vesuki iko kina na meca, ena gauna ni valu. Na ka kece o dou cakava ena loma ni Unit, e sega tale ni dua na Unit e dodonu me kila. It is only when an official inquiry is done, authorised by the Commander me caka, o kemudou report ga vei Commander. Na ka esa yaco, esa direct-taka o Commander, this is an official inquiry. O kedatou e base-taki mai ena British SAS. Ena British SAS ni dau caka na official inquiry, na ka kece e dodonu me dau release. Na ka o tukuna tiko qori, qori ena gauna ga ni valu mo qai vesu. Na tikina ya e kauta cake mai o Major Aziz, keitou qai record-taka. E vakamacakata o Na Qase, ni sega ena official inquiry if all the information that is required. O ya na ka ea yaco. O rawa nio qai mai tarogi Na Qase. We have it official on tape. E rua ga vei kemudou na ka vou, dou sega ni via tukutuku. Oratou na ka makawa tekivou mai vei nomudou OC esa tukutuku. Nomu soli tukutuku eliu e lai kai ga, au sa vola o au “Very reluctant to give information” baleta ga nio sega ni kia. Au tukuna tiko xani ni dodonu mo solia na information ike, this is an official military inquiry, that code of conduct do not count here. Au kilu niu sa vakamacakata oti. Au sa sega ni via tarogi iko tale. E dua tale na ka o via vakamacakata?

A: E sega saka.

Q112: Most likely you will have your case tomorrow and the result of that, you would most likely go to Nukulau. You will meet Major Ligairi there, you have a good talk with him, Soko and Naika. Pte. Sokiveta, O iko na gone ni vei?

A: Mai Bua.

Q113: Bua mai?

A: Na koro o Naisasaivua, Kubulau, Bua.

Q114: O Mr. Baleinamau e gone ni vei?

A: Oko ya mai Bua talega.

Q115: Ena yabaki cava oa curu ena Unit?

A: Ena yabaki sa oti.

Q116: Vakacava na nomudrau veimaliwai kei na nomu OC, o drau veivolekati, veiyawaki, soldier/officer relationship?

A: E sega, keirau sega so ni dau veitalanoa vakalevu, e lai lai sara na gauna keirau dau veitalanoa kina.
Q117: O iko sa kila ga ni nomu OC?
A: Io baleta ni noqu OC.

Q118: Ena gauna oya, o iko na ka ga e tukuna o OC o vakayacora, ia na gauna qo, o bau vakasamataka se cava na vuna e vesu kina o OC ka sega ni charge-taki?
A: Sega, keitou mai tiko vata i Nabua, keitou sega ni kila se cava na vuna e vesu tiko kina.

Q119: O koya e a vesu e liu vei iko se o iko qai vesu i muri?
A: E vesu i liu okoya.

Q120: O sega ni bau kidoa tu oiko se cava e sega ni charge-taki kina okoya?
A: Baleta ni dou se vesuki koya tiko, au sa sega ni rawa ni tukuna tale kina e dua na ka.

Q121: Sega, au tukuna tiko o au, oiko qai vesu i muri osa charge-taki tale. O koya e se vesu sara i liu, e se bera ga ni charge-taki, o sega ni vakasamataka tu ya se cava na vuna?
A: (Silence).

Q122: O iko a involve ena vakatawa gasau mai Makuluva, koya na kena kau yani ena bogi ni Lotulevu na i yaragi ena sand-bag?
A: E sega.

Q123: E sega, se o sega ni rawa ni sauma?
A: Sega ni rawa ni sauma.

[B. SOKIVETA]
Private

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class 1
Member
SEVENTEENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 21583 WOII M V RABICI

WOII Rabici, after having been duly sworn on Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Warrant officer Rabici, vakamacalataka vakalekaleka na nomu military record se na nomu bula ena mataivalu?
A: Au a curu kina mataivalu ena 1975, au laki yabaki dua tu mai Niu siladi, au qai mai regular force kau curu ena tabana ni idinia me yacova ni’u laki taura na i tutu vaka STMS tu ena engineer, donumaka na gauna ni coup kau quarter master. Ena gauna tale ga ni coup ena 1987, au taura tu mai tutu vaka i vakatawa ni keba ni mataivalu. Au laki course ena 1985 i Niu Siladi, ia au sa lesu vakatolu oti mai Lepanoni. Au tiko voli ga ena Idinia me yacova na gauna sa qai dua kina na noqu vale e Naveiwakau ena 1990. Ena gauna oqo au vakaitikotikoga mai Naveiwakau kau veiqaravi ena dua nai tikotiko ni lotu e Tacirua east me’u kena i vakatawa me yacova na i ka 26 ni siga ena noqu gole kina Palimedi. Sa kena levu saka.

Q2: Na i naki ni Board of Inquiry me vaqaqai o ira era akaitavi taki ira ena vuaviri. Vakamacalataka mada na nomu i tavi ena vuaviri oqo?
A: Au a lako kina Palimedi ena i ka 26 ni siga ni vula ko Me, me’u laki raici iratou na noqui tokani o iratou na sotia eratou tiko ekea kau mani laki caka lotu tu vei iratou. Na kena tauruvutaki na vuaviri au sega ni kila. Au a lako ga me’u laki caka lotu tu vei iratou ena Palimedi. Me vaka ni’u i vakatawa, au nanuma ni yaga cake me’u laki vitipe iratou tu ena ka va ko ya.

Q3: Ko bau vaka itavi ena planning stage se na so na ka vaka ko ya ena vuaviri?
A: E sega saka.

Q4: Na i tavi cava ko a qarava tiko?
A: Au a dau caka lotu saka ga. Na masu ka so na mataka au vakaitavi ena vakasama vakayalo.

Q5: Na ncmu a tiko e loma, ko bau vaka i tavi talega e tuba?
A: E sega saka.

Q6: Na ncmu tiko e loma o bau dau tara na i yaragi e tu ekea?
A: E sega saka.

Q7: O bau: curu ena loma ni operation room ena Parliament Complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q8: Na operation room ni 1MS?
A: E sega saka.
Q9: O bua, curu e loma ni vanua era tiko kina na vesu?
A: E segi saka.

Q10: Ena gauna o tiko kina e loma, o kila na ka e yaco tiko e loma ni complex kei na tauadaku ni complex?
A: E segi saka. O au na noqu i tavi ga e kea na caka lotu ga. Au kidacala ni’u tarogi tiko ena keba ena levu ni cala e tukuni ni’u cakava.

Q11: O cei a veitanaotaka na nomudou curu ena complex?
A: Au a cakacaka tiko ena gauna oya, ka’u lako mai sa vakarau tu na lori oiratou mai na plant me sa gole ki Palimedi kau vodo sara.

Q12: Na cava na nomu appointment ena engineer?
A: Au taura tiko na i tutu vaka welfare officer ena so na gauna au dau Paymaster tale ga.

Q13: O welfare officer ena tabana cava?
A: Vei keitou saka ga na engineer.

Q14: O cei e lewa se vaitanaotaka na nomudou lako sobu ira? O cei e kaya vei kemudou mo dou lako ira?
A: Au segi ni vakasamataka baleta ni’u qai lako mai e ratou sa tu oiratou na gone oya kei Major Savua.

Q15: O iratou ena Engineer?
A: Io saka.

Q16: Ena engineer e vei?
A: Ena pantz saka ga.

Q17: Vakamatalataka mada na i tavi o dau qarava ena complex?
A: Au dau veivuwe vei iratou na yadra vei iratou na nodatou gone, na sotia. Ena so na mataka keimami dau caka lotu ni bera na ono na kaloko ena mataka lai lai. E dau tu e kea na kau ni vosa me caka na lotu. E so tale ga na vanua ni masumasu e kea, au dau laki veiquaravi kina. E ra lewe levu era dau veitokani taka tu na ka ni masumasu.

Q18: Vakamatalataka mada na ka e yaco tiko ena loma ni complex?
A: O keitu ena dau caka lotu e tiko na vanua ni neitou masumasu ni da sa qai lako ga yani. E masumasu tale tikoga e kea e vica na marama. O koya ga e via join me qai dau mai join kina. Ena loma ni Library eratou dau masumasu kina na CIDA me 24 na auwa. Ena lotu, era dau sureti na veimata lotu ena Siga Tabu me ra dau mai vakaitavi. E sega ni wase ekea na lotu, ja me lotu Vakarisito ga.
Q19: Ena nomu tiko e loma, o bau veitaratara kei na dua na sotia ena 1MS oiratou na security se dua e tuba; na fax se cava?
A: Ena so na gauna au dau qiri cake vei noqu karua o Mr. Qiodamu. Keirau dau veitalanoataka na lotu, ia ena dua na gauna sa mai cavuka na neirau veitalanoa. Keirau sa sega ni veitalanoa tale ni tukuni ni sa gole i Labasa.

Q20: Talanoataka mada na ka e yaco tu ena loma ni complex?
A: Na ka ga au kila me ra yadravi o ira na vesu me kakua ni dua e mavoa se tauvimate me yaocova na gauna era serek kina. Na ka au raica toka ena veiyakavi era dau tereni mera taubale se vakaukauyago. Oti era qai lesu tale ki loma. Ta e qarauni toka ga me kakua ni dua vei ira na kai vesu me mavoa se me tauvimate. Ena dua na gauna a tauvimate na Minisita ni Home Affairs, e a cicivaki vakatotolo ena ambulance ki valenibula. Sa vo e rua na macawa, au raica ni sa veisau vakalevu na i tovo ni nodratou garavi. Eratcu sa dau talevi iratou vakalevu oiratou na yadra ka vosa vinakta tiko vei iratou. Sa dua tale na neimami veikelai vinaka. Ena i otioti ga ni siga au tiko kina ena gauna eratou talaci kina. E a caka tale e dua na yaqona vei iratou, na Prime Minisita vakacegu o Mahendra Chaudhry kei iratou taucoko na nona i lawalawa. Keitou lulu e kea. Na vanua eratou tiko kina na i taukei, eratou dau bulabula vinaka.

E dua na i talanoa au via talanoataka na nona a lako yani e dua na yalewa ni Korea me la‘i saravi iratou qai tukuna okoya oqo e sega ni hostage, oqo e vaka na picnic me vakatautauvata taka kei na nona vanua ena veivesu. Oya e vaka me‘u dau marautaka tu kina na veiqaravi vei keda na i taukei ena kena bibi toka na tamata.

Q21: E matata veikeda na ka eyaco ena Palimedi ena i ka 19 ni siga ni vula ko Me ka matata talega vei keda na ka e yaco tiko e loma ni Palimedi. E levu sara na ka o sega ni talanoataka.
A: Na ka ga au talanoataka na ka ga au dau raica.

Q22: E tolu tiko na i wasewase e loma oya, na mataivalu, na vanua kei na Palimedi. Na cava na nomu i tavi kina vanua.
A: O koya ga au tukuna tiko ni‘u dau caka lotu ga.

Q23: Ena nomu i tutu vakalotu o bau veitaratara vakavoleka kei ira na tiko ena loma ni Parliament Complex?
A: Io saka.

Q24: Na nomu veimaliwi vata kei ira, o bau rogoca e so na i talanoa me baleta na kena vakayagataki na i yaragi mai na Parliament complex ena nodra dau vakayaragitaki oira na lewenivanua?
A: Au sega maka ni rogoca.
Q25: O bau rogoca eso na vuli vakai valu ena loma ni complex?
A: Au raica ni caka tiko na vuli drill.

Q26: O bau raica eso na vuli ni vakayagataki kina na i yaragi se weapon training?
A: E sega saka.

Q27: O bau rogoca eso na vosa ni tau vei ira na lewenivanua ena veimataka me vakaukauvataki ira ena vuku ni kena beci na lewa?
A: E sega saka.

Q28: Ena nomu vunau tiko na ulutaga cava o dau vunautaka vei ira na leweni vanua?
A: Na ulutaga au dau vunautaka e kea sa i koya mo tovolea me kakua ni dau rai vakaca na matamu baleta na gauna ga sa na rai vakaca kina na matamu o sa na vakamatea e dua na tamata.

Mo raica tiko na tamata ena delu ni nomu loloma. Me vaka na nona rai na Kariso mai na kauveilatai qai tukuna vei Meri “Raica na luvemu.” Oya na uto ni ka au via dusia vei keda.

Na nomu rai me rai vakaloloma, me rai savasava. Ena vinaka kina na nodal vanua.

Q29: O bau rogoca se kila na gauna ka lauvana kina na Ovisa o Seavula?
A: O koya saka e a lauvana ena dua na bogi ni siga tabu.

Q30: O sa tiko kina ena loma ni Palimedi o iko?
A: Au sa tiko saka kina.

Q31: Na cava na nomu rai baleta na nomu vunau vata kei na ka e yaco vei Seavula?
A: O au saka kevaka me’u a lako tu ena i lakolako oya, ia e sega au a toka ga ena loma ni complex. Na gone ogo e lauvana mai na vanua ni yadra.

Q32: Na noqu taro na cava na nomu rai ena nomu i tutu vakalotu kei na ka e yaco vei Seavula?
A: Na kena i talanoa au rogoca ni sega ni lauvana o koya, e a mavo a koya ena tiki ni kaukamea. E ratou a warning shot yani oiratou na gone ka vodo voli ena lori ka qai laki lauti koya na tiki ni kaukamea oya.

Q33: Ko bau kila se ko cei soti e a vodo tiko ena lori?
A: E sega au sega saka ni kilo.

Q34: O kilo era sotia se era leweni vanua ka ra a vodo tiko ena lori?
A: Au sega saka ni kilo.
Q35: Baleti ira na laki vakacaca ena TV One Complex, ni ra sa lesu mai, o bau raica e dua na sotia e lako vata tiko yani kei iratou?
A: E sega sara niu kilia.

Q36: Ena gauna era lesu mai kina, o a tiko e tuba se ena loma ni Palimedi?
A: Oya e yace ena bogi ka’u sa tiko kina ena noqu bure.

Q37: Ko sega ni rogo ca ni ko ira na lewenivanua vaka oqo e soli vei ira na i yaragi vaka oqo ka vakavuna kina na mate nei Seavula.
A: Au sega sara ga ni rogo ca.

Q38: O bau raica eso na sotia se turaga ni valu era sega ni vakaitavi vata kei kemudou era tiko ena loma ni complex?
A: E dau lako saka ga yani o Col. Tarakinikini me dau lako i veitalonga.

Q39: O cei tale?
A: Ena dua na gauna au raica ni lako yani o Col. Buadromo.

Q40: Dua tale?
A: Kei iratou saka ga eratou lako yani ena gauna ni veisiko, oira ga era lako yani enai lakolako ni mataivalu. O iratou o Col. Waqanisau. E dua nai lala levu era a lako yani me laki caka e dua na ka vakavanua ena loma ni Palimedi.

Ena gauna keitou sa tiko kina e kea, era a vakauniform yani ka laki caka e dua na veitalonga. Eso na Kanala kei na Satini Metia.

Q41: When was the first time you met Major Savua?
A: Ni sa march in mai o okoya.

Q42: I vei?
A: Ena engineer.

Q43: Where is your office in the Engineer complex?
A: Ena Headquarters ena Engineer.

Q44: What were you doing in the plant troop which is on the other side?
A: Au a tiko ena keba ka’u qai siro yani ena vuni maqo eliu. Oti au au qai lako yani.

Q45: When you entered the Parliament, you entered as a soldier or civilian?
A: Au vakaisulu tu ni sotia.

Q46: My question is, you entered as a soldier or as a civilian, in what capacity?
A: Au lako e kea au a vaka uniform tu ni sotia, ni'u a cakacaka voli ena siga oya.

Q47: Were you representing the soldier when you entered Parliament?
A: E sega au lako i caka lotu vei iratou na sotia e loma.

Q48: Do you have any role as a force chaplain? Mo vakamacalataka na nomu cakacaka tiko ena keba?
A: Au a vakatawa tiko ena keba ena 1987 ena gauna ni coup me yabaki tolu. Ena gauna au sa toki kina ki noqu vale ena Veiwakau, au sa cegu ena i vakatawa.

E segs ni kauta laivi na noqu i tutu vakaivakatawa, au a se kauta voli ga. Au a laki vakatawa tale ena dua na i tikotiko ni lotu vou me'u laki veiqravai kina.

Q49: Where do you think you were most needed, in Parliament or in camp?
A: Au na sega ni rawa ni sauma na tario oqori?

Q50: What role did Major Savua play in the Parliament Complex?
A: E kea s vaka e nona tu na raici ni kakana.

Q51: What about the engineers that went with you to the complex? What were they doing?
A: O cei saka?

Q52: The other soldiers that went with you. You have been doing service for them but what were they doing in the Parliament Complex?
A: Eratou yadra ga vata kei iratou na i tokani CRW. O au ga au dau caka lotu vei ira.

Q53: Where were you staying in the Parliament Complex?
A: E dua saka ga na vale ni volavola e cake.

Q54: E vakamacalataki taki ena gauna ni vuaviri o dou a march in vata kei Major Savua o kemucou na Engineer. Na cava na nona i tutu e kea?
A: Au sega ni vakasamataka na nona i tutu, au kila ga ni turaga ni valu ena Engineer.

Q55: O segs ni kila na nona i tavi e qarava tiko e kea?
A: Io saka.
Q56: O sa voleka ni yabaki sese ena mataivalu, o se bera ga ni kita na i tutu nei Major Savua ena Engineer?
A: Au kaya saka me bau taba mai na nona i tutu in sa OC eke se me vakatoka o ya. E sega ni dua na ka me taba mai me biu mai kina na nona post.

Q57: Warrant Office Rabici, was there any meeting conducted at the Engineer before you went down?
A: E sega saka.

Q58: When you were at the complex, were there any meetings conducted in Parliament?
A: E ratou dau bose saka o iratou.

Q59: O cei?
A: O ratou na lewe ni mata yadra, security.

Q60: Were you in that group?
A: Au dau caka lotu.

Q61: Were you told of a directive from Commander that all soldiers to return to camp?
A: E sega saka.

Q62: Do you read newspapers in Parliament?
A: No, Sir.

Q63: Do you get a supply of your clothes from home or were you wearing the same clothes all the time?
A: Na noqu lewenivale a laki veisiko yani ka kauta yani na noqu i sulu.

Q64: Did she tell you of the directives, any news from outside or what was happening outside?
A: E sega saka.

Q65: So you knew nothing of what was said outside or what was happening outside? Did you watch TV?
A: Na neiou rumu e sega kina na TV.
Q66: Did you watch TV at anytime in the complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q67: Vinaka vakalevu. Kevaka ena gadrevi tale mo mai soli tukutuku, keitou na qai kacivi iko tale mai.
A: Sa vinaka saka.

[M. RABICI]
Warrant Officer Class II

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class 1
Member
EIGHTEENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 22554 LT. COL. T. BUKARAU

Lt. Col. Bukarau, after having been duly sworn on the Bible, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Col. Bukarau, in the complex, you have certain structure in the command section. I understand there was a military wing, the political wing and the Vanua wing. A confirmation on that, the head of the military wing was Major Ligi'airi.
A: I know he was head of security. I do not know whether the group at Parliament was divided into that organisation.

Q2: In the discussion in the complex when you were down at the complex, were any of the senior army officers in the camp part of the planning team and had any influence in it. I am not talking about the operation.
A: I have no comments. The reason why I have no comments to that question is there are allegations of treason and investigations are being conducted by the Police to that effect and I am here on such charges. Some of the questions which they asked targeted at the charge of treason, conspiracy to treason and all that and to answer that question I might incriminate myself in the process. As I explained to you earlier some of these people will also answer with no comments if you question heads towards that direction.

Q3: When did you actually go into Parliament?
A: I went there on Monday morning (22/5/00) between 9 am to 11 am.

Q4: The initial lot that were inside the complex. You went in on Monday, are you aware of the people that initially went in?
A: No.

Q5: Was there any indication by any members of RFMF, the way they behave there that they supported the action of May 19th?
A: Are you asking about my knowledge at that time? Are you asking me to dob some people in?

Q6: I will give you an indication. What we have done, we have some of the names of people we have interviewed. I will just read from my notes, Dakai, Baleinamau and the rest of them. As they come in, they give the names of people and then when you have the next lot, they keep giving the names and that paints the whole picture.
A: Just ask the question again, let me think about it.
names of people and then when you have the next lot, they keep giving
the names and that paints the whole picture.

A:

Just ask the question again, let me think about it.

Q7:

The reason I ask this question is how clear an investigation can be, it is
the indication by the soldiers, the behaviour of the institution as a whole
indicated that they were directly condoning the actions which was the
impression throughout.

A:

If you want that person I will say that the Old Man, Na Qase, that is what
I learned from him. The first thing he did he went to RFMF and to his
personal contact to RFMF as I explained to you I will not answer that.

Q8:

You had a series of discussions with RFMF in an attempt to diffuse the
situation and find a solution what are some of the assurance you got from
headquarters?

A:

There was a lot of threats between us and RFMF in trying to curb the
disturbances. I have spoken with Jack a few times, with Bill Seruvakula
a few times, in fact we had a meeting at Veituto. Most of the incidences
which happened around that area took place because people took
advantage of the situation at that time. Both we, who were in Parliament,
and RFMF were concerned about these incidences. Phil and Col. Caucacu
came over from RFMF after the GCC meeting to relay the resolutions.
There were numerous occasions where we were just talking with RFMF,
the main subject matter of those discussions were quelling disturbances.

Q9:

Were you aware of the instruction by Commander RFMF for all army
personnels to return to camp?

A:

Is this about marching at 1500 hours on a certain date? We never
received any instructions from Commander. We only learned of the
instruction between two and three when words were passed on from Suva
City that everyone was vacating Suva City because the Army were going
to come in at three o'clock. It came in that form. After calling NATOPS
then they said there was no such command.

Q10:

When Commander put out the ultimatum that all officers to return to
camp, did you hear anything like that?

A:

There was no formal instruction from RFMF that came to the Parliament
Complex despite numerous discussions with Senior military officers
from RFMF. A vehicle came to Parliament with the instructions to take
me and Vakalalabure to QEB. With just that instruction I was not
prepared to go.

Q11:

Were you aware of any offers made to Senior Military officers to take-
over the leadership of Commander and Chief of Staff?
Q15: Those were the preconditions set at that time? The preconditions to the amnesty?

A: Yes? The preconditions to the amnesty, this will be the only time it was mentioned but when we went to discuss the amnesty proper where representatives from the RFMF were Phil Tarakinikini, Caucau and Rupeni Nawaqakuta.

From our side; George, Vakalalabure and Tuberi. From the GCC subcommittee, their lawyer was Qoriniasi Bale and then the GCC Secretariat consist of the current AG, Adi Litia Qionibaravi and Aselela Sadole. Those were the people that were there that evening to discuss the amnesty which now stands. The initial pre-conditions were not brought in by the RFMF. So when the amnesty was drafted, the only thing we concentrated on is the definition of “political offences” and that in the military decree as it stands.

Q17: What was the view of the vanua for the Army? There was elation in the Vanua that the army was coming in to join in this thing.

A: When you said to join in, what thing? To complete the coup cycle. When the military stopped in to ask the President to step down we assumed straight away that when that was done we were to hold hands in a joint effort to realise the objectives of the coup.

Q19: My last question is did you at anytime try to influence anyone in the military to assist you one way or the other?

A: There were a lot of things happened at that time. If you take a joke to someone you know so very closely, and you throw in “why don’t you guys just take over”. A lot of that would be done by almost everyone. Even there were times when people from the military sort of voiced their disgruntlement to whatever they pursued at the end.

Q20: Colonel, on the Accord and the Decree, were there issues raised as to the weapons in the complex; was that a preconditions to the Accord and the Decree?

A: It is a precondition in the Accord. That precondition did not find itself to the Decree and to me as the legal advisor to the people in Parliament I got what I want. If that precondition has to find itself into the Decree it was those responsible at that time to make that precondition that was in the Accord find itself into the Decree.

Q21: Was it part of the discussions in the Accord?

A: The preconditions were:-
1. Return of hostage;

2. All operation stores held by the parties be returned;

3. Reinstatement to pre-15th May status of all RFMF personnel who had been involved from the 19th onwards.

The return of hostages has been done. I assumed that all those who had taken part in the negotiation since the 19th of May, by virtue of that agreement have been reinstated to their status which means that our being ex-communicated from the military does not exist anymore. Now I can be called again, Lt. Col. Bukarau.

The people in Parliament have returned all the weapons which was under their control. After the return of weapons on the 14th of July, I did not see anyone carrying any weapons at the Parliament Complex or in Kalabu or anywhere else. Had there been weapons held by service members at Kalabu soldiers would have used them against the assault on Kalabu because that is would be the natural reaction of the soldier when he is attacked i.e. defend himself with whatever weapons he had at his disposal. But as it transpired all weapons had been returned, all he could do was to surrender, to fight would mean instant death.

The incident when we were arrested on Wednesday evening the 26th of July at about 9.30. It was later reported in the news and it was done very mischievously by Phil Tarakinikini; “it is reported that George’s security had a pistol”, in fact, no weapons were found on us.

The effect on the military operation is very positive because it justifies the RFMF but the effect on us being out here is quite detrimental. It is because of our political belief alone that we are further incarcerated these people.

Q22: On that issue, there was no weapons in the possession of anyone up there?

A: The substantive amount of weapons were returned on 14th July. That is from one of the parties to the Agreement, GSG. RFMF still have the bulk of its operation stores out there whether in the form of check-points or whatever.

The last clause of the Muanikau Accord, (you can revisit it if you want) did say that the parties should have dialogued but this as the accord says will be done "as soon as practicable". "As soon as practicable" is still now and it is still open.
Q23: In reconfirming your answer in that; on the day of your arrest from Laqere, your group has alleged that there was no weapons with anyone.
A: And I said that the weapons that were under control of the military people were returned on 14 July 2000.

Q24: Going back to other issues and one is the holding of ranks by yourself and other military officers were you at anytime communicated that you have been decommissioned and your ranks have been taken away.
A: No. Again the information was coming through the papers.
Q25: What were the information provided to you?
A: I actually called Col. Wong after I read it in the paper and he told me that it has not been formalised.

[T. BUKARAU]
Lieutenant-Colonel

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
NINETEENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 20364 MAJOR I. LIGAIRI

Major Ligairi after having been duly sworn under solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Major Ligairi, you understand the purpose of the Board, the Board will ask you a few questions. On the 19th of May, there was a lot that left the camp and went down and met in the maritime slipway.
A: Yes, I do not know the number of who came down from the camp. It was the first time I was meeting some of these people, I only knew some.

Q2: What we are interested in is, who were the members of the IMS who were with you at the maritime?
A: I think I saw Rava and Tikotani, those were the two faces I really knew, the other faces were vague, I do not know them as individuals.

Q3: Were there civilians present there?
A: Yes, there were civilians.

Q4: The lot that met there and the operation, were you the one responsible for the planning of the operation?
A: No, I did not plan anything as far as the personnel were concerned. I just put myself in there when they put the responsibility on me to look after them. I think they depended on me.

Q5: Major Ligairi, when were you first made aware of what was going to happen?
A: That morning.

Q6: On the 19th of May?
A: Yes.

Q7: Who informed you?
A: I received a telephone call, I think it was Tikotani. I thought it was him, but I am not sure who exactly. It was when I met him at the beach then I thought it was him.

Q8: Who actually went down with the initial group for the takeover?
A: I did not go together with them inside Parliament. I only knew that they were going to go, when they went through the gate then I went up to the camp to see the senior officers.
Q9: When you left with the initial group that took over Parliament, you met with 1MS serving members, some that came down in the mini-bus?
A: Yes, we met at the maritime beach.

Q10: This is the slipway?
A: Yes.

Q11: At the slipway, there were members of the 1MS that had come out from the exercise, waiting there or ....
A: I think the only person I recognise there was Tikotani and they called up the van to come down and I saw Ravai and a few others because there were some new boys too. I just came back into the squadron for about three weeks now. I know their faces, but I do not know their names.

Q12: When you were given the call obviously at 0845 hours on the 19th of May, where were you?
A: I was in Suva, having my coffee at the Cottage.

Q13: So you received the call on your mobile?
A: Yes.

Q14: From the cottage on the 19th, you went to the maritime?
A: That is right, I was called up there. They were telling me, “Mo lako sara ga mai vakatoto” e va mai ya na kena i tukutukuni. At that time, I did not really find out what they were going to do. I think the atmosphere in the whole country at that time, they were expecting something especially when there was going to be a big march on that day. They did not tell me that they were going to storm Parliament.

Q15: When you arrived at the maritime slipway, who actually met you there and briefed you about what was going to happen?
A: Tikotani. It was not a long brief.

Q16: Can you give us an indication of what was it?
A: Yes, I cannot tell you the exact wording but in the sense that they were going to take over Parliament. Esa dede talega na gauna meu qai vakasamataka lesu tale na ka ea yaco, au sa sega soti ni kila besides being kicked in the head at Kalabu and all those places.

Q17: When you were informed by Tikotani of the takeover, in that information, did he actually give you the indication of who was overall in charge?
A: At that time because of the rumours going on in the country, George was there, I did not know him and I was introduced to George. Automatically, it
came to me that the whole thing has been set up by civilians, different political parties. That is my general feeling. I said, "Okay, e sega ni mataivalu ga". The civilians were asking me about the truck, but I did not ask a lot of questions. They told me that, "the lorry is ready, the boys are here and ready". They did not tell me that not the whole squadron was there, but I knew there were some there. Then they said, "E sa waraki saka ga o kemuni".

On the whole thing from 1987 to now, there are always people looking for me for these sorts of things, but I never said anything to anyone. I do not want to take part in it baleta niu sa kila e levu na politicians e va ya so I am not the man to help them.

Q18: On the initial meeting there, were there any other civilians that you knew of?
A: I think it was only George at that time and someone else. He did not talk a lot because that was the first time we met. I left it with the boys, what they were going to do because I trusted them, they were my boys. They have a good plan for it so I really did not bother to ask. E vica ga na taro lalai ga au taroga.

Q19: When you met there, were there any weapons there?
A: Not at the first time, but on the second time when we got ready to move then I saw the weapons. The rest of the boys came in and the weapons was in one of the mini-buses.

Q20: How many mini-buses came down?
A: I think only one and I think there was a twin cab. One came to where we were, they probably have one somewhere else, I did not ask where all these things were.

Q21: Two vehicles left from QEB, there was a mini-bus and a red van.
A: Whatever happened at QEB, I do not know, this was the first time I met these people.

Q22: When you were down at the maritime, in what vehicle were the weapons carried? What were the types of weapons and what vehicle? Do you have any indication of the colour?
A: I know they were pistols, but I already know ours and I can guess what they have. This kind of thing, I did not pay much attention to. Its no heavy weapons because we do not have any.

Q23: The weapons you actually saw there were ....
A: Pistols and probably some SMG but I did not pay much attention.
Q24: Are pistols part of the IMS weapons?
A: You can guess the same, it can be anywhere. The pistols are 9mm, but I do not really know the numbers and where they came from.

Q25: When the group actually went down, when they went in, you said you left them at the main gate and you went to the camp?
A: As soon as I saw their vehicles going in, I went straight to the camp because I knew if something was going to go wrong, I was depending on the Army to stop it. That is why I went straight to see Col. Tuatoko and the senior officers. I think Col. Vatu, Col. Tuatoko, Lt. Col. Saubulinayau and a few others. I told them that the boys were in Parliament, they are taking over and I am supporting them. “I am telling you now and I want you to contact the Police not to do anything”. The last words, “I do not want any bloodshed”. Au vakavinavaka niu sa lako mai, meu sa lesu tale yani.

Q26: When you arrived at the gate in Parliament, were you directed by someone or you just use your own initiative to go back up to the camp?
A: My own initiative, they did not know that.

Q27: The vehicle that came down, that met you, that came down from the Unit at QEB, IMS.
A: There were two vehicles I could see following me up to Parliament on my way in, I think there was a mini-bus and a twin cab.

Q28: You were in one twin cab?
A: No, I was in my own car, I was in front of them. They already planned where to meet, but they depended on me.

Q29: That mini-bus that came down, members of the IMS that came down, was Lt. Baleinamau inside there?
A: That is a good question. I cannot make out whether Lt. Baleinamau was there or not.

Q30: When you arrived at the maritime ....
A: I know two prominent figures, but there could be another truck and Baleinamau was inside. He was not talking directly to me when we met.

Q31: When you came from Suva and went to the maritime, Tikotani was there with one twin cab?
A: I think there was one twin cab.

Q32: Tikotani and Rava?
A: Not Tikotani and Ravai, Ravai came in the mini-bus. I think it was Tikotani, George and two civilian guys in there.

Q33: Later on the mini-bus from the camp came down or the vehicles from the camp came whether it is one mini-bus and one twin cab, came down with IMS personnel to RV with you at the maritime.
A: Yes, that is the mini-bus I am talking about.

Q34: You are not really sure of who was in the mini-bus whether Baleinamau ....
A: No, they did not come out, they were sitting inside. I just cannot make out whether Baleinamau was there or not.

Q35: When you arrived at the Parliament Complex, did you talk with anyone when you left Parliament, when you got on the main gate and went back, did you talk with anyone?
A: No. Once they went in, I went straight to the camp.

Q36: Did Baleinamau accompany you back to the camp?
A: No, I went alone.

Q37: Then you saw the Chief of Staff and the officers as you have said before, did Baleinamau accompany you?
A: I was alone then I came down to the Home Affairs.

Q38: When you returned to the Parliament Complex, were you involved with the initial taking of weapons?
A: I did not know about the weapons until that morning, I do not know who brought them out and also I am not aware of the amount of weapons out in Parliament. When we returned it, that was when I knew all those weapons were kept in Parliament. Au a sega ni kila na kena kau mai cake, au sega talega ni kila how many weapons. Au qai kila ga i muri ni ratou a mai exercise in the previous night or something like that, I did not take much attention on that.

Q39: Major Ligairi, you subsequently went into the Parliament Complex, what was your responsibility in the complex?
A: As far as I know, the Parliament (Government) has been taken over, as far as my soldiers in the complex. I was visualising what is going to happen. I did not know that the hostages will be kept that long. I think I was there, waiting if any help is needed from my boys and I was ready to give them help.

Q40: Were you issued with any weapons for yourself?
A:
I think it was on the fourth week when we heard that some people will storm Parliament and the boys came up to me. There were some weapons in our room, but I am not really issued with it, we just kept it there.

Q41: Who was commanding the whole operation?
A: The commanding is a bit sophisticated. When I was sitting there, then I know I am responsible for it. Look at what is going on, they were depending on me especially with security and the organising of the people coming in. Also, a lot of people depend on me so really I was there and just taking the responsibilities for that. Even the crowd from outside, as far as security is concerned, I think they all depended on me. I am taking the responsibilities.

Q42: Is there any security concerns within the complex for the hostages?
A: Yes.

Q43: Why was this forthcoming?
A: Every person coming into the Parliament, even Major-General Rabuka was coming in, groups of people were coming in all this time, it was not easy to sit down there with over thousands of people coming. A lot of young people came from the village especially, they come here and they show the spirit of 'we are going to fight'. It was a good thing that the boys were there, I know they were going to help me and they could organise themselves. I had to organise these people, the TF and all.

Q44: Was there any structured organisation within the complex?
A: Yes, there was a lot of people there. I think on the military side, it is the security side, the protection of the hostages and also the perimeter as far as the military side is concerned. There is another structure there, the civilians. These civilians are made up of politicians and the turaga ni vanuas. They were on one side and we on the other side. We always do all the negotiations but they have their own structure.

Q45: Would you be able to tell us who was leading the civilian group?
A: I would not know that. There were a lot of turagas there and a lot of members of Parliament too from Fijian parties.

Q46: We had one indication that the head of security for the military wing was you.
A: I take that responsibility.

Q47: And the head of the political wing was George Speight?
A: Yes, you can say that.
Q48: And the head of the vanua wing was Iliesa Duvuloco?
A: No, I do not agree with that. Duvuloco was just right there, you know Duvuloco he is not head and senior because sometimes I overrule him as far as the violence is concerned.

Q49: No one was really in charge of the civilians apart from the individuals?
A: I do not think we were in charge of the civilians. There were a lot of people there, Ratu Volavola and also those members of the ex-SVT/FAP, I think in the last two or three weeks, then Duvuloco showed prominence, his got a big voice. The turagas are there too. It is not only a political wing, it is the vanua too. We can say anything, but they come with their own people, you cannot rule them.

Q50: The other question I have is the security of weapons.
A: Yes, I left the security of weapons solely to the boys, I am not looking after that. We do have briefings every morning. There are only a few of them and it is a big place to protect and I had a feeling, I am not sure now, they got the TF to help them because they cannot be on guard every night. I do not know whether they hid it or not.

Q51: You may recall another incident where a group of civilians that went down to the TV station.
A: It was in the first week, yes I recalled that, just when we got control of everything at that time, people from outside were more or less staying.

Q52: There were allegations made that the group was led out armed by a member of the 1MS.
A: I do not know exactly, I cannot be sure of that. We heard about the shooting when they came back. I did not ask a lot of questions in that whose responsible also because in that stage, you do not go around to ask who is responsible for this and who is responsible for that. The only thing that I heard after that was that the policeman was not shot, it was a ricochet from someone who was shooting. I did not bother to ask who was shooting.

Q53: Were you aware of any of the activities that were done outside the complex? Were you aware of who was responsible?
A: As far as I am concerned anything happening outside is the responsibility of the vanua. When they started putting extra responsibilities on me, then I became aware of what was happening outside. It is the whole vanua that is involved.
Q54: During the whole course of events, you had a lot of interaction with RFMF, what was your impression as to their reaction to this whole event?
A: I think I have already said it in my affidavit, I am an old soldier and when I speak to these people, I tell them straightaway of what I think “you should not do this or you should not do that”. One of the things I emphasised to the people as well is “what you are doing now ...” because I am thinking of the civilians “... you are dismantling the institution which the Taukeis build”. I think you asked those people with you, this was something I was saying at that time because I was worried about the way we were treated at the checkpoints. To me, I was really surprised, they were probably working like in Sinai or Lebanon, the way they were treating the chiefs, the old people and the old ladies coming from the villages. When they come in, some crying; you watch an old Fijian chief talking to you with tears in his eyes, what do you do? For me, I never expect Fijians to be like that and especially the Army which I used to know. They asked, “Why are they acting like this?” I have my faith in sitting in Parliament, the power which I got in there pulled me through up to now, because I am not going away from them. Talatalas come and confess to me, “I refer to the Bible verse which says, “God works in mysterious ways”. God knows that we are not going to kill anyone. Something I have emphasised that we will do this in our Fijian way. Even a General from England called me up, people who know me, and they say, “We know what you are fighting for” and the conversation usually ends with, “We are here if you need help”.

Q55: During this whole event did you have the impression that the RFMF was supporting the whole thing?
A: Yes, I still think they are supporting me, but what I am saying now they do not agree with the way we did this. I expected at that time that the RFMF will not go against us.

Q56: One of the allegations being levied from headquarters is the fact that not all arms has been returned that was held in the complex.
A: That question has been asked already, my answer was I do not know the amount of arms coming in and the ones taken out. I told the boys that all arms were to be returned so as far as I know they have been returned. It was all there, I did not even ask, I just believed my boys. The only suspicion that I had was the TF had arms also and things were happening outside. I had a funny feeling that it is beyond my control, what is happening outside. I do not really know the amount of arms that were taken out from the camp.

Q57: Subsequently after moving out of the complex, the group was relocated at Kalabu, were any member of the group armed?
A: No, as far as I am concerned, there were no arms there. They were there unarmed. That is why we were quite happy to come out. I even told the vanua, “E sega ni noda kaukauwa nai yaragi, na noda kaukauwa na noda dina tikoga. Na noda kaukauwa e tiko vei ira na lewe ni vanua”. Those were my words.

Q58: One of the problems we are encountering is when we question members of the 1MS, they always come in with the concept that they are forbidden to reveal any information.
A: Yes, that is the training we had. That training is from my training, I passed it to them but that is for war situations. A lot of them are still quoting that. I think to the soldiers, it is a good practice as far as I am concerned. If they do it now, it is a good training for them. Now, I think everyone has learned because the Police come here and also the law is involved and some people might say something which might be detrimental to some other people so it is just a straightforward thing.

Q59: Prior to 19th May, what was your position in the RFMF?
A: I was asked to come back to the RFMF after I retired last year. I am 60, the Commander asked me to come back for six months this year, I told the Commander, “Frank, au sa qase”, he said, “O iko sega ni qase” so I accepted to come back. I just put myself there as an advisor, I am not running the Unit, this was my third week with RFMF.

Q60: From your own experiences and what you observed, was there anything RFMF could have done to basically ease this whole problem?
A: I think the lack of communications between us and the RFMF came up to this. If we were talking all the time with the Army as I was the only senior officer there and know what is going on, they should have involved me in a lot of talks as far as the deployment of the arms. I have worked in the Counter Terrorist Unit, I know a lot about counter-terrorism and prevention.

Q61: There is another thing, these activities by the 1MS outside the Unit, were you at any time involved in the planning of this?
A: I thought I answered that question.

Q62: You said no.
A: Planning the coup?

Q63: You had indicated that you were not involved in the planning of incidents anywhere outside the complex.
A: Our role in the Army, you should know that well, we are a special unit in the Army, we are the Counter Terrorist Unit and we learn a lot about counter terrorism in the other forces and that is exactly our job. In other words, we are always going around feelings for other parties, radicals and things like that, it is just the preparation for it.

Q64: The members of the 1MS going to all courses of Fiji (outside), one is Sgt. Lotawa when he went to Levuka, the direction to go to Levuka, the activities done there, was that direction given by you?
A: No, he went there to his place, then things just happened there.

Q65: The other 1MS that was involved outside in other areas, the young man in Korovou.
A: I do not know they were involved in there, it is the Fijians from outside.

Q66: Were any directions given by you?
A: No directions was given by me. I was sitting down there, as far as the vanua is concerned I have no control over those people, the yasana, na ka taucoko qo, e sega ni o au taudua ga. E baleta ga niu tiko ikeba baleta na security, they tell me all the reports, there is nothing I can do about that. E sega niu rawa ni cakava e dua na ka baleta o ira na turaga era ni i kea. There is no turaga that really want anyone to be killed. If something is going to happen, someone is directing them, they are using my name like, “Tukuna mai o Ligairi ni o ....", it is something you cannot control.

Q67: There was an ultimatum put out by Commander for the 1MS and the engineers that were present in the Parliament Complex to return to camp.
A: That happened during the time that we looked at ourselves as being isolated. The engineers marched in, they are against the Commander, na ka kece oqo e veitarataravi mai kei ira na sotia tale eso. It is up to individuals there, they just made their own way in, I did not go around recruiting people. I also did not ask the ex British army people to come and help me. I did not even ask anyone, I did not even ask the lewe ni vanua to come in, they just came in.

Q68: We had some records of 1MS training in the Naitasiri highlands and the Tailevu area.
A: That is probably after when we went out, I do not know. They got their own contracts outside with the rest of the vanua, I do not know, you find that out. I did not pay much attention to that because my assessment, that is going to happen, so I did not want to do anything.
Prior to the 19th of May, there was an exercise done in Vanua Levu and it
ended up at Naibalebale, you met your boys there, was there any discussions
at all?
A: Na plan qori e se lako mai ena neitou ka ni training on the other year. We
have to go around the island and we do that every year, it just happened that
I was already in Naibalebale and they have got a place to live in and they
were really happy to come there. Na noqu vale e tu ya, era lako mai go e
sega ni dua na vanua era gole kina. They went to Valavala and the whole of
Vanua Levu and stayed in villages. There was no discussions at all about the
coup. O ya na exercise they were looking forward to.

Did you at any time at all after observing the indications that were already
there apart from 19th May, did you actually inform or tried to brief
headquarters RFMF of what was most likely to happen?
A: There was a brief, but not my brief, na intelligence brief ga au tiko kina, not
in that three weeks when I joined in, that was before. It was outlined in the
brief, what is going on in the Government, from the intelligence brief, it is
not something that I invented myself.

Within the three weeks you joined, was there at any time that you briefed
headquarters RFMF or any of your people of what was most likely to
happen?
A: I cannot remember this.

My next question, was there some form of training conducted?
A: Yes, I agree with that.

Was there any weapon training done?
A: I suspect there was, for those who have already been trained to drill, the
martial arts, et cetera. That was the only way I found that we could control
these people by training them. We know the difference comparing the first
time they came and after that they follow orders. It was not meant for them
to go and take the weapons. We were planning too a new government at that
time. These young people from villages have got to be trained like that to be
disciplined so they could follow orders se muria na vosa. Na plan esa toka
ikea. It is something like the cadet but it is a bit lower than that. This was
done to stop these people from going to Korovou. There were some arms,
the boys can probably tell me this, I do not know.

Initially, the whole idea was to instill some form of discipline?
A: Yes, the main thing was discipline, after that it worked. You have about 800
young people, era se expose tu ga ena ka vakavamu na ka va ya, na ka kece
ya, e dua na ka na nodra vakavinavaika o ira na qase, na dui tamadra na gone, e dua na vuli levu era mai vulica eke na gone.

Q75: Did this original idea (instilling discipline) not changed as the hostage situation prolonged and the military took over, this idea changed and the message put to us was rather a revolution idea?
A: I think that is not my idea, it is something that just came up. It is up to whatever way you think of it. After they were trained, when they were ordered, they obeyed the order. People were coming in to fight and especially when they looked at us, soldiers in there, we gave them some words of encouragement there, and we do not have to tell them that we are going to take up arms and go fighting especially when they are coming in to fight. E sega ni vinaka meda lai vakadukara nodra qavoka.

Q76: Were you aware of a plan that the coup that was done on 19th May was to have been done earlier?
A: Au sega ni kila qori. I would not say anything like that and in fact I did not plan for that. O au esa tu na noqu ka vakayalo me qai vakadewataka o nai talatala that I was moved to be put in there to stop bloodshed. No one else can control those people. It is not the people that were going to invade us, it is the people inside, o ira qo era lako mai vanua, era cudru va qo o sega ni tarovi ira rawa. That is my problem there. E sega ni noqu problem o ira na sotia or armed people from outside. I can take care of that, is o ira na tiko ga i loma it is about 1000 people there and about 500 to 800 young men sitting there.

Q77: My last question, do you think that some senior army officers from RFMF tried to use the situation tooust the current RFMF Commander?
A: Do I believe? That question there I do not want to answer. I suspect but it is not that I believe, you know what I mean, I suspect that sort of thing. I even said to some officers in there, “Na cava dou cakava tiko, o ira na gone era tu i gaunisala qo, e sega ni lako mai vakavinaka vei ira na communications, e dua na ka dou tukuna tiko, e dua tale na ka era cakava i gaunisala, there is a breakdown in communications”. All those things when you are an army officer, you know straightaway that the leadership is wrong somewhere. I do not have to say it.

Q78: Sir, going back to 19th May, at the slipway, did you ever give a second thought after ....
A: When someone told you this, I quit my second thought. I did not pay much attention to my second thought baleta o ira na noqu gone era sa tu. They depended on me, au qai raica ni ra sa tu na civilians and the atmosphere at the time. I did not expect that a lot of people were involved, the soldiers,
civilians and the Fijians, that is the main thing. At that time, something was going to go up anywhere so I did not pay much attention to my second thought. The only thing I know, they depended on me and I have to be responsible for them. The responsibility is looking after the boys.

Q79: On the 19th, the day you were called by Tikotani, during the day, did you meet Lt. Baleinamau?
A: No. After the signing of the amnesty, I tried to forget everything. I do not want to make excuses that I have been kicked in the head many times or whatever, I just forgot everything. Now that you are asking me questions, it is coming slowly but it will not be as clear as expected.

Q80: Going back to the day you were arrested in Kalabu, were reasons given for your arrest?
A: No, everything I have already put in my affidavit, I have never been treated like that before, and most of all the Fijian soldiers whom I know doing that sort of thing. As far as my faith is concerned, there is a demon being instilled in these people. There is something wrong there because they would never react like that. Probably wrong information are being given to them and also I am very concerned about the people preaching to them. I think I can see this more clearly than those Fijians in the institution that had been wrongly informed, that is the reason I told Mo Driver ena noqu mavoa tu mai va ya, “I forgive these people”. There were people giving the orders so it is what you have to look at.

Q81: Were you in the church service that was conducted in the IMS?
A: That is the normal church service that we normally have on 14th May every year and Rabuka was there. There was no talks at all.

Q82: The allegation is directed that that church service was used as the full ground to elaborate the....
A: I think Ratu Mara believed that because Siti too called me up on the second day, there was a lot of stories circulating. E va qo, “Na nodatou lotu ena Sigatabu, esa rogoca na Tui Nayau, esa sega tu kina na nona veiakadonui vei au”. We did not speak about the coup, it was a normal church service that we usually have every 14th May. Rabuka always came to that.

Q83: All that has happened and the involvement of the IMS in the situation, analysing the situation and the duty performance within Fiji, do you think that the Unit should remain as it is?
A: Yes, I told the people at the top not to disband this Unit. I was asked whether we were supposed to protect the Government, I said yes to that. Na ka no m a ni kina ena pepa talega, it is not a more higher institution I know
to protect than my fighting for the indigenous race. In other words, whatever institution in the Government, to me I look down at it, all my going around to England and back, o ko ya qo sa qai dua na ka au valataka tiko that is above all these.

Q84: The head of the CRW Unit that you set up is actually you?
A: Yes.

Q85: We will not touch the selection of the people that you brought into the Unit. What is relevant for this Board is the recommendations that it makes.
A: Yes, I have spoken to the Colonels I think on the third week, au qai vosataka vei iratou i cake, “Dou kakua ni disband-taka na Unit qo, dou maroro ya”.

Q86: In the setting up of the Unit, the Unit answers directly to the OC, the OC plans everything. The OC listens for direction from the Director.
A: Yes.

Q87: Then you in turn your chain of command only receive one order only from Commander RFMF?
A: Yes, that was right from the beginning, but as time goes on, the three top men in there, they are the people who knows what we do, the operation wise, not much on logistics and other things.

Q88: Because everywhere I am going from now, it is quite relevant for some recommendations that will be determined by the Board. The OC is the head, he plans everything, under the direction and the advise of the Director. The Director only listens to the Commander RFMF.
A: Yes.

Q89: You indicated that you were not involved at all in the planning of this, members of the Unit were involved, we will not comment on the selection process, that is another story. The concern of the board and the question, you were not involved here, and maybe Commander was not involved in what took place, it is quite a concern for this Board in the future anyone can come up with the members of the Unit and just do it. That is quite a concern. I know that will be a concern. The setting up of the Unit in camp e sega ni setup-taki me tu saraga na kena ka taukoko and it is not set up to be independent. I have been in the special forces for 20 years and I believe that we should be independent, me qai tu kece na kena lawa na ka taukoko. In camp, there is nothing written, e levu ga na verbal orders. The RFMF just listens to the goodness of the Unit I think. E sega ni dua na ka e vakaiiola me tukuni mai me da kila vinaka na ka e vinakati. Na channel of
communications ni operation, you have to have regulations. It is good to have the special forces.

Q90: One other concern attached to that is the security of weapons and the question raised is how easily, once you get taken out in this situation, is there a way where we could basically streamline and secure the weapons?

A: We are not worried about securing it, I think we secure our weapons better than RFMF. We introduced this card system in RFMF, na ka kece ya. It is just this situation here, which I think brought out a lot of weaknesses. We look after our weapons. I do not have to go and see myself all the time, the boys are taking care of it and if they make a mistake, it is a mistake.

Recalled on 9/9/00:

Major Ligairi, after having been reminded of former oath was re-examined as follows:

Q91: Ena loma ni Palimedi, o ni a solia e dua na directive e na gauna a suka kina na i yaragi me kau cake i na keba, o ira na bodyguards me ra maroro ya ga nodra pistol?

A: Sega, au sega ni solia e dua na directive vaqori but what I can remember now that few days before we returned the weapons, I briefed the bodyguards that we were going to inform the RFMF that we would provide security for Ilikini Naitini.

Q92: E na i sa 19 ni siga, e na gauna sa brief oti kina o George mai na Maritime, o ni sega ni solia e dua na brief me dua na qiri me caka i cake me ra lako mai o ira mai na Unit, ra ra kauta talega mai nodra dakai?

A: Sega, au sega ni solia e dua na brief vaqori. Au nanuma ga o au ni sa vakarautaki oti tu na ka kece. E ratou tukuna ga vei au, “Sa vakarautaki oti kece saka tu na ka”, sa qai vica ga na taro laalai au taroga, oti au sa mani kaya “Okay”, a va o ya o au. If any of the boys said that I did, he may be right, but I myself I cannot remember.

Q93: Dua na lori o ni a vakayagataka tiko, e rawa ni o ni tukuna mai se lori cava o ni a vakayagataka tiko?

A: Sega, au a sega ni vakayagataka tale e dua na lori.

Q94: Na cava na naba ni lori ko ya o ni a tukuna ni o ni vakayagataka tiko?

A: Na noqu motoka ga o au.

Q95: Na kena naba?

A: CP 850.

Q96: A report-taki na veigauna a kau mai na i yaragi e loma ni Complex. E vica vata na gauna a kau mai kina na i yaragi mai na loma ni Complex; siga Lotulevu e na 2.00
na kaloko, Vakarauwai ena 12.00 na kaloko kei na mataka ni Siga Tabu, rauta na 9.00 ki na 10.00 na kaloko.
A: Na cava o ya?
Q97: Na gauna a kau tiko kina eso na i yaragi i loma, tawa tiko yani e na bag, a liu tiko nomu lori?
A: Mai vei qo?
Q98: E loma ni Complex?
A: Sega, noqu lori, na siga ga au lai raici iratou kina i na keba, sa tu kina i na keba, o ya e na i matai ni siga - 19th of May, sa mani tu sara ga i na keba, au sega tale ni tara. Na lori ko ya a kauti au mai na lori nei Chief of Staff. Na noqu lori au se segu tikoga ni kila qo se a lai park-taki i vei, a lai park tu i na complex se a lai park tu ga mai cake. Na noqu lori o ya au segu ni raica vakadua me yacova sara ga niu sa lesu mai.
Q99: O segu ni kila oceia draivataka?
A: E segu. Au kila ga ni a park tu ga mai na QEB mai cake, mai na headquarters.
Q100: But where was the key?
A: Atu yani kina.
Q101: Major Ligairi, au na via taroga tale na taro qo; matai ni statement, o ni a vakamacalataka ni o ni qai kila ga na ka e baleta na vuaviri ena gauna a brief kina o George ena mataka o ya?
A: Ko ya sara ga qori, au sa qai kila ga niu sa kacivi mai e na talevoni meu lako yani ni sa vakarau tu na ka kece. Au lako gona i kea, au sa sota kei ratou na gone ya.
Q102: Sai kc ya sara ga o ya na gauna o qai kila kina?
A: Ko ya ga o ya au qai kila kina, au qai raici Joji talega kina. Au segu ni kila me caka e dua na kena vakavakarau, au kila ga ni dua na maji. Au qai lako yani i kea, ratou qai kaya vei au ni sa vaka tu o ya.
Q103: Na gauna a tiko kina o Lotawa mai Levuka, drau a bau veitaratara?
A: A qiri mai o ko ya e na talevoni.
Q104: Can you tell us the nature of the call?
A: A veivosakiti kina na ka mai Levuka. Na gauna o ya, segu walega ni o Lotawa, levu talega e ra a qiriqiri yani, e ra a tu heka mai vei na ka e baleta na cava a caka mai Levuka. Au segu ni kila na vakamakama, au segu ni kila o ya. Au kila ga na nodra sa lako i na Police Station, ko ya ga o ya keirau a veivosaki kina.
Q105: E rua na gone rau a qai gole i Levuka, rau lai support-taki Lotawa, rau kau yaragi tale tu ga o rau. Na instruction ni nodrau gole a lako yani mai na Palimedi, o ni kila o cei a soli a yani?
A: Au sega ni kila, au qai kila ga ni sa lako na i yaragi. O au e levu na ka au cakava, au sega sara ni kila, sa tu ga o ira na veivosaki vata kei ira. I just sit down there and say, “Okay”, something like that. A lot of things were just run by my own people, e sega ni ka taurutau mei soli a tiko na kena instruction. Na gauna o ya e sa levu tok a vakatulewa. O au na levu ni ka e caka, I have confidence on my boys. O ratou na cauravou ni ratou plan-taka na ka, ratou dau vakarogotaka yani vei au, e va o ya. I was not really putting my attention to anything. I know that when I was up there, I was responsible for what they were doing. That is what I have been telling them, “Okay”, so there is nothing I can do.

Q106: I understand what you are saying. You were just giving the okay and all those things. E vica vata na ka e yaco e na veiyasai Viti. O ni a sega ni formulate-taka na plan; na kena takeover-taki na keba mai Labasa, mai Levuka. Na ka o ni tukuma tiko qori, era sa plan-taka mai o qai mai va okay-taka?
A: I was not planning, it was some sort of democratic type of doing things. Era tukuma mai vaqo, vaqo; e levu na ka e sa vaka ga e ra vakarautaka tu o ira mai kea.

Q107: You did not actually plan anything?
A: No, I did not plan. Baleta niu se toka i kea, some decisions I have made, au sa cakava ga ni sa yaco na ka. In other words, probably I did not have much control for what was going on on the other side, so I really sat down there and just say “yes” or “vakatua vei kemudou”, va o ya ra noqu saumi taro.

Q108: Nomuni tiko i loma o ya, e tiko na Int. Cell kei na Operation Cell?

Q109: Na Operation Cell a tiko ena Office nei Prime Minister?
A: In fact, I do not really know where the Prime Minister’s Office was, whether it was the one that we were staying in or not.

Q110: Dua tale na vanua o ya e lako kina eso na Operation?
A: Na Civilian Operation ko ya e tiko ena yasana kadua.

Q111: Ko ya na Conference Room?
A: Io, ko ya era tiko kina na turaga, keitou a qai lai stop-taka nearly towards the end because there were a lot of things that were going on in there which we did not know, vakabibi eso na ka e yaco e na veiyasai Viti. Ko ya o ya keitou sega ni kila. Dau levu neitou veiba, ni ratou lai lako mai vaqori, ratou sa via form-taka na matanitu keitou sega tu ni kila. Oti ratou sa biuta cake nodratou line-up, ratou qai
dau lesu mai, keitou sa qai dau kidacalataka. E dua tiko e yacona tiko beka na Matanitu Vuna se dua na ka va o ya, and that was something that was really worrying us, because there were a lot of politicians in there. O au, na politicians ga ko ya au kila ni ratou tiko mai yasana o ya, o ratou ga o George Speight, o Silatolu, o keitou na tiko mai yasana qo.

Q112: So George was not part of their group?
A: No, I do not think he was part of that little group.

Q113: Qo ira ga na veiliutaki vakavanua kei Duvuloco?
A: Io, o Duvuloco e tiko tale o ira na lako tu mai liu vakataki Volavola.

Q114: O Aca Soqosoqo?
A: No, Soqosoqo was not involved in that. He was involved with the BLV Subcommittee I think. O ira na turaga ni vanua era sega ni vosa vakalevu. Me vaka mada o Tui Raviravi, na turaga na Tora ni Bau - they were just there because their people were there. They brought their people over. Ia na ka vaka-politiki, I think just their politicians were able to do that, o ira ga na party members of the Fijian party. A vaka me dua tale tiko na operation o ya, o keitou ga keitou qai vinakata tiko me veivakameautaki na ka, ia e levu na ka vakavanua e direct-taki mai.

Q115: Dua tale na ka; who was actually controlling the logistics?
A: Na logistics i kea, na ka levu.

Q116: Bau dua o task-taka me control-taka na logistics?
A: O Savua, e na gauna eratou qai lako yani kina, o ko ya a qai Bau control-taka eso na ka vakao ya, ia e tiko tale o ira na tikoga e na vanua, you have got a big problem there. First and second week sa Bau chaos sara ga. Na noqu qai raica kina na logistics, sa qai Bau tuvani toka na ka niu lako e na veiyasana, I did not know much about that, but I think Savua did a bit of controlling but it was not him alone.

Q117: Dua nomu gone a tiko i loma o ya, o Tikotani; was he part of the logistics or part of the operations?
A: I think he was doing some of the logistics. E dua tiko talega e yasana qo. O ko ya e vaka e dau kila toka e levu na ka i kea, controlling these people and those people. O ko ya ga e Bau veikilai toka kei ira na lewe ni vanua baleta a tiko talega i kea o ira na nona lewe ni masumasu beka, ratou dau masumasu ka lolo tiko.

Q118: Na gauna o bose kina vei Land Force Commander, there was a big shipment of weapons that were taken down on Saturday, oti beka na vakasigalevu. E dua saka na lori levu a kauta sobu na i yaragi mai na Unit mai cake?
A: Au sega ni kila o au. Au qai kila ga ni sa tu i loma ni Palimedi, au sega ni kila a lako yani e na lori cava.
Q119: Na bose ko ya a caka vata kei Land Force Commander ena gauna o ni a lako cake kina, ena siga Vakaraubuka, o ni a qai vakamalataka vei Col Tuatoko ni sa caka na vuaviri, o ni a sega ni lai kerei i kea me lai kau tale mai e so na dakaik?
A: E sega. Me vaka au sa tukuna oti tikoga, first of all it was at that morning. I did not know much about the time. Au sa qai lai cakava ga na noqu decision niu sa yaco yani i kea, niu raica ni ra sa vakarau tu, au sa raici ira na civilians. At the back of my mind, I thought, “This has got all the support from every corners”. That was the reason I stood up there and then. Au qai lako cake ga au lai vakaraitaka vei ratou. E liu mai na noqu vakasamataka, some did not know the drill about this hostage-taking, they might try to storm-in because I was worried, the army is in there with live ammunition. Niu vakasamataka ena gauna o ya, e sa vaka tu o ya, ko ya ga au vakatotolo kina i cake meu lai tukuna i cake vei iratou i na keba, me lai tukuni talega vei iratou na ovisa, because I know the police will react, me ratou yalovinaka me ratou kakua ni cakava e dua na ka de qai dave na dra.

Q120: Just going back to your earlier statement; this was a concern that was voiced by the Board, the training of the civilian, the response was, to instil discipline. In our course of enquiries, a new concept has come about. Actually your name has been mentioned as saying to the effect that the reasons the civilians are being trained was to basically counter the army in case of an attack, and basically words were used as you were training the civilians so that they would be better than the soldiers in the camp?
A: No, not that way. When I was there, we know that the army was against it and we were looking that outside people might get involved, but there was no way I was going to arm the civilians to counter the army.

Q121: The vehicle that you used on the actual day, May 19th, was it your own personal vehicle?
A: My car, yes - CP 850. I drove from Parliament to the top, and I left it there, and the Chief of Staff car brought me down there to the Home Affairs Ministry, and from there, to the Parliament.

Q122: One other concern that was being revealed by members of 1FMS was their awareness of what transpired in the Parliament Complex and the fall-back now. Basically what they are saying is, they did not know what was happening or what their role was in the whole event?
A: I think everyone in Parliament once the army took over, started to get confused of what was happening. We ourselves probably know a bit, but those people are probably right in the dark and we just got no way to explain exactly what was happening. All we know was that the army was taking over. O au sa qai concentrate ga ena nodra protect-taki na hostages because I cannot protect the whole camp.
Q123: Did you at any time give assurance to the members of the 1FMS that if there was any charge or investigation that you will take the fall for them?
A: No, I did not mention anything at all about any investigation because I did not think that there was going to be an investigation. I thought that the whole thing would be a success. Na coup sa na rawa ni caka, sa na oti ga sa oti. I had believed that probably the army was going to help, have these things sorted out and because the army are full of Fijians and also we are Fijians. Unfortunately it turned out the other way, so when it turned the other way, my main concern rests with the protection of the hostages, so really after the handing over of the weapons, sa oti sara tu ga vei au ena acqu sa vakacegu mai. But I could give my assessment on what was going to happen because the whole Fijians in there, from the 14 yasaans which I think the first time it has ever happened in Fiji, that the repercussion of what we do will be going on for the rest of Fiji.

Q124: Did you at any time consider the likelihood of soldiers being charged for offences like treason after these events?
A: No, I was not thinking much on that because I did not think that we will go this far. I probably based my assumption on what happened in 1987, oti ga, caka na veivakameautaki, oti ga sa oti - na amnesty na ka va o ya.

Q125: One other aspect that has been coming out, there is indication that most of the soldiers that were involved is due to your presence in the whole event and they were there because they see you as a figurative person?
A: Well, they probably can say that because I was there and they relied on me. I think they will rely on me on that because when I sat there, everyone just kind of look up to me. Na ka ga au sa qai saga o au, to try to mold myself to fit into the situation and try to protect as much as possible.

Q126: Major Ligairi, just to carry on from the previous line of questions, this was a question that was asked of you the last time we came here, did you ever give a second thought on this when you said “yes” because of the future of these soldiers?
A: Au a sega ni vakasamataka sara o au na future. On the overthrow of the government, au a sega ni lai vakasamataka o au o ya, my main belief that it was going to be a successful thing, just like the 1987 sort of thing. Ko ya qo, what has been going on over the years really, preaching of the politicians na nodra veivosakitaki o ira na sotia, na ka kece o ya me yacova na overthrow of the government. I did not pay much attention to that sort of thing because I know this is going to be a success and the boys will go back to camp. But right at the time, au sa kila ga ni keimami sa cakava qo because their future is my future. E vakatoka o ya na noqu vakasama o au, baleta talega, probably the reason why I did that is because I was not involved in what they were preparing, it was just right there and then. That was just my third week in the army. I did not really know what was going on in there, so really the decision I made that morning was something I know that was
true. I depend on them because I trust them. I just cannot leave them and let them do it by themselves, there must be some backing or something like that. Koya o ya au sega soti ni vakasamataka sa a na future kei na ka vakao ya.

Q127: At the maritime base, when you came that morning, did you at any time conduct a briefing yourself to the soldiers?
A: No, I did not. Au a taroiga walega, when they got in and saw the arms, I tried to make sure, I think I said something about warning against shooting. I cannot recall exactly what I said but I think it just came to me just to try to make sure because I thought at that time, they would have already had the briefing and everything. Na ka ga au via taqayataka o au na shooting. I think I could remember that I said something to that effect.

Q128: Prior to May 19th, were you ever approached to conduct a coup and use the 1FMS personnel?
A: Na i talanoa ni coup sa lako tu ga e na veivamua tavovalo ga e da lako tu kina, but I was never approached. I feel myself that someone needs to do that, they look at me as if I am going to do it but no, it is nothing like that. Probably if someone comes and tells me that - to conduct the coup, I probably would hesitate.

Q129: Na gauna dou sa tiko kina mai ra, o ni a sega ni bose vata kei Col Tarakinikini se o Col Vatu ni se bera na vuaviri?
A: Sega, o Tara ko ya ga na nona qai dau lako tiko yani o ya, keitou sa qai dau lai veivosaki tiko kina, nona dau lako tiko yani e na bose, a sega ni keitou veirai valailai ni bera o ya.

Q130: Na bogi ni siga Vakarauabuka, ni a sega ni qiri i na keba mo ni offer-taka na i tutu o ya - na i liifu ni Mataivalu kei na Chief of Staff?
A: Io, that was Friday. O au a qiriiqiri ni a sa caka oti na veitalanoa. Au a qai tukuma, “Oh, probably Vatu or someone else.” Oti au sa qai tarogi Vatu, “O iko sa rawa ni tara na i tutu qo?” Kaya o ko ya, “Io!” O Tarakinikini ga, I cannot recall whether he accepted it or not but I could remember that he asked, “Sa gazette-taki?” I do not know whether the Commander was there or not? If not, then that probably was the reason why I asked him that.
Q131: Out of all the other officers, you have got Col Kadavulevu, what has this got to mean?
A: I have not met him since I came back, that was just my third week in the army. I do not remember whether I had met Ratu Kadavulevu within those three weeks. In fact, I just settled down as if someone had just attached to the Unit instead of my position before.
relates to the fact that:

- "...a high standard of self discipline in each soldier is the only effective foundation for Regimental discipline. Commitment to the SAS pursuit of excellence becomes a sham if any single one of the disciplinary standards is allowed to slip."

If SAS were to be replaced by 1FMS, then these two tenets should have been instilled into all 1FMS personnel by Major Ilisoni Ligairi. Sadly not all members of the Unit could relate to these two tenets because of the lack of motivation and focus at the Command level. Major Ilisoni Ligairi who was then the Director, a term coined from the British, Director Special Forces, was employed in a role where vision and strategic thought was required. With his training he was an operator at the tactical level and very much lacked the capacity, nor did he have the requirements to operate at the level of a director. The then OC, Lt. Penaia Baleinamau, a very junior officer, did not have the characteristics or the experience to command such a Unit. He was very much an operator and thinker at the tactical level. For a unit that was arguably elite and answerable directly to the Commander RFMF, it was very much lacking in leadership. The shortcomings of those leaders within 1FMS is clearly indicated in how the illegal takeover of Parliament and subsequent hostage situation was conducted. It was quite apparent to the board that there were no proper military preliminary activities, relating to the actual conduct of the takeover, that was carried out by those involved. Such basics which is very much part of activities that could relate to the "unrelenting pursuit of excellence", should not have been overlooked by those who gave the orders for the conduct of the operation. Therefore "maintaining the highest standards of discipline in all aspects of the daily life of the 1FMS soldier" is undoubtedly questionable. The unprofessional manner, in which the operation was conducted has been revealed to the Board. Trooper Qicatabua trying to tie up the hostages while his pistol was
tucked under his armpit. Shortage of "plastic ties" led to some hostages being left unbounded. An Indo Fijian cleaner was mistaken as a government member and also tied up. The Mr. Penijamiti Valebuli, the Chamber Orderly, was mistaken for Mahendra Chaudhry’s bodyguard and probed for his pistol while the real bodyguards exited with the FIT students who were seating in the public gallery. The lack of organisation with no thought of food and refreshments, a relieve system for the hostage takers, indecision and confusion was evident during the first few days of the crisis. The Board was also made aware of the fact that contingencies were not prepared by the perpetrators. It further raises the question of whether the Unit had the desired capability and level of competency to actually conduct any operation in a life or death situation where confrontation was inevitable. 1FMS is the Unit that conducts most range practices and therefore most of its members should be classed as marksmen or of a very high standard when it comes to weapon handling and shooting. However its two members that was part of the RFMF shooting team that recently toured Australia were at the lower end of the performance scale, in comparison to the rest of the team. Not all 1FMS personnel deployed on ME TODs have displayed attributes of soldiers from an elite unit. While interviewing 1FMS members that initially participated and those that reinforced during the first week of the takeover, the Board could feel a sense of either arrogance or aloofness emanating from them. It was certainly not the “humility and humbleness” which should have been instilled into them by Major Ligairi and their instructors. It is probably due to the praise lauded upon them by the supporters of the George Speight Group (GSG), fuelled by Major Ligairi’s rhetoric to the media, which certainly had inflated a lot of egos, tossing aside “humility and humbleness” and replacing it with aloofness and arrogance. The professionalism of these members is once again questionable.
(d) **IFMS Involvement**

It is obvious that Sgt. Tikotani was involved in the plotting of the events that took place on 19 May, 2000. The Board could not confirm whether his involvement with the Nationalist Party and/or the FAP Party and any other party and/or individuals lead to the takeover. Whether Major Ligairi was involved prior to 19 May could not be established. However, the fact remains that Sgt. Tikotani rang Major Ligairi at approximately 0845 hours on 19 May, to rendezvous (RV) at the Laucaha Bay maritime complex where he met up with George Speight and Sgt. Tikotani. He was convinced about the "cause" and he committed the IFMS.

It has come to the Board’s attention that the majority of those that participated in Parliament throughout the crisis were members of IFMS who had passed selection in 1999. They were on their Continuous Phase of training and were relatively new to the unit. The majority, were formerly reserves and undoubtedly saw the opportunity for selection as one of employment and security. It was therefore understandable that Major Ligairi and Sgt Tikotani would use these troopers, who were freshly indoctrinated and more than willing to prove themselves within the unit.

Major Ligairi’s speech and brief on the "indigenous cause", completely convinced everyone and the question of legality was never raised. Instant obedience, not to question authority and blind loyalty were all fresh in these troopers minds that they only realised the consequences of their actions when the deed was done. By then, the euphoria of the “Taukei Cause” had swept them along and stripping them of the respect and camaraderie they once shared with the rest of the RFMF.

The majority of IFMS members that went inside the Parliamentary
Chambers were field operatives who reported only to the OC, Lt Baleinamau. Sgt Tikotani was the Ops/Ints SNCO and had constant contacts with these operatives. The Board has been made aware of the fact that both Sgt Tikotani and Cpl Nadunaniwai, a field operative, had prior knowledge of the 19 May 00 takeover of Parliament. It is also possible that Cpl Alava, another field operative, would have had prior knowledge or had been privy to information on the takeover because of his association with the Nationalist Party.

It is doubtful for Lt Baleinamau not to have prior knowledge of the takeover of Parliament. His actions throughout the crisis totally contradicts what he stated before the Board and the following questions have been raised:

(i) Why was he not concerned when all the field operatives were present in the Unit, which is not routine, and rostered for Guard Duty together on Wed 17 May 00?

(ii) Why was he not concerned with the weapons that were brought back from Makuluva Island by Lt Dakuliga on the morning of Fri 19 May 00?

(iii) Why did he allow weapons to be prepacked prior to Fri 19 May 00?

(iv) Why did he allow members of 1FMS to board vehicles driven by and occupied by unknown civilians on the morning of Friday 19 May 00?

(v) Why didn’t he stop Lt Tuivuanavou, Lt Dakuliga, Sgt Naika and others when they got off the minibus at the Ratu Mara/Sukanaivalu Road junction on the morning of Fri 19 May 00?

(vi) Why did he order other 1FMS members to join those at the Parliamentary Complex, something that he denied, but statements made by other witnesses clearly indicated otherwise? and
(vii) Why did he destroy and removed documents from the unit ops/intel cell. Documents which he handed to Capt Maivaiili for "safekeeping".

All these questions need to be answered by Lt Baleinamau, who was evasive when questioned by the Board.

Planning and Preparation

It is evident that a lot of meetings and gatherings were held to discuss means and ways of either disrupting or taking over Government. Various weeks prior to 19 May there were frequent meetings in the FAP Office. Some of those present were Timoci Silatolu, Adi Cakobau and Rakuita Vakalabure. George Speight only appeared at these meetings two weeks prior to the coup. Frequently names mentioned were Major-General Rabuka and Col. Draunidalo. On the week of the coup, George Speight and Ratu Cokanauco were talking outside the FAP Office and during the discussions Ratu Cokanauco raised his voice, indicating his disagreement and he said that "things were to be done legally". On Thursday, 18 May, Timoci Silatolu and two personnel in civilian were seen to take four bags of weapons for storage in the FAP photocopy room. On the morning of 19 May at 0730 hours, Timoci Silatolu was overheard in a telephone conversation saying that he was going to be the PM later on that very same day. The phone used to make that call was from 305808. There were meetings held with Sgt. Tikotani on 16 May in Suva, 17 May in Colo-i-Suva then later on at Ratu Epenisa Cakobau's residence. There was some level of preparation of weapons and equipment made only by a select few within the 1FMS Unit. The Board was not aware of any other preparations and planning. In its findings, the Board deduced that no training of the actual takeover was done. A few members knew of the plan and the others were lured in on the 19th
May on the directive of Major Ligairi. It was quite evident that no detailed planning and preparations were done. The brief given at the maritime slipway was short and very general in nature. When they entered the Parliament Complex, they were not familiar with the surroundings and the personnel there. It is very unprofessional and improper for a special operational unit to undertake such a mission with little to no preparation. A lot of decisions were made on site as things developed. The hostage takers were always asking questions and then making decisions. Those that witnessed the initial takeover were both military personnel in civilian employment and civilian workers at the complex. The actions were seen as very disorganised and confusing even to the hostage takers themselves. They did not know who all the parliamentarians were, who the administration staff were and what the students were doing in the public gallery. They even did not know the basic fundamental information of who the PM’s bodyguards were. They appeared nervous at times and confused. They appeared to be indecisive at times and hesitant. When the speaker was told to leave the chamber, he refused and nothing was done. When the Opposition was told to leave the chamber, they refused and nothing was done. When the order were given to tie the hostages up one of the rebels assisted by placing his pistol under one armpit whilst tying up the hostages. There appeared to be too much talking between the rebels. In a special operation like this, a special force Unit would rehearse a lot and during the execution phase there would be little to no talking. Specific allocations would be given to those on security details and those tying up or controlling the hostages. It was also evident that due to the 1FMS years of training and experience that there were some things that was done by individuals which were automatic and required no directive from Speight or Sgt. Tikotani. Initially things were very confusing. It appeared that the 1FMS guards did not sleep for the first two nights as they were small in numbers and worried
of an attempt to rescue the hostages by the RFMF. There was no clear command and control structure and no clear direction given by George Speight and or Ligairi. Ideas and plans would be activated with or without Major Ligairi’s consent. At times ideas would be raised with him for advice and guidance prior to its activation. When Lt. Dakai joined on 26 May, he set up the Ops/Int Room. When Major Savua and the Engineers joined on 26 May, Major Savua set up the Logistics cell. As Engineers and 1FMS personnel joined the initial hostage takers no specific procedures was adopted. As personnel joined they gradually fitted in wherever they could.

Confusion reigned for the first three days. It was on Monday, 22 May that the complex operations began to flow smoothly. Duty rosters were published, weapons registered, specific tasks allocated and some form of semblance took place.

(g)  
1FMS Key Perpetrators

The title of this Board of Inquiry i.e. "The involvement of the First Fiji Meridian Squadron in the illegal takeover of Parliament etc.", indicates that all 1FMS members were involved. On the contrary, not all were involved in the takeover of Parliament.

(i)  
Major Ligairi. He was recalled to the unit only three weeks before when he gave the order to takeover of Parliament and hold the Government members hostage. Why was he recalled when he had gone past the retirement age is an issue that needs to be clarified by Comd RFMF. What was his terms of employment? If he was recalled to organise security for the signing of the Suva One Convention, there are certainly enough qualified RFMF serving officers who could carry out the same task. The Board has been informed that he only met George Speight and knew of the actual
takeover only two hours before it actually happened. However, with his background, training and experience, he would not have easily committed himself. It is therefore possible that he had prior knowledge of the conduct of the operation. The Board could not ascertain the role of Director 1FMS, which Major Ligairi held. He definitely gave advice and was consulted on unit activities. The OC of the unit reported to him and he should have been answerable directly to Comd RFMF. Whether any relevant briefing, was given to Comd by director 1FMS, in the three weeks that he was employed by the RFMF, could not be ascertained by the Board. Whether Comd RFMF had a system to account for 1FMS activities could also not be ascertained by the Board. Prior to his recall, Major Ligairi was already a legend within 1FMS. Members of the unit looked up to him as the ever-knowledgeable mentor, whose decisions and directives were never questioned. The Board is convinced that his presence alone was enough to quell doubts and convince other members of 1FMS of the greatness of the "cause" they were embarking on. Their is no doubt whatsoever that Major Ligairi used his position to influence the actions taken by 1FMS members on Fri 19 May 00," when they took over Parliament and held Government members hostage.

Having said that, the RFMF must, to an extent, be grateful to Major Ligairi for his efforts in nurturing the unit from its inception in 1987. However, Comd RFMF must also take the blame for being overawed by one man's past and giving that man so much control over a special unit that was highly trained and highly thought of. So highly thought of, that it had its own accounting system, when dealing with weapons, ammunition and specialist equipment. Major Ligairi was the middle layer between Comd RFMF and the unit in the tier of accountability. Therefore it was only appropriate that loyalty within the unit vertically followed the chain of command and horizontally amongst peers. Whether Major Ligairi was ever loyal to the institution and
to Commd RFMF is now a matter of dispute, following his actions from Fri 19 May 00 until his arrest. If members of 1FMS have been perceived as disloyal to the institution and Commd RFMF, then it is due to Major Ligairi’s disloyalty to the institution and Commd RFMF. What those 1FMS troopers did was illegal, but they did it because they were ordered to do so. A sign of loyalty, both to superiors and peers within the unit. It was unfortunate that Major Ligairi was given control of the unit despite his limitations. His training and capability was that of a SNCO who had the limited capability of an operator and not a Director and Planner.

(ii) Lt Baleinamau. Already mentioned at para (d) 1 FMS Effectiveness.

(iii) Sgt. Tikotani. This Senior NCO is a very influential person within the unit. He was the Operations/Intelligence Sergeant and assisted the OC who was the controlling officer of the deployed field operatives. He was the key player within the 1FMS that knew of the intentions to overthrow the Government. The Board is of the opinion that he influenced the other operatives to support the planned takeover. The Fijian aspirational stance that was being dished out by the various Fijian political parties had widespread support throughout the Fijian people but Sgt. Tikotani should have remained stable and not be influenced. As a Senior NCO in a special unit he should have fully understood his calling and allegiance to Commander RFMF, the Government and the people of Fiji. He should have remained sound and strong to support the very institution that was the champion of law and order in Fiji. The fact that he reacted otherwise is a direct reflection of his shortcomings and inadequacies.
(h) Concerns for 1FMS

- The transparency of 1FMS is a matter of concern to the Board. The failure to ensure that a quality control system existed within the Unit is the fault of trying to template a foreign system on to the RFMF without the conduct of relevancy and modification studies to suit the environment.

- The 1FMS selection process should also allow for soldiers to think for themselves. Strength in character should also be looked at, with the three principal tenets of attainment of excellence, high standard of individual discipline and humility and humor constantly drummed on to those going through selection.

- Arrogance and egocentric personalities certainly emerged within the Unit during the crisis. A good example is Sgt Tikotani's interview on the TV. All those who were either filmed or photographed had the look of invincibility and aloofness etched on their faces. Humility and humor was certainly forgotten.

- 1FMS was set up in 1987 to cater for a situation that had prevailed then. Its operations were very much covert in nature and reports were made directly to the then Comd RFMF. It had the latest equipment the RFMF could offer and the Unit was isolated from others within QEB. However, the situation had changed 10 years later, but 1FMS, its ad hoc organisation, operations, accountability system, etc. were never reviewed. It was still very much existing like a private army, answerable only to whoever the Comd RFMF was. Whether Comd RFMF, had any
actual control over the unit, could not be ascertained by the Board.

(i) The RFMF's Position on May 19 Events

The inquiry into the illegal takeover of Parliament on May 19 and the subsequent holding of hostages has highlighted numerous considerations and concerns for the RFMF. These relevant concerns and consideration as per the Boards findings are addressed as follows:

(a) Contingencies to deal with National Crisis

The events of May 19 has clearly highlighted the lack of a contingency plan, training and ability of the RFMF to deal with a national crisis, such as that experienced on May 19. Although there had been instances to address the likely events or potential crisis, the failure to implement or conduct training or exercises has disqualified and negated the very thought of RFMF's ability to deal with such crisis.

With the involvement of 1FMS personnel in the illegal takeover, the RFMF had been left with limited options and choice in utilising other units to conduct anti-terrorist or hostage rescue operations.

Arguably, although any operational unit could be assigned operational taskings such as hostage rescuing, their ability will be limited. The effectiveness of a conventional operational unit will not be on the same par as that of a specialised unit.

One of the weaknesses that has been highlighted and which has
been in existence for a period of time is the provision of arms, ammunitions, equipments, vehicles and other support provisions to other operational units. Despite concerns being voiced regularly, there has been little done to solve this problem.

The Board is of the opinion that this matter should be given priority attention. It has become quite apparent that the RFMF has become handicapped in areas stated above.

(b) During the crisis, there has been numerous questions posed concerning the mission and roles of RFMF. This concern has been voiced equally by military and civilians alike. What is the RFMF’s mission and role? The RFMF’s mission is contained in Exhibit U. The that the RFMF’s mission and role is:

"TO PRESERVE THE SOVEREIGNTY AND STABILITY OF FIJI BY MAINTAINING FORCES SUFFICIENT TO DEAL WITH SMALL CONTINGENCIES TO DEAL WITH SMALL CONTINGENCIES IN THE FIJI AREA WHILST CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND NATION BUILDING PROGRAMMES WITHIN FIJI"

The events of May 19 and the reactions of RFMF has prompted the concern about RFMF’s role and its ability to protect the sovereignty of Fiji. Exhibit V contains extracts from Cap 81 which states similar provisions of RFMF’s mission and role as "...The Forces shall be under the supreme command of the Governor General..."
The Defence White Paper, 1997 (copy contained at Exhibit W) which was passed by Parliament as Parliamentary Paper No. 3 of 1997 provide for parallel provisions to the provisions stated earlier. Undoubtedly, the legislations provides RFMF with the primary function of protecting the Constitution, the Commander-in-chief, the President of Fiji; the Government of the day, the people of Fiji and its land waters and all contained in it. The RFMF in effect failed in its mission when it asked the President to step down and abrogated the constitution. The Board is of the opinion that RFMF should now closely scrutinise its mission and roles and its ability to accomplish the same. The Board does not intend to question the decision concerning the abrogation of the Constitution and the "removal" of His Excellency, the President of Fiji and the Government. Because this would have to be the subject of a National Inquiry. RFMF should now re-consider its position in light of its assigned mission and roles. The Board would like to indicate here that, whoever gave the advice for the military to take the above two actions did so without considering the consequences of that action.

(j) RFMF's Operational Capabilities

The RFMF has a role and organisation but not the necessary equipment, weapons, and vehicles to support its operations. Its training levels is dangerously low and its capabilities hindered. This whole operations only reinforced this deficiency and it is essential to re-think the RFMF's position on this matter.
Confusion in the Leadership

The Board heard from witnesses that a lot of confusion reigned within RFMF in the initial stages of the May 19 events. Decisions were not timely and actions were reactive rather than proactive. The George Speight Group seemed at times to have the upper hand on matters pertaining to the May 19 events, and its subsequent discussions and negotiations. Also, indecisions and conflicting decisions had confusing effects on soldiers deployed in the fields. The Board must also highlight here that some very sound decisions were also made, resulting in the hostages being released with no loss of life within the complex itself.

Military Think Tank

During the May 19 events, the RFMF was fortunate to have at its disposal, former senior officers, who possessed a lot of operational, logistic and administration knowledge. This group of officers formed a caucus group known as the "think tank". Did RFMF fully utilise the expertise of the "think tank"? Were advisories adhered to? What role did they play towards operational (strategic) decision making. These are few of the many questions that one could think of. The Board has also been alluded to the fact that two senior Colonels (Col Kadavulevu and Col Vatub) were under utilised during the crisis and at that moment could have contributed more in other roles. The Board believes that their being given public relations work was under-utilisation of their potential and capabilities.

Esprit-de-corps of the Officer Corp

In the course of its Inquiry, the Board deliberated on why the RFMF’s operations were not as coherent as it should be. The RFMF is now at a stage that it has never been. Its officers are now more qualified and better trained to perform far better than before. The concern is whether or not officers were posted to appointments that best utilised their future
potentialities. In their testimony, senior officers alluded to the Board that tension exists within the officer corp. The Board is of the view that RFMF should seriously look into this matter and make appropriate steps towards mending the rifts and dissatisfaction within.

(n) The RFMF Military Alliances
The events of May 19 had taken the nation and the international community by surprise. From evidence and assessment, the situation was undoubtedly one of a terrorist takeover by the very Unit that were training and assigned the anti-terrorist role. Whether or not a military option was viable remains argumentative and open for scrutiny. One fact for sure was that the bond within 1FMS did not allow the option to use the rest of the 1FMS as an assault force. To use conventional forces in a role not trained for could have been disastrous. As stated earlier, the conventional forces were not prepared for such a task. Alternatively, RFMF or the leadership could have requested assistance from our military allies. Resources and expertise could have been sought. In such a situation, the key blue force negotiator would be requested to play an important role. Fiji does not have a well-trained and qualified negotiator. The use of specialised forces could have been requested to assist in whatever way possible. Fiji’s forces are not equipped nor trained to handle complicated unconventional warfare situations and it would only be prudent to solicit the necessary support from our allies.

(o) RFMF’s Actions during the Takeover
Although the RFMF as an organisation did not approve of the actions taken by the George Speight Group, it appeared to have supported them through the following actions:

(1) Some active RFMF personnel in the complex were paid right
throughout the whole crisis. From 19 May, members of 1FMS and the Engineer Units were granted full pay, with some personnel having their pay temporarily suspended.

Details of pay and emoluments for those affected are contained in Exhibit D.

(2) Rations hotbox meals and equipment were supplied to the complex from the 1FMS Unit in QEB. These provisions were given for the duration of the crisis.

(3) 1FMS vehicles in the Unit were almost continuously refilled at the LSU transport pool. Not only were these vehicles fueled, but also utilised in activities that were directed against the RFMF.

(4) The visit of the Military Advisor Group (MAG) to the complex. For an ordinary soldier, this visitation was seen as the RFMF's support.

(5) The numerous visits to the complex by Lt. Col. Caucau. The presence of Lt. Col. Caucau in the Parliament Complex is seen with suspicion. Firstly, being a former member of the 1FMS, the possibility of his support and alliance could not be ruled out. This thought is substantiated by the fact that Lt. Col. Caucau directed that all members of 1FMS in the Parliament Complex be made to sign leave applications. What was the reasons behind the leave application been signed and what was intended cannot be ascertained as yet. Whatever the reasons maybe, the mere fact that soldiers were made to sign leave applications was an indication that RFMF
(through its legal representative) was condoning their actions. Also, the leave application, which is contained at Exhibit X could be interpreted as a mechanism to legalise the absence of the 1FMS personnel away from military duties. The Board could not ascertain the fact, under whose authority or directive did Lt. Col. Caucau act upon?

(6) Numerous visits to the complex by Lt. Col. Tarakinikini. In the course of the investigation, the name of Lt. Col. Tarakinikini had been mentioned and linked to events prior to, during and after the events of May 19. The following are few of the circumstances or events that implicates Lt. Col. Tarakinikini support and possible involvement:

(a) Telephone call to WOI Bainimoli at approximately 0210 hours on the morning of May 19.

(b) Briefing of 1FMS members at approximately 1900 hours on 19 May.

(c) Numerous visits to the Parliament Complex.

(d) The offer and alleged acceptance of position of Chief of Staff and the subsequent promulgation of the appointment in the gazette.

(e) Discussion between WOI Ravai ensuring his support to the 1FMS members. He had indicated that he would send one platoon from the Engineers and one from the 3FIR to support
those at Parliament.

(f) Reprimanding Capt. Stevens for stopping members to go and join other members in Parliament Complex.

(g) Telling Capt Stevens in the presence of Col Tuatoko at approximately 2300 hrs on Fri 19 May at the officers Mess that it was alright for the 1FMS to continue to send men ammunition and weapons down to those at Parliament.

(7) Numerous visits to the complex by Lt. Col. Buadrom. Although his exact involvement could not be substantiated, his presence was deemed one of support.

(8) Some other visits that were made by other RFMF personnel both officers and ORs. During the whole event of May 19, the visit by officers and other ranks was seen as a gesture in support of the 1FMS. There were instances in which soldiers were performing duty or present in the Parliament Complex at night and returned to QEB by day.

Also, the Board heard of Fijian ceremonies performed and words uttered that indicated that the RFMF was not only supporting the events but also was in the process of continuing what had apparently been started by the 1FMS and George Speight’s group.

(9) The inaction of the military to take firm action during the hostage crisis.
(10) The free passage of 1FMS and civilians to and from the complex.

(11) The free movement of the 1FMS personnel involved in the takeover into QEB during the initial stages of the crisis.

(12) The removal of the President and the abrogation of the Constitution.

(13) The amnesty given to Lt. Col. Volavola and others by Commander RFMF.

(14) The acceptance back of the rebel soldiers into the RFMF and Commander's speech at the 1FMS complex in which he allegedly forgave those 1FMS that participated in the overthrow of government.

(15) The numerous phone calls by all levels of the RFMF to those in the complex.

(16) The apparent giving in by the military to the George Speight Group demands.

(17) The free movement of George Speight, Tevita Bukarau, Timoci Silatolu and other key rebel leaders in and out of Parliament. It was stated that even in the height of the crisis, Lt Col Bukarau was frequenting DALS Office, holding discussions and using the facilities therein.

(18) The Military's failure to cordon off the area around the Parliament
complex and allowing civilians to join the George Speight Group.

(19) The inability of the RFMF and the Police to stop the widespread looting and takeover of government offices, police station, military installation and barracks, etc.

(The Board is mindful that there were also positive actions taken by the military to suppress illegal acts and activities).

(p) 1FMS Weapon Accountability
The Board has been made aware of the fact that both the LSU and 1FMS records concerning weapon accountability do not reconcile. Exhibits A and C is a clear indication of the differences. According to the LSU, there are still 25 1FMS weapons missing. However, the 1FMS contention is that, not all the weapons listed by the LSU were issued to the 1FMS. The 1FMS has not been able to verify their contention through documents. Despite this, the fact remains that the records do not reconcile and there are no procedures in place to rectify this. LSU is the holding unit for all assets within the RFMF. Unfortunately, the records were not maintained and updated periodically, to detect problems and deficiencies. The Board envisaged the need by RFMF to maintain a Master Copy of all its Assets. Subsequently, at intervals, all units' records are to be updated with the master list, preferably every six months. All records maintained by the strategic headquarters must remain and not be struck off if it goes missing, especially weapons which may resurface at a later date. For example, a possibility exists that a weapon found during the weapons hunt was not part of the RFMF Weapons List, but could have been one of those lost earlier. The present situation dictates that something must now be done to correct the difference in the weapons accountability between 1FMS and LSU, and within RFMF as a whole.
(q) **1FMS Vehicle Fleet**

The Board’s attention was drawn to the fact that Exhibit B is a copy of the Vehicle Fleet List for the 1FMS unit. Most of the 1FMS operational vehicles were used at one time or another to directly or indirectly support the May 19 and subsequent events both in Parliament and outside. The data at Exhibit B indicates the details of fuel being supplied to these vehicles at the height of the crisis in the months of May and June. Despite RFMF knowing who and what purposes these vehicles were used for, it took too long for it to stop the vehicles from being refueled and being used to directly or indirectly support those in Parliament.

(r) **Pay Details**

Details of pay for RFMF personnel that took part in the takeover is attached as Exhibit D. The documents outlines the suspension and activation of pay. The Board has found out in the course of its inquiry that some RFMF personnel that were involved in the May 19 event continued to receive full pay, whilst others had their pay terminated and re-activated at different intervals. Documents supporting this contention is contained in Exhibit T. The Board raises its concern as to the varying decisions on suspension and reactivation of pay. The position taken by RFMF does not correlate with them signing leave application taken on instruction of Lt. Col. Caucau and not being posted on AWOL etc. RFMF should reconsider its authority to suspend pay.

(r) **Weapons Register**

The weapons register used by the 1FMS personnel in Parliament for issuing
and receipt of weapons from its Armoury is contained in Exhibit E. The original copy of the said document is with the Police. The document contained details and signatures by all those RFMF personnel that were issued weapons at the complex. In the first few days, foolscap's were used but the Board was not able to obtain copies of the same. The Register also contained details of other equipment, stores and ammunition that were issued. It also includes duty rosters for the different security details. The weapons register also highlights the fact that certain missing weapons were in the possession of 1FMS personnel and were issued to them. For example, HP Pistol 315309 issued to Sgt. Naisara is missing. The weapon register proves the fact that the weapons were present in the Parliament complex and not returned. The register verifies that the pistol issued to Sgt Naisara is one of the weapons still missing. This links up to Major Ligiir's directive that only the bodyguards were to retain their weapons on 14 July 2000. The Board believes that Sgt. Naisara still has his pistol with him although he says he has returned it.

(6) **Intelligence Report**

Exhibit F contains an Int Report made by Cpl Vosabeci. It contains some documents for interesting reading. Written by a Corporal the interpretation and opinions were his nonetheless the report should still be given due consideration with a view to further investigate or for any other purpose deemed necessary. It is quite evident that Cpl. Vosabeci and Cpl. Gaunavouivuda were Int operators for 3FIR. The Int operators stopped sending reports to 3FIR after 3 weeks for fear of detection. They were tasked to gather information and feed 3FIR Ops by the Commanding Officer. One of the underlying factors is that whilst the Int Operators were correlating and transmitting informations to 3FIR, at the same time they were analysing
information for the George Speight Group. Their assimilation of information and actions could be deemed as them being part of the George Speight Group. They are liable for charges arising out of their affiliation. Cpl Vosabeci extracting files from the PM’s office is an activity that was not only illegal but in support of the rebel’s actions.

(i) Details of Weapons used in Parliament
Exhibit H contained some photos and serial number of some of the types of weapons used in Parliament. There is no evidence to support the contention that foreign weapons (other than that in 1FMS holding) were utilised in Parliament.

(ii) Hansard Report
Exhibit I contains both the verbal recordings and written transcripts of the initial takeover of Parliament. Witnesses confirmed that George Speight entered first, followed by Sgt. Tikotani and Cpl. Naduaniwai. Jim Speight, Cpl Alava, L/Cpl Buadromo, Pte Qicatabua and Pte W. Liganivai also entered and moved within the chamber. Witnesses indicated that Sgt Tikotani fired the two shots. The sound of the shots is recorded in Exhibit O. The Board confirmed these shots were fired, two bullet holes were found in the ceiling above the chambers. The bullets were not located. Photographs verifying the bullet holes are contained in Exhibit W.

(v) 1FMS Occurrence Book
Exhibit J is a copy of the 1FMS Occurrence Book. It covers details from 14 May to 25 June. Details of the church service on 14 May is included. The register also contained the list of those 1FMS persons who were on duty and the activities that took place in the unit. Not all activities were recorded, however, it is interesting to note the events of May 17. Why was Sgt.
Tikotani, Cpl Naduaniwai on duty on 17 May and why did other operatives come to the unit that night? Cpl Buadromo and Cpl Alava were also seen on that night. From evidence, it is improper for field operatives to be present in the unit at one time, normally they report into the unit on the last Friday of each month to report on their activities. There is also a possibility that the weapons that were seen at the FAP office on Thursday 18 May at 1400 hrs was packed and taken out by the field operatives on the night of 17 May 2000 or prior. It is also vital to note the call by Lt. Col. Tarakinikini to WO1 Bainimoli at 0210 hrs on the morning of the coup - 19 May. The calls made is not only improper, but suspicious when considering the events that followed. It would be prudent to get a copy of all calls made to and from Telephone Number 383779 and 450142 for the month of May and June, which will shed more light and may assist in answering question as to the circumstances and nature of this calls. Both Lt. Col. Tarakinikini and WO1 Bainimoli deny any knowledge of such a call.

Disposition of 1FMS Personnel

Exhibit K contained a list of all the 1FMS personnel within the unit and where they were on the week of 15 - 19 May 2000. It clearly lists the 1FMS personnel that were on the Sea Survival Exercise at Makuluva, the selection course in Nadi, those that remained in QEB, and those that were away on other deployments.

Training Forecast for 2000

The training forecast for the 1FMS for the year 2000 is contained at Exhibit L. The additional training done was consistent with those in QEB who were training for possible scenarios for the current political crisis. The selection
course in the Western Division, the Northern Division and the Makuluva training were all part of the normal cycle of training.

(y) **Exercise Alpha**

Exhibit M contains the exercise instruction of the training conducted in Vanua Levu. It was alleged in the News Papers that this training was in preparation for the takeover. From the evidence obtained, it was ascertained that the training in Vanua Levu was part of the normal cycle of training. It involved the training for the units capability to deploy to the North. No training of any takeover was undertaken.

(z) **1FMS Unit Layout**

Exhibit N is the layout of the Unit. The weapons were contained in the Armoury at (9). The keys for the Armoury were kept on a keyrack in the Q store (8) or in the Q store safe. The documents removed by Lt. Baleinamau was taken out of the Orderly Room (6) and the Int/Ops Wing (14). Weapons were taken out via the back track (21). Weapons that were taken out of the unit went direct from the Armoury to vehicles or were temporarily held in the Lecture Room (17). Ammunitions were removed from the units Magazine (3). On the morning of 19 May at 0930-1030, Jim Speight’s vehicle went into the unit and loaded weapons from the front gate. All other confirmed weapons loading were done via the back gate (21) through Sukanaivalu road.

(aa) **Video Tapes**

Exhibit O are 15 videotapes of the crisis. Some have raw footage and do not have any commentary. These tapes clearly show the participation of those involved. Fiji One has offered to further enlarge shots if the need arises to identify person(s) in the videos. Some of the footage may be used in
evidence during prosecution. Copies of the CNN coverage has been requested but to date nothing has been received. There was no coverage of the initial entry into Parliament as the security cameras in the Parliament complex was out of order. The only coverage inside the chambers were taken by Sgt. Naisara, who alludes to the fact that the tape has since been lost. The Board believes that Sgt. Naisara still has the tape hidden somewhere.

(bb) Parliament Complex Sketch

Exhibit P is a sketch of the Parliament Complex. The Fijians and female hostages were kept in the chambers (1). The Indian hostages were kept in the bottom floor of the Government office block (3). George Speight lived in the PM’s office in building 3. The Int/Ops room was located in the next room beside the storeroom in the Government Office in building 3 (top floor). Major Ligairi utilised the next room next to it. The logistics -under Major Savua was housed in building 2 in the top floor. The entire bottom floor was occupied by civilian rebels. The first room on the west side of the bottom floor of building 5 was used as the Armoury. Other portion of that building were used by civilian rebels. The FAP office that weapons were supposedly taken into on 18 May at 1400 hrs was the first room on the East side of the bottom floor of building (4). Apart from the complex, the kitchen and all other areas and rooms were used by civilian supporters. The Government conference room in building (3), top floor (first room on the west side) was used regularly for meetings and briefings. Security posts were along the perimeter, both gates and Battery Hill. When the complex was vacated, it was very evident that all the rooms occupied by military personnel were not damaged. Those that were occupied by civilian/rebels supporters were looted and extensively damaged.
(cc) **Organisation of IFMS**

Exhibit Q represents three different organisational structures of the unit. Prior to the events of 19 May, the unit operated under the second structure. The first structure was given by the current OC, Major Sorby. The third structure is the organisation as contained by OT records. The Board was not able to locate any authority for the organisation/structure of the Unit. As indicated by Major Ligairi when the unit was incepted, all process was verbal.

(dd) **Coup Organisation Structure**

Exhibit R is a structure the Board drew up to indicate the type of organisation the rebels which were operating within the complex. The Board has question marks on people suspected to be involved. Involvement indicated the persons implicated were involved or had knowledge of the planning and execution of the takeover. The persons implicated and their involvement should be a subject to another police or military inquiry. It is evident that the Vanaa militant organisations were those responsible for the widespread looting and destruction. Sgt. Tikotani was very much involved with these operations, and seemed to have orchestrated some of the incidents. The Military wing was the most organised of all the cells, The Vanaa wing and Political wing were very loose arrangements with no definite responsibility structure and control.

It became quite apparent that throughout the crisis, the main concern of the Military wing was the security of the hostages at the complex. There were, however, some elements within the military wing that co-ordinated some of the activities outside but it is the assessment of the Board that the bulk of the activities of destruction and looting were planned and executed by the Vanaa militant cells either as a group and or as individuals. Lt Col Volavola who
had witnessed the discussion of the Caucus group alludes the fact that the
Vanua-wing were instrumental in the disturbances that eventuated.

**RFMF Personnel in Parliament**

Exhibit S contained the list of RFMF personnel that were involved in the
crisis, and supported George Speight's Group. A total of 16 personnel were
involved in the security of the hostages, 15 personnel provided security
around the perimeters and on the Battery Hills. Five persons (5) were
assigned the bodyguard duties to Speight and Major Ligairi. Three persons
were the main operators in the Int and Ops cell and 17 persons were
involved in some way or rather in the operations outside the complex. 8
persons provided security for the weapons that went out initially to Bilo and
3 persons did armourer duties. 18 personnel remained in QEB. Weapons
were delivered by Sgt Vakadramu on Friday night and Sgt Kaumaitotoya
on Saturday 20 May 2000. WOI Ravai was supposedly the second driver
on the night, for Friday 19 May, when weapons were moved out of QEB.
76 weapons were finally returned by rebels to the LSU on 14 July from
Parliament; On 19 July Capt Stevens returned 70 Wpns that was on loan
from the LSU. On 25 Jul Capt Stevens turned in the 45 Wpns taken initially
to Bilo..131 Wpns were taken from the 1FMS Armoury and returned to the
LSU Armoury at QEB. Exhibit A records the pistol returned on 25 May
from the Police Armoury and the pistol returned by Pte Soko on 7 Aug. In
the Parliament, WOI Waqaniboro and WOI Ravai were doing general
1FMS administration and liaison work. Four officers were in contact and
supported the GSG. Cpl. Cakau was responsible for the communication
network to include Internet and E-mail. There were initially six persons that
went into the Chamber whilst eight provided security outside. 22 soldiers
joined later at different dates and the 13 Engineers joined on 26 May 2000.
There were six 3FIR Int/Ops staff involved in the march on 19 May, two of
which joined those at the complex. Mr Nata was the GSG press representative. There were 10 soldiers who deliberately withheld information. The Board concluded that 16 officers, Senior NCO’s and OR’s were implicated or linked to those in Parliament. There is a need to coordinate with the Police in gathering information to ascertain their level of involvement. The Board would like to point out here that all those person listed in the exhibit that were involved in the take over should be held responsible for their actions and appropriate disciplinary actions be instituted. There is a likelihood that there may have been other RFMF personnel involved, but due to the limited time and mandate, the Board was not able to ascertain their involvement. RFMF should liaise with the Police Investigation team to verify and substantiate all other involvements concerning RFMF personnel. The Board should highlight the fact that some persons left the complex, after accepting the Commanders directive to return and some left on their own free will. Although, these persons had moved out of the Parliament complex, they are still accountable for their participation and action. They cannot be absolved of their illegal actions as they were guilty by association.

**Police Inquiries**

The Police investigations have started well before 19 May and is still continuing. All serious cases should be prosecuted through the DPP’s office. It is very important that a thorough co-ordination be made with the Police to verify and substantiate the evidence gathered and to ensure that no overlap of charges is done. The RFMF should consider the possibility of sharing information with the other investigating bodies in the events of May 19.
Photo Album

Exhibit W contains photos of shots taken during the crisis. These could be used for evidence and further investigations. Important details in photographs of the Parliament Complex and key areas are highlighted in the Parliament sketch at Exhibit P. Included is the 1FMS armurer in QEB, the key rack and the safe in the C store where the armory key was kept, the lecture room which was used as a weapon transit point, the view of the complex entry and exit points, the bags and boxes used to carry the weapons out of the 1FMS unit in QEB, the surroundings of Parliament, which include the Battery Hill and other relevant areas and details that may assist in making determinations.

8. Conclusion

After having scrutinised the evidence adduced, the Board concludes as follows:

1. The following persons were involved in the initial takeover of the Parliamentary Complex: Major Ligairi, Lt Baleinamau, WO1 Ravai, Sgt Tikotani, Cpl Naduaniwai, Cpl Alava, Cpl Vosavere, Lcpl Buadromu, Tpr Soko, Tpr Saukuru, Tpr W Liganivai, Tpr Qicatabua, Tpr Ratu, Pte (res) Rovutiqica, Mr. George Speight and Mr. Jim Speight. However there is a possibility that more civilians could also have been involved.

2. The 16 persons listed in Serial 5 sub para(c) were those 1FMS pers that were involved in the initial armed takeover of the Parliament Complex.

3. In relation to the coup, weapons were confirmed to be taken out on,
seven different occasions as indicated in serial 5 sub para g.

4. Weapons were also taken out by individuals on different occasions. There is also a possibility that weapons were taken to Parliament on Thu 18 May 00.

5. 1FMS pers deployed into Parliament come under three different categories:
   (a) The 16 that was part of the initial takeover;
   (b) Those that were directed by Lt Baleinamau to join after the initial takeover; and
   (c) Those that went down on their own accord. Sgt Tikotani, Cpl Nauaniuwai, Cpl Alava and possibly Lcpl Buadromo with other members of 1FMS knew of the plan to takeover Parliament prior to Fri 19 May 00.

6. Lt Dakuliga, Sgt Naika, Cpl Tawake and Pte Ratu on the evening of Thu 18 May 00 were privy to the information that Parliament was going to be taken over. They did not agree to the plan which Sgt Tikotani had conveyed. Lt Dakuliga who was the most senior person present should have initiated counter actions to foil the plan to carry out an activity that was clearly illegal and of dire consequences.

7. No detailed preparation and planning was done by those 1FMS pers involved in the initial takeover.

8. Widespread resentment was experienced throughout the RFMF on the 1FMS activities both in Parliament and in QEB.
9. No action was taken by the RFMF to completely stop the support given to the 1FMS and Engineer pers who were in Parliament.

10. Threats were made by those in Parliament to 1FMS pers who were in QEB and their families to try and force them to join those in Parliament.

11. There is nothing available in writing to direct 1FMS to officially function as a unit.

12. The 1FMS so called "Code Of Conduct" prevented the Board from getting a more detailed description of what took place.

13. The 1FMS has never been really tested in its role to gauge its full effectiveness.

14. Sgt Vilimoni Tikotani was one of the main perpetrators of the whole operation. He was very influential and had prior knowledge of what was to take place. Furthermore he was very much involved in most of the activities conducted by those in Parliament.

15. Major Ilisoni Ligairi was the icon that most of 1FMS looked to for guidance. A very influential figure whose presence alone was enough to draw members of 1FMS into Parliament. He was also a stabilising figure when the crowd of supporters could not be controlled.

16. The RFMF failed in its mission and role when it asked the President to step down and at the same time abrogating the constitution.
17. The RFMF's operational capabilities is very limited because it does not have the necessary equipment, weapons and vehicles to support its operations in both peacetime and in a crisis.

18. On 19 May 00, Sgt Vilimoni Tikotani fired two pistol shots in Parliament to get the attention of all those in the Chambers.

19. A total of 17 RFMF personnel (Exhibit S page S1), were involved in one way or another in conducting operations outside the Parliamentary Complex.

20. A total of 35 military personnel (Exhibit S page S4), joined those in Parliament to actively or passively support them.

21. 10 soldiers deliberately withheld information during the BOI (Exhibit S page S5)

22. Relevant Police departments are still investigating the whole crisis.

23. RFMS documents removed by Lt Baleinamau were given to Capt Maivalili for safekeeping.

It is most likely that Sgt Jone Naisara is aware of the whereabouts of a pistol issued to him, as well as the videotape of the film that he took while in Parliament.

24. There had been a state of confusion within RFMF at the initial stages of the May 19 events. There was failure at all levels to take appropriate action in attempting to rectify or resolve the crisis. In
addition, there was also the failure by the command element to give clear directives and instructions.

25. The actions by officers and soldiers within the RFMF towards those in Parliament, visitations, traditional presentations performed, telephone calls, administration and logistic support was seen as an act of support to what had transpired. Also, the constant re-supply and no restrictions been placed on the movement of the IFMS persons involved in the takeover into QEB was seen by many as RFMF condoning the activities.

26. The alleged immunity granted by Commander RFMF to the members of RFMF involved in the illegal takeover of Parliament is questioned. The Board concludes that no legal authority existed that permitted Commander RFMF to issue such directives. This pardon which has subsequently been negated and reversed, is seen by many as a double standard being exercised by our regime. The changing decisions has left a question and a stigma on the integrity of our Force.

27. It has become quite apparent that within RFMF, Lt. Col. Tarakinikini's name has been mentioned and him being implicated not only of knowing of the coup and of his possible involvement in it. He is also been implicated in concerting to assume leadership of RFMF, with him acting as the chief of staff and Col. Vatu as the Commander. It was not surprising when questioned that both witnesses alluded to the fact that they would have assumed the new appointments if it was legally bestowed on them. The fact that Lt.
Col. Tarakinikini called WO1 Bainimoti at 0210 hours on the morning of May 19, and again at approximately 0900 asking for Major Ligairi; then held a brief at the 1FMS on the night of May 19; and, also encouraged and voiced his support to WO1 Ravai is a clear indication that there is merit to the allegations for which the officers' has to answer to.

28. The role of Lt. Col. Caucau is questioned. He had directed that leave applications to be filled out and taken to the Parliament Complex for the soldiers to sign. These leave applications are contained in Exhibit X. What purpose was it to serve? Who gave such a directive to get soldiers to sign leave applications? The Board cannot rule over any insincere motives. For the head of the Army legal services to make frequent visits to the complex is grounds for concern. The officer has to be made answerable for his actions.

29. The current accountability of weapons within RFMF is a lot to be desired. There is a lack of correlation within RFMF and Units as to what is within their holdings. RFMF has no master register through which a proper accountability could be done. The fact that there has been no inventory check conducted of the 1FMS is a clear indication of the lax accountability procedure that exists within.

30. There are allegations of a certain rift within the Officer Corps. Although the exact causes cannot be substantiated, it nonetheless requires RFMF's immediate and urgent attention. The indifferences seem quite evident and we can not assume that the other ranks are not aware of this rift. RFMF should take appropriate measures to eliminate the differences.
31. The events of May 19 had caught the RFMF off-guard. Although scenarios for anti-terrorism or counter-insurgency warfare was taught there was no practical training done. The RFMF did not take the warning indicators seriously and as a result was not prepared for what took place.

32. There was lack of unity and cohesion between the different units and also between the different forces, ie RFMF and the Police Force, as to how best to resolve this crisis.

33. The Board also deduced that there seemed to have been a lack of communication and dialogue within RFMF. The RFMF had at its disposal a group of senior officers (i.e. the Military Advisory Group (MAG) and the "Think Tank"). What role they played, and whether or not their advise was taken seriously was difficult to ascertain. The command element within the RFMF should now reconsider the assignment of these officers and how their potentials and ability can be best utilised.

34. It was also evident that RFMF lacked the ability to negotiate on matters pertaining to the crisis. The lack of a clear mandate, directives and ever-changing positions did not improve RFMF’s position.

35. Cpl Cakau was responsible for the communication network in the Parliament Complex. This included Internet and E mail.
9. **Recommendations**

The Board recommends as follows:

1. Major Ilisoni Ligairi be accountable for directing and ordering the involvement of 1FMS personnel in the crisis. He should be charged accordingly.

2. Appropriate actions to be taken against the 50 RFMF personnel that went into Parliament.

3. The RFMF to check its system of weapons security and the issuing authority for all weapons.

4. Lt Baleinamau to be held responsible for all his actions in supporting the illegal takeover of Parliament and should be charged accordingly.

5. Sgt Tikotani, Cpl Naduaniwai, Cpl Alava and Lcpl Buadromo be held responsible for prior knowledge of the coup and are to be charged accordingly.

6. 1FMS pers who participated in looting, shootings and other illegal activities should be charged accordingly.

7. 1FMS pers that were directed by Lt Baleinamau to participate at Parliament were just obeying orders.
8. The RFMF is held responsible for not totally stopping the support given to those at the Parliamentary Complex.

9. The RFMF is to review its operational capabilities and take appropriate measures to rectify shortfalls.

10. Sgt Tikotani to be charged for illegally discharging his weapon inside the Parliamentary Chambers.

11. The 17 RFMF personnel involved in supportive operations outside the Parliament Complex should be charged.

12. The RFMF to train negotiators.

13. The Police to train negotiators and have a unit capable of handling armed lawbreakers.

14. Lt Dakuliga to be charged for failing to carry out relevant actions to oppose Sgt Tikotani.

15. All those IFMS personnel involved (Exhibit S page S4), should be charged and removed from the unit forthwith.

16. All engineers that were involved (Exhibit S page S4) should be charged.

17. The following officers and soldiers implicated in being involved directly or indirectly or in support of the illegal takeover of Parliament are to be further investigated.

(i) Col Vatu;
(ii) Lt Col Tarakinikini;
(iii) Lt Col Caucau;
(iv) Lt Col Volavola;
(v) Capt A Damuni(f);
(vi) Capt Maivalili;
(vii) Lt Narawa;
(viii) Lt Baleinamau;
(ix) SSGT Soqo;
(x) SSGT Naita;
(xi) Cpl Vosabeci;
(xii) PTE Gaunavouivuda.

18. Efforts are to be made by RFMF to locate and retrieve IFMS military documents held at Capt. Maivalili’s residence in Lami.

19. Investigation should be conducted against Capt. Maivalili for his role in the illegal takeover of Parliament Complex and the attempts to solicit 100 K2 firing pins from DEB.

20. Sgt. Naisara should be further investigated. There is a likelihood that he has in his possession or knows of the whereabouts of his missing pistol. The videotapes taken by him should also be handed in.

21. RFMF to immediately address the alleged rift that exists within the Officers corp.

22. Liaison be made between RFMF and the Police Force to share information, in its effort to bring to justice the perpetrators of the
May 19 events.

23. RFMF is to relook at its accounting system of weapon holdings. The accountability to include regular check of other weapons, ammunition and equipment holding of all Units.

24. Appropriate disciplinary actions to be instigated against those Engineer personnel that joined the George Speight's Group in Parliament.

25. Lt. Baleinamau should be held accountable for the following:

(i) Weapons taken out of 1FMS.

(ii) Stores and equipment taken out of 1FMS.

(iii) Ordering other 1FMS persons to join and support other members in Parliament.

(iv) Removal of military documents out of 1FMS.

(v) Involvement in the planning and preparation for the takeover.

(vi) Coordinating the support to the GSG from the outside.

26. Col. Vatu and Lt. Col. Tarakinikini's actions prior to 19 May and after 19 May to be further investigated.

27. Lt. Col. Caucau to be investigated on his role in the crisis and his
direction of having leave applications being signed by 1FMS personnel in Parliament.

28. Appropriate disciplinary action be taken against the following for refusing to divulge information to the Board:

(i) SGT Naisara;
(ii) SGT Malumu;
(iii) Cpl Raiova;
(iv) L/CPL Sovaki;
(v) L/CPL Tamani;
(vi) PTE Sokiveta;
(vii) PTE Serukasari;
(viii) PTE Raivalu;
(ix) PTE Vakacereitai; and
(x) SPR Raudradra.

29. RFMF is to adopt contingency plans to address crisis such as that experienced on May 19. Appropriate training exercises to be conducted on possible scenarios.

30 RFMF to equip and train a minor Unit which would be capable of conducting internal insurgency and counter-terrorism roles.

31. Efforts to be made to equip and furnish all RFMF Units with weapons, equipment, etc so that they may effectively perform and execute their duties.

32. A decision on the retention of the 1FMS be made. It could be
retained only after:

(i) Putting in writing all of the unit's functions to direct its operations;

(ii) The appropriate leadership be appointed and then trained to command the unit;

(iii) The proper screening process be done;

(iv) All personnel posted to the unit should first pass the selection course.

(v) A decision is made to replace the whole unit and start again, and or retain those that were not involved and recruit more personnel into the unit to reach the desired unit strength.

(vi) A much more accountable system to be implemented, relevant to 1FMS, Commander RFMF relationship ie transparency in the operability of the unit.

(vii) A Board, with the necessary clearance, to account for 1FMS activities, equipment etc on a quarterly basis.
33. Cpl Cakau to be further investigated for his involvement with the Internet and E-Mail links that was in support of the George Speight Group activities.

Dated this 24th day of October, 2000.

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
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FIRST WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 27976 LT SERUPEPELI DAKAI

Lt Dakai, after having been duly sworn on the Bible hereby states:

I am 27976 Lt. Serupepeli Sorowale Dakai. I joined the army on 5 February 1988 at the Army Training Group in Nasinu. From then on I joined the Officer Cadet Corp and did my officer training here in Fiji. I graduated in December 1988 and in 1989 I did my first tour of duty to the Sinai Desert. I completed one year and returned home and was posted again to Lebanon in 1991. In 1992 I had an incident in Lebanon where I lost a soldier Pte. Sorovakatini and one of my boys was severely wounded, Cpl. Rasoso and I was one of the victims of that incident on 20 Feb 1992. I returned home and was posted to Sinai where I did not finish my tour of duty because I was repatriated and was posted to the Operations Department in Fiji under Col. Draunidalo.

In 1995 I was posted again to Lebanon for a year of duty but unfortunately on 18 April 1996 I was in a massacre where 100 civilians were bombed out. I suffered severely on that day and I returned home in December 1996. Upon returning home I went on leave and on resumption of duty I was posted to the Intelligence Department. They sent me to Australia to do a course on intelligence and I have been in that department ever since.

Q1: Can you give us a brief outline on the description of your involvement in the events of 19th May and the situation prior and after that?

A: For the record, I joined the guys in Parliament one week after the takeover. I did not involve myself with the planning nor have any prior knowledge to the planning and the execution of the takeover of Parliament. One thing for sure I know is that after the election we have been giving intelligence briefs to the Commander of the end state of the result of the election whereby the Labour Government had a landslide victory and the continuous uprising of the indigenous Fijians. We have been giving the Commander continuous briefs of the end result as to what may eventuate considering the continuous uprising of the indigenous Fijians. We outlined to him that in the end it may result in a civilian coup or a military coup. That was the intelligence briefs that we were giving the Commander RFMF straight after the election. Whilst giving these briefs we envisaged that he and his Staff Officers would carry out preventative measures to stop the end state that we were giving him.

On the day prior to the coup, on Thursday, 18th of May, I was sitting in Commander Land Force’s office with Col. Saubulinayau, Col. Raduva and Col. Tuatoko. I told him from reliable source “you better act now or you will be left behind”. He told me that this was just part of the propaganda going on in the streets. When the takeover happened on the 19th of May, I was with the mass in Suva. Col. Saubulinayau told me that we were to be
deployed to Suva and the other guys were posted out to other areas in Suva to report on the activities. When we reached the main gate of the President’s house, we heard that there was a takeover in Parliament, everyone was surprised.

I made my way back to the Bowling Club where I met the Director of the Army Legal Services, Col. Caucau. We got into his car and went straight to Veitoto to the Parliamentary complex. I went back to RFMF and waited around. For one week there was no clear directive on what the army was going to do about this takeover. That was when I made up my mind. The army was letting the boys get their re-supply from the camp. My belief is that the army was behind the takeover. I decided to walk over to the other side and sit with the guys to give them direction on what to take especially in the intelligence field. No one forced me into it and I did not force anyone to go with me.

Q2: Can you give us an indication of the date that you went in.
A: On Friday one week after the takeover.

Q3: On 26th May or thereabouts?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q4: Can you give us an indication of your activities when you joined on the 26th of May or thereabouts until the day you gave yourself up?
A: When I joined I went straight to the old man and let myself known to him and of my intentions. I was given the job of intelligence officer in the Parliamentary complex and I did the same thing as I did in the camp — collating information, processing and disseminating to him. That was what I was doing all the time until the signing of the Muanikau Accord. After that I went over to the 3rd battalion’s area of operation and had grog with Col. Seruvakula and his men. I spent the night with the ADC and Ms Tadu who were staying nearby. On Sunday I went to Parliament and at night I made my way to Vunani village and stayed there.

After the burial and when the guys moved out of Parliament I made my way up on Wednesday to visit those at Kalabu. I spent the night and came back to the village. We thought that everything was going to cool down and I came back to Suva and spent the night in Suva. Whilst in Suva I heard the news that George Speight and Na Qase were taken in by the military at Kalabu and the very next day Kalabu was stormed and people were arrested.
For the safety of others and myself, I took some people with me – Ratu Rakuita Vakalalabure, Isireli Leweniqila, Peni Naduanivi and Jim Speight – down to the village for their personal safety. On the next day Jim Speight’s sister came over and picked him up. At about 2.00pm the same day, Leweniqila’s brother-in-law arrived and picked him together with Ratu Rakuita Vakalalabure and took them to Suva. I was left with Peni Naduanivi. Jone Naulu a former CRW at Telecom called me on the mobile and said that his house was continuously raided by the soldiers so I told him to come down to the village. He moved down on Saturday. We spent Saturday and after lunch on Sunday we moved out. We heard that the soldiers were coming around and we moved to a safe house and stayed there for a few days before moving to another house. In the first safe house, we split up. Ben left and myself and Jone moved to another safe house. We spent about 4 days in there and were compromised by a drunken village who made his way to the house. I told Jone that the only way to survive is to split up. I gave him $20 and I went to the bush in the vicinity of the village. He said he would move west. I went for about 2km to the bush and I stayed there till I was told that there was a shooting incident in Sawani of Pte. Joela Weleilakeba. That was the turning point in my life as a fugitive, to come back to camp. I did not approve of what happened to “Blood”.

I called Peni and told him of my intention to go back to the camp. I did not know that he was on his way to the camp. He came in on Friday and I contacted Col. Saubulinayau that I will come on Monday. On Saturday night the PR team from the camp came to the village, we had grog and again on Sunday night. On Monday morning they came and picked me and brought me back to QEB.

Q5: You indicated you were part of the Int. unit at the complex. Were you head of the unit; can you outline the chain of command in your unit?
A: I was merely an analyst, the job I was doing at the camp. Everything else was put to the old man.

Q6: You indicated that as the Int. analyst you were actually head of the Int. unit or were you just part of the unit?
A: I was just part of the Int. unit.

Q7: Can you give us a brief outline of the construction of that Int. unit?
A: It was headed by Major Ligairi and I was merely processing all information and giving it to him.
Q8: Can you throw some more light into your specific activities as Int. Officer within the Parliamentary complex with Major Ligairi as head?

A: I analyse information, that is all I was doing all the time I was at the Parliamentary complex.

Q9: You indicated Major Ligairi was head of the Int. unit and you were just a member.

A: Yes, Sir.

Q10: What course did you take in Australia; what did it encompass?

A: I did two courses; the first was merely an analysis course – how to think analytically and militarily; secondly was the military side of the course. It deals with intelligence officer out there in the field.

Q11: You stated that you sent daily briefs to the Commander and Staff Officers; is this information sourced from the media reports or was it first hand information from people going out and getting these information?

A: We have sources who supply us with information and we analyse them as to whether they are reliable or not.

Q12: Would it be correct to say that these sources are the military and the civilians?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q13: In your statement you said there was no clear directive on what RFMF’s role was after the coup. Did you know whether there was any contingency plan in existence at the time?

A: Before I went down to Parliament I was part of the contingency planning team but then it was the reactive mode taken by RFMF instead of being preventative, to prevent what happened on the 19th of May, the outcome of that contingency plan is what is happening now – bloodshed, lawlessness and anarchy.

Q14: Can you tell us who you referred to when you said “that old man”?

A: Major Ilisoni Ligairi.

Q15: When you left the complex after the Accord was signed, you said that George Speight, Bukarau and Ligairi were all arrested, and you sort of put up your own defence system. Did you have any weapons with you at the time?

A: No, the only reason I took them down to the village was because of the information we received that human rights was abused and people were
bashed up. For my safety and their safety I took them down the village to my own house.

Q16: Neither you nor members of the group were armed?
A: No.

Q17: In your opening remarks, you stated you have had three tours of duty – first one in Lebanon where you were injured, second one to Sinai Desert where you were repatriated because of some disciplinary matters and the third one to Lebanon where you were also injured. On your injuries were you fully compensated by the army?
A: The first one in 1992 I did not receive anything, in 1996 all I got was $24,000 paid out from the army medical scheme.

Q18: Was that money enough for the injuries sustained in Lebanon?
A: Life is priceless and the human body is not like a car where it can be taken to a garage and repaired. The $24,000 or even millions will never ever bring back the 65% disability of my right hand.

Q19: Why do you think that in all these three tours of duty when you were injured why do you think you had to suffer all these instead of someone else?
A: It is command, Sir.

Q20: Are you saying you were injured because of the position of command you were holding, because you were an officer?
A: Why I said that the command failed was because in 1992 when the Israelis were coming through the Nepalese area of operation I was told by Maj. Baledrokadroka to go in and reinforce the location.

Q21: Is it not more than a coincidence that in all of these three tours of duty something happens to you? Why do you think these things have happened to you?
A: (No answer)

Q22: You mentioned in your remarks that the turning point was when Pte. Weleilakeba died and you decided to give yourself in to RFMF. As an Int. trained officer and an analyst, did you not foresee that what was happening in Parliament would eventually lead to death?
A: Instead if the Commander and his Staff Officers heeded the intelligence assessment reports that were coming and took a proactive stance or preventative measures, all these things would not have happened including Pte. Weleilakeba’s death.
Q23: You have not actually answered the question put to you by Maj. Gucake. He was asking that in your line of job as analyst at Int. you indicated that prior to that, they did not take any action. After the events and after you had indicated in your statement previously the reasons why you went and then went to Parliament, from the events happening in Parliament and your activities there, you stated you were the Int. analyst operating in Parliament under the direct leadership of Maj. Ligairi. You indicated you only analyse information, what does your duties entail?

A: Whilst in Parliament I was merely analysing information. What we did not want to happen was a clash between us in Parliament and the military with the understanding that it will be indigenous Fijians against indigenous Fijians. Unfortunately we had some skirmishes before the Muanikau Accord but our ultimate objective was the Muanikau Accord. From then on as intelligence officer that was the end of the job and that was why I went to the village.

Q24: You indicated earlier that the Sawani incident was the turning point; you did not envisage bloodshed from then on, that was not part of the cause – the bloodshed. During your stint as Int. analyst in the Parliament Complex, blood was spilt?

A: Unfortunately, Sir.

Q25: On the first incident blood was spilt, what is your comment on that?

A: I remember talking to you on that night. I was not ordering anyone or giving anyone anything to act on. I was merely advising you about the ground troops advancing towards the perimeter of the Parliamentary Complex. We were worried about the civilians who are not professional soldiers and the agitation it may cause by seeing soldiers around the area.

Q26: I am referring to the first incident when blood was spilt. You said your turning point was when blood was spilt?

A: I know Pte Welcilekaba personally, we have served together.

Q27: As an analyst you receive intelligence reports?

A: Information, Sir.

Q28: Was any of the information coming from the camp?

A: Sir.

Q29: Where was the information coming from at the camp?

A: (Silence)
Q30: Before you proceed, you understand that being an officer you understand ethics of the Officer code. In giving that statement, you will understand that you are bound by oath. In giving that statement you are not attacking the character of the person giving the information.

A: Before I name a few characters at the camp I hope the understanding was simply advising each other and those at the camp about the best way out of the conflict. They were not informants and were not about RFMF in such a way to compromise the RFMF. We were only advising each other – Capt Narawa, Capt. Tadu and Col. Draunidalo.

Q31: You have any knowledge of anyone involved also in the camp with the planning of the takeover and also the running of activities from those within the complex that you were part of – military personnel within RFMF or outside?

A: No, Sir.

Q32: From the information you got from the camp, from the three names mentioned only one was of higher rank the other two are just Staff officers. Did you not think that you should be conveying to someone senior in the military hierarchy? People giving advice were the operations bunch. You understand that those who talked directly with the people in the complex were Col. Tarakinikini on the media side and the operations bunch. Those two were not part of the operations bunch, why did you go to them?

A: To get out of the conflict, the best way out, I was giving some information where we could not act upon. We had information that arms were brought in from the western side. We cannot act from inside Parliament and I passed this information to Narawa for him to act on the information that was there. That was the only time I contacted Narawa.

Q33: How did this take place – by fax, telephone?

A: By telephone.

Q34: Was any fax transmitted from Parliament to HQ; by you or anyone from the camp?

A: I believe so.

Q35: I am referring to transmission of information, not other issues?

A: I contacted Narawa through telephone and for Capt. Tadu she was looking at things from the female side and she kept asking about everyone. Nothing about RFMF’s involvement; she wanted to know of the safety of everyone. For Col. Draunidalo, our conversation was on the same line –
the best way to solve what happened on the 19th. All these conversations were through the telephone.

Q36: Being from operations you understand we are bound by the Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention. On the actions when you went in on the 26th of May as actions unfolded one after another, you indicated that you were concerned about violation of human rights and you took people down for protection. Some other activities that were done you were part of it; you were part of the whole body. You were bound by these activities. Were human aspects not already violated during that time when you were in Parliament?

A: In Parliament, we had three organisations – the military, political wing and the vanua. For us we follow orders and we abide by the rules of engagement. For the vanua these are the hard-up guys, we could not control them. These are the ones who kept going out, it was hard to control them because they are not trained. They do not have a clear channel of command. They get agitated very quickly and take things into their own hands. Most times, when things happen when they carry out their actions, we receive reports after they have done whatever. We bring them back and tell them of the way we want things done to achieve the cause.

Q37: You indicated the military, political and the vanua; who were the leaders of these groups?

A: From my point of view the military was headed by Maj. Ligairi, the political wing by George Speight and the vanua by Duvuloco. We found it easier to gel the military and the political wing but for the vanua it is very hard.

Q38: What was the link between these three units – the chain of command?

A: They had daily talks.

Q39: Why do you think the incident on 19th May happened?

A: Because they did not heed the intelligence assessment reports.

Q40: Who do you mean?

A: The Commander RFMF and his staff.
Lt. Dakai, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q41: E vica na taro e tiko. E na nomu statement o tukuna ni o a brief-taki Commander RFMF me baleta na situation. Na Commander cava o tukuna tiko qo, qo nai iului ni mataivalu?
A: Both, Commodore Frank Bainimarama and Commander Land Force, Col. Tuatoko.

Q42: O Commander nona se bera ni lako i Norway?
A: Sir.

Q43: E bau dua na gauna, dou a brief-taki PM, o Mahend Chaudhry?
A: We prepared a brief for Commodore Bainimarama to brief the Prime Minister. We worked overnight, myself and Lt. Narawa and WO Rakikau.

Q44: Na brief ya, na ka o sa vakamacalataka oti? Vakamacalataka mada na nature of the brief in summary.
A: Oya na kena oti nai matai ni march ni SVT. Keirau solia talega vei koya na petition ko ratou a vakauratuka na SVT me present-taki. Ikea talega au a present-taka kina vua na phases kece eratou sa vakauratuka tu na SVT me ratou na ka-taka kina na matanitu nei-Chaudhry. That was after the first march, au sa biuta kece vei koya in my report na phase I, phase II, phase III, me include-taki vata na brief me soli vei Prime Minister. E dua na bogi taucoko keitou a cakaca tiko kina, keitou qai present-taka vei koya. We were actually using his laptop, e solia okoya vei keitou.

Q45: Was any brief on the possibility of a coup?
A: Yes.

Q46: How many such briefs were given?
A: Keirau dau brief o au kei Mr. Narawa.

Q47: E vica na briefs qo e a caka vei Commander?
A: From what I can recall, straight after the elections, keitou sa tekuvau brief tiko mai vua on the ...

Q48: Like daily, weekly basis?
A: O koya e sega ni dua tu na nona timetable ni neitou vei brief-taki. Na gauna ga e vinakata kina ena kaci yani. Eso na gauna e veicoqaoqo nona timetable okoya kei na neitou timetable. Keitou dau kila o keitou ni yaco ga
vei Lt. Col. Baldrokadroka. We are answerable to him, ia ena so na gauna e tu ga e kakivi keitou, keitou lai briefing vei koya.

Q49: O bau kila e vico na gauna ea lai caka kina na brief?
A: Vakalevu, Sir.

Q50: Ten or 20?
A: No, I cannot give a figure.

Q51: Numerous occasions. Na fax e dau vakau mai, I understand you operate from the Int cell, o vakamacalataka ni o liutaka na Int analysis. E bau dua na gauna o vakau fax wavoiki koya e volai tiko i kea na Taukei government, on anything that came out of the Parliament Complex?
A: Na domo ni taukei.

Q52: Io, some of the messages you were sending out?
A: Yes.

Q53: I think I received one of those messages and I called you, I cannot remember. Any of those messages that you send out, did you send out any threat on any person?
A: O keitou na direction keitou taura, when we do fax, fax on facts. E dua na credibility talega ni soqosogo e tiko e loma ni Palimedi, kevaka e dua na ka e yaco, we can claim responsibilities or we deny it.

Q54: Okay, were there any threats made to any person or any organisation that was sent out from the Int, that originated by you or when you were there, you saw it come out?
A: No.

Q55: O Tikotani, nona role in the Parliament Complex, what was his role in the Parliament Complex?
A: Okoya madaga e keirau sega ni veitaratara ena veisiga. O au e dua ga keirau veitaratara ena veisiga o Major Ligairi.

Q56: Okay, so you were not aware. Na vanua o dou operate tiko kina, na old Prime Minister's Office complex, from the corner, the first room was the storage. The second room was the Int cell?
A: Yes.

Q57: Where was the operation cell?
A: In the same room.
Q58: So you were the Int and Ops?
A: More or less.

Q59: Ena gauna o a qiri tiko kina vei Capt. Damuni, Lt. Narawa vata kei Draunidalo, I will go with Capt. Damuni, eso na gauna o dau vakau leaflets se tukutuku me distribute-taki e loma ni RFMF?

What we are doing, I will just give you a brief outline of what we have done. We have interviewed George Speight, Jim Silatolu and 80 personnel. Over the 80, 5 have been recalled and you are the sixth one. We have been through records, tapes and people who work in Parliament and we know certain details. We have an idea of what took place. We are requesting you again, some of the questions I know is quite laborious and time consuming even for us. Most of the witnesses say the same thing over and over again, but that is the way it is, o iko kila vinaka.

Na involvement nei Damuni, na kena dau soli eso na ka whether it is verbal or written to distribute in RFMF, were there any such thing given to Capt. Damuni?
A: Sir, with Ms. Damuni, na ka au rawa ni recall-taka ni keirau dau veitalanoa vakalevu ena telephone. O au na ka au dau vakauta ena fax, au dau dial-taka ga na fax number ni RFMF au vakauta.

Q60: Eso na ka e dau vakau vua, the fax or leaflets?
A: I cannot recall sending it, but I know I have been sending messages through RFMF.

Q61: The nature of the calls between you and Capt. Damuni or some of the nature of the calls, the briefing that was coming through Land Force O groups, some of the points of the RFMF activities were passed through that, from Damuni to you on what RFMF was doing. You want to agree with that or deny it?
A: O keirau dau veitalanoa, Sir, ia na keirau veitalanoa e dau very personal. We yarn we joke, nothing serious.

Q62: The briefing on RFMF activities?
A: E sega.

Q63: Mr. Dakai, just a point of clarification, when you went for your int course to Australia, were there any other officers with you that went for the same course?
A: The same year that I went was Baleinamau.

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Q64: You attended the same course?
A: Yes.

Q65: This march on the morning of the 19th, was there any other military personnel with you?
A: Actually, the guys in the office, myself, Rakikau, Corporal Lasaga. We were posted to various points to monitor the march.

Q66: The Int cell in the Parliament Complex, who was heading that cell?
A: Me, Sir.

Q67: What about the Ops branch of it?
A: Operations is Major Ligairi’s.

Q68: From your military experience, you know the operation of the Ops cell and Int cell, how we operate in a conventional type, in a peace-keeping area. The operation of the Int cell in the complex, was it designed to operate in a similar manner?
A: Yes, we operate very closely.

Q69: Were any Int and operational briefs conducted for command personnel in the Parliament Complex?
A: We have a conference every morning.

Q70: Whose ‘we’ having the conference, which persons are you referring to?
A: The military personnel.

Q71: Were any briefs conducted for the civilians?
A: For the civilians, Major Ligairi speaks to the head of the vanua wing and the head of the vanua wing will speak to the civilians. Like I said, it is divided into three.

Q72: In that block (Int and Ops), which room were you conducting these briefs in?
A: Major Ligairi’s room.

Q73: Which is the one next to?
A: To the Int.

Q74: In your earlier statement you said, when you left the Parliament Complex for your own security and the other members you contact them and went into a safe house, using the words ‘safe house’ or safe place. You said Leweniqila’s brother-in-law came and picked up some of the group members. Who are you referring to here?
A: The sister’s husband.

Q75: It could be the other way around. The faxes that were sent to RRFM, you said you sent faxes, what was the intent? What were your objectives?
A: It was a psychological warfare thing.

Q76: These faxes, the contents of it, who was the author or who gave the directive for such contents?
A: Me.

Q77: Were you at any time directed by someone else to send certain messages by fax?
A: Yes, I have sources.

Q78: When you say ‘sources’, were those persons in there?
A: In and out.

Q79: Was Col. Mua also involved and assisting at times with the psychological operations, whether in practical terms or advisory role?
A: Yes.

Q80: When you left the camp to go to the Parliament Complex, did you take any military materials, disk, anything with you?
A: No, I just stood up and walked across.

Q81: There are allegations that on the day you left the camp, you took a floppy disk which contained the blueprint or the contingency plan for the RRFM.
A: That is wrong, Sir, from what I gathered, Nelson Delailomaloma said he threw it away. When I gave myself up on the 14th, he passed by in camp. I remember Lt. Col. Saubulinayau asking me about the floppy disk. I told him, “Sir, I did not take anything, I just stood up and walked across.” Nelson said that he threw the disk away because I gave everything to him.

Q82: What were the other things you gave him?
A: Only the floppy disk.

Q83: Where did this conversation transpire, where at?
A: At the QEB centre.

Q84: Remember the day I took you down to the cell, from that day, how many days later?
A: I cannot recall, Sir.
Q85: Prior to May 19th, were you in contact with Lt. Baleinamau as with regards to any plans towards the coup?
A: No, Sir.

Q86: Getting back to Capt. Damuni, you said you went to her place, where was the initial contact for that day for you to go over to her place?
A: Beqa Rd.

Q87: Tac Headquarters?
A: No, after the Muanikau Accord was signed. That was across Parliament, the road across Beqa place, Nataqa road, that is the house right at the end of the road that is manned by 3FIR soldiers. We had a grog session there, myself, Capt. Damuni and there were two soldiers there. From that place, then we moved to Tac Headquarters where CO3 FIR joined us and Seta Bogidrau.

Q88: The night of the accord, what night was that?
A: 13th July.

Q89: It was signed on a Sunday?
A: Yes, on the 13th.

Q90: Before Commander, RFMF left for his trip to Norway, did you or members of the session briefed him on the security situation in Fiji?
A: Yes, we have been briefing him. Like I said straight after the first march, the build up, actually in my brief I have put out the phases, the indigenous Fijians are willing to take three phases.

Q91: Can you recall the date from the month of May?
A: I believe it is in my report in camp.

Q92: Have you briefed or any members of your Unit briefed the Commander RFMF of a possibility of a coup within the RFMF?
A: What Lt. Narawa and myself put across to him, was the possibility of a military coup from disgruntled senior officers and a civil coup. When Mr. Narawa told him that there were disgruntled senior officers within the RFMF, he was insulted.

Q93: Insulted or angry?
A: Sorry, he was angry. Actually he did not like us telling him that. I remember at one point in time, he chased me out of his office.

Q94: During that brief?
A: No, in another brief.
Q95: What were the words he uttered when he chased you out? What was the brief about resulting in you being chased out?
A: There was a meeting conducted in Raiwai/Raiwaqa area about the indigenous people. He actually called me up to his office, so after I briefed him then he said, "Your brief is bull-shit, you are wasting my time here, get out." I took my leave.

Q96: What was said in the brief, can you recall?
A: It was a verbal brief. I told him about the intentions of the indigenous Fijians.

Q97: After the briefing on the possibility of a coup within the RRFMF, what was his reaction?
A: He said that there will be no such thing.

Q98: Did he ask for names?
A: No.

Q99: The Intelligence Section that you were in, was it ever threatened by anyone to be disbanded, and you will be posted to other Units?
A: Yes, at one time. Word came around that we will be posted out, just like I said, it was verbal.

Q100: Do you have any idea of what was the reason?
A: Because of the kind of briefings we were giving him.

Q101: Prior to the events of the 19th of May, you with your numerous sources, did you receive any information that there was a possibility of a new Commander of RRFMF before the end of this year, possibility of a change over of the Commander RRFMF?
A: No, I am not sure about it.

Q102: Whilst in the Parliament Complex, were you able to access files that belong to the Labour Government?
A: A few documents.

Q103: Are any of these documents still with you?
A: Like when I left QEB, I did not take anything. When I left the Parliament Complex, I did not bring anything with me.
Where did all those documents go to; all the documents that you people operate in, the files that you read and whatever you operate with, where were all the documents?

A: My last words to Major Ligairi, "Sir, I think I have done my part here".

There had been some allegations that weapons were moved from the Parliament Complex to Serua and at a later date, these weapons were transferred from Serua to other places? Were you aware of this?

A: Sir, like I said I just took myself out from the Parliament Complex, I did not bring anything not even a single piece of paper and weapons, I have no idea about weapons.

At any time, did Nimacere (when you were down there) come and join you there?

A: I heard rumours that we were going around together, but for me I am clean.

Mr. Dakai, do you feel that you have been let down by some people or institutions?

A: Yes.

Can you enlighten the Board on that?

A: Sir, I believe especially in the military, we have been let down big time, the intelligence service. Like I have said before in the Board of Inquiry, our intelligence assessment report was heard and was not taken into consideration, maybe they were looking at us as being merely lieutenants and they were not seeing the quality of reports coming to them. The main downfall of RFMF, mostly senior officers, they cannot communicate on the two way communication, listening to their peers. Most of the time, it is a one way traffic thing, I think, that is from my point of view.

At the Parliament Complex, did you keep any information that the Army was involved?

A: Yes, I heard. When I was in camp, during that one week after the May 19th takeover, the RFMF was letting the re-supply and everything from camp; weapons, rations and everything so the word was going around that the RFMF was in support of the operation. That gave me the courage to stand up and walk across to try and give directions to those guys in Parliament to try and bring about an amicable solution to the conflict and get out of there.

What was happening then, rations coming from the camp to the Parliament Complex and how your brief was received, how do you feel about the whole thing?
A: If only the RFMF acted in time to put preventive network, none of these things would have happened. We can still have the Constitution, we can still have the Labour Government to solve the indigenous grievances.

Q111: Why did they not act?
A: They were looking at things personally and us as merely Lieutenants and not the quality of the reports.

Q112: Sir, in your last statement, you mentioned that you went down to Parliament, one week after May 19th, because you thought that the Army was behind what happened in Parliament. Just now you were explaining to Major Gucake that you feel you were disliked by some of the officers in the Army. What I am trying to say is that did you actually go down because of your dislike for the institution or the head of the institution?
A: Your question is if I dislike the Commander or the institution?

Q113: Yes.
A: My intention of going down to Parliament was because I know and I believe that the RFMF was behind the operations. My intention was to give directions to the military guys inside.

Q114: Okay, the other part, was it not part of it that pushes you to go down?
A: You may be right in there because during that one week, we were never called to assist or give opinions on the conflict. Like the intelligence service did not exist in that one week.

Q115: You remember Corporal Vosabeci from 3FIR, was he working with you in the Int cell?
A: Yes, when I walked in he was there.

Q116: What actually was he doing?
A: He was just a clerk.

Q117: You remember on May 20th, it was a Saturday, the day after the coup, did you see any loading of weapons from the back of the IMS building or weapons being taken out of the Unit?
A: No.

Q118: You people at the Int cell, were you aware of the weapons taken out prior to that?
A: No.
Q119: The whole bunch went out on Saturday 20th, at round about 1400 hours, were you aware of any weapons taken out prior to that?
A: No. From my knowledge, I do not know anything about the weapons being transferred down, all I know is that the RFMF is keeping their re-supply line open to the Parliament Complex and back to the camp.

Q120: While you were inside, Sir, did you ever come across a person by the name of Taufa, this guy is an ex police officer, he was sacked by Commissioner Savua?
A: No, Sir.

Q121: In the complex, Director Special Branch came in to your cell, what was the nature of it? He was accompanied by Col. Mua, it is not a big secret, he was seen on TV walking in.
A: No, I did not meet him in Parliament, but I have met him in CPS.

Q122: It was before your time?
A: Yes, way before my time.

Q123: This meeting in Raiwai/Raiwaqa you briefed the Commander about, were any army personnel present in that meeting?
A: No, Sir.

Q124: Who were the supporters, Nationalists or Taukeis?
A: Nationalists.

Q125: You heard that the Army was involved and you said this was confirmed to the resupply of provisions and weapons, where did you get this assumption from? How did you form that opinion?
A: From our source within.

Q126: What was the report of your sources?
A: That the RFMF is keeping the re-supply line open for them.

Q127: Was there any Int brief conducted for Lt. Col. Tarakinikini or Col. Vatu by you or your members of the Int cell prior to May 19th or the week after?
A: No. Only the briefing that Lt. Col. Tarakinikini was in was the Commander Land Force's conference up in the Officers Mess, that was again when I highlighted these points.

Q128: When was this?
A: It was after the first protest march and before the 19th May march. Col. Tuatoko was there, Lt. Col. Saubulinavau, Lt. Col. Raduva and Lt. Col. Tarakinikini.

Q129: That is when you told them that it was only just a propaganda?
A: No, that was in Col. Tuatoko's office, another briefing. That was on Thursday, 18th.

Q130: On the assessment and the correlation of information in Parliament, your assessment on what you gathered, who was instrumental in the May 19th coup?
A: Individual person I do not know, all I know it is the collective indigenous Fijians.

Q131: Were you at any time told when the Army came into the picture, to see what transpired on May 19th?
A: Before or after?

Q132: Either before or after?
A: It was only after that I know the Army was involved.

Q133: What made you form this opinion?
A: Because the RFMF let the guys in Parliament re-supply everything from QEB.

Q134: Mr. Dakai, the logistics part of the house, who was really in control of the logistics at the complex?
A: Major Savua.

Q135: What was Tikotani's role?
A: I do not know. All I know when Major Savua walked into the complex with his guys, he was in control of the logistics.

Q136: What we have is the operation cell, the room after the Prime Minister's office which is the conference room, I understand that was where the major conferences were held, the civilians had their meetings there. During your whole stay there, did you see Tikotani attending the meetings with the civilians at any time?
A: No.
Q137: We are about done with you for the time being for this session, do you have anything else you would like to add before we round off?
A: No, Sir, but I would be glad to answer any questions.
SECOND WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 25025 LT PENAI BALEINAMAU

Lt Baleinamau, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation hereby states:

I have been in the regular force for the past 13 years. I joined the 1st Meridian Squadron in 1987 until today.

Q1: Have you had any Middle East Tour of Duties?
A: I was in the Middle East in 1986 to 1987, and I joined the Regular Force Battalion in 1987. I had the second tour of duty in 1996 to 1997.

Q2: In Lebanon or Sinai?
A: In Lebanon.

Q3: Can you give an indication of what Unit you served in 1987 prior to joining the 1st Meridian Squadron?
A: I was with the 7/8 Battalion at that time in 1987 when the first selection was done in August of 1987, and I came in that first list and I was enlisted to the then CRW, now known as the First Meridian Squadron.

Q4: Can you give us a brief outline of the events leading to the takeover of the Parliamentary Complex and your involvement until the current day?
A: On the 19th?

Q5: On the 19th and the events leading up to the 19th?
A: On that week, we were doing some training on VIP protection, and another group was on exercise, as VIP protection is one of our roles.

When I came to work on the morning of the 19th, we had a normal Friday morning programme and another training that we do too is follow-up exercises. When we do follow-up exercises, the Director directs, say for a hijack incident, then we do some procedures, that usually happens on some Friday mornings.

That Friday morning, I was at work and the march was on that Friday morning as well.

As for our role, some of our boys were deployed to the march in town just to see if things were going to get out of hand, but we had also made plans for protecting the President if the march gets out of hand, and then I received the information that there is indication that the march was going to go out of hand, so we used that opportunity. It was just like an exercise.
scenario to us, just to culminate the training that we were doing for that week and then I got a call that there was the Director with him.

Q6:
A: With whom?
Q7:
A: With one of the boys who was deployed that morning for the march, they said they were waiting for us, and I went down thinking that we were going from there to the President's residence but for the takeover, I did not have any knowledge that it was going to be like that.

Later on, I received a call saying, “Come through Ratu Sukuna Road, we will meet you there” and from Ratu Sukuna Road, we turned into Vuya Road then into the Parliamentary Complex, then I saw the Director standing beside the Parliament Complex, and I came back, I met him. I asked him of what happened, I told him, “I think we better go and inform the Commander”. We went in his car and Col. Tuatoko was there. We talked and he briefed Col. Tuatoko, and all the colonels, all the battalions, including Seruvakula, Saubulinayau, Tarakinikini came in later because he was attending an MBA examination that day.

From then on, they went with the Acting Commander down to Home Affairs, and I stayed up at the Camp, that was the event on the 19th. I stayed in Camp and I was acting as liaison between HQ RFMF and the boys down at the Complex. They then made contacts through me and then I went up, until the Commander directed me to leave Camp and to go and stay at home which I did until the 27th of last month when they had the takeover at Kalabu. They told me, “Don’t get involved in this, just stay home and I will come back when everything has finished”, which I did.

Q8:
A: We have a number of questions: do you have any prior knowledge of the events leading up to the takeover in the Parliament Complex?
Q9:
A: No.
Q10:
A: Who wrote your Unit Training Programme for the exercises a week prior and the week of the coup; who is responsible for drafting the programme?
A: The Training Officer after consultation with the Director.
Q11:
A: Who is the Training Officer?
A: Capt. Stevens.
Q12:
A: You have served with the CRW. What is the chain of command; who commands the CRW?
A: The Director.

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A: Major Ligairi.

Q12: Are you aware of where the Director gets his directives from?
A: He gets his directive from the Commander.

Q13: Are you aware of any officers within the RFMF that were involved with the planning of events prior to the 19th May?
A: No, I am not aware of any.

Q14: After the 19th of May, are you aware of any of the officers or any other ranks or civilians that were involved with those in the Parliamentary Complex that were outside the Parliament Complex?
A: I have no idea.

Q15: Can you just go back to the morning of the 19th, you said that there was a group out there doing exercise; where was this exercise being held?
A: In Nukulau Island.

Q16: Do you know the composition of that group; how many were involved?
A: They were with Dakuliga.

Q17: You are not aware of how many were there?
A: There were about four teams.

Q18: Those teams consist of?
A: Four men.

Q19: Were they fully armed?
A: Yes.

Q20: Concerning the teams of four that were deployed in Nukulau, did they have arms and ammunition with them?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q21: Would you be more specific in terms of what they were equipped with?
A: Normal patrol weapons which we use.

Q22: Which comprise of?
A: M16s.

Q23: Just M16s or any other weapons?
A: Just M16s and team of amphibious because they were using dinghies. They would use pistols and other shorter weapons.
Q24: You said there was a person who called you, would you be able to tell us who that person was?
A: It was Tikotani.

Q25: When you arrived at the Parliamentary Complex, what time was it?
A: I think it was between 11.00 and 12.00.

Q26: You said you saw Major Ligairi?
A: Yes.

Q27: Were there any other military persons with him?
A: No, I just saw him.

Q28: What did he specifically tell you at that moment?
A: He just said that there has been a civilian takeover, so I told him that it was better for us to go and brief the Commander as I stated before.

Q29: Did he mention to you who these persons who were involved?
A: No.

Q30: At this point in time, what was your team doing?
A: They came up to the Complex that morning.

Q31: Who was leading the teams?
A: Dakuliga.

Q32: So it was the teams that were supposed to go to Nukulau that were there?
A: No.

Q33: I thought you had earlier said that the teams that were deployed to Nukulau were commanded by Dakuliga?
A: Yes, the team that went there for exercises that night came back that morning.

Q34: Are you referring to the 18th, the previous night?
A: Yes.

Q35: So they went for the exercise on the 18th?
A: Yes, they were doing the exercise then but they came back on the night of the 18th, they were supposed to come back on the morning of the 19th.
Q36: Lt. Baleinamau, you mentioned earlier on that your job was liaison between HQ RFMF and the people at the Parliament Complex. Can you enlighten the Board what these jobs entail?

A: For example, after the Director has informed the Commander, I was up there then I went down to brief Home Affairs and then the Commander said that I will be in contact with the gang at the Complex. He asked that if people were going down to the Complex, that I will inform them.

Q37: This job was specifically given to you by the Commander of the RFMF?

A: No, as I said, I went in because there was no link between the men inside and the Army HQ at the Camp.

Q38: It was through your own initiative?

A: Yes.

Q39: You mentioned earlier in your statement that you were told to go home by the Commander and stay home. While at home, were you involved at all with people at the Parliament Complex?

A: No.

Q40: You were involved with people at the HQ RFMF?

A: No.

Q41: Lt. Baleinamau, you mentioned that when you came down to the Parliamentary Complex, Major Ligairi briefed you that there has been a civilian takeover and you said that you were to go and tell the Commander or Major Ligairi to go and tell the Commander?

A: I said that it will be better for us to go up to the Commander and inform him.

Q42: That there had been a takeover in Parliament?

A: Yes.

Q43: Do you know the reasons why you have to inform the Commander?

A: Because I was caught unaware.

Q44: When you were going down, you were told to come down and you thought that you were going down to protect the President?

A: Yes.

Q45: Were you going down in uniform or in civilian?

A: In civilian.
Q46: Is that the procedure?
A: Yes, for us.

Q47: Lt. Baleinamau, when Major Ligairi was at the Complex after the 19th, who was in command of the Unit back at RFMF in Nabua?
A: Myself.

Q48: Did any of the members of IMS join Major Ligairi after the takeover of the Parliament Complex on the 19th?
A: Yes.

Q49: Would you be able to name persons who joined in?
A: There was quite a number of them.

Q50: Can you recall any names?
A: Some of them are now at Nukulau Island.

Q51: Who?
A: Tikotani, Ravai, Naika and Soko.

Q52: What was the arrangements for the security of the weapons in your Unit?
A: It was given through the directive of the Director.

Q53: Did that directive apply after the 19th also?
A: Yes.

Q54: It is still there?
A: Yes.

Q55: This Director you are meaning is Major Ligairi?
A: Yes.

Q56: Were you aware of his involvement in the takeover on the 19th?
A: No.

Q57: When did you become aware of his involvement?
A: When I arrived there.

Q58: When you arrived at the Complex but it is still the 19th?
A: Yes.

Q59: My earlier question I had asked if you knew he was involved in the takeover, did you still take commands from him in the Unit?

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A: Yes.

Q60: You still did?
A: Yes.

Q61: Was there any weapons released after you came back from Parliament to be taken back to Parliament House?
A: Not to my knowledge, because at that time, I was with the Land Force Commander, Col. Raduva and Col. Tarakinikini.

Q62: What did you understand when the Director mentioned to you that it was a civilian takeover, what it meant to you - what did you understand it to mean?
A: I was confused.

Q63: Did you question him as to what was happening?
A: Yes.

Q64: What did he say?
A: I asked him of what happened and he said that there has been a civilian takeover, so the only thing that came to my mind was that, it was better to go and brief the Commander, so that he explains to him what has happened.

Q65: So, you wanted him to go and explain to the Commander what was happening?
A: Yes.

Q66: Were you present when he explained what was happening?
A: Yes.

Q67: What was your first impression?
A: I was shocked.

Q68: At that time, what did you take the Civilian takeover to mean when you heard the explanation?
A: After that explanation, I could not still believe that it has occurred.

Q69: Just a point of clarification; you had indicated earlier that when the events of May 19th occurred, you were actually the person in command of the IMS, correct?
A: Yes.
Q70: You first became aware of the involvement of the Director when you went down for the exercise to protect the President and you were called into the Complex, and you met him in the Complex and being informed by him of the takeover?
A: Yes.

Q71: You indicated also after that you still take orders from him, although you knew of his involvement. Knowing his involvement then, at that point, as you have indicated earlier, why then do you still take orders from him?
A: Yes, there is a bond between us which holds us together as a unit, I understand.

Q72: Because of that bond you still took orders from him?
A: Yes.

Q73: Members of the IMS that went into Parliament that day, not all went with the team, some stayed behind?
A: Yes.

Q74: How do you explain this bond?
A: Can you just clarify that question?

Q75: You indicated the bond. The IMS is a whole group of soldiers. You had indicated that some went in, some did not; can you just clarify that. You have indicated that a whole bunch of them were involved in the Complex and the activities of the taking over; what is the relationship between the group that went in and the remainder that stayed out; can you just clarify that?
A: Our relationship is still intact.

Q76: Your relationship is still intact?
A: Yes.

Q77: So the Unit is still operating as a Unit although one element of the Unit was operating inside the Complex?
A: Yes.

Q78: And the remainder of the Unit that was outside remained at QEB, still operate as a Unit. The whole of the IMS or you operate on two different levels; one was for the events or the activities within the Complex; can you just clarify that relationship between those inside and those outside? Were you still operating or working as a team or was there a definite separation between the two teams - those inside and the outside?
A: ... not together, but we could feel what they were feeling inside.

Q79: One point of clarification here; so you still operated as a Unit even though part of the elements were inside and the remainder outside?
A: You can interpret it that way.

Q80: Is there any other interpretation to it?
A: We are still together.

Q81: Just a point of clarification; Lt. Baleinamaau, when you mentioned that you wanted to brief the Commander on the incident on the 19th of May, which Commander are you referring to?
A: Col. Tuatoko.

Q82: Not the Commander RFMF?
A: No, because the Commander RFMF was away at that time.

Q83: For the record, the Acting Commander at that time was Col. Tuatoko. After the discussion with the Commander, were the Members of the Unit informed of what had transpired in the Parliamentary Complex?
A: Yes.

Q84: What was their reaction?
A: The same as mine.

Q85: Was there any moves made to basically move out of camp or isolate weapons for security purposes from your Unit in RFMF, Nabua?
A: I went for duty one afternoon and when I came back, the 3FIR had surrounded the Unit.

Q86: This was for security measures placed by another Unit. Was there any initiative taken by any member of your Unit to secure the weapons or other equipments you had in the Unit?
A: Yes, there was. We have armoury at the Unit which is fenced and the gate was locked at the back.

Q87: Was this the initiative of any individual or was it the normal practice?
A: It was the normal practice.

Q88: Just give us an indication; after those events happened, you indicated that the 3FIR surrounded the IMS Complex in the Camp.
A: Yes, at the back gate. They have sealed off Sukanaivalu Road.
Q89: When did you stop taking orders from Major Ligairi?
A: Three or four days later and they were making direct contacts with him through the phone.

Q90: Would you know whether the Unit was in contact with Major Ligairi?
A: He was making calls to the RFMF. They had wanted to talk to him then after that the line was cut off.

Q91: After the 19th, those in the Complex were still making calls to you people - IMS personnel in the Camp?
A: Yes.

Q92: To the IMS in the Camp?
A: Yes.

Q93: There was no specialised communication equipment used?
A: No, nothing at all.

Q94: You indicated earlier that your training programme was done by Capt. Stevens, then when did Capt. Stevens come back in?
A: He was running a selection that week. He was in Nadi.

Q95: Lt. Baleinamau, should we require you to appear before the Board in future to answer questions that we are unclear of or for points of clarifications, we will recall you, but we are done with you for now. Do you have anything else to say or add to what you have stated in your statement, you may if you wish?
A: No, Sir.

Recalled On 13/09/00:

Lt. Baleinamau, after having been duly reminded of oath earlier taken, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q96: On the 18th of May, the squadron was out training in Makuluva. Weapons were taken out in sand bags to those at Makuluva. Were you aware of these weapons being taken out to those that were training in Makuluva?
A: They said it was for that exercise.

Q97: Weapons that were taken out for the exercise were taken out when they went for the exercise which was on Tuesday, 16th, and these were M16. However,
on Thursday, Uzis were taken out, were you aware of the weapons being taken out?
A: No, Sir.

Q98: You gave an indication that it was taken out for the exercise.
A: For the exercise.

Q99: On Thursday?
A: Thursday.

Q100: Lt. Baleinamau, on our first talk with you, you were the second witness. We have gone through 85 witnesses, of the 85, we have recalled about 10 of them, you are one of the recalled ones. Your involvement in this, you know much more than what you are letting up. You either do not waste your time and ours by informing us of what really happened or just tell us what really did happen then we will proceed.
A: Sir, the weapons you mentioned that were in the sand bags, I do not know when they took it out. The only weapons I knew was the exercise one.

Q101: When was that taken out?
A: On Tuesday.

Q102: On the RV, who called to say for you people to go down for the exercise, who gave you the call on the day of the 19th?
A: It must be Tikotani.

Q103: Okay, Tikotani called you, what was your directive to the men?
A: (Silence).

Q104: What was the directive given by the old man? I will actually indicate it. The directive was given for you and the men to go down and bring the weapons down, was it so?
A: The directive was given for ....

Q105: The men plus the weapons to come down?
A: Yes.

Q106: Was it so?
A: Yes.

Q107: You went down there and met at maritime. Let me go through that again. Who was at maritime?
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A: I did not go down to maritime, but I met them when I went down Sukuna Rd. As I had said earlier, the exercise which I knew of was for the protection of the President, which we were doing for that week. When Tikotani rang, I had in mind that it was for that reason.

Q108: Did you go in a mini-bus that waited at the back of the Unit?
A: Yes.

Q109: Who else got on the bus?
A: (Silence).

Q110: Members of the Unit?
A: Yes.

Q111: Where did that bus go to?
A: Sukuna Rd.

Q112: Where were you told to RV?
A: They said that the old man was waiting for us at Sukuna Rd.

Q113: Which place in Sukuna Rd did you meet?
A: At Sukuna Rd they turned into Vuya Rd because I knew that we were going to go from Sukuna Rd to Berkeley Crescent.

Q114: You were at Kalabu when they left the Parliament Complex, what were you people doing at Kalabu?
A: Sir, I live near that place.

Q115: All the CRW went to Kalabu, what were you doing at Kalabu or a meeting?
A: The old man directed that all of us were to meet there on that day welcoming those who came back from East Timor. That was the purpose of our meeting.

Q116: What was the nature of the discussions made between you, Lt. Col. Tarakinikini and Lt. Col. Raduva on the various meetings that you had. One was in Lt. Col. Raduva’s office.
A: Most of the meetings, they said that this thing will only be solved through negotiations.

Q117: You spent the whole of the afternoon and late hours in the night with these officers I have just named in Lt. Col. Raduva’s office. What was the nature of the discussion?
A: If I could recall it, mainly it was on how to solve the crisis.

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Q118: We had various witnesses here, various members of the 1MS to indicate that after the 19th, you had directed them to go down and provide security in the complex, is that true?
A: After the 19th, as I was acting liaison between headquarters RFMF and ....

Q119: The question is quite clear, it requires a no or yes answer. After the 19th, when the Parliament was taken over, you had given directives or orders to members of the 1MS to go down and join those in the Parliament Complex, is that true?
A: I did not give them a directive to go down and join, it was on their free will.

Q120: We have sworn statements here by various members to say that you were directing them to go down to provide security at the complex, to go and join those people down at the Parliament Complex, is that true or not?
A: (Silence).

Q121: Were you aware of the weapons that were taken out prior to the 20th?
A: No, Sir.

Q122: Prior to the 20th, the whole batch.
A: At that time, I did not have any knowledge of that.

Q123: On the 20th, the whole batch of weapons were taken out, you were the OC, where was your directive, is it true you gave the directive for the weapons to be taken to Wailoku, to await there for further orders?
A: Yes.

Q124: Mr. Baleinamau, let us go back to the 18th of May, where were you on the evening of that day?
A: At home.

Q125: From Tuesday, the day the Makuluva exercise started until Thursday night, did you at any time meet with your Int Operatives and Lt. Dakuliga at the maritime slipway?
A: No.

Q126: Were you aware of any such meetings taking place?
A: No.

Q127: Who directed the training at Makuluva?
A: It was in our training cycle.
Q128: Let us go back to the morning of the Friday 19th, what time did you report for duty in the morning?
A: At 7.30 a.m.

Q129: Was there any message left for you to contact any persons?
A: No.

Q130: What time did you get a call from Tikotani?
A: It was between 9.30 and 10.00 or 9.30 to 10.30.

Q131: Where did this call come from, the normal phone in the Unit or your mobile?
A: Normal phone.

Q132: What were his exact words to you or approximate words?
A: I cannot recall it.

Q133: You would recall some things that were said by him?
A: "Na Qase wants you down here" or something like that.

Q134: Who is the head of the Unit, 1MS?
A: The Director.

Q135: What is your role?
A: I am just the OC.

Q136: If the Unit was called out, either for exercise or something else, would you take directives from persons other than Na Qase in your capacity as OC?
A: Because Na Qase was standing beside him.

Q137: How do you know that he was there?
A: Na Qase was relaying messages to Tikotani.

Q138: Did you hear him on the side?
A: Yes.

Q139: Why did you not ask to speak directly to Na Qase other than a third person?
A: After that he went off the phone.

Q140: His instructions was for you to get the boys together and RV in the Sukuna Rd for the exercise?
A: For the exercise.

Q141: At this time, your Int Operatives were there in the camp?
A: No, they were down in the march.

Q142: What, if I tell you, that they have given evidence here saying that they were in the complex loading weapons in a blue pick-up truck, belonging to Jim Speight and that you were present in the complex at that time.

A: Yes, Sir, I was in the complex.

Q143: You were at the complex?

A: Yes.

Q144: Did you see them loading weapons in a vehicle, a blue pick-up truck belonging to Jim Speight?

A: They just came in, they said that was from "Na Qase's" orders and from there I realised the weapons were taken that night.

Q145: Who said this to you?

A: I could not recall.

Q146: One of the operatives?

A: Yes, I think it was one of the operatives.

Q147: Where was the blue pick-up van parked, in front of your Unit?

A: Yes.

Q148: Is it true that Jim Speight was the driver?

A: I do not know.

Q149: What weapons were taken out by then?

A: Sir, as I mentioned already.

Q150: What weapons, Sir, you have to say that again?

A: The same weapons as mentioned before, they said it was the Uzis and pistols.

Q151: Did they give you the number of weapons they would want to take?

A: 16.

Q152: You do not recall the person you spoke to?

A: No.

Q153: It was a very important conversation.

A: I could not recall because they just came in and said ....
Q154: Okay, how many Int Operatives you have?
A: Four.

Q155: Tikotani, Vosavere, Baleinamau and Buadromo?
A: Yes.

Q156: Out of these four, who spoke with you? Naduaniwai is also an operative.
A: I think it was Ben Naduaniwai.

Q157: You said he informed you that Na Qase (Major Ligairi) instructed for those weapons?
A: Yes.

Q158: How were these weapons carried to the van?
A: I think in duffel bags.

Q159: Did you make any attempts to contact Major Ligairi to confirm this, what Corporal Naduaniwai has said to you?
A: I tried his mobile, but there was no contact.

Q160: They packed the weapons and they left?
A: Yes.

Q161: Can you recall who left in that van?
A: It was the same guys who came in.

Q162: How many of the operatives were there?
A: Except Tikotani.

Q163: Was Vosavere there?
A: No.

Q164: What time was this?
A: I think it was 10.30 or sometimes before that.

Q165: This was after your discussions with Tikotani?
A: Yes.

Q166: Were all these members issued weapons?
A: No.

Q167: Do you usually go out on an exercise without weapons?
A: Because the weapons have gone in that van and I said we were going to meet them in that RV.

Q168: Then there were supposed to be more than 16, is that true? How many members are usually involved?
A: All the members of the IMS.

Q169: How many members would that be?
A: More than 30.

Q170: So the 16 weapons and 30 persons does not tally, correct?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q171: So there would have been more weapons taken out, 16 or more weapons were loaded in the van.
A: They told me it was 16, but I do not know how many they actually took.

Q172: Did you after they had taken the weapons or during this process of moving the weapons, visit the armory? Did you go towards the armoury and check what weapons were being taken out?
A: No.

Q173: Who locked the armoury?
A: I think it was Private Lala.

Q174: What is his full name?
A: Etuate Lala.

Q175: They had left in the pick-up truck, where was the rest of your members from IMS at this moment?
A: Some were in the complex and some were in the barracks.

Q176: You got them together, did you conduct a brief for the boys?
A: Yes, I told them that we were going for that VIP exercise and Na Qase was going to meet us at Sukuna Rd on our way to Berkeley Crescent.

Q177: Is it true that you gave them 10 minutes to be back in the complex after changing?
A: No.

Q178: When you met at the back of the gate of the Unit, how did you travel to Sukuna Rd?
A: Because they said that the vehicle was going to come and pick us up.
Q179: Did they specify which vehicle?  
A: They said a mini-bus and a twin cab, Sir.

Q180: When you approach the road, was there a twin cab and a mini-bus waiting for you?  
A: When I came there, only the mini-bus was there.

Q181: Could you identify any of the persons in the mini-bus? Who was in the mini-bus, was it a member of the IMS driving the mini-bus?  
A: No.

Q182: Was it Apenisa Rokotuqica? We all know him, he is a soldier with a tattoo on the head. Was he the driver or the occupant of that bus?  
A: I think that was him with a tattoo on his head.

Q183: What colour was the mini-bus?  
A: It was white.

Q184: Can you recall the registration number?  
A: No.

Q185: How many of you got into the mini-bus?  
A: Myself, I came in first and the rest of the boys came in later.

Q186: The rest of the boys, can you name them?  
A: All those who came out from that exercise that day.

Q187: Was Dakuliga and Tuivanuavou there?  
A: Yes.

Q188: The boys that had returned from Makuluva, all of them?  
A: Except Tikotani.

Q189: Except Tikotani, so the rest were there?  
A: Except Tikotani and Alava.

Q190: Sergeant-Major Ravai was there with you?  
A: He went in the first mini-bus.

Q191: There was another mini-bus?  
A: Yes.
Q192: How many of them were in the first mini-bus?
A: I think it was 10.

Q193: How many in yours, approximate?
A: Approximately more than 10.

Q194: Let us just get some of the names. Just give a quick indication of who may have been in the first mini-bus and who may have been in the second. Corporal Tawake, was he there?
A: Yes, I think so.

Q195: When you came down in the mini-bus, did the mini-bus at any time stop and anyone got off?
A: At the junction of Sukanaivalu Rd and Ratu Mara Rd.

Q196: The rest went on?
A: Yes.

Q197: When those got off, who else was left inside, 1MS personnel?
A: Myself, Ratu and I think another three.

Q198: What about Private Raivalu?
A: He could also be there.

Q199: Bukasila?
A: He was away in Vanua Levu, he went to bury his mother.

Q200: Serukasari?
A: Yes, I think so.

Q201: Sokiveta?
A: I think ....

Q202: When Lt. Tuivanuavou got off at the junction of Sukanaivalu Rd and Ratu Mara Rd, did Lt. Dakuliga got off?
A: Yes.

Q203: Did you have a discussion as to their getting off at the junction?
A: Yes.

Q204: What discussion took place?
A: They said, “We are getting off” and I said, “You wait in the complex.” Because part of the boys have gone, I have to go and see them just to justify
that this is a real exercise because Na Qase was waiting there. That was the main reason I went.

Q205: Lt. Baleinamau, is it a normal convention for the IMS to conduct exercise with civilians or use their facilities in an exercise?
A: At times, yes.

Q206: How many such occasions has such occurred?
A: In Nadi.

Q207: Any other time?
A: It was in Suva.

Q208: What was the nature of the exercise?
A: It was the same as the VIP Protection, mainly on VIP protection.

Q209: Those civilians that were involved in the exercise, did you know them?
A: Usually we were told in the last minute, who they were.

Q210: Did they use your vehicle for transportation and all those, transportation such as a mini-bus?
A: Yes.

Q211: You left through Ratu Mara Rd, which route did you take?
A: From Ratu Mara Rd to Grantham up to USP, then Ratu Sukuna Rd.

Q212: You went up USP hill?
A: Yes.

Q213: At the juncture of Ratu Sukuna Rd and Vuya Rd you turned in?
A: Yes, from there I asked them, "Where is Na Qase?"

Q214: Who did you ask?
A: I asked the driver.

Q215: Do you know the driver?
A: No.

Q216: How do you know he knew Na Qase?
A: I assumed that they have already met.

Q217: Did he respond?
A: He said that he was just in front.
Q218: You proceeded down, did you get in contact with Major Ligairi?
A: Yes.

Q219: Where did you meet him?
A: I met him when we had gone into Parliament.

Q220: When you said, "we went in", you went past the gate?
A: Yes, when we reached the gate then I saw that what I had expected was not what I was seeing. The only thing that worried me was the boys who came in earlier.

Q221: Let us look at what you expected. What was your expectation at that moment?
A: My expectation at that moment that the march has gone out of hand.

Q222: Lt. Baleinamau, in this whole episode, you were quite a key player in that you operated from the complex or from the Unit, you have given your statement, we have gone through them. I am giving you now an opportunity, would you like to retract anything or put the record right or your statement as given will not change? Would you like to recap anything right from the start? You do not need to give us everything over again, if it is the same thing, but anything you felt that you have missed out due to long time since it has happened and now in retrospect, you have enough time to re-think about what has happened. Would you like to retract or add anything else to your statement?
A: Starting from the 19th?

Q223: Yes, 19th or whenever. If you are aware of situations leading up to the planning of the coup prior, whether it was 17th, 18th, or any time before that.
A: Concerning the event on the 19th, I had no prior knowledge that it was going to happen on that day as I have mentioned in the statement. When that occurred, we went up to the Commander as I have mentioned to Land Force Commander with Na Qase. He briefed them on what has happened and after that, I remained up there. When Commander came back from Norway, I went and saw him, I went for a run that day then he rang me up at home and said he wanted to see me. I went to see him at 2 o’clock that midday, in his office alone, myself and him. He asked me about what has happened and I told him about everything that has happened. He asked me, "Did you have any prior knowledge?" I said "No". The only thing I knew that we were going on an exercise and when we arrived there, this thing has unfolded. That is why I told Na Qase that we have to go up and inform the then Acting Commander, Land Force Commander, Col. Tuatoko. That night he told me
to come to his residence, we talked this thing over, as in my statement, I told him that for me and the boys who went down, we did not know anything about the plan until Na Qase informed me on that day. We drank grog until 4 o’clock the next morning then I left his residence because the next day was the Bose Levu Vakaturaga meeting.

When I met him on that midday, we are related from my mother’s side, I gave him a tabua and the purpose of the tabua was to tell him about what has happened. I was not prepared for it, the boys were not prepared for it except some who already knew but did not tell me, “This is a tabua for you.” The boys are down there, as their leader, it does not look good that they are down there, “This is a tabua to tell you that things have happened but our relationship to remain intact.” It was not for the mata ni gasu, it was just for that. He told me to come to his house that night so I went and had grog until 4 o’clock in the morning and I remained in camp. I think after three weeks, he called me up again, he queried about my allegiance, I said “I have already mentioned it because you have the tabua”, he said “You go home, don’t come into camp, you stay home until I tell you to move.” On the day he arrived, he spoke with those of us who were up there and he said “I know that your bond is a very strong one”, he told the Unit, “If you want to go down, sign your leave and go down, the rest of you if you want to stay here, you stay here.” That was before the next day he called me. That is all, Sir.

Q224: Lt. Baleinamau, we go back to what you were saying, you were talking about your expectations when you arrived in Parliament, when the mini-bus arrived there and you were at the gate of the Parliament Complex, can you tell us what you were saying there? What were your expectations then? My expectation was just to meet Na Qase.

A: When you met Major Ligairi, what was said about your presence and what the Unit was doing then?

A: When I came in, I realised that the boys who have taken the lead walked into something that they were not expecting. I sensed that it was too late and I felt that we had been used. When I spoke to him, the first thing I asked him, “Sir, what is this, is it part of the operation?” I am just here to come and confirm that those who came in are safe. He said that it was a civil takeover. I asked him, “Have you informed the Commander?” He said, “No”. “Have you informed the Chairman of the BLV?” He said “No”. “Have you informed the President?” He said, “No”. I said, “We go up to the Commander and inform him right now.”

Q226: At that juncture, did Major Ligairi tell you what his role was in this whole affair?
A: No.

Q227: When you got off there, there were still some members of 1MS in the minibus, is that true?
A: I was the last one.

Q228: You were the last one to get off?
A: Yes.

Q229: From the Parliament Complex, where did you go next?
A: To the Commander's conference room.

Q230: Who did you meet there?

Q231: What was said in the meeting?
A: Col. Tuatoko was the acting Commander and he said that there has been a takeover in Parliament and Na Qase said the Unit is involved and he is here. He said, "I am just here to come and brief you and I am prepared to answer any questions".

Q232: Were any questions raised?
A: No.

Q233: What was the reaction of the officers that were present in the conference?
A: Same as mine, we were all surprised, there was silence in the room. Na Qase was sitting next to Lt. Col. Raduva. It was Col. Tuatoko, Na Qase, Lt. Col. Raduva. I was sitting on the other side with Lt. Col. Saubulinayau and Lt. Col. Driti.

Q234: After this meeting, what transpired?
A: He went down with Col. Tuatoko to Home Affairs and briefed His Excellency the President.

Q235: Who went down?
A: Col. Tuatoko and Na Qase in his white car.

Q236: From the Parliament Complex back to QEB, what vehicle did you travel in?
A: In Mr. Whitting's private car.

Q237: Am I correct in saying the number is CP 850?

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A: I do not know.

Q238: When he left with Col. Tuatoko to go to His Excellency, where was his car?
A: The road as you come down the Officers Mess, it was parked there.

Q239: The one just going beside the Commander's Office?
A: Yes.

Q240: Who had the key, was the key handed over to you?
A: Yes.

Q241: Did you remove the vehicle subsequently?
A: After a few days.

Q242: Where did you take the vehicle to?
A: To the complex.

Q243: Was the vehicle used after this?
A: No.

Q244: Who had the keys to the vehicle?
A: It was in the Ops room.

Q245: Major Ligairi and Col. Tuatoko had gone to brief His Excellency, what did you do?
A: I stayed behind.

Q246: Where?
A: With Lt. Col. Raduva, we went and had lunch but I remained up there.

Q247: What time did you return to the Unit that afternoon?
A: I think it was at night.

Q248: Were you there when Lt. Col. Tarakinikini came to the Unit on Friday night to speak to the boys?
A: I think so.

Q249: What was the nature of his brief?
A: I think he briefed us on the bondage between the members of the Unit. He emphasised that.

Q250: This bondage, is it the bond between the members on what transpired in Parliament or the bondage between members and their allegiance to RFMF?
A: I think, if I could remember it correctly, he said, “We are still one family and we will remain that way.”

Q251: Was he called to conduct the brief?
A: I think he just walked down.

Q252: You did not call him?
A: No, or he just came in as an ex-member.

Q253: When you came back to the Unit, did you meet Capt. Stevens? Have you met him during the day since his return from Nadi?
A: Yes.

Q254: What time was this?
A: I think when he came in after, I do not know probably after lunch and before dinner.

Q255: Where did you meet him?
A: Inside the complex.

Q256: My earlier questions to you was after the meeting, the conference, when did you go back to the Unit, you said at night.
A: Yes. Mr. Stevens came back from Nadi after lunch. After that, I came down to see the boys who just came back from the selection, then I went up again and returned.

Q257: This question has already been put to you, I will raise it again. Did you at any time during that period utter any words or direct any member of the IMS to go and support the members in Parliament?
A: I said, “What has happened, it is our own free choice now, you know members of the Unit are down there and we are here.” That is what I said, but to direct them and say, “You go down there”, I did not say that.

Q258: Various members of the Unit have indicated that you gave them the directive to go down there and join them and provide security. Various members of the Unit have actually said here in this Board of Inquiry that you gave them a directive?
A: I gave them a choice, to go down or we still remain.

Q259: Throughout the whole time?
A: Yes.
Q260: He said you took CP 850 and parked it at the Unit. At any time, did you or anyone else take that vehicle down to the Parliament Complex?
A: Not to my knowledge.

Q261: That vehicle was seen preceding the vehicles that took in the weapons into the Complex, Friday, Saturday and Sunday. That same vehicle.
A: As far as I know, the vehicle was parked at the Commander's ... .

Q262: Near the Commander's Office?
A: Yes.

Q263: After that it was removed from there and taken down to ....
A: In the morning, I cannot recall which morning.

Q264: The morning of Saturday, the next day?
A: Yes.

Q265: On Saturday it was moved at midday and also early morning on Sunday. It came into the Complex with the vehicles that brought in the weapons. Who drove the vehicle there?
A: Because there were only two drivers then, it was Paul Vakadranu and Vuki or ....

Q266: So, when the keys of that vehicle were taken down to the Unit, where were the keys kept?
A: The keys for?

Q267: When the car was taken down. It was taken down from near the Commander’s Office to the Unit?
A: Yes, it was kept in the office.

Q268: Where was the key for that car kept?
A: It was kept on a pen holder.

Q269: Did you direct that to go down with the vehicle that carried the weapons into the Complex? Did you direct or knew anything about those weapons that were taken in?
A: The only weapons I knew that were taken out were the ones that were taken to the jungle.

Q270: Let us go back again: Friday night, you had a briefing. Now, after the briefing, what transpired in the Unit?
A: The briefing was given by Lt. Col. Tarakinikini.
Q271: Did he have any grog with you guys? Was any vygonia served?
A: I think so, there was.

Q272: What transpired after that?
A: We just drunk grog and talked about things that were happening and that we must remain together.

Q273: Let us go to Saturday morning; what time did you go back to your home or to the Officer’s Mess on Friday night or did you stay at the Unit?
A: I think I went out for breakfast.

Q274: You went out for breakfast?
A: Yes.

Q275: What time did you come back to your Unit?
A: Immediately after breakfast.

Q276: Reports have been given that at that period, approaching 10 o’clock, weapons were packed in cases and duffel bags and moved out of your Unit. Did you direct any of those weapons to be packed or see any of those weapons being packed?
A: When I came in I saw the weapons packed in barrel boxes.

Q277: Where were they kept?
A: In the crash boxes.

Q278: Were they in the Lecture Room or in the Armoury?
A: I think it was in the Lecture Room.

Q279: Who gave the orders to pack those weapons? Was it you who gave the orders to pack the weapons from the shelves into those boxes?
A: When I came in, it was packed.

Q280: Who gave the orders? All weapons are on shelves.
A: Yes.

Q281: Who gave the orders for those to be taken out and packed in boxes? Was it you?
A: Yes.

Q282: Your discussions with those in Parliament, those weapons were supposed to be taken down to Parliament eventually, correct?
Q283: You received a phone call from Parliament, those weapons were supposed to be tagged and taken into Parliament, correct?
A: Say it again, Sir.

Q284: Your discussions and phone call with those at the Parliament Complex, the result of that was your directive for the weapons to be packed and eventually taken into Parliament, but the reason for the packing was to be taken down, then eventually end up in Parliament. Is that correct?
A: No, Sir.

Q285: You gave the directive to pack those weapons?
A: Sir.

Q286: What for?
A: To be taken to Wailoku.

Q287: Why Wailoku?
A: Because that was a safe area.

Q288: That was a safe area for vehicles from the Parliament Complex to come and further pick up weapons or further arrangements to be made for an RV point for the weapons to be picked up by a team coming from the Complex?
A: No, Sir, that was not the intention for that.

Q289: Now, weapons were packed in the barrel boxes. Can you tell us what weapons were packed in?
A: I think it was all the counter-terrorist weapons.

Q290: To whom did you give this directive to pack those weapons?
A: All the boys just came in and said, "What about the weapons?"

Q291: Which boys?
A: If I could remember correctly, I think it was ....

Q292: The weapons were tagged. The question about taking the weapons to the wharf in Wailoku, is it not true that there was a directive given by Captain Stevens for the weapons to be taken down to Bilo? Did you hear of that directive?
A: Yes, he mentioned that they were going to RV there and down to Bilo.

Q293: RV where?
A: Wailoku.

Q294: What if I tell you that evidence has been given that after Sergeant Bonefasio was told to cache the weapon at Bilo, you gave him the directive to take the weapons to Wailoku. Is that true?
A: Yes. The reason was this: when that thing happened, he came in and told me, “I don’t trust the weapons being taken to Wailoku” and I asked, “For what reason?”, and he said that Steven has gone to wait for them there. He said, “If I take it there, we don’t know if someone will be waiting for me there. So, it is better if I take the weapons to Bilo, so, you decide”. That is what happened.

Q295: On the same day, was there any weapon taken out of your Unit and taken to Parliament?
A: I cannot recall that, Sir, because the only conversation we had with Steven was the weapons were to be taken as the one ....

Q296: On Saturday, some weapons were prepared to be taken down to Parliament, but was stopped and approval of the Land Force Commander was sought. Which weapons were these?
A: It might be, yes.

Q297: You were aware of this, right?
A: Yes.

Q298: So you have to be quite specific because you know about it. You stop beating around the bush here, because you are giving me words yourself.
A: Yes.

Q299: So, you tell me which weapons are we talking about here?
A: I think it is both.

Q300: Both weapons?
A: Yes.

Q301: Who took the weapons down to Parliament, that was approved from the Land Force Commander?
A: I think it would be one of the operatives, Sele Kalounivale.

Q302: Which vehicle was it taken down in?
A: I do not know which vehicle they used that night.

Q303: Where was the pick-up point, at the gate of your Unit or Sukanaivalu Rd?
A: I think it was Sukanaivalu Rd.

Q304: What time was this?
A: I cannot recall, it was early night or midnight.

Q305: This is early Saturday morning we are talking about?
A: It is either early Saturday night or early Sunday morning.

Q306: These weapons that were taken out, who gave you the directive to release those weapons?
A: From the armoury.

Q307: Who specifically because the fact you are the OC, the weapons are in your control, you need some authority to release, who gave you the authority to release or what weapons is to be taken out?
A: I think it was the Land Force Commander.

Q308: Weapons were taken out?
A: Yes.

Q309: Going back to Sunday morning, were more weapons taken out on Sunday morning?
A: I do not know.

Q310: Are you sure?
A: That Sunday morning I walked up to Lt. Col. Raduva’s office and I think padre rang.

Q311: What was that for?
A: He said that he saw the boys going out through the Sukanaivalu Rd.

Q312: What happened?
A: He suspected that maybe weapons were being taken.

Q313: What was your response?
A: I came down and saw that the armoury was empty.

Q314: Going back to Saturday night, did you question anyone in Headquarters as to why the weapons were being released and taken down to the Parliament Complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q315: You did not?
A: No.

Q316: I will ask you again, were there any weapons taken out on Sunday around 10 o'clock in the morning?
A: Yes, when I came down after Padre rang up, he said that all the weapons were gone so I said, "Okay, do not take any more weapons now, leave the other ones here."

Q317: These weapons here of Sunday is different to the ones taken out on Saturday?
A: Yes.

Q318: So another lot was taken out on Sunday morning, the one padre is saying that went out.
A: Yes, I think so.

Q319: Did you question anyone in the Unit about those weapons that went out on Sunday?
A: When I came down, it was already gone.

Q320: Who was on duty in the Unit?
A: I was on duty that night.

Q321: Who was the next senior?
A: Bainimoli.

Q322: Was he in the complex when you were away in the Unit?
A: I think he was having breakfast at the Warrant Officers Mess.

Q323: Who was in the Unit at the time the weapons went out within that period of time?
A: I cannot recall which of the boys were there.

Q324: You could recall some senior personnel there?
A: Yes.

Q325: You were there, Bainimoli, who else from the senior guys?
A: Naika, ....

Q326: Was Sgt. Vuki there?
A: I think Vuki came in on Monday because he was on leave.
Q327: The Saturday one, you sure it was not around 2 o'clock to 4 o'clock in the afternoon when the Land Force Commander gave the approval?
A: Maybe that is right.
Q328: On Sunday after discussions, were you called up to explain about these weapons going out on Sunday?
A: No.
Q329: I will take you back to Friday morning, 19th. Did you have a message on your notice board for you to call some senior officers?
A: Yes.
Q330: Which officer had called you?
Q331: What time was it?
A: At 8 o'clock.
Q332: What was the nature of your conversation?
A: He just said, "Where is Na Qase?" I said, "He just rang me, he has gone to drop his sister (Major Masi's wife) at the wharf and he will be coming up later."
Q333: This conversation was it on your mobile or the normal telephone?
A: Normal telephone.
Q334: How could you identify that that was Lt. Col. Tarakinikini on the phone?
A: It was written on the white board.
Q335: And then?
A: For me to call him.
Q336: And you called him?
A: Yes, I spoke to him.
Q337: On Sunday, what happened during the rest of the day in the Unit?
A: I just stayed there.
Q338: During the stay of the 1MS personnel in Parliament, there was a regular admin run going in with Warrant Officers?
A: Yes.
Q339: Who authorised this?
A: It was authorised by NATOPS.

Q340: Was there any request made from your Unit?
A: Yes.

Q341: By whom?
A: It was requested on the ration request form.

Q342: Who was the requesting officer?
A: Vuki.

Q343: On whose authority was he requesting?
A: On mine.

Q344: Because you need an officer to seek authority?
A: Yes.

Q345: The other incident is, whilst the 1MS persons were in Parliament, they were made to sign a leave application, are you aware of that?
A: Yes.

Q346: Do you know how that came about?
A: I think it was through the advice of Lt. Col. Caucau.

Q347: Advice to who?
A: That everyone signs, that was after the Commander told us, "If you want to go down, sign your leave, if you want to stay here, then stay here."

Q348: You said you were surprised as to what transpired in the Parliament Complex?
A: Yes.

Q349: Knowing that you gave an option for members of 1MS to go and join the complex, why was that? At one stage, you had reservations then you came back to the Unit and you gave an option to the rest of the members of the 1MS to go and join the others in the Parliament Complex, why was that so? Because Lt. Col. Tara came and spoke to us and the rations were going, that is why I said, "It is up to you."

Q350: At any stage, were you given assurance of RFMF support?
A: The way things were going, it indicated to me that RFMF was supportive.
Q351: Prior to May 19th or on 19th May, did you hear of any reports or someone mentioning that there will be a change as to the appointment of Commander?
A: No.

Q352: Are you sure?
A: Yes.

Q353: On Friday 19th, is it not true that you briefed the soldiers and said that the appointment of Commander will be changed and Lt. Col. Tarakinikini will be the new Commander?
A: No.

Q354: Are you sure?
A: Yes, but I think it was the night of the 19th and they rang me up to give a fax to Lt. Col. Tara.

Q355: Was the fax send in your machine?
A: In the Comms ....

Q356: How did you come to know of the fax?
A: People down at Parliament rang up on the telephone.

Q357: What did they say?
A: Go and pick a fax and give it Lt. Col. Tarakinikini.

Q358: Did you do that?
A: Yes, that is what I did.

Q359: Who did you pick up the fax from?
A: The duty officer that day.

Q360: The person’s name?
A: He is a blond, fair guy.

Q361: What was the nature of the fax?
A: I did not read it, I just took the fax and gave it to Lt. Col. Tarakinikini.

Q362: Where was Lt. Col. Tarakinikini?
A: In his office.

Q363: What did he say when you handed him the fax?
A: No, I just gave it to him.
Q364: Who rang you up from Parliament?
A: I think it was Na Qase.

Q365: Just recall that, when you said the weapons were taken out, when was the first weapons taken out?
A: On the 19th.

Q366: When was the first time you knew about it?
A: I think it was after 10 o'clock.

Q367: Weapons were taken in what form?
A: In duffel bags.

Q368: How many duffel bags?
A: It was three.

Q369: You said 16 weapons, Uzis and pistols, were you sure about the number?
A: I am not sure about the number.

Q370: Okay, that is the first lot, when was the second lot taken out?
A: I think it was either on Saturday night to Sunday morning or on Friday night to Saturday.

Q371: Go through the Friday night one to Saturday morning, those were the weapons that padre saw?
A: I think so, if it was not that, it was on Sunday morning. Io, e dua vei rau na mataka ya.

Q372: Okay on Friday night, how were the weapons taken?
A: The vehicles were waiting on ....

Q373: What vehicles?
A: They said that the vehicles were waiting outside.

Q374: What vehicles?
A: It was the twin-cabs.

Q375: Okay, the twin-cabs and who had come in to pick the weapons?
A: The boys who were down there.

Q376: Who packed those?
A: Paul is the driver and the rest of the boys that came down. I think it was the operatives and those boys who came in the first drop.
Q377: Who?
A: I think it was Ben, Paul, Alava.

Q378: This was on Friday night to Saturday morning?
A: Yes.

Q379: Okay, that is the second time, the third time, which came first, the weapons being taken out or the truck that took the weapons out? Which event came first? Firstly, on the morning of Friday, one lot was taken out.
A: Yes, that is the first one.

Q380: Okay, the vehicle came into the complex, into the Unit, that was taken out in duffel bags?
A: Yes.

Q381: Which event came first, the big truck loading up at the back or the taking out of the weapons in that vehicle, which event came first?
A: I think it is the truck first, I cannot recall.

Q382: Okay, we will go back one step. We have the weapons taken out on Friday night?
A: Yes.

Q383: We have the truck taking out the weapons. Midday after lunch, the daylight loading followed by Sunday morning, the vehicle has been taken out on Sunday morning, roughly at about what time?
A: That is after padre had his church service in the morning.

Q384: Roughly at about what time?
A: Usually he has his church service from 6 o’clock to 7 o’clock.

Q385: Who had packed the weapons that went in the truck? You gave the directive for the weapons to be taken out, who had packed it?
A: Those boys who were present at the complex at that time.

Q386: Who was in charge of the packing?
A: The most senior person there then.

Q387: Who is he?
A: Vuki came in on Monday.

Q388: What about Gaunavinaka?
A: I think that is the person.

Q389: When that packing was done, some more weapons were kept inside?
A: Yes, in the armoury.

Q390: And those weapons were taken out on Sunday morning?
A: Yes, I think so.

Q391: Where was Sergeant-Major Bainimoli all this time when this packing was being done?
A: I think he was still in the complex.

Q392: Did you see him near the packing?
A: No.

Q393: Did he know about these weapons being packed?
A: At that time, I went up and I came down that was the second load and on the third load, I was up there then I came down. I think Bainimoli must have been somewhere around there.

Q394: How long have you been the officer in command of this Unit?

Q395: As the officer in command, what are your responsibilities?
A: Class A stores, welfare of men and operational strength.

Q396: Can you confirm that also one of your responsibilities is to gather information or to collate information that had been gathered by your Int Operatives?
A: Yes.

Q397: Who do you share this information with?
A: With the old man, the Director.

Q398: When the Director is not there, like in this case, this year he only came in three weeks before the events of 19th of May, who do you share the other information with?
A: With Int at Headquarters RFMF.

Q399: Do you do this all the time or only some times?
A: Usually once a month.
Q400: Is it true that you and some of the Operatives prior to the events of the 19th of May were meeting with the other prominent people in your safe house in Samabula?
A: No.

Q401: Is it true that prior to the events of 19th of May, Sergeant Tikotani had briefed you on the events that were going to take place on the 19th of May? He never briefed me on anything such as that. The only brief he gave me was on the march that took place on the 19th.

Q402: That there was going to be a march on the 19th?
A: Yes.

Q403: Was that march not publicised in the papers?
A: Yes, it was publicised in the papers.

Q404: Prior to the march, everyone knew that there was going to be a march on the 19th?
A: Yes.

Q405: Do you not find it strange that someone is briefing you on something that you already know of?
A: No.

Q406: Or did he brief you on the activities that were going to take place with the march?
A: No, he never briefed me on that.

Q407: When do your operatives come into the Unit? How often do they come back to the Unit?
A: On the last Friday of every month.

Q408: Is that when they all come back to the Unit?
A: We have not had all of them present at one time, one would be missing.

Q409: But always the last Friday of every month?
A: Yes.

Q410: Do you not find it strange then that on the night of Thursday, 18th all the operatives were present and they were on duty in your Unit?
A: No.

Q411: You do not find it strange?
Q412: Why not after you just told me that the only time they report back to the Unit is on the last Friday of every month? Why were they all there on Thursday, 18th?
A: They just came in, had a bowl, because I left early on Thursday afternoon.

Q413: Yes, you left early.
A: They said that they were coming in to check with me. I said, “What about tomorrow, Friday?” They said, “No, we just want to come and check today.”

Q414: Is it not normal for you as OC to give the approval for them to come back in?
A: I would give them approval if they requested to come in unless they have something urgent to tell.

Q415: Did they request your permission for them to come back to the Unit on Thursday?
A: No.

Q416: Why were they rostered to be on duty the night of Thursday, 18th? Is that not strange since they are all Ops Operatives and on Thursday 18th they were rostered for duty?
A: That is strange.

Q417: I mean it is pretty strange for you being the OC, Mr. Baleinamau, you are not even aware of all these things.
A: Yes.

Q418: Or you are deliberately saying that you were not made aware or you just did not want to know what was happening then? My next question, on Friday afternoon did you order Sergeant Naika to go down to the Parliament Complex with his fire team to reinforce those already in the Parliament Complex?
A: I think that was after Lt. Col. Tara spoke to us.

Q419: Where was Major Ligairi when Lt. Col. Tara was talking to you?
A: He was down in the complex.

Q420: Was Major Ligairi at your Unit on the afternoon of Friday 19th?
A: No.
But did you order Sergeant Naika and his fire team to go down to the Parliament Complex?

I just told them, "if you have to go down there, it's on your own free will."

Did you also tell them to take their assault kits down there?

No.

With their weapons?

No.

It's strange because they left your Unit driven by Staff Sergeant Paul Vakadrau in your Unit vehicle and the whole fire team went down with all the assault equipment including their personal weapons and you were there? (Silence).

The next question, Mr. Baleinamau, is that it has been mentioned to the Board that you arranged a meeting between Lt. Col. Tarekinikini and WO1 Ravai up at Headquarters Land Force Command maybe on Tuesday night, 22nd of May, is this true?

When Ravai came out that afternoon he requested to meet Lt. Col. Tara.

Can you elaborate on that please?

We went up and I called Lt. Col. Tara and he met Lt. Col. Tara at Headquarters.

Did you know what took place?

No, it was only between him and Lt. Col. Tara.

Where were you when they were meeting?

I just left them and I came back to the Unit.

Going back to Friday 19th, on your normal exercise with civilians like you have already mentioned to Major Aziz you normally have exercise with civilians, when you have these exercises with civilians, do you actually travel in civilian vans driven by civilians?

It happened once in Nadi and in Suva.

But is that normal, yes or no?

No.

Is it also normal that you go into a vehicle that you do not know who the driver is?

No.
Q432: Then do you not find it strange that on Friday 19th May, you did all these actions with all your training and the capabilities that you allegedly have and yet you did not take heed of all these and you just went in that vehicle and went blindly to wherever you were told to go to?
A: I only did that because they said Na Qase was waiting for us.

Q433: That is why you did it?
A: Yes.

Q434: And do you not find it strange that two of your officers found it strange to do the same as you did and that is why they got off?
A: When they got off I told them, "You wait in the complex because part of the team has gone first. I will have to go and see them."

Q435: Sir, going back to Thursday, 18th, did you authorise any weapons to be taken out of the Unit that was taken down to Parliament?
A: No.

Q436: On Friday 19th in the morning, a blue twin-cab came into your Unit, you authorised the weapons to be taken out?
A: Yes.

Q437: You said for the weapons that were taken out on Saturday in the truck to be taken to Wailoku?
A: Yes.

Q438: But Mr. Stevens said for it to be taken to Bilo? Do you know that it was taken to Bilo, Sir?
A: After Stevens called me.

Q439: When the weapons were unloaded at Bilo, a vehicle from Parliament went down to Bilo to uplift some weapons but the guy was chased out by Mr. Stevens, do you know that?
A: No.

Q440: Do you know how this guy knew about the weapons in Bilo, who might have told the guys in Parliament that the weapons were in Bilo?
A: No.

Q441: Because only you spoke to Mr. Stevens. No one else knew about the weapons being taken to Bilo, only two, only you and Stevens. How do the people in Parliament knew that the weapons were down in Bilo? The
weapons that were taken down on Saturday, who gave the approval for the weapons to be taken down, you through Land Force Commander, what was the purpose of that?
A: They said it was for VIP protection.

Q442: You gave that because the requesting authority was you, for the weapons to be taken down, what was the reason for taking those weapons down?
A: Sir, Na Qase had briefed them, they said that things have happened, the RFMF is still one family, "Those boys down there are the same as the ones up here".

Q443: Who gave you the authority for the weapons to be moved down on Saturday, the truck that parked outside? On what reason was given to Land Force that Land Force approved it?
A: To support the boys down there.

Q444: That is the reason the truck was taken, just make it clear, that truck came and parked at the back, driven by Kaumaitotoya and weapons were loaded after lunch on Saturday, the day after the coup? The Land Force Commander gave his approval for that to go, you were the requesting authority, what reason did you tell the Land Force? You just indicated now that you told Land Force that was for the weapons down at the Parliament Complex, was that true?
A: After Na Qase had briefed them, he said the Army is just one family, it should not be seen as different, those guys down there and the support given to them.

Q445: The weapons were really taken on Saturday, it was supposed to end up in Parliament as you indicated, correct? The weapons that were taken down on Saturday in the truck under your authority, that was supposed to be taken down to Parliament, and it did not end up in Parliament, it ended up in Bilo, is that correct?
A: No. The weapons taken out on that Saturday was supposed to go to Wailoku and Bond came and told me that he was going to pick the weapons from Bilo.

Q446: But eventually that was earmarked to go to Parliament?
A: No, it was not for Parliament.

Q447: What is the purpose of taking the weapons out there?
A: The purpose for it was this, someone said that we were going to be stormed, the Unit, the weapons were to be moved to a safe place.
Q448: Were ammunitions taken out?
A: Yes.

Q449: You previously said that it is SOP within your Unit that in times of confrontation, weapons have to be removed to be cached and you just said now that the reason you moved those weapons was because of the reasons that you mentioned. Now which of these two is the truth? Why do you normally move weapons away from the Unit?
A: We heard that we were going to be stormed.

Q450: But is it not also part of your SOP that weapons have to be cached in times of confrontation?
A: Yes.

Q451: But in this particular instance, the reasons why weapons were moved is because you thought, not because it was written in your SOP?
A: We heard earlier that they were going to storm us.

Q452: That is why you moved the weapons?
A: Yes.

Q453: What does your SOP state in a situation like this, like that occurred on May 19th?
A: Our SOP states that if we are being confronted, as early as the quickest time that the weapons to be cached.

Q454: That is the reason why you moved those weapons, so it was in accordance with your SOP?
A: Yes.

Q455: Lt. Baleinamau, just recollect when was the weapons taken out again whether it was on Friday night, Saturday morning or Saturday night, Sunday morning? Can you recall, which event took place first, the movement of the massive weapons on the big truck that went down to Bilo or the vehicles coming in at night and taking weapons in the duffel bags?
A: I think it was the van first and then the truck later.

Q456: Just recall when the van came, do you know what van and who came in that van, just resurrect that thought, you have the intellectual capability to do that plus you being in that Unit, the ability to recall is outstanding.
A: I think it was Paul.

Q457: Okay, Staff Sergeant Valandrau, anyone else that came?
A: I cannot recall the rest.

Q458: How many bags would have been taken out?
A: It was at night time.

Q459: You are not sure of the bags?
A: No, I am not sure.

Q460: Were these the para bags?
A: It might be the para bags.

Q461: How many vans came?
A: If I can recall Paul said two.

Q462: Two vans?
A: Yes.

Q463: I have certain names, you just try and recall whether they came up, Naduaniwai, Vosavere, Buadromo, Tikotani, Alava, any of those names ring a bell?
A: I think it was Ben and I think Kalounivale.

Q464: Lt. Baleinamau, why do you think the boys from the IMS were used to carry out the events that took place on 19th May?
A: I think just because Na Qase was there.

Q465: Are you telling the Board that they were used by Na Qase or you are telling the Board that just because Na Qase was part of the plan that he had access to members of your Unit, that is why they were used? Could you please elaborate further?
A: Na Qase is a father figure to us. Little did we know, we did not have any idea that it was going to be really like what happened on the 19th. We did not know that, when the boys entered the complex and Na Qase was there, I think all of us were just following orders. The boys were used.

Q466: Lt. Baleinamau, you were the officer commanding the Unit, could you have stopped the reinforcement of the Parliament Complex by members of your Unit?
A: I could have, but after the brief that day and they said that we are just one family, I said, “These guys must have given up”.

Q467: My last question is up to you whether you want to answer it or not, as an officer what are your responsibilities to your men?
A. "Their welfare, their day to day work.

Q468: Does that include being responsible for orders that you gave them?
A. Yes.

Q469: Does that include telling your superiors that you are responsible for their actions because of the orders that you gave them?
A. Yes, I think that is the way I interpreted it, but as for me, when Na Qase said for us to come down, I was taking in that he was my superior but ending there, that was not the intention of our going down there. As I have mentioned, we were going on a VIP protection exercise and when we ended up there, I was surprised, but it was too late, things have unfolded. That is why I just said for us to come up.

Q470: How do you feel about your people that are currently in custody?
A. I feel that they have been used without knowing the real thing that happened. No one knew of what was going to happen until all of us came to realise only on arrival there.

Q471: Do you feel responsible?
A. Yes.

Q472: What are you going to do about it?
A. All of us were just following orders from our boss.

Q473: Do you know who were the initial persons that stormed the Parliament from IMS?
A. No.

Q474: Do you have anything further to say?
A. At this time I think the Unit, myself and the boys were just carrying orders from our superior. We did not know what was behind it and when it has happened, all of us were surprised, we were caught in the middle but it was too late. I feel sorry for those guys in Nukulau and their families. That is all I have to say.

Recalled On 21/09/00:

Lt. Baleinama, after having been duly reminded of oath earlier taken, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q475: The training that was conducted on 18th of May, you knew very well that all arms going out of the Unit, you had to authorise it being the Unit OC. We
had three witnesses that said arms were taken out on Thursday night, 18th, it was taken to Makuluva in bags. In a court of law or if we come straight to the Court Martial that is proof enough, however, leaving the complex or the Unit at QEB it had to have your approval.

I will ask you the question again, you are reminded that you are under solemn affirmation. Did weapons go out on Thursday night, the 18th of May, the weapons were taken in bags to Makuluva?

A:

Q476: The weapons that you indicated were taken out, you indicated that para bags were taken out on Friday night by Sergeant Vakadranu, the two bags that came and you saw Naduaniwai. To the left there (pointing to para bag), we see one of the para bags that we have brought from the Unit. Was it taken in one of those bags?

A: Yes.

Q477: Also the weapons that were taken out on Friday morning, from 9.30 to 10.30, were taken out in a blue van. You had indicated 16 Uzis and pistols and the holding party was Alava, Naduaniwai who have taken that out, was it also in those black bags? You had indicated duffel bags, was it duffel bags or those black bags?

A: It is that one (para bags).

Q478: Okay, para bags?

A: Yes.

Q479: We have on the 18th of May, weapons were taken into the complex, you being the OC, this was taken round about 1200 hours, did you authorise the weapons to be taken? Four of those bags were taken in at 1400 hours and put in the FAP Office, did you authorise these bags to go?

A: On which date, Sir?

Q480: On the 18th, on Thursday also 1400 hours, four similar bags were placed in the FAP Office and present there was Ratu Timoci Silatolu. It was placed in the photocopying room, in the FAP Office, did you authorise these four bags to go?

A: No, Sir.

Q481: The question is, if you are the OC who gives all authorisation for things to be moved out and you are not aware of it, then who else can give the orders and take things out?

A: It can be the Director, Sir.
Can that Director give orders direct to other people and not come through you?
A: Sir, that is not true.

In the chain of command, it comes directly from the Commander to you, the Director is only there in an advisory role. How can the Director order you people around when he has no command?
A: Because I have seen when at times he calls, he said “Can you get this, just tell him to get it from the stores”.

Mr. Baleinamau, one thing we have to make clear with you, you have to come out with the evidence, you are not helping yourself and the others. One thing the other soldiers have said is, when we refer questions to them, they say, “Refer it to you and you will answer”, they said this because you are the officer. They look up to you. At the moment, they feel betrayed because they say, “We were told to do things, we have done it, and when its time to answer, the officers do not answer”, and they have been subjected to answer them. This Board knows that you know a lot. You will have to be forthcoming with the evidence. It is not for your own sake, it is the men you had commanded. You had basically taken them down a line, you basically deserted them. When we visited the soldiers in Nukula, this is the grievance they have said. Now, they are questioning the officers, mainly you and us.

Let us go back to the loading of the blue vehicle (Jim Speight’s vehicle), you said there was Adava and Naduauniwai, the spare amount of weapons taken, who were the other persons loading, packing the weapons?
A: Buadromo.

When you arrived at the Parliament Complex on the morning of Friday, were you there when the personnel entered the Parliament chambers?
A: I do not know.

Were you there? By then the Parliament chambers was not stormed, was it?
A: No.

The persons were still outside?
A: I did not know that, when I came there, I just saw Na Qase and I asked him, “What is happening?” and he said that it is a civil takeover. The events that happened inside, I did not know. I said, “Can we go up to inform Col. Tuatoko?”
Q488: When Parliament was taken over, you were subsequently told that your men were involved, when I say 'your men', I mean members of the IMS. Surely you would have been told who the persons were that entered Parliament. It is out of curiosity you would have asked or if not, you would have known beforehand who were to enter Parliament.
A: As I stated in my statement, when I came down there, then I saw Major Ligairi but for those who went into Parliament, I do not know.

Q489: Have you subsequently found out who they were?
A: No.

Q490: Were you in the complex when the admin run left for the maritime slipway to resupply those guys in Makuluva?
A: No, I was at home.

Q491: On Thursday, 18th of May, the resupply that Staff Vakadranu took, the hot box to be taken to those in Makuluva, who went with Staff-Sergeant Vakadranu?
A: I do not know, Sir.

Q492: Lt. Baleinamau, let us go back to Thursday, 18th of May. Earlier in your statement you have mentioned that normally your field operatives only report back to your Unit on the last Friday of every month, yet on Thursday, 18th of May, all your operatives were present in your Unit. You have already mentioned that the operatives always report to you, could you please tell the Board why the operatives were all present in the Unit on Thursday, 18th of May rather than the last Friday of every month.
A: On that Thursday afternoon, I did not meet them. All these things I came to realise that when I came back from Parliament that they had known it and that there was negotiations. The only sad thing about it is that some of the information which I was supposed to know I was not informed.

Q493: Like what?
A: Like what was going to take place on Friday. When the boys went down on Friday morning, I thought that it was a VIP protection exercise. When they went down, they said that Na Qase was waiting for them. Now, I know that when Na Qase was waiting for them, he was waiting for them at the slipway. What took place from the slipway to there, I did not know.

Q494: My question, Lt. Baleinamau is that why were all the operatives present in your Unit on Thursday, 18th of May? Who would recall them?
A: I did not recall them, I think they just came in there to have a bowl, but what they had known, they did not tell me.
Q495: But as the OC, as the one who actually control these field operatives, should you not have queried them, should you not ask the questions?
A: As I said, when they came in, I was not in the complex, I had already left.

Q496: When was the last time these operatives reported to you?
A: I think it was two weeks before that.

Q497: What was the nature of this report, Mr. Baleinamau?
A: They said that everything was just escalating and they said that the march might get out of hand.

Q498: Where was this information filtered to?
A: To the Director.

Q499: Do you know what the Director did to this information?
A: No, Sir.

Q500: Let us go back to Friday, 19th of May, we had evidence given to this Board that there was a telephone call made by Tikotani to you on the morning of the 19th of May and the nature of this call was for you to bring the boys down with their weapons, can you confirm this? Is it also true that prior to the boys going down, you had weapons pre-packed, you had people issued with weapons on the 19th of May when your people went down for this so-called exercise that you mentioned. You had issued them with weapons, their personal weapons, is this true?
A: The weapons were taken first.

Q501: Could you please elaborate on that?
A: In the blue van, when these two came for the pick-up ....

Q502: Who came for the pick-up?
A: Naduaiwi and Alava.

Q503: This was prior to you going down and meeting with the Director at Sukuna Rd on Friday morning?
A: Yes.

Q504: On Friday morning, where was Alava and Naduaiwi, were they with you in the Unit or they were away somewhere?
A: On that Friday morning, they were out in Suva.

Q505: When did they come back into the Unit to pick up the weapons?
They came in that blue van and said, "Na Qase said for us to come and see you, did Tikotani call?" I said, "Yes".

The weapons that were loaded then, was it signed out of the armoury, did you sign for it, did you give an authorisation note?

I think I signed it.

Do you know where the records are?

It should be up there.

Do you know where all the Ops/Int files are?

That was taken out.

Do you know where they are?

Some of the files I took home.

Where are the others, destroyed?

Yes.

Why?

Because it had some information that is very sensitive.

Sensitive to whom Mr. Baleinamau?

To the then Government.

This is an official inquiry, what information was sensitive enough to be destroyed? You destroyed it?

No, I think some of the information is in the report with Vosabeci.

Where are the remainders of the files that you took out?

It is in a stronghold in Lami.

Are you willing to produce these files to the Board?

Sir.

When can this be done, Mr. Baleinamau?

Do you still have the weapons register with you?

The weapons register should be with the quarter master.

It is not. The weapons register and the Int files are missing.
What we are saying here, Mr. Baleinamau, all records linking up to the 19th of May, rosters, weapons register, the duty officers' reports are all missing and to us it paints a picture that some people are trying to hide something. It seems that it is pointing towards you.

You were seen when the time you were told to go on leave with the whole bunch of files in your vehicle.

A.

Q518: Mr. Baleinamau, when were you commissioned?

Q519: Where were you commissioned, Mr. Baleinamau?
A: Here in Fiji.

Q520: What is your view of an officer or what entails an officer?
A: To set examples and have integrity.

Q521: What is that word again, Mr. Baleinamau?
A: Integrity.

Q522: Define 'integrity', Mr. Baleinamau.
A: That one should be true in everything one does.

Q523: Are you being truthful, Mr. Baleinamau?
A: Sir.

Q524: How about moral courage?
A: Yes.

Q525: Do you have the moral courage to be responsible for your actions?

I shall allude to what was said earlier, Mr. Baleinamau, that your men feel betrayed, they were ordered to do something and when it comes to the crunch, the officer who gave them the orders will not stand up for them. That is why I asked you, what you believe an officer should be and that word 'integrity' came up. Do you not feel any responsibility for your men, Mr. Baleinamau?

A: Sir, I do.
Q526: What are you going to do about it? Are you going to let them rot?
A: No.

Q527: Are you going to let them hang?
A: No.

Q528: Because everyone that came here, Mr. Baleinamau, told us that they went down to the Parliament Complex on your advice, you told them to go.
A: Yes.

Q529: They are still wondering why nothing has been done to you, why you have not said anything to the Board. We have had numerous reports also from the Parliament Complex, Ligairi and the senior IMS, we know from evidence presented that you were the link man with RFMF.

You were given the orders and coordinate it from this side, that was why you were sent on leave.

The information is not coming out well, just have a re-think of it. What we will do now is we will adjourn, organise a vehicle to take you down to Lami, pick up those documents.

For the sake of you, your Unit and what you hold dear to the officer core, the integrity, re-think of it then we will recall you again after we have gone through those documents and those documents are brought back.

A: Is it kept in one storage place or is it at home?
A: It has been transferred to Lami.

Q530: Which place in Lami?
A: Solomone Street.

Q531: Is it someone’s house?
A: Yes.

Q532: Is it Capt. Maivalili’s house?
A: Yes.
Q533: Why was it transferred to Maivalili’s house when you are the OC?
A: For safe keeping.

Q534: Who were the members of Team Moses?
A: As far as I know, it was Maivalili, Luvuiwasa and the rest were ex-CRWs.

[P. Baleinamau]
Lieutenant

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
WO1
Member
THIRD WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 22239 WARRANT OFFICER CLASS ONE EPINERI BAINIMOLI

WO1 Bainimoli, after having been duly sworn under solemn affirmation states:

I joined the Army as a TF recruit in 1976. I spend 3 years in the TF until I joined the Regular Force in 1979. I went four times to the Middle East. I was in IFR depot before the 1987 coup and when IFMS was formed I joined the Unit up until now.

Q1: Can you give us a brief outline of your involvement in this whole affair in question?
A: Before May 19th I was in the 1FMS Unit. I had just returned from my tour of Bougainville. On May 19th I went straight to the Unit and then down to Suva to observe the march. During the march before it reached the President’s gate, I was told that the Labour Government had been taken-over. I went back with the driver to camp to prepare for anything from the Army regarding the hostage situation. When I arrived in camp there were only a few boys. I asked as to where were the rest of the boys and was told that they all went down to the march. I stayed in camp the whole day and for the duration of the situation at the Parliament Complex. I cannot remember whether it was the first week of June when I was told by my boss that the Commander had asked me to take leave.

Q2: When was this?
A: Sir, I cannot remember, the last week of May or the first week of June but I remember it was on a Saturday when I left camp. From there I went straight home. I stayed at home until Sunday 30th July at about 2.30 p.m when I was arrested by the soldiers and brought to camp and put in the cell. I asked the soldiers as to why I was arrested and was told that it was authorised from the top. That was the answer they gave me.

Q3: Mr. Bainimoli, we have a number of questions for you. Were you involved in any training within the 1FMS prior to the 19th of May?
A: What training is that?

Q4: Any training within the Unit.
A: No.

Q5: When you were in camp in the last week of May or first week of June, were you at any time involved or in communication with those in the Parliament Complex?
A: Once I went down to the complex. I took rations on Sunday. It was approved by the NatOps and Col. Saubulinayau. I went to distribute the rations and came back again.
Q6: Can you recall the date?
A: I cannot recall the date but it was a Sunday, the second week of May after the coup.

Q7: May the 21st was a Sunday so the following Sunday was the 28th.
A: Yes.

Q8: That was the only time you were in contact with those members of the 1FMS within the complex?
A: That was when I was in the complex.

Q9: After the events of 19th May, did you at anytime had any contact through fax or any mode of communication with those in the complex?
A: I was with the boys at the complex. I did not have any contact with the boys down at the Parliament Complex.

Q10: The only contact you had with the boys in the complex was the delivery of the rations on the 28th of May?
A: No.

Q11: Mr. Banimoli, the question I ask was when you were in the unit 1FMS you went down to the Parliament Complex to distribute the rations. You were then told to go on leave. For the record, while you were on leave until the 30th of July, did you at any time visited those in the complex or contacted them?
A: Yes. When I was on leave I went once to the complex during the burial of the civilian that was shot.

Q12: Mr. Banimoli, when you were out on leave or when you were deposed to the 1FMS Unit and remained in the camp, were you involved in any activities of the 1FMS or directed by the 1FMS members in the complex or from the Director?
A: No.

Q13: Are you aware of anyone within the 1FMS or RFMF or any civilian involved in activities with those involved in the complex?
A: No.

Q14: Mr. Banimoli, what was your appointment prior to 19th May?
A: Operations Intelligence Officer.

Q15: On 19th May when you returned to camp, were you told who had taken over the Parliament Complex?
A: No.

Q16: Did you subsequently find out who had taken over the Parliament Complex?
A: First of all I heard rumors that the Unit was involved but I did not believe so I went and stayed in camp. In the evening when I heard stories then I believed that the Unit was involved.

Q17: You said you were directed by the boss to go on leave. Who are you referring to?
A: My boss at that moment was Mr. Baleinamau. He was directed by the Commander to pass the message for us to take our leave. The Sunday morning we left we were briefed by Colonel Saubulinayau before we went on leave.

Q18: This is getting to the end of May and the first week of June.
A: I cannot remember.

Q19: From the day of the takeover in Parliament up to the time you went on leave, what were you doing in your Unit in the camp, what responsibility did you hold?
A: I was just looking after the boys at the camp and also thinking of the boys down at the complex.

Q20: During this period was there any arms or ammunition taken out of your Unit to the Parliament Complex?
A: No, I did not know of any arms taken out to the Parliament Complex.

Q21: Going back to the day of the arrest, were you told specifically why you were arrested?
A: No, the answer they gave me was it was authorised from the top.

Q22: Were you subsequently told what was the reason for your arrest?
A: No.

Q23: Have you been told of the reason until today?
A: No.

Q24: When were you released?
A: It was on Sunday the 14th day.

Q25: Was there any exercise conducted in the Northern Division prior to the 19th of May?
A: I did not go to the exercise.
Q26: But was there an exercise conducted in the Northern Division?
A: Yes.

Q27: Can you tell the Board who were the persons that went to the exercise?
A: I could not remember all the names.

Q28: Can you remember some of the names?
A: Down in the SOP of the Unit I cannot tell the names of the boys, only the boss can give the names.

Q29: Let me remind you Mr. Bainimoli that this Board of Inquiry sits on behalf of the Commander of the Fiji Military Forces, the people that teach you the Code of Conduct within the unit. This Board is authorised to ask the questions that it needs to ask on the activities of the IFMS. Do you understand that?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q30: Can you just tell us who were the persons that went for the exercise in the Northern Division?
A: I can only give two names that I remember, my boss Mr. Baleinamau who is executing the exercise and Sgt. Maj. Ravai.

Q31: What was your instructions on the day of the march?
A: I just went down to observe the march.

Q32: Were you given any specific directions by the Officers or Warrant Officers from the Unit?
A: No.

Q33: Were you briefed on what you were to observe and report from the march?
A: I went to observe the march and to provide security for the nation because it was in the papers that the march was going to be bad.

Q34: Let me just rephrase that question. Who had given you the directive Mr. Bainimoli to go down and observe the march?
A: No, I just spoke with Mr. Baleinamau and he told me to go down and observe the march and its progress.

Q35: You said on Sunday you took down rations to the Parliament Complex. Where did you get your directive to take down those rations?
A: I think that the approval came from the NatOps.
Q36: Where did the request come from?
A: The ration I heard when it was taken down, it was cleared from the NatOps. It was taken down and passed through the checkpoints.

Q37: Before you took the rations down there must be a request made to you. Who made that request for the rations? Did someone tell you to take it down?
A: We were thinking of the boys down at the complex and the ration so our Administrative Officer made the request and the ration was approved from the top.

Q38: So am I correct in saying that there was no request made from the complex itself but it was made on the initiative of the Administrative Officer within the 1FMS Unit. Who is the Administrative Officer?
A: The Administrative Officer is Sgt. Vuki.

Q39: You said that the training was done in the north. Can you specifically give the area where in the north was it conducted?
A: From Macuata Province to Labasa then to the other side of the country.

Q40: Mr. Bainimoli, not to waste your time and our time, we are interviewing over 100 people. In that process we will interview about another 100 people from outside. The information we want you to give to us, some of it has been already given by previous witnesses. What has been put out in the papers everyone knows, what we need to do as a means of reconfirming things is information from you. The attempt here is to find information of actually what happened and piece together. Most of the information has been rehearsed to the Board over and over again by witnesses. You came in and gave your statement or answer and half of what you say has been given by other witnesses. A good majority of things that you had already said has already been given by other witnesses. We are establishing here the pattern, so it is only in your interest and the interest of the institution that we are asking you to pass across to the Board your knowledge of what happened. This Board of Inquiry can sit for one week, one month or even one year. Both you and I we do not want to sit for one year. Not to waste your time, our time and other peoples time, I would advise you to give an answer.
A: Sir, I said that the exercise in the north went to Labasa in Macuata. Then they went through to the other side of the country to the Saqani area. From there they went up to the bottom of the bay in Drekeniwhai then to Savusavu.

Q41: Within the Drekeniwhai any specific area.
I heard they were in the Tunuloa area. This is the normal exercise and the Army base combine exercise.

Q42: Were you aware of any arms and ammunition taken out of your Unit after 19th May?
A: No.

Q43: Who was responsible for the safety of arms and ammunition of the Unit after 19th May?
A: I said the boss, Mr. Baleinamau, he is overall Commander.

Q44: Mr. Bainimoli, good morning. Can you just talk to us and tell us a bit about the bond that exists within your Unit? We heard from prior witnesses that the bond that exists within your Unit, one has to be a member of your Unit in order to understand this bond.
A: The bond in the Unit is like a father-son relationship or a brother relationship, it is very close.

Q45: Do you think this bond is much closer than the bond that you encountered when you were a member of the depot?
A: Yes.

Q46: With that in mind and also with the Operations and Intelligence of Warrant Officers within the Unit, did you have any prior knowledge of the May 19th incident?
A: I got no prior knowledge of the May 19th coup.

Q47: Why do you think the members of the squadron were used in the taking over of the Parliament Complex and the hostage situation?
A: I got no idea.

Q48: Mr. Bainimoli, you said on the 19th you went down to observe the march. Did you meet up with anyone whilst you were in town?
A: I met one of my boys.

Q49: While you were in town you heard that the Parliament has been taken over. Did you call your boss and tell him what has happened?
A: No, I just went straight from the march up to the camp.

Q50: From the march up to the camp. Can you further explain on that?
A: When I heard about the coup I came back to camp as I mentioned that our role is to prepare for any kind of situation. I asked for the boys and
was told that they all went down to the march but I did not meet anyone during the march.

Q51: When you returned to the complex did you see Mr. Baleinamau there or did you meet with him?
A: No.

Q52: Did you meet him at all on that day?
A: I did not meet with him on that day.

Q53: I am not talking about the complex, this is back in your Unit.
A: Yes, we call it a complex.

Q54: We will confuse ourselves because you got the Parliament Complex and your own complex. I think for ease of understanding we will call it your Unit. You did not see Mr. Baleinamau at your Unit. Did you see him at all during the day of the 19th?
A: In the afternoon.

Q55: Did you talk to each other?
A: Yes, I asked him that I heard rumours that the Unit was involved.

Q56: What did you specifically ask him?
A: I was asking him if the Unit was really involved in this.

Q57: What was his response?
A: He did not confirm anything to me about the Unit's involvement.

Q58: Going back to the day you attended the funeral in the Parliament Complex, did you talk to any members of the Unit there?
A: Not at all.

Q59: Did you meet with any of them?
A: I saw only the Director.

Q60: Did you talk to him?
A: No, I did not talk to him. I heard that the funeral was to be held at 3 o'clock. When I got there it was nearly finished. The funeral was brought in at 1 o'clock.

Q61: Did you go alone to the funeral or did someone accompany you?
A: Myself alone.
Q62: Can I just go back to the question asked about the Code within the Unit. Did you see yourself, the personnel in the 1PMS different from all other soldiers in the RFMF?
A: I can say, yes because of the bond within the Unit, the closeness within the Unit.

Q63: Do you consider the Unit separate from the RFMF?
A: I would say, yes because of the training.

Q64: Mr. Bainimoli, we have asked you a lot of questions. What we will do now is release you. Should we have any other questions we will recall you to the Board but before we do that, do you have anything else you want to say in regards to this investigation. You maybe required not only for this investigation but to come before many more investigations. There are eight investigations currently in progress. There are two more Board of Inquiries that are about to start. I am giving you an opportunity to anything that you might have missed within your first opening session with us.
A: No.

Recalled on 13/9/00:

WARRANT OFFICER CLASS 1 Bainimoli, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q65: Confirm-taka mada; o iko a curu e na Unit ena 1987, donu?
A: Donu saka.

Q66: Na tamata taucoko e loma ni Unit, na ka kece e dau yaco e loma ni Unit, na naba e tu vei iko, e na matata vei iko na ka e dau vakayacori tiko e loma ni Unit, donu?
A: O ya saka e na gaua au tiko kina e na loma ni Unit.

Q67: When you were in the Unit, all the activities within the Unit seeing that you are a Warrant Officer Class 1 and you have been from the inception of the Unit, you know what happens within the Unit?
A: Donu saka.

Q68: E na hogi ni siga Lotulevu na i ka 18 ni siga ni vula o Me, o iko a duty tiko e na loma ni Unit, donu?
A: Au sega ni vakasamataka rawa saka.

Q69: You are bound by your solemn affirmation that you gave earlier on your interview on the 21st of August. Na vuaviri a vakayacori e na i ka 19 ni
siga; siga Vakaraubuka. E na siga Lotulevu na i ka 18 ni siga, na macewa na i ka 15 ni siga ni vula o Me, o iko a tiko i vei e na macewa taucoko o ya?

A:
Au tiko saka ga e na keba; au lako ga mai cacacaka au lesu tale.

Q70:
Kena macewa vata tikoga o ya, na i ka 18 ni siga, o iko a tiko i vei? O iko a mai cacacaka e na siga o ya?
A:
Au a mai cacacaka e na i ka 18 ni siga.

Q71:
Na kena bogi?
A:
Au kila niu a lesu tale i vale ena yakavi ni siga o ya.

Q72:
Dou a tiko e na bogi o ya e na loma ni Unit mai cake vata kei Buadromo, Vosavere, Tikotani, Naduanivi; a donu o ya?
A:
Au sa sega saka ni vakasamatata rawa o ya. Au rawa ni tiko saka ia au sa lako sobu saka mai ki na keba.

Q73:
E na bogi o ya, o cei a pack-taka na dakai ko ya a qai kau ena siga Vakarauwai? O tiko i vei e na bogi ni Vakaraubuka?
A:
Au a tiko saka ga e na keba.

Q74:
O cei a pack-taka na dakai ko ya a kau e na mataka lailai ni siga Vakarauwai?
A:
Sir, au tukuna vakadodonu niu sega saka ni kila na kena pack-taki na dakai.

Q75:
O iko na Operation Officer; e dina o ya?
A:
Sir.

Q76:
Na ka kece e yaco e na training o na must kila o iko?
Ke rawa saka niu vakamacala saka kina e na i tutu ni Ops. Noqu mai digitaki saka e na i tutu o ya, noqu lesu mai Bouganville ena 1999, oti na Siganisucu, au mai taura toka e dua na leave balavu. Au a sega saka ni vakamacala e na noqu a mai vakatarogi e liu. E na vula o Epereli beka, a caka kina vei au na internal posting. E na gauna saka o ya au sa qai lai dabe kina i loma, au se qai lai saka saka tiko meu settle down mada, na handover na ka e caka saka tiko vei au, qai dredre saka tiko e na gauna o ya. Ko ya na gauna e dodonu me handover saka tiko vei au e course saka tiko, o Sgt Tikotani. Au mani mai toka i kea, au caka admin. saka tu ga, vakawilika saka tu ga na file ia na ka kece e baleta na ka ni Ops se nona saka tikoga o Mr Baleinamau, baleta ga ni a OC saka tikoga e na gauna o ya, se nona saka tiko na ka taucoko. Se bera saka ni dua na handover vinaka me soli vei au me rawa niu cakava saka kina na cacacaka vaka Ops.
Q77: Na' bogi ni Lotulevu a vi'a vata na briefs a caKa me baleta na vuaviri, a brief-taki na timi ko ya a lako i Makuluva, a brief-taki ni na caka na vuaviri e na siga tarava; o bau kila e dua na ka e baleta na brief?
A: Au sega saka ni kila. Na ka saka qo au a sa vakamacala saka kina e liu na mataka lai'ai ni Vakaraubuka noqu gole sobu na noqu gole saka o ya meu lai tayabe. Au a sa vakamacala oti saka niu tiko mai ra sa yaco na vuaviri E na gauna au gole mai kina i cake, mai vakadewataki vei au, au dredre tale kina baleta niu sega saka ni vakabauta ni involve saka kina na Unit.

Q78: O a tiko e kea e na gauna a caka kina na vakavodo dakai e na siga Vakarauwai?
A: Au sega saka ni vakavodo na dakai.

Q79: Na gauna a caka tiko kina na vakavodo dakai e na siga Vakarauwai, a kele tu e muri na lori; o a tiko evei e na gauna o ya?
A: Na i yaragi saka ko ya a kau i tuba, na kena dina saka ga e tiko vei Mr Steven.

Q80: Sa soli oti na i tukutuku qori, keitou sa kila tiko qori; o iko a tiko ena keba e na gauna o ya?
A: Au a tiko saka.

Q81: O a vakaitavi e na kena vakavodoki tiko na i yaragi?
A: Au a sega ni vakaitavi e na kena vakavodoki.

Q82: O kilo o cei a pack-taka na i yaragi o ya?
A: Sega saka.

Q82: On Friday afternoon, there was a call made by Major Ligairi to the Unit. The phone was picked up by Capt Stevens but Major Ligairi wanted to speak to you; is that true?
A: I cannot recall that, Sir.

Q84: A vosa vei iko ena talevoni e na siga Vakaraubuka o Major Ligairi?

Q85: O kemuni na Sgt Major, Warrant Officer Class 1 E na siga e caka kina na vuaviri, au vakabauta na tamata taucoko e sega ni guilecava, e dua na siga e na guilecavi dredre na siga ni vuaviri. A qiri yani vei iko o Major Ligairi e na siga Vakaraubuka se sega?
A: Sir, meu tukuna saka vakadodonu, kevaka e vosa saka vei au, au na rawa ni vakadewataka eke, ia au sa guilecava saka, e vosa saka vei au se sega.
Q86: That evening of May 19th, that same Friday afternoon; were you present when Lt Col Tarakinikini came and spoke to 1FMS persons?
A: O au a tiko saka e na loma ni office.

Q87: You were not in the briefing that he was giving?
A: Sega.

Q88: What were you doing in the office?
A: Au debe saka tu ga i kea, me vaka niu Ops Officer e na vanua au tiko saka kina

Q89: Did you give instructions to personnel of 1FMS to go down to the Parliament Complex to join the others?
A: E sega saka.

Q90: What if I say to you that your name has been mentioned here by members of the Unit who said that you instructed them together with the OC for them to go to the Complex and provide security?
A: Au vakacala saka na i tukutuku qori. Na i vakamacala saka au solia vei ira au sega ni tarovi ira, au sega ni solia vei ira e dua na orders me ra lako, au solia saka tu ga vei ira na galala me ra cakava nodra decision. Au sega ni force-taki ira me ra lako sobu.

Q91: E rawa ni o vakamata tataka mada na i tavi e dau qarava e dua na Ops Officer ni nomudou Unit?
A: Sir, me vaka saka niu se vou saka e na i tutu o ya, se qai matai ni noqu post-taki meu lai Ints Officer, au se lai toka saka toka i kea meu waraka toka na handover briefing e soli saka mai. Au kila saka ga ni dau tiko ga me mai ciqoma na information, lako saka mai me qai mai vakaraica na information ko ya e soli saka tiko mai o ya.

Q92: Se bera ni o lesi mo lai Ints Officer, e rawa ni o vakadinadina taka ni a tiko o iratou na nomudou field operatives i tuba?
A: Tiko saka.

Q93: Rawa ni o vakadinadina taka ni o iratou na nomudou e ratou tiko i tuba o Sgt Tikotani, Cpl Vosavere, Cpl Naduaniwai, Buadromo vata kei Alava?
A: E sega saka ni o Vosavere; o Naduaniwai. Alava vata kei Buadromo.

Q94: O Sgt Tikotani?
A: Vata kei Tikotani.
Q95: E na gauna cava e ratou dau lesu mai kina e na loma ni keba o ratou na Operatives qo?
A: So na gauna ratou qai dau gole sara tu mai ni sa oti na gauna ni weekend, yakavi ni Vakaraubuka. E so, kevaka e tiko saka na information vei ratou, ratou qai dau gole sobu mai, vakabibi tu ga e na bogi.

Q96: Bau so na gauna me ratou tiko vata kece kina e na loma ni nomudou Unit e na dua vata ga na gauna?
A: E rawa ni dua saka e yali, sega ni dua na gauna me ratou tiko taucoko e na duavata ga na gauna.

Q97: Vakacava na training dou dau vakayacora e na nomudou loma ni Unit, so na cyclic training dou dau vakayacora se so nomudou Unit training se Unit activities me vakataka na sports va o ya; ratou dau mai vakaitavitaki iratou kina?
A: Me vaka ga ni ratou tiko o tuba, e sega ni vinakati me ratou laurai saka tale mai i loma ni so vai iratou sa vakatubu kumi toka, sa sega ni vinakati me ratou laurai e na loma ni keba.

Q98: O ratou qo o cei e sole responsibility vei iratou? Who are they directly responsible to in your Unit?
A: E na gauna saka e ratou dau lako mai kina, o OC ga e dau veitalanoa vata kei iratou. Me vaka niu se vou saka tiko o au, au se qai lai tikoga i kea, se bera ni dua na ka au se sakava saka tiko.

Q99: O vakaraitaka ni o waraka tiko baleta ni a course tiko o Tikotani; a course tiko mai vei?
A: FNTC mai Narere.

Q100: Siga Vakarauwai na i ka 20 kei na Siga Tabu na i ka 21; o iko a tikoga i na keba e na Unit i cake?
A: Io.

Q101: Eso na i yaragi a kau sobu i na Palimedi e na siga Vakarauwai na i ka 20 ni siga kei na Siga Tabu na i ka 21, e ra a kau sobu ena para-bags; o kila na kena kau na i yaragi o ya?
A: Sega saka.

Q102: O vakadeitaka ni o a tiko e na nomudou Unit e na yakavi ni Vakaraubuka ni oti na vakasigalevu, qo na i ka 19 ni siga ni vula o Me?
A: Me vaka au sa vakamacala oti saka niu gole cake saka mai na keba, au sa mai raica ni sa lala tiko na keba. Au se tiko ga o ya sa qiri sara mai na noqu lewe ni vale meu lai raici iratou mai noqu gonevuli eratou vuli tiko mai
Turaki. Au sa mani gole sara au lai raici iratou na gnevuli, kauti iratou i vale, mai kea au sa qai lesu tale mai e na yakavi i na keba.

Q103: Rauta beka na vica o lesu tale mai kina o ya i na keba?
A: Rauta saka tiko beka na loma ni bai ni 3.00 ki na 4.00 saka, dua na gauna i loma o ya.

Q104: Vakadeitaka; o ya e ratou sa lesu mai kina o iratou na Selection Team mai Nadi?
A: Se bera saka.

Q105: Gauna cava o qai biubiu tale kina mai na nomudou Unit, ko ya na siga Vakaraubuka o ya, siga cava tale o qai gole tale kina i vale?
A: Vica na siga au gole saka tikoga i vale, au lesu tale mai.

Q106: Na Vakaraubuka o ya, ni o tukuna tiko qori ni lai brief yani o Col Tarakinikini o sega ni tiko kina, o tikoga e na nomudou Office, o ya e rauta toka beka na 7.00 se 8.00; vica na kaloko qai o biubiu kina mo lako i vale?
A: Au tiko saka ga e na keba.

Q107: O moce ga e na keba e na bogi ni siga o ya?
A: Io, au moce tikoga e na keba.

Q108: Bau dua na gauna o wavoki e na nomudou armoury ena nomu tiko e na loma ni keba e na bogi ni siga o ya?
A: Seg, Sir.

Q109: O bau kila e dua a lai dolava na armoury?
A: Seg saka.

Q110: O tiko i kea e na gauna e ratou yaco mai kina na lesu mai Nadi, na Selection Team?
A: Au tiko saka.

Q111: Drau sota kei Capt Stevens?
A: Keirau sota saka.

Q112: Bau dua na ka drau veitalanoataka?
A: Me baleta saka ga nai yaragi ko ya e lai maroro saka tiko i tuba.

Q113: E rawa ni o vakamatataraka mada i na Board na nomudrau veitalanoa?
A: Me vaka saka ga na SOP ni Unit, ni dau yaco e dua na leqa ni Unit, e dau cache-taki na i yaragi. Oti o ya keirau sa mani veitalanoa, sa mani tukuna.
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sara me lai maroroi i tuba. Na kena qai kau i tuba, na kena lai maroroi saka tikoi i tuba, sa tiko saka ga e ligai Mr Steven.

Q114: A tiko i vei na nomudou OC o Mr Baleinamae e na gauna drau veitalanoa tiko kina kei Capt Stevens?
A: O ko ya tekivu saka na caka ni coup o ya, sa tekivu lako saka tiko mai cake ni na HQ oti lesu saka tiko yani i ra. Au sega ni vakasamataka a tiko o ko ya e na gauna o ya se a tiko ga i cake.

Q115: Na gauna sa oti kina na nomudrau veitalanoa kei Capt Stevens, bau dua na gauna o wovoki kina i na nomudou Lecture Room?
A: Au tiko beka ga ena Lecture Room.

Q116: Nomu dau tiko e na Lecture Room, o bau raica e so na i yaragi ni sa tawani kisi tu, tuva tu e na nomudou Lecture Room, e so na para-bags e tu kina, e so na salt bags?
A: Na i yaragi saka e tiko i kea, e nodratou saka tiko beka ga na yadra saka ga i na Complex.

Q117: Ko ya qori ko ya e a tu e na Lecture Room?
A: Ko ya e tiko saka e na Lecture Room.

Q118: O sega ni bau raica ni so sa tawani kisi tu?
A: Sega, na nodratou i yaragi saka ga na yadra e dau biu saka tikoga e na kisi.

Q119: A sega tale ni dua me kauta na i yaragi mai na Vakaraubuka o ya me lai yacova na mataka lai lai ni Vakarauwai?
A: Sega.

Q120: Your Unit Complex in QEB, a very small Unit; a lot of things have transpired in the Unit. You are sitting here and you are telling us you were not made aware of these things. Do you expect us to believe that you were not made aware of any of these things?
A: What do you mean, Sir?

Q121: What I mean is, you said you were in the Ops Room, so the Ops Room is located near the armoury. Beside that is located the key rack - where all the keys are kept. Weapons were packed on Friday, Saturday, you had a briefing by Col Tarakinikini on Friday. You being a senior officer, you did not even attend the briefing. Do you expect us to believe that you knew nothing of this?
A: Sir, na briefing e caka, ia au sega saka ga ni tiko kina.
Q122: On Saturday afternoon at 2.00 o'clock; were you aware of weapons being loaded at Sukanaivalu Road?
A: Na i yaragi saka ko ya e kauta o Mr Stevens.

Q123: That was taken to Bilo, you knew of that?
A: Ko ya saka na i yaragi qori.

Q124: Who were the persons loading those weapons?
A: O ratou ga na group saka ga nei Stevens ko ya ratou a train-vata tiko.

Q125: Can you name them?
A: I can remember Bonefasio.

Q126: Did you at any time instruct Bonefasio to take the weapons to a place other than Bilo?
A: Au a tukuna vei Bonefasio me kau i Bilo na i yaragi.

Q127: You said that?
A: Ko ya na briefing a caka.

Q128: Did you, after that briefing, briefed Bonefasio to take the weapons somewhere else?
A: No, Sir.

Q129: This loading of weapons; that new Selection Team that went for the exercise and just got back from Nadi, were they also present there in the Unit?
A: Ratou lesu mai e soli vei iratou me ratou off e na yakavi ni siga o ya.

Q130: During May 19th to July 15th, did you receive any calls from Major Ligairi at the Complex?
A: Au a tukuna saka e na noqu i vakama'acala taumada ni keitou sega ni veitaratara rawa kei iratou mai ra e na matana votu - face to face, ia so na gauna keitou veitalanoa e na talevoni.

Q131: What was the nature of these calls?
A: So na gauna dau taro tu ga mai oko ya baleta na nodra welfare na cauravou, se ra vakacava tiko, bulabula vinaka tiko ira na tiko yani i caka, e dau tukuna talega ni ratou bulabula vinaka na tiko mai ra.

Q132: Was there any time he requested for weapons from the Unit?
A: Sega saka.

Q133: Was there any time you supplied information of what was transpiring in camp?
Q134: Na Unit cava o sa tiko kina e na gauna qo?
A: Au sa tiko saka e na 3FIR.

Q135: Na cava na nomu i tavi i kea?
A: Qo keitou se tiko ga e na nodratou RP, a tukuna vei au o CO 3 me keitou lai tekivuna na Recon Platoon, au mani lai taro vei iratou na Recon Platoon, Sgt Major Soko, au se waraka tikoga qo na kena macala. Tukunaoko ya meu wawa tiko. Noqu rai ga o au, ni vaka beka me keitou sega ni trust-taki sara ni keitou se qai gole saka ga yani e na 3FIR.

Q136: Bau dua nomudou internal posting e caka e na 3FIR me macala na vanua dou lako kina?
A: Se bera saka.

Q137: O sa biuta e dua nomu application mo sa request-taka mo sa suka e na Mataivalu?
A: E se bera saka e na gauna qo.

Q138: Au rogoca e dua na veitalanoa ni vaka o sa vakasamataka tiko mo sa request-taka mo sa suka?
A: Sa yacova saka tiko mai na gauna kei na yabaki ni bula meu sa cegu kina.

Q139: Ia na nomu veisaumi kei na ka kece e lako tu ga?
A: Au se bera tikoga ni veisaumi e na veisaumi ko ya au mai tukuna saka e liu. Na veisaumi ko ya e se qai oti saka ga qo au a qai veisaumi kina.

Q140: Bau dua e vakamatatatake vei iko na cava na vuna o a sega ni veisaumi tiko kina e liu?
A: Sega saka.

Q141: O bau taroga?
A: Sa tarogi tiko sa qai tukuni tikoga mai ni sa kena directive ga mai cake.

Q142: O cei mai na Pay Office drau veitalanoa?
A: Sgt Major Buadromo.

Q143: Tukunaoko ya ni directive mai cake, o raica e dua na i vola ni lako mai cake ni volai tu kina mo kakua ni veisaumi?
A: Sega saka.
Q144: Just between the period of May 19th until July 14th, were you at any time requested to prepare leave applications for all those soldiers from 1FMS who were in the Parliament Complex?
A: Ni tara saka tale mada?

Q145: We have heard evidence in this Board that the soldiers that were in the Parliament Complex were made to sign leave applications when they were there, were you at any time requested to make leave applications for them in the Unit?
A: No, Sir, na i vakamacala saka ga au taura, mai tukuna saka ga vei au o Mr Baleinamau ni tukuna mai o DALS me sign-taki na leave apps. vei iratou na lako sobu i na Parliament Complex. Au sega ni raica, au qai rogoca ga ni ratou tukuna tiko ni qai lako sobu yani o Col Caucau me kauta yani na leave apps. vei iratou na tiko mai ra me ratou sign-taka na leave mai ra.

Q146: Mr Bainimoli, sa i katolu ni noqu na tarogi iko qo; o tukuna ni o sega ni kila e dua na ka me baleta na vuaviri; e dina o ya?
A: E dina saka.

Q147: O kila o cei a vakaitavi, se o bau raica e na noratau bose kina o Lt Baleinamau, o cei soti a bose, o bau raica e na dua na gauna?
A: Na bose saka mai vei o ya?

Q148: Mai na loma ni Unit, me ra dau bose vakatikiti, e ra sega ni dau vinakata tale e dua me lako yani; o bau raica e dua na bose me yaco va o ya ena loma ni Unit?
A: Sega saka.

Q149: Vakadeitaka mada, o iko a tiko e na loma ni nomudou Unit ena bogi ni Vakaraubuka, na i ka 19 ni vula o Me ko ya a yaco kina na vuaviri?
A: Io saka.

Q150: Bau dua na gauna o a rogoci nomudou OC ena gauna o ya, Mr Baleinamau ni tukuna kina oko ya ni sa na vakarau takeover o Lt Col Tarakinikini me dua na nona i tutu ni veilutaki ena loma ni keba ena bogi tikoga ni Vakaraubuka o ya?
A: E sega, Sir.
Recolied on 14/09/00:

WARRANT OFFICER CLASS ONE E. Bainimoli, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q151: Na matai ni gauna e a kau kina na yaragi i tuba, mai na unit ena mataka lailai ni Siga Vakaraubuka na i ka 19 ni siga. E a vakavodoki ena lori, e dua na twin cab karakarawa, e a curu ga ena loma ni complex me ra vakavodoki kina na operatives, rauta beka na veimama ni ciwa kina veimama ni tini?
A: Sir, ena gauna saka oqori, au a tu kina ena tayabe mai ra.

Q152: Kena i carua ena bogi tikoga ni siga Vakaraubuka tikoga o ya e a kau tale eso na i yaragi e tuba? E rawa ni ko vakamacalataka na ka o kila me baleta na kena vakavodoki na i yaragi ena bogi ni siga Vakaroubuka kei na mataka ni siga Vakarauwai?
A: Na ka saka au kila me baleta na kena kau, au kila ni rua na lori a gole mai na Palimedi, o ko ya me' kau yani kina na i yaragi ena bogi ni siga Vakaroubuka.

Q153: O kila na mataqali lori vakacava?
A: Au kila saka ga ni lori ni civilian, na kena brand au sega ni taura rawa.

Q154: O cei e a vakavodoka tiko na i yaragi?
A: Na vakavodoki saka ni yaragi, e sega sara ni matata vei au. Au kila ga ni rau draiva tiko o Ravai vata kei Vakadranu me vaka na i tukutuku e soli vei au.

Q155: O raica na kena vakavodoki na dakai e loma ni para bags se na kisi?
A: Na i yaragi au kila ni a kau ga mai ena liga baleta na lori e vakayagataki e lori ni civilian, e sega ni rawa ni biu kina na crash box.

Q156: O bau raica na kena vodo?
A: Niu a tiko ena Ops au rogoca na veivosaki e tuba. Ena gauna e caka tiko kina na vakavodo, au rawa ni kila ni boko tiko na cina.

Q157: O bau taura rawa na gauna?
A: Au sega ni nanuma rawa.

Q158: E dua tale na ka o via vakamacalataka?
A: E sega saka.

Q159: On Friday morning, did you receive a message to call any senior officer at RFMF?
A: E sega.
Q160: E dua e qiri mai iko mo qiri vei Col. Tarakinikini?
A: Au sega saka ni vakasa mhataka baleta na noqu' gole ga mai o ya i vale, au gole ga mai ena keba, vodo ena motoka, au gole sara i vale

[ E. BAINIMOLI]
Warrant Officer Class One

[ J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
FOURTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 22505 SGT IOWANE WASEROMA

Sgt Waseroma, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Can you tell us when did you join the army?
A: I joined in 1987 in Labasa and was recruited at 1MS which was known as the CRW then. I went to the Middle East in 1990 and the rest of the time I have been with 1MS.

Q2: Describe what happened during the coup – before 19th May and after that?
A: During the coup I was in Australia, I was a member of the shooting team of the army. We came back to Fiji one week after the coup took place. I was briefed by Mr. Stevens after the Commander told our unit that if we wanted to go on leave, to remain outside the complex. I was confused about this brief because it was not clear.

Q3: You came back to the unit from Australia one week after the coup?
A: Yes, I came back and went to the unit. I came back on a Friday and on Monday I was briefed by Mr. Stephens that the Commander was there and he said that if we wanted to go on leave to go out and if not, to be inside. This directive was not clear.

I stayed in the unit at the camp and they stated for the security at the unit to be reinforced. I was involved with the administration of those inside – the welfare of their families. I used to visit their families, their wives and children. Their rations had to be taken inside and approval was given from the top for rations to be taken inside the Parliamentary complex. That was my only involvement. I used to take rations inside and after one week, I was told not to take any more rations inside or to take the vehicle inside otherwise I will be arrested. That was the end of the matter and I stayed home until I was arrested.

Q4: For two weeks you took the rations inside before you stopped?
A: I think more than a week.

Q5: Were you involved in the planning of the coup?
A: No, I was not involved.

Q6: When you returned from Australia and was at the camp 1MS unit, did you get in contact by telephone or any other way with those inside?
A: They use to call when they wanted something. At one stage I used to answer the telephone and they were asking for rations.

Q7: When you left the unit and was at home, did you contact those at the Parliamentary complex?
A: No, after I received orders I did not talk to them again.

Q8: Did you know of anyone in the army, anyone at the top who was involved with the operation at the complex?
A: No.

Q9: Within the army or outside?
A: No.

Q10: What was your appointment in the unit after you returned from Australia?
A: I only supplied rations at the time; there was no specific appointment because everything was in disarray.

Q11: What was your appointment before that?
A: I was an instructor.

Q12: Are you married?
A: I am a divorcee.

Q13: When you went out on leave, who did you stay with?
A: I was staying with my de-facto wife.

Q14: You said you were taking rations to the Parliamentary complex, can you tell us who requested for these rations?
A: I was carrying out something that was in the process from the week before I came to Fiji. I carried on from there. I did not really know as to who authorised or demanded for the rations.

Q15: To take over a procedure or process already in place, you need someone to tell you to do it?
A: All I knew was that someone from the top had approved the ration and the role I played was only to escort the storeman.

Q16: Were you arrested at home?
A: From home whilst I was asleep.

Q17: What was the reason for the arrest?
A: I was detained for 17 days without any reason at all.

Q18: Have you been told of the reason of the arrest to date?
A: No.

Q19: In your statement you said your rations came from the top; who was giving the rations from HQ?
A: I have no idea.

Q20: Were you picking up rations in HQ?
A: No, from my unit.

Q21: The rations was supplied to your unit?
A: Yes.

Q22: Who is in charge for demand for rations?
A: We have a storeman.

Q23: Who is your storeman?
A: Sgt. Vuki.

Q24: These trips of taking rations, was there any time you took arms or ammunitions with you to the Parliamentary complex?
A: To my knowledge the rations that I took were in cartons and not once did I know whether I took weapons from my unit to the complex.

Q25: Were the cartons sealed?
A: Yes, some were sealed but the tinned stuff were just left like that. The stuff, we all checked and vehicles searched before by the Muanikau checkpoints and the MPs at the gates before being given access and final approval by Major Hennings and other checkpoint IC.

Q26: You said you used to receive calls from Parliamentary complex requesting for resupply; is it true?
A: Yes.

Q27: Who did the call come from?
A: I have no idea.

Q28: Can you identify the voice?
A: I cannot.

Q29: The visits and taking of food to the other 1MS personnel in the Parliamentary complex, you went to visit their families, were you given directive to do that or was it done on your own accord?
A: I followed on from what was going on. I was told to take up responsibility and to deliver rations as an escort to the storeman.
Q30: Who assigned you this responsibility?
A: The storeman requested me to escort him to the Parliamentary Complex. To put it right, I played no major role other than being just an escort to him.

Q31: The storeman is Sgt. Vuki?
A: Yes.

Q32: Did you hear or know of any arms or ammunitions taken out of the unit after 19th May?
A: I heard of it but I have no evidence.

Q33: What did you hear?
A: I heard that the boys were in the Parliamentary complex armed.

Q34: Those 1MS personnel who were in the Parliamentary complex, can you give their names?
A: I think that should be answered by my superior.

Q35: We already know – a lot have already been answered and a lot of people charged. We have to ask this question over and over again and has been put by so many people?

Q36: Were you aware of any training conducted in the Northern Division prior to 19th May?
A: Sir.

Q37: Were you part of the training?
A: No.

Q38: Do you know who was present at the training?
A: We were doing preparation for the tour to Australia with the shooting team and I was involved in that.
Q39: You were not aware or would not be able to state here who was involved in the training?
A: No.

I WASEROMA
Sergeant

J. N. B. EVANS
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

T. GUCAKE
Major
Member

H. MACOMBER
Warrant Officer Class 1
Member

CONFIDENTIAL
-364-
FIFTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 25080 CPL SELESITINO KALOUNIVALE

Cpl Kalounivale, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows.

Q1: Can you just give a brief outline of your services in the RFMF, the year you joined and when you joined the IFMS?
A: Sir, my name is 25080 Cpl Selesitino Kalounivale. I joined the Army in 1985. I went twice on TOD to Lebanon and once to Sinai. I joined the IMS in 1988 and I have been there ever since.

Q2: Can you explain your personal involvement on the day of the coup, prior and after the 19th of May up to the time when you were brought to camp?
A: On the 19th of May, I was at the Red Cross Office attending a course. I was there when I was told that there has been a coup. At 1.00 o'clock, I went to Parliament and I saw that the Complex was full of people. When I reached the Complex, I was told that personnel from our Unit were already inside. I then went straight to the camp to see if that was true. After that I made my way down and I remained there till we dispersed.

Q3: Vakamatatatata - nai ka 19 ni siga o curu i loma, o sa lai tiko i loma me yacova na i ka 13 ni siga ni vula ko Jiulai, e dina ‘oya?
A: E dina saka.

Q4: Sa oti oya, qai o gole i vei?
A: Oti mai na Parliamentary Complex, au sa gole i vale me yacova na gauna au lai vesu mai kina, kau cako sara i na keba, 16 na siga noqu tiko i loma, ni oti na noqu sainitaka e dua na i vola vata kei iratou mai na Legal, me tiko kina na veidinadinati vata kei iratou na Mataivalu baleta na veika sa yaco.

Q5: Se bera na vuaviri e na i ka 19 ni siga, o bau vakaitavi o iko e na dua na vuli vakaivalu ena loma ni Unit?
A: Sega.

Q6: Ko bau vakaitavi o iko e na kena vakavakarautaki na vuaviri?
A: Sega.

Q7: E na nomu sa curu e na Complex e na i ka 19 ni siga, o bau veitaratara tiko kei iratou na lewe ni IMS ena loma ni keba?
A: A lako tikoga na veitaratara kau vakabauta ni sema tiko ga kina o ira na cauravou e ra tiko mai ra.
Q8: Na veitalanoa qo e-vakacava; na veivosake i na talevoni, fax se-gaunisala cava dou a vakayagataka e na nomudou veitalanoa?

A: E levu ga na veitaratara e vakayacori tiko c na talevoni e baleta tikoga e so na "admin work" ka baleta ga na kedra kakana na cauravou e ra tiko mai ra.

Q9: Nomudou sa tiko e na Complex, o bau kila tu eso e ra tiko e na Mataivalu e ra vakaitavi ka dou veitaratara tiko me baleta na ka e yaco tiko mai ra, se so na civilians?

A: E dua ga na turaga ni valu a liaise tiko yani i ra.

Q10: O cei na turaga ni valu koya o vakamalataka tiko qo?

A: O Col. Tarakinikini. Au sega ni kila na cava na vuna e liaise tiko yani kina.

Q11: Ni oti na nomu sa mai tiko i vale, ni oti na i ka 13 ni Jiulai; o bau veitaratara tale kei iratou na lewe ni nomu Unit ka ra tiko mai Kalabu kei na veiyasa i Viti?

A: Keimami a veitaratara tiko, keimami a sota i tauni, baleta ni sa oti mai na Complex, sa suka kece na i yaragi, keimami sa lako mai keimami sa veitaratara tiko ga na gauna keimami na lesu yani kina i na keba.

Q12: E na loma ni Complex, vakamalataka mada na organisation e na loma ni Complex, o cei na i liuliu, na i tavi cava o qarava tiko e na nomu tiko i loma oya?

A: Au kila ga noqui i liuliu, neitou i tavi ga na secure-taka na Complex vata kei na nodratou safety na hostages.

Q13: O cei na nomu i liuliu o vakamalataka tiko qo?

A: Warrant Officer Ravai.

Q14: Just recapping on what you said, first you reported to camp for duty and then went down to the Parliamentary Complex. Who did you speak with at the Camp when you came up?

A: Au lako yani i na keba, sa chaos tu na keba.

Q15: Did you speak with anyone to find out what was happening?

A: Segae, niu raica ni o ratou na tiko mai ra e ratou gone kece, sa mani kaya o Kovula meu gole sobu i ra oya meu lai toman iratou.

Q16: When you went to the Parliamentary Complex, who did you report to there?

A: Warrant Officer Ravai.
Q17: What were you dressed in?
A: As I said, I was attending a course at the Red Cross when the coup took place so I was dressed in civilian.

Q18: When you reported to Sgt. Major Ravai, were you issued with weapons and ammunition?
A: Yes.

Q19: What weapons were you issued with?
A: MP 5.

Q20: Were you given rounds of armaments?
A: Yes, one magazine.

Q21: How many rounds of armaments?
A: Full 30.

Q22: Where was this weapon brought from to be given to you inside the Complex? Did you go and pick it up from somewhere or someone brought it and gave it to you?
A: It was given to me by Sgt Major Ravai.

Q23: Did you see any other weapons inside the Complex?
A: No.

Q24: What made you join the IMS group in the Parliamentary Complex?
A: It is a bond of comradeship.

Q25: The bond that you are talking about is the bond that existed in the 1FMS; are there any other reasons?
A: It is because I believe in the bond that binds us.

Q26: What was your appointment prior to 19th May in the 1FMS?
A: Diving supervisor.

Q27: Do you have a naval background?
A: No.

Q28: Whilst in the Complex, were you aware of any arms and ammunition brought in from the Unit in the QEB?
A: No.

Q29: What is the system of your security duties in the Complex?
A: Most of us were occupied almost all the time, when it is time to sleep that is when we are relieved.

Q31: When it is time for rest, did you hand over the weapon to someone else or did you take it with you to sleep?
A: It was handed back to Sgt. Major Ravai.

Q31: How was the weapons accounted for, was there a register?
A: No register.

Q32: Did you sign out for the weapon or it was just given to you?
A: It was just given to me.

Q33: When you went home after 13th July, were you in contact with other Members of your Unit after that?
A: Yes, I was.

Q34: Could you tell us which persons you were in contact with?
A: Our contacting each other was mainly on our return, mainly Sgt Vuki, because he was the Quarter Master and he was in charge of admin for IFMS.

Q35: What I am trying to get is, those individuals from IFMS who were in the Complex, when you moved out there, were you in contact with each other after that?
A: Yes, I was in contact with some.

Q36: How were these contacts made?
A: By vodaphone.

Q37: When you moved out on the 13th, did you take your weapons with you or what happened to those weapons?
A: The weapons were returned from Parliament.

Q38: When were you arrested?
A: I was arrested over the weekend, the week of the raid at Kalabu, Saturday morning.

Q39: Where were you?
A: I was in bed.

Q40: Was there a reason given for your arrest?
A: They said they needed me for questioning.
Q41: Were you aware of any training conducted by IFMS in the Northern Division?
A: Yes, I am aware of that.

Q42: Are you able to tell us what form of training this was?
A: It was jungle and amphibious.

Q43: Were you involved in this training?
A: Yes.

Q44: Would you be able to tell us the places you trained at?
A: I was not actually one of those people who were involved in the exercise but my part in that training was I was the one who approached the chiefs in the traditional manner concerning the land because I am from the area.

Q45: Where was this?
A: Tunuloa-Natewa Peninsula.

Q46: What training was to be conducted there?
A: Rural OP concerning marijuana because Tunuloa and Natewa are mostly marijuana related areas.

Q47: Was there any previous training conducted there?
A: Yes, but it was from Sese across the Bay.

Q48: How many people were involved in this training?
A: I have no idea.

Q49: Were you there when the training was conducted?
A: No.

Q50: And this site is a frequent area where you train at? Has any training being conducted at the same place before?
A: No.

Q51: This was the first time?
A: Yes, first time.

Q52: This bond you talk about between personnel of IFMS. You said that the reason for going to the Complex was because of the bond. Would you have bond to the Complex if there was any regular force soldiers involved other than the IFMS?
A: I will go there on orders. If I was told to go there, I think I would have gone.

Q53: Were you following orders when you went there on the 19th?
A: There was no orders in the Complex.

Q54: There was no orders given?
A: Yes.

Q55: Your going there was on your own volition, your own decision?
The reason for my going there is because what I have stated before.

Q56: Cpl Kalounivale, e na gauna oqo o se vesu tikoga se ko sa sere?
A: Au sa sere.

Q57: O cei e sereki iko?
A: Col. Raduva.

Q58: E na gauna o a sere kina, e bau vakamacalataki vei iko na vu ni nomu vesu tu se dua na charge o na charge-taki kina, se cava na instruction a soli vei iko e na gauna o a sere kina?
A: E soli ga vei keitou me keitou sign-taka e dua na bond oya baleta na neitou a involve i loma, ia e sega ni dua na charge keitou se charge-taki kina.

Q59: Sa dou mani sere ga, tukeni mo dou lako sara i i na nomudou Unit?
A: Tukeni vei keitou na neitou posting.

Q60: From the time you were arrested and in custody, were you paid from the RFMF?
A: I was paid.

Q61: All throughout from the 19th until today?
A: Yes.

Q62: Na gauna o lai tiko kina e na Complex e na i ka 19 ni siga, o kila e dua na ka baleta na i yaragi, eso tale na i yaragi a kau tale ena loma ni Complex. O bau kila e dua na ka e baleta na i yaragi mai na nomudou Unit mai cake?
A: E sega saka.

Q63: Okay. Kevaka o na vinakataki tale, o na qai kacivi tale mai. Sa soli na galala go mo ni gole tale ki na nomuni Unit. O ni tiko e na 3FIR?
Recalled on 12/09/00:

Pte Kalounivale, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q64: Is it true that you escorted those mobs down to the TV station? You did not escort them down?
A: No, Sir.

Q65: Cpl. Kalounivale, ena siga e vakayacori kina na ka o ya ena TV station, o kila na vanua e tiko kina o Private Sokiveta?
A: E sega saka.

Q66: E dua tale na ka o via vakamacalataka kina Board?
A: E rua saka na turaga ni valu e rau gole sobu saka yani. E dua e kauta tiko yani na Leave Application me kelamani laki vaka leveweno o kelamani na tiko mai Parliament o ya mai vei ko ya na Director of Army Legal Services, o Col. Caucau. E qai lako talega yani e dua na i tukutuku ni vakadewatika yani o Commander ni tamata e via lako sobu yani ena Parliament me lako vaka leave. O ya e dua na brief a caka vei keitou.

Q67: O cei e brief taki kemudou?
A: Ejako yani ena complex, e verbally ga yani na kena tukuni yani. Ena gauna a lako sobu yani kina o Col. Caucau, e kauta tiko ga yani na Leave App

Q68: E dua tale?
A: E dua tale saka ga ena gauna au sentry tiko kina e kea, e gole yani o Col. Tara, e dodonu me mai take over o ko ya i na keba. Au sega ni rawa ni recall taka na siga o ya.

Q69: Na tiki ni siga cava o ya?
A: Au sega saka ni kila na tiki ni siga.

Q70: Na i ka 19 se 20?
A: Au kila na macawa e tarava.

Q71: O rawa ni vakamatatataka, o kila vakacava ni dodonu me mai take over o Col. Tarakinikini ena keba i cake?
A: Au a sentry saka tiko ena gauna o ya. E a lako yani ka vakaraitaka o koya vei Na Qase e na rumu vei Na Qase.
Q72: E a tiko tale ga kina o Col. Tarakinikini?
A: Io saka.

Q73: E rawa ni ko vakamatata taka na cava a veitalanoataki tiko?
A: E kaya saka ga o koya ni na mai take over i cake.

Q74: Vakacava na nona reaction?
A: O koya e vaka io saka vei Na Qase.

Q75: O kila e oti e vica na siga mai na vuaviri qai vakayacori tiko na veitalanoa ogori?
A: Ena macawa saka e tarava. Siga Vakarauibuka e caka kina na vuaviri ena kena macawa e tarava.

Q76: E rawa ni o vakamatatataka o cei tale e tiko ena loma ni rumu o ya me vakadeitaka na nomu i tukutuku?
A: O Na Qase saka.

Q77: Cpl. Kalounivale, you went to the Parliament Complex, would you have gone there if you had not seen Major Ligairi?
A: Sir, I saw the boys there, not Major Ligairi. I never see Major Ligairi until the next day.

Q78: Was there any briefing given to you or any discussions about the immunity or basically that an immunity be given to you of your involvement in the coup?
A: No, Sir. I only knew that the things that we were doing, the Army was backing us up.

Q79: What made you believe this?
A: We had rations coming from the Army camp and the senior officers that were coming down, what Col. Caucau came to do, they were more or less sympathising with the course.

Q80: Did you have any weapons or any ammunitions with you at the moment?
A: No, Sir.

Q81: Do you know of anyone?
A: No, Sir. All arms have been returned in Parliament.

Q82: Kovula, ko a tiko ena nomudou unit mai cake ena gauna a vosa kina vei kemudou o Commander ni sa oti na vuaviri?

Q83: O tiko e vei ena gauna oqo?
A: Au tiko saka ena Land Force.

Q84: E dua tale na ka o via tukuna ni se bera ni o lako?
A: E sega saka.

[Signature]
[S. KALOUNIVALE]
Corporal

[Signature]
[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[Signature]
[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[Signature]
[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class 1
Member
Where Has All the Music Gone?
Reflections on the Fortieth Anniversary
of Fiji's Independence

Brij V Lal

On the whole it is better to explore history rather than to repress or deny it.

EDWARD SAID, Culture and Imperialism

It is not enough to stand at a tangent of other peoples' conventions; we should be the most unforgiving critics of our own.

TONY JUDT, "ON BEING AUSTERE AND BEING JEWISH"

[There is a] difference between the silence after the music, and the silence when there is no music.

VINCENT O'SULLIVAN, IN
John Mansfield Thompson:
Notes towards a Biography

On 10 October 2010, Fiji marked the fortieth anniversary of its independence from the United Kingdom after ninety-six years of colonial rule. It was a precipitously subdued affair. The guest of honor, Sir Michael Somare of Papua New Guinea, failed to turn up for the celebrations. There was in truth little to celebrate. The Public Emergency Regulations in place since April 2009, when the constitution of the country was abrogated, severely curtailed mobility and free speech, threatening retribution to anyone who questioned the conventional wisdom of the day—all this in marked contrast to the joy and (misplaced) optimism that attended the severance of

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the colonial umbilical cord in 1970. What a tumultuous forty years it has been in the ill-fated history of that otherwise richly endowed country: coups and constitutional crises, state-sponsored constitutional engineering, more coups, and endless cul-de-sacs. The prospect of stability, peace, and prosperity at the time of independence—the sense that Fiji, as a multiethnic society, might have a lesson to teach similarly situated countries in the developing world at the end of colonial rule—seems like a dream now. What was once thought to be the fate only of newly independent countries in Africa and Latin America whose fledgling democratic values were regularly subverted by the military in the name of good governance has now become an integral part of Fiji’s postcolonial narrative. And there is no end in sight to its unpredictable future.

I was in my final year of high school when Fiji became independent. I remember the occasion vividly. Lollies were distributed at the morning assembly along with miniature plastic navy blue Fiji flags; the Union Jack came down for the last time as we dutifully recited “God Save the Queen” for the last time; speeches were made by Mr Sukru Rehman, chairman of the school’s Board of Governors, and by the District Commissioner Mr Dodds; and words were spoken about achieving independence with tolerance, harmony, and justice and about the legacy the British were leaving us: a sense of fair play, the rule of law, and the fundamentals of parliamentary democracy. It was a quietly proud moment in our youthful lives, and we were told never to forget the wonderful legacy our colonial masters were bequeathing us. I did not know then that I would spend my entire life variously engaged with Fiji’s history and politics. I am a part of the history I now seek to understand. I cannot and do not claim detachment or objectivity. But I will say that what I express is not entirely idiosyncratic, and that in some ample measure it reflects the opinion and experience of a section of the community from which I come and those of the generation of which I am a part. In the sounds of my footsteps, many would, I am sure, recognize the echoes of their own.

The late 1960s was one of the most dynamic periods in Fijian history, comparable in some senses to the 1990s, full of animated debate and discussion about what kind of political culture was appropriate for a multiethnic society such as Fiji (B Lal 1992). Opinion was genuinely divided. The National Federation Party (NFP), with its base in the Indo-Fijian community, advocated a nonracial common roll of voting with one person, one vote, one value. The Alliance Party, nominally multiracial but solidly backed by the Fijian and European communities, wanted nothing less than
the retention of full communal, that is, race-based rolls. The Federation wanted Fiji to become independent with an elected Fijian head of state, while the Alliance was lukewarm about independence and wanted ties to the British monarchy maintained. Questions were asked about such sensitive subjects as the role and place of traditional social and cultural institutions in the fabric of the wider society, and about the social, cultural, and institutional impediments to change and growth in Fijian society (Belshaw 1964; Spate 1959; Watters 1969).

These were questions that I came upon much later at university. In rural Labasa on the island of Vanua Levu, in a village without running water, paved roads, or electricity, where the radio was still a novelty in many households and newspapers were an expensive luxury only a few could afford, we lived largely in blissful ignorance. We had few means of finding out what was going on in the world. We had no contact with Fijians who lived on the outer edges of our settlement, no comprehension of their concerns, aspirations, and needs, just as they were innocent about ours. We were preoccupied with making do with what little we had, which was very little indeed. More than national politics, the affairs of the sugar industry, then under the mighty Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR), were of much greater concern to us. The sugar industry sustained us. It was our lifeblood. It was the reason we were in Fiji. The news of national politics came to us via the occasional Hindi newspapers such as Jagriti, Shanti Dut, and the Fiji Samachar. More immediately, it came through occasional visiting politicians—important men, impressively dressed, who talked about independence, about pride and sacrifice, about a new future, things that few of us actually understood or contemplated. That luxury was denied to us by our desperate economic situation. Our cane-growing village was solid NFP country; the Federation was “our party.” It had fought the CSR on our behalf. It carried our hopes and aspirations. There were a few Alliance supporters in the village, such as my eldest brother, because of whom I was sometimes taunted at school as a traitor to our community; but since such people were few and far between, they were generally tolerated as misguided men with misplaced loyalties, harmless.

At high school, politics was taboo, even in the higher grades. The colonial protocol of separating politics from education was strictly observed. It was as if nothing was happening in the country that truly mattered to us. In our school debates, we chose (or, rather our teachers chose for us) topics such as “Alcoholics should have no place in society” and “Why students should be allowed to wear thongs [flip-flops or slippers] to school,”
but nothing more serious (B Lal 2001). Politics was a dangerous, destabilizing territory, best left unexplored. The colonial educational bureaucracy kept a close, watchful eye on what went on in the classroom, and we were all focused on preparing for the final exam, which would determine our fate and our school’s ranking in the colonial prestige system. In our history classes, we learned about the unification of Germany and Italy and about the causes and consequences of the First World War and the Russian Revolution, but nothing about Fiji itself, or the broader Pacific region, for that matter. Colonial rule was no longer fashionable and its defense was problematic. The irony is glaringly obvious now. There we were, people who would inherit the challenges and opportunities of independence, Fiji’s next generation of leaders, completely unaware of important developments taking place all around us. And as products of largely mono-racial schools, we would be called on to play national leadership roles on a multiracial stage for which we were spectacularly ill prepared. No wonder Fiji foundered on its postcolonial journey.

Fiji embarked on this postcolonial journey as we entered university. The opening of the University of the South Pacific in Suva must count as one of the turning points in modern South Pacific history, providing higher education to masses of students from poor homes who, before then, would have been deprived of the opportunities of tertiary education altogether. Higher education in colonial Fiji was the privilege of a selected elite: usually a dozen or so scholars sent to Australia and New Zealand to study “useful” subjects in preparation for careers in the teaching profession and in low-level administration. The university was for us an enlarging and enriching experience—but no more informative about what was going on in political circles in Fiji. Once again, we had our sports, hiking, social, and cultural clubs; we staged plays, read poetry, and went bushwalking, but serious discussion of politics was absent, or confined to a few individuals. The Indo-Fijians generally assumed that their Fijian counterparts were supporters of the Alliance Party while they, in turn, suspected us of being NFP sympathizers. Given that the political parties were essentially race-based, we were conscious of the ever-present danger that any criticism of a political party could easily be interpreted as a provocative attack on an ethnic group; and so the boundaries remained intact, and we kept our thoughts largely to ourselves.

Other Pacific Islands students, from Sāmoa, Tonga, the Cook Islands, and the Solomons, talked proudly of their history as beneficial and nourishing influences in their lives. They had a history to celebrate, which had
a coherence borne of ancient heritage or forged in response to colonial rule (the Mau movement in Sāmoa, Maasina Rule in Solomon Islands, the monarchy in Tonga). Their obvious pride in their national identity was a source of envy for us. We had no overarching sense of a common identity; we were “Indians” and “Fijians,” separate in our conceptions of the past and divergent in our understanding of the present. We hardly spoke each other’s language. Our memory was racially compartmentalized. While one group lauded the policies of colonial rule, the other rejected them. In our vision of what Fiji as a multiethnic society should be, we were poles apart, a disparity symbolized most immediately by our different attachments to communal and common roll systems of voting. Our traditions of politica discourse were different: one was open and robust, the other hedged in by a careful observance of rituals and protocols of hierarchy. The space of common concerns was small, although social boundaries were freely breached in the lived experience of daily life. For us, history could not provide a serviceable ideology of nation building as it could and did for many of our Pacific neighbors. There was little we could agree on.

This was the unspoken reality on the ground, but our national myth evoked a different image. The early years of independence were warm and fuzzy. We had become independent without strife. Our links with the British monarchy remained intact. The old colonial pattern of political representation, with paramountcy for Fijians and privilege for Europeans, was maintained, and Indo-Fijians had to content themselves with the illusion of parity in the overall scheme of things. We were paraded before the world as a model of multiracial democracy. “The way the world should be,” Pope John Paul II had intoned on a fleeting visit to the country in 1985. That became our national mantra, shamelessly self-promotional. But deep inside us, I am not sure we really believed this myth. Independence had arrived peacefully, but none of the deep, underlying problems about power sharing, land leases, or the underpinnings of affirmative action had been resolved. We were reluctant to look into the abyss that separated us.

In truth, we had merely pandered over the cracks and fractures that lay just beneath the surface. There were certain assumptions and understandings underpinning the independence order that lay unexplored lest we discover the hollowness that lay beneath the center of our public life. Race, we were repeatedly told, was a fact of life; in truth, it was on its way to becoming a way of life. Every issue of public policy came to be viewed through the prism of race. We were asked for our race when we opened
a bank account, applied for a driving license, or left or entered the country. In scholarship awards and public-service promotions, race became a consequential factor as part of the national equation of affirmative action. “Blood will flow,” Ratu Kamisese Mara said menacingly, if Fijian sensitivities about land and leadership were ever breached. Race serviced a convenient political ideology, but it was also deeply flawed. Neither the Fijians nor the Indo-Fijians were homogenous communities. That much was obvious to us. There were interests and concerns that transgressed communal boundaries in many parts of Fiji. Nonetheless, the overall architecture of national life was race-based.

Expatriate academic analysts scratched the surface and developed the theory of “Three Fijis” (Fisk 1970). There was some truth to this characterization, although fundamental structural changes in the economy were surreptitiously unsettling established orthodoxies. The Fijians were behind in some sectors but considerably ahead in others, such as ownership of land, timber, and marine resources. Affecting us most directly, the Fijian government of the day adopted an affirmative action policy in favor of indigenous Fijians in the field of education. An education commission in 1969 had recommended that 50 percent of all government scholarships be reserved for indigenous Fijians, with the unexpended funds designated specifically for Fijian educational projects (Sherlock and others 1969). Fijian disadvantage in education, and in the professions generally, was a direct result of the policies and visions of an earlier generation of Fijian leaders, principally Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, who thought that the place for his people was in the subsistence sector in the villages, under the guidance of chiefly leadership, and that higher education was to remain the preserve of the chiefly elite (Sukuna 1984). In the abstract, the policy of racial balance made sense, but it was quite another matter at the personal level to see Fijian students getting scholarships for far lower marks than Indo-Fijian students. That policy of discrimination inevitably bred resentment. We felt as if we were the stepchildren of the state. In the civil service, senior Indo-Fijians stared blankly at the glass ceiling (B Lal 2010). The feeling of disappointment was muted, but it was real. A few years after independence, the warm mantra of multiracialism espoused by the leaders seemed strangely cold.

Things went from bad to worse after the mid-1970s. In 1974, Sakeasi Butadroka, former Alliance junior minister, founded the Fijian Nationalist Party with its motto, “Fiji for Fijians.” The following year, on the fifth anniversary of Fiji’s independence, he proposed a provocative motion in
Parliament: to have the Indians deported from Fiji, with the expense of relocation to be paid by the British government (B Lal 1992, 235-238). In hindsight, the motion seems ludicrous, nothing more than a rhetorical flourish of the Fijian nationalist fringe. But at the time, it had a powerful, unsettling effect on us. In 1974, Idi Amin had expelled long-settled Indians from Uganda for no reason other than their industry and hard-earned prosperity. If it could happen in Uganda (and, earlier, in Burma), there was no obvious reason why it could not happen in Fiji. The Alliance government’s political point-scoring response to the motion—condemning Butadroka but affirming support of the rights of all citizens, not only Indians, who were its specific targets—deepened our sense of alienation, especially when it became clear that the motion’s sentiment, in varying degrees, was shared fairly widely in the Fijian community, according to Ratu David Toganivalu, himself a man of widespread cross-cultural friendships. For the first time, many Indo-Fijians began to feel that Fiji might not, after all, be their permanent home. Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s more liberal, skills-based migration policy opened doors that began to attract many. A gradual drift began.

Two years later, the tremors of the earthquake started by Butadroka were felt when the Alliance lost the general election in April 1977, with 25 percent of the Fijian votes going to the Nationalists. Five months later, the Alliance recaptured its natural constituency by effectively jettisoning its multiracial philosophy and embracing an openly ethnic one. The Alliance learned anew the truth of a central assumption that underpinned the independence settlement: that Fijians would remain in power so long as they remained united. Henceforth, the main preoccupation of the Alliance would be the preservation of Fijian ethnic solidarity. A similar consolidation was taking place on the Indo-Fijian side. Having won the April elections by the narrowest of margins (two seats), the National Federation Party tried for four days to form a coalition government with the Alliance, an offer that the party flatly refused. The dithering allowed the governor-general, Ratu Sir George Cakobau, to appoint a minority government headed by Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. The NFP’s delay in forming a government and its internal but well-publicized leadership skirmishes were blamed for this, but everyone knew privately that an “Indian” prime minister would not be acceptable to Fijians, proclamations of democratic principles and multiracial values notwithstanding (B Lal 2010). One by one, all the founding Indo-Fijian members of the Alliance party left or were forced to leave on one pretext or another, finding a welcoming home
in the NFP, headed by its new leader, Jai Ram Reddy. Reddy had not been part of the bitter ideological fights of the pre-independence era. He wanted all Indians united under one umbrella, precisely the goal that Ratu Mara had in mind for the Fijians. Racial polarization was almost complete. We could feel it in our bones.

In 1982, things nearly boiled over. Indo-Fijians had joined hands with some western Fijian leaders who were disgruntled with the Alliance government’s development policies (especially about the lucrative pine industry), and they nearly succeeded in toppling the Fijian government. Racism raised its ugly head again. Calls were made to deport Indo-Fijian leaders, refuse renewal of leases to Indo-Fijian tenants unless they agreed to Fijian political control, and amend the constitution to enshrine Fijian paramountcy. Crises were manufactured and events staged to rouse people’s emotions. Old-timers will remember the “Four Corners” program and the Carroll Report (B Lal 1983). Once again, the reluctance of the Fijian establishment to concede power or to share it except on its own terms was on full display. The tensions generated by the political debates percolated down to the grassroots, subtly influencing (and infecting) cross-cultural attitudes and perceptions. There was cordiality in public but a great deal of circumspection in private. Not everything, however, was as the Alliance narrative portrayed it to be. Villages and settlements were changing in significant ways as the tentacles of the modern cash economy reached the hitherto isolated sections of the community (Taylor 1987). Travel and technology were transforming urban attitudes and relationships. More and more children were attending multiracial schools, and people of all ethnicities were feeling the effects of a stalled economy and lengthened unemployment lines caused, in part, by World Bank–inspired policies. A multiracial working class was haphazardly in the making. Old polarities and binary oppositions were making less and less sense.

One result of the dissatisfaction with the existing orthodoxies and power arrangements in the country was the formation of a (nominally) multiracial Fiji Labour Party (FLP) in 1985. Rhetorically left leaning, it was in fact cautiously pragmatic, or pragmatically cautious, but its emergence posed a potential threat to the established order of things Fijian in which the conventional wisdom held that the business of leadership was the prerogative of chiefs. FLP criticism of the eastern chiefs who had dominated Fijian political discourse for much of the twentieth century caused further alarm in minds accustomed to deference and acquiescence to duly constituted authority. It came as little surprise that the Fiji Labour
Party-National Federation Party coalition, which won the 1987 general elections, was swiftly deposed by the Fijian military in the name of the “Fijian race.” I argued at the time that the coup was more than the simple racial contest it was made out to be by the supporters of the coup and by the international media, and that it was really about defeated politicians taking back power by any means possible (B Lal 1988). This narrative lacked traction in those emotionally charged days when “race” was the privileged explanatory factor of the coup.

The story of the 1987 coups is too well known to be retold here. The wounds it inflicted on the body politic, social fabric, and interethnic relations were profound and enduring. The daily harassment of people, the religious intolerance symbolized by the “Sunday Ban,” the nonrenewal of leases, and the rampant discrimination in the public service left a deep wound in the Indo-Fijian psyche. The sense of rejection and humiliation was deep—just how deep would become clear a few years later. I think I misjudged the depth of the hurt. The 1999 general elections were the first time that Sitiveni Rabuka had to seek Indo-Fijian support to govern. Under the 1990 Constitution, which was completely race-based, he only had to court the Fijian electorate, but there were twenty-five “Open” (that is, nonracial) seats under the 1997 Constitution (B Lal 1997).

The Indo-Fijians rejected his overtures for partnership in opening a new chapter in Fiji’s political evolution. All his achievements in helping give Fiji the most liberal constitution it ever had counted for little. I campaigned vigorously throughout the country for the Rabuka-Reddy coalition parties, explaining the contents of the new constitution, why it needed to be given time to prove its worth, and how it was paving the way for a new future for Fiji away from its preoccupation with the politics of race. To be sure, there were good reasons why the Rabuka government was unpopular: his administration was riddled with corruption, mismanagement, and scandals that nearly drove the country to the brink of bankruptcy. Politics of patronage were the order of the day. A new era was beckoning, I argued, but all this fell on deaf ears; the electorate wanted revenge and retribution. Rabuka had done something terribly wrong and he could not go unpunished. Mahendra Chaudhry, the Labour leader, understood the Indian psychology well and exploited it adeptly for his own purposes, even though it was his support that enabled Sitiveni Rabuka to become prime minister in 1992 in the first place. But, sadly, defeating Rabuka turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory for Chaudhry.

The 1987 coup sent an important message to the Indo-Fijian commu-
nity. As Rabuka said at the time, they could live in Fiji and make as much money as they wanted, but they should never aspire to political power, which should always remain in Fijian hands (Dean and Ritova 1988). The Indo-Fijian community was caught in a cul-de-sac. With very little to fall back on—the land leases were expiring at a rapid rate, discrimination was rampant in the public sector—many Indo-Fijians began to contemplate migration, which had started in earnest soon after the May military takeover. A trickle turned into a torrent. Precise figures are understandably uncertain, but a conservative estimate would put the numbers of those who left after the first coup at over 120,000. As a result, the proportion of the total population constituted by Indo-Fijians has declined from around 49 percent in 1987 to around 33 percent now. And the decline will continue well into the future through a continuously falling birthrate and unceasing migration (Chetty and Prasad 1993).

This huge demographic transformation is full of important implications. To start with, the fear of “Indian domination” that so plagued the dynamics of Fiji politics since the end of the Second World War, when the Indo-Fijians for the first time exceeded the indigenous Fijians, has gone forever. You can feel this in the texture and tenor of ordinary conversations with Fijians who know it in their hearts that Fiji is once again “their country.” This transformation has demonstrated the potential for the reconfiguration of Fiji politics. It has, for instance, opened up more space for democratic debate among Fijians about such sensitive topics as chiefly titles and inheritance in ways that would have been unimaginable during the reign of paramount chiefs in the early years of independence. In the 1990s, there was a proliferation of Fijian political parties, each with its own specific agenda, which opened up and reenergized the discussion of intra-Fijian issues (Durutalo 2000). The carefully nurtured artifact of “Fijian unity” was visibly fractured, both by the departure from the political stage of paramount chiefs who had once wielded overarching, unifying influence over their people and by the disappearance of traditional gatekeepers of knowledge and information by the advent of modern technology, including radio, television, the Internet, and the visual and print media. Fragmentation is going to be the future order of the day. “Race” has lost its edge in ordinary conversation and behavior.

Most of those who left the country were people of talent and education whose skills were in great demand overseas, especially in Australia and New Zealand: doctors, nurses, accountants, science teachers, mechanics, and businessmen. The best and the brightest have left, are leaving, or will
leave; on this there is general consensus. Among the migrants are members of my own family: three brothers in Brisbane, a sister in Darwin, and nieces, nephews, and cousins scattered across the globe. Those who remain in Fiji do so for reasons of business, lifestyle, or enduring commitment, but they have their families and their investments safely “parked” elsewhere (the word is theirs, not mine). Some who are overseas talk of retiring “back home,” but few so far have taken the opportunity, now on offer, of becoming permanent residents or citizens. They are keeping their options open—once bitten, twice shy. Among those leaving are people who in the normal course of events might have been expected to take a more moderate, longer-term view of the future. Their departure affected the power base of the National Federation Party, playing an important part in its downfall in the 1999 elections (B Lal 2010). Those who remained and who could not leave—unskilled workers, farmers, the elderly—had nothing to lose by demanding the sky and fell prey to the demagoguery and vaguely emancipating, empowering rhetoric of the Fiji Labour Party. Among those left in Fiji are the desperately poor with few hopes and little opportunity. They will continue to be vulnerable to the entreaties of opportunistic politicians preying on the needs and aspirations of the truly desperate. And the young will continue to migrate through family sponsorships, arranged marriages, or other means. Many are taking courses at tertiary institutions in the hope of improving their chances in the migration stakes.

The creation of the Fijian diaspora in Australia and New Zealand, in particular, is an important recent social phenomenon. We are not talking about “migrant communities” in the old sense of a rupture of a more or less permanent kind. They might more accurately be described as “transmigrant” communities whose links with their former homelands are never severed but nurtured in a variety of novel ways. People maintain contact with friends and family back home through the Internet (e-mails, Facebook), through regular telephone conversations (via Skype), and through periodic visits. Air travel is not as prohibitively expensive as it once was, and physical proximity helps: Australia and New Zealand are just a few hours away by plane. People help with scholarships, refurbishment of temples and schools, medical supplies, and relief efforts during the natural calamities that visit Fiji with mundane regularity every year. Clusters form around places of origin in Fiji (Ba, Labasa) or around religious or cultural affiliation (Sangam, Muslim League, Sanatan Dharam, and Arya Samaj) to provide more targeted assistance in times of need. This sort of contribution is difficult to measure, but it is real and it is increasing. The
principle of gift giving is as much a part of this modern situation as it is of “traditional” societies much studied by anthropologists.

Many migrants left Fiji in emotionally difficult circumstances, giving up secure jobs that once held the prospect of promotion and permanency, selling homes and other property for a fraction of their normal price, rupturing relations built over generations, taking a journey into the unknown from which they knew there would be no return. The pain of dislocation is real, if ever fully expressed. Understandably, their attitude toward those whose policies led to their displacement in the first place is suffused with a mixture of bitterness and deep anger. Many became strong supporters of the Fiji Labour Party and vocal critics of the more moderate and consensus-building strategies of its opponent, the National Federation Party. Jai Ram Reddy’s plea to make a fresh start, to let bygones be bygones, fell on deaf ears. Labour’s red-hot, punitive rhetoric was more to their liking. It came as little surprise that many Indo-Fijian residents in Australia and New Zealand also became vocal supporters of Frank Bainimarama’s December 2006 coup for a variety of motives, not the least of which was revenge. Fijians had caused a lot of misery for Indo-Fijians in the past, enthusiastically endorsing the nationalist rhetoric of previous coups. Now it was time for them to “taste their own medicine,” as the phrase goes in Fiji. Many are reluctant to believe anything but a positive narrative of the ongoing Fijian saga—that whatever the present state of affairs, Bainimarama will come good in the end. He therefore needs support, not opposition. Angered by my opposition to the latest coup, some Indo-Fijians in Sydney petitioned my vice-chancellor, Ian Chubb, to fire me from the Australian National University for my publicly aired and widely disseminated views.

While migration was proceeding apace, other developments in the 1980s and 1990s aided the alienation of the Indo-Fijian community in Fiji. Among them were the Rabuka government’s avowedly pro-Fijian policies, especially during its first term, when Rabuka seemed overtly indifferent to the concerns of the Indo-Fijians. He allocated government funds to enable Fijian landowning units to purchase freehold land on the market but appeared to do little to address the anxieties of Indo-Fijian tenants evicted from expiring leases. Scandals rocked the government. The economic rationalist policies of Finance Minister Jim Ah Koy affected all workers, Fijian and Indo-Fijian alike, especially at the lower levels. Jobs were lost and unemployment lines lengthened. The man who had committed the coup was now embarking on a course that was compounding Indo-Fijian misery.
The expiration of the thirty-year agricultural leases under the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act in the 1990s caused havoc in the Indo-Fijian farming community (P Lal 2009). Leases were not renewed partly because Fijian lanowners themselves wanted to enter the industry in which until then they had been bystanders. But land was power, too: Fijian power. Around 85% of the land was owned in inalienable right by Fijians. People like Marika Qarikau, the Fijian nationalist manager of the Native Land Trust Board, realized this early and used land as a blunt instrument to extract maximum political concessions from the Indo-Fijians. Tenancies would be renewed, the message went out, if Indo-Fijians accepted the principle of Fijian political control. The threat of nonrenewal of leases came at a particularly inopportune time for struggling farmers: the ancient milling structures were collapsing, husbandry practices had deteriorated, tonnage per acre produced was low, and the preferential access to the European Union under the Lomé Agreement was about to expire. It was always in the nature of the leases that they would end one day, and the theoretical possibility was constantly in the back of growers’ minds. But when it finally eventuated, the reality was different. The experience of being uprooted after generations of living in a place, seeing one’s formerly productive farm revert to bush, and having to start afresh in a new occupation in a new place, often among complete strangers, was wrenching. It left many—including members of my own extended family—deeply traumatized and unforgiving of those whose policies had brought about their demise as cane growers.

Ironically, many positive things were happening in the country concurrently, the most important being the review of the racially lopsided 1990 Constitution, which Rabuka, along with Jai Ram Reddy, had played a genuinely important role in establishing. It was a courageous move, going against the grain of nationalist Fijian opinion, which was completely averse to any concession in the direction of political partnership with the Indo-Fijian community. The 1997 Constitution was a genuine improvement over its previous counterparts. There was limited but important movement in the direction of non-racialism. Race had been removed as a factor in affirmative action programs. The constitution had significant human rights provisions. Most importantly, the power-sharing arrangements of the constitution ensured that Indo-Fijians, if they won a sufficient number of seats in the House of Representatives, would as a matter of right, not charity, be entitled to an invitation into the cabinet. This is what the community had been struggling toward for nearly a century,
and the opportunity was now within its grasp. But constitutional reform counted for little in the countryside, which was emptying from the nonrenewal of leases, and in the mushrooming squatter settlements fringing the main urban centers of Fiji, where memories of deprivation and displacement were fresh and deep and the struggle for sustainable living getting more difficult by the day. The constitution won’t put food on the table, opportunistic politicians told the people, who believed them. Among them was a former university academic, now a senior academic administrator: Mahendra Chaudhry.

Chaudhry’s Fiji Labour Party was the clear beneficiary of the gradually growing reservoir of Indo-Fijian hurt and grievance (Fraenkel and Firth 2007). He won the 1999 general elections by annihilating his old enemy, the National Federation Party, which failed to win a single seat. Apart from anything else, the Indo-Fijian electorate was unforgiving of NFP’s embracing of Sitiveni Rabuka. Grudges run deep in the Indo-Fijian psyche. But after a year in office, the Chaudhry government was toppled in a quasi-military coup led by the improbably self-styled Fijian nationalist George Speight. It was a dark moment for Fiji, but darker still for the Indo-Fijian community, which saw, yet again, a government elected by them overturned by force. It did not matter that the causes of the Speight insurrection were complex and had more to do with intra-Fijian rivalries and struggles for power. The overthrow simply reinforced the feelings of rejection and marginalization already well entrenched in the broader narrative of the Indo-Fijian experience in the postcolonial period. Chaudhry’s fate might have been affected by his rather abrasive style (developed in the cauldron of Fiji’s combative trade union movement), his ill-advised confrontation with the media, and his untimely and reportedly unilateral pursuit of policies of land reform, which could have been postponed to more propitious times; but all this was ignored. For many, it was enough that a prime minister of Indo-Fijian descent had been overthrown. Chaudhry, it should be emphasized, was not the cause of George Speight’s insurrection, though he might have contributed to it unwittingly.

What followed made matters even worse, deepening Indo-Fijian disenchantment with the unfolding events. An interim administration was set up by the military and led by Laisenia Qarase, the merchant banker and former head of the Fiji Development Bank. This administration morphed into a new political party, the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL), which won the general elections in 2001 and remained in power until 2006. The tragedy was that Qarase in his first term had not learned the
lessons of Fiji's recent history. Everything he did repudiated the spirit of consensus building of the 1990s. He openly courted the Fijian nationalist fringe to remain in power (Fransen, Firth, and Lal 2009). Qarase gave the Fiji Labour Party ministerial portfolios of no significance, which Labour rightly refused, seeking Supreme Court ruling on the numerical composition of the multiparty cabinet. The fundamental thrust of his government's policy was to address the concerns and needs of the indigenous Fijian community to the exclusion of virtually everything else. His reading of the Fijian scene was as dated as it was blinkered, premised on the notion that the Fijians were the disadvantaged community needing special assistance, while Indo-Fijians were the well-to-do ones—this when every piece of objective, verifiable evidence showed that poverty and disadvantage paid no respect to ethnic boundaries but freely transgressed them; that, indeed, rural Indo-Fijians comprised some of the most disadvantaged groups in Fiji society (as shown in various studies by Wadan Narsey, eg, Narsey 2008). Qarase's "Fijian Blueprint" promised massive assistance for specifically Fijian projects. His education policies directed special assistance to Fijian-run schools but not to Indian-run schools, even though many of them in urban areas had more Fijian students than Indian. The overall narrative of the first Qarase government was Fijian empowerment and Indo-Fijian disempowerment.

After the 2006 elections, looking ahead at his last term in Parliament and with an eye on his place in history, Qarase tried to make amends for his past errant, explicitly race-based politics. He now honored the spirit of the power-sharing provisions of the 1997 Constitution by giving Labour nine senior ministries in his cabinet. Labour ministers in the cabinet felt that there was a genuine effort to make power sharing work. Qarase himself was, as he told me, full of praise for his Labour colleagues in the cabinet. The mood among Indo-Fijians, and in the country at large, was buoyant, filled with optimism that at long last Fiji might be turning the corner of racially divisive confrontational politics. But by then, Mahendra Chaudhry, the Labour leader, was completely disaffected. He thought, unlike most other people in Fiji, that the 2006 elections had been rigged. I thought at the time, as I covered the campaign and the weeklong voting, that there may have been inconsistencies here and there, but nothing that would have changed the outcome of the election. As party leader, he wanted to allocate portfolios to his ministers, and he wanted them to be accountable to him rather than to the prime minister as the Westminster convention requires. This was crude politics designed to destabilize the
multiparty government. When his ministers balked, punishing them in the name of party solidarity became Chaudhry’s prime concern, pursued relentlessly. At that point, the multiparty government was doomed.

Qarase did not help his cause by attempting to fulfill some of his controversial campaign promises, which could, and should, have been left for consideration later in the life of his government, if they were implemented at all. These included returning the ownership of the foreshore to the indigenous owners (the Qoliqoli Bill), which deeply angered developers, hoteliers, and non-Fijians generally; investigating the basis of land purchases in the nineteenth century with a view to returning illegally or fraudulently acquired lands to the traditional owners; and, most controversially, bypassing established judicial procedures to release from jail people convicted of coup-related crimes. The story is more complex than it is possible to discuss here, suffused with a variety of motives. None of the bills actually went before Parliament, but the damage to the government’s reputation for probity and fairness was significant, providing its critics with powerful ammunition. Among these critics was Commodore Frank Bainimarama, the head of the Fiji military. His wrath focused particularly on the use of the Compulsory Supervision Order to effect early release of prisoners convicted for their role in the mutiny in November 2000 in which several loyal soldiers lost their lives and that nearly claimed the life of Bainimarama himself. He was angry, too, at the prospect of facing a reduction in the size of the top-heavy military force recommended in a White Paper commissioned by the government. There were also issues surrounding the length and duration of Bainimarama’s contract. Deep personal animosity between military commander and prime minister did not help. For these and other reasons, Bainimarama unleashed his coup on 5 December 2006.

Fijian anger at the overthrow of a Fijian government, elected with overwhelming indigenous Fijian support, was understandable. No one had ever contemplated the possibility of a Fijian military confronting a Fijian government, or the unceremonious humbling and humiliation of the central institutions of Fijian society, the Great Council of Chiefs and the Methodist Church. The reaction of the Indo-Fijian community was revealing. In 1987 and in 2000, there had been immediate outrage: strikes were threatened or mounted, trade unions mobilized, international sanctions sought. But there was none of that in 2006. There were many reasons. To begin with, there was the nature of the 2006 coup itself. This must have been one of the most advertised coups in the history of the world, announced
several years before it actually materialized: a coup by hemorrhage. When the denouement finally came, it was received not so much with surprise as with relief that the deed was finally done. It was not a coup, Bainimarama said; it was a “Cleanup Campaign.” The catchphrase caught on; it resonated in the experience of many who had witnessed or been victims of burgeoning bribery and corruption in Fiji. “Baksheesh” (payment to expedite service) was fast becoming a way of life in the country. Reports of government largesse being channeled to constituents for political, vote-buying purposes were well known. Many genuinely believed that Bainimarama meant business when he promised to halt the looting of the public purse for political purposes.

A new dimension to Indo-Fijian thinking was added in January 2007 when Labour leader Mahendra Chaudhry joined the military administration as its finance minister. Many in Fiji believe that Chaudhry was in on the game from the very beginning, a charge he denies vehemently, and for which he must be taken at his word. Nonetheless, throughout the steadily building crisis, Chaudhry was quietly seeking audience with Bainimarama after hours, keeping his powder dry, keeping abreast of the latest developments, and taking every opportunity to criticize the Qarase government and his own ministers in it. Perhaps, like Bainimarama, Chaudhry too was haunted by a past that had denied him his just due, and he was determined not to forgive his enemies. Chaudhry was the leader of the Indo-Fijian community and many, for that reason alone, followed his lead. There were other Indo-Fijian leaders—like those of the National Federation Party, for instance—who opposed the coup, but theirs was a minority voice. Perhaps Chaudhry thought he might be able to use his vast political experience to steer the novices in the military regime in a desirable direction, the tail that might wag the dog, but in this view he was seriously mistaken. A year later, he was unceremoniously dumped from the military cabinet, but by then the damage brought about by his involvement had been done. Chaudhry's participation had given the military regime a certain cloak of much-needed legitimacy at a time when it mattered most. Bainimarama had been able to buy valuable time to consolidate power and fend off criticism at home and from abroad. Chaudhry now finds himself hobbled on the margins, taking occasional potshots at various government policies from his website. His once strongly organized community is similarly disabled.

The Indo-Fijian business community switched sides in quick time, which comes as no surprise. When the coup took place, many were heard to say
that the country would bounce back to normalcy within six months. It did not, which forced them to take a longer-term view of things, including the need to court elements of the military. Some supported the new regime because of their experience with corruption in the previous administrations, but for many, making money was their main priority, the end that could justify any means. The authoritarian environment suited their purpose. Some are known to have direct access to the members of the shadowy Military Council. The commitment of the business community to Fiji is suspect. It has been so for a while. Many have moved their nest eggs safely elsewhere, to Australia and New Zealand, where many also have permanent residence. Businessmen with conscience and commitment have been rare in Fiji.

More surprising has been the reaction of the Indo-Fijian moral community. After the obligatory disapproving tones, many Indo-Fijian religious leaders quickly fell in line. The head of the largest Hindu organization in Fiji, the Sanatan Dharam Pritinidhi Sabha of Fiji, declared quiet support for the stated goals of the coup. The acting president of the Arya Samaj, the wife of a high court judge, joined the military administration's National Council for Building a Better Fiji and urged an understanding of the military regime's plans for Fiji. From western Viti Levu, Swani Maharaj, a perennially changeable politician and member of several political parties in the past, gave similar assurances of support. The South Indian cultural organization Sangam expressed opposition, while the Fiji Muslim League, whose leaders were close to the Qarase administration, maintained strategic silence. But the overall narrative was of compliance.

A part of the reason for the support was pragmatic. There were personal business interests to consider. The regime in power had to be courted to receive special grants and other favors for schools and community projects, because it looked likely that the regime would remain in power for longer than originally thought. But other important reasons for supporting the regime were grievance and grudge. People remembered the excesses of the Sunday Ban of the late 1980s, the mindless acts of religious vandalism, and the burning of mosques and temples and other places of worship with the support of the leaders of the Methodist Church—the Reverend Tomasi Raikivi, the Reverend Manasa Lasaro, and the Reverend Viliame Gonelevu, to mention just three. For this reason, many welcomed Bainimarama's punitive approach toward the Methodist Church leaders. It was the same with the humiliating and humiliation of the Great Council of Chiefs, which had supported coups in the past and which many thought
was anachronistic in the modern era. Why should this body alone decide who should be the president and vice president of Fiji?

In the past, academics and tertiary students played a prominent role in rallying public opinion against the coups, but now, with one or two notable exceptions, they took a backseat. In the early days, many of them were seduced by the “Cleanup Campaign” message, their strategic silence quietly encouraged by the leadership of these institutions of higher learning fearing reprisals, if nothing else. Many actually believed in the possibility of the Bainimarama coup being a good coup, a means to an end, the end being the creation of a better-governed, race-neutral society. They were prepared to give the new regime the benefit of the doubt over Laisenia Qarase and Mahendra Chaudhry, two old practitioners of race-based politics. A focus on personalities detracted the fundamental principles at stake: a military coup had deposed a democratically elected government. Qarase and Chaudhry might fall under the proverbial bus tomorrow, but the sanctity of the ballot box must be guarded at all times. Others offered old, tired, extra-constitutional justifications, such as the need sometimes to go outside the law to protect it. Students took their cue from their teachers. Their apparent indifference and apathy was dismaying, their involvement in the great issues of governance almost nonexistent. Perhaps many were simply focused on acquiring the right qualifications to emigrate. Others saw opportunities for themselves and thought it undesirable to “rock the boat.” Edward Said’s words are apposite: “You do not want to appear too political; you are afraid of seeming controversial; you need the approval of a boss or an authority figure; you want to have a reputation for being balanced, objective, moderate; your hope is to be asked back, to consult, to be on a board or prestigious committee, and so remain within the responsible mainstream; someday you hope to get an honorary degree, a big prize, perhaps even an ambassadorship” (1994, 160–161). Said also wrote, “If anything can denature, neutralize, and finally kill a passionate intellectual life it is the internalization of such habits” (1994, 74).

Unexpected support for the coup came from Fiji’s émigré community, particularly from retired Indo-Fijian expatriates. Many had left Fiji, or had been forced to leave it, in singularly unfortunate circumstances in the late 1980s; some were summarily dismissed for suspected harboring of pro-coalition sympathies. Now in their retirement, they wanted to return to help set things right, to make Fiji a true, nonracial democracy, albeit while receiving exorbitant consultants’ salaries, almost obscene by local standards. Some were clearly opportunistic, yearning for a brief moment
in the sun before the inevitable twilight. But there were also among them technocratic ideologues with little confidence in the institutions and practices of electoral politics to deliver desired outcomes. They had no time for wicked politicians who played the race card to win elections. Voters could not be trusted to know what was in their own best interests. Elections were problematic, low voter turnout endemic in developing countries, corruption and scandals rampant, and alienation of people from the processes of governance growing, leading to the conclusion that democracy may not be the most appropriate form of government for all societies. They therefore threw their weight behind the so-called “Peoples Charter,” a document full of motherhood statements lifted straight from a Good Governance 101 course, to put the country onto autopilot, leaving elected politicians only to dot the i’s and cross the t’s. The charter has now become the military regime’s roadmap, its foundational document, but it is honored more in the breach as the regime tramples on principles of natural justice and basic human rights in order to entrench itself. Charter supporters are caught in a bind: they can neither condone the excesses of the regime that their participation helped to legitimize nor condemn it outright. Like most Indo-Fijians, they too are caught in a cul-de-sac.

Some responses are easily categorized, but others are not. Many Indo-Fijians, perhaps the majority, have no view either way. Their standard of life has not changed much at all since 2006; quite the contrary, they live precariously on the charity and sufferance of others. People who have endured enough upheaval in their lives for the last two decades hope that this too will pass soon so that they can get on with their lives. It is resignation borne not of indifference or fatalism but of experience of an endless cycle of promises made and broken. I should at this point declare my own hand. I have been a strong opponent of military coups in Fiji. I was as opposed to them in 1987 as I was in 2006. For me, there is something deeply immoral (quite apart from being illegal) about overturning the verdict of the ballot box with the bayonet. The history of the world shows that coups don’t solve problems, they merely compound them. Violence as an instrument of policy is always counterproductive. And I believe deeply that the intellectual classes (but not they alone) have the sacred responsibility to speak truth to power. If we don’t, who will? I did that in my own small way, speaking and writing against coups and their consequences for Fiji, and I have paid the price. I was interrogated by the military in November 2009 and expelled from the country, the land of my birth. I have no rancor or bitterness; if that is the price that had to be paid for
standing up for the values of democracy and the rule of law, then I am glad I paid it.

Five years after the 2006 coup, the Indo-Fijian community, diminished and demoralized, is caught between a rock and a hard place. The rhetoric providing the initial justification for the coup rings hollow now. The "Cleanup Campaign" has yielded few results except more embarrassment for the military regime and its bungling Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (headed by a serving military officer). Like the Qarase administration, the military regime too has used the Compulsory Supervision Order to effect early release from prison of people convicted for various coup-related crimes, including manslaughter of civilians, thus denting its claims of moral superiority over the regime it deposed. It is now clear that the military will only countenance a new political order in which it has a visible and permanent presence. A militarized democracy is in the offing. Burma as a comparison comes to mind. There are many Indo-Fijians who, having supported the coup thus far, feel that there can be no turning back. They have burned their bridges with the Fijian community. They know that they are seen by others, fairly or unfairly, as aiding and abetting the coup through various acts of omission or commission. If the coup fails, they know they are done for, and so out of desperate necessity they back Bainimarama because they know that he is the only one who stands between them and anarchy. Indeed, some are beginning to embrace him as their real leader, rather than Mahendra Chaudhry or anyone else.

The impulses underlying this kind of thinking are understandable but wrongheaded and in truth counterproductive. Rhetoric of non-racialism aside, the Bainimarama coup is morphing into a "Fijian" coup as many Fijians take up opportunities left by the departing Indo-Fijians and as province after province lines up to "apologize" to Bainimarama for opposing his regime. The presence in the interim administration of such notable former coup supporters and members of the hard-line Taukei Movement as Inoke Kubuabola and Filipe Bole is reassuring to them. Bainimarama has vowed not to allow 1987-era politicians to stand for elections in the future and yet has rewarded two of them with senior positions in his administration. There is talk of nonracial equality, but not a word has been said about opening up the almost racially exclusive military to non-Fijians. The ethnic imbalance in the public sector is glaring. Military personnel increasingly take up senior civilian positions. Commodore Bainimarama promises to address the perennial land-lease problem by making available unused Fijian land on ninety-nine year leases for agricultural pur-
poses. It sounds an attractive proposition on paper, but it is like locking the gate after the horse has already bolted. The sugar industry is dying and no amount of artificial resuscitation will revive it. Places in northern Vanua Levu—Wainikoro, Lagalaga, Naqiqi, Coqeloa—are emptying at a depressingly rapid rate as people move into the congested squatter settlements, principally in the Suva-Nausori corridor where an estimated one third of the total population now lives, often in wretched conditions. Yet those displaced from the farming country say they will never return to the perpetual uncertainties of the past. The umbilical cord is severed for good. Many are contemplating an overseas future for their children.

For the Indo-Fijians, as indeed for Fiji as a whole, the last forty years have been a time of frustration and bewilderment, the promise of independence having gone awry. A large part of the problem lay with the architecture of the independence political order itself. It was constructed on the pillars of ethnic compartmentalization, while, with time and with the advent of new forces of change, “race” largely lost its relevance in daily life to all but the leaders who continued to embrace it as “a fact of life.” When power was finally wrested from the ruling elite at the ballot box, the military was unleashed to win it back. In a strange twist of irony, the military, which was nurtured as the ultimate bastion of power for the Fijian establishment, returned in 2006 to destroy its very foundations. It now looks unlikely that it will ever completely disappear from the political scene. Power concedes nothing without a struggle, and once out, soldiers do not voluntarily return to the barracks. The intense and deeply felt debates over the last forty years about strengthening the institutions of parliamentary democracy—electoral systems, political parties, constitutional protection of rights, institutional mechanisms for strengthening the participation of citizens in the governance of the country—seem in the end to have been a wasted effort. There is poignant irony in the fact that a community committed broadly to a nonviolent, Gandhian approach to politics, and that itself had been a victim of coups in the past, now endorses, however indirectly or tangentially, violence as an instrument of public policy in the desperate hope of a better outcome.

The Indo-Fijian community itself has changed almost beyond recognition in the last forty years. The self-contained, self-sustaining rural community built around the sugar industry is uprooted and adrift. The settlements in the cane areas that once hummed with life—local sports competitions, festivals, and festivities—now look empty and forlorn. The land has ceased to be the sole source of livelihood for most families, includ-
ing my own. Villages are now essentially residential sites. There is a deep yearning among most young people still stranded in rural areas to leave for someplace else. The rapid transformation of the rural scene is eroding a culture and a way of life that once formed the bedrock of Indo-Fijian society and provided a direct link to its foundational past. Cut from its cultural moorings, with declining support and sustenance from its roots, the community is vulnerable, much more at the mercy of forces of change beyond its control. It is, in truth, living on the sufferance of others. In the early 1970s, migration would have appeared a very distant prospect for most Indo-Fijians. It was something that only the wealthy and the well connected might contemplate. It is a daily occurrence now, uppermost in the minds of most people, if not for themselves then certainly for their children. The community is emotionally uprooted. It is often said with some truth that there is hardly a single Indo-Fijian family in Fiji that does not have at least one member abroad. The emotional center of gravity has shifted. Perhaps in time, “From Immigration to Emigration” will become the dominant narrative in the overall experience of the Indo-Fijian community, its Fiji sojourn a momentary stopover in the life of a people condemned by fate to scatter around the world. But by then, people of my generation will have moved on. In the words of John Dryden:

Not Heav’n itself upon the past
Has pow’r:
But what has been has been, and I
Have had my hour

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Abstract

Fiji’s postcolonial journey has been fraught. The promise of prosperity and political stability, high at the time of independence in 1970, dissipated soon afterward as the politics of ethnicity came to the fore and as disagreements developed among indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians about the nature and direction of public policy. A military coup in 1987 removed a democratically elected government, but instead of ensuring the entrenchment of Fijian political control, it unleashed forces whose ultimate effect was the undermining of Fijian political unity. Commodore Frank Bainimarama’s coup in 2006 removed from power an indigenous Fijian-led government, promising in the process to overturn the assumptions and understandings about power sharing that underpinned the understandings and assumptions that were embedded in the Independence constitution and to lead the country towards a non-racial future. The reaction to the latest coup from Fiji’s different communities remains a matter of intense debate in the country.

Keywords: Fiji, independence, military coup, land problems, emigration, Fijian diaspora, constitution making
TWENTIETH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 21947 WARRANT OFFICER CLASS ONE FESIKATOA RAVAI

Warrant Officer Class One Ravai, after having being duly sworn under solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Warrant Officer Class 1 Ravai, when did you join 1MS?
A: I joined 1MS since it started in 1987.

Q2: Were you involved in the planning of the events that took place on the 19th of May?
A: I know nothing about it.

Q3: When were you first made aware of 1MS going down to take over the Parliament Complex?
A: Sir, I am not aware of anything.

Q4: The other question is, you went down with the initial group for the take over on the 19th of May? Is that correct?
A: I moved on the orders of the officer in command.

Q5: Who was the officer in command?
A: Lt. Baleinamau, Sir.

Q6: What was his directions to you?
A: I was the duty officer on the night of Thursday, 18th May. At about 3 a.m. on Friday morning I received a call from Col. Tarakinikini asking me the whereabouts of our operation officer WOI Baimol. I told him that he was off duty and I was the duty officer in the complex. He told me to relay the message to Baimol to ring him before 8 o'clock on Friday morning. The message was relayed at 6 o'clock in the morning to WOI Baimol. There was only a few of us holding the complex security, myself and a few senior NCOs and a few from other ranks because our boys were on training outside.

On the morning of Friday when we were just about to have tea at approximately 8.30 a.m. to 9.00 a.m. We were having tea when the boys arrived from training when our officer in command came and ordered us to change into civilian clothes within 15 minutes and report immediately to the Lecture Room. We were going to go on an exercise outside.
Q7: Can you tell us what was said in the brief? What time was this brief?
A: 15 minutes was allocated to us to go and change and go into the brief room. As the boys entered the brief room, myself and the clerk, I left the brief room to go to the orderly room to write my report. I came back after sometimes, that is when my officer in command had already briefed the men and they have started walking out. They were moving out and as I was just about to enter the brief room he called me and ordered me to go with the team. I asked what exercise, the exercise of VIP protection and area security in relation to the march that was going to take place in Suva that Friday. This is an exercise we have been learning through the past weeks which has been lectured by Mr. Baleinamau and Mr. Bainimoli on the daily training of the troops.

Q8: When I refer to the complex that means the Parliament Complex, when I refer to the Unit that means the Unit back at QEB because we refer to both as the complex. After work, where did you go? The team was going out and you were coming in. You were ordered by Lt. Baleinamau to join the team to go down.
A: We went down the track to Sukanaivalu Road.

Q9: Was there a vehicle waiting for you there?
A: A van.

Q10: Is it like the minibus that travels between Suva and Nausori.
A: Yes, similar type.

Q11: Did you get into the van?
A: Yes.

Q12: Can you give us an indication as to those who went into the van?
A: Some of the boys whom I cannot recall their names. I can remember Vosare and for the rest of the members, I am confused.

Q13: Did Baleinamau go with you?
A: No, as we walked out I did not see him because he was still at the QEB.

Q14: Was Lt. Tuivanuavou with you in the van?
A: I did not see him in the morning.

Q15: Was it the mini-bus or the twin cab that you catch?
A: It was a mini-bus slightly smaller than our mini-bus, I would say it was a van.
Q16: When you left, who was in the van? Was it all the IMS team or was there any civilians?
A: I did not see any civilians.

Q17: When you left, where did you go to?
A: We went to the Maritime.

Q18: Who was at the maritime?
A: My Director was there.

Q19: Was there any civilians there?
A: Yes, some civilians were standing there but I do not know them.

Q20: You came to know them later on. Did you know them now?
A: I cannot remember them, there were only a few.

Q21: When you were at the maritime did any other vehicles from the unit back at QEB come down?
A: I cannot remember the vehicle that came down because we stayed there for only a short time.

Q22: When you came down there, did you meet the Director, Major Ligairi. From there, you left towards the Parliament Complex, how many vehicles left from there?
A: I only know of our vehicle.

Q23: Were you a member of that group that initially went down to Parliament for the take over?
A: As we were told, we were just to provide security. The actual activations was done by a different team. They were the field operative officers. We were just to provide security.

Q24: So, when you went down to the Parliament Complex, what did you do there? You said you went to provide security, where did you provide it?
A: Just around the area; the passage, gates etc.

Q25: Who was the leader of one team?
A: I was just a member of the team.

Q26: Mr. Ravai, the information that you gave we know most of them. After this we will go to the SB Branch, we have seen all the photos. You are the 49th person to come before us. Basically, we know what happened and those involved and we want to know your specific involvement. You have been
with the unit since 1987. You are not as dumb as you appear to be. You have been in the unit for so long. You are saying that you do not know who you met with. You are a Warrant Officer Class 1. We have just had a discussions with the Old Man and we have it on tapes. We have told the Old Man that you people are not willing to release information which is wrong. You have to understand your code of conduct and that is when you are caught on the military ground, you do not give information. This is a different story. This is within the force and there is only one person who can give that authority which is our overall boss, Commander RFMF. That authority has been given. We have interviewed Major Ligairi and he came up with everything. In your interview, you do not know who was the head of the team. You must know who is the head of the team. Who was the head of your team? You have been in the unit for that long.

Because the way things goes it is the field operative team with the field officers. Myself and our guys in the complex, our work is to provide security.

Q27: You have an operation team but you were part of the security team. Who went in your vehicle with you?
A: Alex Alava and Vosavere.

Q28: Alava and Vosavere; who else was in your team?
A: Saukuru.

Q29: When you went to the complex, what were you securing?
A: To secure the surrounding of the complex, from the main gate and it also covered the passage way around the Chambers.

Q30: So, you were at the front gate. Who led the operation team that went in?
A: The Operation team was our field operative officers.

Q31: Who was in command of the Operation team?
A: Tikotani but I do not know who was in command at the time because their work is separate.

Q32: Who were the members of this team?
A: Baleinamau, Bainimoli, Alava, Tikotani and Buadromo. These are all field operation officers. They only reported to Mr. Baleinamau and Mr Ben Naduaniwai and some field operation officers from the Western side; Sgt. Lawalau and Dawai.

Q33: The operation officer is Bainimoli?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q34: What was your job in the Parliament Complex?
A: I am the SSM of the 1FMS and therefore my duties include being the Welfare Officer of the men in the Complex.

Q35: Who rostered all the duties and security within the complex?
A: The security side was looked after by our senior sergeant, Staff Ravulo and Sgt. Celesiga.

Q36: Did you at any time give any of the briefs for the situation and security brief to the 1MS personnel?
A: I asked one sergeant on Sunday that who gave the order to him to move to the complex? He told me that Col. Tarakinikini came down and briefed another group of boys in the complex. That was after the Commander had spoken. He quoted to me that Col. Tarakinikini said “go to the complex and hold that area as long as you can”. What happen after, do not worry about it. He told me so many times.

Q37: Who is that Sergeant?
A: Sgt. Tony Celesiga

Q38: Sgt. Celesiga told you of the briefing by Col. Tarakinikini to a group of 1MS at the unit to go down.
A: Yes, at the QEB.

Q39: Did you at any time go with any of the group and operated outside the complex?
A: I only stayed in the complex and did not go out any time.

Q40: Were you involve in any of the planning for the operation of 1MS personnel outside the complex all over Fiji, Levuka or anywhere else?
A: There was not a time when I was involved in any of the discussion whatsoever.

Q41: Did you at any time enter the operation room in the complex?
A: No. The operation room is out of bound to us. It is only allowed to certain people.

Q42: Who was looking after the operation?
A: Dakai and his team.

Q43: Who were the members of the operation team?
A: The military personnel I know of is Mr. Dakai, Gaunavouivuda and Vosabecei.
Q44: Who were the IMS authorised to go into the operation room?
A: Vosavere, Ben Naduaniwai, I do not know how many came from Mr. Gun and his group.

Q45: Who were the members of the IMS in that group?
A: Tikotani, Ben Naduaniwai, Alava and Buadromo.

Q46: Were they also operating inside there?
A: Yes, Buadromo I did not see him in the few days that I came. I only met him at the QEB complex.

Q47: Did you meet him at the Parliament Complex?
A: He was in the operation team and separated from us.

Q48: When did you leave the Parliament Complex?
A: Sometimes around the 27th of June. I left for a reason because I was not a betrayal to the army, I was a loyal person to the army. There was a confrontation between the IFMS personnel in the complex and my comrades at the camp. I was not happy with that so I left. That time our legal officer, Col. Caucau has already told us to sign leave. Our leave balance was brought up and we were asked to sign leave and proceed through the normal procedure. My balance of leave was 96 days. Whilst in there, I applied for my leave when I was working out of the complex. I was not a traitor to the army. There was no time that I left the complex until 27th June. I continued my leave and would not exceed the 96 days and when the crisis is finished I will go back to work. That was the reason for my walking out, my loyalty to the army.

Q49: When did you come back to camp?
A: I was at home, as I said when the crisis is going to finish then I will return to camp. I heard the news on a Friday that there was a new Government. I rang my clerk and told him that I would be at home and if anything happens, give me a call. Before that, on Thursday afternoon, I rang my clerk and told him if there was an urgent message and for him to call me I would attend to it. Later on I came to know that we were supposed to come back and attend Commander's brief to us on Friday morning at 1800 hours. I did not know anything about that message.

After that, the clerk just joined the rest of the group and have a grog session. On Saturday morning the 17th, Mr. Frank Aisake rang me home and said that they wanted to take me to the camp. That was the time when I called Mr. Stevens because by then Mr. Baleinama was suspended and Mr. Stevens was the OC. I told him that I did not receive the message that I was to attend
the briefing. Our on-call system at the RIFM, any urgent message or with any family problems even for those guys in the middle east, there is a vehicle to go and relay that. I rang Col. Tuatoko and explained to him the situation I was in and he said to give my number, he would call me later. I rang again to Col. Tarakinikini. After 45 minutes Col. Tuatoko rang and told me that I have to come to work on Monday in uniform and report to my new OC which is Major Sorby. In the afternoon of Saturday, I called Mr. Sorby to explain the same situation and the reason I did not come because I did not know anything. His wife told me that he was out and early Sunday morning, around breakfast time, I called him again and told him the reason I did not come to attend the briefing. He told me to come on Monday and report to the office. On Sunday about 5 o’clock, 3FIR soldiers arrived and told me to come with them.

Q50: Sgt-Major Ravai, what was your system of taking and returning weapons?
A: Anyone removing weapons from the room will have to sign for it. It will be issued by the storeman or our group of storemen known by the squadron to be issuing officers. But the knowledge have to be known by the officer command, OC or if none of those, a senior officer with the seniority in rank.

Q51: Who was responsible for issuing in the Parliament Complex?
A: The storeman?

Q52: Who was that?
A: Bukasila.

Q53: Was this system practised in the Parliament Complex?
A: Yes, he did the same system.

Q54: Do you know or are you aware of the weapons that were taken out of the unit during the initial take over? Were you aware of it or were you involve in it?
A: I am not aware of any weapons that were removed on Friday.

Q55: Did you later receive extra weapons from your Unit?
A: Some members arrived later, members with specialised skills. Any member that goes, goes with his kit.

Q56: Did they come with the kit?
A: No, Sir. The kit bag is the only staff ration and that includes our black bags.

Q57: Who were members of this specialist skills team?
A: The members that have arrived later were Sgt. Naika and Sgt. Celeasiga.
Q58: Who usually conducted the briefing at the Parliament Complex?
A: Major Ligairi.

Q59: There was an ultimatum put out by Commander, RFMF that all soldiers who were in the Parliament Complex to return back to camp.
A: We heard it on the radio and I told the boys that we have to adhere to this message but we await the result of the conversation of the IFMS Director with the Ops Centre at QEB.

Q60: There were incidents where civilians went down; one was the damaging of the TV station. The allegations was that the mobs were escorted by armed members of 1MS. Are you aware of that?
A: I learned of it afterwards that there was a group that went down and they came back.

Q61: Were civilians carrying weapons in the complex?
A: The ex soldiers. The civilians were told not to handle the weapons because they do not know how to use it.

Q62: How can you identify a TF or a reserve?
A: Some of them came and said that they were ex servicemen from the middle east and some from the Engineers.

Q63: Warrant Officer Ravai, on the morning of 19th May, you received a call from Col. Tarakinikini, how could you identify that the call came from Tarakinikini?
A: I asked who was calling and I was working with him for some years.

Q64: Sgt-Major Ravai, were you on duty on the night of Thursday the 18th?
A: I was the duty officer.

Q65: On that morning were you aware of any weapons that was moved from the complex? You were on duty on the 18th to the 19th. During your stint of duty, were any weapons taken out of the Unit?
A: No, I am not aware of any weapons that was taken out at that time.

Q66: What was the procedure of securing the weapons within the unit?
A: Any weapons removed from the armoury must be signed with the storeman or the armurer or any senior officer at the camp.

Q67: Where were the keys to the stores?
A: On the stores key rack.
Q68: Did any of the field operatives visit your unit?
A: I cannot remember.

Q69: Did your OC visit you that night, the night of Thursday, the 18th?
A: I was the duty officer but I cannot remember.

Q70: Did any of the field operatives visit your unit that night?
A: I cannot answer that.

Q71: You mentioned the situation that you were in and you were detained in the cell at QEB. Did you mention your situation when you spoke with the Land Force Commander and Lt. Col. Tarakiniki? Did you mention it to the Army legal corps?
A: When I came up, I told the MP if I could see Col. Caucau as I want to tell him of my situation. He told me that he would try his best to tell him.

Q72: Did any of the Army legal officer come to see you?
A: No.

Q73: When you were charged by the charge that you are now in was it read to you by the army personnel?
A: No, I was at QEB and they moved me to Nabua Police Station.

Q74: When did you know of the charge that you were charged with?
A: I was with the Police CID team. They were CID officers.

Q75: I will take you back to the 19th after the briefing by OC where you were told to exercise. Did you go straight into the van?
A: No, we walked down.

Q76: So, from the mini-bus you came down Sukanaivalu road, did some of the members get off the junction of Sukanaivalu road?
A: No, I do not know.

Q77: What about Cpl. Cakau?
A: When I left to Lebanon and came back, he was no longer in the unit.

Q78: On Saturday, 20th in the evening, you were at the Parliament Complex. Do you know Private Raivalu? Do you remember those 1MS that came to Parliament on the 20th in the Government vehicle?
A: I cannot remember that.
Q79: Sgt-Major Ravai, when you were tasked to go on a training exercise, to you, what did the whole operation mean? When you were going to Parliament for security duty, did you take that as a normal duty or as some other task?

A: As I have stated before when we conduct our exercise, there are daily programmes in the unit that include this similar exercise which is conducted by the operative members which is their leader, the OC and Mr. Bainimoli.

Q80: What was the indication you got after that exercise? Was it part of a long planned one? What was the indication when you went down that day? You were told to go down, does that normally happened in the unit as part of your training? Like you said this was an exercise; get on the vehicle, go down to Parliament, is that normal? Normally, when you go down for an exercise, you plan an exercise, you say what an exercise is, you are told in the exercise briefing what the exercise is and then you go for an exercise?

A: I cannot remember that. The time when our OC ordered us, he did not tell us right to the day it happened.

Q81: When you were on duty on the 19th, can you name some of the people that were with you?


Q82: Was Sgt. Vuki there with you on the 19th?

A: On Wednesday morning the 18th but Sgt. Vosabalavu was with me in the night and the morning.

Q83: This Sgt. Vuki that you are talking about, is it the same person who is your Quarter Master?

A: Yes.

Q84: Whilst in the Parliament Complex, did you at any time contact the soldiers that were at QEB by phone or some other means? Did you at any time when you were in the complex make contact with 1MS personnel at the QEB?

A: No, I have not made any contact with any of them.

Q85: Mr. Ravai, can you tell me whether there was any Sergeant Vuki with you on Thursday the 18th?

A: He applied for leave that day. He approached me because he wanted to take leave because of his family problem.

Q86: Did he go on leave on Thursday the 18th or before Thursday the 18th?

A: If I can go back to our record in the orderly room, I can confirm that.

Q87: Was Cpl. Gaunavinaka with you?
I cannot recall that. I humbly feel the whole situation that I have been betrayed by some of the members by the Army. The reason I say that whilst in Parliament we have been used and we do not know anything. We are just loyal soldiers receiving orders from senior officers. As I looked at some of the activities that happened which I mentioned here there was one night, that I was told that the plan was for Col. Vatu to take over Commander of RFMF but he was shaky and nervous and he - Col Tarakinikini will seek assistance by organising a group of soldiers from 3FIR to assist us in Parliament. I strongly believe that my loyalty to the Army and my appointment is SSM as events happened, my role as SSM to provide welfare. I put the scenario on a fire-fight situation and if I the SSM run away from the scene that is a coward act. A coward act is my disloyalty to my small unit. I want to say that I was involved because of my loyalty to my work. I have been strongly used by an unknown associated group, civilians or in the army and used my loyalty to be involved in this. I do not know anything. I am just a body with mind. I humbly request if the Army could assist and bail us out from the charges. As I looked at my loyalty and performance that also goes to the other soldiers I was with.

Q88: WOI Ravai, is it Wednesday, the 17th of May?
A: I am not sure it was late in the night, Tuesday the 17th or Friday the 19th.

Q89: Where was this meeting taking place?
A: It was just outside the operation room just on the steps between the Land Force Commander and the Pay office beside the Commander’s office.

Q90: You were outside the office talking with Tarakinikini and on the 23rd of May. Who called you in? Were you called in to attend the meeting?
A: I went to see OC. OC called me to see him.

Q91: OC told you to go and see Col. Tarakinikini?
A: Yes.

Q92: Can we confirm the dates again. Was it Tuesday midnight?
A: Yes.

Q93: Was this after the coup?
A: Yes.

Q94: How did you get into camp that night?
A: I was in camp.
Q95: You were in the office with the unit? From the unit you were told by OC to go and see Tarakinikini. You went up with OC, OC left and Col. Tarakinikini talked to you?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q96: This was on the 23rd of May. When did you actually go into Parliament? You said you went down with the initial group into Parliament on the 19th. You left Parliament in July.
A: I usually go up to get the ration.

Q97: All this time, you used to drive up to QEB, pick up the ration and drive back to Parliament.
A: The ration is provided by the storeman.

Q98: On this occasion when you drove to camp was there anyone else with you?
A: With Sgt. Celeasiga.

Q99: Sgt. Celeasiga was with you in the camp or was there anyone else?
A: He was the only one with me.

Q100: Were you arrested at any check-point?
A: At Vatuwaqa by the police.

Q101: What was inside the vehicle?
A: The food container plus the weapons to be taken to Nabua.

Q102: Where were you stopped, on your way to the Unit?
A: On my way to the Unit.

Q103: What weapon was being taken back?
A: MP5.

Q104: Another report was that the pistol was also taken?
A: Only MP5 plus the container, Sir.

Q105: The weapons when you took them back to camp, who did you hand it over to?
A: To the storeman.

Q106: Was that only one occasion when you put the weapon back? Was there any other time that you took the weapon back to the unit to be returned?
A: No, only once.
Q107: Can you recall who in particular you gave the weapons to at QEB?
A: The storeman.

Q108: You said you were taking hot box, did at any time cooked food have been taken from QEB to Parliament?
A: Yes.

Q109: Cooked food and fresh rations?
A: Yes. That is why I said that I believe the whole institution has been supportive of the actions. I am pleading with you that we do not know anything. I humbly request the army to assist us in the situation.

Q110: Were you promised any benefits when you spoke with Lt. Col. Tarakinikini?
A: No, Sir.

Q111: Was there any other such events after this? Did you meet again to discuss about these things?
A: No, Sir.

Q112: I just want to recap this, Tarakinikini said when he told you that you continue doing what you are doing at the Parliament Complex those were the words from Sgt. Celeasiga. What I am referring now is the meeting on the 23rd with Tarakinikini. He told you that Col. Vatu was supposed to take over as Commander in the RFMF. When he said that he will organise a platoon-size strength from the engineers and 3FIR to reinforce you?
A: Yes.

Q113: When he told you that Col. Vatu was going to take over from the Commander, did he say anyone to take over the Chief of Staff?
A: No, Sir.

Recalled on 9/900:

WOI Fesikatoa Ravai, after having been duly reminded of oath earlier taken, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q114: Ravai, since our last discussions, we have come to gather a lot more information. We have gone on to the 79th witness, five we have recalled. You will be the 84th person. We have visited some units in the Police Force and also spoke with the IMS people. What we want to do is to go through your statement again.
On Monday, the week of the coup, were you at the unit for the whole week?
A: I report daily to work, Sir.
Q115: Did you see any kit bags, or any weapons taken out from Monday to Friday?
A: No, I was present in camp but I did not see anything.

Q116: Where were you after lunch on Saturday, 20th May?
A: I was inside the complex.

Q117: On Saturday, 20th May, weapons were taken to the complex around midday? Did you see when the weapons were being brought in?
A: I did not know anything about it.

Q118: On Sunday morning, at about 9 to 10 o'clock did you see the weapons being unloaded also in the Parliament Complex?
A: I did not see anything.

Q119: On Monday, the week of the coup, did you attend any briefing by the OC or was it made known to you by the OC of the events that will take place on the 19th?
A: Do you mean the week before it?

Q120: Friday is the 19th, anytime during that week from Monday to that Friday, did you at anytime were given a brief or were you told about what was going to take place on the 19th?
A: No, Sir. I was just holding the office with the clerk. I was just working as normal providing sentry security in the complex.

Q121: Mr. Ravai, where were you on Thursday, 18th May?
A: I was on duty, Sir.

Q122: Were you aware of some weapons being taken out of your armoury that night?
A: No, Sir, our only weapons used were the ones for sentry duty inside the complex.

Q123: Was Cpl. Gaunavinaka on duty that day?
A: I cannot recall our members but I know I was with our clerk.

Q124: Did you see OC, Mr. Baleinamau that night?
A: It is very hard for me to recall it.

Q125: Were you aware that the weapons were taken out of the armoury on Thursday night?
A: No, Sir.
Q126: On Thursday 18th May, do you recall that there was a group training at Makuluva?
A: That was under Lt. Dakuliga.

Q127: You always have administrative runs every night? What time is this usually done?
A: They set their own programmes and they coordinate with their duty driver on standby.

Q128: Can you recall who was the duty driver that night?
A: It was Staff Vakadranu.

Q129: The present exercise that was conducted, we were told that this was a sea survival exercise but we also heard that they were being given hot box meals? Is this normal?
A: I do not know anything about how they conduct their exercise. I was just doing security in the complex and doing other clerical work.

Q130: On Thursday 18th May, you were on duty. Anything that stays in your unit and anything that goes out, you must know.
A: It is supposed to be reported to me.

Q131: The weapons were taken out on Thursday and moved in bags, were you aware of that?
A: I am not aware of that, Sir.

Q132: They were brought on Thursday night from there to here; pistols, MP5, ammunitions, magazines, they were put in sandbags.
A: I did not know anything about it, Sir.

Q133: Where were you that whole day? Did you ever leave the unit or were you inside there all the time?
A: I went to the mess during meal time and then I came back and continued my activity.

Q134: Can anyone come and take the key while you away?
A: The key is always in our store key rack and anyone can come and pick it from there. But I suppose to know that information.

Q135: When you draw weapons in the unit; Private A wants to draw weapons, Private B, the armourer is there, if he wants will the armourer open the armoury for him or he can just take the key himself? He just tell the armourer and take the key.
A: Sometimes he tells the armourer that he needs the weapons, and the armourer can give him the approval to go and do it or he will tell him to wait and he will do it himself.

Q136: Sometimes the armourer can give the key to draw weapons?
A: There is a duty storeman too.

Q137: Who was the duty storeman that day? Gaunavinaka was the armourer, the stand-in armourer, who was the duty storeman?
A: The duty storeman, because of the minimum number of man supposed to be our storeman, Sgt. Vuki. I am trying to recall because once when we spoke he said that he wanted to take leave that same week. I cannot say whether he was there because he might be on leave.

Q138: On that evening when the admin run came, who signed the RI?
A: The RI supposed to be the OC if it is an exercise and the storeman supposed to follow up the RI. If the run is closed, then he has to accompany the duty officer, the duty officer gives the approval of the extra run between the excercise.

Q139: Was there any authorisation sought from you that evening for the admin run? It is very hard for me to recall. The duty driver is the senior NCO and he coordinates with the OC. Once the exercise is activated, OC handles the situation and sometimes he opens the RI, it is just an exercise RI or exercise runs.

Q140: When you were on duty on Friday morning, who was supposed to relieve you?
A: That Friday morning, we were ready to do our weekend brief and change guards. The senior NCO supposed to hold the fort there.

Q141: Were you still at the unit when Mr. Dakuliga and his exercise team arrived from Makuluva?
A: I was there with the clerk preparing our breakfast.

Q142: Whilst you were there, were any weapons, taken out of the armoury?
A: No, while we were having breakfast, I saw them cleaning their weapons.

Q143: Just before the soldiers went to Parliament that morning, a blue pick-up van arrived in front of your unit and picked up some weapons, did you see that?
A: No, I did not see anything.
Q144: Did you see Mr. Jim Speight? Do you know him?
A: I did not know him and I did not see him.

Q145: Were the operatives present in the unit that morning?
A: I did not see anything from where I was that morning, I was in the office.

Q146: You have the main block and you have the OC’s office at the back, where were you located there?
A: I was in the changing block having tea and talking with the clerk.

Q147: The day your weapon was confiscated at Vatuwaqa, what was the reason for carrying your weapon?
A: I was told to return it to the armoury.

Q148: You were told that the firing pin was not working?
A: Yes.

Q149: I could not gather when the firing pin was not working why were you filling ammunitions. You had 90 rounds in it.
A: Those weapons anyone who signed for it have to cross it off from the armourer. Most of the weapons that were signed came with the whole operation equipment. So, anything that comes with that have to go back.

Q150: In the Parliament Complex, the night binoculars were used, what was the purpose of using night binoculars?
A: I do not know anything, Sir.

Q151: Do you know who has those night binoculars? Who was using it?
A: It was handled by the storeman so I do not know who he issued it to.

Q152: Mr. Ravai, whom did you hand-over duty to on Friday morning?
A: I was supposed to hand-over duties to the incoming officers, either Mr. Dakuliga, Mr. Tuivanuavou or Mr. Bainimoli.

Q153: Who was supposed to be on duty that Friday, do you know?
A: The roster always changed, anyone who is free can be rostered. I have drafted the roster for the guards and I had informed Mr. Bainimoli to take the duty next.

Q154: Who were you supposed to hand-over the duty to, I know you know exactly who you were supposed to hand-over the duty to?
A: I was supposed to hand-over to Mr. Bainimoli.
Q155: Did you hand-over to Mr. Bainimoli on Friday morning?
A: No, I was just preparing to hand-over when the order from OC came.

Q156: When your guys were doing the exercise, how were you getting in touch with them?
A: The radio was supposed to be set up.

Q157: So all those nights at the week beginning to May the 19th, you people were getting in touch with them?
A: The radio was supposed to be set up so that they can get in touch with those in the exercise.

Q158: Would you know whether they were really getting in touch with each other when you came for duty on Thursday night?
A: I did not check, Sir.

Q159: Who looks after the armoury in Parliament during day time?
A: The ordinance storeman.

Q160: Were you at any time in charge in the armoury?
A: Everything was handled by him and when he goes out, I just stay there so that no one comes in. The paperwork and everything is done by the storeman.

Q161: Mr. Ravai, on the morning of the 19th, in your statement you said that you had received a call from Col. Tarakinikini?
A: At about 3 o'clock on Friday morning.

Q162: Was there any other calls to any members of 1MS?
A: That was the only call because the guard woke me up to tell me about that call.

Q163: Was there any message for Sgt. Tikotani?
A: I do not know, Sir.

Q164: Was Sgt. Tikotani in the unit that morning?
A: I cannot recall.

Q165: Were any of the field operatives there?
A: No, Sir.

Q166: What was the request made by Lt. Col. Tarakinikini?
A: He wants to speak to Warrant Officer Bainimoli, I told him that he was off duty but that I can relay any message to him.

Q167: Did Lt. Dakuliga get in touch with you on Thursday night?
A: No, Sir.

Q168: What about on Friday morning?
A: Only when I was having tea I saw them cleaning their weapons, I said good morning to him and told him that tea was ready.

Q169: When did staff Vakadranu leave to go and pick them up?
A: I cannot say the exact time but it was some time in the morning.

Q170: Mr. Ravai, do you wish to say anything?
A: I again raise my appeal to the RFMF as I strongly believe that my young comrades and myself were covertly set up and framed by some unknown associated people. I strongly request the RFMF to assist us in this situation, that is my only plea, Sir.

[F. RAVAI]
WO Class I

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class I
Member
TWENTY-FIRST WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 24624 SGT. K. NAIKA

Sgt. K. Naika after being duly sworn under solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Nai matai ni taro qo, o a curu ena Unit ena yabaki cava?

Q2: O iko a vakaitavi ena vuli vakaivalu vata kei na kena plan-taki na vuaviri ko ya a caka ena i ka 19 ni siga se o a kila?
A: Au sega ni kila e dua na ka.

Q3: O sega saraga ni kila?
A: Sega.

Q4: Ena siga cava o qai kila na ka ea yaco ena complex mai Palimedi?
A: Enai ka 19 ni siga.

Q5: E rawa ni o talanoataka na ka e a yaco?
A: Ena mataka lai lai ni 19 ni siga ea kacivi keitou o OC ka tukena vei keitou me keitou vakavakarau me keitou lako ena VIP protection exercise. Eso era sa liu, o keitou qai muri. Au se tiko ga e na Keba, au sa rogoca ni sa caka na vuaviri.

Q6: O iko a lako sobu vata kei iratou nai lala eratou a laki vakaitavi e na vuaviri?
A: Sega.

Q7: O a vodo sobu ena dua na lorry?
A: Au a gole sobu ga ena neitou lorry.

Q8: O a lako sobu i ra, ena siga cava o a lako sobu kina?
A: Au a lako sobu ena i ka 19 ni siga.

Q9: E rawa ni o vakamacalataka mada na nomudou gole sobu?
A: Keitou a vodo ena lorry vata kei na neitou yaya ka keitou gole ena complex.

Q10: O sega ni vodo ena dua na mini-bus ko a veikau sobu vata kei Lt. Tuivanuavou, drau a qai lai sobu koso ena dua na vanua?
A: Io, keirau sobu mai, keirau taubale lesu mai na keba.

Q11: Okay, vakamacalataka mada, mai na Unit drau a taubale va qo i muri, esa kele tu na mini-bus, na cava na colour ni mini-bus?
E vulavula.

Q12: Ocei soti ea tiko ena loma ni mini-bus?
A: O au, Tuivanuvou, oya au rawa ni confirm-taka, e dua tale au sega ni rawa ni confirm-taka qo o Dakuliga, kei na neitou OC. Na tolu ga ya au rawa ni confirm-taka.

Q13: Tuivanuvou, Dakuliga, Baleinamau?
A: Io.

Q14: Dou vodo ena mini-bus, eso na civilians era a tiko ena loma ni mini-bus?
A: Io, au kila ni o koya na driver.

Q15: O sa raica e vica vata na ka esa taba tiko ena pepa (Fiji Times), matai ni gauna ni vuaviri, raica nai taba nei Apenisa ni tiko kina. O kila ni a vakaitavi talega ena vuaviri, ea sega ni tiko ena loma ni lorry ena siga ya?
A: Au sega mada ni kilai Apenisa, au sega mada ni kilai ea tiko i loma ya se sega.

Q16: Dou a vodo ena loma ni mini-bus, e dua tale na lorry e kele tiko e muri se i liu?
A: Au sega ni vakadeitaka rawa.

Q17: Dou gole sobu ena gaunisala na Sukanaivalu Rd, ni sa lai yaco i ra, veidoumi kei na gaunisala na Ratu Mara Rd, ocei soti ea sobu?
A: O au, Tuivanuvou kei Dakuliga.

Q18: O kemudou ga na lewe tolu?
A: Io, kevaka e dua tale, au sega ni vakasamataka, o koya mada ga ya au confirm-taka.

Q19: Oti dou sa taubale, vakamacalataka mada na nomudou taubale, dou yaco evei, me yacova na gauna dou lai vodo tale ena lorry me gole sobu i loma?
A: Keitou taubale lesu cake tale yani ka yaco yani ena Unit, yacova tale na gauna esa tukuni kina vei au meu sa lesu sobu, au sa qai vodo kina neitou motoka ka lako sobu.

Q20: Ocei ea tukuna vei iko mo gole ira?

Q21: Ocei soti dou a vodo vata ena loma ni lorry ya?
A: O au, draiva o Vakadranu, Baro, Ledua kei na dua tale, au sega ni taura rawa na keitou i ka va.
Q22: Dou gole sobu i ra, dou qai repört vei cei i ra?
A: Keitou curu sara i loma, au sa sega ni taura rawa o cei.

Q23: Cakacaka cava o lai cakava i loma ya?
A: Au lai yadra tu i matamata.

Q24: Na matamata i liu se i muri?
A: Na matamata i muri (back gate).

Q25: E bau dua na gauna o a yadra ena matamata eliu?
A: E sega.

Q26: E bau dua na gauna o a yadra ena Battery Hill?
A: E sega.

Q27: E bau dua na gauna o a yadravi ira na vesu tiko i loma ya?
A: E sega.

Q28: Ena veigauna o a tiko i loma ya, o yadra tiko na matamata i muri?
A: Io.

Q29: E bau dua na gauna o a curu i tuba? E vica vata na ka ea yaco, eso na lala era a curu i tuba mera lai vakacaca, e bau dua na gauna a wili kina oiko?
A: O ira na lai vakacaca?

Q30: Sega, ena veivanua, e bau dua na gauna o curu i tuba, kauta na nomui yaragi ....
A: Sega, au a sega ni curu i tuba meu laivakacaca.

Q31: Ena gauna cava oa qai curu i tuba?
A: Au sega ni kila na tiki ni siga, au kila ga niu a curu mai tuba, au a lako i vale, Au lai tiko mai vale, au qai lesu tale mai.

Q32: E vaka vica?
A: E vakaruva se vakatolu.

Q33: E bau dua na gauna o curu ena loma ni Operation Room ko tiko i loma ni complex, na nomudou Operation Room o kemudou na 1MS?
A: Io.

Q34: O cei a tiko ena loma ni Operation Room?
A: O keitou ga na lewe ni Unit.
Q35: O cei a liului tiko ni Operation Unit se o cei è cicivaka tiko na Operation Room?
A: O Na Qase beka.

Q36: E vaka vica nomu curu i loma?
A: Sega sara ni vakawasoma.

Q37: O kila o cei e veilutaki tiko i loma ya, o vakamacalataka o iko ni o Na Qase, e bau dua tale o raica i loma ya, o Col. Mua, o Lt. Dakai?
A: Io, o Lt. Dakai, Gauna, Mua, Speight kei iratou na neitou cauravou ga na CRW.

Q38: Ena gauna o a tiko kina ena loma ni Operation Room, ena gauna cava o a qai biuta kina na complex mai ra, mo sa biuta vakadua?
A: Ena dua na noqu lako mai vale, au sa gole vakadua mai kina.

Q39: O bau kila na tiki ni siga?
A: E sega.

Q40: Esa vo e vica na macawa me suka na ka ya, se sa vo e vica ga na siga?
A: E vo beka e rua se tolu na macawa, au sa sega ni nanuma e vica na macawa sara. Ena siga ea voroki kina na TV station, au se tiko mai loma ia ena gauna e vakasukai kina mai yaragi, au sa tiko mai vale.

Q41: Vakacava na gauna ea vakayacori kina na nodra bose na turaga mai Palimedi?
A: Au sa tu kina i vale.

Q42: Vakacava na gauna ea lauvana kina o Vosavere?
A: Ena gauna e lauvana kina o Vosavere, au sa tu kina i vale.

Q43: Ena gauna cava o qai kauti iko lesu tale mai kina i loma ni Keba, se nomu vesu mai?
A: Au a vesu mai Kalabu.

Q44: O iko a dua vei ira na vesu mai Kalabu?
A: Io.

Q45: Sgt. Naika, o iko tiko ena assault team ni nomudou Unit? O iko kei na nomu four men team dou a lako i Palimedi, dou a kauta kece tu na nomudou kit-bag?
A: Io.
Q46: E bau dua na gauna o vakarotaki mai Palimedi mo sign-taka e dua na leave application?
A: Io.

Q47: O cei e vakarautaka yani?
A: Au qai lako ga yani, esa tu ikea na leave application, e tukuni me keitou sign-taka nai vola.

Q48: Me tou lesuva tale mada na nomudrau taubale i na Keba, e tukuna tale o OC, Baleinamau mo dou gole sobu tale na complex, ena vica na kaloko ya? Esa oti na vakasigalevu, se bera na vakasigalevu? Ena 9 na kaloko a caka na brief, 9.00 a.m. kina 9.30 a.m. dou a vodo sobu ena basi, dou yaco i ra, dou taubale lesu tale i loma ni Keba, dou vakasigalevu oti dou gole sobu ena complex se se bera na vakasigalevu, dou yaco ga i cake, esa tukuna tale o Baleinamau mo dou gole i ra se dou a lai wawa tale tiko vakalailai i cake?
A: Keitou mai wawa tale toka i cake ena office.

Q49: O kila ena vica na kaloko?
A: E sega, au kila ga ni sa oti na vakasigalevu.

Q50: Ea bau dua na gauna ea musu na kemui sau nomu tu mai Palimedi?
A: E sega, au veisaumi tu ga.

Q51: Me yacova mai nikua e lako tu ga?
A: Io.

Q52: Na ration e lako tu ga yani i na Keba?
A: Io.

Q53: E bau dua na gauna o rogoca ni ra veitalanoa ena loma ni Parliament Complex, o bau rogoca kina eso na yaca ni turaga ni valu era vakaitavi ena navuci ni vuaviri ko a vakayacori ena 19 ni siga?
A: E sega.

Q54: When you went down Sukanaivalu Rd and got off the mini-bus, why did you get off?
A: Au a tarogi neirotu OC se keitou sa lako tiko ihei. Nona saumi taro, au sega ni taura rawa ni tukuna vei kemudou, au sega ni duavata kei na nonai sau ni taro, au mani sobu kina.

Q55: E bau dua na nomudou exercise, o dou exercise vata kei ira na civilians?
A: Civilians?
Q56: Mo dou lako, dou vodo vata, lorry vata, e bau dua na gauna ca vakayacori oti kei ira na civilians?
A: E sega.

Q57: The story you are telling us, when we ask you questions, we know a lot of things. We also asked your Director about the code of conduct, we know you are bound by a code of conduct. When you come to a board like this, you are under the directive from Commander to release information to us because everything that is said here will basically put everything in the picture. Your holding information back will not help anyone. They have given information, the Director and Mr. Ravai. What we want to do is bring everything in the open, this is the reason why the Board is asking questions so you have to be forthcoming to give us information. What your Director says that the code of conduct apply in wartime situations, not in peace time and when you are in a board.

What we would like for you to tell us is basically what exactly was said by Baleinamaui?

Q58: When you came back to the camp, you said you hopped into one of your own vehicles, which vehicle was this?
A: It is the Army’s.

Q59: Is it a car or a half-cabin?
A: Na motor car.

Q60: Was there any weapons inside the car?
A: Na noqui yaragi ga.

Q61: When you went to the complex, you tell us the arrangement there was for the issuing of weapons and returning it to security?
A: Noqu gole yani i kea ena vanua e tiko kina na neiou yaragi, e doi taura ga mai nona yaragi. E lako tiko na gauna, esa qai tiko na neiou storeman, esa qai vakaivolataki, me sign-taki na i yaragi.

Q62: Nomudou a gole sobu i ra, dou a kauta na nomudou kitbag, e tu ena loma ni kitbag na yaragi, ena gauna cava ea pack-taki kina na kitbag ya se sa dau vakarautaki tu ga ena veigaua taukoko?
A: Esa dau vakarau tu ga na neitou yaya, o keimami kece, e biu tu me yacova na
gauna ni sa soli mai kina na orders me vakarau me toso se tukuni me
vakarau, esa qai kau mai na yaragi.

Q63: Na kitbag e tiko ike ena veigauna taukoko? Ena gauna esa tukuna o OC mo
dou lako sobu ira, oti beka na vakasigalevu, lako o iko lai draw-taka mai na
nomu dakai mai na store, mai na nomudou armoury ga, ena gauna o draw-
taka kina na dakai, e tiko ike e dua na register mo dou sign-taka?

A: Io.

Q64: O cei a issue-taka na dakai? Baleta mai na 1MS e vica ga na tamata e dau
solia tiko na dakai, matata? Ocei soti e dau taura na key ni armoury?

A: Na neitou stores, na armourer.

Q65: O cei na armourer?

A: O Lala.

Q66: Ena siga ya, nai ka 19 ni siga, ocei e issue-taka na dakai?

A: Gaunavinaka.

Q67: Who are the other members in your assault team?

A: Baro, Ledua vata kei na dua tale.

Q68: Were they issued with weapons?

A: Yes.

Q69: When you left the camp, did you stop anywhere on the way or went direct to
Parliament?

A: Neitou lako sobu mai, keitou tarovi ena Police check-point vei Commander
ekea, eratou tukuna ni sa vakatabui na gole vaka i Palimedi. Keitou mani
gole lesu tale ka qiri ina complex me tukuni vei iratou na dredre keitou
sotava tiko. Eratou tukuna mai o iratou meratou veitaratara i ra, oti keitou
cawiri tale lai gole sara mai va ya i USP, batini wai, e dua na ovisa e tu eke,
au sega ni kilai koya, o koya ga e kilai au mai, keitou sa mani lako mai ena
complex.

Q70: Who did you talk to in the complex?

A: Bainimoli.

Q71: Did he tell you what arrangements he was going to make?

A: E tukuna o koya vei au, ni na qiri sobu ira ina complex, me ratou na qai tarai
iratou na check-point me rawa ni keitou curi. F. se va tu ga ya, keitou sa
tovolea tale e dua na gauni sala, ka keitou curu rawa.
Q72: Was there any assurance given to you before you entered the Parliament from either RFMF or any single members of your Unit? Assurance like you will not be charged or nothing will happen to you and were you promised benefits like money, et cetera?
A: Sega.

Q73: You said you returned home, you did not go back to Parliament, what was the reason for not going back?
A: Na noqu bui ea tauvimate.

Q74: When you were arrested in Kalabu, were you assaulted?
A: Io.

Q75: What injuries did you receive?
A: E mavo na yavaqu kei na ucuqu.

Q76: Whilst in Parliament, were you in contact with the group that was in QEB, at your Unit?
A: Io.

Q77: When you were contacting them, who did you speak to?
A: O Bukasila e a kauta mai na kakana kei ira mai cake, o Bainimoli.

Q78: On the 19th, there were some extra weapons taken to the Parliament Complex, were you aware of these weapons being moved?
A: E sega. Au qai lako mai ena loma ni rumu, esa tu kina na yaragi, au sega ga ni kila na kena kau mai.

Q79: But did you hear where it came from or who brought it over?
A: E sega saka.

Q80: How many days later was it taken across, the day after or what?
A: Au sega ni rawa ni vakadeitaka qori.

Q81: Sgt. Naika, ena matai ni gauna o a sobu kina ena gauna o a vodo tiko kina ena mini-bus, o a sega ni duavata kei na nonai sau ni taro. E nai kaua ni gauna o sa vodo kina, o tukuna ni nomudou OC e tukuna mo lako sobu? Na cava na duidui ni vakaro ea soli vei iko?
A: O Na Qase e sa tu, o koya gona ya au sa qai lako sobu kina.

Q82: Nona lako yani ya o Na Qase e sa mai vakadewataka na ka e sa yaco?
A: Au sega ni vosa vua.
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Q83: Ena gauna ya osa rogoca oti kina ni sa vakayacori na vuaviri mai Palimedi?
A: Io.

Q84: E dua na noqu taro, o rawa ni vakamatatataka na vosa cava ea tukuna o Baleinamau ni se bera ni dou lako sobu mai kina?
A: Na vosa e tukuna o koya au sega ni rawa ni tukuna, na ka ga au kila me keitou lako sobu mai i ra, me keitou kauta ga na neitou i yaya, lai report ga ira.

Q85: Sgt. Naika, ni se bera nomu lako i vale ni sa tautimale o watimu, o a raica ni bau caka e dua na weapon training, na kena vakavulici vei ira na civilians na dakai?
A: Sega.

Q86: Na drill?
A: E Sega.

Q87: Ena yabaki 1988, o a tekivu ena Unit?
A: Io.

Q88: E matata saraga na nomu veikilai i loma ya, dou na veikilai ya, dou na veikilai vinaka, e dua na timi e rawa ni vica e tiko e na dua na timi?
A: E va.

Q89: E dua e tiko nomu timi o Baro, ocei na kenai ka va?
A: Au sega ni nanuma.

Q90: O iko sa dede ena loma ni Unit, o qai sega ni kila nai ka va ni tamata, e dua na lomatarotaro levu e rawa ni taroga na Board. O sa yabaki sese eka, raica tiko na nomu number o iko na satini, na vakatulewa kei na vuku e tiko vei iko e tiko sara i cake, baleta ke sega e sega ni soli vei iko na number qori, o qai tukuna o iko ni o sega ni kila na i ka va ni tamata.
A: Na timi e sega ni dua tu ga vakadua na timi, oti ga e veisau.

Q91: O sega ni kila vakacava nai ka va ni tamata, tamata vou se tamata makawa?
A: Au sega ni vunitaka, kevaka au kila au na tukuna.

Q92: O tukuna na motoka na Toyota Corolla, draiva tiko o Sgt Vakadranu, e rawa ni lewe vica na tamata e vodo ena motoka oya?
A: Ke wili kina o draiva ena lewe lima.
Q93: Sgt Naika, can I ask you this question again? I have asked you before. I know it is hard to answer but what we want to know is the instructions given to you by Mr. Baleinamau when you were told to go to the Parliament Complex, what was his instructions to you?
A: Tukuna ga o koya ni dou sa sobu ga, dou lai vakarorogo vei iratou na sa tiko mai ya. Au sa muria ga nai vakaro ya.

Q94: E dua tale na ka o via tukuna se via vakamacalataka?
A: Ena dua talega na inquiry mai Kalabu?

Q95: E levu na inquiries, qo na inquiry levu. Na inquiry mai Kalabu e dua tani. O keitou qo na ka ga ni nomudou vakaitavi ena vuaviri vata kei na ka kece. E dua tale na ka o via tukuna?
A: Sega.

Q96: Ena gauna cava Sergeant o sa kila ni o sa charge-taki ena charges e sa tiko qo vei iko? O charge-taki talega kei iratou nailalaloqo ena treason?
A: Yes.

Q97: Oti ga na interview?
A: O keitou a interview-taki ga ena Keba ekea.

Q98: Ocei e interview-taki kemudou?

Q99: E sega ni dua mai na Army Legal Services e a tiko ena gauna o a vakatarogi kina?
A: Sega.

Q100: E dua na gauna o bau kerea mo raica e dua na lawyer se dua mai na Army Legal Services?
A: Sega baleta keitou sa vaka lawyer tiko.

Q101: Ni se bera ni o charge-taki e a tiko ekea na nomu lawyer?
A: Sega.
Sgt. Naika, after having been duly reminded of oath earlier taken, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q102:  
A:  
Sgt. Naika, na nomi statement e liu o via veisautaka se sega?  
E sega saka.

Q103:  
A:  
Vakadeitaka mada, o a tiko ena exercise mai Makuluva?  
Io saka.

Q104:  
A:  
Ena siga Lotulevu na i ka 18 ni siga, ko a cici ki na Maritime?  
E sega saka.

Q105:  
A:  
O cei a kauti Mr. Dakuliga?  
O au saka.

Q106:  
A:  
Ena bogi tiko ga oya?  
Io saka.

Q107:  
A:  
E tiko talega ga e loma o Ratu?  
Right, Sir.

Q108:  
A:  
O dou lesu mai, dou load talega mai, e tiko e loma na MP5, pistols?  
Au na sega ni rawa ni saurna na taro oya.

Q109:  
A:  
O dou lesu tale, dou cabe i vei?  
Au na sega ni rawa ni saurna na taro oya.

Q110:  
A:  
Ko a lako sobu ena yakavi se mataka lai?  
O koya ga au a sa tukuna oya.

Q111:  
A:  
Vakacava o Satini Celeasiga, o dou a lako vata sobu?  
Au sega mada ni vakasamataka rawa.

Q112:  
A:  
Na i ka 27 ni siga, siga Vakarauvai, e rau a mavoa kina o Mr. Rokoura vata kei na dua na Private ena checkpoint e Vuya Road ena gauna era lako sobu mai kina na mob, o vakasamataka tiko oya?

Io saka.
Q113: O kilo o cei a vanai Mr. Rokoura?
A: Au sega saka ni kilo.

Q114: O tiko e vei a caka na vanavana?
A: Au a tiko ena loma ni Palimedi.

Q115: E nai ka 28 ni siga, ena bogi ni siga Tabu, e dua na mob e a smash taka na TV Station. E a tukuni vei koitou ni dua vei kemudou e a lako vata kei ira na mob? Oqo e mai vakavuna na nona mate e dua na ovisa? O kilo o cei e a lako vata kei ira na mob?
A: Au a tu ga e vale.

Q116: Kemudou a mai dua na macawa ena exercise e a caka mai Makuluva. Ena siga Vukeulu, e dua tale na run e lesu tale?
A: Au sega ni vakadeitaka.

Q117: Ena siga Lotulevu, o cei e kauti Dakuliga kina Maritime? Na i dini cavu oya koya kauta wavoki tiko?
A: Io saka.

Q118: Na kena i balebale o iko a kauta wavoki tiko ena siga Lotulevu oya?
A: Io saka.

Q119: Ni se bera na i ka 19 ni siga, e dua na brief e a solia vei kemudou o Dakuliga. Vakamacalata o koya vei kemudou e dua na ka ena yaco ena i ka 19 ni siga?
A: Au sega ni rawa ni sauma saka.

[K. NAIIKA]
Sergeant

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class 1
Member
TWENTY SECOND WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 24503 SGT VILIMONE TIKOTANI

Sgt Tikotani, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: O a curu e na 1MS Unit e na gauna cava?

Q2: Kena i tekivu sara ga?
A: Io.

Q3: Kemudou a tekivunà mai na Unit qo?
A: Io saka.

Q4: Ni se bera na vuaviri, a caka na vuli vakaivalu, a caka talega na vakavakarau ni orders kei na veika kece vakaoya. O cei dou a vakaitavi e na kena vuli vakaivalu kei na plan-taki ni operation?
A: E sega saka ni matata vei au na nomuni taro. E rawa beka ni o ni vakkamatatataka tale.

Q5: Ni se bera na i ka 19 ni siga, dou a vakayacora e so na vuli vakaivalu ena vakavakarau e na ka e yaco e na i ka 19 ni siga. E vica vata na i tukutuku e sa lako oti mai. Sa mai soli i tukutuku oti Na Qase, o kemuni sa i ka 51 ni tamata. Mai vei ira taucoko na i lala qo, e rua e sega ni lewe ni 1MS; o Col Bukarau ga vata ke: Lt Dakai. Kena vo, me tekivu mai vua na nomudou OC mai nai matata ni siga e ra sa mai soli tukutuku e na veika a yaco e na i ka 19 ni siga. Sa na oti qo, keitou na lako sobu na Board ki na Special Branch. E so na i tukutuku e sa tauri oti mai vei ira - na i taba, koya e vakaitavi kina kei na veika kece vakaoya, sa matata vinaka sara ga, na gauna e caka kina na bose kei na veika kece vakaoya. E levu na i tukutuku qo sa tu oti vei keitou. Na ka keitou via taroga na ka o kila baleta na nomu vakaitavi oiko e na vuaviri qo, e na ka kece e yaco. Ni se bera na i ka 19 ni siga, rawa ni o vakamacalataka na ka e baleta na vuli vakaivalu e na vuku ni vuaviri kei na veika sa yaco.
A: Au via vakaritaka sara ga vakadodonu niu sega sara ga ni kila e dua na ka me yacova mai na i ka 19 ni siga.

Q6: Na gauna cava o qai kila kina na ka e baleta na vuaviri?
A: Na ka e baleta na vuaviri au a sega vakaadua ni kila me yacova na i ka 19 ni siga ni sa qai mai vakamacalataka vei keirau kei Na Qase o ratou o George.
A vakamacalatakai vei kemudrau i vei?

A vaqo na kena i lakolako meu vakaraitsaka. Au a mai cakacaka e na mataka lai ai i Vakarauliku. Noqu qai mai cakacaka e na mataka oya, sa tiko e na notice-board mai na naitou complex e du na message meu qiri totolo e na dua na naba ni o tinaqo e tauvimate bibi. The message says that it is an emergency and that I have to contact that number as soon as I arrived. E na gauna au qiri yani kina e na naba oya, sa kerei mai vei au ke rawa niu lako soku e na dua na gauna totolo duadua ki na slipway mai na Maritime.

O cei a qiri yani vei iko?

Au a sega ni taura vinaka se o cei a qiri yani. Na ka ga au kila ni kerei mai ke rawa niu lako mada yani vakatotolo i na slipway e na Maritime. E na noqu yaco yani i kea, sa tiko i kea o George vata kei na so tale na gone ni Viti au sega ni kilai iratou.

E na noqu yaco yani i kea, eratou sa mani vakamacalatakai vei au ni sa tiko eso na gagadre, na kena vuna levu tikoga me baleti keda na kawa i taukei. Au tukuna vei iratou ni o au sega ni rawa ni cakava kina e dua na ka baleta ni tiko na noqu i liuliu, vakavo ga kevaka e ratou via vosa vua na noqu i liuliu. Oti e ratou sa qai taroga se o cei na noqu i liuliu. Au sa mani tukuna ni o Major Ligairi. E ratou sa mani kerere ma ni ratou via vosa vua. Oti au sa mani qiri vei Na Qase, sa qai kerei o Na Qase me gole sobu mai. E na vanua oya sa qai mai vakamatatatuki kina na i naki ni veika eratou via vakayacora o George. E na vanua sara ga oya au sa qai kilia kina, sa mani yaco na kena veitalanao, sega ni balavu sara. Oya ga na ka au kila o au me baleta na ka a yaco e na i ka 19 ni siga.

E na gauna dou yaco yani kina i kea, ai matai o iko - a qiritaki vei iko.

O sa yaco yani i kea sa tu kina o George, sa qai brief-taki iko o George?

Na ka ga e tukuni vei au e na siga o ya ni sa tiko e so na i nakinaki me baleti keda na kawa i taukei, o ya ga na ka e tukuni vei au, au sa mani tukuna vei iratou ni o au e sega ni dua na ka meu rawa ni cakava i kea baleta e sega ni tu vei au e dua na kaukanu, sega ni dua na lewa. Au sa mani tukuna ga ni tiko na noqu i liuliu. Kevaka e ratou vinakata me ratou vakamacalatakai e dua na ka me ratou qai vakamacalatakai vua na noqu i liuliu. Ratou taroga se o cei, au sa mani tukuni Na Qase. Au sa mani tukuna vei iratou me ratou qiri cake kevaka eratou via vosa vua na noqu i liuliu.

Na gauna o lako sobu kina mo drau lai sota vata kei George e na slipway mai na Maritime, o cei soti dou a gole vata?

O au taudua sara ga.

Nomudou a sota oya, o cei so a tiko vata kei George?
Ena gauna oya, au raici George taudua ga au kilai koya. O ratou na cauravou koya e ratou tiko vata au sega ni taura rawa.

E ratou sotia se civilian?

E so na civilian.

Sa lai oti kece na ka qo, dou sa lai sota tale ena gauna balavu dou a tiko kina mai na Palimedi, sa tekivu mo dou lai veikilai vakavinaka, o sa qai kilai ira e na gauna qo koya dou a sota e na i matai ni gauna?

E na gauna keitou a yaco yani kina i na Palimedi, a sega ni matata sara vei au na matadra baleta ni keimami a lewe levu sara tu ga e na siga o ya. Keitou a lai tu ga i loma o keitou na CRW, vica vata na siga o ya me yacova na siga Tusiti keitou tu ga e na loma ni Palimedi me keitou raici iratou tiko na hostages. Baleta e na siga o ya, e lewe levu e ra lako ga mai, era sa curu mai loma.

E na i matai ni siga nomudrau sota vata kei George, e ratou tiko talega eso vata kei koya.

Io, keitou a sega ni veitalanoa. O ratou na cauravou o ya e ratou tu tani tu ga yani va o ya.

E ratou lewe vica beka na cauravou?

Au sega sara ga ni taura rawa na kederatou i wiliwili.

E vica na lori?

E dua na mini-bus; e ratou a tu ga e na loma ni mini-bus.

O kila na colour ni mini-bus?

Na mini-bus e colour vuvula.

Sa yaco ga yani o Na Qase, ratou sa qai vakamacalatakei vei Na Qase na cause e ratou via cakava kina na vuaviri - it is for the indigenous, Fiji to be a Christian State which is not in the 1997 Constitution, sa kau tale mai na freedom of worship, sa vakatarai na nodra dodonu na homosexuals which is not according to Christian principles, vata kei na kena soli o Viti me Christian State i Igiladi ratou solia na chiefs, qo sa qai mai veisautaka o Rabuka, so we have to put that back in the Constitution. Vanua o ya au sa duvata kina kei iratou, that Fiji is supposed to be a Christian State baleta o Ratu Cakobau a soli Viti ki Peritania to be a Christian State, vata kei na ka sa cakava na Labour Government me baleti keda na i taukei at that particular time under one year of leadership. Sa tagi tiko na kawa i taukei qai sega ni
rogoce rawa tiko na Labour vata kei na ka e baleta na qele ni taukei. Business people are fighting for their rights and they are not being heard at the moment. E na gauna oya, a mosi vei au na ka e ratou vakaraitaka tiko, au sa tokona kina na cause ni veika e yaco at that time, sa mani vakadonuya o Na Qase, keirau sa duavata kina, o ya na vu ni noqu vakaitavi.

Q19: O George ga e brief-taki kemudrau; o iko vata kei Na Qase?
A: Io.

Q20: E dua tale a tiko ekea?
A: Sega, o au ga vata kei Na Qase.

Q21: Sa oti o ya sa qai vakacava ni se bera ni yaco e na Parliament Complex?
A: Sa oti ga oya sa qai tukuna vei au o Na Qase: "Tiko, qiri cake i na keba vei Tupena Baleinamau, tukuna niu sa tiko qo vata kei iko, me ratou lako sobu mai na cauravou, me kau talega mai na i yaragi", koya a lai vakayagataki i Palimedi.

Q22: O Na Qase a tukuna vei iko mo qiri cake, o iko o qai qiri cake vei Baleinamau?
A: Io.

Q23: Vakamacalataka mada na ka o tukuna vei Baleinamau e na talevoni.
A: Au tukuna vua, "Sir, sa tiko saka qo o Na Qase, sa vakadonuya saka yani qo me ratou gole sobu mai na cauravou, me ratou kauta vata mai kei iratou na nodratou dui yaragi."

Q24: Na nomudrau veitalanoa, o tukuna vua me ra lako mai na i lala taucoko e ra tiko mai na Unit?
A: O iratou na tiko e na gauna o ya me ratou dui kauta mai nodratou dui yaragi.

Q25: Nomu vakamacala tiko, me kau mai na i yaragi, na cava me mai caka?
A: E sega ni dua na veitalanoa vakaoya me caka i kea, sai koya saka ga o ya.

Q26: O iko tukuna me ratou lako ga mai, ratou dui kauta mai nodratou i yaragi?
A: Io.

Q27: Tomana sara nomu i vakamacala?
A: Sa ratou gole ga mai ya, vakamacala ga vakalailai o Na Qase, keimami sa duavata kece kei na i vakamacala sa vakamacala kina o Na Qase, keimami sa vakamuria sara ga na ka sa tukuna o Na Qase.
Q28  Na gauna e ratou sa siro sobu mai kina, na lori cava e ratou vodo sobu mai kina na i lala oya mai na 1MS?
A: E ratou a vodo mai e na dua na mini-bus.

Q29  O kila na kena colour?
A: E mini-bus vulavula.

Q30  Kena i balebale qo sa i karua ni mini-bus, e dua sa kele rawa tiko?
A: Au a sega ni taura rawa baleta keitou a sega ni tiko veivolekati vata kei iratou na lai kauti iratou mai o ya. Au sega ni taura rawa kevaka okoya ga na mini-bus sa kele tu i kea koya e lai kauti iratou mai se i karua ni mini-bus. Au vakabauta ni o koya beka ga koya a kele tiko o ya a rairai lai kauti iratou mai.

Q31  A lako cake?
A: Io, a rairai lai kauti iratou mai.

Q32  O cei soti a ra qai gole mai e na loma ni mini-bus o ya mai na 1MS?
A: O iratou kece sara ga keitou a lai vakaitavi e na i matai ni siga.

Q33  Sa tiko oti na yaca, qo me re-confirm ga, e rawa ni o solia mai na yaca koya ratou a lako sobu mai?
A: O ratou o Vosavere, Naduaniwai, Buadromo, Ravai, Naika, Soko.

Q34  E rawa ni o nanuma lesu o cei soti tale na yaca e vo tiko?
A: Na ka e yaco e na siga o ya baleta ni sa totolo na toso ni lori. Ratou sa yaco ga mai, keitou sa vodo yani na tiko o ya, keitou sa gole sara ga. Sa sega mada ga na gauna me keitou veikilaitaka o cei soti sa tiko ya.

Q35  Vosavere, Naduaniwai, Ravai, Naika, Soko; a tiko talega i kea o Baleinamau?
A: Segu, o koya a sega ni lako mai e na mataka o ya.

Q36  Bau dua tale a tiko i kea o bau nanuma?
A: Segu, o ratou ga qori koya keitou lai tiko vata i loma baleta siga Tusiti sara au qai gole mai tuba.

Q37  Dou gole vata o kemudou na i lala qo?
A: Io.

Q38  E na nomudou gole, na dakai cava dou a kauta?
A: Na pistol ga, o au e dua saka ga noqu pistol.
Q39: O ira na kena vo?
A: O keitou mada ga na tiko i loma o ya, e dua saka beka ga na MPS au raike tiko vei Naduaniwai, kena vo keitou vaka pistol tu ga.

Q40: A solia o Na Qase na brief?
A: A solia o Na Qase na brief.

Q41: Sa solia o Na Qase, dou sa duavata taukoko?
A: Keitou sa duavata kece.

Q42: Oti dou sa gole sobu?
A: Io saka.

Q43: Vakamacalataka na nomudou gole, e vica vata na lori dou veimurimuri sobu?
A: Na ka saka ga au kila e na neitou i golegole o ya; o Na Qase ga e liu tiko, keitou taravi Na Qase tiko yani.

Q44: Na van nei Na Qase?
A: O Na Qase e vodo saka tiko e na motoka.

Q45: Motoka nei Na Qase, muria yani nomudou van, dua tale i muri?
A: Au sega mada ni kila baleta ni vou vei keitou na ka o ya, keitou sa focus tu ga vua Na Qase. E na mataqali situation va oya keitou mada ga sa focus tu ga vakadua vua Na Qase. O au mada e na gauna oya, o keitou kece sara ga, keitou sa focus tu ga e na ka ga e kaya o Na Qase. What was behind us, we just did not bother, sa sega da ni qai da kauwaitaka me da vakasamataku tale.

Q46: Dou sa toso, vakamacalataka ni dou sa yaco i na Palimedi kei na ka sa qai lai caka?
A: Keitou sa yaco saka ga i na Palimedi, sa lai sobu o Na Qase, sa liu cake sara, o au mada ga au se qai lako vakadua i Palimedi, au sega ni kila tu mada ga na i tuvaki ni Palimedi, oti sa qai lako mai kea o George. Sa qai lako yani o George me kauti keitou i loma ni Palimedi, au sega ni kila tu mada ga e vakatu evei na i rairai ni Palimedi.

Keitou sa qai vakamuri George tu ga me yaqova na gauna sa lai curu kina i loma. Curu ga i loma sa tukuna o George vei ira i loma ya, "This is a civilian takeover ...."

Q47: Na nomudou i sulusulu na lako i loma; dou qai lai vakaisulu i vei?
A: Keitou vaka civilian sara tu ga. Na i sulu ga keitou daramaka mai e na mataka o ya, o au mada ga dress-up ga mai vale au lai lako tu kina i loma ni Palimedi o ya.

Q48 Na gauna ratou lako mai kina na i lala o ya, ratou kauta mai na nodratou kit?
A: O au, Sir, au tu ga mai loma ni Palimedi me yacova na siga Tusiti.

Q49 Sega, na gauna e ratou lako sobu mai kina, eratou kauta sobu mai nodratou kit?
A: E sega, e sega ni dua na kit se kau mai e na siga o ya.

50 Vakacava na matavulo?
A: Au sega ni kila saka.

Q51 Nomudu curu i loma o ya, dou vakamatavulo se sega?
A: E sega ni dua e vakamatavulo. Keitou tu sara tu ga vata kei na dui matai keitou, e sega tale ni dua na matavulo, e sega ni dua e va-balaclava se cava, keitou dui matai keitou sara tu ga yani.

Q52 Dou curu yani sa vakamacala sara o George?
A: Koya saka ga o ya; sa vakamacalataki ga, sa ra dui gole i tuba o ratou na Opposition Members, keimami sa qai tu i loma o ya vata kei iratou na kena vo.

Q53 Dou sa sobu mai Palimedi qo, dou curu mai e na matamata i liu?
A: Io.

Q54 Nomudou yaco yani e na matamata i liu, dou sobu?
A: Io.

Q55 O cei a qai veikau cake?
A: O George.

Q56 O Na Qase?
A: Gauna o ya, o au a raici koya ga ni sobu, waraki keitou me keitou sobu yani, sa liu o George, keitou sa qai muri koya cake. O Na Qase e wavoki saka ga yani, lai raici keitou ni keitou sa tiko i loma, na vanua e qai lai veilakoyaki kina o ya au sa sega ni taura rawa tale. Na ka ga au kila ni noqo yadrahi iratou tu na hostages ya me yacova na siga Tusiti.

Q57 Dou sa lai tiko i loma, sega ni dua na ka e rehearse-taki me baleta na takeover se na ka e caka?
A: E sega sara ga ni dua na ka vakaoya me bau caka mada ga, se me a vakavakaratuki e na dua na gauna - e sega sara ga.

Q58: Dou curu yani i loma, o kilo o iko ni tamata kece e lako yani o ya e vaka pistol?
A: Donu.

Q59: Nduaniwai ga e vaka MP5?
A: Io.

Q60: Kena vo dou vaka pistol?
A: Va-pistol.

Q61: Dou sa vakaraitaka sara ga nomudou pistol?
A: Keitou sega ni vakaraitaka neitou i yaragi. O George ga e sa vakamacala vei ira oya, "This is a civilian takeover, keitou sa tiko qo, mo dou lako i tuba na Opposition Members. O kemudou na vo ni Members of Parliament mo dou tiko."

Q62: O cei e qai tuvani kemudou i loma ya?
A: O keitou oti ga o ya, ratou sa lako i tuba na Opposition Members, keitou sa mai dadabe yani ekej, keitou sa mai vakaraici ira tu ga na tu ya. Tu tale ekej o ira na dau veiqaravi, au taro sara; "Tiko na yaqona? Me dua na yaqona me lose."

Q63: Nomudou a curu yani i loma, bau so vei kemudou a vakaraitaka eso na dakai?
A: Na gauna keitou curu kina i loma, keitou du i taura tikoga na neitou i yaragi, e tiko ga e na dia ligai keitou. Keitou du i kauta tikoga na neitou dui pistol.

Q64: Na gauna dou curu kina i loma, o vakamacalataka tiko eso, o sega ni taura rawa tiko na yacadra na vo ni tamata dou curu vata i loma?
A: Io.

Q65: O sa guilecava?
A: Na ka mada ga au vakamacalataka tiko, niu qai kilo ni keitou sa tu i loma. O kemuni na kilo saka na focus ena gauna o ya, o ilo sa na kauwaitaki iko tiko ga.

Q66: Dou sobu yani, dou sa vakarau curu i loma, o bau raica e dua na civilian ekej?
A: Au sega ni raica saka e dua na civilian.
Q67 O kemudou ga?
A: Io, o keitou ga.

Q68 Nomudou qai veiraici tiko i loma o ya, sa o kemudou tikoga?
A: Io, sa o keitou tikoga.

Q69 A sega ni dua na civilian?
A: Au sega ni raica e dua na civilian me tiko vata kei keitou. Ni o keitou sa veikilai tu na CRW, our abilities and what we can do. Na ka ga keitou sa qai cakava, keitou sa qai dabe ga, keitou kaya vei iratou na tu ekca, "Lose mai na yaqona." Sa ratou lako i tuba o ratou na ovisa. Na kena vo kece ya, sa ratou qai veitalanoa tikoga. Keitou gunu yaqona, sa lako laivi mai o George, au sega ni kila na vanua e lako kina. Keitou sa qai mai tu vata ga yani i loma vata kei iratou na hostages me yacova na siga Tusiti.

Q70 O cei a qai lewai kemudou na tiko i loma ya?
A: O Na Qase sara ga. Oti ga sa qai dua e lako tiko mai me mai tukuna, "Tukuna mai o Na Qase me caka na ka qo". O keitou ya keitou sa dadabe sara tu ga.

Q71 Rauta beka na vica na kaloko na nomudou curu i loma o ya; o bau kila na gauna?
A: Ke bera sara beka - a quarter past 10.

Q72 O cei na nomudou i liuliu e na nomudou curu i loma ya?
A: Neitou lako o ya e sega tale ni dua e delegate-taki me liutaka e dua na ka; keimami sa vakaoroqoro vakadua sara ga vei Na Qase. O Na Qase taudua ga e sa solia vei keitou na command ni neitou tiko i loma ya. Oti keitou sa qai mai gunu yaqona tu ga yani vata kei iratou na Members of Parliament koya ratou tiko eke.

Q73 O ya dou sa taura tiko kina na nomudou dakai i loma oya?
A: E sega, na neitou dakai e tu ga va qo. Keitou sa mai cakava tale tiko yani na veiwali. Matai mada ga, e vou tale vei keitou na neitou lai yadra tu i loma. Dua tani me ratou a se plan-taka makawa mai se dua na ka vakaoya, e vakatate me vou tu vei keitou na neitou lai tu i loma o ya.

Q74 A cava nomu cakacaka i loma oya, o iko mada ga?
A: Oti ga mai na Tusiti oya, sa tukuna vei au o Na Qase meu sa qarava na logistic operations ni neimami tu oya, vakabibi na hygiene and cleanliness of the Parliament Complex kei na kena arrange-taki na kena dau mai caka tiko na lotu.
Q75
Bau dua na gauna o curu e na loma ni nomudou Operation Cell se o cee e setup-taka na nomudou Operation Cell?
A: O ratou na Operation Cell au sega ni ki se ratou qai lai lako vakacava e na rumu e ratou lai tiko kina. Niu qai lako mai e na matak ni Tusiti, na ka kece o ya sa setup-taki kece tu, keitou sa veikilai vinaka sara kina kei Tupeni Baba, o Poseci Bune ni keitou sa tu vata tu ga mai na siga Vakaraubuka ki na siga Tusiti. E na siga Tusiti, e ratou sa qai lewe levu yani o ratou na neitou cauravou, au sa qai vakila ni sa qai tekivu me sa co-ordinate-taki vakamahua na ka kece.

Q76
Dou sa curu yani i loma, ratou sa vesu na lewe ni Palimedi, o sega ni bau taura rawa na i wiliwili - dua, rua, tolu, va, lima, ono, o loko na kena i ka vitu se bau so tale e tiko kina?
A: O keitou mada ga na tiko i loma, sa o koya tikoga o ya. Au sa sega ni concentrate vakalevu i tuba. Sa levu ga na gauna keitou sa veitalanao tikoga vata kei iratou na tu i loma o ya. Sa lako tu ga na veimarautaki baleta ni sa yaco tiko na ka o ya, ratou via loma taqaya, ia sa keitou assure-taki iratou tu ga, "O keitou qo e sega ni dua na ka keitou vinakata me yaco."

Q77
Bogi ni siga Vakaraubuka o sa tekivu yadra, a qai caka na veisaau yadra?
A: O keitou mada ga na tiko i loma o ya, Tusiti vakadua keitou qai gole mai. Eso beka vei keitou, e ra sa lako ga sa ra lai moce tu, koya ga sa via moce, vaqara ga e dua na vanua e lala tu e na loma ni Palimedi ya, moce toka kina.

Q78
Kena vou dou yadra tikoga?
A: Kena vo yadra tu, sa qai vaka ga me keitou veisaau tiko.

Q79
Veveisaau toka ga me yacova na siga Tusiti?
A: Io.

Q80
Tusiti qai cava?

Q81
Bau dua na gauna o curu e na loma ni Operation Room?
A: Keitou dau lai brief tiko mai e na veimataka vei Na Qase.

Q82
Na cava mada na nomu i sema vei George, a cava mada e kacivi iko kina, a sega ni kaciva e dua tale?
A: Keirau a lotu vata saka kei George.

Q83
Lotu every?
A: Lotu Ka-Vitu saka.
Q84 E kilai iko o George?
A: Keirau veikilai saka, keirau veikilai e na vuku ni lotu baleta ni keirau lotu vata.
Q85 Na gauna o tiko kina e na loma ni Palimedi, drau bau veitaratara vata kei na dua na Turaga ni Valu i tuba? E tiko na gaunisala ni nomudou veitaratara vata na Operation, ia na veitaratara ko ya au taroga tiko qo e dau link vata tiko na nomudou Operation?
A: Ko ya qori, meu tukuna sara ga vakadodonu, na ka ga au kiia o au, ko ya au sa talanoataka tiko qo. Na connection ni veitaratara i tuba au sega sara ga ni kila.
Q86 Na gauna o sa lai tiko kina i loma; dou bau veitaratara kei na so na Turaga ni Valu se so i loma?
A: Na ka ga au via tukuna, na logistic operation ga, o ya o ira ga na veisiko yani, na kena maroro na kakana, na kena wasewasei vei ira na veiyasana e ra tu o ya. Ko ya na contact vaqori i tuba, sa na qai kila beka ga o Na Qase.
Q87 E na gauna cava o qai biubiu mai kina e na Palimedi mo curu i tuba?
A: Au qai biuta mai na Palimedi ena siga sa suka kina na dakai, sa tukuni talega me keimani sa vagalala mai kina, sa kele yani na basi. Au se biubiu mai e na mataka laiiai, rauta toka na 10.00 na kaloko.
Q88 E na i ka vica ni siga; ka 13 se i ka 14?
A: Ka 14 ni siga, na siga ko ya sa vagalalataki mai kina na Palimedi. Au sa via gole sara ga i vale, au sa mani tarova e dua na taxi, au sa direct sara ga i vale. Na balavu ni gauna au tu kina i na Palimedi, au sa taurag a e dua na taxi au sa vakadodonu sara ga i vale.
Q89 Vakamacalataka na nomu biuta na Palimedi, o lai tiko I vale. O bau lako tale e na dua na vanua se o lai cakava tale e dua na ka?
A: Au qai lai vesu sara ga mai vale noqu kau mai qo.
Q90 O lai tiko sara ga mai vale me yacova nomu vesu?
A: Au tiko sara ga mai vale me yacova na gauna au vesu mai kina.
Q91 Ka vica ni siga o qai vesu?
A: Au vesu e na yakavi ni Vakaraubuka na i ka 28 ni siga.
Q92 Vula o cei?
A: Jiulai.
Q93  E na gauna o tiko kina e na loma ni Palimedi, bau dua na gauna o curu i tuba. E levu na i lala e ra curu i tuba. E vica vata na gauna e ra curu i tuba e so na IMS vata kei na civilian. Bau dua na gauna o curu i tuba o kauta nomu i yaragi?
A:  Na gauna saka ga au curu kina i tuba na gauna a yaco kina na vakacaca e na TV One, ia au a sega ni lako vata kei ira. Au rogoce na nodra sa lako i taonii e dua na i lala ena gauna e ra sa lako oti kina.

Q94  Noqu taro qo; bau dua na gauna o curu i tuba vata kei na so na i lala, e na TV One se dua tale na vanua mo kauta nomu i yaragi?

Q95  Vakarutakata; o sega ni bau biuta vakadua na Palimedi mo kauta nomu i yaragi e na dua na mission i tuba?
A:  E sega sara ga.

Q96  E loma ni Palimedi o bau raica ni caka na wali vakaivalu; drill se weapon training se hapkido?
A:  A brief-taki keitou o Na Qase e na vuku ni kena caka, me disipline-taki ira na gone ni veikorokoro koya e ra mai tu ya, me ra discipline-taki baleta so na gauna e ra kumukumunii ga ra bosea sara e so na ka me ra cakava. Me vaka sara mada ga na first two weeks, o ira tu ga va qo ra plan-taka e dua na ka me ra cakava, ra lako. E so e ra plan-taka ga me ra lai basu vale, e ra lako. E na gauna sa tekivu kina na ka qo, au raica e effective sara ga, it sort of kept them busy. Ni gauna e ra tu wale tu kina, ni ra sotasota ga vaqo, e levu na ka e rawa ni vakavurea.

Q97  Na noqu taro qo; o raica ni a caka na drill?
A:  Io.

Q98  Vakamecalataka mada na ka o tikuna tiko qori - na command structure, na nomu kila mada o iko. O cei na i liului ni IMS i loma oya?
A:  Neimami tu i loma oya e sega tale ni dua keimami vakarorogo kina, o Na Qase ga.

Q99  O ira na civilian; bau tiko nodra i wasewase?
A:  O ira na civilian i loma oya era sa dui tu ga e na nodra dui yasana.

Q100  E bau dua na nodra i liului?
A:  E ra sa dui tu ga vata na nodra dui turaga. E ra qai lako mai, era sa kila tu mai na nodra dui turaga.
Q101  Bau dua e liutaki ira taucoko?
A:  Sega, e ra sa dua vakarorogo sara tu ga vei ira na nodra dua turaga.

Q102  Na gauna e dau caka kina e so na bose lelevu e na Palimedi, o cei e dau lakova tiko na bose?
A:  O ira sa dua tu ga na nodra dua liuliu ni vei yasana.

Q103  Sa sega ni ka ni vanua?
A:  Sega.

Q104  Na gauna e sa lai bose kina na komiti levu, o cei e lewe ni komiti oya?
A:  Na bose vakamaataivalu?

Q105  Sega, taucoko - George Speight, o kemudou - na caucus, na main group, e sega ni koya na bose lalai?
A:  Qori au sega ni kila. Sa lai noqu i tavi tu ga i kea me vaka ga au sa vakamacalataka, na maroroi ga ni kakana ni veisiko, na kena distribution na kakana; na suka, falawa, raisi, bisikete, coi ni ti ni ra dau yaco mai, na kena laurai na vakarautaki ni kedrato kakana na hostaces e na veisiga.

Q106  Vakamacalataka mada na ko o tukuna me baleti ira na lewe ni vanua; ni ra via cakava ga e dua na ka e ra cakava se ra lako.
A:  E na i matai se i karua ni macawa, so na gauna me ra tu vata tu ga ra bosebose vata sara, se vaka me so e moku mai vei ira na ovisa, o ya e dau initiate-taka vakalevu sara e levu na ka, se ra moku yani vei iratou na sotia, baleta ni ra tu vakaveitacini, vakaveiwekani, vakoro i loma o ya; koya o ya e via vakadomobula tu kina na nodra tu. Ni va oya e ra sa gai kilai nodra turaga ni koro tu ga, e ra sega ni kila tale e dua vei keimami na tu qo. Ni ra sa lako ga, e ra sa lai tukuna vei turaga ni koro, "O ka e moku mai ka", "O cei e mokuti koya, tou lako", sa ra lako sara ga.

Q107  O vakadinadinataka sara ga ni levu na ka vaka o ya e yaco?
A:  Koya o ya, Sir, e levu na basu vale koya e yaco wavoki tiko i kea, e vu tiko gona mai na so na i vukivuki va o ya, baleta ni ra tu vata ga vakoro, vakaya-

Q108  E sega ni dua e liutaka tiko na ka e yaco?
A:  Sega. Baleta ni dua lako tu yani na veiyasana, e vakavanua tale tu ga na veika e yaco tu i loma o ya. E sega ni dua e vaka me control-taka tu se me vaka tu me ring-leader; e sega.
Q109  O iko o tukuna ni o liuli ni logistics, a cava na nona cakacaka o Major Savua?
A:  O koya e nona i tavi na veitaratara vata kei iratou na ovisa me baleta na crime; ke mani so na gone e mavoa, e nona i tavi me tarogi iratou na ovisa i na Special Branch, me qai nona i tavi na veitaratara vata kei iratou me tukuna, "E dua na neiou gone e moku mai qo, e cava e moku kina, ratou taroga tiko na wekana". Na ka kece e ra dau vinakata eso me baleta na i tukutuku vaqo me tarogi vei iratou na ovisa, baleta ni sega tu na talevoni, e ra dau mai taro vei Major Savua, koya e ra qai dau cakava na veitaratara.

Q110  Dou dau vakayagataka na talevoni cava?
A:  Keitou dau vakayagataka saka ga na talevoni i na Palimedi, ia e sogo vei ira na lewe ni vanua me ra kakua ni vakayagataka, koya o ya e ra qai dau gole kina vei Major Savua me ra lai veitaratara.

Q111  Kena i balebale o iko na i liuli ni kakana taucoko i loma o ya - logistics?
A:  Na ka kece me baleta na veisiko, logisctic au qarava saka o au.

Q112  Na kakana koya e dau lako tiko mai e na Unit mai cake; o cei e dau organise-taka na kena dau kau tiko mai na kakana mai cake?
A:  Na taro saka qori e rawa ni tarogi vei Rava. Na kena au qarava e vakatabakidua e na i kakana ni veisiko e dau yaco tiko yani; na falawa, na raisi, bisikete, suka.

Q113  Na ka ni kakana mai cake o Rava?
A:  Io.

Q114  Bau dua na gauna e musu na kemu i sau nomu tu i loma oya?
A:  Au full-pay sara tu ga me yacova mai qo. E lako tu ga noqu veisaumi.

Q115  Can we just confirm the timing; what time did you leave home that morning on May 19th?
A:  About 7.00.

Q116  What time did you arrive at the Unit Office in QEB?
A:  At about 20 past 7.

Q117  The message that was on the notice board; was it shown to you or you just read it there?
A:  It was written there on the notice board but the guard had already told me that I have got a message on the board.

Q118  Did you know who had received that message?
A: No, I do not know who received the message.

Q119 When you received the message with that emergency number to call, was it a mobile number or a normal telephone number?
A: Actually, I cannot really recall that number.

Q120 Where did you ring from?
A: We got a direct line in our office.

Q121 Na number o ya e tiko kina na -9- e liu, se sega?
A: Au sa sega sara ga ni taura rawa, I just cannot recall.

Q122 After ringing that number, what time did you leave the camp for the maritime slipway?
A: It was about 8.30.

Q123 What form of transportation did you take?
A: I came down by bus.

Q124 From the complex, which way did you leave camp?
A: Just outside to the Nabua bus, then to Vatuwaqa by the Vatuwaqa bus.

Q125 What time did you arrive there at the slipway?
A: I think I was there at about 9.00 or ten past 9.00.

Q126 The weapons that were brought over and given to you; how many magazines did you have?
A: It was already fitted.

Q127 When you spoke with Major Ligairi and you were instructed to call Lt Baleinamau, what form of communication did you use, how did you ring?
A: I was using George's mobile telephone.

Q128 The number you called in the camp, was it a mobile number or the normal telephone line?
A: No, it is the normal telephone line.

Q129 Those civilians who were at the maritime, did any of them have any distinguished mark, a lot of tattoos, etc?
A: I cannot recognise them, Sir.

Q130 O cei a draivataka nomudou mini-bus ena nomudou tekivu gole i na Complex?
A: Na mini-bus e nona e dua na civilian.

Q131 A: A draiva tiko na civilian?
A: Io.

Q132 A: Bau dua tale a tiko i kea?
A: O au na gauna ga e sa lai kauti iratou mai kina ya, ratou yaco ga mai, vakalailai, keitou sa vodo yani keitou sa gole sara.

Q133 A: A bau dua tale na civilian a dabe tiko e na gauna o ya?
A: Sega.

Q134 A: Would you be able to recall the number of the mini-bus?
A: No, I cannot recall.

Q135 A: Whilst in the Parliament, there were some shots fired; do you know who fired those shots?
A: I do not know, Sir.

Q136 A: Was Mr Speight or anyone given a pistol or weapon to carry?
A: That, I do not know, Sir.

Q137 A: In the media reports, there is a name mentioned "Commander Bill"; is that name referring to you?
A: I think that is because of the foodstuff, because people come everyday to get the food. We all know the Fijian style, when we want something we praise that particular person so that we get what we want.

Q138 A: Mai na loma ni Palimedi, o iko o refer-taki tiko me o Commander Bill?
A: Baleta o ya na tabana ga ni kau kakana.

Q139 A: There is also a report that you are the one who was coordinating all the operations in the Parliament Complex?
A: No, Sir, maybe because I was receiving all the visitors with all their gifts but I have nothing to do with the operations. The Fijian there do not know when we mean "operations" and the meaning of the Fijian culture and protocol.

Q140 A: Were you aware of the roadblocks that were conducted around Fiji, especially the one at Nabukavesi?
A: No, that was through our operation cell.
Q141 The reason why ask is that, to pass that checkpoint, the individuals were required to produce a pass, it is called "the vanua pass"; are you aware of that?
A: I am aware of that, Sir.

Q142 One of the allegations made is that, the vanua pass was issued from the cell and they had given your name, the person who issued it?
A: Well, most of those people know me because of all those stuff. They do not know all the people who work in the operation cell. Whenever they want food they come to Commander Bill. Who is there? Commander Bill; that is how they all know my name.

Q143 Were you authorising actions against checkpoint from Parliament?
A: It is them, it is not me.

Q144 This is what we are trying to verify?
A: That is from the operations, not me.

Q145 Were you at any time asked for permission to clear certain individuals who pass through checkpoints?
A: I had one brother who rang me up. He came from Nadi and asked if I could help him out.

Q146 How was this conversation made, telephone or mobile?
A: I think we were using the mobile.

Q147 When you talking about the raid on the TV Station, you were telling us a story after that. Would you like to continue with that and tell us more about it?
A: I was never part of that group. I was the last man to leave the Complex and the first man to get back without weapons.

Q148 There is allegations that the group was escorted down by one member of the IFMS?
A: Sir, I was the last to leave the Complex that evening. All the guys that went did not tell us anything about their going down that night.

Q149 O iko a gole vata kei ira?
A: Au a sega ni lako vata kei ira, au a qai muri tu ga. Keitou a qai lako wale sara tu ga e na neitou vakamuri ira wale tu ga se ra lako ivei. Keitou via laki sarava se cava e ratou via laki cakava i taoni, o ya na vu ni noqu lako.
Nomu muri ira o ya me yacova nomu lesu mai vata kei ira, o lesu tale i loma ni Complex?

A: Au liu mai e ra qai muri yani o ira. Au sa mai tiko tale e loma ni Complex e ra sa qai lako yani o ira.

Q151
A: O iko muri ira sara i veii?
O au na vanua ga au lai raici ira kina ni gauna e ra sa biubiu mai kina e na TV One me ra sa biubiu me ra sa gole tale mai vaqo e na Centra Hotel. Au sa rogoca ga nodra kaila, au sa lako sara talega mai na Palimedi.

Q152
A: O iko a tiko e kea e na gauna e ratou vakacaca kina ena TV One?
Sega, au a sega ni tiko i kea.

Q153
A: Na gauna ga e ra yaco yani kina i na Centra, o biuti ira ga mai kea?
Au sa biubiu sara ga mai kea, lesu tale mai na Palimedi.

Q154
A: Kena i balebale o muria sobu ga mai na gaunisala o ya?
Na route keitou sightseeing tu kina e na yakavi o ya, keitou coiri mai vaqo i Vuya Road, lako sobu mai, Queen Elizabeth Drive, USP then to Flagstaff then going up to Toorak then going down, just sightseeing. Keitou qai yaco yani i kea, sa oti nodra cakava na ka o ya, e ra sa lako tu vaqo e na Centra, so we went past them and straight into Parliament.

Q155
A: O wavoki tikoga ena lori?
Au lako tikoga e na lori.

Q156
A: Na lori cava o vakayagataka?
Au kila ga ni a draiways view tiko o Talei, au sega ni kila na lori cava keirau vakayagataka tiko e na yakavi o ya.

Q157
A: Talei cava?
O Talei pori.

Q158
A: Ulu drika?
Io, keirau a lako vata tiko e na yakavi o ya, keirau wavoki sara tu ga.

Q159
A: O Talei tiko talega i loma?
O Talei, Sir, a tiko i kea, a qai vesu, on the first week or first two weeks.

Q160
A: Whilst in the Complex, did you hear of an ultimatum given by Commander RFMF for all soldiers to return back to camp; did you hear of that?
Yes.
Q161
A:
What was the reaction amongst the soldiers in the Parliament?
Sir, as I have already mentioned, we went there through the directive of our Director so what was happening at that particular moment, we were under the leadership of our Director.

Q162
A:
Was this concept discussed amongst yourselves?
There was no discussion about it. We understand that Na Qase was the Commander at that time.

Q163
A:
Was the security of any of the soldiers in the Complex under threat at any time?
From?

Q164
A:
From others - any threat at all?
There were plenty threats coming to us from outside, especially those who want to come and rescue the hostages; threats were coming from overseas; threats were coming from the army; threats were coming from any angle when we were inside.

Q165
A:
Were you yourself ever threatened by the civilians?
I myself was not threatened. We were there for the protection of the hostages. This was our duty inside so most of the threats that were going to the hostages were coming to us too so we were there for their protection, so whilst most of the threats were coming from the civilians we ourselves have to protect the hostages, particularly we have to be aware of the civilians.

Q166
A:
During this whole events, did you at any time ever discussed this with any officers from RFMF other than members of the Unit?
Sir, that is what I am saying. I was there to distribute the food, logistics.

Q167
A:
So you did not talk to anyone?
No, not myself.

Q168
A:
Bau dua na gauna o veitaratara kei iratou na nomudou e ratou tiko mai cake?
Au dau raici iratou ga na neitou e ratou gole tiko yani mai na keba me ratou kau kakana tiko yani vei keitou i loma ni complex.

Q169
A:
Bau so na gauna o veitaratara e na talevoni se ka va o ya?
Sega sara ga, sa cut-off taki vei keitou na line i cake e na gauna keitou tiko kina mai ra.

Q170
A:
Personally, what was your feeling about RFMF position in this whole event?
A: Sir, I think if we do this code of operation in the special unit, which is to be backed up by the whole Force which mostly happens in other big forces, then everything will be finished by then. It is the special unit that usually does the code of operation and the back-up is always done by the main one. This one, I do not know what went wrong.

Q171 Am I correct in saying that you thought you would get the backing of the RFMF?
A: For the first two weeks, I thought that that was going to happen until someone said something then everything was in a different situation.

Q172 Who said what?
A: I do not know what is happening up there.

Q173 There is allegation that you had threatened the life of His Excellency, the former President?
A: Who - me?

Q174 Yes?
A: I did not go to him at any time, Sir.

Q175 The reason why we ask you is to clear the air, you have to understand this. How bitter it may be to you or to us to ask you this, we have to ask this to clear the air, that is why we have a board of inquiry.
A: I just want to say this, Sir, so that you can understand. I did not do that at any time to interfere with the Operations and to do any such calls to the Authority, au e sega sara ga ni tu vei au e dua na kaukauwa. I have no authority to do so.

Q176 The allegation that is made is that, you tried or you attempted to assassinate the President as he was leaving the harbour, you travelled in a boat and tried to stop him, what do you have to say this?
A: Sir, may I make it clear that maybe people are using my name because I was in charge of all those foodstuff, and most people from the interior know me because of this. If there is no food, people will leave, and that is why I think most of the people know my name because whenever they want food they come to me.

Q177 On the same token, was there any plan you know of to basically assassinate the Commander when he arrived back to Fiji on May 19?
A: No, Sir; may I say this that I am clear from all this as I can personally say from my heart that I have nothing to do with all those things.
Q178 You are aware of the number of weapons that were in the Parliament Complex; a lot of these weapons have not been accounted for; are you aware of any weapons that are left somewhere?
A: Sir, to tell you the truth, I do not know anything about the weapons that went missing.

Q179 Matai ni yaragi dou vakayagataka dou a kauta sobu; na pistol ga, dua ga na MP5. Na kena kau na vo ni yaragi koya ra a taba tu e na TV koya e ra tu mai kea ra qai kau mai, na gauna cava a qai kau mai caké na dakai?
A: Meu vakaritaka sara ga vakadodonu, Sir, o au koya ga na pistol koya au a kauta e na i matai ni siga, au vakasuka tale ena siga a suka kina na i yaragi. How those weapons were being taken from here to there, au a qai mai kila ga niu sa mai wili pepa tale. E levu na ka e yaco tiko, au qai kila ga niu sa qai wili pepa tale, na veikauyaki ni yaragi kei na kau yami ni yaragi i na Palimedi au sega sara ga ni kila kina e dua na ka.

Q180 In the Parliament Complex, you were issued with your personal weapons?
A: Yes, personal weapons.

Q181 Even the pistols were personal?
A: We have our own pistols - personal weapon.

Q182 In Parliament that day, you have your own weapon?
A: Yes.

Q183 Did you go to Kalabu after you left the Complex at any time?
A: No, I went straight home from the Complex by taxi.

Q184 From 13th July to the day you were arrested, 28th July, during that period, did you at any time go to Kalabu?
A: No, Sir.

Q185 Amongst the group that were in Parliament, you had Reserve and TF officers and soldiers present as well?
A: Reserves and TFs.

Q186 Is that true?
A: That is true.

Q187 How was the identification made then?
A: They just came in and say, "I am a TF" or I am a Reserve".

Q188 Were you allowed to carry weapons?
A: I was not responsible for the distribution of weapons.

Q189 Did you at any time see any person other than the IFMS personnel carrying weapons?
A: No. It is dangerous for us because people who come from villagers can just pick up any weapon and approach us, and that is why we are careful not to allow any other persons to hold or take any weapon.

Q190 Your taking part in the events of May 19th, were you promised any monetary benefits?
A: No.

Q191 O sa vakaraitaka oti ni drau veikilai kei Mr. Speight, ia bau dua na gauna drau veitalanoa kina ni se bera na i ka 19 ni siga mo vakaraitaka viva na capabilities e tiko ena nomudou Unit?
A: Sega.

Q192 Daru lakova mada na mataka lai lai ni ka 19 ni siga ni vula o Me nomudou tiko e na Maritime Slipway. O vakaraitaka o iko ni o qiri Mr. Baleinamau. A cava na dede ni gauna mai na gauna iko qiri kina kei na gauna ratou sa yaco yani kina na cauravou ratou sa lako yani dou sota ena Maritime Slipway?
A: E rauta ni 40 to 45 minutes

Q193 O sega ni kurabui ni o raici iratou na cauravou ni ratou yaco kece mai qo, o raica ni ratou field operatives kece vaka taki iko?
A: Na cava tale nomuni taro?

Q194 Au tukuna tiko o au ni o iko field operative tiko e na gauna o tiko kina mai cake oya. Na gauna o sa qiri oti kina, ratou sa lako mai na cauravou, o raica o iko ni ratou sa lako mai o Vosavere, o Naduaniwai, o Buadrom - dou field operative kece?
A: Au sega ni kurabui.

Q195 Vakacava na cauravou qo o Alex Alava, a tiko tale ga kina?
A: Au sega ni raici Alex e na mataka ni siga o ya.

Q196 Nomudou curu i Palimedi?
A: Sega.

Q197 Na gauna dou sa curu kina i Palimedi, o cei e securetaka na taudaku ni Parliament Complex?
A: Na gauna keitou curu kina i Palimedi, o au mada ga au sa qarauna ga na neitou i tavi i loma.

Q198. E na gauna o tiko kina i loma, o raici W01 Ravai e loma o ya?
A: O Ravai e wavoki yani i loma vei keitou, oti o ya lako tale mai tuba, oti mai tu e na corridor.

Q199 O cei sara mada koya a tiko i loma vata kei iko?
A: Au raici Naduaniwai ga, Buadromo, Soko.

Q200 O Vosavere o bau raica i loma vei iko?
A: Au vakabauta ni a sega ni tiko i loma o ya o Vosavere.

Q201 Gauna cava sa qai tomanii kemudou kina o Sgt Naika?
A: Au sega sara ga ni taura rawa.

Q202 Gauna cava o qai raici Alex kina?
A: Sa via oti beka e dua na macawa.

Q203 Bau dua na gauna o vanataka kina na nomu yaragi ga o iko vakataki iko?
A: Sega.

Q204 Daru lesuva mada na incident ni vakacaca e na TV Station. E tukuni tiko ni ratou curu i tuba o ira na lai vakacaca o ya, e ratou a escort-taki, e so e tauri yaragi. O iko bau kila se o cei era tauri yaragi tu go?
A: Na ka e baleta na TV One au sega sara ga ni kila kina e dua na ka. Meu tukuna sara ga vakadodonu, Sir, o ira kece na lai vakaitavi kina, au sega sara ga ni taura rawa, au sega sara ga ni kila kina e dua na ka.

Q205 Na gauna cava o qai kila kina ni sa lauvana e dua na ovisa?
A: Au sa qai kila sara ga e na mataka ka tarava e na gauna e sa tabaki kina e na pepa ni dua na ovisa e curu i valenibula, au sa qai wilika i kea ni dua na ovisa e mavo a bogo ni siga o ya.

Q206 Daru lesuva tale mada na vuli vakaivalu a vakayacori tiko e na loma ni Parliament Complex. O tukuna tiko o iko ni caka tiko na drill kei na veika va oya me rawa ni instill-taki vei ira na cauravou kei ira na lewe ni vanua na discipline, ia mai na dua na yasana, e na nomu training koya e tiko qori vei iko, ni o Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit Member, dua na yasana o rawa ni raica iko ni rawa ni veisautaki na vuli vakaivalu e caka tu o ya, instead of being a disciplinary organisation to instill discipline but it could instil revolutionary ideas vei ira na gone koya era vuli tiko o ya?
A: Segal, gauna oya au sega sara ga ni vakasamatake e dua na kena vakasama vaqor.

Q207 O ira na i lala koya e ra vakaitavi mai Sawani, era sa vakayagatake sara ga na nomoudou concept of operation; sa kacivi sara ga na naba.

A: Na ka au kila o au ni ra vakatavulici wale sara ga e na drill mai na noqu kila saka o au. Kevaka e dua tale na ka e na taudaku ni ka vaqori, au sa sega sara ga ni kila na vanua a caka kina. Mai na noqu kila o au, meu tukuna vakadodonu, au kila ga o au ni ra vakatavulici e na drill.

Q208 Otioti ga ni noqu taro me sema tiko ga vata kei na revolutionary ideas koya e nanumi tiko ni a sa bucini mai Palimedi, baleta na nick-name koya e sa tiko vei iko, "Commander Bill". Kevaka me da na raica na vei revolutionary groups e ra vakaitavi tiko mai South America, e vuqa nodra i litili e ra vakayagatake tiko, Commander X, Commander so and so, koya o ya na vu ni noqu tiko baleta na vuli vakaivalu e vakayacori tiko qori. O kemudou na ka ni counter revolutionary warfare dou train-taki kina, kenai balebale in order for you to counter that, you must know about it, kena i palebale e rawa talega ni dou vuqica me instill revolutionary ideas, e rawa talega ni dou counter-taka; o ya na vu ni noqu taro. Na cava na nomu rai i kea?

A: Na vanua lelevu va oya koya e sa desperate kina na ka kece, o kedatou i Viti, me vaka ga au sa vakamacalatake oti, au raica ga na logistics. Na operation e dua tale na master koya e tiko i cake vei au, o koya e levu sara na ka e kila mai vei au. Kevaka dou na kila mada ga, we were playing safe mai vei keitou mada ga vakatake keitou. E da na vakila kece na security forces, kevaka o tiko e dua na vanua sa tense vakalevu na situation, you have to go through the system. Kevaka o na via kaukanti iko cake tale, ia sa na rawa ni dua na ka e caka vei iko mai vei iratou na nomu i tokani. Kevaka o ni na taura vakavinaka sara na vakasama o ya, na vevakatatabei ga ni kai-Viti koya e lai tukuni tiko kina na yaca na "Commander Bill", baleta ni sa tikoga o ratou na tabana ni Operation. Commander Bill e baleta ga na yaqona kei na ka kece vakaoya. Ni sa dua ga e sa lai vakateteya tu na yaca ya ni rawa kina na kau mai ni yaqona, sa na tekivu me vakayagatake tu ga na yaca o ya, vakabibi vei iratou na noqu tauvu mai Vanua Levu, ia na ka ni Operation va o ya, au sa galala sara ga mai kina.

Q209 Talanoatake mada na nomu interview-taki e na TV - o iratou na BBC.

A: Au sa vakamacalatake vakadodonu ga na neitou lako mai ki na loma ni Palimedi, na neitou a veitalanoa kei Na Qase ena matak e o ya, sa vakasaka ga na ka au mai tukuna saka tiko oqo.

Q210 E na nomu taura tu na nomu dakai o ya, e na gauna o interview-taki tiko kina, e a vakatarogi iko tiko na reporter, e tawa tu na nomu dakai, o
cawiritaka tiko; na gauna o ya e bau curumi iko tu e dua na yalo, me vaka e dua na kaukauwa levu sa tu vei iko e na gauna o ya?

A: O keitou mada ga vakataki keitou, na pistol se dakaia o ya e sa neitou tu ga e veisiga. Na neitou training mada, na vakayagataka na i yaragi, sa i karua tu ga ni keitou tavioka se madrai e veisiga. Sa sega ni dua na ka me keitou ririkotaka kina se me dua na ka me keitou rerevaka kina, o ya beka na level ni training sa toka vei keitou e na gauna oqo. Ni keitou qai taura toka e dua na dakaia, sa sega sara ga ni qai vaka me keitou rerevaka tu e dua na ka, sa vaka ga me keitou madrai tu.

Q211

O bau vakaitavi e na kena marautaki na nodra siganisucu na hostages e na Palimedi?
A: Sir, au se qai rogoça vakadua na ka qori.

Q212

A sega ni bau dua na gauna o a takuna vei Tupeni Baba, "Nomu siganisucu ni kua, lai dabe e na I dabedabe nei Speaker me tune-taka o Joeli Kalou me laga na 'Happy Birthday' ena loma ni Palimedi"?
A: Meu takuna sara ga vakadodoun, Sir, se qai matai sara ga ni ka au rogoça me baleta e dua na siganisucu mai na Palimedi au se qai mai rogoça qo vei kemuni.

Q213

E na gauna o sa qiri kina vei OC, "Au sa tiko qo vei Na Qase, dou kauta mai nomudou dui yaragi, dou lako sobu mai, e sega tale ni question-taka mai o OC na ka o takuna yani?
A: Sega.

Q214

Na cava e takuna mai o koya mai yasana kadua?
A: O koya sa takuna mai "Okay."

Q215

Ni bera ni keitou solia vei iko na galala mo lesu tale I kea, bau dua tale na ka o via vakamacalataku?

Recalled on 9/9/00:

Sgt Tikotani after having been reminded of former Oath was re-interviewed as follows:
Q216: Sgt, ena vica tale na taro. Ena gauna dou a lako sobu kina i Palimedi, matai ni tamata e liu i loma o George Speight, karua ni tamata o iko, katolu o Naduaniwai, dina ya se sega?
    E dina saka.

Q217: O iko a taura na pistol ena loma ni chamber, o qai vanataka e loma ni chamber, e dina ya se sega?
    Au sega ni rawa ni sauma saka na taro qori.

Q218: Ena loma ni Palimedi, ena nomu matai ni statement, o tukuna ni o tiko ena tabana ni logistics.
    Sir.

Q219: Mai na so tale na statements keitou taura, keitou sa kila ocei nai liuli ni logistics. Keitou sa lai raica rawa mai na Palimedi na vanua e tiko kina na logistics, keitou sa veitalanoa vata kei koya e liutaka na logistics. Na taro qo, O iko a lewa tiko na ka ni logistics se o lai tiko kei ira na lewe ni vanua?
    Na kena vakadinadina saka ga o ni na rawa ni tarogi Na Qase saka kina, okoya e wasewasea vei keitou na neiutou i tavi. O Major Savua e mainly deal-taka na crime me vaka ga au a solia enai matai ni gauna. Ia, na ka ga au a tukuna enai matai ni siga, au na sega ni veisautaka ya, Sir, o ya saka na noqui tavi meu cakava me baleta na matanitu.

Q220: Enai ka 18 ni siga ena vula o Me, o ya na siga Tusiti ena macawa ga ni vuaviri, o iko a sota vata kei Peceli Vuniwa, drau a vakasigalevu vata?
    Au sega ni rawa ni sauma saka na taro qori, Sir.

Q221: Ena i ka 17 ni siga, ena 10 na kaloko, e mai pick-taki iko o Peceli Vuniwa, drau lako i Colo-i-Suva, drau lai sota vata kei Maciu, e dina ya se sega?
    Au sega saka ni rawa ni sauma qori, Sir.

Q222: Esa oti ya, drau qai gore lai sota kei Duvuloco, Savua, Speight ena vale nei Apenisa Cakobau, e dina ya se sega?
    Sega, au a sega ni tiko ena sota qori.

Q223: Ena i 17 ni siga, ena 10 na kaloko, na bose e caka ena vale nei Ratu Apenisa, oa sega ni tiko kina?
    Au sega saka ni tiko kina.

Q224: E nai matai ni gauna nomu soli tukutuku eke o vakamacalataka ni o sega ni kila saraga e dua na ka me baleta na ka oqo. Au tarogi iko, matai ni gauna o
qai rogoca na ka ni vuaviri enai ka 19 ni siga se o sa kila rawa ena ka 16 ni siga?

A: Qori au na sega saka ni rawa ni sauma ena gauna saraga qo. Au na sega ni veisautaka na noqu statement, na ka au vakabauta ni sa donu, au sa solia mai ena matai ni noqu statement.

Q225: Satini, enai ka 27 ni siga ena siga Vakarauwai, oti e dua na macawa mai na takeover, e dua na group e lako mai Palimedi, ka cavuta na check-point ni 3FIR ko tiko e Vuya road. Na kena yaco na ka ya, ea lauvana kina o Mr. Rokoura kei dua na private, o kila o cei e vanai rau qo?

A: Sega. Na taro qori, au via vakaraitaka ga vei kemudou o koya na matai ni noqu statement ya, au na sega saraga ni rawa ni vakadeitaka ocei ea vakayacora. Au kila ni lewe levu era beitaki au kina baleta na lako ya, ia meu vakaraitaka vakadodounu na tamata kece era tiko ena siga ya, era sa vakayaragi tu. Ia meu tukuna saraga vakadodounu, Sir, au sega ni kila na vuna erau lai mavoa kina oran ya. E dua saka na ka au vakabauta ni dua na cross-fire levu eratou a cakava o iratou ena siga ya, me vaka na kena ea yaco mai Kalabu, au vakabauta talega ni na dua na ka va ya ena yaco. Ia meu kila ocei e veivana, au sega saraga ni kila.

Q226: Vakacava nae ka 28 ni siga, ena Sigatabu ea smash-taki kina na TV station, na Board esa kilo tiko ni gauna e lako kina na mob i tuba, eso vei kemudou e lako tiko vata kei ira. Na Sigatabu qo, e so ea lako vata kei ira baleta ni dou tukuna tiko ni sega ni issue na yaragi vei ira na civilians, o kemudou ga dou vakayaragi tiko, kenai balebale ya o kemudou ga dou na lako tiko se o kemudou ga dou na vana tiko ena gauna kece, me vaka na nona a lauvana o koya na ovisa. O kila ocei ea lako vata kei ira na mob ya?

A: Au sa tukuna, Sir, ena matai ni noqu statement niu sega saraga ni kila kina e dua na kena veitalanoa.

Q227: Ena gauna esa lauvana kina na ovisa, o qai rogoca?

A: Okoya saka ga ya, Sir.

Q228: Ena gauna dou a curu kina ena loma ni chambers enai matai ni siga, ea veitaba tiko o John Naisara, e dina ya se sega ena loma ni chamber?

A: Ena loma ni chamber, ena matai ni siga, au sega ni vakabauta ni a veitaba o koya.

Q229: Io, oti e vica na auwa e qai curu i loma o Naisara?

A: Sir, ena gauna madaga qo na ka au vakasamataka me baleti Naisara, au sega saraga ni understand-taka na gauna e veitaba tiko kina okoya.
Q230: E dua na ka au via clear-taka, e curu ena loma ni chamber o George, o iko, Naduaniwai, ocei tale ea curu vata kei kemudou i loma ya?
A: Sir, au vakabauta ni noqu matai ga ni statement, okoya ga ya na ka au se vakasamataka rawa, mai na siga keitou a lako kina i loma ya. Mai na taudaku ni ka ya, au sa sega ni kila.

Q231: O sa dede ena loma ni Unit, vakasamataka lesu ea tiko i loma o Qicatabua?
A: Au kila esa oti beka e vica na siga, au qai raici Qica i loma. Ena matai ni noqu statement, ena gauna sa caka kina na veisau.

Q232: O raici Liganivai mai Mokani?
A: Sir, ko saka au rawa ni vakasamataka ni keitou a lako vata i loma, au sa biuta oti ena noqu first statement.

Q233: Is it true that whilst holding the Fijian Members of Parliament, you threatened to shoot them if the Army raided the complex?
A: Au vakabauta that that is a false statement.

Q234: You did not say that?
A: No.

Q235: Na brief e qai caka vei ira, e tukuni vei ira ni kevaka ena kaba mai na mataivalu, era na lauvana mada elitu na hostages, e dina ya se sega?
A: Au vakabauta ni statement qori ena qai saumi taro kina Na Qase.

Q236: Satini, o iko ena nomu qai curu i loma ni chamber, o sa kila tu na kenai naki?
A: Sega, au sa vakamalatataka oti ena noqu first statement, ke dou wilika vakamalua esa tiko kina.

Q237: Satini, o bau curu i tuba ena gauna o a tiko kina i Palimedi?
A: Sir, mai na siga ga keitou a lako kina i loma me yacova mai qo, au qai lesu tale mai tuba.

Q238: Vakacava na siga Vakaraunwai, 20th, o sega ni lai kauta mai na nomu veisau ena dua na vanua se o lai veisau ena dua na vanua?
A: Au sa vakamatalataka tiko ena noqu statement ya, au qai lako mai ena loma ni chamber ni sa siga Tusiti. Au sega ni vakasamataka tale e dua na vanua au a gole kina.

Q239: O sega ni lai sobu sebera na wavu i Laqere, ena yasana i matau?
A: Sega.

Q240: O sega ni lai kauta mai e dua na nomu veisau se o via sili?
A: Sega.

Q241: O vakavale tiko ilei?
A: Au tiko saka mai Laqere.

Q242: Ena siga Vakarauwai, o sega ni lako vata kei ira na lala cakacaka tiko ena Palmedzi?
A: Sega, au kerea saka ga me lai kau mai na noqu veisau. Na noqu veisau ga e dau lai kau tiko mai vale.

Q243: O sega ni lako i vale?
A: Sega, au sega ni lako i vale. Ena gauna ya, keitou se osooso sara tu ga, na noqu veisau ga au dau kerea me kau mai.

Q244: You told them where you stay?
A: Yes.
TWENTY THIRD WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 27149 PRIVATE JITOKO SOKO

Pre Soko, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Na gauna cava ko a curu kina ena IM5?
A: Ena yabaki sa oti saka.

Q2: Vakamacalataka na nomu vakaitavi ena vuaviri me tekivu mai na gauna o rogoca na ka e baleta na vuaviri.
A: Ena mataka ni siga Vakaraubuka, au a tiko ena Unit ka mani kaciva o OC e dua na brief.

Q3: O kila na gauna?
A: Au sa sega ni vakasamataka. A soli vei keitou me keitou mai veisau mai, a soli vei keitou e 15 na mimiti me keitou veisau mai ena civilian.

Q4: Na cava e tukuni ena brief?
A: Au qei muri yani, au sa domuya ga na kena tukuni na provide security me baleta na maji, a sega ni tukuni na vanua cava.

Q5: Dou sa lai veisau?
A: Keitou sa lai veisau, keitou sa qai lako mai, neitou lako mai o ya esa lako oti e dua na lawalawa. Esa lako e dua nai lawalawa, au sega ni kila evei.

Q6: Nomudou lako o ya, o cei soti dou a lako vata?
A: Au a muri yani, au sega ni raica e dua.

Q7: Okay, ena gauna ko a vodo kina ena loma ni lorry o ya, nau tukutuku tautoko oqo keimami sa kila oti, o iko sa i ka 52 ni tamata. Naduaniwai, Baleinamau, Dakai kei Na Qase, na yaca tautoko o ya o kila vinaka. Na ka keitou cakava tiko oqo e reconfirm taka tiko yani me davo vinaka na ka dina e yaco. O cei dou a gole vata i ra?
A: Au a lako tauauga ga, au sega ni vodo ena lori. Au a berata mai na i lakolako. Ni tukuni ni mai caka na brief ni maji, au a lako sobu i na maji. Sa lako mai na maji, au sega ni raica e dua e kea. Au qai lako ga mai keirau sota kei Major Kafoa qai tukuna mai o ko ya ni ratou sa tu e kea o iratou na unit.

Q8: Oqori na i ka 19 ni siga?
A: Io saka.

Q9: You were told to provide security?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q10: O gole vakacava i ra?
A: Au vodo basi saka.

Q11: O kaura sobu na nomu i yaragi?
A: Sega saka, au a qai laki issue ga e Palimedi.

Q12: Ena gauna o gole sobu kina ki Suva, o gole vata kei na dua?
A: Sega saka, au a gole taudua.

Q13: O lako vaka cava?
A: Ena gauna au lako sobu kina, au a gole taudua ga yani. Keirau qai laki sota ga kei Ledua e loma ni Palimedi.

Q14: O lako sobu i Suva ena maji, oti na maji o ya, vakamacalataka mada?
A: Ni oti na maji sa rogo yani ni caka na vuaviri. Keirau sota kei Mr. Kafao. Qai vakaratanga ko ya ya sa ratou tiko na unit i cake ena bai. Au sa mani gole caka sara me vaka ni a brief taki keitou o OC me baleta na squadron.

Q15: Ena i ka 19 ni siga o a gole sobu mo laki raica na maji. Ena gauna cava o qai lesu tale kina ena unit i cake? Mai kea ga kina loma ni complex?
A: Mai vanua ga ni maji ki na loma ni Parliament Complex.

Q16: O drau a sota e vei kei Major Kafao?
A: E loma ni tauini.

Q17: Ena nomu curu e loma ni complex, o cei o sotava?
A: Au sota vata kei iratou na neiitou i lawalawa.

Q18: E dua na i yaragi e qai laki issue vei iko e loma o ya?
A: Io saka.

Q19: Ea tu evei na i yaragi?
A: Na nciq lako yani me issue-taki na i yaragi ea tu e kea o Sgt. Celeasiga vata kei storeman o Bukasila.

Q20: Na cava na nona appointment o Celeasiga?
A: Au curu ga yani ena loma ni store room sa dabe tu e kea o ko ya, au segu ni taura rawa, au taura ga na i yaragi.

Q21: Na i yaragi era a tu e loma o ya o ko ya ga na i yaragi a kau lesu mai ka taba tu ena pepa?
A: Na i yaragi e tu i loma o ya, au segu ni taura rawa se a taba ena pepa se segu.

Q22: O raica na ka ea qai taba tale ena pepa? Na i yaragi koce e tu e loma o ya a qai taba tu ena pepa. O raica o ya?
A: Io saka.

Q23: Na ka kece o ya o raica ni o tu e loma?
A: E so saka ga vata kei na so tale na neitou assault kit.

Q24: Ena nomu qai curu yani ena i ka 19 ni siga, na ka kece o ya sa tu e loma o ya?
A: Ena ke na yakav.

Q25: Ena gauna o curu kina ki loma, na dakai e tawa tu ena cava?

Q26: O cei a sainitaka vei iko na dakai?
A: O Celeasiga a tiko kina.

Q27: Na i tavi cava qai soli vei iko e loma o ya?
A: E na yakav tiko ga o ya qai soli vei au na i tavi ni yadra.

Q28: Mo yadra i vei?
A: Ena perimeter.

Q29: O bau yadra ena dua na gauna ena matamata i liu se i muri?
A: Sega saka.

Q30: O bau yadderi ira na hostages?
A: Io saka, oya ni sa oti e rua na siga.

Q31: Ke na i balebale e rua na nomu i tavi, dua na perimeter, dua tale na hostages?
A: Io saka.

Q32: E so tale na i tavi ea soli vei iko e loma o ya?
A: E a soli mai vei au ni oti e tolu se va na siga, me'u personal security nei George.

Q33: O cei ea solia vei iko?
A: O Sgt. Tikotani.

Q34: Na i ka vica ni siga ea soli kina vei iko na i tavi o ya?
A: Sa oti saka beka e tolu na siga sa qai soli vei au na i tavi o ya.

Q35: E na nomu tiko ena Parliament complex, ko a bau lako vata kei ira na i lala laki vakacaca i tuba se vanavana?
A: E sega saka.

Q36: E bau dua na gauna o vanataka na nomu dakai ena nomu tu e loma ni complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q37: Ko a vakaitavi ena kena kau mai na i yaragi mai cake se o a rogo ca na kena kau mai na i yaragi mai na unit kina complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q38: O bau curu e loma ni operation room ena loma ni complex ena dua na gauna?
A: O au na noqui tavi tu ga na yadra vi George sa o koya sara tu ga o ya.

Q39: Ni dau vakayacori na bose lelevu, o cei soti e dau lewe ni bose? Ena gauna eratou dau bose kina o George.
A: Au mada ga au sega ni kilai ira na bose.

Q40: O cei so na body guard nei George?
A: O au, o Vunitabua kei Na'sara.

Q41: The weapon that you were issued when you arrived at the complex, was this your personal weapon from the camp?
A: E sega ni personal weapon, au lako yani au tara sara na i yaragi.

Q42: Every time you drew a weapon and you return it, it must be logged in?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q43: When were you arrested?

Q44: Where were you arrested?
A: At home.

Q45: While in the cell, did you return the pistol? Was this the same pistol you were carrying in the complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q46: Was there any question asked as to why that weapon was not returned? Did anyone ask you for that weapon in the complex?
A: I told Col. Caucau.

Q47: That was after you were brought in. What I am asking is when the weapons were confiscated from the complex before returning it to the camp on 13th July, did someone in the complex ask you for the pistol?
A: Ijo saka. Au a sa laki vakasuka na dakai. Oti e a qai dua tale na instruction e lako yani vei Na Qase vei keitou na body guard me tikoga vei keitou na pistol. Au mai maroro ya na pistol ena dua na vanua ga e kea mo'lu sa lako ki vale.
Q48: Ni'u sa tiko mai vale qai qiri tale yani o Jese me taroga tale yani na pistol me vakayagataka o Cakau. Au tukuna vei koya ni'u na sega ni solia vua na pistol baleta ni issue-taki tu. Au qiri sara vei Shane au tukuna sara ni gauna ga au na lako mai kina au na qai kauta mai. Au kauta mai na pistol mai bulu tale i vale. Na kena mai bulu tiko o ya qai lako mai na kena veivaqaqai, au sa taura ga na neiraue veivosaki kei Shane. Au trust-taki koya me vaka ni noqu i liliu ka sa tukuna o koya meu qai kauta ga mai ena gauna au lako mai kina i na keba. Ena gauna e qai vosa kina vei keitou o Col. Tuatoko, oti e ria na siga, sa qai lesu tale na noqu vakasarna au sa qai kerea meu raici Col. Caucau. Oti o ya sa tukuna oko ya me'u kauta cake mai. Au qai saga me'u tarai Shane tale tiko sa oso-oso. Au vinakata me keirau veitalanoa kei Shane ke mani dua na leqa e yaco mai muri, erau sa veitalanoa oti kei Caucau. Au vinakata me'u vakaraitaka vei ko ya na maroroi ni pistol ogo e muria tiko ga na lewa mai cake vata kei na neirau veivosaki kei Shane, eda se vei trust taki ka sa mai soli ogo. Ena siga ka tarava sa qai lako mai o Tuivaanavou sa qai mai vosataki au. Sa qai tucuna o koya na cava au solia kina na pistol, au qai tukuna ni'u sega ni vinakata me'u na leqa kina. Qai vakatarogatale o koya vei au na serial number au sa sega ni taura rawa. Ena gauna ogo na pistol sa tikoga vei Col. Caucau.

Lt. Tuivaanavou when he spoke with you, was this in the QEB guard cell?
A: Yes, Sir. E mai vakaraitaka saka ga o koya kevaka me'u sa mani tarogi me'u kua ni vakaraitaka e dua na ka me baleta na i yaragi.

Q50: O cei a tukuna vei iko?
A: O Tuivaanavou.

Q51: Na directive o ya e lako mai vei?
A: E mai vosa tiko i katubaleka. E tukuna o koya kevaka e sa lako mai e dua me taroga na i yaragi, me'u kua ni tukuna e dua na ka.

Q52: Who was with you when he said these things? Was there anyone else there?
A: Ena gauna o ya keimami tiko taucoko ena cell. O koya e lako mai katubaleka, kacivi Sauluru. O keitou na tiko e kea keitou rogoca na veitalanoa.

Q53: The other two body guards; did they have the pistols with them also?
A: Au sega ni raica se kila e rau vakasuka se sega.

Q54: Na instruction o ya e lako mai vei Na Qase?
A: Sa tukuna mai o Na Qase, au qai lako tale me'u laki confirm taka vei Waqaniboro. E tukuna o Waqaniboro ni na ka ga e tukuna o Na Qase dou vakamuria.

Q55: When you were in the complex, did you at any time escort people out of the Parliament complex? This is not George Speight and the others. These were the mobs that went out to damage the TV station and ransacked the houses at Veiuto.

CONFIDENTIAL
There were allegations that one of the 1MS personnel escorted the mobs to the TV station.

A: Ena noqu tiko e loma o ya, au sega tale ni vakaitavitalicu ena dua tale na i tavi.

Q56: We know it is there but surely you would have spoken with each other in the complex. You always talk about events, what transpire, such a small place. What date did you leave the Parliament complex?

A: 13th July.

Q57: From that day until the day you were arrested, did you go up to Kalabu?

A: No.

Q58: The day you were arrested, were you given reasons for your arrest?

A: No.

Q59: Since the day you were charged and put on this island, has anyone approached you to basically withhold information from the enquiries or ....

A: Only Tuivanuavou.

Q60: You have not been told by anyone to change your story to basically distort the facts.

A: No, Sir.

Q61: Private Soko, ena i ka 19 ni siga ni vula ko Me, ko a bau tiko ena briefing a caka tiko ena Maritime ka tiko kina o George Speight?

A: E sega saka.

Q62: Ena vica na kaloko ko a qai curu kina ena Parliament complex?

A: Ni oti na vakasiga levu, au sega ga ni taura rawa ena gauna cava.

Q63: O bau rogoca e dua na i talanoa ni sa vakaraun vakayacori na vuaviri?

A: Au via tukuna vakadodonu, au sa tukuna talega vei iratou na ovisa, na veitalanoa au sega sara ga ni kila kina e dua na ka. Au qai mai curu koso ga ni'u sa muria ga na order o koya sa laoko mai. E sega ni dua na i talanoa se vosa me'u rogoca.

Q64: Kila na gauna o sa laki taura mai kina na nomu dakai ea tiko kina o Satini Celeasiga, o bau raici Bukasila talega i kea?

A: E sega.

Q65: E bau dua na gauna o vakayagataka kina na dakai?

A: E sega saka.

Q66: Na i otioti ni taro, ena gauna sa tukuni kina vei iko o Lt. Col. Caucau mo vakasuka mai na nomu pistol, ea bau dua tale na ka e tukuna vei iko?
A: Na ka ga keirau veitalanoataka mai kea, au kidacala ni sa taroga tale vei au o Sarge. O koya ea tukuna vei au; "ogo na nodaru ga, ena sega ni vakau na yacamu na se na taba edua na kemu jaji se mo na tarogi tale kina".

Q67: Ea bau dua tale e tu e kea ena nomudrau veitalanoa?
A: E sega. Keitou a vodo mai ena neitou lesu mai vale, keitou kele, ea kacivi au o koya i tuba, qai vosa vei au. Ta, eratou vodo tiko o Driver vata kei na escort. E kacivi au o koya e tuba ka keirau lako me keirau laki veitalanoa.

Q68: Ena nomudrau veitalanoa na cava ea tukuna o koya vei iko?
A: E tukuna o ko ya vei au oqo me nodaru ga o kedaru, au na sega ni kauta cake ena Board se me na tarogi tale vei iko vakalawa se tabaki ena pepa. Daru tukuna ga ni soli ga mai vua e dua na lewe ni vanua.

Q69: Do you know that that pistol has been used in evidence in court?
A: Au sega ni kila e dua na ka, au kila ga na instruction mai vei Na Qase. Au tu e kea, au veisaumi tiko ena noqo tuga ena muri lewa baleta na ka ea tukuni vei au.

Q70: My question is that the pistol that is handed over to Col. Caucau, are you aware that that pistol is being used in court as evidence?
A: Au sega ni kila e dua na ka.

Q71: Bau dua na gauna e musu na kemu i sau?
A: E sega.

Q72: Na i tekivu ni ka oqo, e lako tu ga na kemu i sau?
A: Au veisaumi tu ga, e lako tu ga na kequ rations, na kequ i wasewase mai cake me ratou sainitaka. E dua na instruction e soli mai vei iratou na legal meu sainitaka na noqu leave.

Q73: O se qai tekivu, o iko live-in? Ena i tekivu ni operation oqo, na kakana mai cake e lako tikoga.
A: O au mada ga na kequ i wasewase e kauta yani o Satini Vuki, na tini bulumakau, hot box.

Q74: E dua na report e lako mai ni o iko a tiko vata kei ira na 1MS ka ra a curu i loma e liu?
A: Au a sega ni tiko kina.

Q75: Na gauna o qai curu kina e loma, sa caka oti na vuaviri. Na i vakadinadina cava e tu vei iratou na nomu i vakadinadina, o iratou na ovisa?
A: Manasa (SB) and Hansard Staff. Au lako yani o ya, o iratou a tiko e loma eratou se tikoga e loma, e tiko e tuba o wati Marika Nasegai. E ratou kacivi au meu gunu ti, eratou duri tu ena vanua ni talevoni. Na noqu duri tu o ya, au qai lako tale i loma
ena bogi ni siga ka tarava. Au curu ga ena i ka 19 ni siga, na i ka 20 au sa qai tekvu kinu.

Q76: Still on the same point, we have evidence from senior members of the unit who have given your name that you were at Maritime and also in the complex? How do you justify that?
A: Keirau a duri tu vata kei Ravai.

A: Au sega ni tiko e loma. O rau o Liganivai kei Qicatabua e rau a tiko ena timi a lako i loma vei keitou na selection vou.

Q78: O Liganivai cava?
A: O koya e senior tiko vei rau.

Q79: Na cava erau sa qai tukana o rau na curu e loma?
A: O iratou na Ops team; Naduaniwai, Tikotani, Alex Alava, Vosavere, Liganivai and Qicatabua kei Buadromu.

Q80: What about Sgt. Naika, did he go in?
A: Au a sega ni tiko i loma me'u raica o cei e lako yani. Au qai mai rogoca ga na veitilanoa e caka tiko ena Ops. O rau na noqu i vakadinadina, au sa sotavi rau me rau na vakadinadina talega ena kisi e caka ena vale ni veilewai.

Q81: Na nomu curu e loma o cei so sa tiko e loma ni complex ka ratou tiko kina o iratou na hostage.
A: Au kila ga o rau o ya, o rau o Qicatabua kei Liganivai.

Q82: Na matai mada ni nomu curu, o kila rawa o cei e sa tiko e loma?

Q83: O Ravai ga e sotavi iko i matamata?
A: O Ravai ga keirau yadra vata tiko ena perimeter ena nodratou building na Hansard kei na building e cake.

Q84: E lakc tale i vei o Ledua se o cei o drau a gole vata sobu tiko i na maji?
A: O Ledua e yadra tiko i na matamata i muri.

Q85: Na gauna cava o kiia ni sa caka kina na vuaviri?
A: Au kila ga ni a caka vei keitou na briefing to protect the VIP E sega ni tuikini e dua na ka dina e yaco.
Q86: Na gauna cava o qai kilo kina ni sa yaco e dua na ka dina?
A: Ena gauna au qai lako yani kina au raici iratou na neitou ni ratou sa yadra tu vata kei ira e so na civilians.

Q87: O kila e dua vei ira na civilians?

Q88: O sega ni raici Apenisa Rokoqica?

Q89: E sega ni dua na scar e tiko kina.
A: Au sega ni raica vakavinaka baleta ni vaka balaclava tu.

Q90: Ena gauna cava drau sota kina kei Major Kafoa?
A: Ena gauna era sa cici mai kina e Draiba. Au sa raici iratou ga au sa mani kaya me ratou lako mai.

Q91: O lako yani sa tu e kea o Sgt Major Ravai?
A: O Ravai, keirau qai sota tikoga ena yakavi.

Q92: O cei e direct taki iko mo lako vei Sgt. Celeasiga?
A: Au lako ga yani, au tarogi ratou ya, eratou tukuna na i yaragi sa issue tiko ena store room i ra. Ni keitou tiko mai cake, keitou dau vakarorogo ga vei Tupena, ena gauna au tiko kina i Palimedi, au sa vakarorogo vei Na Qase. O Tupena e sa tukuna me keitou vakarorogo vei Na Qase.

Q93: Kevaka keitou vinakati iko, keitou na qai kacivi iko tale. Ni se bera o ya, e dua tale na ka o via vakamacalatake?
A: E dua sakaga na noqu kerekere, me kerei mada o iratou na Legal de tiko e dua na dodonu me ratou raica mada vakavinaka na neitou kisi. Me vaka ni keitou muri lewa tu ga, keitou sega tu ni kilo na veika e caka tu. Na jaji e mai tau tu oqo, me'u tukuna vakadodonu, au sega saraga ni kilo e dua na kena bosei se dua tale na ka. Me kerei 2 dua na veivuke vei iratou na Legal.

Recalled on 9/9/00:

Pte Soko, after having been duly reminded of oath earlier taken, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q94: O na yadreva me veisau nomu statement?
E rawa ni vakamacalataka vei au o Bukarau, baleta qo se qai matai sara ga ni noqu saumi taro qo, e so na taro dou taroga vei au a sega ni matata vei au. Au sa qai lai dahe e na siga o ya, so na taro dou taroga vei au, sa tu oti na noqu i cau ni taro vei iratou na ovisa.

Q95: Sa raici au oti o Bukarau ni o iko vata kei Tikotani, drau viaveisautaka nomudrau statement?
A: Sir, o ya na statement baleta na ka ni dakai.

Q96: What we will do we we will keep asking you questions, when it is time for you to sign your statement, then you can have a look at it before you sign your statement. O iko viaveisautaka nomu statement baleta na dakai?
A: Sir, me vaka au a sa tukuna oti, na dakai o ya na neirau veitalanoa lo ga, neirau veidinadini gao o keirau, a sega ni biko ena noqu statement. Au sa nanuma tiko me dua na noqu affidavit me qai biu e na noqu affidavit, meu vakamacalataka kina na neirau sota, na ka taucoko a yaco, kei na taro e na tarogi tale mai vei au.

Q97: Ko ya na dakai koy a soli vei?
A: Mr. Caucau.

Q98: Nomudrau veidinadini qori; you gave the pistol to Col Caucau, tukuna o koya vei iko, ke o solia na dakai, sega ni dua na ka ena yaco?
A: Na suka ni yaragi mai na Palimedi, a tukuna vei keitou na bodyguards o Na Qase, me keitou maroroya ga na neitou side-arms, o ya na noqu personal side-arm ga o ya, na naba ni dakai o ya, meu maroroya, me suka ga na MP5. Na gauna au sa vakasuka kina na MP5, au sa tukuna sara vei Bukasila vata kei Ravulo ni noqu side-arm sa tiko ga vei au, oti au sa mai cache-taka ga e na dua na vanua o ya, au sa la ko i vale. Au tiko mai vale, sa qiri tale yani o Ulucake. Sa kere a o koya noqu dakai me vakayagataka o koya e sosomitaki au, o Cakau. Oti au tukuna vua, "Sega, au na sega ni solia na dakai baleta na neirau veivosaki kei Na Qase, tukuna o koya me maroroy, me qai lai vakasuka ga i cake." Oti au lako, au qiri vei Steven, au tukuna vua, 'Steven, dua na side-arm e tiko vei au'. Sa qai tukuna o Steven me na gauna ga au sa lako kina i cake (i na keba), meu qai laki vakasuka lesu tale kina vei koya.

Dua tale na siga Vakarauiwai, au qiri tale vei koya au tukuna vei koya, sa qai tukuna mai o koya, "Sega, gauna ga o sa lako mai kina, qai kauta cake ga mai", oti au sa mani maroroya tikoga, o koya ya au sa lai cache-taka tale mai vale. Na gauna au sa lai vesu mai kina e na Siga Tabu, biu tikoga i vale na ka o ya, sa lai brief yani o Mr Caucau nodratou lako mai na CID, ko ya na i matai sara ga ni siga me keitou interview kina, na i ka 7 ni siga. Nona brief-taki keitou oti ga, lako ga i tuba, au sa kacivi koya tale me keirau veitalanoa baleta ga na i yaragi ko ya e tiko vei au, keirau mani mai veitalanoa. Oti au sa mani vakaratika vei koya, "O Steven e sa tukuna vei au meu qai kauta cake mai vei koya, ia, koya na kena e tiko vei au, au sega ni..."
vinakata me dua na leqa me yacovi au, baleta au vinakata meu sa solia ga na dakai vei Stevens. Oti sa tukuna sara o koya me keirau lako i vale, keirau lai kauta mai. Ncira au lako mai o ya, keirau sa mai sobu i Rabuka Hall, se ra interview tiko o ira ya, keirau sa lako o keirau. Keirau lesu mai, o kemuni a duri saka tu ena Rabuka Hall e na mataka saka ni siga o ya (to the President), keirau sobu yani. Keirau duri tu o ya, sa vakamatalataka sara oko ya vei au (o keirau ga tu ekeea, e sega tale ni dua e tu ikeea) sa tukuna oko ya, "Qo na nodaru ga o kedaru. Au na sega ni vakaraataka e dua na ka, kakua ni tukuna tale vei dua, au na tukuna ga ni qo e lako ga mai vua e dua na lewe ni vanua, dua ga e handover-taka mai. Sa taura ga o koya na dakai, kauta, au sa lako sara o au meu lai interview.

Q99: Dua tale na ka o via vakamatalataka baleta na nomu statement o solia e na siga o ya ni se bera ni keitou tarogi iko e na so tale na taro?
A: Dou sa taro saka toka mada ga mai, au sa na qai vakasamataka toka na sau ni taro.

Q100: E rawa ni o vakamatalataka na gauna dou a brief-taki kina e na i ka 19 ni siga, o tukuna ni a brief-taki kemudou o OC mai na Unit? Rawa ni o talanoataka mada ni ka 19 ni siga, tekivu mai na nomudou lesu mai Nukulau e na exercise?
A: Sir, vakacava saka ni sa tiko vei iratou na ovisa na noqu statement? O OC e brief-taki keitou e na VIP Protection ka sega ni tukuna o koya e caka i vei.

Q101: Na statement o ya e na tiko a vei iratou na ovisa, what we are taking is an independent statement.
A: Ia, e dua ga noqu taro, baleta au sega ni vinakata meu na leqa kevaka au veiveisautaka tiko noqu i sau ni taro, baleta au sa na vosa ga vakadodonu de lakolako dua na ka au tukuna i ke qai lai veicalati tale na gauna se na tiki ni siga au tukuna vei iratou na ovisa, de qai lai blu vata au na qai leqa kina vakalevu.

Q102: The statement you give in this Board, the army can lay charges based on that statement but the statement itself cannot be used in court. If you have given the police a statement and you give us a statement, the police cannot come back and use this statement to contradict an earlier statement because this statement do not hold water: This statement cannot be used. That is the Board of Inquiry regulations. The army cannot only lay charges based on the statement. If they do, they cannot use this statement either in an orderly room or court martial. If they want to do that, they will come back to you and take another statement, in which case you will be cautioned, and then that statement will be used in court.

Dua na ka meu vakamatatataka, na ka eratou sa cakava na ovisa, keitou na sega ni cakava tale, you cannot be charged twice. Basically what we are doing is not what the police are doing. What we are doing we are looking at the circumstances, why it was committed, we are also taking into consideration why it was done, mitigation. Do you understand that mitigation?

A: Sega saka.
Q103: Meu vakamacalataka, this is a unique case baleta e dua na kena i wase e taura tiko na ovisu. Ko ya na kisi e ratou prosecute kina na ovisu, keitou na sega ni prosecute kina. In other words, you cannot be charged twice. What we want to do is really to establish why it was done. Koya beka o ya meu vakamatatatuka, some dates you may not be sure but we will try and help one another, we can assist you with some of the dates. Na i matai ni nomu statement o tukuna ni matai ni nomudou brief, dou lako mai Nukulau, oti i Nukulau dou lako i cake.
A: Sega ni Nukulau, i Makuluva saka.

Q104: Oti na exercise dou a cabe mai vei; i na Marine se i vei?
A: Keitou a cabe i na Range.

Q105: Rawa ni o vakamatatataka o a cabe vata kei cei i na Range, o cei so na Member ni nomudou team?

Q106: O koya a veikau tiko kina?
A: Lako tikoga e na boto - na dinghy. E vaka tiko o ya me yacova sara na mataka lailai ni Vakaraubuka. Cici e na bogi, lai kauta tikoga mai na i tukutuku vei iratou na Ops. Au sega ni taura rawa baleta e ratou kila tikoga o ratou na tiko i cake, o keitou cakava tikoga na neitou i tavi. Bogi ni Lotulevu lako tale ena waqa o Daks, nona qai lako mai o ya, sa kau mai kina e e vica na taga yaragi - na MP5, pistol vata kei na gasau.

Q107: O cei o Daks?
A: O Dakuliga. Lako mai, kauta tiko mai na MP5, mai brief-taki keitou oko ya. Tukura vei keitou oko ya me keitou tawana nai yaragi.

Q108: Vakačeitaka mada; MP5, pistol vata kei na kit-bag?
A: Sega, e tawatawa ga mai e na taga, sand-bag. Veitalanoa tikoga o ko ya, e levu na ka eratou veitalanoataki tiko ike, e ratou veitalanoa tikoga kina o ratou na neitou senior officers, o keitou na private keitou tu tani tu ga, o ratou ga eratou veitalanoa tiko. Keitou e tukuni ga vei keitou na tawa gasau, vakarau tu ga, e sega ni tukuni vei keitou na ka eratou veivosakitaka tiko.

Q109: Na gasau bula - mag?
A: Io. Keitou yadra tu ga mai e na bogi o ya me yacova na mataka lailai ni siga Vakarubuka. Siga Vakarubuka o ya a tukuna ga o koya me keitou sota e na Maritime, sega ni tukuna o koya na cava na kena i naki, sega ni dua na ka e tukuna o koya me baleta na neitou lai RV e na Maritime.

Q110: O ya sa dodonu me sa oti dina na exercise o ya?
A: Io, me keitou sa pull-out tiko yani. Na gauna o ya, na keitou kakana e kau tiko mai cake. Veiyakavi nodratou lako tiko o ya, lakovata tiko ni lai kau tiko mai na kakana mai cake - hot box. Keitou lako mai, keitou mai kele ciri tu ike (pointing) e na mataka lailai o ya, keitou sa veiva ike a o keitou baleta ni sega ni vakaraitaka tiko o koya na lomana vei keitou. E ratou kila tikoga na senior NCOs - o ratou na kovula, keitou veitalanoa tikoga, keitou vodo wale tu ga neitou vodo tu o ya. Oti sa lako tale o koya e na bogi, lai sobu i vanua, gauna vata o ya sa soli mai vei koya e dua na mobile, rau lako vata tiko kei Ratu. Rau sa lai sobu me rau na qai contact tiko mai.

Q111: O ya e na bogi ni Lotulevu?
A: Io, me sa lai mataka lailai tiko ni Vakarubuka. Keitou lako mai, keitou mai kele ciri tu ike, keitou waraka toka me qiri mai, e sega, ia sa soli tiko na neitou RV, na time me keitou sota kina, oti ga o ya keitou sa pull-out keitou sa lai kele tu i Vatuwaqa, keitou sa sega ni lai sota ena vanua e dodonu me keitou lai sota kina. Sa tukuna oko ya me keitou sa dro laivi. Keitou sa kele tu e kea, sa qai kele tale yani o koya vata kei Paul, i na Maritime. Oti keitou sa vakavodoka ga e kea na yaya, keitou sa lako cake i na keba.

Q112: Nomudou biubiu ga ike e na mataka lailai ni Vakarubuka, dou lako sara i vei?
A: Keitou kele ciri toka ga ike (pointing), keitou qai lai wawa mataka toka ikea (pointing), i ucuna i yasana ka dua.

Q113: Se mataka lailai dou sa lako yani i na Maritime?
A: Se mataka lailai bera na ono se ono beka na kaloko, se buto toka. Keitou sega ni lako i na Maritime, keitou lako i na Rifle Range. Keitou sa lai vodo i kea. Neitou lai vodo ikea sa kele tu kina na lori. Na kena kau mai na i yaragi o ya e sega ni macala e kilai se sega baleta na neitou vodo yani o ya, keitou sa vunitaka tale tikoga na neitou kauta lesu tiko yani, me kua ni kila o draiva.

Q114: Lori savu dou vodo kina mai na Maritime?
A: Neitou lori ga o keitou.

Q115: Na Renault ga?
A: Io, ko ya e sega ni vakalaca tiko.

Q116: Na lori cava ko ya a lai kauti iratou mai na Selection mai Nadi?
A: Segu mada ni macala. Nodratou lori beka na Maintenance Unit.
Q117: Ko ya dou vodo kina e na mataka o ya?
A: Io, a load-taki mai cake, ratou vakayagataka o ratou na lori ko ya e ratou kauta yani o ya. A draiva tiko yani kina o Paul. Keitou vakavodoka ga na i yaya, keitou sa lai sava sava tiko i na shed. Keitou lai savata na waqa, biu tu ga ike na i yaragi, keitou lesu mai me keitou lako mai i na complex, me keitou mai sava i yaragi tiko i kea, na neitou personal weapon ko ya ga keitou a kauta tiko mai, ko ya a qai lai kau mai e na bogi ni sega cava ya. Keitou sava i yaragi tikoga i kea sa kaci yani o Tu Pena, tukuna oko ya me sa rauta na sava i yaragi.

Q118: O cei o Tu Pena?

Q119: E kele mai loma se i tuba?
A: E curu mai i loma ni keba, ena dua na twin-cab blue. Sa vodo gona kina na i yaragi.

Q120: Nona twin-cab ga o koya?
A: Sega mada ni macala.

Q121: E sega ni motoka ni unit?
A: Sega.

Q122: A vodo kina na i yaragi cava; rawa ni o vakamacalataka?
A: Au raca ga yani ni dola na laca i muri, tawa ga e na twin-cab i muri, sogo tale na laca.

Q123: Qo na kit-bag loaloa se na para-bag?

Q124: Na i yaragi a tu e na cava?
A: Na i yaragi keirau qai veitalanoa tiko kei Naika (oko ya e kila na ka ni yaragi) baleta na i yaragi a sign-taka o OC na kena kau i tuba. Neirau sa qai mai veitalanoa tiko ike, se qai tukuna o koya ni o Good-time (Gaunavinaka) a solia vua na register me sign-taka na kena kau i tuba na i yaragi, ko ya a lai vakayagataki.

Q125: Na i yaragi e kau, e single piece se vica na bag?
A: Sega, au sega ni taura vinaka sara ga.
Q126: O bau kila na gauna, via vica na kaloko o ya?
A: Via voeleka toka na tini (a quarter to 10.00).

Q127: O cei a qai vodo vata kei Jim?
A: O ratou ga na Operatives ratou a veivodo yaki tiko ena twin-cab.

Q128: Mai kãa, dou qai gole vakacava i ra?
A: Keitou a wasewase, au a lako cake i cake, au lesu mai sa lako oti na i matai ni wasewase.

Q129: O a lako i vei ena gauna o ya?
A: Au a lako i bure. Au rogoca ga i kea ni rua na lori - mini-bus sa kele tu i tuba.

Q130: Me se qai lako yani?
A: Me sa lako i na Palimedi.

Q131: O lesu tale i na Unit, oti qai takoso i na gaunisala i muri mo lai vodo i na mini-bus?
A: Sega, Sir.

Q132: O cei soti a vodo e na mini-bus?
A: Au sa sega ni taura rawa sara ga, ia, na gauna o ya o keitou ga na ka vou keitou tiko sara ga e kea.

Q133: E mini-bus vulavula?
A: Au sa sega ni taura rawa sara ga, na noqu i vakamacala baleta na ka o ya e sa tiko vei iratou na ovisa.

Q134: O sa vodo i loma ni mini-bus, oti o ya dou sa qai gole i na Maritime?
A: Au a sega ni vodo.

Q135: Sa qai lai brief i kea o George Speight vata kei Na Qase.
A: Au sega ni tiko kina kau rogoca ga ni tukuna o Na Qase vakaroro tu ga, kakua ni leqataka na kena veitalanoa se na bilitaki ni ka oqo. Ia, me keitou vakamuria ga na ka sa tukuna o Na Qase.
Nomudou yaco yani i na Maritime, o bau raici George Speight?
A: Au qai lai kilai ko ya ga i na Palimedi.

Kemudou sa tiko i kea, se sega ni yaco yani o Vosavere?
A: O Vosavere, na ka ga keitou sa mai veitalanoa tiko ike baleta na gauna ratou vakasota qavokavoka tiko kina na tiko mai Nukulau kei Makulua, na gauna ratou sota kina o ratou na senior - neitou turaganivalu, keitou a veitalanoa tikoga vata kei Ratu, so ga na ka e mai wasea tiko o Ratu, ni ratou lako tiko e na veibogi, ratou dau sota kece tiko kina nona lako tiko i kea o Dakuliga - wili tale tikoga kina o Vosavere.

O ratou na veitalanoa tiko o ya, o ratou o cei?
A: O iratou ga na sa senior ena Unit, o ratou na veikau mai vei keitou na ka vou; o Kovula Tawake, Satini Celeasiga, o Naika; kena vo taucoko o ya o keitou ga na ka vou.

Na nona kauta mai na i yaragi o Dakuliga e na i ka 18 ni Me, bau brief-taka o koya se cava na i naki ni yaragi e kau mai o ya?
A: E levu na ka e caakava o koya e sega ni vakaraitaka vei keitou, eratou veivosaki tiko ga o iratou na neitou ka makawa vata kei ratou, e ratou sega ni vakaraitaka vei keitou e dau na ka. Na ka ga qai tukuna mai o koya, nona sa lako o ya me keitou qai waraka ni na qai lai qiri mai oko ya e na talevoni.

Ia nona lako o ya e sega tale ni qai qiri mai?
A: A qiri mai, sa tukuna mai o koya me keitou sa lai kele ga i na Range, me keitou sa kua ni kele i kea.

Na gauna dou sa vakavodoka tiko kina na dakai e na nomudou sa lesu tale tiko mai, dou sega ni bau taroga vua se me vakacava na dakai, me sa suka lesu tale?
A: Na gauna sa lako tiko kina sa veivosaki, sa qai lako mai vei keitou me keitou a se cache-taka ga na dakai e na dua ga na vanua qo, me sa bulu ga i waitui qo, me keitou qai mai kauta malua tale ke sa macala e dua na ka e yaco, ni keitou sega ni kila tiko na cava e na lai caka, oti o ya keitou sa mani veivosaki, "Sega, me sa kau ga", ia na kena kau cake o ya, keitou sa vunitaka ga na kena vakavodoki yani e na lori me lai biu lesu tale ena armoury.

Ena a ekivu ni exercise, a issue vei kemudou nomudou i yaragi?
Q143: Ko ya ga qo qai kau malua mai?
A: Ko ya ga qo, qai kau mai ni sa siga Lotulevu beka.

Q144: When you left the Camp on May 19th, which vehicle did you travel in; did you travel with Jim Speight?
A: No, I travelled in the mini-bus.

Q145: On Saturday the 20th, there were weapons taken to Parliament, are you aware of that?
A: Au seja sara ga ni kilo qori.

Q146: When you arrived in Parliament on the 19th, who made the selection for the persons who went to the Chamber.
A: Balea niu Private, au seja sara ga ni kilo e dua na veitalanoa. Au kilo ga ni so vei iratou na Operatives vata kei na so na civilian, a tiko eso na gang nei Speight, o iratou na civilian, ratou a vodo tiko e na twin-cab, o ratou o ya o iratou na curu i loma. O keitou, keitou sa yaco i kea, sa qai tukuni vei keitou me keitou guard-taka ga na parameter. Eso ga na neiutou Operatives ko ya ratou tiko o ya i loma. Na i mata ga ni siga eratou curu kina o ya, kena yakavi ga ratou sa due yali tale mai kea. Nodratou yali mai o ya, ratou sa mai cache tu ga kina e na keba.

Q147: Who are these Operatives loading weapons in the Camp?
A: O ratou ga na neiutou Ops., eratou duil kilai ratou tikoga.

Q148: Naduanaiwi, Vosavere, Lakepa Buadromo, Alex Alava, Qicatubua?
A: O Qicatubua, au seja mada ni kilo. O ratou na ka vou, ratou a qai mai laudre ga me ratou lai vesuvesu beka i loma.

Q149: O Liganivai?
A: Liganivai kei Qicatubua.

Q150: Vakadeitaka tale mada, o Lakepa talega a curu i loma?
A: Io, o Lakepa a tiko i loma, va-baclaeva. E levu vei iratou ratou curu ga i loma e na i matala ni siga, ratou cakava rawa ga o ya, ratou dro i tuba, ratou lesu tale ratou lai vuni tu mai na keba. O keitou na lako tu o ya, keitou lako wale sara tu ga, keitou kilo na keitou vakayagataki sara tu ga, keitou sega ni kilo tu e dua na kena veivosaki. Keitou sa lai tu i loma, keitou sa qai kilo ni o ratou ga na vesuvesu ratou sa dro tale o ya, ratou sa lai tiko tale mai cake, keitou sa qai mai tu wale tu ga yani. Sa dede tiko
na gauna, keitou sa qai lai veivosaki na ka vou, keitou kila ni o keitou ga na ka vou keitou sa tu i loma o ya, o ira na ka makawa era sa drio i tuba. Nona vosa ga o Na Qase vei keitou, keitou sa mani tu i kea, keitou sa vakarorogo vua, sa tubuna oko ya, na ka laucoko keitou cakava tu i kea na instruction ga mai vei Na Qase. O Tu Pena e lako ga mai, biuti keitou ga i kea sa lesu tale.

Q151: O OC?
A: OC.

Q152: Na mini-bus e vodo mai kina oko ya e vakadua sara i na Parliament Complex?
A: Au raii ko ya talega i loma ni a taubale vata kei Na Qase ni rau sa lako i loma.

Q153: The young recruits - selection team; when you went in the mini-bus, did they accompany you, and how many of you were there?
A: O ratou na lesu mai Nadi, keitou sa tiko i kea ena kena yakavi, ratou kele mai ena bogi ni Vakaraubuka vata tikoga o ya. Ratou lako beka ga mai, ratcu brief-taki beka ga mai cakke sa ratou vakau mai e lewe vica me ratou mai veitomani vei keitou. Na ka ga au kil, ni neitou tiko o ya, me keitou pull-out e ni siga ka tarava, me ratou na qai lako mai o ratou. Na ka au rogoa e na veitalanao ko ya e cakka tiko i kea, me keitou na vosota ga vakalalai, me ratou na qai lako mai na main body. Au sega ni kili se o cei na main body me lako sobu yani, me keitou qai withdraw. Keitou sa lai wawa tiko, ratou sa mani sega ni basika yani, keitou sa mani tu ga i kea me yacova sara ga ni keitou sa qai biubiu tale mai.

Q154: O kemudou dou a maroro ya na nomudou dakai; o iko, o Naisara, o cei tale?
A: O Vunitabua.

Q155: Kemudou a maroroya nomudou pistol?
A: O ya e tukuuni vei keitou, au sega mada ni kilo o rau na lewe rua.

Q156: Those weapons that were taken out, were they cached anywhere else?
A: (Answer was given off-the-record)

Q157: E na i ka 27 ni siga, a lauvana kina ena check-point mai Vuya Road e rua na sotia; O Mr. Rokoura kei na dua tale; dua e lauvana na yavana, e dua na tabana. It is believed that a sniper-rifle was used in that shooting. Sa kilai tiko ni tolu na sniper e tiko; o Ben, Alava kei Celeasiga, o bau kilo o cei e veivana?
A: Na shooting incident qori au sega sara ga ni kilo, au a tu ga i loma. Au qai raica ga na vale laca ni sa kau i loma.

Q158: E na i ka 28 ni siga a smash-taki kina na TV Station. E tukuuni ni so vei kemudou a lako vata kei na mob, era muri e na back-road ki na vale vei Pereaitedi, oti era sa qai lai valacara e na TV Station. The Board has been told that member or members of the IMS accompanied the mob. O bau kilo o cei a lako kina?
A: Au sega sara ga ni kila, o au a tu ga i loma.

Q159: O sega ni bau rogoca ena kena veitalanoa se o cei a lako vata kei ira?
A: Au rogoca ga ni ra a lako i tuba, au sega ga ni kila o cei.

Q160: O sega ni rogoca ni so vei kemudou a lako vata kei ira?
A: Au rogoca ni so vei keitou a lako, ia au sega ga ni kila o cei.

Q161: O Sokiveta a lako vata kei kemudou?
A: Io, o keitou taucoko na ka vou keitou a lako taucoko i loma ni Parliament Complex.

Q162: Vakacava o Kovula Kalounivale?
A: Sega, o ratou ga na Ints. Operative, nona lako tiko o Ratu, ratou dau lai sota tiko i na Maritime ena veibogi, ratou dau lai RV tiko kina i kea.

Q163: Na cava e lako tiko kina o Ratu?
A: Sa digitaki ko ya ga o Duks me rau lako vata, me rau lako vata tiko - rau lewe rua.

Q164: Kemudou a mai dua na macawa, na veibogi taucoko rau dau lako tiko?
A: Sega, sa siga Vukelulu beka sa qai tekivu kina me lako tiko e na bogi, lesu mai, me vakatiko o ya, me sa tekivu lako bogi na waqa.

Q165: O sega ni kila na gauna a drakusi kina na sagai Saukuru, a qai kau koso yani?
A: A drakusi na sagana, au sega ni taura rawa ga a lako se sega.

Q166: Ko ya a veikau kina o Nawaq?
A: Na waqa taucoko e lako o ya e veikau tiko kina o Naika, qai dau nona boy tikoga o Nawaq.

Q167: Dua tale na ka o via vakamacalataka?
A: Dua ga noqu tao; au kila niu sa cavuta oti e liu, baleta ga na neitou kerekere; dou sa bau lako mai vei iratou na Legal? Baleta na neitou kere veivuke me vakamatataaki vei keitou baleta ni o keitou sega sara tu ga ni kila na cava na vu ni neitou mai vesu tu eke. Ka keitou kerea me keitou lai veilewai i na keba. Keitou kerea na nodratou veivuke.

Keitou a muri lewa tu ga, keitou sa mai biu vata tu kei iratou na daunipolitiqi qo. Dua ra ka au raica tiko, ni dua ga na lewa e tau mai valeniveilewai, keitou sa mai wili taucoko tu kina vakadua, keitou sega ni kila tu o keitou se cava e vakakina o ya. Ko ya gona keitou sa kerekere kina vakabibi na sotia i Nukulau me keitou vukey mai vei iratou na Legal me keitou veilewai ga i na keba.
Tautauvata e na siga o ya, keitou lai veilewai, keirau sota kei Major Ben Lomaloma, au sa vakamacalataka vua ke rawa ni dua na veivuke, baleta na charge e lako mai vei iratou na ovisa, ni kacivi ga mai kea, keitou sa wili taucoko tu kina, keitou sega ni kila tu na charge cava sa tau tu qo vei keitou. De na lakolako, sa na tau mai e so na charges keitou sa na sega ni vosa rawa tu baleta ni keitou tiko vata kei ira na i lala qo.

[ J. SOKO ]
Private

[ J. N. B. EVANS ]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[ A. MOHAMMED ]
Major
Member

[ T. GUCAKE ]
Major
Member

[ H. MACOMBER ]
WO1
Member
TWENTY FOURTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 20771 LT-COL METUISELA MUA

Col Mua, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: When did you enter Parliament Complex?
A: I was there on the afternoon of the 19th May, maybe 2.00 o'clock in the afternoon after the people have stormed Parliament. I went to Parliament for a different reason. That Friday I was doing community work for our church in the morning, and after paying the labourers I overheard on the radio when I returned home that some people have stormed Parliament using arms and the Government had been taken over.

The fact that they were using arms was a concern to me, so I went down to the FBC and listened to the transmission to be able to ascertain just how the takeover was done, knowing that they had recordings of whatever transpired on that day so I asked them to replay it for me which they did.

I was still there when the General Manager overheard that I was in the Complex and he asked me to come and have coffee with him. We were having coffee when two of the journalists told the Chief Executive that there was a big rampage in downtown Suva. All this time, I thought that it was the Opposition that had undertaken this coup so I asked Isireli if I could use his telephone to get to the people in the Opposition Office in Parliament. The two reporters went out and came back in less than ten minutes to say that there was a big rampage in town. I tried to get Ratu Inoke on the phone and I was told that he was at a meeting, so I asked Isireli, "Look, would you please clear a line because I would like to go down to Parliament and see if I can get Ratu Inoke to make an appeal on the air to stop people from destroying the town, and I was also concerned that there were people at Parliament with arms. I just wanted to find out who were the people in Parliament with arms. That was why I arrived at 2.00 o'clock or so in the afternoon of Friday. Isireli Kini allowed me to travel with two of their reporters. Some distance away from the main gate, I met people there, they were scared and frightened of course.

As soon as I walked up to the main gate, I recognised some of the soldiers there. From the way they handled the weapons, I knew that they were servicemen and the type of weapons they had indicated that they were from the military. I asked, "Can I go to see the people in the Opposition Office, please?". They opened the main gate, paid compliment as usual, (I did not know who their names were), and allowed me to go into the Parliament Complex to see the members of the Opposition.
As soon as I walked into Ratu Inoke's Office, the Opposition Members were there including Speight's father, Vunibobo, Manuela, Ah Koy and the two ladies; they were still under house arrest when I walked in. I asked to see Ratu Inoke but he was busy having a meeting with someone else. When he came out, I told him, "Would you please make an appeal because Isireli has kept a direct line open for you to make an appeal to the public to stop this rampage in town?". He asked whether there has been a rampage, I said, "Yes, the whole town is gone." It was then when Manuela and Ah Koy came and told me what occurred in Parliament. He asked, "What is happening here?" He started complaining about the CRW. That is how I knew that this was a CRW squad because Manuela started complaining to me, "I've told Epeli Ganalau to disband the Unit. See what it has done to us" etc, etc. They were trying to work out just how they were going to get organised in order to try and diffuse the situation, whatever that they could have done. They asked me, "What is going to happen next?" I said, "Who are these people who are doing these things?" Someone said, "He is someone by the name of Speight". Speight's father came straight to me and he said, "Those fellows are very young, why don't you go and do something about it?" I said, "What should I do, I wouldn't know what to do, I've got nothing to do with those people." We were talking amongst ourselves and they mentioned what they planned to do was agreed to generally and that was for two of their members to go to Government House and say, "Look, this has happened, could you please just dissolve Parliament for the time being until we find out the solution." That was generally what they were talking about.

They were still going through that when one of the representatives from Speight's people came and said, "Would all of you please come and attend the meeting which is being held at the Government Office?" We went across as directed by Speight's men.

I went and sat right at the back and listened. I saw Major Ligairi walk in; some of the people at the meeting I knew and some I did not know. That was the first time I was exposed to those people at that time in the afternoon. They were discussing the various steps that they were going to take. After awhile, Major Ligairi walked out and I also walked out with him; and we had general discussions with him and he confirmed to me that they were his boys from the Army camp.

At that point in time, I visited Parliament regularly, almost on a daily basis but sometimes, I missed out on a couple of days and then I came in again. That is how it all started until we had a team from our side which was meeting with the RFMF team and that was almost a continuous activity. We started talking, negotiating, etc.
Q2: What was your work or your main function inside the Complex? I understand that you were part of the liaison team, what was your main function?
A: I was just part of their team and because of my exposure in Government I existed in an advisory capacity. I have told them many times over and over again that I would like to ensure that people exercise rational and balanced decisions at all times.

Q3: You eventually ended up with an advisory role?
A: Yes, in an advisory capacity.

Q4: At any time, were you part of the Operation Cell that was operating within there?
A: No.

Q5: Were you aware of the different wings, sectors or groups in there in Parliament?
A: They were there.

Q6: What were they?
A: As a military man, your mind starts to work when you come across a situation like that. You see people walk in, people doing things. I see that the people were mostly doing just sentry duties and the security of the premises there, security of hostages and security of personnel. Those were mainly what they were doing.

Q7: We have one indication earlier that there were three different wings, the military wing, the political wing and the vanua wing; three different sectors. Can you confirm now the leaders of the different wings? We had earlier indications that Ligairi was heading the military wing, political wing really was George Speight and in charge of the vanua wing was really Duvuloco in conjunction with the various yasanas. Were you aware of those wings?
A: I was aware that these things existed in a very loose arrangement except for the military. That was a very tight arrangement, I can assure you that but the others were very loose. That there was a vanua, yes; that there was a political wing, yes but then there were politicians coming in and out of the Complex almost on a daily basis and they come from all sorts of political parties with their agenda and objectives.

The only people that were keeping a tight arrangement over there were the military as far as I was concerned. The vanua was very very loose. Duvuloco ran away, he was not the head of the vanua. What had happened they had a representative from each yasana and they had regular meetings, and of course, one must also understand that the place was crowded with
visits from different communities, villages, groups, political parties, tikinas, etc. I estimated that the total number (because I was going through the books merely to find out) that had visited the Complex on the duration of the stay in Parliament excluding the burial, just for visits alone, was between 130,000 to 140,000 people.

They came from the West, Bua, Macuata, Cakaudrove, they came from Suva, Naitasiri, Tailevu and then the tikina visits, the koros, the villagers, church groups, political parties, etc, and that is a very conservative estimate. About 130,000 to 140,000 people came to support those in Parliament and the police are going to have a very hard time trying to get all those people as supporters of the coup.

Q8: During the whole stint in the Parliament Complex, were you involved in any of the activities that were happening outside the Parliament Complex? We understand your indications of what was happening within the Complex, security, the different sectors within the Parliament, the vanua, the military, the politicians coming in and out; all the activities that happened outside based on the political situation from within the Complex, were you responsible or were you aware of any of the activities that happened outside the Parliament Complex, be it in the Suva area or throughout the whole of Fiji?

A: Is that specific?

Q9: You understand what had happened, the rampage at the TV Station, we had the shooting of the police officer?

A: Oh no. The only thing I heard of the shooting of the police officer was when they came to me afterwards for me to arrange with the people in Parliament that the parents want to visit to say that; one, they have forgiven; and two, that they support the cause because my sister in law who is older than my wife is from that household. She is married to that household so she came and asked me if I could do that arrangement which I did, and they all came down. The whole thing was done. There was a burua, there was a tabua which was the usual Fijian protocol - the full works were done. It was a special occasion where the parents and the family came all the way down from Navala in Ba. They even spent the night with us, we had a service before they went back.

Q10: You were not aware of the planning of those activities whatsoever?

A: No, no.

Q11: Whilst in the Complex, were you in contact with any of the persons within the Military in regards to activities of people in the Complex? This is not normal everyday conversation with the Operations and other things to ask
questions but other things apart from that, like assisting the cause. Was there a link person that you were having discussions with in the Military?
A: Along that nature?

Q12: Yes, like passing on information to you on what is happening at the camp - along that nature?
A: I was up to date with what was happening at the camp because I was part of the negotiating team right through to the signing of the accord. I was there and went up to QEB, PTC, we went to OTS in Vatuwaqa, we went to Ratu Iloilo's place so we went all over the place, so since from day 1 I have been part of the negotiating team, just listening in and negotiating with the RFMF officers but for the other officers, if you are trying to find out whether some of those guys have something to do with the events of the 19th of May, I know them, yes.

Q13: You are aware but you are not releasing any names?
A: No, because the guys that met with those guys in the RFMF all of them told me; this guy, this guy, this guy and his family, this guy, this guy

Q14: These were the persons ....?
A: Senior officers of the army.

Q15: These are not those who have voiced their opinion - okay, we support the cause. The question is, those who were working directly with you?
A: Not with me, with the people. I found this out later and it is unfortunate. Why should I be in this situation. I actually know nothing about it except that I was there on the afternoon of the 19th with a very genuine reason, when there were people who have been meeting since June, July, August of last year.

Q16: You are aware of people who have been meeting from last year in regards to this?
A: Yes, I am aware because the people that meet with them told me.

Q17: You had indicated, from July last year?
A: Yes, people have been meeting with these people, these group, have lunch here, have coffee here at so and so's house - disgusting.

Q18: This information you are not willing to release?
A: No, I have taken the appropriate measures to ensure that it is protected but I am just wondering what kind of officers they are.

Q19: On the 19th May when you walked in, that was your first involvement?
THIRTY-FOURTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 23809 SSgt E. RAVULO

SSgt Ravulo, after having been duly sworn on the Bible hereby states:


Q1: Sgt Ravulo, can you indicate to the Board your involvement on the events of 19th May, the activities leading up to the 19th May and activities after that until the time that you gave yourself up and came back to the camp?


Q2: Ena siga cava o qai lako sobu kina ena Parliament Complex?
A: Lotulevu e na macawa e tarava.

Q3: Na vuaviri ea caka ena 19 ni siga, Moniti na macawa tarava na 22 ni siga. Na cava o lai cakava i loma ni Palimedi?
A: Au a lai raici iratou saka na cauravou.

Q4: Cakacaka cava o mai cakava e loma ni complex?
A: Keitou saka na security vei iratou na hostages.

Q5: Kenai balebale na ka o cakava i loma ni complex na security ga, sega ni dua tale na ka?
A: Sega saka.

Q6: Security ga ni hostages?
A: Io saka.

Q7: E bau dua na gauna o lai yadra i Battery Hill?
A: Sega.

Q8: E bau dua na gauna o curu i tuba ena mission, e levu na missions mai na loma ni complex?
A: Sega.

Q9: E bau dua na gauna o vakaitavi o iko e na operation room ena loma ni complex, na Ops Room?
A: Sega.

Q10: O vakaitavi o iko ena kena kau na yaragi mai na Unit i loma ni complex?
A: Au qai lako saka yani ya sa oti saka ya, au sega ni kila na gauna e kau saka kina.

Q11: Staff Sergeant Ravulo, who was in charge of the whole of the security for the complex?
A: Au qai lako saka i kea esa lako saka tiko na security i kea.

Q12: But who was in-charge?
A: Au sega ni rawa ni tukutuku saka kina.

Q13: Staff Ravulo, ena gauna se bera ni yaco kina na vuaviri o sa bau rogoca vakacaca tu ni dua na veitalanao ni na yaco e dua na vuaviri?
A: Sega saka.

Q14: Ena gauna dou a tiko ena Parliament Complex, dou raica eso na vuli vakaivalu era vakaitavi kina o ira na civilians e vakayacori tiko?
A: Sega saka.

Q15: O bau kila ni ra vakayaragi tale tikoga o ira na civilians ena loma ni Parliament Complex?
A: Sega saka.

Q16: Ravulo, e dua na noqu taro, o kilai Alex Alava?
A: Sir.

Q17: O koya ea tiko talega ena 1MS. Ena gauna cava ea suka kina o koya?
A: O koya ea sega ni suka.

Q18: E dua na vanua ea lai attach kina?
A: E sega saka.

Q19: Dou a tiko vata tiko ena Unit mai cake?
A: Au a tu saka mai veikau.
Q20: Io, bera mada ya. O koya e sega ni dua vei kemudou na vakarau lako i East Timor?
A: Sega saka.

Q21: E tiko ga na Unit i cake, ea sega ni suka o koya?
A: Au sega saka ni kila baleta ni dua saka e suka e nona saka ga o koya. Au na sega ni kila saka o au ke dua e via suka.

Q22: Me vaka ni vakarau suka e dua eda dau farewell taki ko ya, a sega ni caka vua e dua na ka va qo?
A: Sega saka.

Q23: Staff, when you went to the Parliament Complex, those looking after the hostages, were civilians assigned duty of securing them or was it only military personnel?
A: Au sega ni rawa ni tukuna saka kina e dua na ka.

Q24: O bau rogoxa na veitalanoa ni tukuni tiko ni veitokoni na mataivalu ena veika e yaco tiko ena Parliament Complex?
A: Au rogoxa saka tiko nai talanoa me vaka ga niu tiko mai veikau au sega ni kila saka na ka e yaco i kea, au sa lako saka ga i kea me vaka ga au sa vakaraitaka oti baleti iratou saka na cauravou.

Q25: Ena gauna o a tiko kina ena loma ni Parliament Complex, o veisaumi tiko ga mai ena mataivalu?
A: Sir.

Q26: E bau dua na gauna ea musu kina na kemui sau?
A: E sega saka.

Q27: Vakacava na ration ni kemudou kakana, e kau tiko yani i vei?
A: Kau saka yani i na Keba.

Q28: E kau tiko yani e veisiga?
A: Sega.
Q29: Oti ya e dau qai deliver-taki yani?
A: Sir.

Q30: Staff, e dua tale na ka o via vakairataka i loma qo?
A: Sega saka.

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member

[E. RAVULO]
Staff Sergeant

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member
THIRTY-FIFTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 24341 SGT M CAKAUNITABUA

SSgt Cakaunitabua, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, hereby states:

I was recruited in 1982, I went to Sinai in 1983 to 1984. Au suka mai, au post-taki


Q1: Ena gaua cava o qai curu ena 1MS?

Q2: Ena 1987?
A: Io, saka.

Q3: Ni se bera na i ka 19 ni siga, o a vakaitavi ena kena vakarautaki na vuli
vakaivalu kei na ka kece o ya me baleta na ka ea yaco enai 19 ni siga?
A: E sega.

Q4: Ena gaua cava o a qai kilina ku na vuaviri?
A: Au a tu saka mai Lepanoni.

Q5: Talanoataka mada na nomu involvement ena ka me baleta na vuaviri, nomu
vakaitavitaki iko ena vuaviri o ya se na nomu lesu mai Lepanoni kei na nomu
vakaitavitaki iko ena complex.
A: Au a lesu saka mai ena lift one e nai ka 8 ni June. Lako saka mai ena complex,
au veitalanoa kei Stevens, au tukuna meu livi. Au sa mani livi macawa rua. Au
lako sara mai au mai cakacaka, au report tale ena Keba.

Q6: Ena Parliament Complex?
A: Segai ena complex ga i na Keba.

Q7: Gauna cava o qai lako sobu kina ina complex? Ena refer taki tiko i cake na
‘unit’, Parliament Complex e refer taki tiko me ‘complex’.
A: Oti mai na noqu two weeks leave, niu oti saka mai na Keba.

Q8: O bau curu ena loma ni complex, ira?
A: E sega.

Q9: Ena gauna o a tiko kina ena unit mai cake, o bau veitaratara kei ira na tiko ena
loma ni complex?
A: E sega.

Q10: O bau vakaitavitaki iko ena dua na ka, mai na loma ni unit se na dua tale na ka e
link mai na operation ena loma ni complex?
Q10: O bua vakaitavitaki iko ena dua na ka, mai na loma ni unit se na dua tale na ka e link mai na operation ena loma ni complex?
A: E sega.

Q11: O lai vakaitavitaki iko i Levuka? O a lako i Levuka?
A: Au a gole saka i Levuka.

Q12: Talanoataka mada na ka o lai cakava i Levuka.
A: Au lako saka ike ena Moniti, enai ka 10 ni siga (beka).

Q13: Talanoataka na ka o a lai cakava i Levuka, na siga Moniti nai ka 12 ni siga.
O lesu mai Leapanoni ena i ka 6 ni siga.
A: Sega, ena i ka 8 ni siga.

Q14: O qai lako i Levuka, ena macawa e tarava?
A: Ena July.

Q15: Enai ka 10 ni siga ni vula o July? Vakamacalataka na ka elai yaco i Levuka.
A: Ena yakavi saka ga, a tukuni saka meu lako ikeu, au gole saka ena Ovalau au gole saka i Levuka.

Q16: Sergeant Cakaunitabua, o iko sai ka 35 ni tamata mo mai dabe, me rogoca tiko na board, o vaka number tiko o iko, raica tiko na tamata era dabe tiko i cake qo. O sa yabaki sese ena loma ni mataivalu, e dua na taro au tarogi iko sara kina vakavinaka, na cava o nai cakava i Levuka? Na ka o lai cakava i Levuka e document-taki tu, sa vica vata na tamata o dou gole vata, Lotawa, na ka kece e document taki tu, e sagai tiko mo vakamacalataka na ka o lai cakava.
A: O Lotawa evinakata saka na support o koya kau lai gole saka kina i Levuka.

Q17: O cei e direct-taki iko mo lako i Levuka? O cei a tukuna vei iko mo lako i Levuka?
A: Au sega saka ni rawa ni sauma.

Q18: Na cava?
A: Au sega saka ni rawa ni sauma.

Q19: O cei a tukuna vei iko mo lako i Levuka?
A: (Silence)

Q20: E dua na ka meu vakamacalataka vei iko. E dua na ka na wiliwili ni tamata ena mai dabe ena vanua o dabe tiko kina qori. Qo qo na ka lima ni siga e dabe tiko kina na Board. Na nomu Unit, na liuliu ni unit e OC ni Unit. O koya e direct taka na mission ni Unit na Director ni Unit. O koya e solia na mission
ni Director e liulu ni mataivalu ni Viti. Ni o lako ena buca ni valu, e tiko na Code of Conduct o sega ni rawa ni talanoataka na yaca, na ka kece, o ya ena buca ni valu. Oqo e dua na Board of Inquiry me baleta na ka ea yaco ena 19 ni siga, e debe kina na Board of Inquiry. O koya e direct-taka na Board of Inquiry na liulu ni mataivalu. Na information o koya e dodonu me soli ena loma ni Board oqo, e authorise taki na Board oqo me rogoca na information o ya. Kila vinaka saraga na Board oqo na tamata e vakaitavi ikea, na cava e lai caka ikea, na ka kece.

Kevaka o na vinakata me tou na talanoa ike me dua na macawa, dua na vula, dua na yabaki, na debe ga na Board qo me dua na yabaki. E rawa niko vakarawarawatake se o vakadredetaka e vakatau sara tikoga vei iko. Na qualification o lai qualify tiko kina, na Code of Conduct, au kila o au, o kila vinaka o iko. Na Code of Conduct e sega ni apply eke. Kevaka e sega ni matata vei iko, e rawa ni soli vei iko na galala, mo lako i tuba, lai tarogi OC, taroga nomu Director, tarogi Commander RFMF e rawa ni o solia o iko na information se sega kevaka e sega ni matata vei na ka e dodonu mo cakava i loma qo, e dodonu mo tarogi iko vakataki iko.

Esa vica vata na tamata esa mai soli tukutuku ike, era senior cake sara vei iko ena loma ni Unit, Waqaniboro, o OC. Na Board of Inquiry qo e levu na tamata ena mai dabe kina, e sagavulu, rawa ni yacova na drau, raiai dua na macawa, rua na macawa, rua na vula. Ena gauna e mai dabe kina e dua na tamata eke, keimami vulica na ka me baleta na Board of Inquiry, na investigations, na gauna e mai dabe kina e dua na tamata eke me mai tarogi, keimami kila vinaka saraga okoyo e sega ni via sauma na taro, oko ya e vakadredetaka na investigations, na ka kece o ya, e matata saraga. E sega saraga ni dua eke e classic vua, se qai sucu ga ena noa.

Kevaka e sega ni matata vei iko na ka o dodonu mo solia i loma oqo, e rawa ni soli na galala. O vinakata mo gole tale, mo lai tarogi nomu OC, mo qai lesu tale mai?

A:

Au sa vosa madaga i loma qo.

Q21:

E dua na ka dredre me tou mai dabe va qo na board. Eso na tamata e dodonu me ra vakaitavi ena Board oqo, era qai sega ni vakaitavi, meda mai veitarogi vakasotia, e sega soti ni vinaka na morale ena loma ni Unit ni dou va tiko qo. Ia, e tiko e dua na kena gaunisala, na investigations, na court martial, na ka kece, e tiko na gaunisala me maroroi keda se maroroya kina na mataivalu, kevaka e sega, ena vakaloloma sara na mataivalu. Kevaka o lomana na mataivalu, na sulu o daramaka tiko qori, e dodonu mo vaksamataka sara vakavinaka. E dua na cakacaka dredre na debe tiko va qo. E levu tale na ka eda rawa ni cakava. Au rawa ni tiko e vale vata kei na noqu matavuvale se au tiko ena operation unit, na vanua au cakacaka kina, e vakalusiy na gauna ni

E rua ga na tamata, na private ena loma ni nomu unit a sega ni via vosa ike. E rua ga na tamata, ia na rua na tamata o ya, na ka rau cakava au kila vinaka. Nai tavi o garava, nai taba e tiko ena pepa na ka kece o ya, na Board qo ena lai kauta mai. E kila vinaka sara ga o koya na tamata ke vosa tiko yani qo na ka e tiko vei ira na ovisa. Nai taba kece e laurai ena TV tekivu mai na CNN, CN, BBC, TV One e tiko. Na ka kece e volai ena pepa e tiko. Na fax koya e fax-taki ena veivanau taucoko, eso na fax e tiko. Na ka e yaco e Levuka e kilai vinaka saraga. Era na lai kacivi mai oira na tiko mai Levuka. E matata saraga. E rawa ni ko vakadredretaka, o vakabalavutaka se o vakarawarawataka na veitalanoa. Ia kevaka o na debe tiko ena vanua au debe tiko kina, e dodonu mo kila na kena dredre e tiko, ena must e dua me na cakava. Nai tutu o tiko kina qori ena sega ni oti rawa, na ka sa yaco esa yaco. Laiva mada na Board qo me cakava mada na investigations.

**A:**

Au na tarogi iko tale, o cei a tukuna vei iko mo lako i Levuka?

**Q22:**

Oratou saka mai loma ni Palimedi.

**A:**

O cei mai Palimedi a tukuna vei iko mo lako i Levuka?

**Q23:**

O koya saka qori, au sega ni kila.

**A:**

O a curu ena CRW ena 1987, e dina?

**Sir.**

**Q24:**

E vica na tamata e tiko ena loma ni CRW Unit?

**A:**

Au a tiko saka mai Lepanoni, e rua na selection e a caka. Au sega saka ni kila e lewe vica tale e qai curu mai, au a qai lesu mai au sa raica eso, au sega ga ni kilai ira.
Q25: Ena loma ni Palimedi, nai liuli ni operation ena military wing, o Major Ligairi. O koya talega ni liuli ni Operation CRW. O koya ga e direct taka na operation mai Palimedi o Major Ligairi. Ea qiri vei o Major Ligairi mo lako i Levuka, se sega?
A: Sega.

Q26: Noda i valavala taucoko na tamata, se vinaka se ca, kila tau dua ga o iko, o keda yadu dua vata kei na Kalou. Ni na yaco e dua na ka, noda i valavala ga ena sauti keda. O vosa bubului ena Vola Tabu se tukuna ga nomu vosa (solemn of affirmation), na ka e yaco keimarni sa kila vinaka na Board. O cei e solia na directive, na ka kece o ya, esu matata. Nomu tutu vaka Senior NCO o tiko i loma ni Unit qo, na 1MS, raica e levu na vosa au tukuna tiko yani qo, e calacala tiko, qo na stress sa lako tiko yani qo. O kila vinaka o iko, tovolea mo dabe i yasana qo qai raica na stress, lailai na stress o kila tiko o iko qori, fererere. Ia, o iko o Senior NCO e loma ni Unit, o rawa ni taura ga na directive mai vei ira ga na turaga ni valu se dua e senior vei iko ena loma ni Unit.

Osa dede e loma ni Unit o ya, e sega ni rawa ni dua na civilian e direct-taki iko mai na complex mo lako, o qai lako o iko. E sega saraga ni rawa ni dua na private mai na CRW e direct taki iko, o lako. Na domo o rogoca ena loma ni telephone o ya, o must kila o iko. O na kila ga o iko na dina. E drau a veitalkona ena siga o ya, e naik ka 10 ni siga, e dua a qiri mai na complex o qai sega ni kila o cei, mo lako i Levuka. Na cava na directive e a soli vei iko?

A: E tukuni saka vei au meu gole saka i Levuka, meu lai support-taki Bill Lotawa.

Q27: Support-taki cei?
A: Veitokoni ga vei Lotawa.

Q28: O sega ni kila ocei ea vosa tiko yani vei iko ena telephone?
A: Sega.

Q29: Talanoataka mada na ka e a lai caka i Levuka?
A: Ena siga Moniti, keioun yadra saka tiko ena complex, au rogoca sara ena retilo (news) na ka ea caka mai Levuka. Ena 9 na kaloko ena matakina lailai ni siga Tusiti, taqiri sara na talevoni ni rauta tiko na 10.30, e vinakati saka tiko e dua me lako i Levuka me lai veitokoni ga vei Lotawa.

Q30: Na dakai cava o kauta i Levuka?
A: (Silence)
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Q31: Ea tukutuku o Sergeant Lotawa, e vosa bubului o koya ena i Vola Tabu. O iko vata kei Kovula Rere drau a lako i Levuka. O drau a kauta yani e rua na pistols, kei na rua na M16 A2. Na pistols qo na kena number qo, 315327, 315316. Na rifle M16 o ya na Browning, M16 A2 8002652, 820712, e dina o ya se sega?
A: Io, Sir.

Q32: O a gole vata kei Kovula Rere?
A: Sir.

Q33: Ena gauna e a soli kina vei iko na order, o iko a tiko i cake ena Unit?
A: Sir.

Q34: Ena gauna o a tiko mai kina ena Unit, ea qiri yani vei iko o Major Ligairi a task-taki iko mo lai reinforce-taki Sergeant Lotawa, io se sega?
A: Io.

Q35: These two rifles and the pistols, where are they now?
A: We returned it.

Q36: Who did you return it to?
A: To the camp.

Q37: To your Unit or to LSU?
A: To the Unit.

Q38: Who received it?
A: O Stevens.

Q39: Ena gauna o a tiko kina mai Levuka, na dakai o vakayagataka, o a bau vanataka?
A: Sega saka.

Q40: Where was these weapons taken from? Was it from Parliament or from the Unit here at QEB? Do you understand what I am saying? Where did you take the pistols and rifles from? Was it taken from Parliament or the Unit?
A: From Parliament.

Q41: Who issued you the weapons? Who did you take it from? Someone must have given it to you to take it to Levuka, who was that?
A: (Silence)
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Q42: Sergeant Cakau, e vakamacalataka o Sergent Lotawa ni dakai ya e kau ga mai ena Unit, e sega ni kau mai ena Parliament Complex, e dina ya se sega?
A: Io.

Q43: Na dakai ya e sega ni kau mai ena complex, ea kau ga mai ena nomudou Unit mai cake ya. E dina se sega?
A: Sir.

Q44: Ni yalovinaka e sa rua na ka o ni tukuna tiko qo, o ni sa tekivu lasu, ke o doka na number e tiko vei iko, vosa vakadodonu. O keda na tagane dau vosa vakadodonu. O tukuna ni o sega ni kilo na domo ni tamata ko drau a veitalanoa ena talevoni ka direct-taki iko mo lako i Levuka. Tara o ya, o tukuna tale ni a kau mai ena Parliament Complex na yaragi, osa qai veisautaka tale ni a kau mai ike. E lomatarotaro tiko na Board, e yaga tale me toso tale na veitalanoa qo se sa sega ni yaga?
A: Koya ga sa tukuna saka o Lotawa, sa o koya saka ga.

Q45: E dua na ka e laurai vakalevu eke, esa note taka na Board qo, ni o ni sega ni tukutuku tiko vakadodonu. Ni na caka na veivagqai, e levu tale na tamata ena tarogi. Na Board qo e na tini sara i Levuka, i Nukulau, ena vakadua sara i na SB Branch. Na i tukutuku e tiko e kea, esa vakadomobula ga, nai taba na ka kece, na tamata era vakaitavi, e kilai vinaka saraga. E vakatau sara tikoga vei iko. Kevaka e dua na ka o sega ni talanoataka o via talanoataka, tukuna vei iratou na MP mo rawa ni kacivi tale mo mai soli tukutuku. Kevaka e sega keitou na kacivi iko tale, e dua tale na information keitou na qai kacivi iko tale. E very unreliable sara ga na nomu i tukutuku, keitou sega tale ni vinakata me toso tale na veitalanoa qo. Kua ni leqa, keitou na kacivi iko tale mo mai soli tukutuku.

[M. CAKAU]
[MITABUA]
Staff Sergeant

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member
Sgt Bonefasio, after having been duly sworn on the Bible hereby states:

Na gauna saka au curu mai kina ena mataivalu, au lai yabaki dua saka ga mai Sinai. Au tiko mai Sinai, au sa curu ena 1MS, au sa yabaki 13 saka toka qo ena 1MS.

Q1: Na yabaki cava o a curu kena ena 1MS?
A: 1987, Sir.

Q2: Talanoataka mada na nomu vakaitavi, ni se bera na vuaviri enai ka 19 ni siga, na vuli vakaivalu, na planning kei na ka kece va o ya me baleta na ka e caka enai ka 19 ni siga.
A: O au saka au tiko ena training wing, au sega saka ni kila e dua na planning baleta saka niu a tiko mai yasayasa vaka Ra, mai Nadi. Au a tiko saka vata kei iratou na neitou selection team, au train taki ira saka tiko na new recruits. Oti na siga Vakarauwai na neitou selection course, o ira na curu vou mai ena Unit, keitou biubiu mai Nadi, keitou sa rogoca ena walesi ni sa kacivaki na coup.

Q3: Sergeant, o rawa ni o tomana tiko mada na nomu vakamacala qori? Ni dou sa oti mai Nadi, dou yaco mai Suva, na ka kece e yaco.
A: Me vaka ga na system ni mataivalu, esa yaco na coup, e tiko na neitou SOP, ni sa yaco e dua na full confrontation, keitou sa kila, it is a terrorist act, e sa dodonu me involve na Unit ena call-out. We were expecting a call-out in the Unit. Keitou yaco mai, keitou sa kila ni sa civilian takeover, keitou sa kila ni sa dodonu me involve na Unit ena activities.

Q4: Mo vakamatatataka mada, o dou rogoca mai vei cei ni civilian takeover?
A: E kacivaki saka tiko ena retio.

Q5: Dou yaco mai Suva ena yakivi tiko ni Vakaraubuka, nai ka 19 ni siga?
A: Ena siga Vakarauwai saka.

Q6: Ena mataka lai lai se na yakivi?
A: Na takeover beka na Vakarauwai se na Vakaraubuka?

Q7: Dou a sega ni yaco mai ena bogi ni Vakaraubuka?
A: Ena yakavi ya.

Q8: Ena yakavi ni Vakaraubuka dou a yaco mai kina. O rawa ni talanoataka mada na cava o sa qai vakayacora me yacova sara mai na gauna e mai oti kina na veika e yaco tiko mai Palimedi nai ka 13 ni July.
E vica ga keitou a brief-taki mai gaunisala. Au sa kaciva e dua na O-Group i kea baleta niu senior toka vei keitou taucoko. Au kila ni kevaka me caka na takeover, e dodonu me na utilise-taki na neitou headquarters ni bera ni dua na takeover e yaco baleta ni o keitou ga na counter-taka na situation. Keitou mai raica ni sa caka tu na call-out, ia e sega ni dua na ka e vakayacori. Na ka au sa cakava o au ni sa full confrontation, au sa liutaka na SOP. Na SOP, e tiko ga na neitou SOP, kevaka e mani yavalati na mataivalu se yavalati na matanitu so we move out. O au na noqu team saka e keitou move out i veikau. Keitou tiko saka mai veikau me yacova ga na gauna e sa direct-taka tale mai o Commander ni sa dodonu me keitou lesu mai.

Q9: Nomudou a tiko mai veikau, e dua na yaragi o dou kauta?
A: Na taro qori e tiko saka ena neitou SOP, au vakabauta ni na qai saumi taro ga kina na noqu Commander.

Q10: E dua tale na taro, a sega ni tukuna vei iko na nomudou OC ena gauna o ya, o Mr. Baleinamau mo dou kauta eso na yaragi qori i veikau, i Bilo?
A: Au a cakacaka saka ga ena command mai vei Mr. Baleinamau. Au a cakacaka saka ga ena command mai vei noqu training officer baleta niu tiko saka ena Training Unit.

Q11: Mr. Stevens?
A: Sir.

Q12: Dou a lewe vica ena nomu team dou a tiko qori i veikau?
A: Keitou lewe va saka.

Q13: Na lewe va qori e willi tale tikoga kina o Mr. Tuivanuavou, se sega?
A: O Tuivanuavou e qai muri saka yani na nona team o koya. O au na noqu team mai matai ni gauna e keitou lako saka kina, au kila saka ga na noqu team. E keitou four men patrol.

Q14: Mo vakadeitaka, na nomudou lako qori ea tukuna vei kemudou o Mr. Stevens, ea sega ni tukuna vei kemudou o Mr. Baleinamau?
A: Sir.

Q15: Na lorry cava dou a vakayagataka ena matai ni nomudou lako qori?
A: Na lorry saka ni mataivalu.

Q16: Mo vakadeitaka, na nodratou lorry na engineer?
A: Sir.
Q17: Ena gauna cava sa qai lai tiko maliwai kemudou kina o Todua?
A: Ena gauna saka eratou sa kacivi lesu tale mai kina na la la mata timi ni East Timor. Esa oti tiko beka e rua na macawa ni keitou sa tiko mai veikau.

Q18: Vakacava o Buadrom, ena gauna cava e qai mai maliwai kemudou kina?
A: Ea golo yani vata kei ira na goni era golo saka mai East Timor.

Q19: Ena gauna dou tiko kina mai veikau, na gauna cava dou qai biuti Navua kina mo dou lako i Sigatoka?
A: Au sega saka ni rawa ni sauma vakadodonu na tario qori, esa viavina oti toka beka e rua na macawa.

Q20: Na rua na macawa ya, na kena secure taki tiko na yaragi e tiko vei kemudou, ocei a vakaitavi tiko kina?
A: E levu saka na gauna au vakaitavi tiko kina o au.

Q21: Kenai balebale o iko a vakayaragi tu, mag-on, vagasau tale tikoga na nomu yaragi?
A: E donu saka.

Q22: Dou golo sobu ira mo dou lai sota vata kei Na Qase. Oa golo sobu o iko, ena loma ni complex, mo lai sota kei Na Qase?
A: Sir.

Q23: Na cava e a veitalanoataki ena bose o ya?
A: Kila saka ni a yaqo na vuaviri, eso saka vei keitou e brief taki ni na yaco na operation, eso a sega. Keitou a sega ni kila e dua na ka ea yaco, keitou e via kila na dina ni ka esa yaco tiko ena Unit, esa tiko saka na duidui. Keitou a via kila na duidui cava esa tiko, o ya saka ga na vuni neitou lako sobu.

Q24: O rawa ni vakamacalataka na ka dou a veitalanoataka vata kei Na Qase?
A: Na ka saka ga au vosa tiko kina me baleta na neitou golo sobu saka yani me vakavinakataki ga na duidui esa tiko. O koya saka beka ga ya nai naki ni neitou golo sobu yani. E levu tale na ka eratou veitalanoataka o ira ya, sa tukuni me keitou sa lesu tale mai. O koya ga ya nai naki ni neitou lako sobu.

Q25: Ena gauna o a tiko kina i QEB, dou bau veitalanoa kei ira na lai era tiko ena complex, na telephone se na fax se dua tale na ka.
A: Keitou a without contact e nai matai ni rua na macawa, oti au sa qai volia e dua na noqu vodaphone.

Q26: Mai na Unit?
A: Sir.
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Q27: Mai na vanua o tiko kina ena Unit, o veitaratara vata kei ira na tiko ena complex?
A: Sir.

Q28: Na gaunisala cava dou vakayagatakia?
A: Vodaphone saka.

Q29: Veitalanoataka na cava?
A: E veitalanoataki saka na nodratou up to date taka mai na ka esa yaco tiko.

Q30: What weapons did you have with you?
A: Au vakabauta na taro saka qori me qai rawa ni saumi taro saka kina na noqu training officer. E tiko saka vei ko ya na account kece ni yaragi e keitou kauta i veikau.

Q31: I will ask him. What I want you to do is tell me briefly what weapons were there, I do not want to know the numbers. All I need is the makes.
A: E levu saraga na mataqali yaragi e keitou kauta. Na yaragi saka ga e vakayagataki ka dodonu me tu ena dua na special force.

Q32: MP5?
A: Kece, Sir.

Q33: What were they packed in?
A: Cases.

Q34: Any M72s with you?
A: No.

Q35: What was your instructions when you were situated in Bilo?
A: E sega ni dua tale na instructions e soli vei keitou. Keitou cakava ga na SOP ni Unit, full confrontration so we have to move out.

Q36: I understand you have a code that exist in the Unit.
A: Sir.

Q37: The code is applicable when you are in a war situation, it is not when you are in front of a Board of Inquiry. The Board has been directed by Commander, your reluctance to give any information amounts to perjury. I do not have to remind you of the severity of perjuring yourself. There had been officers and senior non-commissioned officers, senior than you who have come and sat on the same chair and divulge information. I do not have to remind you, with your rank, what your obligation is towards this board and towards the institution. What we will do is try to basically put in picture of what has
transpired. What we will ask you has already been told here, that is the reason why we put in those questions. We know what had happened, we know where you were. Is it true that weapons taken to Bilo were on the directive of Lt. Baleinamau?

A:

Sir, na taro saka qori au na sega ni rawa ni sauma baleta na tamata ga e brief taki au meu move out, na noqu training officer.

Q38:

So your moving out of the Unit at QEB was Capt. Stevens?

A:

Sir.

Q39:

What was his instructions to you?

A:

Secure all arms.

Q40:

How were you to communicate with him from Bilo?

A:

A sega ni dodonu saka me keitou sota i Bilo, e dodonu saka me keitou sota ena dua na neitou RV, e qai fail na matai ni neitou RV ena vuku ni comms. E sega saka tu na neitou comms. Na transport e keitou kauta e sega ni vinaka. Au direct taka ga i Bilo, au sago me keitou contact vata kei Mr. Stevens, esa oti e tolu na siga keitou sa qai contact.

Q41:

What was your discussions about the ammunitions and arms in your next contact?

A:

To secure, Sir.

Q42:

Did you move base from there?

A:

Keitou qai toso saka ga ena gauna sa qai kau saka yani kina e dua tale na tolii mai vei iratou na engineers.

Q43:

When you returned after that directive was given to move back into camp in QEB, when you brought back the weapons, where was it stored? In the armoury in LSU or back in your Unit?

A:

Au a sega saka ni kauta mai na yaragi, esa lako saka yani e dua na team mai base sa ratou nai kauta saka mai, in charge mai kina o Mr. Tuivanauvou meratou mai secure taka. Esa suka lesu tale mai ena vanua esa vinakata o Commander me mai maroroi kina.

Q44:

Where did you go to?

A:

Au secure taka tu yani na nodratou yaya na neitou boys eratou sa lako i East Timor, nai matai ni noqu four men team o au.

Q45:

What was these equipments you are talking about?

A:

Pack, webbing.
Q46: Any weapons?
A: Sega saka.

Q47: You took part of the weapons to secure, did you know what happened to the rest of the weapons in your Unit?
A: Au sega saka ni kila baleta au kila nai yaragi e keitou kauta esa keitou vakasuka lesu tale mai vei Commander.

Q48: Did you know the second lot of weapons that were taken into Parliament?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q49: Who was with you when you went to secure the weapons on the first time?
A: O ratou na noqu four men e ratou sa tiko saka mai East Timor.

Q50: They are in East Timor now?
A: Sir.

Q51: One of them was Tuiwailevu?
A: Sir.

Q52: Who were the others?
A: Tamani and Leweniqila.

Q53: Na siga cava ea kau kina na yaragi i tuba, dou a vakavodoka na yaragi me kau i tuba?
A: Oti saka e dua na siga na kena caka saka na vuaviri.

Q54: Na siga Vakarauwai?
A: Sir.

Q55: E caka na vuaviri enai 19 ....
A: Enai ka 20 saka.

Q56: A vodo evei na yaragi koya a vakavodoki o ya, ena Unit i loma ni Keba se na gaunisala i muri?
A: Gaunisala saka i muri.

Q57: Ocei soti ea vakavodoka na dakai?
A: O au saka ga kei iratou na lewe va na noqu selection team.

Q58: Tukuna tale mada na yaca, Satini?
A: Tamani, Tuiwailevu, Leweniqila.
Q59: Ocei a draivataka na lorry?
A: O Kaumaitoto ya.

Q60: Mai QEB, dou a gole ivei?
A: I Bilo saka.

Q61: O raica na kena kau sobu na yaragi koya a qai kune e loma ni complex?
A: Sega saka.

Q62: Kenai balebale ya, na yaragi dou kauta sobu i Bilo, o ya na yaragi ka vo ena loma ni Unit.
A: Sir.

Q63: E dua na kenai wase ea kau sobu ena complex, kena vo dou qai kauta o kemudou i Bilo, e donu?
A: Sir.

Q64: O a sega ni raica se rogoca na kena kau sobu na i yaragi ki na complex?
A: Sega saka.

Q65: O bau curu ena loma ni complex ira, mo lai veitalanoa?
A: Sir.

Q66: E a report-taki eke na nomu curu i loma kei so tale na lewe ni Unit dou a nai veitalanoa kei Na Qase. E bau dua tale na gauna o a curu i loma ni complex?
A: O koya saka ga ya.

Q67: O koya ga ya?
A: Sir.

Q68: Tukuna o iko na lewe ni nomu team, Tamani, Leweniqila, Tuiwailevu kei na driver o Kaumaitoto ya, ea lako tale e dua?
A: Keitou ga ya.

Q69: Vakacava o Naiqama?
A: Sega saka.

Q70: Sergeant, na gauna dou a vakavodoka tiko kina na yaragi ena siga Vakaranwai nai ka 20 ni siga, e bau dua tale ea tiko ena loma ni Unit?
A: O ratou saka na selection ka ratou se qai pass-out saka ga qo.

Q71: E bau dua vei iratou e taroga se dou kauta ivei na yaragi, se via tarovi kemudou se dou veitalanoataka na kena kau na yaragi?
A: Vei ira kece na tiko ya, o Mr. Stevens ga e kila na vanua e keitou kauta kina na yaragi.

Q72: Ena siga ya, o bau raici Mr. Baleinamau ena nomudou loma ni Unit?
A: Sir, e tiko saka na Ops room.

Q73: E dua na gauna dou a veitalanoa?
A: Sir.

Q74: Io se sega?
A: O au saka ga au a curu na Ops room.

Q75: Drau a veitalanoa kei Mr. Baleinamau?
A: Sir.

Q76: Na cava drau a veitalanoataka?
A: Keirau veitalanoataka saka ga ikea na threat esa lako tiko mai i loma ni Keba.

Q77: O rawa ni vakamatatataka mada na mataqali threat vakacava?
A: Esa qiritaki saka mai ni na mai storm taki na complex.

Q78: Na complex cava?
A: Na neitou keba saka.

Q79: Na Unit?
A: Sir.

Q80: O cei na storm taka?
A: Au sega saka niu taura rawa, na information ga ya e solia saka vei au o Baleinamau.

Q81: Na key ni nomudou armoury, mai vakavuna na nomu kauta mai na yaragi, mai dola me lai vakavodoki na yaragi, o kauta mai vei na kena key?
A: Esa dola saka tu na armoury.

Q82: O bau kila o cei a dolava?
A: Sega saka.

Q83: E kila tiko o Baleinamau ni dou a vakavodoka tiko mai yaragi me kau i tuba?
A: Na yaragi esa tawa oti kece tu ena kisi, esa vo ga me keitou lako yani, me keitou taura me keitou lako. Keitou a tiko saka mai na neitou dui vale, e tukuni me 7 na kaloko me keitou mai sota, e keitou mai sota esa tawa ni kisi kece tu na yaragi ka tukuni me keitou kauta.
Q84: O cei e a tawana na yaragi i loma ni kisi?
A: O ratou saka ga na selection team, pass out team eratou a tiko i na Keba.

Q85: E kila o Lt. Baleinamau na nomudou vakavodoka tiko na yaragi me kau i Bilo?
A: Sir, au vakabauta ni kila saka.

Q86: E kila?
A: Sir.

Q87: Vakamatatataka mada, ocei na nomudou CQ ni Unit?
A: O Vuki saka.

Q88: Na cavai tavi nei Kaumaitoto ya ena nomudou Unit?
A: Special Projects Officer.

Q89: Ena gauna ea dola tu kina na armoury, oa bau raici Vuki?
A: Sega saka.

Q90: O bau raici Bukasila?
A: Sega saka.

Q91: Sergeant when you loaded those weapons from the armoury, was there any weapons left behind?
A: Sir.

Q92: There were some weapons still left in the armoury when you left?
A: Sir.

Q93: Were they in boxes or loose?
A: Loose, Sir.

Q94: Would you be able to tell us approximately how many weapons was left behind?
A: Nodratou yaragi saka ga na yadra.

Q95: When you were carrying these weapons to the back road (Sukanaivalu road) to be loaded, did those new recruits helped you in taking it across?
A: Eratou veivuke saka.

Q96: Would you be able to identify some of them?
A: Sir.
Q97: Give us some names.
A: Au sa guilecava saka ga meu tukuna, eratou lewe vitu saka ga na selection, au vakabauta eratou a vakaitavi saka kece.

Q98: Just any names you can recall.
A: Fero, Gadekibua, Ratu, Leleqe, Naqamu.

Q100: O tukuna tiko o Naiqama?
A: Naqamu.

Q101: Was there ever any threat made to the IMS personnel that were in QEB, either to you or to your family?
A: Sir.

Q102: Do you know where these threats came from?
A: Sir.

Q103: Can you tell us?
A: From Parliament.

Q104: Do you know who made these threats?
A: I do not know.

Q105: What was the threat?
A: To take our life.

Q106: When you went to the complex, did you talk to Major Ligairi about these threats?
A: Sir.

Q107: What was his response? Did he know about these threats?
A: No, Sir. He told us he was going to brief those guys in Parliament.

Q108: What was the reason for this threat?
A: Because we had some differences within the Unit.

Q109: What was these differences?
A: Because some of our guys know what the operation was about and the selection team did not know anything about what was going on.

Q110: Kenai balebale na threat ko ra lako ya, o kemudou mo dou nai curu tale e loma ni complex, se sega?
A: I think they were expecting us to storm Parliament.
Q111: Was there any threat made after you had spoken with Major Ligairi?
A: No more threats.

Q112: Sergeant, e dua ga na noqu taro, enai ka 20 qo ena nomudou vakavodo yaragi tiko, o Private Raivalu a tiko ira ena Unit?

Q113: Nomudou vakavodo yaragi tiko ya, e sega ni dua na lorry e mai kele vei kemudou, e dua na lorry ni matanitu, pajero beka se twin cab, GM na kena number.
A: E levu saka na lorry era kele tu i matamata.

Q114: Sega, mo se qai raica vakadua ike me lako mai vei kemudou?
A: Sega.

Q115: Sega nio bau vakila ni dua na lorry va ya e lako mai na Keba, e curu mai loma?
A: Sega saka, au raica saka ga ike na lorry ni mataivalu, na renault ko keitou vodo mai kina.

Q116: Qo ena yakavi dou a vakavodo yaragi tiko kina?
A: Sir.

Q117: Was there ever any requests or directive given to you either by Major Ligairi, Baleinamau or any members of the 1MS to take the weapons to Parliament?
A: No, Sir.

Q118: Enai ka 14 ni siga ni vula o Me, e dua na lotu ea caka ena 1MS Unit, o a tiko kina?
A: Au a tiko saka ena lotu qori, Sir.

Q119: Ena gauna ni gunu yaqona, na cava ea veitalanoataki tiko?
A: Au sa guilecava tale na ka ea veitalanoataki ikea.

Q120: E bau vakamacalataki ikea ni na caka e dua na vuaviri?
A: Sega saka.

Q121: Na lotu o ya, e a tiko kina o Major-General Rabuka?
Recalled on 8/9/00:

Sgt Bonefasio, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q124: Na kena kau sobu na yaragi ena loma ni lorry, e kau sobu i Bilo?
A: Sir.

Q125: Dou vakasobura ivey, i cake ga ya?
A: Na bunker saka.

Q126: Na bunker i cake, se na bunker i ra?
A: I ra saka.

Q127: Na vanua e tiko kina na range i ra?
A: Sir.

Q128: E bau dua na gauna, e dua na yaragi, oti ya e transfer-taki kina lorry levu, ena gauna ea kau kina na lorry levu ....
A: Nodratou lorry saka na Engineers.

Q129: E bau dua na gauna, e dua na yaragi ko dou a kauta sobu, e dua e mai kauta e dua na kenai wase?
A: Sega saka.

Q130: Just go back to the day the weapons were loaded in camp, that is Saturday, correct?
A: Sir.

Q131: Can you reconfirm the time?
A: Au sega saka ni vakadeitaka, ena sigalevu saka, keitou sa vakasigalevu oti saka.
Q132: Confirm-taka mada na loading party, o iko a tukuna o ira na lala era veivuke ena kena vakavodoki na dakai, o ira na recruit vou, lesu mai Nadi?
A: Oratou saka na team au brief-taki iratou saka, oratou saka ga na noqu four-men team. Ena siga talega ya e via lala saka toka na neitou complex, o ira na yayavoki tiko na complex, e dodonu me caka saka na siga ya na break-up party o ira na selection vou, ena 8 na kaloko me ra brief-taki na siga ya. Au kila saka ni o keitou ga na four-men team. O Leweniqila, Tamani, kei Tuiwailevu.

Q133: O Kaumaitotoya e draiva?
A: Sir.

Q134: O Naqamu?
A: O Naqamu saka e dodonu me lesu tale mai na siga ya, me escort saka vei Kaumaitoto ya.

Q135: Ia, o Naqamu e a tiko ena lorry?
A: Sir.

Q136: Eso tale na yaca o a solia ike, o Feoko, Ratu, Raileqe ....
A: Na yacadra saka o ira na selection vou qori.

Q137: O iko a tukuna ni ra veivuke ena loading. Oira qo era tukuna ni ra a sega ni tiko ekea ena gauna ni loading.
A: Era rawa ni dina saka o ira.

Q138: What were the weapons kept in when they were loading?
A: E tiko saka na boxes lelevu.

Q139: Any of the duffel bags?
A: E va saka tiko beka na duffel bags.

Q140: When you took the weapons from the armoury, were they already packed or did you have to pack them into the cases?
A: Esa tiko saka ena neitou lecture room, era sa pack-taki oti tu.

Q141: So it was already in your lecture room? O cei e pack-taka na dakai?
A: Au sega ni taura rawa.

Q142: The day you moved the weapons out from QEB, what route did you take to Bilò?
A: We drove past Kundan Singh, Reservoir Rd, oti qai muri mai Suvavou koro, i Bilò sara.
Q143: Did you stop anywhere on the way?
A: No, Sir.

Q144: Lesuva tale mada na siga Vakarauwai ya, ena vica na kaloko o yaco yani kina ena nomudou Unit?
A: Ni bera saka na 8.

Q145: Nomu yaco yani ya, o cei soti a tiko ena loma ni Keba ena nomu yaco yani?
A: Mr. Baleinamau, Mr. Bainimoli, e rua saka ga ya au raica, na kena vo o keitou na selection team kei iratou na gone vou saka.

Q146: O bau raica eso tale na to lili ni matanitu e a kele tu ena nomudou Unit, i tuba se i loma? Nomu curu yani e na Keba, o a curu yani ena matamata cava?
A: Au curu saka yani ena matamata i muri.

Q147: Na back gate se na nomudou gauinisala ga mai Sukanaivalu?
A: Na neitou matamata saka ga.

Q148: Sukanaivalu?
A: Sir.

Q149: Nomu lako mai ekea, o sega ni raica eso na lorry e kele tu i tuba ekea?
A: Sega saka.

Q150: Ena gauna dou vakavodoka tiko kina na dakai ko tukuna tiko ni sa bini tu qori i na nomudou lecture room, ea bau dua na gauna o a lako ena armoury? Eso na yaragi e lai kau mai na armoury?
A: Au sega ni nanuma saka.

Q151: Na dakai ko dou vakayagataka ena nomudou selection mai Nadi, nomudou iesu mai na Vakaraubuka ea suka taucoko?
A: Sir.

Q152: Se sa dou dui maroro ya tu ga o kemudou?
A: E tiko saka ga vei au na noqu.

Q153: E tu ga vei iko na nomu personal ga?
A: Sir.

Q154: Ia, ena nomu lako tiko mai ena mataka lailai ni siga ya, o sa kauta tiko mai na nomu personal weapon mo mai cakacaka?
A: Tiko saka ena loma ni noqu pack.
Q155: Nomu pack e tiko ga ena nomudou Unit?
A: Tiko saka ena bure ena complex.

Q156: Vakadeitaka mada na lorry cava o dou a vakavodoka kina na yaragi me kau sobu i Bilo?
A: Na renault saka.

Q157: E draiva tiko kina o?
A: Kaumaitoto ya.

Q158: Ena siga cava e sa qai lako yani kina na lorry ni Engineers mo dou sa qai toso ya nai yaragi?
A: Ena siga Moniti saka, au sega ni taura rawa saka ga na tikini siga.

Q159: Ena siga cava ea lako yani kina o Mr. Stevens?
A: Ena siga saka ea kauta yani kina na lorry.

Q160: Ocei a draiva tiko ena lorry?
A: E dua saka na kaidia ena Engineer.

Q161: Vakadeitaka mada na gauna cava dou vakavodoka kina na yaya mai na nomudou lecture room, e sega ni dua tale na yaragi e tawa tu na kit bag se na duffel bag ea vo tale se so a vo tu ena siga ya?
A: Eso tale na kisi.

Q162: E vo tu, dou a sega ni vakavodoka?
A: Sega.

Q163: Ena gauna dou unload kina, e sega tale ni dua na bag e vo tiko ena truck?
A: Sega.

Q164: Ni qai lako mai na truck esa lako lala saraga mai?
A: E lako lala mai, Sir.

Q165: O iko a dabe tiko e liu?
A: Sir.

Q166: E sega ni dua na duffel bag ea tiko eliu?
A: Noqu pack saka.

Q167: Nomu ga o iko?
A: Sir.
Q168: Ena gauna o a sobu kina o vakasobura?
A: Sir.

Q169: Ko ra a vo tiko mai na Unit mai cake ena gauna dou sa load kina, e boxes kecega se so na bags (duffel/kit bags) ea vo tiko mai cake?
A: Kit bags vata kei na boxes.

Q170: Kit bags kei na boxes e vo tiko ena nomudou complex i cake?
A: Sir.

Q171: Na cava mada dou sega ni vakavodoka kece kina na yaragi?
A: E keitou kauta na yaragi saka ga e dau vakayagataki ena counter terrorist role. E levu saka ga na special equipment e keitou kauta kei na so nai yaya e dau vakayagataki ena night visions. E levu talega nai yaya e dau vakayagataki ena ka ni assault vaka kina na ka ni snipers.

Q172: Vakacava nai yaya koya a biu tu mai?
A: E levu saka na personal weapons me nodra na yadrava tiko mai na Unit.

Q173: Me nodra na cauravou?
A: Sir.

Q174: Vakacava na nodratou kit na assault team, eso talega e tu ga mai?
A: E dua saka beka ga na set e vo tiko mai.

Q175: Mai na yaya talega e biu tu mai, e sega ni so na claymore e tu kina?
A: Segu saka.

Q176: Vakadeitaka mada, o cei a tukuna mo dou tosoya na yaragi?
A: E rua saka na orders e solia vei au. E dua na order mai vei neitou OC, e dua na order mai vei Mr. Stevens. Au taura saka ga na orders e solia mai o Mr. Stevens.

Q177: Na cava na order ni nomudou OC?
A: E solia saka oko ya na RV na vanua e dodonu me keitou toso kina ni sa yaco saka na full confrontation, esa yavalati na mataivalu, esa yavalati na matanitu. Na orders e solia o koya me keitou lako na RV me secure. Na RV e solia o koya, keirau kila saka ni dua na duidui e tiko ike. E duatani na RV e solia oko ya, e duatani na RV e solia o Mr. Stevens. Au mani taura saka na orders e solia vei au o Mr. Stevens.

Q178: Na order cava e solia vei iko o Baleinamau?
A: Meu toso saka ena RV.
Q179: Na RV evei?
A: Na wavu saka i Wailoku.

Q180: Mo dou lai wawa i kea?
A: Sir.

Q181: Waraki cei?
A: Waraka saka tale na vanua me keitou toso kina baleta ni vanua ya e via safe.

Q182: O cei a solia e liu na orders, o Mr. Baleinamau se o Stevens?
A: Mr. Stevens, Sir.

Q183: Esa oti e vica na mimiti e qai mai solia tale vei iko o Mr. Stevens na nona orders, se o sa toso tu o iko e qai solia yani o koya na orders?
A: Keirau sa veitalanoa oti kei Mr. Stevens ni se bera ni solia mai nona orders o OC.

Q184: A liu vei iko o Mr. Stevens?
A: Sir.

Q185: E vakadeitaka na orders e tukuna vei iko o Mr. Stevens mo toso ya na yaragi i Bilo?
A: Sir.

Q186: Na cava tale e bau tukuna vei iko o Capt. Stevens?
A: E tukuna o koya me kua tale ni dua e kila na vanua keitou tiko kina, na mataivalu vaka kina kei iratou na tiko mai Palimedi.

Q187: Na cava na nomu SOP, na nomu rules of engagement ena gauna ya?
A: E sega tale ni dua na rules of engagement e solia saka mai oko ya. Mai na orders ya, na ka ga e vinakata o koya me keitou secure-taka na yaragi me kua tale ni dua me kila na vanua e keitou sa toso kina vata kei na yaragi.

Q188: Confirm-taka mada, se bera ni dou vakavadoka na yaragi, na briefing ea soli vei kemudou, ea solia o Capt. Stevens?
A: Sir.

Q189: Mo dou vakavadoka na dakai?
A: Sir.

Q190: E oti e vica na mimiti e qai tukuna o Baleinamau mo dou kauta i Wailoku?
A: Eina gauna sa biubiu oti kina o Mr. Stevens, esa oti e vica na mimiti, au sega ni vakasamataka rawa ....
Q191: O kemudou sa tekivu vakavadoka na yaragi?
A: Sir.

Q192: Ena gauna e solia kina na directive o Mr. Stevens, dou sa tekivu vakavadoka saraga?
A: Sir.

Q193: Oti ya e qai lako yani o Mr. Baleinamaun?
A: Sir.

Q194: Esa vodo oti kece na yaragi se sebera, se lako tiko ga na vakavodo yaragi?
A: Sebera ni caka na vakavodo.

Q195: E qai tukuna oko ya mo dou kauta sobu na yaragi i Wailoku?
A: Sir.

Q196: Na nomu lako tu ya, o bau lomatarotaro ena rua na orders esa soli vei iko?
A: Lomatarotaro saka ni cava.

Q197: O tukuna ni rua na orders e soli vei iko, o qai vakamuria ga na nei Mr. Stevens?
A: Au kila saka ga ni neitou command elements esa leqa saka tu ena gauna ya. Esa wase rua na command e lako tiko mai vei irato na veiliutaki. Au sa mani taura na nei Mr. Stevens baleta ni keirau dau cakacaka vata ena levu na gauna.

Q198: Can you explain to us what is a para-bag?
A: Para-bag saka ena gauna e dau lako na flight, e dau vinakati ga me one piece saka ga nai yaya e kau. E tawa kina nai yaya kece, na pack, dakaia, na ka kece, me dau saka na tamata.

Q199: O ya nomu kit bag?
A: Oka tale tikoga vaka kit bag. Ia, qo eratou sa vakayagataka tale tiko ga na snipers me dau tawa kece tiko kina na nodratou i yaya, one piece.

Q200: These sniper rifles you use, is it part of that bag or you take it separately, you said you carry a weapon with you?
A: E tiko saka na box, esa rui balavu saka.

Q201: That day, you said there were some specialist weapons taken with you, were there any of those equipments left behind in QEB, in your Unit?
A: E tiko beka ga ko ra sa ca tiko.
Q202: The reason I asked you that question because some of these specialist weapons were found in the Parliament Complex. I am trying to correlate how it got there? Do you know how these specialist equipments got there?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q203: Did you on your journey go to Wailoku?
A: Sega saka.

Q204: O sega ni raica se o sega ni rogoa, o cei a pack-taka na dakai ko biu ena box?
A: Sega saka.

Q205: Na box ea tiko ga na box, na dakai ya e kau mai ena loma ni armoury me mai pack-taki ikea. E sega ni dau tutu ga ena box ena veigua na taucoko na yaragi.
A: Eso saka ga na yaragi e dau tu ga va na box.

Q206: E tiko va na box ena loma ni armoury?
A: Sir.

Q207: Ia na yaragi kece ko tiko i loma ya, na kena vo a pack-taki se dau davo tu ga va ya i loma ni armoury?
A: Oratou na stand-by team esa dau tu saka tu ga na nadratou yaya kece ena box.

Q208: O kila nai wiliwili ni yaragi dou a kauta sobu ena siga ya?
A: O Mr. Stevens ga esa tiko kece vei ko ya na account ni yaragi keitou kauta sobu.

Q209: Io, au kila qori, ena via vica vata na boxes?
A: Ena via 6 saka na boxes.

Q210: E 6 na boxes, e 4 na duffel bags?
A: Au sega saka ni taura rawa tiko. Vakacaca ga, e via 50 saka na personal weapons. O Mr. Stevens me qai kauta saka mai na kena account.

Q211: The selection team persons that were in the Unit, you know them well?
A: Sir.

Q212: They were there in the West for the last phase with you?
A: Sir.

Q213: Prior to the loading of the weapons, did you see any of them in your Unit? Were they there?
A: Au kilai iratou maka tikoga ko keitou qai toso vata. Na kena vo, au vakabauta ni ra a tiko talega ikeba baleta na 8 na kaloko ea dodonu me keitou sota kece ikeba, na selection team.

Q214: Sgt. e sega tikoga ni matata vei au se cava mada dou sega ni kauta taucoko kina na yaragi?
A: Sir, na threat talega esa lako mai loma ni Keba, eratou a threat-ta kai na cauravou ena loma ni Keba, eratou a tiko saka ena Keba ena siga ya, eratou defend-ta kai iratou tiko. E mani tiko talega vei iratou eso na yaragi.

Q215: O kilai ocei a threat-ta kai iratou?
A: Au sega ni taura rawa saka. Na brief ga e soli vei kai to ni sa dua beka na platoon, se rua eratou sa rehearse tiko meratou storm-ta kai mai neitou complex.

Q216: Ocei e solia na brief?
A: O Mr. Stevens.

[M. BONFASIO]  
Sergeant

[J. N. B. EVANS]  
Lieutenant Colonel  
President

[A. MOHAMMED]  
Major  
Member

[T. GUCAKE]  
Major  
Member

[H. MACOMBER]  
Warrant Officer Class One  
Member
THIRTY-SEVENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 23813 SGT J NAISARA

SGT Naisara, after having been duly sworn on the Bible hereby states:


Au a curu tu vaka-Reserve, au re-enlist tale mai e na FMF as regular e na gauna a vuaviritaka kina na Matanitu na Mataivalu e na i matai ni gauna ena 1987. E na 1987 talega au curu mai kina ena CRW, na i matai ni gauna a tekivutaki kina na CRW, me yacova na gauna a mai vuki kina na yacana me lMS kau sa tiko ga kina me yacova mai na gauna au mai tokitaki kina ki na 3FIR ena gauna qo.

Q1: Ni se bera na vuaviri e na i ka 19 ni siga, vakamacalataka mada na veika kece e yaco; na nomu vakaitavi e na kena vakavakarau, na vuli vakaivalu baleta na vuaviri?
A: E sega ni dua na vakavakarau se vuli vakaivalu me baleta na vuaviri au vakaitavitaki au kina seu bau kilo me baleta na vakavakarau me baleta na vuaviri.

Q2: E na i ka 19 ni siga, o a gole sobu i ra i na Complex?
A: E na i ka 14 ni siga ni vula o Me, o ya e na Siga Tabu, au a tauvimate kina (au ED) me yacova na i ka 19 ni siga. E na kena siga Vukelulu, au a kerei kina mai na neitou vale ni volavola meu lako i veitaba e na gauna ni tayabe, o ya ni oti na gauna e vakayacori oti tiko kina na veitaba mai na i matai ni tayabe kei na i karua ni tayabe - ko ya au a lai vakaitavi kina o au e na veitaba ena i karua ni tayabe. E na i ka 14 ni siga, au a tauvimate, ED.

Q3: Me yacova na i ka vica ni siga?
A: Yacova na i ka 19.

Q4: Siga Vakaraubuka, na siga ni vuaviri?
A: Io.

Q5: O a tiko e vei e na tikini siga o solia mai ya; o cacakaka tikoga se o tiko e vale?
A: Au a tiko e vale. E na i ka 19 ga ni siga au a qai gole sobu kina meu lai veitaba me vaka niu a vakaroti kina mai na neitou valenivolavola.
Q6: O cei a tukuna vei iko mo lai veitaba i ra?
A. Au kerea meu na kakua ni cavu yaca kina. A vakarotia ga vei au mai na ngitou valenivolavola meu lako i veitaba.

Q7: Satini Naisara, e i liulu ni nomu Unit na OC, nona boso na Director. Oko ya e dau solia na mission tautoko na i Liulu ni Mataivalu ni Viti. E authorise-taka na i Liulu ni Mataivalu ni Viti me caka na Board qo. E tiko na code of conduct ena loma ni dua na Unit me vaka na 1MS. E tiko na gauna e dau vakayagataki talega kina na code of conduct. Na code of conduct, ni o lako e na buca ni valu, e dau vakayagataki tiko kina na code of conduct - o ya ni o sa vesu mai vei ira na meca, kua ni vakaraitaka na yaca kei na ka kece vao ya. Na vanua qo e sega ni oka kina na code of conduct.

E sucu na Unit qo mai na SAS ni Peritania. E na loma ni SAS mai Peritania, ni dau caka vaqo na inquary, e vakatarai me soli na i tukutuku. E tiko ga na gauna e vakatarai kina. Levu na gauna dau lako tiko eso na investigation se so na veilewai, sega ni dua dau tiko e loma. E tiko tale na gauna e dau tiko na public presence ena gauna e caka kina na veilewai. Ni dau caka na veilewai, na dau authorise-taki na kena dau tukuni na i tukutuku. Matata sara ga vei keda tautoko e na loma ni Mataivalu o cei e tiko e loma ni 1MS. Ni keitou dhe keitou taro iko, e sega ni dua na tari qo kemami sega ni rawa ni taro iko kina, na veitaro qo e ra authorise tautoko. E vica vata na tamata sa dabe oti ike, e ra sa mai soli tukutuku. O iko sega ni qai kena e matai. O i ka 37 ni tamata, tekiuva mai vua na OC. Raica na pepa qo; WOI Bainimoli, Satini Waseroma, Sg Major Waqaniboro, Lt Dakuliga, Lt Tuivauavou, Sgt Bonafasio kei na levu tale na tamata. Na ka kece e yaco e matata vakaivola vei ira na dabe tiko e na Board qo. E drede me dabe na Board me vaqaqai eso na sotia, ia o cei tale ena cakava?

E na loma ni mataivalu e tiko na lawa eda oka kina ena ka kece. Na Board of Inquiry, kevaka e da na sega ni cakava o keda na dabe tiko qo, o cei e na qai cakava, ena must dua e cakava. Kevaka tou na mate ni kua, dua tale na board e na digitaki tale me mai rogo ca na ka qo, me mai cakava na Board of Inquiry. O rawa ni vakalekalekatake se o rawa ni vakabaluavutake. E sega ni macala na i wilivili ni tamata e na mai dabe me na mai saumi taro e na board qo; 40 se drau beka.

E matata talega e na record ni ovisa na ka kece e yaco, na i taba tautoko e tiko, na i taba mai na CNN, BBC, Fiji One News. O rawa ni vakalekalekatake na veimalanoa qo se o vakabaluavutake. Kevaka o lomatarotaro o sega ni kila na ka e donu mo tukuna, e rawa ni solia vei iko na Board na galala mo lesu tale, lai taro gna nomu OC, nomu Director se na i liulu ni Mataivalu na ka e donu mo mai tukuna e na loma ni
Inquiry qo. Kevaka o vinakata me soli vei iko na galala mo lai tarogi ira ena ka o rawa ni tukuna ike, tukuna mai. E rawa ni soli vei iko na galala, vakatau vei iko. Au na sega ni lesuva tale na i tukutuku e gadrevi mo tukuna e na Inquiry qo.

Q8: O cei a tukuna vei iko mo gole sobu i na Complex?
A: Na noqu gole sobu i na Complex, e vakarotai mai vei au mai na neitou valenivolavola meu lako i veitaba.

Q9: Clear-taki Satini Naisara, MP. Keitou na qai kacivi iko tale e na dua tale na siga. Lako lai taroga nomu boso e na ka o rawa ni tukuna i ke.
A: Sa vinaka saka vakalevu, Sir.

Recalled on 28/8/00:

Sgt Naisara, after having been duly resummoned and after having been reminded that he was still under oath, was reinterviewed as follows:

Q10: Sgt. Naisara, e soli vei iko e dua na chance mo rawa ni vakamacala ena gauna oqo. E dua tale na ka o via tukuna ka vakamacalataka i ke?
A: Sega saka.

Q11: Sgt. Naisara, o vakaraita ena siga Vakaraubuka ni vuni nomu gole sobu ena Parliament Complex baleta ni dua e tiko e cake vei iko na nona i tutu e tukuna vei iko mo lako sobu. E dina ya se cala?
A: E'dina. A soli yani vei au nai vakaro mei lai veitaba, i na noqu veitaba tiko yani me te'ivu mai taoni me'nako va dua ena Parliament Complex.

Q12: O cei qai tukuna mo curu ina Parliament Complex?
Q13: O cei a solia vei iko na order mo lai veitaba i Suva?
A: Au a sa vakamacalataki oti ena siga Vakaraubuka ni a soli mai vei au nai vakaro mai na nettou vale ni volavola meu lai veitaba i Suva.

Q14: O cei mai na vale ni volavola e solia vei iko na order o ya?
A: Au kerea saka meu kakua saka ni cavu yaca ena loma saka ni squadron ena veika au vakaitavitaki au kina.

Q15: Sgt. Naisara, kevaka au taroga vei iko e dua na taro oqo, au kerea mo sauma ena io se sega. Ona sega ni cavuta kina e dua na yaca, e rawa ya se sega?
A: Au kerea saka meu na rogoca saka e liu na taro ni bera saka niu qai sauma.

Q16: Vakadeitaka mada mai, ea tukuna mo lako sobu lai veitaba o nomudou OC ena gauna o ya o Mr. Baleinamau?
A: Dina.

Q17: Sgt. Naisara, did you take photographs during the march?

Q18: Ena gauna o tiko kina ena Parliament Complex, e dua na gauna o vanataka kina na nomu dakaia?
A: Sega.

Q19: E dua na gauna oau curu i tuba?
A: Io.

Q20: Na cava o lai kakava ena nomu curu i tuba?
A: Au a salavata voli mai kei George Speight ina veitalanoa mai yaco tiko e tuba.

Q21: The photographs you took, where are they now?
A: E dua na i wase ni taba e yanaraki mai Kalabu. Au se vaqara tiko ga qo, au sebera ni taura e dua na kenai tukutuku matata.

Q22: E dua tale nai wase, the other half?
A: Esa maroro tu ga.

Q23: O iko o a vakaitavi ena kena kau sobu na yaragi ena loma ni complex ni se bera na vuavivi enai 19 ni siga?
A: Sega.
Q24: Sgt. Naisara daru vakadeitaka e dua tale mada ga na ka. O rawa ni vakadeitaka mada na i vakar o soli vei iko, mo laki veitaba mai na maji na kena tekviva mai na makete me yaco sara i na Parliament Complex?

A: E sege ni dua na i vakaro e soli vei au meu veitaba mai na maji me yaco i na Parliament Complex. A soli ga vei au na i vakaro meu veitaba ena gauna ni maji.

Q25: Ni sa lai oti ya, lai cutu sara O iko ena Parliament Complex, e dua a solia vei iko na directive mo lai vakaitavi tale i loma ya?

A: Au kere saka mo ni vakamatatatata na nomuni taro.

Q26: Ena gauna o lako sobu, ena i matai ni gauna o cutu ena loma ni complex, o a gole mo lai veitaba e loma ni complex, e dua a direct taki iko mo lai yadra tale ike?

A: Au kere saka na kakua noi vakamacala ena kena qori.

Q27: E va qo, e rawarawa sara na tara. Na gauna o lako e loma ni complex, a soli vei iko na directive mo lako lai yadra ike se sega? Io se sega?

A: Au kere saka me na kakua saka noi vakamacala ena kena ogori.

Q28: Baleta na cava?

A: Baleta na gauna au sa yaco yani ikeu au sa raica ni sa tu e kea o iratou na lewe ni squadron, e dua na ka sa vakaitavi kina oratou na squadron. Ena tikina qo, esa dredre vei au meu na tukuna e dua na ka sa vakaitavi kina o ira na cauravou na lewe ni squadron.

Q29: Keitou sa veitalanoa oti ike me baleta na tikina o ya. O sa lai taroga na nomu OC?

A: Sega.

Q30: Baleta na cava?

A: Na gauna oqo e vesu tu na neitou OC.

Q31: O cei na liului ni nomudou Unit ena gauna qo?

A: Na ga ga au kila ni under strategic command.

Q32: Negative. O iko na senior NCO, na liului ni nomudou Unit o Major Sorby. O Major Sorby esa OC ni Unit?

A: Kevaka ni veitalanoa saka tiko ena gauna oqo, ena gauna oqo au sa tiko saka ena 3FIR.

Q33: Gole ni kua, lai veitalanoa kei Major Sorby, qo na directive ni Board qo. Na Board qo e direct taka mai na liului ni mataivalu, oko ya na nomudou employer. Mo lai veitalanoataka vata kei ko ya “what you can release in this Board and what you cannot”. O tukuna ni sega ni rawa no release taka na information. This Board has the authority to receive all information. All the questions that is asked, it has authority to ask and you are abided by Army regulations to pass on that information.
You are confused as to whether you have the ability to release the information or not. That is the confusing point. There is no doubt here whatsoever, that the information that is being asked by this Board is authorised by this Board to ask and authorised by the Commander which is your employer. You have a slight misunderstanding here.

This is what the Board has directed, you go back and talk with the OC of the CRW and get him the directive of whether you can. If you have difficulty, go back and ask Commander RFMF, your prime employer no qai lesu mai. You will appear before this Board ena siga Lotulevu se Vukelulu, keitou na qai kacivi iko tale. E dua na caution au na biuta vei iko eke. E 43 na tamata sara mai habe eke. E rua na tamata mai tarogi vakarua. Mai na 43, e tolu ga na tamata e sega ni via soli tukutuku. Au na caution taki iko eke, kevaka ona sega ni soli tukutuku ike, ena volai sara ena nomu report, you will be subject to further investigations. Everyone else, e matata vinak, sara na ka e yaco, kena vo, they know where they stand, tekiyu sara mai vei Lt. Baleinamau, Lt. Dakai, Bainimoli, Waseroma, Kalounivala, Taveke o ira a tekiyuna na CRW vata kei iko. Eso o Lotawa, Uluicake, qo eso era qai tekiyu i muri, Kalounivala, na kena vo au na sega ni tukuna, Tuivauavou, Daunadoniwai, Bukasila. E tolu ga na tamata eratou sega ni via soli tukutuku, O iko kei na rua tale.

Au caution-taki iko qo, nomu sega ni via soli tukutuku. You are sitting before a Military Tribunal. This Tribunal is authorised to ask you the questions it is asking. We understand the code of conduct that you have within the 1MS. Rethink that code of conduct, you are obviously confused with that code of conduct now. You think you are bound by that code of conduct, go and ask your seniors. If you have a problem, go one step up until such time that they will tell you what you are authorised to say here. Let me caution you, kevaka ona sega ni via soli tukutuku, you will be subject for other military actions which will be recommended by this Board. We will recommend it, the choice is yours. Na digidigi e sa nomu, sa ko ya ga ya.

Recalled on 13/09/00:

Sgt. J. Naisara, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q34: Firstly, you were George Speight’s bodyguard. In the weapon register, your weapon is still outstanding, it has not been returned. We have your signature in the weapon register in Parliament. Your weapon has not been signed out, it is also recorded in one of the list here of the weapons outstanding, a pistol. We also have on record given by some witness that when weapons were returned, e tukuna o Na Qase me kua ni suka na nodra pistol na bodyguard. Do you still have your pistol with you?

A: No, Sir.
Remember that you are bounded by oath, the consequence of this oath, o kila tu ga o iko. Na nomu dakai, na pistol, e se tikoga vei iko?
A: E sega saka.

Q36: E tiko e vei na nomu pistol?
A: Na i yaragi kece e tu vei au ena gauna a tukuni kina mai Palimedi me suka, au sa vakasuka. Ena mataka lai lai au a sa vakasuka kina na i yaragi.

Q37: Ena mataka lailai cava?
A: Ena mataka ni siga a suka kina na i yaragi. E tiko vei au e dua na SMC ke laki laurai saka e kea, e tiko saka kina e dua na “J” e muri. E dua na personal weapon, ena laurai saka e muri e tiko kina na “J3” vata kei na noqu pistol au vakasukara vata, ia au sega ni makataka. Ena gauna au vakayagataka tiko kina, au twink taka tiko na foresight e liu.

Q38: O vakasuka vei cei na nomu pistol?
A: Na yaragi kece a sa suka vakadodonu ena vanua e tu saka kina na i yaragi.

Q39: A suka vei cei?
A: Ena gauna saka o ya o Kalounivale e qarava tiko na suka ni yaragi.

Q40: Ena gauna a caka kina na vuaviri, o curu ena loma ni Palimedi, ko a veitaba tiko e loma. Au wavoki tiko e loma ni chambers, e dina o ya?
A: Au kereya ke rawa ni vakamatata taka saka na gauna.

Q41: It does not matter, during the day that whole day, on the 19th, sometime during the 19th, you went in and took photos of the chambers.
A: Au sa vakaraitaka oti saka ena matai saka ni BOI niu a talai sobu meu laki veitaba ena maji.

Q42: Satini Naisara, oqa na taro? Did you at any time go inside the chambers on the day of the 19th and take photos inside the chambers? You also took a video camera?
A: E dina saka.

Q43: E vei na video camera, na tape o ya?
A: Au a tukuna oti saka ni dua na i wase ni tapes e yali mai Kalabu.

Q44: Where is the tape you took of the chambers? John, just answer me straight, you have it or not?
A: E sega saka.
Q45: Where is the tape?
A: Au seng saka ni kila na vanua e tu kina na tape ena gauna oqo.

Q46: Where was the tapes taken?
A: Au seng saka ni kila.

Q47: Who did you give it to?
A: E seng saka.

Q48: Whom did you give the tape?
A: Eya biu saka tu mai Kalabu ena gauna e yanaraki kina na tape.

Q49: Sgt. Naisara, the last time you came to give evidence, when we asked you about the photographs, you said you were keeping it.
A: E dina saka, e cala saka na ka au tukuna niu a maroro ya saka tu baleta ena gauna eya yaco kina na ka mai Kalabu vata kei na ka e yaco saka tiko, au a sa solia saka kina na tapes. Ena gauna au qai vakataroga tale kina oqo, au sa seng saka ni kila na vanua e sa tu kina ena gauna oqo. E dua ga na i tukutuku au qai taura e tukuni ni sa viritaki laivi.

Q50: Sgt. Naisara, na i taba o vakayagataka tiko na video camera, na nomu ga se ka ni nomudou unit.
A: E seng saka ni ka ni unit, keitou lewe vica walega, keitou contribute taka na i taba o ya ka qai laki vakayagataka tiko ena unit.

Q51: Mai na lewe vica kemudou contribute taka o ya, na veika kece dou vakayagataka ena i taba o ya, e soliga ena unit se so na gauna dou dau vakayagataka me nomudou own private use.
A: Na veidinadinati e tiko saka, e rawa ni keimami kauta me keimami laki vakayagataka ena neimami private use.

Q52: Ena gauna oqo, e tiko vei cei na nomudou video camera?
A: E maroroi saka tu.

Q53: O maroro ya tiko o iko?
A: E seng saka e dua tanzi tale.

Q54: Satini Naisara, o tiko e vei ena gauna oqo?
A: Au tiko saka ena 3FIR.

Q55: E nai matai ni gauna o tukuna ni tiko vei iko na i taba, oqo o sa tukuna ni sa seng. Ena report taka na Board oqo that you were reluctant to give information. The Board do not believe that you are actually telling the truth
here or you did not want to pass on information that you know of what took place in the complex.

A: Sir, au kereya mev vakaraitaka saka e baleta na i taba o ni tukuna kina niu sega ni via soli i tukutuku?

Q56: You are not passing on information to the Board. You are reluctant to give names, you are reluctant to pass out knowledge that you know of what happened, what took place. Na i taba oqori kei na vica vata na ka. E na i matai ni interview e tarogi na yaca, o qai tukuna ni o sega ni via cavu yaca, me tarogi ga na OC. All that has been recorded, we will record that you are reluctant to give information.

A: Sir, o ni via vakayetaka saka oqori mo ni threaten taki au kina.

Q57: There is no threat, the Board does not threat, what the Board does is find information. All that we record is just to bring to your attention what you already know. You have indicated here throughout that you will not give information me tou raici OC. That is what I am telling you now.

A: Au vakabauta saka ni levu nai tukutuku o ko ya au sega ni solia, au kila na veika kece oqori e sa solia mai o Na Qase, Mr. Whiting.

Q58: Sa solia o Na Qase, other members have also given it, there is only a few people that have not given information willingly and you are one of them. I want to bring your attention now that you will be recorded as you as one of the person that do not want to give information.

A: Na veika kece saka oqori e sega saka ni dina, Sir. Na nomuni tukuna saka niu sega ni via soli information, au via tukuna eke ni sega ni dina. Dua, au a tukuna saka vei kemuni e nai matai ni gauna au vakatarogi kina, e bind taki au na Secret Oath Act, kena i karua na Code of Ethics.

Q59: Do you have something in writing to prove that? me tiko e dua na vanua mo rawa ni muria. O rawa ni kauta mai ena Board oqo.

A: Au kila ni matata tu vei kemuni na veika kece oqori.

Q60: O rawa ni kauta mai na Board oqo?

A: Na ka saka o ya e pass taki mai vei keimami me tekivu mai na gauna keimami recruit kina.

Q61: O rawa ni kauta mai e dua na kena i vola? O rawa ni present taka ena Board se sega? Its either yes or no.

A: E sega saka ni tu e dua na ka.

Q62: E vica vata na taro eya tarogi, o cei e involve, ena gauna o tiko kina e kea, na ka kece, o iko na saumi taro ga, me na qai saumi taroga na neitou i liiu. That was your statement right through out. I will indicate that on the report.
You are one of the three. You said you are bined by the code of conduct, we remind you of the code of conduct, na ka e tukuna o Na Qase, you cannot present the code of conduct which had been handed down. Keitou vakaita vei iko na statement nei Na Qase, we also told you to research that and go and find it out. We also reminded you here that official enquiry, the code of conduct does not count. I also directed you here as a senior NCO mo laki taroga. Na inquiry oqo, we are based on the British army. British Army official enquiry, information must be given. The only difference is it does not refer to the person. Persons are listed as Private A, Private B, Private C, that is all but all information. The identity is kept during official inquiry when the official inquiry is made public. All information must be given in an inquiry and this is one of it. I brought that to your attention, I told you also to go and have a look, find your boss, talk to your boss, talk to your seniors. You have come back in your second interview and said that you have not talked to them about it. You have been given the opportunity. Also you cannot present your code of conduct. I understand about the code of conduct and where it applies and where it does not apply. Sai ko ya o ya.

Q63: O tukuna o iko ni se bera na i ka 19 ni siga ko a ED tu? E dina saka.

A:

Q64: Na nomu ED oqo, e soli mai vua na GMMC se dua tale na vale ni bula? Na ED e soli mai valenibula i na keba.

A:

Na nona dau soli na ED me da dau kauta ena orderly room? E dina saka. Au a solia ena orderly room. Au vakabinta ni rawa ni tu talega na kena record e valenibula.

[J. NAISARA]
Sergeant

[Lieutenant Colonel
President

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
CONFIDENTIAL

THIRTY-EIGHTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 26572 LCPL L BUADROMO

Lcpl Buadromo, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Just give us a brief background and outline of your military service?
   A: I was enlisted into the army in 1987 as a reserve. In 1988, I went to the Middle East, Lebanon. In 1989, I joined the 3FIR and in 1992, I went for selection into the CRW.

Q2: Just indicate to the Board your involvement with the unit prior to the 19th of May?
   A: I was in the unit until the 19th.

Q3: Explain to the Board your involvement in the planning of the take-over of the Parliament Complex on the 19th of May?
   A: I was not involved.

Q4: Were you involved in the planning and take-over of the Complex?
   A: No.

Q5: Did you have any knowledge of the take-over of Parliament Complex?
   A: No.

Q6: When did you become aware of the take-over at the Parliament Complex?
   A: I was at home when I became aware of the take-over, then I went to the Complex. I was in the Complex for one week.

Q7: What Complex are you talking about?
   A: QEB.

Q8: QEB is referred to as the unit and the Complex is the Parliament Complex. When did you return to the unit? On what date? Where were you on the 19th of May?
   A: I was at home.

Q9: On day off?
   A: Yes, Sir.

Q10: When did you return to the unit?
    A: I heard about the coup, then came to the unit and stayed there on the directive of the present OC.
Q11: On the 19th of May, you were in the unit. You stayed in the unit for one week under the order of the OC. Who was he?
A: Captain Stevens. Under his directive, we went to the jungle.

Q12: Where did you go?
A: We cannot reveal where we went, but I think you should ask Captain Stevens of our whereabouts until we returned.

Q13: We already know where you went, Corporal Buadromo. Were you part of the team that took weapons down to Bilo?
A: No.

Q14: Were you part of the team that went and relieve those guarding the weapons?
A: Yes.

Q15: Did you, at any time, enter the Complex down at Parliament?
A: On one occasion. There was a dispute and we went to solve things.

Q16: Whilst at your unit, did you or anyone else contact those 1FMS personnel in the Complex?
A: No.

Q17: Were you part of the loading team that took the weapons that went to B?
A: No.

Q18: Were you part of the brief that was given on the 19th of May by Lt. Col. Tuatoko?
A: No, Sir.

Q19: Were you involved in any activities at all in regards to the activities controlled by those in the Complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q20: Why did you not go down and join those in the Complex?
A: We had to stay at Nabua to secure the area.

Q21: Most of the members of the unit went down and joined Parliament. Why did you not go down?
A: I was to stay at the unit for security reasons.

Q22: You said your OC told you to stay there and secure the unit at QEB. Who was this OC?
A: Mr. Stevens.
Q23: He was not your OC then?
A: Yes.

Q24: Who was it then?
A: 21C...

Q25: When you went to the Parliament, what disputes were these?
A: Sir, I cannot comment on that.

Q26: Let me mention that you make a 'yes' or 'no' answer. Were you aware of a threat?
A: I was not aware of a threat, but I was told to go and talk to them. All the threats, I was not aware.

Q27: You indicated you were given operations to go down. Which operations?
A: 3FIR.

Q28: Who was making these arrangements?
A: OC.

Q29: Do you recall the person who briefed you at Parliament House?
A: I cannot comment on that, Sir. You can ask SOP.

Q30: What you are not trying to answer, we already know. This is a crime under the Army Act and I think if you read the Army Act, you will see the judgement it leaves.

When you heard that you were ordered by the Commander to return the weapons, did you return it to the 1FMS?
A: Yes.

Q31: Did you return it to the 1FMS armourer?
A: Yes.

Q32: Who received the weapons?
A: Mr. Stevens.

Q33: Did you, at any time, meet with any members of the 1FMS in Parliament?
A: No, Sir.
Recalled on 15/9/00.

Pte Buadrom, after having been duly reminded of oath earlier taken, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q34: Since the Board has seen you, we have now heard 97 witnesses, we have gone through the files in various sections of the Police Force, we have gone through Parliament, we have seen photos, we have gone through seven video tapes, we have been in contact with the media and also those people who were present in Parliament have been interviewed here; those that were sitting in Parliament on that day. What we will do we will re-question you and ask you again.

Firstly, were you involved in the packing of the weapons on Friday night; the day of the coup?
A: No, Sir.

Q35: On Friday, during the initial entry into Parliament, did you go down with the lot that initially took over Parliament? When did you first come to know about the events leading to the takeover of Parliament?
A: I was at home when I heard it over the radio then I came to the base in Nabua.

Q36: Cpl Buadrom, you have been identified as one of the persons that entered and took over Parliament; what do you have to say to that?
A: That is false.

Q37: Your name has been given by those who actually entered Parliament, and that has also been reconfirmed by those who work inside and also by other persons who were present inside the Chambers. Did you go in with the first lot?
A: No, Sir.

Q38: When do the people who work in the Ints Ops Surveillance team; when do you normally report back to your Unit?
A: If we have information then we report there.

Q39: Is it not normal that you report back every last Friday of every month or something like that?
A: It is not that normal but whenever we have information then we report back.

Q40: Who do you pass on the information to?
A: The Int Cell.

Q41: That is Mr Baleinamu and Sgt Tikotani?
A: Yes.
Q42: Where were you on Thursday night, the 18th of May?
A: Home, Sir.

Q43: Were you not on duty that night in your unit?
A: I was at home.

Q44: You were at home?
A: Yes.

[ L. BUADROMO]
Lance Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS] [A. MOHAMMED]
Lieutenant Colonel 
President 
Major 
Member

[H. MACOMBER] [T. GUCAKE]
Warrant Officer Class One 
Member 
Major 
Member
THIRTY NINTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 23825 SGT K KOROIDIMURI

Sgt Koroidimuri, after having been sworn on Bible in English was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Sgt Koroidimuri, just give us a brief outline of your service in the Force?
A: Au a curu saka e na Mataivalu e na 1981 ena i matai ni lakolako i Sinai; au a vakaitaviti ko ma kea me 15 na vula, lesu tale mai; au lako vakarua i Lepanoni lesu mai, au qai mai curu e na RF ena 1987 e na i matai ni selection ni CRW, mai o ya me yacova saka mai qo.

Q2: Can you give us a brief outline of your participation in the events leading up to the 19th of May, the planning phase for the CRW or the IMS involvement in the events of the 19th of May earlier this year; your involvement before, during, after and up till this week?
A: E na vula saka o Januari e na yabaki sa oti, au a lako kina i East Timor. Au tiko saka mai kea sa rogo ni sa yaco na coup. Au kila e na i ka 21 saka beka ni vula ko Juilai au lesu tele mai kina i Viti.

Q3: E na siga cava o lesu mai kina?
A: E na i ka 21 saka beka ni siga ni Juilai.

Q4: Satini, talanoataka mada na ka o kila ni yaco e na nomu lesu mai. Bau dua na ka o kila se rogoca me baleta na ka e yaco e na i ka 19 ni siga?
A: Au sega saka ni kila kina e dua na ka o au. Keitou kidacala na lewe ni Unit mai kea ni sa vakaitavi na Unit.

Q5: O lesu mai e na i ka 21 ni siga, o ya na siga dou lesu mai kina mai East Timor?
A: Io saka.

Q6: O qai gole i vei?
A: Keitou gole ga mai keitou rai i neitou vanua ni cakacaka, keitou dui gole sara e na neitou dui vele.

Q7: O a qai tekitu e na i ka vica ni siga, se o sa tekitu sara ga e na siga o ya?
A: Via w;ca na siga na neitou tu i vale keitou sa qai mai tekitu.

Q8: O sega ni kila e dua na ka baleta na ka e yaco?
A: Sega saka.

Q9: O mai rogo i talanoa ga?
A: Io saka.
Q10: Did you make any contacts with the IFMS personnel who were involved in the Parliament takeover?
A: Keitou tiko mai kea, keitou sasaga qiri mai ki na Ops, qai sega sara ga ni keitou veitarala ra wa mai.

Q11: Did you personally speak with any of them?
A: No, Sir.

[K. KOROIDIMURI]
Sergeant

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
Cpl Bitu, after having been duly sworn on the Bible, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Were you one of the lot that went to East Timor?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q2: When did you return from East Timor?
A: 21st.

Q3: 21st of?
A: July.

Q4: When did you join the Unit - CRW?
A: 1988, Sir.

Q5: You understand why the Board is sitting. This is the Board of Inquiry to investigate the involvement of the 1st Meridian Squadron in the takeover of the Parliament Complex. Do you have any knowledge of the 1MS involvement in that incident?
A: No, Sir.

Q6: While you were out there in East Timor, did you at any time contact any of the members of the 1MS in the 1FMS Complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q7: How was the contact made?
A: By telephone, Sir.
Q8: What was the nature of the conversation?
A: We were discussing how the boys at the Complex were carrying out their work.

[ P. BITU]
Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
FORTY FIRST WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 24986 CPL E CAGINIVALU

Cpl Caginivalu, after having been sworn on Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Cpl Caginivalu, e na gauna cava o a curu kina e na 1MS?

Q2: O se qai lesu ga mai East Timor e na i ka 21 ni siga ni vula o Jiulai?
A: Io saka.

Q3: E na gauna o tiko kina mai East Timor, o bau veitaratara vata kei ira na tiko e na loma ni Complex ena talevoni se na i vola?
A: Talevoni saka.

Q4: A cava a veitalanoataki?
A: Au taroga saka ga mai se sa vakacava na Unit; ko ya saka ga o ya au taroga mai.

Q5: Noru lesu mai o bau rogoca e dua na veitalanoa me baleta na nodratou vakaitavi ni lewe ni 1MS Unit e na vuaviri?
A: Sega

Q6: Kovula, ni o tukuna ni o veitaratara mai na Complex, o ya i na Palimedi se i na nomudou Unit i cake?
A: Na Unit saka mai cake, Sir.

[ E. CAGINIVALU]
Corporal

[ J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member
FORTY-SECOND WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 26286 CPL E GAUNAVINAKA

Cpl Gaunavinaka after having been duly sworn on the Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Cpl. Gaunavinaka, o a curu kina 1MS ena gauna cava?

Q2: Vakamacakalataka mada na nomu vakaitavitaki iko ena ka e yaco ena vuaviri ena i ka 19 ni siga ni vula ko Me? Ni se bera o ya, vakamacakalataka e so na vuli vaikaivalu se na ncmu a involve ena dua na plan ena kena plan taki na vuaviri kei na ka kece me yacova na gauna ni kua.

Keitou qai lesu yani o ya sa rogo tiko ni sa yaco na coup mai Palimedi. Na veika kee mbelela na coup saka o ya, au sega ni kila kina e dua na ka baleta ni’u se qai lesu ga mai ena Middle East ka’u tu welew ele sara ga ena noqu tu ena loma ni Unit. Na kena rogo sa yaco vei Tu Sak, au sa vakasama ni siga ni dua na ka me keitou brief:aki kina se me tukuni vei keitou na ka e baleta na kena caka na coup o ya. Au sa mani vakamanganu me’u sa lako ga ki na koro ena siga o ya, siga Vakarau buka. Au sa mani tuga au sa lako. Au vodo basi ka gole ki nakoro. Au tu mai nakoro me yacova saraga na siga Moniti au lesutale mai ena keba. Au lesu ga mai ena Moniti sa mba tukuna vei au o Mr. Stevens me’u sa na lako i veikau. Au tarogi ko ya na cava me’u laki cakava i veikau? A mani tukuna o ko ya me keitou laki secure taka eso na i yaragi sa tiko e veikau me keitou na maroro ya tiko. Au sa mani gole saka i veikau me yacova na gauna e oti kece sara kina na nodra suka mai Palimedi.

Q3: Na siga cava ko a gole kina ki veikau?
A: Ena siga Moniti saka.

Q4: O ya ena macawa e tarava?
A: Io saka.

Q5: Kouvula, na nomu lako i veikau, o bau veitaratara vata kei ira na tiko e loma ni complex? Ni’u vakamacakalataka na complex, o ya na Parliament Complex, i cake na Unit.
A: A sega saka ni dua na veitaratara ena complex ruarua. Au sa vaka rogo saka tiko ga na ka e tukuna o Mr. Stevens baleta ni sega tu ni dua na nei tou gaunisala ni veitaratara.
Q6: Ena gauna o tu kina e veikau, o sega ni bau veitaratara kei na dua?
A: Au sega saka ni veitaratara kei na dua.

Q7: O cei soti e a tu i veikau vata kei kemudou?
A: O au saka ga, o Bonafasio, Buadromo vata kei iratou saka ga na sa gole i East Timor.

Q8: O cei soti era sa gole ki East Timor?
A: O Todua kei Tuiwailevu saka.

Q9: E nai ka 18 ni siga ko a tiko ena Unit ena keba vaka talega kina ena i ka 19 ni siga?
A: Io saka.

Q10: E na i ka 18 kei na i ka 19 ni siga, o bau raica e dua na ka e kau mai na Unit me kau ki tuba, na i yaragi?
A: E sega saka.

Q11: Ena gauna ko a tiko kina ena Unit ena nomu lesu mai Sinai, o bau rogoce se raica na gauna e kau kina na i yaragi ki tuba?
A: E sega saka ni'u rogoce se me'u raica.

Q12: O cei soti e a tiko ena Unit ena keba ena i ka 19 ni siga?
A: O keitou saka kecega na lewe ni squadron.

Q13: Baleta e dua na kena i vakaraitaki oqo, e dua na kena i wase e a tiko i Makuluva. e vica na team e a tiko mai Makuluva?
A: Au sega saka ni taura rawa.

Q14: Tolu, va se lima?
A: Au sega saka ni'u taura rawa. (*4 teams*)

Q15: Edua na kenai wase e tiko mai Nadi, oiratou na selections vata kei Stephens. O cei e qai vo tiko e loma ni keba?
A: E so saka vei keitou na tiko o ya, au sega saka ni kila tiko na yacadratou ena gauna o ya. Era a se qai selection vou saka mai.

Q16: O ira na yadrava tiko na dakai, vakacava o Tamani, Leweniqila vata kei Naiqamu
A: Io saka.

Q17: O Naiqamu?
Q18: O cei e a solia tiko veikemudou na instruction ena kena kau wavoki tiko na dakai o ya? Na i matai ni kena kau, a kau mai na keba, o cei eya solia na instruction me vodo na dakai?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q19: Ko a s au vaka itavi ena kena vakavodoki na dakai?
A: E sega saka.

Q20: Ena gauna o laki secure taka kina na dakai, eya tiko e vei na dakai?
A: E na Namosi kei Nabukavesi areas.

Q21: Ena gauna o secure taka tiko kina na dakai, e bau dua e taura na dakai mai na batch o ya?
A: E sega saka.

Q22: O bau raica e dua na list ka ra tiko kina na dakai o ya? E bau tiko e dua na kena list.
A: E tiko saka beka ga vei Mr. Stevens, au sega saka ni kila.

Q23: Ena gauna eya kau kina na dakai, eya bau kau tiko eso na gasau?
A: E rawa ni vakasaka kina baleta ni dua na lori o ya era tawa kece tikoga kina vakadua na i yaragi.

Q24: E tawa tiko vakacava na i yaragi? E tawa tiko ena loma ni cava?
A: E tu sakaga ena loma ni lori.

Q25: E tawa tiko ena cava; plastic bags, kisi se kateni se davo tu ga?
A: E davo saka tuga.

Q26: E davo tu ga ena loma ni lori ka sega ni dua na ka e ubi kina se cava?
A: E vakatavule ni saka tuga na lori o ya.

Q27: Na lori vakacava o ya?
A: Na na nodratou lori sakaga na Engineer.

Q28: Na cava na size ni lori oqo? Oqo na lori ga ni mataivalu na kena drokadroka, na Hino?
A: I o saka.

Q29: Na gauna e maroro kina na i yaragi, eya sogo tu na kena tavuleni

Q30: E vodo tu e loma ni lori, ubi tu ena tavuleni, o kemudou dou qai davo tiko e loma ni lori.
A: (Silence)
CONFIDENTIAL

Q31: Cpl. Gaunavinaka, what was your appointment in 1MS before 18th May?
A: Patrol Commander, saka.

Q32: Were you there when the weapons were brought back in camp?
A: Au sega saka ni kila, au qai lako yani sa tiko saka kina.

Q33: Ena gauna a kau lesu tale yani kina e loma ni keba, ko a sega ni tiko e kea?
A: Io saka.

Q34: Ko a tiko e vei?
A: Au tiko saka mai nakoro.

Q35: Oti o ya o lesu tale ki nakoro?
A: Io saka.

Q36: Ena gauna o tiko kina ena loma ni Unit, o bau rogo i talanoa se ko cei e vaka i tavi ena ka oqo?
A: Au sega saka ni kila o cei e tekivuna se vakaitavi.

Q37: Kovula, e na i ka 19 ni siga ko tukuna tiko ni o dou savata tiko kina na i yaya ni exercise mai Makuluva, ena gauna sa yaco kina na vuaviri e yaco i Palimedi, o dou a kacivi lesu tale mai ena nomudou loma ni unit? O dau a savata tiko na i yaya ni exercise e vei?
A: Ena shed i cake.

Q38: E a sega ni dua na brief eya solia na nomudou OC, o Mr. Baleinamau?
A: E na noqu qai lesu saka yani o ya era sa veilako yaki na cauravou. De a caka beka na brief, au sega ni kila.

Q39: O sa mani gole ga i nakoro?
A: Au gole ga mai, au rogoca na ka sa yaco, au sega mada ga ni taura rawa o cei e cakava na vuaviri. Au sa mani taura ga na noqu i sulu ka’u gole saka.

Q40: Ena gauna cava o sa qai kila kina na vakaitavi ni nomu unit ena vuaviri?
A: Au sa tiko saka ga i matamata, e dua na cauravou sa qai tukuna vei au. Au sega ni taura rawa, e dina se sega.

Recalled on 8/9/00:

Cpl E Gaunavinaka, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q41: O ikc a tiko e na keba e na Lotulevu na i ka 17?
A: Au a liko saka kina.

Q42: Tekivi mai na Moniti kei na macawa taucoko o ya, o iko a tikoga e na base?
A: Sir.

Q43: O iko a vakaitavi e na kena vakavodoki eso na dakai se e na loma ni macawa o ya, o raica na kena kau i tuba na i yaragi?
A: Nodratou i yaragi saka ga na lako i exercise.

Q44: A kau e na siga cava?
A: A issue saka e na siga Tusiti, Vukelulu saka beka sa qai kau kina.

Q45: Rawa ni o vakamacalataka mada na issue?
A: O Satini Vuki saka e kaya me handover saka vei au na stores. Au sa qai tukuna vua, “Sega, au sega ni dua na ka au kila e na sitoa.” E verbal tu ga mai na ka e tukuna oko ya, oti sa qai kaya tale oko ya, “Sega, baleta au na vakarau leave, o ratou na gone eratou lai exercise, mo qarauna ga na nodratou i yaya na lako i exercise.”

Q46: Lai exercise i vei?
A: I Makuluva saka.

Q47: Na exercise cava?
A: Survival exercise, sa mani tukuna sara oko ya meu raica rawa na nodratou i yaragi me ratou na kauta e na exercise.

Q48: Na i yaragi a pack-taki ena cava?
A: Sega, o ratou dui taura tikoga nodratou i yaragi.

Q49: E ratou dui lako ga ratou lai draw-taki?
A: Sir.

Q50: O iko a issue-taki?
A: Sir.

Q51: O ya e na siga cava?
A: Siga Tusiti saka.

Q52: Ka 16 ni siga?
A: Sir.

Q53: Na dakai cava a issue vei ira nai lala o ya?
A: Na nodratou personal M16 saka ga.
Q54: Na gauna cava o qai solia kina na key, handover-taka na armourer vei ko ya drau veisolisoli?
A: Na key e dau tu ga o na kona rack ena loma ni sitoa. E na siga o ya au a vakaliliya sara talega na key ena kena rack.

Q55: E vica na timi a lai exercise i Makuluva?
A: Au vakabauta ni va saka na timi.

Q56: Dua na timi e vica na tamata?
A: Va saka.

Q57: Kena i balebale e 8 na M16 o issue-taka?
A: Sir, au kila e ra lewe 16 saka beka.

Q58: E ra lesu mai Makuluva e na siga Vakaraubuka, na siga ni vuaviri; a suka na M16 taucoko?
A: Sir.

Q59: O a raica na kena suka?
A: Ko ya saka ga qori au seja ni taura rawa na kena suka.

Q60: O iko o a lako i veikau ena Siga Tabu, ka 22 ni siga?
A: Monii saka, 22\textsuperscript{nd}.

Q61: O tukuna o iko ni task-taki iko o Stevens mo lai secure-taka na dakai. Gauna cava o lako sobu kina i Bilo mo lai secure-taka na dakai?
A: Oti saka na vakasigalevu.

Q62: Na lori cava a kauti iko sobu i Bilo?
A: Twin-cab.

Q63: Nomu sobu o iko mai Bilo, a vakavodoki eso na i yaragi ena loma ni lori o ya?
A: Sega, au seja saka ni a lako i Bilo.

Q64: O a lako ga i vei?
A: I Nabukavesi.

Q65: Ena gauna dou secure-taka kina na dakai, bau dua na dakai e kau mai kea, e kau i loma ni Complex?
A: Sega.

Q66: What is the no. of the vehicle that took you down to Bilo?
A: I forget the no, Sir.
Q67: Nomudou lori ni Unit?
A: Sega saka. E kauta saka mai o Steven na rental car.

Q68: Who was the driver of the vehicle?
A: Mr. Steven.

Q69: He drove you?
A: Sir.

Q70: When you arrived there, was any weapon loaded into that vehicle?
A: No, Sir.

Q71: In Nabukavesi, where were the weapons kept?
A: In the truck, Sir.

Q72: Ena Vakaraubuka o vakaraitaka e na nomu i tukutuku i liu ni ratou sa vakasuka tiko nodratou i yaya ni exercise mai Makuluva, sa mani gole i vale, ia na kena mai sava tiko na i yaya, nodratou vakasuka tiko nai yaragi, o iko bau raica ni kau taucoke mai nodratou i yaya, se so na i yaya a sega ni tiko e na siga o ya?
A: Sega, a kau saka mai.

Q73: Kau taucoke mai?
A: Sir.

Q74: Rauta beka e vica mai na 4-men team o ya, ratou sa yaco mai ko ya dou sa mai sasamaki vata tiko?
A: O ratou kece saka.

Q75: Tiko kece?
A: Io saka.

Q76: Na nomu a lako sobu i na koro, o a solia vei cei na key ni sitoa?
A: Sega, na key a tu saka ga e na kena rack.

Q77: Sega ni dua o handover-taka vua na armoury, sega ni dua o handover-taka vua na stores?
A: Sir.

Q78: Norru lako sobu o ya e na siga Vakarauwai, o bau wavoki mai Suva?
A: No, Sir.
Q79: Sigatabu?
A: No, Sir.

Q80: O bau veitaratara mai vei ira eso e na nomudou Unit ena Vakaraubuka, Vakerauwai se Siga Tabu?
A: Sega.

Q81: E na siga Vakaraubuka o ya, o bau rogoca e dua na exercise vakarau vakayacori, dua na VIP hostage exercise, a brief kina o nomudou OC Baleinamau?
A: No, Sir.

Q82: Na gauna a issue kina na i yaragi vei iratou na timi ko ya ratou a lako i Makuluva, e sega ni so na extra weapons me vaka na support weapon e issue vei iratou?
A: Sega saka.

Q83: Na nadratou dui personal weapon sara ga?
A: Sir.

Q84: Na personal weapon o tukuna qo, o mean-taka na side arms talega, se na rifle ga?
A: Na rifle saka ga

Q85: Na gauna a issue-taki kina vei iko na i yaragi, a sign-taki e dua na register?
A: Sir.

Q86: O raica na kena sign-taki?
A: Sir.

Q87: E tiko i vei na register o ya ena gauna qo?
A: Au sega saka ni taura rawa baleta mai na gauna o ya me yacova saka mai qo, au sega saka tale mada ni raica na armoury, de sa lala saka tu.
Q88: Dua tale na ka o via vakamacalataka, Kovula?
A: Baleta saka ga na veika e yaco saka o ya, au via tukuna saka vakadodonu niu sega saka ni kila e dua na ka me baleta na veika sa yaco.

Corporal

Lieutenant Colonel
President

Major
Member

Warrant Officer Class One
Member
FORTY-THIRD WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 28972 CPL W KADAWA

Cpl Kadawa, after having been duly sworn on the Bible, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Kovalu, ko a curu ena IMS Unit ena yabaki cava?

Q2: Ko a tiko evei ena gauna e caka kina na vuaviri?
A: Au a tiko saka mai Lepanoni.

Q3: Na gauna cava o qai lesu mai kina?
A: Ena liit one, saka.

Q4: Na i kavica ni siga o qai tekvu cakacaka kina?
A: Au lesu saka ga mai o ya, au mai leave saka me tolu na macawa.

Q5: O kila na tiki ni siga o yaco mai kina i Viti?
A: Ena early June saka.

Q6: Na i ka vica ni siga ko a qai tekvu cakacaka tale kina.
A: Ni oti saka ga e tolu na macawa, au sa sega ni nanuma rawa na i ka vica ni siga.

Q7: O sega ni kila na tiki ni siga o tekvu cakacaka kina?
A: E segs. saka.

Q8: O kila e dua na ka baleta na kena vakarautaki na vuli vakaivalu kei na ka kece vakao ya balsta na vuaviri? O kila e dua na kena i tukutuku?
A: E segs. saka.

Q9: O lesu mai o mai tekvu tale e loma ni Unit, o bau vakaitavi se veitaratara se o veitalanoa vata kei ira na vakaitavi ena vuaviri.
A: E segs. saka, koi tu a tikoga ena complex ena keba.

Q10: O tukuna O iko ni ko a tikoga ena Unit e cake. Ena gauna o cakacaka tiko kina ena Unit mai cake, o bau veitaratara kei ira na tiko ena Unit era?
A: E segs. saka.

Q11: E bau dua na gauna o rogoca se ko iko vakataki iko o veitalanoa vata kei ira na tiko ena loma ni complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q12: Where did you spend your leave?
A: At home.
Q13: Where at?
A: At Cunnigham, Sir.

Q14: When you were on leave, did you at any time visit the Parliament Complex?
A: No, Sir. I only went at that time; na gauna e tukuna kina o Commander me laki kau saka mai na i yaragi. Au a lako tu ga mai qai tukuni me keitou lako.

Q15: Ko a lako kina complex e ra me laki kau mai na i yaragi?
A: Io, a tukuna o Commander me laki kau mai na i yaragi.

Q16: Na i yaragi mai vei?
A: Na i yaragi beka ga mai Palimedi me kau mai cake.

Q17: Ko a lako sobu ena i lakolako ko ya?
A: Io, keitou lako vata kei neitou boso.

Q18: Na i yaragi cava o tukuna tiko oqori? Na yaragi o ko ya e tiko ena Yasayasa Vaka Ra se o ko ya ka tiko ena complex?
A: Oko ya ga ka lako tiko ena TV na kena kau mai.

Q19: When these weapons were brought back from Parliament, where were they kept?
A: Au sega saka ni kila, au a qai vodo ga mai ena lori me keitou lako mai.

Q20: You put it on the truck from Parliament, you brought it back, where did you put the weapons?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q21: Cpl. Kadawa, o Alex Alava, o kila beka ena nomu tiko ena 1MS, e sa suka oko ya mai na Unit?
A: Ena gauna cava oqo, ena noqu se bera ni lako ki Lepanoni?

Q22: Io. Csa rogoca ni sa suka o ko ya ena nomu se bera ni lako i Lepanoni?
A: E sega, au sega saraga ni kila.

Q23: O kila o iko ni se tikoga ena 1MS?
A: Io saka.

Q24: O tara rawa tiko na boy au tukuna tiko oqo, o Alex Alava?
A: Io.

Q25: O kilai ko ya?
A: Io saka.

Q26: E tiko ena nomudou Unit se sega?
A: E tikosaka ena Unit.
Q27: E se bera ni suka o ko ya?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.
Q28: O sega ni tara rawa?
A: Io saka.

[ W. KADAWA]
Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. Macomber]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
CONFIDENTIAL

FORTY FOURTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 24991 SGT KALISITO VUKI

Sgt Vuki, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Sgt Vuki, o a curu e na yabaki cava ki na 1MS Unit?

Q2: Vakamacalataka mada na nomu vakaitavitaki iko e na loma ni 1MS ni se bera na i ka 19 ni siga ni vula o Me?
A: Ni bera saka na i ka 19 ni siga ni vula o Me, au a leave saku tu kina kau tu kina mai na koro. Au tiko saka mai na na koro sa tekivu na vuaviri. Au qai march-in tiko ga mai e na Siga Tabu.

Q3: O tukuna o iko ni o leave tiko e na i ka 19 ni siga ni vula o Me. Na leave e na ka ni cava qo?
A: Au leave macawa rua saka, dua ga na personal commitment ni noqu vuval, au a gole kina i na koro.

Q4: Ka vica ni siga o a qai march-in tale i na keba?
A: Sigatabu na i ka 21.

Q5: O a vakaitavi e na vuli vakaivalu kei na ka kece va o ya me baleta na vuaviri?
A: Sega.

Q6: Gauna cava o qai kilina kina na veika e yaco e na i ka 19 ni siga?
A: Au rogo ca ga e na walesi.

Q7: Talonoataka mada na ka o a cakava e na gauna o lesu mai kina i loma ni keba? O vakamacalataka o iko ni ka 21 ni vula o Me (Siga Tabu) o a tekivu cakacaka tale, o lesu mai ki na loma ni keba?
A: Noqu march-in mai, au vakatarogi iratou na tiko e na keba. E na gauna o ya, na tabana ni admin, e na gauna ni noqu leave, me noqu tiko o au na kena raici tiko na admin i ra, kauta tiko na i yaya me lako sobu i ra.

Q8: O vakaitavi e na kena kau na i yaragi koya a vakayagataki e na Complex?
A: Sega.

Q9: Na cava nomu i tutu ena Unit ni se bera na vuaviri?
A: (Silence)

Q10: O vakaitavi e na kena vakavodoki na vo ni yaragi?
A: Sega.

Q11: O cei s taura tiko na ki e na gauna o ya?
A: Au sega saka ni tara rawa se o cei s taura tiko na ki o na gauna o ya.
Q12: O vakamacalataka o iko ni a kau sobu e so na i yaya i na Complex; na i yaya cava sori qo?
A: Na bisikote, sucu, suka.

Q13: O cei e authorise-taka na kena kau sobu?
A: NATOPS.

Q14: Na gauna e tawa tiko kina na Complex, na kena kau sobu tiko na kakana i ra, a kau sobu mai na kena i tekivu me yacova na gauna e ra pull-out mai kina e na i ka 13 ni siga ni vula c Jiutai se lako tikoga na supply i ra?
A: A lako tikoga na supply.

Q15: E lako tikoga na supply i ra?
A: E lako tu ga na supply.

Q16: Veigana tauruko?
A: Io.

Q17: Sega ni dua na gauna a mai cegu na kena kau tiko na kakana i ra?
A: Mai voleka toka e dua na macawa na kena mai vakadaber na Military Zone vakavololita na Palimedi, e sa mai tarovi i kea na veitoso yaki. O au dau draiva tu e na motoka, sa mani tukuni vei keitou me keitou kaku na curu tale e na check-point. Na kakana kei na veika vakao ya e lako tu, na veitoso yaki ga sa via dredre.

Q18: A qai kau vakacava na kakana mai na keba ki na loma ni Complex?
A: Tekiva i kea au sa mani sega ni draiva. Sa tukuni vei au, “Kevaka o sa sega ni draiva ia mo leave” e na gauna e mai cava kina na kau kakana o ya, ia na gauna e se tadola tiko kina na lako tiko i ra, au se dau kau kakana tiko. Na gauna e sa vaka e dredre kina na veitoso yaki, au sa mani tukuna ga, “Sa vinaka ga mea sa leave mea veigana loma mai kina, mea kaku na ti ko kale e na loma ni keba.”

Q19: O cei a qai vakau kakana i ra?
A: Au sega mada ni kila na kena matata, ia na ka kece o ya sa qai control-taka o Steven. Ati qai rogo ca walega ni nona tiko o koya na vei toso yakiki kece i muri ya.

Q20: Dua e tarova na kena kau sobu na kakana mai vei kemudou?
A: Na kena soli mai na kakana mai cake e sega ni tarovi. E tarovi ga ena check-point, sa vaka e vakadredretaki na veitoso yaki. Ia, o Mr. Steven ga o koya e rawa ni veitoso yaki tiko, ia, au sega ga ni kila o cei a qai nona i tavi na jauta na kakana o ya.

Q21: Na ka o vakamacalataka o iko ni se vo e dua na macawa ni se bera ni sign-taki na Muan.kau Accord, sa tarovi na kau kakana i loma. E sega ni tarovi ia e vakadredretaki ga?
A: Io, e vakadredretaki ga na curu e na check-point.
Q22: A dua e qai takeover vei iko me kauta tiko na kakana i loma?
A: Sega, baleta sa tarogi au sara ga i kea o Steven; meu tiko se meu leave. Au sa mani digitaka ga meu sa leave, meu tu i tuba, ia au sega ga ni kila o cei a qai kauta na kakana o ya.

Q23: Na gauna o sa leave kina, o sega ni rogoca o cei sa qai kauta tiko na kakana i loma?
A: Sega.

Q24: Na gauna o cakacaka tiko kina vaka CO i na Unit i cake, o bau veitaratara kei ira eso e na loma ni Complex; e na talemone si na fax?
A: Sega.

Q25: Na gauna e dau kau kina na kakana, e dau lai sobu sara i vei na kakana?
A: Au dau curutaka ga yani ki na loma ni Complex.

Q26: E dau soli tiko vei cei na kakana i loma o ya?
A: E tiko talega kina e dua keirau cakacaka vata i na Stores, o Bukasila.

Q27: O koya e receive-taka na kakana mai yasana kadua?
A: Io.

Q28: Bau dua na gauna a kau sobu kina na dakai?
A: Sega.

Q29: Na gasau, e na gauna o deliver-taka kina na kakana?
A: Sega.

Q30: Vakamacalataka mada na kakana cava o a kauta sobu?
A: Bisikete, suka, sucu, coffees, noodles.

Q31: Dua tale na mataqali kakana a kau?
A: Sega.

Q32: Na gauna o tiko kina mai na Unit mai cake, bau dua na gauna o rogoca se raica ni dua vei iratou na tiko e na Unit me veitaratara kei dua vei iratou na tiko mai na Parliament Complex?
A: Sega.

Q33: Prior to going on leave, who did you handover these responsibilities in the Unit?
A: Kovula Gaunavinaka.

Q34: When you returned back to your Unit on Sunday, was he still there holding the same responsibilities?
A: No.

Q35: Where was he?
A: I do not know.

Q36: E na gauna o vakamacala kina o iko - o leave i na koro rua na macawa. E na gauna ni nomu leave, a soli vei Gaunavinaka me takeover e na cakacaka ya. E na gauna o lesu mai kina e na leave, a se tikoga i na Unit o Gaunavinaka?
A: Sa lako tale i na Complex.

Q37: Who in the Camp told you to resume the normal duties of CQ again?
A: O au ga.

Q38: Did you just come and takeover the duties or you were given a directive by someone in the Unit?
A: O au saka ga.

Q39: Where was your pick-up point in the Camp?
A: Supplies.

Q40: Did you use the normal RFMF demand vouchers for rations?
A: Yes.

Q41: Who was the demanding officer?
A: Baleinamau.

Q42: What was the reason given for these rations?
A: Normal standby

Q43: The rations you drew out from Supplies, they were only dry rations or you had fresh rations also?
A: Only dry.

Q44: How did you know what rations to demand for or were you getting instructions from someone as to what were you to demand?
A: No, Sir.

Q45: Was there any call from the Parliament Complex where requests had been made?
A: No.

Q46: Did you get a call from Sgt Major Waqaniboro as to some request for provisions?
A: No.

Q47: From Pte Bukasila?
A: No.
Q48: Did you make any demand for stores?
A: No.

Q49: Satini Vuki, e na gauna o leave tiko kina, o a leave tu mai vei?
A: Rukuruku, Ovalau.

Q50: Vakacava na gauna sa mai oti kina na nomudou kau kakana i Palimedi, sa tukuni tale vei iko mo leave; o leave tale i vei?
A: Au sa tu ga kina mai Kino ya.

Q51: Sega ni dua na gauna drau a veitalanoa kina kei Lotawa e na nona a tiko kina mai Levuka?
A: Sega.

Q52: O kila vakacava ni gole i na Parliament Complex o Kovula Gaunavinaka; o raici ko ya kina se o rogo i talanoa ga?
A: Au rogo i talanoa ga.

Q53: Na siga cava a tekvu kina nomu leave ni se bera ni o lesu tale mai e na Siga Tabu na i ka 21 ni siga?
A: Ka 17.

Q54: Na i ka 17 na siga Vukelulu, na siga talega a tekvu kina nomu leave ya, o solia keve kina na ki ni nomudou Stores witi kina na armoury vei Kovula Gaunavinaka?
A: Na veika kece me baleta na neitou ki, e dua ga na ki au solia vua, ko ya e tiko kina na ki tautoko.

Q55: Vakaciva na ki ni armoury?
A: E tiko vata kece i loma, e loka kece tikoga.

Q56: E loka tikoga e loma ni safe?
A: Io.

Q57: Ia na nomudrau veisolisoli qo, bau dua na i vola drau signtaka?
A: Sega.

Q58: A sega ni tiki ni nomudou procedure o ya me dau caka na handover, so na ka vakaivola me volai me i vakaraitaki se o cei sa responsible e na i yaya e tu o ya e na nomudou i tikotiko?
A: Au dau cakava ga kevaka au lako i Middle East e na dua na TOD balavu.

Q59: Na cava e sega ni soli kina na ki vei Bukasila?
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A: Baleta o Bukasila beka e sega ni tiko e na keba e na gauna o ya. O Gaunavinaka a tauvinate, qai vakabulabula tiko au mani tukuna vua me toka mada i kea, me taura toka mada vakalailai me yacova na noqu lesu mai.

Q60: E na veisiga kece ni dau oti na nomudou cakacaka e na nomudou Unit, e dau biu tiko i vei na nomudou ki ni safe ko ya e dau biu tiko i loma na ki taucoko ni nomudou stores kei na veika kece vaka o ya?
A: Dau dua na vanua e dau biu tiko kina keirau kila vata tikoga.

Q61: O iko ga o Bukasila?
A: Io.

Q62: Sega tale ni dua e na Unit e kila?
A: Sega.

Q63: Sgt Vuki, ni bera ni o leave, na gauna e dau kau kina na iyaragi i tuba me dau lai caka na exercise, na ka kece qo dau authorise-taka o OC?
A: E vakakaka kina.

Q64: Oko ya ga e authorise-taka na kena kau i tuba na i yaragi?
A: Io.

Q65: Bau dua na gauna me lai caka na exercise va o ya o raica o iko ni suka mai na yaragi e sega ni suka kece mai?
A: Sega, na yaragi kece e dau kau mai, keitou dau crosscheck-taka ni bera ni vakamacakataki tale e na gauna ni vuli ka tarava. Kevaka e dua na ka e leqa, sa na qai vakaritaki cake e na gauna ni vuli. Ta se sega vakadua ni yaco e dua na ka va o ya.

Q66: Na gauna o sa tukuna kina vei Cpt Steven mo leave, nomu leave ya o lako i vei, i Palimedi?
A: Sega, baleta sa tukuna oko ya, “Ni o sa leave qo, o sa na sega tale ni laurai i kea mo sa toka vakatkitiki.” Ko ya o ya au sa mani vakamura, au sa mani lai tu kina i Kino ya.

Q67: Na gauna o leave kina, o bau veitaratara se o cakaka e dua na ka mo veitaratara kei ira na tiko e loma ni Palimedi?
A: Sega saka.

Q68: Na kakana ko ya e dau kau sobu e loma ni Palimedi. O cei e solia mai na kena directive e lorra ni Unit na IMS mo lai pick-taka na kakana mo kauta? O cei mai na loma ni Unit? O iko na CQ, e sega ni rawa ni o tu tu ga vaqo o kauta na kakana mo lako; o cei e solia za directive - laiko, kauta na kakana i na Palimedi?
A: OC Baleinamau.

Q69: Sgt Vuki, when you came back on Sunday, did you check what was in the stores? Did you do an inventory?
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A: Sir.

Q70: Did you list down the things that were there?

(Listance)

Q71: Then how did you do the inventory? What I am trying to say is, you have got a list of items that are there in the stores, did you crosscheck with what is there in stock when you came back on Sunday?

A: Sega.

Q72: The weapons that were taken out for the exercise; do you keep a register for every loan made?

A: Sega.

Q73: How do you account for a weapon being taken out of a Unit? How do you know that a weapon has been taken out?

A: E tiko saka beka na loan record.

Q74: Is there a form there to show that the weapons have been loaned?

A: Yes.

Q75: So a person loaning a weapon signs for the weapon and you countersign when it is returned?

A: Sir.

Q76: In the Parliament Complex, was there any occasion where you took rations and someone else received it other than Bukasila?

A: Sega.

Q77: Sg Vuki, ni bera ni o leave e na i ka 17 ni siga ni vula o Me, sa vo e vica na macawa mo leave e o sa tekuv kerea tiko mo leave?

A: Se vo toka beka e dua na macawa, au sa biuta tu na noqu i vola.

Q78: Kena i balebale o ya, na gauna e tekuv kina na vuli vakaivalu a vakayacori mai Makuluva, o iko a issue-taka nodratou i yaragi?

A: Sega.

Q79: O cei a tiko e na Stores e na gauna a tekuv kina na exercise mai Makuluva?

A: Au sega ni vakadeitaka kevaka o Gaunavinaka se o Bukasila.

Q80: O iko kila na gauna cava a tekuv kina na exercise mai Makuluva?

A: Sega.

Q81: O iko kila na exercise a lai caka i Vanua Levu?

A: Io.
Q82: O cei a isuetaka na nodratou stores?
A: O au saka a vakarautaka na kena i yaya, keitou a lako vata tikoga. E noqu tiko o au na admin kece ni lakolako.

Q83: Ia nomudou lako tiko o ya, e kau tale tikoga na i yaragi?
A: E kau tiko.

Q84: Live rounds?
A: E kau tiko.

Q85: Na kena suka mai na i yaragi o raica o iko ni suka taukoko mai e na gauna dou sa yaco mai kina i na keba?
A: Sa suka taukoko.

Q86: E na gauna dou sa lako mai kina i waqa, dou vodo mai Savusavu, e secure-taki tu mai vakacava na nomudou i yaragi vata kei na gasau?
A: E tawa i box saka mai.

Q87: Kena: balebale o ya na ka o vakamacalataka tiko o iko ni o Kovula Gaunavinaka sa vuqa na gauna e sa dau takeover tiko vei iko e na stores?
A: Se qai matai sara ga ni gauna o ya baleta ni a ED tiko oko ya me rua beka na macawa qai sega ni dua na cakacaka bibi me cakava, au sa mani kerei ko ya ga vakadodonu me toka nada i kea.

Q88: Ia na normu i vakamacala e liu niu taroga tiko na vuli vakaivalu a vakayacori tiko mai Makuluva, au a taroga vei iko se o cei a issue-taka vei iko na i yaya, o iko sega ni kila mada se o Bukasila se o Gaunavinaka. Kena i balebale na exercise mai Nukulau kei Makuluva a caka e na siga cava? Gauna cava e ratou gole kina o Mr. Dakuliga i Makuluva, o kila na tiki ni siga?
A: Au sega ni taura vinaka saka.

Q89: Na cava na i tavi nei Staff Sgt Vakadranu e na nomudou Unit?
A: (Inaudible)

Q90: O sega ni kila o iko o cei a issue-taka na i yaya ni training mai Makuluva kei Nukulau?
A: Sega.

Q91: Na gauna o se bera ni leave kina e na loma ni macawa o ya, na siga Moniti na i ka 15 ni siga, Tusi ni na i ka 16 ni siga, ni o rai i na nomu sito, o nau raica na levu ni yaragi e tu kina e rawa ni o kila kevaka eso e lako i tuba se sega?
A: E tu kecega, e sega ni dua na i yaragi e lako i tuba.

Q92: E sega ni dua na i yaragi e lako i tuba e na siga o ya?
A: Na gauna au se bera ni leave saka kina o ya.
Q93:  Kena ia balebale o ya na i ka 17 ni siga, siga Vukelulu o leave kina o iko, o raica o iko na i yaragi ni tiko taucoko?
A:  (Silence)

Q94:  E rawa ni o vakasamataka, o bau check-taka se sega?
A:  Au sega mada ni taura vinaka, baletat na gauna e caka saka tu kina na exercise o ya, au sega ni taura vinaka tiko na kena tiki ni siga.

Q95:  Baela ni tukuni tiko ni exercise o ya mai Makuluva a vakayacori tiko e na lorna ni macava sara ga ko ya o mai leave kina o iko, e na i ka 17 ni siga, tekiku tiko beka e na siga Moniti se Siga Tabu na exercise o ya. O ya na vu ni noqu taro. Kevaka e lai caka tiko na exercise o ya e dodunu me dua na i wase ni nomudou i yaragi talega me tiko kina?
A:  (Silence)

Q96:  O sega ni rawa ni vakasaditaka?
A:  Au sega saka ni rawa ni vakasaditaka tiko na time ko ya a lako kina na i yaragi o ya.

Q97:  Otiti ni noqu taro; veigauna taucoko ni dou dau exercise mo dou dau vakayagataka na i yaragi, e vakayagataki talega kina na live rounds, me vaka a vakayacori mai Vanua Levu?
A:  E dau kaul wale saka tu ga ia e sega ni dau vakayagataki.

Q98:  Kena ia balebale na i yaragi taucoko e tiko o ya, e rawa ni tiko e dua na magazine e live rounds tiko kena vo e rawa ni blanks?
A:  E sega ni dau tawa na live, ia na blanks ga e dau tawa.

Q99:  Ia na live e kau tale tu ga?
A:  Io, e kau tu ga ia e sega ni dau vakayagataki.

Q100:  Sgt Vuki, were you in camp when Lotawa returned from Australia?
A:  Sir.

Q101:  Were you still in camp when Lotawa left for Levuka?
A:  No, I have been on leave then.

Q102:  E na nomu i tutu vaka armourer, sai iko sara ga o lewa tiko na i yaragi?
A:  (Silence)

Q103:  E tu sara ga vei iko na ki, sega tale ni dua, se dau tu tale vei dua?
A:  E tiko na neitou armourer - o Lala.

Q104:  Lala cava?
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A: O Etuate Lala, oka ya na neitou armourer.

Q105: Naka dau issue na gasau, na ka kece e dau through vei iko - donu?
A: E through mai vei neitou OC, oti ni sa approve-taka mai oyo ya, sa qai lako mai vei au, au sa na qai solia vua na armourer.

Q106: Na toso ni yaragi kei na gasau me through mai vua na OC; donu?
A: (Silence)

Q107: E tiko e na nomu record na i yaragi kei na gasau tau coco e maroro i tiko ena Unit?
A: E tiko.

Q108: E tiko i vei e na gauna ooyo na record?
A: E tiko saka ga mai cake.

Q109: Au vinakata mo lako mai e na siga Vukelulu, kauta tau coco mai na record mo mai present-taka i loma qo. Ni o sa gole sobu, liaise vei OC, kauta mai na record o ya, dina ga ni o sa tiko qo e na 3FIR.

Na veiwaqaqai ni Board qo e tiko na kena dodonu, o na gole sobu, veitalanoataka vata kei na OC na nomu na mai present-taka na record. E dau maroro i vei na gasau ni Unit?
A: E dau maroro i tiko ga e na container.

Q110: Na gasau vata kei na i yaragi - o OC ga e rawa ni issue-taka. E rau ga na tamata e tiko vei rau na access ni key ni armoury; o iko ga vata kei Bukasila - donu?
A: O Lala e nona tiko oyo ya na armoury, ia ni sa yali oyo ya au sa mani solia tiko vei Gaunavinaka.

Q111: O tukuna o iko e rau ga na tamata e kila na vanua e dau maroro i tiko kina na key - donu?
Vakararatataka, o iko vata kei cei?
A: O au vata kei Lala, ia na gauna sa lako kina o Lala, au sa vakaraitaka vei Gaunavinaka.

Q112: A sega ni soli talega vei Bukasila na access ni ka qori?
A: Sega.

Q113: What is Lala’s full name?
A: Etuate Lala.

Q114: E tiko e vei e na gauna ooyo o Etuate Lala?
A: East Timor.

Q115: Sgt Vuki, Cpl Vosavere and Sgt Cakau took two pistols and two rifles (M16) to Levuka to Sgt Lotawa; did you issue these weapons to them?
A: No.
Q116: Do you know who issued these weapons?
A: No.

Q117: What is the rank of Lala?
A: Lance Corporal.

[K. VUKI]
Sergeant

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
Corporal Davui, after having been duly sworn on Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Cpl Davui, which year did you join 1FMS?

Q2: Vakamacalataka mada na nomu vakaitavi e na veika e yaco e na i ka 19 ni siga, mai na kena i tekivu me yacova na gauna o qai post-taki sobu kina i Yasayasa Vaka-Ra?
A: Na ka e yaco e na i ka 19 ni siga me yacova mai na siga ni kua, o au e sega ni dua na ka au a vakaitavi kina. Au a tu tu voli ga mai na Yasayasa Vaka-Ra me yacova sara ga na noqu qai kacivi meu lako mai qo.

Q3: Na gauna cava o qai post-taki sobu kina i na Yasayesa Vaka-Ra?
A: Au se gole sobu i na Yasayasa Vaka-Ra e na 1997.

Q4: O sa biuta na 1FMS?
A: Au se lewe tu ga ni 1FMS noqu loko sobu i Yasayasa Vaka-Ra.

Q5: O post-taki i vei e na Yasayasa Vaka-Ra?
A: Au tiko mai Nadi.

Q6: O se cakacaka tikoga e na loma ni 1MS?
A: (Silence)

Q7: O a kia na kena plan-taki na vuaviri, se o bau kila e dua na ka e vakayacori?
A: Sega, au a sega sara ga ni kila kina e dua na ka.

Q8: E na gauna e caka kina na vuaviri, o a bau veitaratara kei ira na tiko e na loma ni 1MS e na talevoni se dua tale na gaunisala?
A: Sega.

Q9: E so na ka e yaco mai na Yasayasa Vaka-Ra era laki vakaitavi kina na 1MS e baleta tikoga na ka vakapoliti ki ka yaco e na i ka 19 ni siga; o a vakaitavi kina se sega?
A: Sega.

Q10: E dua na report e tiko qo ni a soli vei iko na i tavi mo vakamatea na i Liuliu ni Matanitu, na Peresitedi ni vanua o Viti; e dina ya se sega?
A: Sega.
Q12: Cpl Davui, based also on another report, do you know of any plot made against the Commander RFMF on his return to Fiji from overseas?
A: No.

Q13: Have you heard rumours about the plot?
A: No.

Q14: From May 19th until today, have you had any contacts with your Unit in QEB?
A: Mr Moceica contacted me.

Q15: When?
A: Last week, Sir.

Q16: Have you been in contact prior to that with any person in the Unit?
A: No.

Q17: E na gauna e yaco kina na veika eso i Suva, o bau veitalanoa kei Moceica?
A: Sega.

Q18: Vakawasoma?
A: Sega, ena gauna beka ga sa lako sobu yani kina, sa qai qiri yani kevaka e rawa ni keirau mai veitalanoa e na vuku ni lakolako vou tale qo.

Q19: E na gauna cava o ya?
A: Via oti beka qo e macawa rua.

Q20: Ni oti na vuaviiri?
A: Sega.

Q21: O ya na i matai ni gauna drau qai veitalanoa kina?
A: Io.

Q22: Sa oti na ka kece qo, sa qai qiri yani o Moceica?
A: Io.
Q23: Vaka nacalataka tale mada na ka drau a veitalanoataka?
A: Baleta ga na ka sa mai yaco, na i lakolako vou ga ni Unit se na ka me lako kina na Unit e na gauna oyo.

[S. DAVUIJ]
Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
Pte Roko, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Private Roko ko a curu ena 1MS Unit ena yabaki cava?
A: Ena yabaki sa oti saka.

Q2: Ko a baue vakaitavi ena kena kau sobu na i yaragi ena loma ni complex ni se bera na vuaviri?
A: E sega saka.

Q3: Ena gauna cava o qai rogoce kina na vuaviri?
A: Au a tu saka mai Nadi, na neitou timi ni selection.

Q4: Ko a baue vakaitavi se rogoce na kena vakaraotaki na ka me baleta na vuaviri? Ko baue kila e dua na ka?
A: E sega saka.

Q5: Vakanacakataka na nomu lesu mai Nadi kei na nomu gole sobu ena complex?

Q6: Ko a tiko ena dua na briefing ka caka ena ika 19 ni siga ni vula ko Me ka brief kina o Col. Tarkiniki?
A: E sega saka.

Q7: O kilai Col Tarkiniki?
A: Io saka.

Q8: Ko a sega ni tiko ena briefing ka caka ena bogi o ya?
A: Io saka.

Q9: Ko a tiko e vei ena gauna e caka kina na briefing?
A: Au gole saka ga mai ka’u kauta na noqu i sulu i vale.

Q10: Na gauna cava o qai gole sobu kina ena Parliament Complex?
A: E sa cti saka e tolu na macawa, au qai gole sobu kina Palimedi.

Q11: O cei e tukuna vei iko mo gole sobu kina complex?
A: Au kila saka ga ni ratou sa tu na Unit mai na Palimedi, au sa mani lako sobu kina.
Q12: O cei a tukuna vei iko mo gole sobu?
A: E sega ni dua saka.

Q13: E loma ni Unit mai cake, na cava ko a cakava tiko ena tolu na macawa o ya?

Q14: E vica na macawa na nomu leave?
A: E macawa dua ga.

Q15: Ni oti o ya?
A: Au lesu mai ka tiko mai cake.

Q16: Na nomu tiko mai cake, o bau veitaratara se rogoce e so mai cake era veitaratara kei ira na tiko mai Ra ena complex; na talevoni, fax se gauinisala cava tale?
A: E sega saka.

Q17: Ena gauna o curu kina i loma ni complex, o iaki report i vei?
A: Au lako ga yani vei iratou ga neitou Unit ka ra tou tiko e kea.

Q18: O iaki report vei cei e kea?
A: Vei Na Qase.

Q19: Na i tavi cava ko a qarava e loma?
A: Au laki yadra saka tuga.

Q20: E vica na vanua e caka tiko kina na yadra, o yadra i vei o iko?
A: Au yadra saka tiko ena matamata.

Q21: Dua tale na vanua?
A: Ena matamata talega mai muri.

Q22: Na matamata ruanua?
A: Io saka.

Q23: Vakacava o ira na hostages, ko a bau yadravi ira ena dua na gauna?
A: E sega saka.

Q24: O bau yadra ena Battery Hill?
A: E sega saka.

Q25: Ko Bau curu ena dua na gauna ena Operation room ena loma ni complex?
Q26: Ena gauna o dau yadra tiko kina mai ra, na dakai cava ko dau vakayagataka?
A: Na MP5, Sir.

Q27: O bau vakayagataka na nomu i yaragi ena dua na gauna?
A: E sega saka.

Q28: O bau curu e tuba ena dua na gauna vata kei ira na i lala ka ra laki vakacaca se mera lako kina check-point?
A: E sega saka.

Q29: O bau vodo ena dua na gauna ena patrol?
A: E sega saka.

Q30: Private Roko, o vakaraitaka tiko ena nomudrau veitalanoa kei Col. Evans ni o iko o dau lako sobu ga i ra o laki yadra, oti ga o lako tale mai cake ena keba.
A: Io saka.

Q31: O iko duadua se dua na i wase ni tamata e yadra tiko ena Palimedi e vaka tiko ko ya na nodra i tovo ena veisiga?
A: O au saka ga.

Q32: Ena gauna o dau biuta mai kina mo lesu tale mai ena keba e cake, e biu ecei na nomu i yaragi?
A: Au dau biuta ga vei Na Qase. E sega ni noqu talega, au dau lako ga yani sa biu tu na i yaragi ka’u vakayagataka.

Q33: E kena i balebale ni so na gauna o rawa ni vakayagataka na MP5, so na gauna na UZIS ka so na gauna na M16.
A: E sega saka, na MP5 ga.

Q34: Ni o lesu tale mai cake, o ya o lesu tale tiko ki na keba?
A: Io saka.

Q35: O lesu tale i bure?
A: Io saka.

Q36: Mo dau lako i sisili ka veisau?
A: Io saka.

Q37: Ena gauna o tiko kina e loma o ya, a bau musu na kemu i sau ena dua na gauna?
A: E sega saka, full pay.
Q38: Na nomu tiko vata kei ira na gone ni Dawasamu, me vaka ko sa vakaritaka oti, o bau kilo na vuli vakaivalu era vakaitavi tiko kina o ira na lewe ni vanua?
A: E sega saka.

Q39: O sega ni bau raica me ra vakaitavi tiko ena drill?
A: E sega saka.

Q40: Ena so na mataka e dau caka e so na foleni vakaivalu ka ra vakaitavi kina oira na lewe ni vanua?
A: E sega saka.

Q41: Na nomu tiko vata kei ira na gone ni Dawasamu, o bau kilo ni so vei ira era vakaiyaragi tiko?
A: E sega saka.

Q42: O bau raica e dua na taukei sega ni lewe ni mataivalu e vakaiyaragi?
A: E sega saka.

Q43: Ena gauna ni o dau yadra ena matamata, era dau yadra talega na civilians ena so na gauna?
A: Io saka.

Q44: O ira na civilians era dau vakaiyaragi se sega?
A: O kei ou saka ga kei ou tara tiko na dakai.

Q45: Na sotia?
A: Io saka.

Q46: Vakacava oira na sotia ka ra reserves vata kei na TFs. Era dau vakayagataka na i yaragi ena gauna era yadra kina?
A: Io saka.

Q47: O kilai ira?
A: Au sega saka ni kilai ira na reserves kei na TFs.

Q48: Ena yabaki cava o curu mai kina kina mataivalu?
A: 1996.

Q49: O recruit mai vei?
A: I Nas.nu saka.

Q50: TTS?
A: Io saka, au tiko saka mai na maintenance.
Q51: Private Roko, what are you doing at the moment? Which Unit do you belong to?
A: 3FIR, Sir.

Q52: Are you also studying at FIT?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q53: What are you studying at FIT?
A: Na tabana ni mechanic.

Q54: When you went into the Parliament Complex, who issued the weapon to you?
A: Na dakai saka ga nei Na Qase.

Q55: Did you sign for that weapon?
A: Io saka.

Q56: There was evidence given here before you came in that the weapons were issued by
Private Bukasila not Cpl. Delasiga. He said all weapons were returned and they
issued it. What do you have to say to that? Do you understand what I am saying?
Ena gau na dau laki taura tiko kina na nomu i yaragi, e dua na storeman e tiko e kea
me dau sign out?
A: Io saka.

Q57: Ocei?
A: O Bukasila. E dua saka na taro; mai na keba se mai ra?

Q58: Mai ra?
A: E sega saka, au sega ni kila saka, au nanuma ga de mai na keba.

Q59: E oti e tolu na macawa osa qai curu ena loma ni complex?
A: Io saka.

Q60: Ko a laki yadra tiko e kea?
A: Io, saka.

Q61: Ena gaua o dau taura kina na dakai e loma mo laki yadra, o cei e dau solia vei iko
na dakai?
A: Na dakai ga nei Na Qase au dau tara tiko.

Q62: O sega ni gole tale vua e dua me laki issue taka?
A: E sega saka.

Q63: O iko na gone ni vei?
A: Au gone ni Nadroga saka.
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Q64: O ira kece na vo ni tamata e ra laki taura mai na dakai ena vanua e maroroj kina na dakai, na cava o laki tara tiko kina na dakai nei Na Qase ena gauna ni nomu yadra?
A: Baleta gona o ya ni'u sega ni tu mai kea, oti ga au lako mai. O iratou kece o ya eratou tu vakadua tuga mai na Palimedi.

Q65: Ena veigauna kece o curu i loma, o curu, o taura na dakai nei Na Qase ka ko lako i yadra. Oti o ya o lesu tale o solia vei Na Qase o lako i tuba? E vaka tiko o ya.
A: Io saka.

Q66: Dua mada na taro, ena gauna e wavoki tiko kina o Na Qase e loma, e dau kau i yaragi talega?
A: E sega saka.

Recalled on 12/09/00:

Private Roko, after having been duly reminded of oath earlier taken, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q67: Ena bogi ni siga Vacaraubuka na i ka 19 ni siga, ko a tiko e vei ena nomudou lesu mai Nadi?
A: Au tiko saka mai vale.

Q68: O a bau vakaitavi ena kena kau na i yaragi, na kena vakavodoki?
A: E sega saka.

Q69: O qai gole ena Parliament Complex ni oti e tolu na macawa?
A: Io saka.

Q70: Ko vakayagataka tiko na MP5?
A: Io saka.

Q71: O a bau vakayagataka na pistol?
A: E sega saka.

Q72: O bau kila tale tiko e so na dakai e se tiko ena so na vanua?
A: E sega saka.

Q73: Roko, o bau rogoca na vosa nei Stevens vei kemudou mo dou tiko ga ena Unit ka kua ni gole kina Palimedi ena nomudou lesu mai Nadi?
A: Keitou lesu mai Nadi, oti e tolu na macawa au sa qai gole i na Palimedi.
Q74: O ya tiko e vei ena Siga Vakarauwai ni rauta na rua na kaloko ena yakavi?
A: Au a tiko ena complex.

Q75: O bau raica na kena load taki tiko na dakai?
A: E sega saka.
EIGHTEENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 24393 CPL ISIRELI CAKAU

Cpl Cakau, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation hereby states:

I was recruited in 1983 and did a Tour of Duty to Lebanon on the first lift in 1983. I was posted to the Reserve Force. I came in 1987 where the first selection into the CRW Squad was made. I went to Lebanon in 1994 and returned in 1995. I did my courses at FNTC regarding electronics and was attached to Telecom Fiji. I came back in January of this year. I am still in the Force. In February I was discharged from the Force taking up a post at Telecom Fiji. I marched back into Camp during the coup on May 19th.

Q1: Give us a brief outline of your involvement in the events of May 19th. Prior to that, you must give us an outline of the events leading up to that; the initial planning, training and the events prior to the 19th of May. Give us your indication of what happened on the 19th of May and also after the 19th until such time when you were brought in or returned to QEB?

A: I joined the squadron at Parliament on the second Friday (26th of May). I went into Parliament without anyone’s invitation. The unit was involved so I had to commit myself to it. I was asked to look after the comms. in Parliament, get info from the outside world and provide security to the hostages.

Q2: What you need to do, Corporal Cakau, is to explain from the start. Explain your activities in the Complex from when you joined on the 26th of May and after the Complex until such time when you returned to the Camp?

A: When I went in on the 26th, I was told to look after the communication within the Parliament and outside. I was also asked to provide security to the hostages where I came back outside because I was marching into Camp during May 19th. I was operating from Camp and from there I was told to go back into Parliament to join the squadron inside. After we pulled out from Parliament, we went to Kalabu, but we did not sleep there. I was told to provide security for George Speight. We were detained at the Lagere Bridge and brought into Camp. We were there for no reason and without any charges being read to us until we were released last Sunday. We returned to Camp and were posted to Headquarters until now.

Q3: After the events of May 19th, you said you marched in to QEB?

A: I marched in to Port Security

Q4: You operated from the Port Security Unit?

A: Yes, Sir.
Q5: Feeding information to those at the Complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q6: You indicated that you were told to go to the Complex. Who told you to go to the Complex?
A: I, myself, wanted to go there.

Q7: In the statement you gave earlier, you said that you came back to Camp (1FMS) and you were told to go down to the Complex. Can you just clarify that point? From the Port Security Unit, you returned to the Camp (1FMS)?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q8: By whom were you told at 1FMS to go down to the Complex?
A: I was not told by anyone, I just went there voluntarily.

Q9: I understand that. In the statement you gave earlier you said that you went to the Complex on your own, you then stated that when you returned to the Camp you were feeding information operating from the Camp. This “camp” means the unit back at QEB. Am I right?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q10: At QEB, you said that you were told to go down from there to the Complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q11: Who told you to go down?
A: I was told by unit members that everyone was told to go down there.

Q12: Everyone was told by who?
A: By the OC.

Q13: Who was the OC?
A: Mr. Baleinamau.

Q14: This information that you are giving has been given by so many people before you, even Mr. Baleinamau. If all the CRW gives the information regarding whatever happened, then all will give it. Back at the Complex, you were responsible for all communications from the Complex. Who set up the communication system at the Complex?
A: I, myself.

Q15: Where did the communications come from?
A: The communication was already there from Telecom Fiji. I just used that access to get in touch.
Q16: Whilst in the Complex, you said you were responsible for the communications, were you part of the operation within the Complex?
A: I was not part of the operations. I just go there voluntarily.

Q17: What I mean is that when you went into the Complex, you were responsible for communication?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q18: Within the Complex, they had an IFMS operation room. Were you part of that operation?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q19: Who headed the IFMS operation room?
A: I just went there one week after, but I do not know who was heading the operation room at that time.

Q20: We have heard from evidence taken earlier that there were three organisations within the Complex: military wing, political wing and the vanua wing. We understand who headed the military wing. Who was in charge of that operation cell that you operated from sometimes for communication?
A: We had different people who were in charge of different things.

Q21: Duty officers?
A: Yes.

Q22: Can you give us some of the names of these duty officers?
A: They were not officers, they were all senior NCO’s, Sir.

Q23: Tell us their names?
A: The only one there was Laki. He was the one in command at that time.

Q24: Who is Laki?

Q25: Is that Vosabeci?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q26: This is Corporal Vosabeci from 3FIR?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q27: He was operating inside the operation cell?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q28: As what?
A: He was in charge of that office.

Q29: During your stint with operations, did you or anyone within the operation cell, at any time, call and talk to members of the 1FMS at QEB?
A: I did not spend most of my time in the cell. Most of the time I was out providing security to the hostages and around the premises.

Q30: At any time when you returned to the operations cell, were you or anyone else in the cell aware of any calls made to RFMF from the cell?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q31: Who were the calls made to?
A: Col. Tarakinikini.

Q32: Do you know what the purpose of the calls were?
A: I do not know.

Q33: You indicated you were the communications man and that you was part of the communications in the cell or within the Complex? You also indicated that you were responsible for the communication outside the Complex. What communication outside the Complex?
A: Internet and E-mail.

Q34: The messages going out of the complex were on the internet and e-mail and you were responsible for the set-up. Who was responsible for sending those messages?
A: Those guys in the cell. I just gave them the access.

Q35: Whilst employed in the Complex, at any time since you went in did you join any of the operations that went outside the Complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q36: Any other operations that came from within the Complex?
A: No.

Q37: Whilst in the Complex, did you see or was made aware of any other member of the RFMF that went into the complex? Not those members who were already inside the Complex, but those who were still in RFMF that were coming in.
A: I only saw Col. Caucau.

Q38: At any time during your stay there did you leave the Complex?
A: No.
Q39: So throughout the whole duration you stayed until the 13\textsuperscript{th} of July?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q40: On the 13\textsuperscript{th} of July where did you go?
A: From there we went to George Speight's residence in Lami.

Q41: Just let me clarify this point. On the day you left the Complex (13\textsuperscript{th} of July) until the day you were apprehended (16\textsuperscript{th} of July), you remained as George Speight's bodyguard the following week?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q42: In those movements around, what were your activities?
A: They were invited by His Excellency the President to have a talk with them regarding the Cabinet line-up.

Q43: Some of those meetings have already been officially documented and we are aware of. Was George Speight also involved in other political meetings that were being held throughout the area and if so, where were they held?
A: I think that is the only one that I can remember (the invitation from HE the President). He also had a meeting with Adi Samanunu.

Q44: During your stint in the Complex, were you aware of or involved in discussions with any other military personnel based at QEB apart from Col. Tarakinikini?
A: Yes, Sir; Col. Tuatoka, Col. Waqanisau and Col. Caucau.

Q45: What was the nature of the discussion?
A: I do not know because they were discussing behind closed doors with George Speight and Mr. Ligairi.

Q46: So those people were with George Speight?
A: And Mr. Ligairi.

Q47: When were you assigned the duties of bodyguard for George Speight?
A: I was tasked one week before we left the Complex.

Q48: All the meetings that Speight attended to a week prior to leaving the Complex, did you accompany him outside the Complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q49: The earlier question of you not leaving the Complex is false?
A: No, I was his bodyguard within.
Q50: But did you leave with him to go outside to attend meetings?
A: No.

Q51: Who accompanied him as a bodyguard?
A: We have three bodyguards.

Q52: Who are the other two?
A: Soko and Raivalu.

Q53: This officer you told us about in Parliament, did he have any military officers with him?
A: They were all military inside there.

Q54: Military officers. You are a soldier.
A: They were all soldiers.

Q55: Were there any officers in there?
A: All soldiers were inside.

Q56: Did you have an "Intelligence Cell" in that "Operation Cell"?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q57: Who was heading the "Intelligence Cell"?
A: I was heading it.

Q58: You know a Lt. Dakai?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q59: What was his involvement in the Cell?
A: I do not know.

Q60: Was he in your Cell?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q61: So there was an officer present there?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q62: Your statement that there was no officer present is false?
A: No, sometimes we rotate.

Q63: You headed the "Intelligence Cell"?
A: Yes.
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Q64: Who was assigned to you in that Cell?
A: Members of the unit.

Q65: Can you give us the names of those members?
A: I cannot give you.

Q66: And what are the reasons for not giving us the names?
A: I think they will come and tell you.

Q67: They have already told us. When conducting sentry at Parliament House, what was your role as sentry? You said you were assigned security duties. What was your role?
A: Look after the hostages.

Q68: What were your instructions concerning the hostages?
A: There was no instruction.

Q69: If there was no instruction, how were you to know what to do?
A: We are professional soldiers, we know what to do and we were not told to do anything. We use our improvise.

Q70: What was your aim?
A: Aim for what?

Q71: When you were securing the hostages?
A: That they do not get hurt by the civilians outside.

Q72: What would you have done? You said you were to use your initiative. If the hostages wanted to leave, what would you have done?
A: Talk to them because I know the civilians outside.

Q73: Would you allow the hostages to leave?
A: That is out of the question.

Q74: There were reports that there was a meeting held in Tacirua which George Speight attended a few days after leaving the Complex. Did you attend that meeting?
A: Can you clarify which place in Tacirua?

Q75: Tacirua Village.
A: There was no meeting at Tacirua Village.

Q76: Was there a meeting near that place?
A: Yes, at the President's residence.
Q77: When did you leave the Complex?
A: After we were told to leave Parliament.

Q78: You said that you were providing security to Mr. Speight whilst at Kalabu. Were you armed?
A: I was not armed, Sir.

Q79: How were you to provide security?
A: We were taught unarmed combat.

Q80: Were you involved or are you aware of weapons that were taken out of QEB from the 1FMS Unit?
A: I am not aware.

Q81: While on attachment with Telecom Fiji, did you come across Mr. Timoci Silatolu?
A: No, I did not know him from Telecom. I only knew him when we went into the Complex.

Q82: Were you given any prior instruction to assist in the activities of the 19th while working with Telecom Fiji?
A: No, Sir.

Q83: When you went into the Complex, did you hear from anyone at all that the RFMF was involved?
A: No, Sir.

Q84: When were you arrested with George Speight?
A: I think it was the last week of July.

Q85: While being arrested, were you ever assaulted?
A: Yes, about twice.

Q86: Did you resist being arrested?
A: No.

Q87: Were you charged before being released from detention?
A: We were not read anything.

Q88: Corporal Cakau, who told you to go and join the Ports Unit?
A: Myself.
Q89: They did not know that you were a member of the 1FMS?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q90: You said that you did not take part in any of the operations outside Parliament?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q91: Any operation happening outside the Parliament Complex would have come from the “Operation Cell”?
A: I do not know that because I have not been involved in any operation outside.

Q92: I know that, but any operation that has to be conducted outside has to come from the “Operations Cell”?
A: No.

Q93: The question is this, were you involved or were you aware (from the “Operations Cell”) of the activities being conducted outside the Complex?
A: No.

Q94: Whilst you were in the Operations Cell, were you aware of any of these activities prior to its happening, after its happening or during its happening? I was unaware.

Q95: So any operation that happened outside the Complex, you only come to know about it after it has happened?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q96: Where were you employed prior to joining the Force?
A: I was at Telecom.

Q97: You were working there as a permanent worker?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q98: You moved from Telecom to the Ports Unit?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q99: Who gave you the directions to go and join the Ports Unit? You were a member of 1FMS?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q100: On recall, we only go to our parent unit. By then you went to another Force unit. Did you go on your own accord or were you directed to go to that unit?
A: I just wanted to go there.
Q101: Can you give us the reason? Usually, when people march in, they return to their parent unit.
A: I wanted to go inside to the Camp, but I wanted to join the Ports because it was outside.

Q102: Were you aware of any arms and ammunition that were being shipped in?
A: No, Sir.

Q103: The civilians that were in the Complex, who were controlling them?
A: We were controlling them

Q104: Remember the incidents that happened; houses being looted and a police officer being shot, why was there no control? Why did all these events eventuate?
A: Those involved were outside. We were between the hostages and the civilians.

Q105: Were you aware of the activities of the civilians within the Complex outside the Complex?
A: No, we operated between the civilians and the hostages. We were not controlling the outside.

Q106: Later on when we call you again, we will actually use the model. The hostages are here, the perimeter outside at the gate you provide the security?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q107: Outside that were the civilians or the vanua?
A: Yes.

Q108: Your indication is that the control of the vanua was not the control of the IFMS. Who was in command of those civilians outside the Complex?
A: All the turaga-ni-vanua's were controlling them.

Q109: Did you secure the perimeter of the Complex?
A: No, we secured the hostages.

Q110: No, but was someone securing the perimeter of the Complex?
A: Yes, all the vanua's.

Q111: What form of security did they have?
A: They were just on the look-out.
Q112: Did they have any arms?
A: I do not know anything.

Q113: It is either yes or no, whether you know or you do not know.
A: I do not know.

Q114: Remember the police officer that got shot? Did you hear of that?
A: Yes.

Q115: Where were you on that day?
A: I was inside.

Q116: Did you hear about how he got shot?
A: No.

Q117: So your "Intelligence Cel" had no idea what happened?
A: I do not know anything about that.

Q118: How did you feel when you heard of his death?
A: I felt sorry for him.

Q119: How many Cakaus in the 1FMS?
A: Two, Sir.

Q120: The other one is Sergeant Cakau?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q121: Do you have anything further you wish to say to the Board before we release you? Anything further you would like to add to the evidence you gave today?
A: No, Sir.

[I. CAKAU]
Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
Pte Raivalu, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Pte Raivalu, before we proceed, give us a brief outline of your service in the Military.
E na yabaki sa oti, au curu e na selection e na 1PMS, me tekivu mai ya me yacova mai qo.

Q2: Pte Raivalu, what you need to do now is the evidence that you need to give on your involvement in the events of the 19th of May, but prior to that if you were involved in the planning, training or whatever in the events leading up to the 19th of May then do so. Afterwards you need to give us your involvement on the 19th of May - the takeover at Parliament and also the activities after the takeover, till the time you were brought into the camp.
A: Na gauna o ya me yacova mai na Vakaraubuka na i ka 19, keitou tu kina mai Makuluva ena dua na neitou exercise me yacova sara ga na i ka 19 ni siga. Au vakabauta sa via oko ya beka ga o ya.

Q3: The Board of Inquiry has been assembled to inquire into the involvement of the Mercian Squadron on the illegal takeover of the Parliament Complex. What you need to do is to give your involvement in the events of the 19th of May - the takeover of Parliament also the events prior to the 19th of May, and after the 19th of May your involvement in Parliament what you did in Parliament, the work that you did until the time that you were called back into the RFMF at the QEB.
A: Vo toka e dua na macawa mai na i ka 19, keitou tiko mai Nukulau. Au qai lai curu i Palimedi e na i ka 20, o ya na siga Vakarauwai. Na cakacaka ga au cakava tu mai kea, reitou i tavi tu o keitou na perimetere ni vanua o ya, keitou yadrava tu. Vaka tu mai o ya me yacova mai na i ka 13 na siga a vakasukari kina na i yaragi. E na i ka 14, e ra gole yani kina o ira i na keba ko ya e ra lai kauta mai kina na i yaragi, oti ya au sa gole i vale. Kalabu, au a tiko mai kina me yacova sara ga na gauna qai storm-taki yani kina. Se bera mada ya, dodonu me keitou mai RV i na keba. E tukuni vei keitou ni via vosa vei keitou o Commander. Keitou gole kece mai sega ni gole yani oko ya. Sa qai tukuni vei keitou, dou qai gole mai e na Vakaraubuka ka tarava. Ko ya na Vakaraubuka o ya, na kena Lotulevu ko ya e curumi yani kina o Kalabu. Au vakabauta sa viavio ko ya beka o ya.

Q4: Na gauna o tiko kina e loma ni Palimedi, o vakamacalata tiko o iko ni o tiko e na security ni perimeter. Qo na perimeter ni Parliament Complex?
A: Io.

Q5: O cei na nomu i liilui e na loma ni Complex?
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A: Au vakabauta ni na via matata toka ni o keitou neitou tu ike, e sega sara ga ni dua na neitou i liului. Keitou cakacaka ga vakai keitou. Na ka ga keitou raica e dodonu vei keitou sa i ko ya sara ga o ya.

Q6: Ni ko tiko ena dua na loma ni Unit vakaivalu, e na dua tiko na kena i liului; o cei na nomudou i liului e na Parliament Complex oko ya e solia tiko na order e na vanua ni yadra, na briefing, na ka kece va o ya?
A: O keitou e neitou na perimeter i tuba, keitou sa neitou sara tu ga o ya me yacova sara ga na gauna sa oti kina na ka kece.

Q7: Dou vakaiyaragi?
A: Keitou vakaiyaragi.

Q8: O cei e solia tiko nomudou briefing na tiko e na Palimedi?
A: O keitou na vanua ga keitou yadra se na vanua ga keitou duy lako kina, vanua ga o sa tu kina vakataki iko, o sa cakacakahaki iko sara ga va na nomu i tavi.

Q9: Pte Raivalu, ni o raici iratou tiko na tamata e ratou dabe tiko i cake qo, sega sara ni dua na gole laiai e dabe tiko yani i cake qo. Se tekivu mai e na Moniti na veivaqaqai qo, e sega sara ni dua na gole laiai e dabe tiko i loma qo. Na yabaki taucoko ni nomu tiko e na Mataivalu, e sega ni rawa vakadua ni dua e lako e na dua na vanua me sega ni caka e dua na briefing. O keda na tiko e na loma ni mataivalu e tiko na nodia i liului. E tiko na tamata e brief-taki keda, e tiko na tamata e kauti iko, solia vei iko na dakai, soli vata kei na nomu responsibility. E sega ni rawa ni o tu tu ga o lako vaqo e na dua na vanua mo lai ya. Na i vakamacala qori o vakamacalataka vua e dua na gone laiai. Sa dua na cakacaka levu keitou cakava tiko ike. Na ka ga o cakava tiko o iko e vaka ga o veibeci tiko.
A: Au a vakamatatahataki tiko o au nius qai yaco yani ike e na i ka 20, e ra sa tu makawa tu ma: o ira na yadra tu. O au na vanua ga e lala ike, au ciqo kina.

Q10: O cei e solia tiko na briefing ni yadra e na veisiga e na gauna dou tiko kina ike?
A: Qori beka ga vei ra na veisau. Vei keitou na perimeter i tuba, keitou tu sara ga e vanua ya me yacova neitou lemu mau.

Q11: O cei nomudou i liului? O cei e dau lako yani me lai check-taka na perimeter na ka kece?
A: O keitou moda ga na vanua keitou tu kina ya, e sega tale ni dua e lako yani me lai check-taki keitou, keitou sa veitrus-taki sara ga e na vanua duidui keitou duy tu kina.

Q12: Pte Raivalu, nomu sa yaco yani e na i ka 19 ni siga ki na Parliament Complex, o cei a solia vei iko na i yaragi, kei na yaragi cava a soli vei iko?
A: Na i yaragi a soli vei au e na i ka 20 ni siga noqu a lako yani se ra tu vata taucoko sara tu ga. Keitou gola ga yani ratou sa tukuna sara vei au na kauti au yani, "Taura i keri e dua nomu i yaragi." O rau nada ga na kauti au yani ya, au sega sara ga ni kila se ra: lako mai vei, ia e lori ni Matanitu. Au lako yani au sa tauri mai e dua na i yaragi; dua ga na MP3, va mai na kena magazine, sinai taucoko.

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Q13: O ra na kauti iko yani ki na loma ni Complex, dou sota mai vei?
A: Rau gole sara yani i na Unit i cake.

Q14: Tou lesuva mada na nomudou exercise tiko mai Makuluva. E vica na timi e ra a vakaitavi tiko e na exercise mai Nukulau?
A: Au vakabauta keitou lewe 15.

Q15: Rawa beka ni va na four-men teams?
A: Io.

Q16: Karua ni taro; e na gauna dou tiko kina mai Nukulau kei Makuluva, rauta beka e dua na macawa nomudou exercise, e na gauna o ya bau dua na gauna dou a biibi bi mai kina mo dou mai cabe i na Range, se i na Hanger se dua tale na vanua, se macawa dua ya dou tu ga kina mai kea?
A: Ka 19 sara ga ni siga keitou mai cabe i na Range i Vatuwaqa.

Q17: Sa oti mai na exercise ya?
A: Oti.

Q18: Dou cabe mai na Range, o cei a tavaki kemudou tu ike?
A: Dua na draiva o Vakadranu.

Q19: Staff Sergeant Vakadranu?
A: Io.

Q20: Dou lako cake i na Complex ni sa oti na nomudou exercise, lai re-condition nomudou stores, a caka e dua na de-brief me baleta na nomudou exercise, na veika dou malumalumu kina se so na ka dou vinaka kina?
A: Sega baleta se caka tikoga na sava i yaya, sava tiko na dingy sa rogo mai na ka ko ya e yaco i na Palimedi.

Q21: Na cava o qai cakava ni sa oti na nomudou sava i yaya?
A: Sega ni sava vakaotii na i yaya, na i yaya a biu tu ga. Keitou tu ga ike, sa dua na qiri e lako mai cake, au sega ga ni taura rawa se o cei e qiri mai. Sa tukuni beka ga mai cake me vakarau e rau na two-men team vata kei na rau talega na timi ni snipers. Sa i ko ya sara ga ya, sa keitou sa vakarau sara ga. Keitou se vakarau tu ga, ratou sa kaci tale mai me sa rauta, dou stand down sa i ko ya sara ga ya.

Q22: Nomudou a stand-down kina, o a gole i vei?
A: Au a tu wavoki tu ga ikeba baleta au sa kila na ka e sa yaco tiko se lakolako keitou na kacivi tale. E na gauna o tu wavoki tu ga kina e na nomudou Unit, ni a bau veitalanoa kei ira na vo ni lewe ni nomudou Unit me baleta na veika e yaco tiko mai na Palimedi?
Q23: Ia na gauna cava o qai kila kina ni so mai na nomudou Unit e ra vakaitavi tiko e na Palmedi?
A: E na gauna sara ga au sa curu yani kina e na i ka 20 ni siga.

Q24: E na nomu tiko o ya e na i ka 19 ni siga, bau dua na gauna o kila ni dua beka na brief a solia na nomudou OC me baleta e dua tale na exercise e na vakayacori tiko e na siga ya?
A: Sega.

Q25: Daru lakova maka na i ka 20 ni siga na nomu a gole sobu i na Parliamentary Complex. O tukuna tiko ni dua na lori ni Matanitu a kauti iko sobu, lewe rua rau mai kauti iko, e rau a mai vakavodoki iko i vei?
A: Rau gole cake sara mai ki na Complex rau mai vakavodoki au.

Q26: Rau mai kacivi iko sara ga, se rau mai taro se so e via lako sobu i na Parliamentary Complex se cava na vu ni nomu vodo?
A: Rau lako mai cake, rau mai taro, “Eso e galala tiko ikere me gole sobu?” Sa o au sara ga.

Q27: Bau dua tale e vodo vata kei iko?
A: Sega.

Q28: O kilai rau na mai veikau o ya?
A: Sega sara ga. O rau na lako mai ya au se qai raici rau sara ga vakadua.

Q29: Na tolili cava e rau vakayagataka tiko?
A: Dua na tolili damudamu, 4-wheel ko ya e vaka na ka vou ko ya e ra tiko go e na Matanitu. Au raica ga ni tiko kina na GM registration.

Q30: E Toyota Twin-Cab se Pajero?
A: Via vaka toka na Pajero, me vaka sara ga ya ia e sega ni Pajero.

Q31: Nomudou a gole sobu i na Palmedi, bau dua na veitalanoa a vakayacori tiko e na loma ni tolili e na nomudou gole sobu tiko?
A: Sega gole tiko mada ga ya, e escort tale tu ga e dua na ovisa, e liu tiko vei keitou e dua na lori ni ovisa.

Q32: E vei na vanua dou sotava kina na lori ni ovisa?
A: Na lori ni ovisa keitou qai curu ga mai tuba sa kele tu, sa kauti keitou sara ga.

Q33: O bai kila kevaka e dua tale i na loma ni Unit a va o ya na nona gole sobu ki na Parliament Complex?
A: Sega sara ga.
Q34: Na nomu vakaitavi tiko ena Parliament Complex, o tukuna tiko ni o yadrava tiko na perimeter. Bau dua na gauna o vakaitavi e na nona body-guard-taki tiko o George Speight?
A: Sega.

Q35: O bau kila o cei soti a bodyguard vei George Speight?
A: Sega.

Q36: E na gauna o sa tiko kina e na loma ni Parliamentary Complex, o bau rogoca e dua na veitalanoa ni tukuni ni Mataivalu e vakaitavi tiko e na vuaviri se Mataivalu e veitokoni tiko e na vuaviri ko ya e vakayacori tiko ya?
A: Se bera mada ga ni keitou gole, e na bogi ni ka 19 a gole yani o Tarakinikini, o ko ya e lai vosa vei keitou.

Q37: Lai vosa vei kemudou e na nomudou i Unit?
A: Io.

Q38: Na i tukutuku cava a vakadewataka toka oko ya vei kemudou?
A: Au sa sega sara ga ni vakasamataka, ia na ka ga au vakabauta, e vaka e lai vakayaloqaqataki keitou ena so na ka e tukuna. Tukuna o ko ya, "Na ka dou vakaitavitaki kemudou kina qori, dou lai tu mada ga i loma qori, na veivuke e na qai yaco ga yani."

Q39: Tu i loma i vei?
A: I na Palimedi.

Q40: Brief-taki kemudou o Tarakinikini mo dou lako i na Complex. Dou lai tiko i loma ena qai veivuke yani na Mataivalu?
A: Io.

Q41: Bau so tale na turaga ni valu e ra a tiko e na nomudou veitalanoa qori mai na nomudou Unit?
A: Sega, bogi o ya lako duadua sara ga yani oko ya lai vosa vei keitou.

Q42: Na i ka 19 ni siga?
A: Io, e na kena bogi.

Q43: Vakazava o nomudou turaga ni valu ga o kemudou? Bau so a tiko e na vosa a lai vakayacora yani o Col Tarakinikini?
A: Sega.
Q44: O cei ga a senior duadua a tiko kina e na gauna a lai vakayacori kina na vosa qori?
A: Sega sara ga niu vakasamataka.

Q45: Vakacava na i liuli ni nomudou exercise, Mr. Dakuliga, a tiko taleda i keri?
A: Sega, z yali oko ya.

Q46: OC Baleinamau?
A: Sega, yali.

Q47: Can you recall if any of your members from 1FMS Unit was present at that briefing when Col. Tarakinikini came down?
A: I think all of the guys were present there.

Q48: Can you recall any of them?
A: (Silence)

Q49: How long have you been together with the 1FMS boys?
A: Nearly a year.

Q50: Do you know them by name?
A: Yes.

Q51: Do you know them by face?
A: Yes.

Q52: You know all who were present in that briefing?
A: Ao sega ni vakasamataka, because everything was prepared. We were busy preparing our kits, etc when he came in.

Q53: Do you remember the person sitting beside you that day?
A: No.

Q54: When you walked in, usually in the military tradition, usually we get the whole room’s attention?
A: No, not that night.

Q55: So everyone was just sitting around?
A: Yes, they were just busy preparing their things.

Q56: Approximately, what time was this?
A: I cannot recall it. I think it was nearly 10, something like that, I am not sure.

Q57: Were you promised any money or any benefits?
A: No.
Q58: You were arrested in Kalabu, were you assaulted?
A: Yes.

Q59: What were the injuries you received?
A: Facial injuries and I lost two of my teeth.

Q60: Were you hospitalised?
A: Yes.

Q61: Where at?
A: CWM.

Q62: Were you given a reason for your arrest?
A: No.

Q63: O kilu na tamata e cakava na ka o ya mai Kalabu?
A: O ratou na gule yani, ko ya mada ga o ratou na vesuki keitou kei iratou na vacuvaculaki keitou era va-balaclava, vica vei ira e ra va-gas mask.

Q64: E na gauna o mai tomiki kina, o a kauta sobu e so na i yaragi vata kei iko se a tukumi vei iko mo kauta sobu e so nai yaragi i Palimedi?
A: Sega, au qai vodo sa o au sara ga - ligaqu ga yavaqu.

Q65: Sega ni dua na i yaragi e tu e loma ni lori?
A: Sega, sega sara ga ni dua tale na i yaragi e tu e loma ni lori.

Q66: Mai na Unit ki na Complex, o bau vakaitavi ena kena kau sobu na i yaragi?

Q67: Dua tale na ka o via vakamacalataka niu se bera ni serekoi iko?
A: Ko ya ga au vakadewataka e liu ni tukuni na Matavalu e na qai vakaitavi yani. Dua na ka na levu ni Turaga ni Valu ko ya e ra lako yani i loma ya. Ko ya o ya sa qai vakadeitaki keitou ni Matavalu talega e na vakaitavi ko ya e ra a lako yani.

Q68: E ra lako yani i vei?
A: I na Palimedi, levu sara ga na Turaga ni Valu lelevu. Ko ya o ya keitou vakadeitaki keitou tu kina ni keitou kilu ni keitou cakava tiko o ya keitou duavata tiko vata kei na Matavalu?

Q69: O ira na Turaga ni Valu qo e ra gole i na Complex?
A: Io.

Q70: Rawa ni o tukuna na yacadra na Turaga ni Valu e ra lako yani i na Complex?
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A: Col Tuatoko, Col Saubulinayau, Major Caucau, Col Tarakinikini, o kemuni - ko ya beka g a o ya ko ya au raica rawa.

Q71: Pte Raivalu, e na gauna o a tiko kina e na Complex, na gauna o lako kina i Kalabu me yacova sara na gauna o lesu mai kina ki na Mataivalu, bau dua na gauna a musu na kemu i sau se o a sega ni bau veisaumi?
A: Sega.

Q72: Lako tu ga nomu veisaumi?
A: Io, me yacova mai qo e lako tu ga noqu veisaumi.

Q73: O bau kila talega ni dua na gauna a bau kau tiko yani e so na ration i na keba me kau sobu yani vei kemudou?
A: Na ration e sega vakadua ni cala, e lako tu ga yani.

Q74: O cei e vakaitavi tiko e na kena kau tiko yani na ration; o ratou ga na nomudou, se e so tals mai na LSU se o ratou na 3FIR?
A: Qai ratou dau yaco ga yani, e ratou sa dau tukuna "Ei, nā ka qo era kauta mai na Mataivalu se na Sotia - na kemudou kakana.

Q75: Na kena kau yani na kakana, qori na i matai ni vica vata na macawa se vica na macawa o raica ni kau tiko yani na kakana se na i matai ni vica vata ga na siga?
A: Au vakabauta ni veimacawa kece sara ga e lako tiko yani na kakana.

Q76: Pte Raivalu, kevaka keitou na vinakati iko, keitou na qai kacivi iko tale mo lako mai. Sa na oti ga qo, sa rawa ni o lesu tale i na 3FIR, kakua ni lesu tale i yasana o ya. Kevaka o vakasamataka ni dua na ka e lutu, o guilecava mo talanoaataka i loma qo, e rawa ni o qai golole tale mai, mai tukuna vei dua vei keitou na lewe ni Board, oti mo na qai kacivi tale mai mo mai solia na nomu evidence i ke. Vinaka vakalevu.
A: Vinaka saka.

Recalled on 12/09/0

Private Raivalu, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q77: Private Raivalu, you have said that when you came to the camp, there was a government vehicle waiting for you?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q78: What colour was this vehicle?
A: Red.
Q79: Was there something loaded in the vehicle? Any weapons loaded in the vehicles?
A: No, Sir.

Q80: Who was driving that vehicle?
A: I do not know, Sir. I have never seen him before.

Q81: Who told you to travel in the vehicle? You did not know the driver so someone must have said for you to go in the vehicle?
A: It just that they came over and asked who was free to go down to the Parliament.

Q82: You said that the vehicle was escorted from the main gate, by who?
A: Police, Sir.

Q83: Was there any other civilian vehicle with that vehicle?
A: No, Sir.

Q84: What about vehicle No. CP 850?
A: No, Sir.

Q85: Where did you get off in the Parliament Complex?
A: Inside.

Q86: Where was the vehicle parked in the complex?
A: Right inside but we went through the backgate, Sir.

Q87: Was there anything off loaded from there?
A: No, Sir.

Q88: When you left the unit, was Mr. Baleinamau at the unit?
A: I cannot remember, Sir.

Q89: What about Warrant Officer Bainimoli?
A: I cannot remember, Sir.

Q90: On the 19th you were doing the exercise at Makuluva? Is that true?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q91: When you return from Makuluva, where did you land? Was it at the range or the Maritime?
A: Range, Sir.

Q92: On the night of the 18th, were you told to pack some ammunitions in a magazine at Makuluva?
A: I could not remember, Sir.
Q93: On the night of the 18th, the morning of the 19th, did you go to the Rewa landing before you came to the range?  
A: No, Sir.

Q94: Was there a briefing done at Makuluva by Mr. Dakuliga on the night of the 18th?  
A: No, Sir.

Q95: Were there any weapons brought in sandbags to Makuluva island on the night of the 18th?  
A: No, Sir.

[F. RAIVALU]  
Private

[J. N. B. EVANS]  
Lieutenant Colonel  
President

[A. MOHAMMED]  
Major  
Member

[T. GCACKE]  
Major  
Member

[H. MACOMBER]  
Warrant Officer Class One  
Member
FORTY-NINTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 29549 PRIVATE KILIMO RATU

Pte Ratu, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Private Ratu, before we take evidence, can you give us a brief outline of your military service?

Q2: Can you give us your explanation on your involvement prior to the take over on 19th May, also the activities on the 19th of May plus your involvement in the whole event.

Q3: Vakamacalataka mada na i tavi o a qarava i loma o ya, o cei a brief taki iko mo lako sobu kei na i tavi cava o laki qarava i loma o ya?
A: Ena gauna au sa rogoca kina ni sa involve na mataivalu ena coup, au sa gole mai ena basti, au qai taura e dua na motoka me'u gole kina Palimedi. Na noqu cakacaka e loma o ya na security baleti iratou na hostages.

Q4: O rogoca mai vei ni sa caka na vuaviri?
A: Au rogoca ena reijo.

Q5: Ni se bera o ya ko a bau vakaitavi ena kena vakarautaki se plan taki na vuaviri?
A: E seja saka.

Q6: O bau kila e dua na ka se dua e involve ena kena vakarautaki na vuaviri?
A: Au seja ni kila edu na ka se'u rogoca.

Q7: Nai kavica ni siga o qai rogoca kina?
A: Ena vakaraubuka saka ga.

Q8: Ko rogoca mai vei?
A: Au rogoca ena reijo.

Q9: Mai vei?
A: Mai vale.

Q10: Vale e vei?
A: Mai nakoro, mai Namara.

Q11: Oti ga o ya?
A: Au sa qai lako mai ki Suva, au taura e dua na taxi ka gole kina Palimedi.

Q12: E na nomu yaco o koa o cei o solia vei iko na i yaragi?
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A: Na i yaragi e sega ni soli mai vei au, sa tu ga na i yaragi, au taura ga mai.

Q13: Na nomu tiko e koa, o cei na i liuli ni security?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q14: E vica vata na ka e yaco ena taudaku ni complex, ko a bau vakaitavi ena dua na ka e yaco ana taudaku ni complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q15: Ko bau vakayagataka na nomu i yaragi ena nomu tu e loma?
A: E sega saka.

Q16: Ena gauna cava o curu kina ena complex.
A: Ena yakavi saka.

Q17: Rauta na vica na kaloko?
A: Au sega saka ni taura rawa.

Q18: Yakavi siga se bogi.
A: Yakavi bogi saka.

Q19: Ko a tiko ena briefing ena keba ena i ka 19 ni siga vei ira na CRW ka tiko kina ko Col. Tarakikiini?
A: E sega saka.

Q20: O lako ga mai nakoro o gole sara ena Parliament Complex?
A: Io saka.

Q21: O cei na i liuli ni tabana ni security ena loma ni Palimedi?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q22: O bau raica e dua e curu yani e na loma ni complex ena gauna o tiko kina e loma mai vei iratou na mataivalu?
A: Io saka.

Q23: O cei so na yacadra?

Q24: Ena gauna cava o qai biuta kina na complex?
A: Ena i karua ni macawa.

Q25: O biuta na complex, oti o qai lesu tale ki loma?
A: Io saka.
Q26: O lako i vei?
A: Au lako kina keba.

Q27: Baleta na cava?
A: Au tobo ena check-point ena noqu lako tiko kina keba. Au a tobo ena bogi levu ka’u qai mavoa.

Q28: O ya nai ka rua ni macawa ni nomu tiko e loma?
A: Io saka.

Q29: O bau curu tale e loma ni complex oti o ya?
A: E sega saka.

Q30: Ena nomu sa sere mai na keba o gole tale ki vei?
A: Au a navao levu saraga kau mani gole vei neitou OC. Au a rua na macawa mai nona vale meu laki vakacegu tu. Au sa bula vinaka, au sa qai lesu tale.

Q31: O cei na nomudou OC?
A: O Mr. Baleinamau.

Q32: Ko a bau dua vei ira na vesu mai Kalabu?
A: Io saka.

Q33: Na cava tale o laki cakava e kea?
A: Au a laki veisiko ena bogi. Au a tiko ena keba ka gole yani.

Q34: O bau raici Major Ligairi mai na Parliament Complex?
A: Io saka.

Q35: O drau bau veitalanoa kei Major Ligairi?
A: E sega saka.

Q36: Ko bau raici Mr. Ravai mai na Parliament Complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q37: O kila na i tavi nei Mr. Ravai?
A: E sega saka.

Q38: Na nomu vesu ena check-point, ko a bau lauvacu se laumoku?
A: Au a lauvacu, laumoku ka laucaqe.
Q39: O qai laki biu ena cell?
A: Io saka.

Q40: O cei e qai sereki iko mai na cell?
A: O Coi. Tara.

Q41: Na cava e tukuna vei iko ena gauna o sere mai kina?
A: Me'u gole ki valenibula.

Q42: Ni oti na nomu gole i valenibula o gole sara ki vei?
A: Vei neitou OC.

Q43: Ni o sa lesu mai vei nomudou OC, osa vakacegu vakavinaka, na cava ko laki veisiko tale kina ki Kalabu?
A: Bailea ni'u lesu tale mai na keba.

Q44: Ena gauna cava o lako kina ki Kalabu?
A: Ena bogi ni Vukelulu.

Q45: Ko sega ni rogoca e dua na soqo e vakayacori mai Kalabu ena bogi ni Vukelulu?
A: Io saka.

Q46: Na nomu lako i kea sa vakayacori na soqo ogo na i quasi ni loaloa?
A: E se bera saka. E dodonu me caka ena siga Lotulevu.

Q47: Ena nomu tobo ena Lotulevu, o se baci yamo tale ka lauvacu?
A: Io saka.

Q48: O kau i valenibula?
A: Io saka.

Q49: E vica na siga na nomu vesu tu ena cell?
A: E riu na macawa vakacaca. E viavia 16 na siga.

Q50: Ena nomu sere mai e dua na ka e a tukuni vei iko?
A: Io saka.

Q51: O cei a sereki iko mai?
A: O iratu ga mai cake.

Q52: O cei mai cake?
A: O Major Tamata.

Q53: Ratu, na cava mada e vakavuna na nomu lako sobu kina Palimedi?
A: Ena gauna au rogo ca ni sa involve kina na mataivalu.

Q54: Ena nomu tiko ena Palimedi o bau rogo ca ni vakaitavi tiko na mataivalu ka veitokoni tiko ena yadra?
A: Au a rogo ca.

Q55: Ve i cei?
A: Ve i ra na tu ena Palimedi.

Q56: E bau musu na kemu i sau ena dua na gauna?
A: E sega saka.

Q57: O veisauri tu ga?
A: Io saka.

Q58: Na ration e lako tiko yani o bau kila?
A: Io saka.

Q59: O kil a cei e kauta tiko yani?
A: E sega saka.

Q60: Na nomu tiko ena Palimedi, o bau yadra e tuba?
A: Io saka.

Q61: Au na kauti iko lesu tale ena i ka 19'ni Me. Ena gauna cava o a biubi u kina ena keba?
A: Ena mataka iulai.

Q62: Oti ga na exercise kei na debriefing o sa gole sara yani?
A: Io saka.

Q63: E vica na kaloko o ya; e bera na tikikarua?
A: E se bera sara.

Q64: O sa yaco i vale o sa qai rogo ca na ka e yaco?
A: Io saka.

Q65: Private Ratu, what was your responsibility in the 1MS?
A: Patrol man.

Q66: Who was your team leader?
A: Lt. Tjiwamavou
Q67: Can you recall the other members of your team?
A: No, Sir.

Q68: You do not know the other members of your team?
A: Au sa rogoca niratou sa tiko mai loma. Au rogoca ena rei jo ni sa involve na Unit.

Q69: I am not asking whether they were involved or what. I am asking whether you remember who was the CRW members?
A: E sega saka.

Q70: How long have you been together with your team?
A: Sa dede.

Q71: Too long and you still do not know them? O cei soti na lewe ni team?
A: Keitou saka keitou sega ni wasewase vaka team. Mai cake e wasewase tu vaka troops.

Q72: How many in your troop?
A: Au sega ni kila saka.

Q73: On the second week, why were you arrested in Parliament?
A: At Ratu Sukuna Road, after the curfew.

Q74: Where were you going to?
A: I was going to buy grog.

Q75: When you entered the complex, you said you picked up a weapon, is it true?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q76: Who gave you the weapon?
A: Au sa guilecava saka.

Q77: E a namu tiko ena complex, o bau raica na OC ni wavoki yani ki loma?
A: E sega saka.
Q78: Vinaka Private Ratu, keitou na qai kacivi iko tale kevaka ko na vinakati tale mo gole mai. Kevaka e dua na ka ko guilecava, mo qai tukuna ga mai veiketou na lewe ni Board. E rawa mo na qiri ga mai se o gole mai.

A: Vinaka saka vakalevu.
CONFIDENTIAL

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FIFTIETH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 29551 PTE JONA NAWAQA

Pte Nawaqa, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Pte Nawaqa, just give a brief outline of your military service?

Q2: Pte Nawaqa, you understand the reason behind the Board, why the Board is sitting which is really to find out your involvement in the takeover at the Parliament Complex. What you need to do in your own words, give us your involvement prior to the events of 19th of May, and also the 19th of May and after the 19th of May until such time that you were brought in, whether you were arrested or you came in voluntarily into the Camp. Give us a brief outline of that.
A: Ni se bera saka na I ka 19 ni siga, keitou exercise saka tiko mai Makuluva, keitou yaco mai e na Siga Vakaraubuka ko ya e caka kina na coup. Ni oti saka na neitou debrief, au a gole saka i bure. Au qai yaco saka yani i na Palimedi ni sa yakavi.

Q3: O a tiko e na Unit e na bogi ni ka 19 ni siga e na nona a brief kina o Col Tarakinikini?
A: Sega saka.

Q4: O cei a tutuksa vai iko mo gole sobu i na Parliament Complex?
A: O au ga vakataki au.

Q5: Na cava na nomu cakacaka e na Parliament Complex?
A: Au lai security saka.

Q6: O security-taka na cava?
A: Au a lai yadra saka tiko e na matamata.

Q7: O cei na nomu boso e na Complex?
A: O au ga.

Q8: O cei na i liulii ni security?
A: Sega saka.

Q9: Bau dua na gauna o a vakaitavi e na Operation Room e na lorna ni Complex?
A: Sega saka.

Q10: Bau dua na gauna o bau curu i tuba?
A: Sega saka.

Q11: Gaua cava o qai curu kina i tuba?
A: Ka 13 saka ni siga.

Q12: O gole i vei?
A: Au sa lesu tale i bure.

Q13: Lesu tale i na keba
A: Io.

Q14: E na i ka 13 ni siga o biubiug ga mai e na Parliament Complex o lesu tale I na keba?
A: Io saka.

Q15: Pte Nawaga, what time did you leave Camp for the Parliament Complex?
A: Friday 19th May.

Q16: The time?
A: I cannot recall.

Q17: Morning, lunch, evening, night?
A: Au sa vakasigalevu oti au qai biubiug.

Q18: Where were you arrested?
A: In Kalabu.

Q19: At the checkpoint or at the school?
A: At the school.

Q20: Were you assaulted?
A: Yes.

Q21: Did you sustain any injuries?
A: Yes.

Q22: What injuries did you receive?
A: Mavoa saka na uluq vata kei na mataqu.

Q23: When you went to Parliament, who did you report to?
A: O au saka ga au kauti au yani ikua.

Q24: I know you took yourself down. Who did you report to in the Parliament?
A: E sega ni dua.
Q25: Who was the first person you spoke to in Parliament?
A: O ira na civilian e ra tiko i matamata.

Q26: Did they allow you in the Parliament?
A: Yes.

Q27: Who was the first military person you spoke with?
A: I cannot remember.

Q28: You did not speak with any military person in the Complex?
A: Sir.

Q29: From the 19th to the 13th of July, you did not speak with any military person?
A: O ratou ga na dau lako yani i loma me ratou laki veisiko.

Q30: Who was the first one you spoke with?
A: Col Tuatoko & Saubulinayau.

Q31: E tarogi tiko o ira na tiko i loma. O vosa vei cei i loma ya mai na Unit; o cei na i matai ni tamata?
A: Au sega ni taura rawa.

Q32: Pte Nawaqa, bula vinaka. E na gauna o sa lako sobu kina i na Palimedi, o bau raica tale e dua dou a exercise vata mai Nukulau kei Makuluva sa tu i loma o ya?
A: Sega saka.

Q33: Otioti ga ni taro; bau dua na gauna a musu na kemui i sau se o veisaumi tu ga e na gauna o tu kina i na Palimedi?
A: Au qai mai veisaumi saka ga e na Siga Vukelulu, kena siga Lotulevu, ka 28 ni siga keitou ka mai kina i ....

Q34: E na gauna o a tiko kina e na Palimedi, a bau musu na kemui i sau se o veisaumi tu ga?
A: Au sega saka tu ni veisaumi.

Q35: E na nomu mai veisaumi e na Siga Vukelulu ni se bera ni yaco na ka mai Kalabu e na Lotulevu, e a saumi kece vei iko na nomu a sega tu ni veisaumi se na normal pay ga a soli vei iko?
A: Sa qai mai saumi tale vei au.

Q36: Sa qai mai saumi tale vei iko na veika o a sega tu ni taura e na loma ni gauna o ya?
A: Ko ya walega mai na i ka 13 ni siga me yacova mai na gauna au a vesu kina.
Q37: Ko ya au taroga tiko o au baleta ni o kaya tiko o iko ni nomu tiko ena Palimedi ya, e sega tiko na veisaumi. Na nomu qai veisaumi e na nomu sa lesu mai e na Palimedi, au taroga tiko o au, o a laura lesu tale na i sau ko ya a sega ni soli vei iko; a soli tale vei iko na I sau o ya se sega?
A: A qai mai soli tale vei au.

Q38: Qai mai soli tale vei iko?
A: Io.

Recalled on 8/9/00:

Pte Nawaqa, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q39: O rawa ni tukuna tale mada vakarua vei keitou, na Board, na veika o vakayacora tu o iko enai ka 19 ni siga ni vula o Me kei na nomu gole sobu ena Parliament Complex, o gole sobu vakacava?
A: E keitou gole saka ga mai na exercise i Makuluva, au gole cake lai de-brief ena complex, au gole cake sara i bure. Oti na vakasigalevu, au lako sobu i town, au lako sara i Palimedi.

Q40: Ocei a solia na nomudou de-brief ena nomudou Unit?
A: O Dukus (Mr. Dakuliga).

Q41: O sega ni bau rogoca ni tukuna o Mr. Baleinamau me dou lako dou lai veisau, qai lesu tale mai kea within one hour baleta ni vakarau caka e dua na exercise ni VIP hostage?
A: Sega saka.

Q42: Drau a sega ni vodo vata kei Mr. Baleinamau ena dua na mini bus vulavula ena siga o ya?
A: Sega saka.

Q43: E dua e tukuna vei keitou, Nawaqa, nio iko drau a tiko vata kei Mr. Baleinamau ena dua na mini bus vulavula, drau vodo mai na Sukanaivalu Rd, drau lako sobu i Palimedi ena kena matakai lailai.
A: Sega saka.

Q44: Ena loma ni mini bus ya, e tiko talega kina o Mr. Dakuliga.
A: Sega saka.

Q45: O cei drau a tiko vata i bure me rawa ni vakadinadinataka nio a tiko mai bure?
A: Au lako yani i bure, noqui lala eratou sa dui lako i nodratou.

Q46: Nomudou lesu mai na exercise i Makuluva, na tikini siga cava dou lesu mai kina, dou cabe mai vei, go na exercise ni sea survival?
A: Enai ka 19 ni siga, keitou cabe mai na range i Vatuwaqa.

Q47: Dou sega ni cabe mai na Maritime School?
A: Sega saka.

Q48: O cei soti ea cabe mai vata kei kemudou ena range?
A: Keitou kece, Sir.

Q49: Vakamacalatakai mada na nomu team madaga o iko?
A: Na noqu team ni?

Q50: Na nomu team ko dou cabe vata mai na range. O cei e tiko ena nomu team?
A: O ratou na lala keitou lai exercise vata.

Q51: O cei soti?
A: O ratou saka na neitou Unit.

Q52: O cei soti dou a cabe mai na range?
A: O ratou o Mr. Dakuliga.

Q53: O cei soti?
A: O Lings.

Q54: Liganivai?
A: Sir.

Q55: Liganivai mai vei qo, mai Mokani seoko ya na karua ni Liganivai?
A: Mokani.

Q56: E sega ni o koya na Liganivai e tiko i tuba qori?
A: Sega saka.

Q57: O cei tale?
A: O Fish (Sgt. Naika).

Q58: O cei tale?
A: Qica.

Q59: E dua tale na yaca o bau nanuma?
A: Sir, o ratou saka ga ya au kilai iratou tiko, na kena vo ya e keitou dau veikacivi ena so tale na yaca, au sega ni kilai iratou.

Q60: O vakasamatake tiko na siga Vukelulu ena 17 ni siga ni vula o Me, dou sa tiko mai kina i wai ya?
A: Sir.
Q61: E dua na admin run o a kauta mai?
A: Sir.

Q62: E rawa nio talanoataka mada na ka o mai cakava?
A: Mai re-sup ga na neitou batiri ni walesi, au kauta talega mai e dua vei keitou, e tauvimate. E tauvimate mai Makuluva.

Q63: O koya e tauvimate ya, o mai vakasoburi ko ya i vei?
A: Maritime.

Q64: Ocei ea wawa tu na maritime?
A: O Paul (Staff Sergeant Vakadranu), o Good Time (Kovula Gaunavinaka) vata kei ko ya e dau taura tiko na neitou walesi i cake, e kovula, au sega ni taura rawa na yacana. E gone ni Gau.

Q65: E sega ni o Matainaniu?
A: Qori saka.

Q66: Nawaqa, na nomu lako sobu mada i Palimedi, oa lako sobu mada vakacava? O biubiu mai na complex, ena siga Vakaraubuka tiko ya, nomu lako sobu, o cei drau a lako vata?
A: Au lai gole mai town.

Q67: Nomu biubiu, ocei mada drau lako vata mai na Keba?
A: O au taudua saka.

Q68: Nomu lako ya, o sa kau yaragi? E dua na brief e solia vei iko o Mr. Baleinamaa?
A: Sega saka.

Q69: Enai ka 27 ni siga, ena siga Vakarauwai ya, erau mavo kina e lewe rua na 3FIR, e dua e turaga ni valu o Mr. Rokoura vata kei dua na private, erau a lauvana ena check-point i Vuya Road. O vakasamateka na siga Vakarauwai qo?
A: Sega saka.

Q70: O iko a tiko evei ena gauna ya?
A: Au tiko ga i loma ni Palimedi.

Q71: Qo ko ra lako sobu mai kina e so na lewe ni vanua, e so vei kemudou era muri iratou sobu mai, ea lauvana kina na tabai Rokoura, oti e dua na macawa ni vuaviri.
A: Au sega ni vakanamamata.
Q72: Vakacava na kena Sigatabu, na gauna ea voro kina na TV station, oa tiko ivei na gauna ya? O kila na Sigatabu ya?
A: Sega saka.

Q73: O ya nai ka 28 ni siga?
A: Sega.

Q74: O iko nomu cakacaka i loma, o yadra ivei?
A: Yadravi iratou na hostages vata kei na perimeter.

Q75: Ena gauna o dau yadra kina ena perimeter, o bau kila eso na ka e yaco tu i tuha?
A: E sega.

Q76: Nawaqa, what weapon were you issued with in the complex?
A: Uzis.

Q77: On the Saturday, 20th were you in the Unit in QEB?
A: Au sega ni vakasamataka.

Q78: Did you come back to the Unit on Saturday, 20th, during the day at any time?
A: Au sega ni vakasamataka rawa.

[J. NAWAQA]
Private

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
FIFTY FIRST WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 29628 PTE ILIESA LIGANIVAI

Pte Liganivai, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Pte Liganivai, when did you join the IMS Unit?
A: This year, Sir.

Q2: E na gauna cava o qai kila kina na ka e baleta na vuaviri? O bau tiko ena planning stages se kena vakavakarau kece me baleta na vuaviri?
A: Au sega sara ga ni kila kina e dua na ka.

Q3: E na gauna cava o qai kila kina na ka e yaco?
A: E na gauna a caka kina na ka qo, keitou a tu mai Nadi.

Q4: Gauna cava o qai lesu tale mai kina i Suva?
A: Siga Vakaraubuka vata ga a yaco kina na coup.

Q5: Sega ni dua na brief a bau soli vei kemudou mai na Unit mai cake me baleta na vuaviri?
A: Sega saka.

Q6: Gauna cava o qai lako sobu kina i ra?
A: Macawa ka tarava e na siga Lotulevu.

Q7: O cei a tukuna vei iko mo gole sobu i ra?
A: E ra sa involve ga kina o ira na noqu comrades, au sa lako talega kina.

Q8: A cava na nomu cakacaka e na loma ni Parliament Complex?
A: Security.

Q9: O bau vakaitavi e na dua na security detail i tuba? E vica vata na vanavana a yaco i tuba, o bau lewena na i lala ko ya e ra curu i tuba?
A: Sega.

Q10: Bau dua na gauna o biuta kina na i tikotiko o ya?
A: Sega.

Q11: Gauna cava o qai biuta kina na Parliament Complex mo curu i tuba?
A: Na i ka 12 ni siga.

Q12: Na vula?
A: July.
Q13: Ka 12 se sa i ka 13 ni siga?
A: Ka 12.

Q14: Sa ra biubi mai kea e na Lotulevu na i ka 13 ni Jiulai.
A: Macawa ka tarava sa ra qai biubi mai na Palimedi – 18th or the 19th.

Q15: E ra biubi mai kea na tamata taucoko e na i ka 13 ni siga ni vula ko Jiulai. O iko o biubi mai kea e naica?
A: Ka 12.

Q16: E na siga Vukelulu?
A: Io.

Q17: Vakamata tataka tale mada; o iko o biubi mai na Palimedi e na i ka vica ni siga?
A: Ka 12.

Q18: O ya s na vula ko Jiulai?
A: Io.

Q19: O qai gole i vei?
A: I vale.

Q20: O cei qai kauti iko mai na keba?
A: Au qai lai kau mai Kalabu.

Q21: O iko o a vesu mai Kalabu?
A: Io.

Q22: Nomu curu i tuba o ya, o kauta e dua na i yaragi i tuba mai na Parliament Complex?
A: Sega.

Q23: Wheres were you when the hostages were released?
A: Au sega saka ni kila na release ni hostages.

Q24: You did not see the hostages being released. You cannot recall anything?
A: No.

Q25: Do you remember making a statement to the police?
A: Sir.

Q26: What day did you tell the police that you left?
A: I do not remember.
Q27: I will read to you an answer you gave to a question to the police. (Major Aziz reads):

Our investigation revealed that you and your group continued to remain in the Parliament Complex after the release of the hostages on the 13th of July.

A: Yes, I stayed in the Parliament Complex on 13th July after the release of the hostages."

Q28:

Na investigation ni ovisa o iko a tiko e na loma ni Palimedi e na gauna a sereki kina o ratou na kai vesu; dua tani na ka o tukuna vei iratou na ovisa, dua tani na ka o qai mai tukuna i ke. O iko o a tiko e na loma ni Palimedi e na gauna e ratou a sere kina na hostages?

A: Au sega ni kila na gauna e ratou a sere kina na hostages baleta talega ni levu tu na gauna ni release; matai o iratou na yalewa, qai muri o ratou na tagene.

Q29:

Na i otioti ni release?

A: Sega.

Q30:

O iko o a sega ni tiko i kea?

A: Sega.

Q31:

Na siga a caka kina na veibulu, o a tiko i kea?

A: Sir.

Recalled on 8/9/00:

Pte Liganivai, after having been duly reminded of oath taken earlier, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q32: Nomu (Regiment) No. na 29628?

A: Sir.

Q33: Matai ni yacamu o Iliesa?

A: Sir.

Q34: Vakarauwai na i ka 20 ni siga, o tiko e na nomudou Unit?

A: Sir, an dau report ga mai e na 8.00 na kaloko, oti au sa suka tale i vale.

Q35: Vica na kaloko?

A: Mataka lai lai saka.

Q36: Segi ni dua na brief e caka?

A: Segi saka.

Q37: Nomu dau golei yani i nomudou Unit, o curu e na Lecture Room ko ya e dau caka kina na briefing, veitalanoa, hau dua o raica i kea?

A: Segi saka.
Q38: Nomu curu i loma, o bau raica e so na kisi se duffel bags?
A: Eso ga na kisi e tu e loma o ya.

Q39: O bau kila na cava e ra tu e loma ni kisi ko ya e tu o ya e na loma ni Lecture Room?
A: Sega saka.

Q40: O iko e dua vei ira na pack-taka na kisi ko ya e ra tu o ya?
A: Sega saka.

Q41: Bau vica na kisi o raica?
A: E tolu saka beka na kisi.

Q42: O cei tale mai na nomu timi o bau sotava e na Unit?
A: Keitou lewe va mai na lewe 8.

Q43: O cei sotii; vakadeitaka la mai ie?
A: Gadeikibua, Ratu, Basuga, Raileqe, Ulhmioala, Naqamu.

Q44: Nomu dau tiko voli e na loma ni Unit o ya, drau bau sota kei Baleinamau?
A: Sega.

Q45: O bau raica nomudou lori levu?
A: Sega saka.

Q46: O bau raica e so tale na lori ni Matanitu era kelekele tu e na nomudou Unit?
A: Sega.

Q47: O sega ni bau raica na landcruiser ni kele tu i tuba?
A: Sega.

Q48: O iko qai lai curu i loma ni Palimedi ena siga Lotulevu?
A: Sir.

Q49: Na cava soti o cakava tiko mai cake ko ya e dede kina na nomu lai curu i na Palimedi? Na cava soti o a cakava tiko i cake ko ya e vakavuna tiko kina na nomu sega ni lako sobu vakatomolo?
A: E sega tale ni dua na ka e caka tu ike. Au dau report ga mai e na mataka lailai, vakacivilian tu ga, au suka.

Q50: O suka o ya, na cava na kena ibalebaie, o lako sara tikoga i vale se o tikoga e na nomudou bareki?
A: Au lako sara tiko i vale.
Q51: O iko tiko mai vei o iko?
A: Mai na koro saka.

Q52: Sa qai Lotulevu sara sa qai tukuni vei iko mo gole sobu?
A: Sir.

Q53: O cei a tukuna vei iko mo gole sobu ira?
A: Ni ratou sa tu ga mai kea na neitou lewe ni Unit, au sa mani lako sobu.

Q54: O cei a qai tukuna vei iko mo gole sobu ira?
A: Eratou kere veivuke mai loma o ya ni sa lailai na nodratou strength, me so tale yani me lai veivuke.

Q55: O cei a qai tukuna vei iko mai na Unit i cake mo gole sobu ira?
A: Sa tukuni ga mai, au sega ga ni taura rawa o cei a solia mai na command o ya.

Q56: O cei na OC ni Unit?
A: Mr Ealeinamau.

Q57: Na vaika e cakava na Unit, o cei e solia na order?
A: OC.

Q58: O cei a solia na order mo lako sobu i na Parliament Complex?
A: Me vaka ga ni sa vakaitevi tu ike na lewe ni Unit.

Q59: Ia o cei a tukuna vei iko mo gole sobu, e levu na yaca ni tamata e tiko i cake ya; Bainimoli, Baleinamau? O cei a solia vei iko na order mo lako sobu i ra?
A: (Silence)

Q60: E dua a tukuna vei iko mo gole sobu ira?
A: Na ka ga au taura rawa ni a tukuni mai loma meu veivuke ena security.

Q61: O tukuna o iko ni o qai lako sobu e na Lotulevu, nai ka 26 ni siga. Na nomu i matai ni statement o tukuna o iko ni o lako sobu e na i ka 19 ni siga. Na ka au via kila o au, na siga Vakarauwai na i ka 27 ni siga, o vakasamataka na siga rau a mavoa kina e rua na lewe ni 3FIR e na Vuya Road; dua na turaga ni valu o Mr Rokoura vata kei na dua na private e lauvana na yavana; o vakasamataka na siga o ya, na veiba e caka e na check-point, ko ya a basu kina na nodratou vale laca na 3FIR.
A: Na siga cava saka?

Q62: O iko o lako yani e na Lotulevu, Vakaraubuka, na kena Vakarauwai; o tiko i vei ena gauna o ya - Palimedi se i tuba?
A: Au tu saka i loma.
Q63: O iko kila na ka e yaco i Vuya Road?
A: Sega, au qai lai rogoca tikoga ni sa yakavi.

Q64: O iko a rogoca na gasau ni a vanataki e na sigalevu o ya?
A: Sir.

Q65: O kila o cei a vanai rau na lewe rua o ya?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q66: Kena i karua, na i ka 28, ko ya a voro kina na TV Station. Es na i lala a gole ike. O kila nia dua vei kemudou a curu tiko i loma o ya; dua se rua a lako vata kei ira, kau i yaragi tiko?
A: Au warai saka ni kila.

Q67: Siga tabu - o vakasamataka na kena Siga Tabu?
A: Sir.

Q68: O a tiko evei e na Siga Tabu o ya?
A: Au a tu saka ga e loma ni Palimedi.

Q69: O wawoki tu ga i loma?
A: Sir.

Q70: Na i yaragi cava a tiko vei iko e na gauna o tiko kina i loma?
A: (Silence)

Q71: Dakai cava a tiko vei iko e na gauna o tiko kina e na loma ni Complex?
A: E duicui na i yaragi ko ya a issue-taki baleta ni veiveisau tu ga.

Q72: O iko bau lai yadra vei iratou na hostage?
A: Sega.

Q73: O iko a yadra tu ga i tuba?
A: Au tu ga e tuba.

Q74: Nomu dau yadra tu e tuba o ya, na i yaragi cava a soli vei iko?
A: Na i matai ni yaragi a soli vei au e dua na MP3.

Q75: Bau issuei vei iko e dua na pistol?
A: Sega.
Q76: Liganivai, dou lewe vica dou gole vata sobu e na siga Lotulevu o ya?
A: O au duadua saka ga.

[I. LIGANIVAI]
Private

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
FIFTY SECOND WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 21985 SGT P MALUMU

Sgt Malumu, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Sgt. Malumu, the evidence will be given in English, however, you may speak in Fijian if you wish to. Can you briefly outline your services in the military?

Au sa lesu mai vakatolu mai Lepanoni ka vakarua mai Sinai. Au a tiko ena Plant Troop me yacova na noqo gole yani.

Q2: E rava ni o vakamacalataka na nomu vakaitavi, na nomu gole ki na Palimedi ka yacova na nomu gole lesu tale mai kina keba.
A: Au a sakacaka tiko mai Vunidawa ena gauna ni coup ka’u gole kina Palimedi ena i 26 ni siga ni vula o Me ka yacova na i ka 13 ni Jiulai ena gauna sa dodonu me vagalalataki kina na Palimedi.

Q3: Ena i ka 26 ni siga ko a tiko ena Engineer e Nabuni. O cei a veitalanoataka na nomuni gole kina Palimedi?
A: E sega saka ni dua. O au a noqo leva ga vakai au baleta ni’u dua vata ena kena i naki.

Q4: Ena gauna o tiko kina ena Engineer, o ni bau veivosakitaka na lako kina Palimedi?
A: E sega saka, e sega ni dua e veivosakitaka.

Q5: O cei na senior officer ekea?
A: O Major Savua.

Q6: O ni ra sega ni tutuga mo ni lako kina Palimedi, o ni sana veitalanoataka tiko.
A: Keimami sega ni veitalanoataka e dua na ka.

Q7: Na i tavi cava ko a qarava tiko ena Palimedi?
A: Ena so na gauna au dau vaka itavi ena yadra, au dau veivuke vei iratou na security.

Q8: Ena nomu tiko ena complex, o dau vakaitavi tiko ena yadra?
A: Io saka.

Q9: E tubs se e loma ni complex?
A: Ena so na gauna e loma ni complex kei na so na gauna e na matamata.
Q10: O tukuna ni ko a tiko e matamata, o bau kila na gauna a lauvana kina na ovisa?
A: E sega saka.

Q11: Ko a tiko ena Palimedi ena gauna o ya?
A: Io saka.

Q12: O raici ira na i lawalawa ka ra vakacacana na TV station?
A: E sega saka.

Q13: O a tiko e vei?
A: Au a tiko ena loma ni complex.

Q14: When you were at the gate, did you check the people that were going in and out of the complex and what were they carrying?
A: Io saka.

Q15: Did you at any time come across any people bringing weapons out of the complex or inside the complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q16: Where did you get your weapon from?
A: E a tiko ena dua na rumu ena loma ni complex.

Q17: Was anyone in the room looking after the weapons in the complex?
A: E sega saka ni dua.

Q18: Do you remember where this room is located in the complex?
A: E tiko saka e ra.

Q19: How many weapons were in this room?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q20: What weapons did you have?
A: Na colts saka.

Q21: When did you leave the Parliament Complex?
A: Ena i ka 12 ni siga ni vula ko Jiulai.

Q22: Where did you go from there?
A: I vale saka.
Q23: Were you arrested after this?
A: No, Sir.

Q24: Did you receive your pay after this?
A: No, Sir.

Q25: What role did Major Savua play in the complex?
A: Au segu saka ni kila.

Q26: What was his role in the plant troop at Nabuni?
A: O ko ya e troop commander.

Q27: Who was the Officer-in-Charge at the Plant Troop at that time?
A: Ena gauna o ya na officer in charge e a gole tu ki Niu Siladi.

Q28: O cei na yacana?
A: O Lt. Dreu.

Q29: Who was the most senior officer?
A: O Major Savua.

Q30: Who was the most senior officer before 19th May, Sir?
A: Au segu saka ni kila.

Q31: Did you at any time use your weapon?
A: E segu saka.

Q32: Were you promised any rewards for going to the Parliament Complex?
A: E segu saka.

Q33: Were you told that you would be given money?
A: E segu saka.
Q34: Do you wish to say anything else?
A. E seya saka.

[P. MALUMU]
Sergeant

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
FIFTY-THIRD WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 22002 CPL WAOALIVA RAIJOA

Cpl Raiova, after having been duly sworn on by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Vakamacalataka mada vakalekaleka na nomu vaka i tavai vaaviri oqo ena kena tekivi: me yacovna na gauna ko lesu tale mai kina ena loma ni keba?
A: Au a curu saka ena Palimedi ena i ka 26 ni Me.

Q2: Vakamacalataka mai ena kena i tekivu?
A: O ko ya saka ga o ya.

Q3: Na cava na nomu cakacaka ena Engineer?
A: Plant Officer.

Q4: Na kena i balebale ni o tiko ena Plant Troop?
A: Io saka.

Q5: O tukuna ni ka 26 ni siga ni vula ko Me, dou gole sobu kina Palimedi; ocei dou a veitalanoataka na gole sobu?
A: E sega saka na veitalanoa.

Q6: O qai gole vakacava e loma?
A: Keitou gole saka ga, e sega ni veitalanoatoki.

Q7: Kova Raiova na nomu naba na 22002, elevu vei kemuni sa 21 eso sa tiko ena 23 kei na 24. E sega sara ni dua na gone laiaini e dabe tiko e cake oqo. E sega ni rawa ni o dou tutu ga dou gole sobu. E sa na yaco e dua na kena veitalanoa ena bati ni tanoa se vanua ni gunu ti. E rawa ni o vakamacala mada kina. E vu vakacava na nomudou gole sobu ira? Na cava e yaco ni se bera ni ko dou gole sobu?
A: Keitou sega ni veitalanoataka na neitou gole sobu.

Q8: O dou a veitalanoa tiko e vei?
A: E na Plant Troop ia, keitou sega ni veitalanoataka tiko na lako ki na Palimedi.

Q9: Ena nomu dou veitalanoa, o cei na senior e kea?
A: E sega saka ni dua na veitalanoa, oqo na veitalanoa ga vaqo, dua ga e tiko ka tukuni tiko mai na veitalanoa.

Q10: O cei a tiko ena veitalanoa o ya?
A: O keitou saka ga.

Q11: O kemudou na cava?
A: O keitou saka ga na cakacaka e kea.

Q12: E wili talesga kina o Major Savua?
Q12: E wili talega kina o Major Savua?
A: O koya e tu ena nona march-in tu ga. E so na gauna e sega oko ya ka keitou veitalanoa ga o keitou.

Q13: Ena ika 26 ni siga ni vula ko Me dou a veitalanoa kina ea tiko kina o Major Savua?
A: Oti saka ga, keitou sa gole.

Q14: Na i tavi cava dou a laki qarava e loma o ya?
A: Au a yadra tuga e loma e kea.

Q15: O cei na nomudou iliiliu ni yadra ena Parliament Complex?
A: E sega ni macala.

[ W. RAIOVA ]
Corporal

[ J. N. B. EVANS ]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[ A. MOHAMMED ]
Major
Member

[ T. GUCAKE ]
Major
Member

[ H. Macomber ]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
CONFIDENTIAL

FIFTY FOURTH WITNESS
21300 LT. COL. RUSIATE KOROVUSERE

Col Korovusere after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Na ka e gadreva tiko na Board ogo really is to paint the whole picture of what hapenred. Ni biuta mada na ka e yaco. O ni kila vinaka na i balebale ni Inquiry it is really information gathering. O kemuni o ni a bau kilia e dua na ka me baleta na ka ogo.
A: Well, I think many Fijians will understand that ni oti ga na veidigidi e levu e ra sa sega ni taleitaka na matanitu ni Labour. Na ka ga sa qai yaco tu, sa yaco tu. It is just because of the voting system. What happens is all military officers do their own thing. To be directly involved, I was so many thousands miles away from Fiji.

Q2: Ko a bau rogoca na kena caka na vuaviril
A: O au na noqu appointment me'u lesu ga mai ena 30th June. Au gole mai au lai moce i neitou koro, the first thing on Saturday morning I went to camp and had a discussions with all the senior officers. Ena matakia lai lau au gole kina city, oti au sa qai taubele tu kina Palimedi. Ia ena yakavi ga au lesu tale mai tuba ka'u gole sara i noqu koro.

Q3: Ena nomuni a tiko ena loma ni Parliament complex, ko ni a bau vakaitavi ena operation room.
A: Au sega mada ga ni kilia se tiko e vei na operation room.

Q4: Au vinakata me vakamatatataki, na tabana cava ko ni a gole kina?
A: Au gole sara ga i veisiko. Au gole mada ga yani eratou kacivi au o iratou na wekaqu ni Burebasaga ka'u lako sara me'u laki debe vei iratou. Au rai sara vei iratou na tavalequ mai Dawasamu. Not to be involved in anything.

Q5: Ni talanoataka mada na nomuni involvement. If some information you are not willing to release, please just make it known?
A: Na involvement at this point in time, I do not really know what you are talking about.

Q6: Na ka kece e yaco ena loma ni complex?
Q7: Na ka keitou cakava tiko qoqo e independent.
A: I will probably tell you, I was there on Saturday 1st, on the 8th au laki donumaka sara niratou sa dabe tiko na veitalanoa o Jerry kei cei so tale ka ratou gunu yaqona tiko.

Na veitalanoa ni ka ni Accord ka kauti au na lorry nei Jerry me laki biuti au i noqu vale mai na koro. E tukuna o koya vei au meu gole tale ena mataka there will probably be the signing so I went back there on the 9th, it was a Sunday. Every night I went back home, I never spend a night there. Oti na signing o ya, au qai kerei koya me kauti au, sa tukuna o koya ni laki gunu yaqona vei Commander.

Au a vakatarausesa balavu mai neitou, au veisau meu vakaisulu vakataga kau mani gole sara. Tukuna o koya ni caka na gunu yaqona e vale vei Commander, au sa qai nanuma na noqu bag. I had to go back, au sa qai laki kere lori, sa qai dua tale na motoka me kauti au i neitou. That was Sunday and the next time I went there was the 12th, au kauti Adi Samanunu ki na Bose ni Turaga. Au gole tale i kea ena i ka 13th ni a caka na Bose Vakaturaga and Adi Samanunu was asked to lead a delegation to go and confirm the release. Keirau lesu tale i kea ena i ka 13 ni siga. Au lesu tale yani ki na keba and on those two incidents, I was not allowed to get into camp for whatever reason, I do not know. I will ask you that later on. You still have not explain to me the reason why I was not allowed in. Au gole tale e kea ena i ka 14 ni siga ena sogo ni bose. Then I saw the weapons there. All those times I was escorting Adi Samanunu. Those are the days that I went to Parliament not to be involved in whatever was happening there, anything else apart from that I do not know.

Q8: Sir, when you said you were escorting Adi Samanunu, am I correct in saying that there was no weapon with you?
A: I went to Nadi to pick her up from there after the approval by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for her to come to Fiji for her part me vakameyautaki na ka o ya. I do not need weapons anyway.

Q9: Where were you arrested?
A: I was arrested at Adi Samanunu's house on the 27th at about 10 minutes to 5.

Q10: Were reasons given for your arrest?
A: It is unknown to me and is still unknown to me.
Q11: E dua tale na ka o ni via vakaraitaka?
A: O koya beka ga o ya, me qai off-record ga meu tukuna vei iko.

Q12: Vinaka vakalevu. Na ka ena caka ena toso tiko na veivakaqaqai e na i kau na ni macawa. If you want to give more information, e rawa ni o ni qai lesu tale mai. Kevaka e dua na ka oni guilecava e rawa ni ko ni qai mai vakaraitaka tale. Ia, sa vinaka vakalevu.

[R. KOROVUSERE]
Lieutenant-Colonel

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBUR]
WO1
Member
Corporal Vasutoga, after having been sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Cpl Vasutoga, where do you work in the Engineers Unit?
A: Plant, Sir.

Q2: When did you go into Parliament?
A: On the 26th.

Q3: Who did you discuss about going into Parliament with?
A: I did not discuss anything with anyone about going into Parliament.

Q4: Were you part of the Plant Troop team that were seen on TV, led by Major Savua that actually marched in on the 26th?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q5: Prior to going in to the Parliament Complex, you had some casual discussions over tea, what were the casual discussions about, was it about going in to the Parliament Complex?
A: There were no discussions. When I came there, they were boarding the truck when I arrived at the Plant Section that day so I told them to wait and that I was coming also.

Q6: What did they say to you on where they were going?
A: No, they did not say anything about their destination.

Q7: Did you know where they were going?
A: No, Sir.

Q8: When you went and entered the Parliament, what did you do in Parliament?
A: I stayed there.

Q9: Doing what?
A: Sentry duties.

Q10: When did you leave the Parliament Complex; is it on the 12th of July?
A: Yes.

Q11: When did you come back to camp?
A: The very next day; on the 13th.
Q12: 13\textsuperscript{th} July you went back to QEB?
A: Yes, Sir, to the headquarters of the Engineers.

Q13: And you remained there ever since?
A: Then I was told to stay out again.

Q14: Stay out?
A: Yes.

Q15: When did you finally go back to the Camp?
A: Last Monday.

Q16: Last Monday was the 14\textsuperscript{th}, so on the 14\textsuperscript{th} of May you returned to the barracks?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q17: Whilst in the Complex, who was the head of security?
A: I do not know.

Q18: Did you or anyone to your knowledge participated in any of the activities outside the Parliament Complex
A: No, Sir.

Q19: Were you holding a weapon during security?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q20: What weapon?
A: Uzis.

Q21: Did you at any time fire that weapon?
A: No, Sir.

Q22: Did you at any time go into the Operation Room in the Complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q23: What was Major Savua's role in the Complex?
A: I do not now.

Q24: What was Mr Veisamasama's role in the Complex?
A: I do not know, Sir.

Q25: Lnc Cpl Vasutoga, when you were in the Complex, did you get to see newspapers?
A: Some times.
Q26: Did you get to watch TV?
A: No, Sir.

Q27: Did you hear of a directive or ultimatum put out by the Commander requesting all service persons in Parliament to return to camp?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q28: Why did you not return to camp?
A: I would rather not answer that question.

Q29: Ni o sa raica na ka e taba tu e na niusipepa me lesu tale i na keba na sotia, a cava o sega ni lesu tale kina?
A: E na gauna saka o ya sa caka tiko kina na veimoku, au sa rere sara ga na lako saka mai.

Q30: O ce: a veimoku tiko?
A: Na ovisa vata kei na mataivalu.

Q31: Was this discussed amongst the other soldiers about coming back in the fear of being hit?
A: Yes.

Q32: What was the reaction of the other soldiers?
A: I do not know, Sir.

Q33: You did not discuss it amongst yourselves?
A: We discussed it.

Q34: How did they feel - they must discuss their feelings?
A: I do not know.

Q35: Which part of the Complex were you doing your sentry duties?
A: On top.

Q36: Who were at the top, is that where the hostages were kept?
A: No.

Q37: Ther? When you say “on top” which place do you mean?
A: Battery Hill.

Q38: What was instructions whilst manning the gun at the Battery Hill?
A: We were there to see the perimeter.
Q39: What were you there to do?
A: We were there to see that no one enters through the perimeter.

Q40: Do you recall the day the police officer was shot?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q41: Where were you on that day?
A: I was on top of the hill.

Q42: Did you hear that shot?
A: No.

Q43: E na siga a caka kina na vanavana, lau kina e tolu na gasau e na rara mai Grammar, o iko a yadra tale tikoga mai na Battery Hill?
A: Sir.

Q44: O cei a vanataka na gasau o ya mai na Battery Hill?
A: E sega saka ni vanataki mai kea e dua na gasau.

Q45: Na vaigauna kece o lai yadra kina e na Battery Hill, sega ni o iko se dua i kea e vakayagataka na dakai?
A: E sega saka.

Q46: Cpl Vasutoga, o bau kila se o rogoca e dua na veitalanoa ni vuaviri o ya e veitokoni kina na Matavalu, na gauna o tiko kina e na loma ni Complex?

Q47: O bau veimaliwai vata kei ira na lewenivanua?
A: Sega.

Q48: Na kemu i sau a lako tikoga se a musu e na gauna o tiko kina i loma ya?
A: Neitou curu saka ga i loma sa musu me yacova saka tu mai qo.

Q49: Se bera ni o veisaumi vakadua?
A: Se bera saka.

Q50: E na gauna o lesu tale kina ki ni Engineer, a dua na veisorosorovi dou a vakaroti kina me vakayacori, me rawa ni dou qai lesu tale kina vei iratou na Engineer?
A: Sa caka oti saka beka.

Q51: O cei a nona i vakasala me caka na soqo o ya?
A: Au sega saka mada ni kila.
Q52: O a bau moku e na gauna o lesu tale mai kina ki na Mataivalu se dua na i vakarau kaukauwa a vakayacori vei iko?
A: Sir.

Q53: Sega?
A: Au moku saka.

Q54: Mai vei?
A: Mai Kalabu saka.

Q55: O iko a vesu mai Kalabu?
A: Io saka.

Q56: Na mavo a cav a yaco vei iko; iko a mavo a mai Kalabu?
A: Io saka.

Q57: Mavo a cav?
A: Na mataqu, saresarequ saka.

Q58: This ceremony you were talking about; where was it done - in Nabuni or at the headquarters?
A: Au Sega mada ni kila baleta niu a Sega ni yaco mai e na siga ni veisorosorovi, au sa rogoca ga ni ratou sa mai veisorosorovi baleta au a curu tu i valenibula.

Q59: Where did you hear it was done?
A: I do not know.

Q60: E na gauna o a curu yani kina i loma, a soli vei iko e dua na dakai - na Uzis?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q61: Na dakai o ya o tara tu ga me yacova sara na gauna dou vakasuka tale kina na dakai?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q62: Bau dua a vakavulica vei iko na kena vakayagataki na Uzis?
Q63: Nomu tukuna qori ni o dou lako i delana, dou Engineer kece?
A: Sir.

Q64: O cei soti dou a lai tiko i delana ya?
A: Keitcu vaka-mata yadra saka tiko. O keitou saka tiko ga vaka Engineer keitou yadrava saka tiko na delana o ya.

Q65: Dou lewe vica?
A: Keitcu lewe va saka tiko dua na mata yadra.

Q66: O cei soti o kemudou e na nomu mata yadra o iko?
A: O au saka ga, o kovula Tamani, o Taylor vata kei Vulaki.

Q67: Kena i balebale ni ka o tukuna tiko qori, o ira ga na yadra e na Battery Hill e ra Engineer ga, e sega ni yadra yani i kea na IMS mai na kena i tekivu?
A: Sir.

Q68: O kemudou na tiko i cake ya, e na Battery Hill, dou vaka support weapon?
A: Sir.

Q69: Dakai cava?
A: LMG.

Q70: LMG cava baleta e levu na LMG e tiko e na gauna qo?
A: Sega mada ni macala vei au.

Q71: E vakabeleti?
A: Sega, one-mag ga.

Q72: O iko kila na ulti-mex?
A: Sir.

Q73: Kó ya e vaka drum-magazine i ra. Ia na M16, MLG e drum talega ia e rua.
A: Io, e rua.

Q74: Ko ya na gauna e yaco kina na veivanavanai ko ya a mava kina e dua mai na IMS, dou a vanataka nomudou dakai?
A: Sega saka.

Q75: Cpl, you said that you were a member of a team that went up to Battery Hill; you, Vulaki, Taylor and Tamani. Who was the other team?
A: The others.
Q76: In your group, who was leading the team?
A: Myself.

Q77: And the other team?
A: One of them.

Q78: Who?
A: I do not know.

Q79: Who were in that team?
A: The rest of the team?

Q80: Yes, the other team you were talking about?
A: The other team comprise the other guys.

Q81: Katonivere?
A: No.

Q82: Degei?
A: Maybe.

Q83: Ratudradra?
A: Maybe.

Q84: Sovaki?
A: No.

Q85: E caka vakacava na veisau yadra i cake ya?
A: Ratou dau lako cake saka ga yani keitou lako sobu mai ra.

Q86: O ira taucoko na veisau yadra e ra lewe ni Plant Trōp?
A: So na gauna dau so tale e ra lako mai me ra lai yadra yani.

Q87: So na?
A: So na civilian me ra lako yani me ra lai yadra.

Q88: Na veiliutaki i cake o ya me must dua ga vei kemudou na Engineer?
A: E rairai saka.
Q89: E na gauna o guard commander kina o iko i cake, o cei na i liuliu ni mata yadra ko ya e lai veisomitaki; dua ga vei kemudou, sa dede na nomudou cakacakavata e na Plant Troop? O cei e lai sosomitaki iko me i liuliu ni mata yadra?
A: Cpl Sovaki saka.

Q90: A sega ni lewe ni nomu mata yadra?
A: Sega.

Q91: Nomu lewe ni matayadra o Tamani ga o Taylor vata kei cei?
A: Vulaki.

Q92: Dou e salavata i cake kei ira eso na i lala civilian?
A: Sir.

Q93: Dakai cava dou a kauta i cake ena nomudou a lai yadra tiko i cake?
A: Uzis saka.

Q94: Uzis vata kei na LMG. O ya dou vaka Uzis kece ya?
A: Sir.

Q95: O ratou o Taylor e dua tani nodratou i yaragi?
A: O keitou saka ga na sotia keitou vaka Uzis, sega o ira na civilian.

Q96: Sega au kaya mada na nomu mata yadra o iko?
A: Sir.

Q97: Nomudou issue kece na Uzis qai nomudou support weapon na LMG?
A: Sir.

Q98: Vakacava na mata yadra kadua, ko ya o ratou na lewe ni Plant Troop ko ya dou dau veiveisau yadra tiko, Uzis talega na nodratou i yaragi?
A: (Silence)

Q99: Bau so na gauna e ra vakayagataka na civilian?
A: Sega saka.
Q100: E ra dau tauri dakai e na gauna e ra laki yadra kina i cake?
A: Sega saka.

[R. VASUTOGA]
Lance Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
FIFTY SIXTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 24072 STAFF SGT. USAIA RADROKAI

SSgt. Radrokai, after having been duly sworn on Bible, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Staff Radrokai, you are brought before this Board to give evidence on the events linked to the Parliament activities from the 19th of May this year.

A: Sir, it was on Saturday after the coup, I went up to headquarters, LSU. On my way up to headquarters, LSU, I met Lt. Col. Saubulinayau and Mr. Dakai who were standing at the porch. They were looking down towards the CRW building. When I went up to headquarters, LSU, I saw some of the LSU guys looking towards the CRW building.

From there, I saw them looking at some of the CRW boys loading weapons to the CRW Renault truck. I spoke with WOII Leweni and asked him what was going on. He told me that the CRW boys were taking the weapons. That's about all, Sir.

Q2: Staff Radrokai, where was the truck located?

A: Down at the CRW building.

Q3: Was the truck located at the CRW building or the back road?

A: Sukanaivalu Road, Sir.

Q4: Were they loading from the track leading from the IMS complex to the Sukanaivalu Road?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q5: Those personnel that you saw at LSU, one was WOII Leweni, was there anyone else you saw there?

A: I saw, CO, LSU.

Q6: Can you remember anyone else you saw there?

A: A lot of them, Sir.

Q7: When you went up to LSU, did you manage to look down and see the truck?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q8: Did you see the colour of the truck?

A: It was green, Sir.

Q9: It was the green military truck?

A: Yes, Sir.
Q10: Did you recognise anyone loading the truck?
A: No, Sir, they were all new boys.

Q11: You said Lt. Col. Saubulinayau and Lt. Dakai were looking down towards the 1MS building from the operation building?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q12: What time was this?
A: Around midday, Sir.

Q13: Staff Radroka, these weapons that were taken from the 1MS location to the truck at Sukanaivalu Road, were the weapons carried loosely or were they packed in bags?
A: They were packed, Sir.

Q14: What made you believe that they were weapons?
A: Because they were being brought up from the armoury.

Q15: You could see them taking the weapons from the armoury? What were they taking it in?
A: They were like duffle bags.

Q16: Do you have an indication of the colour?
A: Black.

Q17: Black duffel bags?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q18: Approximately how many people were involved in the carrying of these bags?
A: Approximately 10.

Q19: Did you recognise the driver of the vehicle?
A: No, Sir.

Q20: Since that day until todate, there are some 1MS attached to 3FIR, have you subsequently seen any of them in your unit?
A: No, Sir.

Q21: Staff Sgt. Radroka, on your way from 3FIR headquarters to LSU, did you meet someone on the road?
A: I met OC, Mr. Baleinamau.

Q22: How was Mr. Baleinamau dressed?
A: He was in civilian.
Q23: Did you see him carrying anything else?
A: He was carrying a mobile phone.

Q24: In which direction was he heading to?
A: He was heading towards the 3FIR complex.

Q25: Did you speak to him when you walk passed him?
A: I just said "hellow" to him, Sir.

Q26: That was it, nothing else was said between you two?
A: No, Sir.

Q27: Where did you meet him?
A: Just beside the mango tree.

Q28: Staff Sgt. Radroka, can I just add on to the question, when you met him, was he coming out of the CRW unit complex or was he coming from headquarters, RFMF?
A: CRW complex.

Q29: Staff Sgt. Radroka, before we stand you down, do you have anything else to say?
A: I spoke with Sgt. Tagicakibau on that day. He was sent by the operation officer to go and cut off the group and he told me that they went there, the Renault was gone and after they have gone back, Major Kafoa told them that he was not with them when they went to cut off the group. He was angry with them.

Q30: Maybe, just summarise that. Who sent Sgt. Tagicakibau?
A: The Operation officer?

Q31: Who was the Operation officer?
A: Captain Bogidrau.

Q32: Are you aware of the route that was taken? Was it through the main gate or the back gate?
A: Through the back gate, down Rewa Dairy and up Sukanaivalu Road, Sir.

Q33: What transpired after that when the cut off team went?
A: When they went there the Renault had gone, the army truck so they came back. After they got back, they met Major Kafoa. He was angry with them.

Q34: Were you aware of the reason?
A: No, Sir.
Q35: Staff Sgt. Radrokai, can you just clarify a point here. He was angry with Sgt. Tagicakibau's group because they were late or was he angry with them because they actually went out there to try to cut off the weapons that were loaded from the CRW complex?

A: I am not sure, Sir, that was what Sgt. Tagicakibau told me. He said that when they got back, Major Kafoa was angry with them. He did not know why he was angry.

Q36: Thank you. Staff Sgt. Radrokai, do you wish to say anything further?

A: No, Sir.

[ U. RADROKAI]
Sergeant

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
WO1
Member
FIFTY-SEVENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 25353 WOII A.G. LEWENI

WOII Leweni, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Mr. Leweni, the Board understands that you witnessed some of the events that took place after the 19th of May in relation to the activities in the Parliament Complex, can you relate to the Board what you saw?
A: On that day, I was standing at the corridor of our Orderly Room, I saw new faces from the CRW Unit carrying boxes towards the truck.

Q2: That day, what day do you refer to? The coup happened on the 19th, are you referring to Saturday, 20th?
A: Sir.

Q3: Were you aware of the time?
A: It was about 1200 to 1300 hrs.

Q4: You said you saw them carrying boxes, can you confirm that?
A: A few of the boxes were painted camouflage and a few were wooden boxes and tin boxes.

Q5: You said new faces, are these the new entry into the 1MS?
A: Sir.

Q6: The vehicles that you saw, where was the loading done? Was the loading done at Sukanaivalu, the track that leads from the Unit to Sukanaivalu Rd?
A: Sir.

Q7: The truck was parked there?
A: Sir.

Q8: Those personnel loading the weapons, how can you be certain that weapons were being loaded?
A: The size of the boxes, I could identify that the weapons were inside.

Q9: From what building inside the 1MS Unit were these boxes being taken from?
A: From the container.

Q10: What is contained in that container?
A: I think the container was their armoury.
Q11: You know being a storeman, you know where is their armoury within that Unit, where they kept their weapons, so the boxes were taken out from their armoury?
A: Sir.

Q12: Sergeant-Major Leweni did you subsequently inquire what was happening or what was being taken out? Did you ask someone? Who was with you when you witnessed all these events?
A: A few of the guys I was standing with on that day, but I remember I was standing with our CO.

Q13: Who is your CO?

Q14: Was there any duffel bags taken to the trucks?
A: No.

Q15: How long did this loading take, from start to finish, were you aware of the time?
A: About half an hour.

Q16: So the whole duration of that loading, from start to finish, you watched?
A: I cannot remember.

Q17: During this taking of boxes from the CRW complex to the truck, did you see any CRW officers present?
A: No.

Q18: You know Lt. Baleinamau?
A: Yes.

Q19: Did you see him anywhere near the area?
A: No.

Q20: Before the Board stand you down, do you wish to say anything further?
A: No.

Q21: Can you identify the boxes if you see them again?
A: Sir.
Q22: The type of boxes?
A: Sir.

[A.G. LEWEN]
Warrant Officer Class Two

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
CONFIDENTIAL
629

FIFTY-EIGHTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 24102 CORPORAL LAGILAGI VOSABECI

Corporal Vosbeci, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Corporal Vosbeci, you understand why the Board is conducting this inquiry, what we need you to do now is relate to the Board your involvement in the activities leading to the takeover of Parliament. Prior to the 19th, on the 19th until such a time as you sit here, addressing the Board. We need you to give your involvement, you can go ahead.

A: Na noqu vakaitavi ena noqu beitaki tiko me baleta ena ka enai ka 19 ni Me, au a cekekece tiko vaka Int Operative ni sebera nai 19 ni Me, ea tauri e dua nai tukutuku me baleti na march ena 28, ni sa na taura kina na mataivalu na matanitu. E tukuni kina na yacadrau e rua na turaga ni valu.

Q2: Qo ena i ka 28 ni siga ni vula o cei?
A: Epereli.

Q3: E kau mai vei nai tukutuku qo, e dua na nomouad source?
A: Io, s tukuni kina ni rau sa na taura na matanitu o Lt. Col. J. Baledrokadroka koi Lt. Col. Tarakinikini. E rau a mani vakasuka ena mataka ni siga Vakarabuka, na siga me caka kina na march. Esa vakau nai tukutuku vei neitou Commanding Officer ni nanumi tiko ni so na turaga ni valu era sa nanuma tiko mera vakayacora na kena tauri na matanitu. Ena mataka lai?ai ni ka 19 ni siga, au a taura tale kina e dua nai tukutuku ena 10 na kaloko ena mataka lai?ai ni siga oyu, esa na dua na Prime Minister vou. Au qai vakatautavatatake de na vaka ga na nai tukutuku ko a se tauri ena march yani eliu. Au mani kacivi iratou na vo ni operatives au tukuna ga vei iratou ni sa tukuni vei au ni mataka ni siga oyu ena 10 na kaloko, esa na dua na Prime Minister vou. Keitou lako mai, keitou sota, keitou sa vakamuria na march, me yacova na gauna me keitou lai yaco ena Palimedi, keitou sa raica ni sa tauri tu na Palimedi. Ena 12 na kaloko esa curu mai tuba na source, kacivi keitou sara i loma. Ena neitou vinakata tikoga me keitou kila se o cei kece era vakaitavi ena ka qo, ko vakavuna na neitou lai tiko i loma. Keitou lako i loma, esa lai dua sara tu na neitou vale ni volavola, ia e lako tu ga na neitou vatato, e keitou vinakata tiko me keitou kila se ocei sara mada eratou vakaitavi ena ka qo. Nai tukutuku e tukuna vei au okoya na source ena gauna keitou sa curu yani i loma, oti na 12, e tukuna okoya ni so na senior staff officers era sa taura tiko qo na matanitu. Keitou lai tiko i loma ena vale ni volavola e keitou lai tiko kina, e levu ga na gauna keitou vakacereka tu na files, keitou vakaraica na computer, ena vuku ni so nai tukutuku, keitou kila ni sa yaga lua na mataivalu. Ena matai ni tolu ni macawa, keitou se rawa ni biuta tiko mai tuba nai tukutuku, nai ka va ni macawa, esa via dre dre vakalailai ka a sa nanuma me rau sa lako mai tuba orau na rua, keirau sa tiko ga e loma na rua me yacova sara ni oti na ka e vakayacori tiko me keirau na qai kauta mai na vo ni tukutuku keirau sa raica mai kea. Okoya saka ga ya na levu ni ka au rawa ni tukuna me baleta na noqu vakaitavi ena ka me baleta nai 19 ni Me.
Q4: Ni bera nai ka 19 ni siga o kila na kena plan taki na ka ena yaco, na takeover, o bau kila e dua na ka?
A: Sega.

Q5: O cei a lesi iko mo lai curu mo lewena na operation ena loma ni complex?
A: E sega ni dua e lesi au, ena gauna ga keitou sa lako yani kina, au sa tukuna vei iratou na kena vo keitou lako vata yani, as professional operatives, keitou sa rawa ni kila saraga na vanua me keitou fit yani kina i loma.

Q6: Ena gauna oa curu kina i loma ni complex, o gole tiko vata kei cei?
A: O au vata kei Gaunaveivuda.

Q7: Mo drau nai cakacaka ruarua ena loma ni operation room?
A: Sir.

Q8: O iko vakamacalataka oiko ni rua e tiko i loma, e tolou e curu tale i tuba?
A: Sir.

Q9: O iko se qai cavuyaca ga e rua ga na yaca o solia, oiko ga kei Gaunaveivuda. Kevaka o dou lewe lima, enai katolu ni macawa, e rua e tiko i loma, e tolou i tuba, ocei na tolou qo?
A: Oratou na vo ni operatives.

Q10: Ocei o iratou na i lawalawa qo?
A: Mateboto, Laverua kei Veilawa.

Q11: Lewe ni katolu ni mataivalu?
A: Sir.

Q12: Nmu vakau tukutuku tiko mai na loma ni complex, o vakau tukutuku ivei?
A: Nai katolu ni mataivalu.

Q13: Nmu cakacaka ena loma ni katolu ni mataivalu, na cakacaka cava o cakava ena loma ni katolu ni mataivalu nio bera ni curu ena loma ni mataivalu?
A: Int Operative.

Q14: Eso na yaca o cavuta, na senior military officers era vakaitavi ena ka qo, na yaca cava o vakamacalataka tiko oiko?
A: Na matai ga ni yaca e tukuni vei au na yacai Lt. Col. Tarakinikini.

Q15: O cei e tukuna vei iko nai tukutuku qo?
A: Okoya na source.

Q16: Na source qo e civilian se mataivalu?
A: Civilian.

Q17: O cei tale na senior officers, esa dua na yaca qo o Lt. Col. Tarakinikini?

Q18: Ena: kavica ni siga qo?
A: Au sa guilecava saka na tiki ni siga.

Q19: Corporal Vosabec, can you explain to us the structure of the Int and the Ops cell in Parliament? How was it functioning?
A: E sega ni operate vaka e dua na ops, keitou mada na 3 i loma ya, ena veisiga kecega keitou ciqoma ga na telephone vata kei na neitou saga me keitou collect taka mai eso na ka e keitou vakabauta ni na yaga ena mataivalu.

Q20: Oiko a tiko ena Int se na Operation ena loma ni cell oya?
A: Int.

Q21: Ocei na liuliu ni Int i loma ya?
A: E sega ni dua tu e neitou liuliu.

Q22: O cei nai liuliu ni operation?
A: E sega talega ni dua e tu ikca e lewa na operation, o Major Ligairi ga okoya e ka taka tu na veitalanoa kei ira na turaga ni valu lelevu ko ra dau qiri yani.

Q23: What was Lt. Dakai's role in there?
A: O Dakai ena gauna e se qai vica ga na siga ikca esa de-commission, okoya e keitou tautauvata kece tu ga kina na neitou cakacaka i loma, keitou vaqara files tu ga, e tiko eso e dau qiritaka mai okoya vei iratou na Int i cake, vata kei keitou okoya e qiritaki mai na 3.

Q24: In the Parliament Complex, were you receiving information from the camp, QEB other than your 3FIR?

Q25: O vakamaclalatake tiko ni dou dau veitaratake kei iratou na 3FIR kei ira talega na Int mai cake, dou dau soli tukutuku, dou tauri tukutuku talega mai vei iratou na 3 kei na Int.
A: E soli ga vei iratou nai tukutuku.

Q26: Eso tale nai tukutuku mai cake o dau soli vei kemudou?
A: E sega.
Q27: O dou dau veitaratara kei cei mai na Int i cake?
A: Na Int i cake, o Dakai ga e dau veitaratara tiko kei iratou.

Q28: Vata kei cei i cake ina Int cell?
A: Ena gauna ya ese tiko kina o ....

Q29: O Lt. Narawa?
A: Io.

Q30: Mai na 3FIR?
A: Ena 3FIR e dau relay tikoga nai tukutuku vei iratou na operatives, eratou sa qai dau lai submit taka na report.

Q31: In the beginning of your statement, you said that by the 19th of May, there will be a new Prime Minister. You brief the operatives, who are these?
A: I have already said their names. The two of us and the other three.

Q32: Ena gauna cava oa rogoca kina ni cavuti kina na yacai Lt. Col. Jone Baledrokadroka ni okoya talega e nanumi tiko ni dua e vuaviri taka na matanitu?
A: Au a tiko ena dua na bose ena siga Vukelulu, me Vakaraubuka me caka kina nai matai ni march, ea tukuni kina na yacadrau na rua au tukuna tiko.

Q33: Qori ena vula o?
A: Epereli.

Q34: Ena gauna sa dredre kina na nomudrau soli tukutuku mai enai katolou ni mataivalu, me vaka o vakaraitaka tiko, ni oti ga e tolu na macawa esa dredre na nomudrau soli tukutuku mai, a cava drau sa qai vakayacora tiko ena loma ni Parliament Complex kei Gauaaveivuda?
A: Na heira cakacaka saraga na vakawilika na files kecega e tu ike kei na saumi telephone ena office keitou vakayagataka tiko.

Q35: Ea bau dua na gauna ea tarogi sobu yani kina vei kemudrau de drau sa tiko ivei na nomudrau tu se cava na nomudrau rai me baleta na veika e vakayacori tiko ena Palimedi?
A: Sega.

Q36: Ea bau dua na gauna eratou vakaraitaka vei kemudou oratou na 3FIR ni drau sa sega ni lewe ni nodratou Unit?
A: Sega.

Q37: O a bau curu mai tuba ena gauna oa tiko kina ena loma ni Parliament Complex?
A: Sega.

Q38: Oa tiko ena veibulu vei Tabua ko bulu tiko qori ena Parliament Complex?
A: Sega.
Q39: O kila ni a tiko kina o Gaunavoivuda?
A: Sega talega.

Q40: O sega ni kila nia tiko kina?
A: Keirau ena mataka ni 14 keirau sa biubiu mai na Palmedi.

Q41: Enai 14 ni vula o Me, oya sa suka oti na yaragi?
A: Ena vula o July.

Q42: O sega tale ni kila ni lako tale o Gaunavoivuda enai tiko ena veibulu?
A: Au sega ni taura rawa, ea lako tale se sega.

Q43: Ena gauna o a tiko kina ena Parliament Complex ya, e dua na gauna ea musu na kemui sau?
A: Io.

Q44: Ena gauna cava?
A: Ena matai ni veisaumi ena vula o July esa musu kina na kequi sau me yacova tiko mai qo.

Q45: E musu oya, o sega sara tu ga ni veisaumi se cava?
A: Sega saraga ni veisaumi.

Q46: Ea tukuni vei iko na vuna?
A: Sega.

Q47: Nomu lesu mai Palmedi, ena gauna cava o march tale kina ena 3FIR?
A: Eratou a qai lai kauti au mai vale ena mataka ni Sigatabu, au sa guilecava na tikini siga. Ni sa oti na raid mai Kalabu ena Lotulevu, na kena Sigatabu eratou qai lai vesuki au mai vale.

Q48: Kenai balebale oiko ga vakataki iko o sega ni kauti iko i na Keba, osa vesu ga qai lako mai na Keba?
A: Sir.

Q49: Ena gauna o a tiko kina ena Parliament Complex, o bau sign taka talega e dua na leave letter?
A: Sega.

Q50: Ena gauna osa vesu kina, e cava e tukuni vei iko na nomu vuni vesu?
A: E sega ni tukuni vei au na vuni noqu vesu.

Q51: O vesu mai o kau ivei?
A: Na cell i na Keba.

Q52: O coi dru vaitalanoa ena gauma osa vesu kina ena cell?

Q53: Ea bau dua e interview taki iko ena cell ena gauna o a tiko kina ena cell?
A: Sega.

Q54: Ena gauna cava o qai sere tale kina?
A: Ûti e rua na macawa, ena gauna ya au sa tokitaki kina ena Police Station i Nabua.

Q55: Kenai balebale ya nomu rua na macawa tu na nomu vesu, e sega tale ni bau dua tale e interview taki iko se tarogi iko?
A: Eratou sa qai lako yani na legal ena otioti ni macawa, e lako yani o Mrs. Rokomokoti, esa qai tukena vei au na noqu dodonu, ia na vu ni noqu vesu ga e sega ni vakamacalataka vei au.

Q56: Ena gauna cava o qai sere kina?
A: Au sa guilecava na tiki ni siga, oya na matak a ni Sigatabu, oti e rua na macawa mai na gauna au ....

Q57: Ocei e sereki iko?
A: E lako yani o Major Tamata. Keitou sa sere kece mai kina o keitou na tiko mai Nabua vata kei iratou na vesu tiko mai na Keba.

Q58: Ena gauna osa sere kina, na cava ea tukeni vei iko?
A: Au a sign taka ga e dua ni vola, e tukeni vei au me matak a ni Moniti meu sa march in mai na Keba.

Q59: Nomu march in ena 3FIR ena matak a ni Moniti ya, ocei drau a veitalanoa se ocei a interview taki iko?
A: E sega ni dua ea interview taki au ena matak a ni Moniti, esa lai siga Lotulevu ga, au sa qai kerea kina me dua na noqu appointment kei CO, keirau lai vakaranitaka vua na vuni neirau a tiko mai na Palimedi kei na ka keirau kauta mai na Palimedi ko se tiko vei keirau.

Q60: Nio tukena tiko o 'keirau', o vakaibalebaletaki Gaunavoivuda tiko?
A: Sir.

Q61: Na cava esa qai tukena na nomudou CO?
A: Na ka ga e tukena vei keirau me baleta na keirau i sau, ni sa na qai tukena vei adjutant me sa na qai cakaca katala tale vata na vo ni tukeniku ko kau mai Palimedi me qai submit taki yani vua e dua na report.

Q62: Ea sega ni tukena okoya na gauna cava me qai submit taki yani kina?
A: Sega.

Q63: Kenai balebale ena gauna oqo, nai tukeniku ya e se tiko ga vei kemudrau?
A: Au se qai cakava tiko e dua na report, esa veleva sara tiko ni oti, au vakabauta ni macawa beka mai qo, au sa na qai solia vei koya.

Q64: Ena yakavi nai 18 ni siga, oa tiko ievi ena vula o Me?
A: Au a tiko mai vale.
Q65: Tukuna mada vei keitou, e dua a lai sikovi iko yani ena yakavi ya?
A: Ena yakavi ni 18, keitou a sota kece na operatives ena dua na safe house, keitou lai veitalanoataka ga kina na neitou na muria na march ena 19 ni siga, ena dui vanua keitou na tu kina.

Q66: O kemudou ga na operatives dou a veitalanoa kina?
A: Sir.

Q67: E sega ni dua tale?
A: Seg'a.

Q68: O a vakamacalataka o iko nio a tiko ena dua na bose ka cavuti kina na yacai Lt. Col. Baledrokadroka kei Lt. Col. Tarakinikini, na bose ya, ea vakayacori i'vei?
A: Na bose ya ea vakayacori ena nodratou vale ni volavola na nationalists.

Q69: Ocei a lutaka na bose oya?
A: E lewe levu era a tiko ena bose oya, e wili kina o Apisai Tora, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola kei ira na so tale au sa sega ni vakasamataka ia ea oso drigi na bose ena siga oya.

Q70: Na bose qo ea vakayacori mai vei?
A: I Laucala Beach.

Q71: I'vei i Laucala Beach?
A: Au sega ni taura vinaka tiko na gaunisala qo, e voleka ga vei Shah, ko vakadodonu me lako sara i MHs, e tiko ike a dua na vale.

Q72: Na vale nei cei?
A: Na vale nei koya na vunivola ni Nationalist.

Q73: O Feceli Vuniwa?
A: Seg'a.

Q73: Ocei na vunivola?
A: O Joe Waqabac.

Q74: Oiko tukuna oiko ni katolu ni macawa, e dredre na soli tukutuku i cake, baleta na cava?
A: Ena gauna ya esa via kasamitaki kina ni so e solia tiko i tuba nai tukutuku, ko saki e vakavuna na kena sega ni qai soli tale nai tukutuku.

Q75: O tukuna oiko enai ka 14 ni July na biuta na complex?
A: Sir.

Q76: Baleta na cava?
A: Au vakasamataka tiko ni yacova na 13 ni siga, esa dodonu me keimami vagalala mai kina okoya e cover taki tiko ena Immunity Decree, e mani sega
ni rawa, ena yakavi ni siga, esa qai vakavuna na neirau qai lako mai ena mataka ni 14 vata kei na ka keirau kauta mai kina.

Q77: Nai tukutuku cava tale e tiko vei iko ko sebera nio biuta mai? Qo baleta okoya e vakaitave taucoko i loma kei na ka kece, e dua na report o tukuna tiko uiko nio vola tiko.
A: Na report qo e levu ga na ka e lai kau mai na Palimedi e tiki ni report tiko qo.

Q78: E levu na ka, o rawa ni vakamacalataka mada?
A: E wili tiko kina na nodratou contacts kece na Labour ena veiyasai vuravura, rai lavo ko soli mai vei iratou mai na Labour Party mai England, e lai yacova sara e dua nai vola ko a kune e tiko kina na nodra assassinate taki na Ministers kevaka e sega ni rawa na i naki ni ALTA.

Q79: E vinakata na Board qo mo present taka na information ko tiko qori vei iko, ena dua tale na siga ona kacivi tale mai, mo vakarautaka. Ena gauna cava ena oti kina nomu vola na nomu report qori?
A: Ena macawa saka mai qo.

Q80: Ena qai kacivi iko tale na Board, e dua tale na ka o via vakamacalataka?
A: Sega saka.

Q81: Corporal Vosabeci, these two incidents that happened whilst you were in Parliament, just give us an indication whether you got information about that? Firstly, remember the riot, mob that went down to the TV station, there were allegations that the mob was led by some members of the IMS, are you aware of this?
A: No, Sir.

Q82: Whilst in Parliament, were you issued a weapon?
A: I was not issued one but there used to be a weapon in the cell.

Q83: What weapon was that?
A: It was an uzi.

Q84: What was Lt. Col. Mua's responsibility in the cell?
A: Okoya e sega ni dau tiko ena cell.

Q85: Did he visit you?
A: E dua ga na gauna e lako yani ike, erau curu vata yani kei Director Special Branch, okoya ga ya na gauna au raica kina ni curu yani ena cell au tiko mai kina.

Q86: Who is the Diretor Special Branch whom you are referring to?
A: Mr. Beranado.

Q87: O Beranado Laveti?
A: Au sega saka ni taura rawa tiko na karua ni yacana.
Q88: Were you aware of any threatening faxes that were sent out from your cell to QEB?
A: No.

Q89: O kilo se rogoca eso nai talanoa me baleta nai yaragi na kena kau mai yassayasa vaka Ra ka soli vei iratou i Palimedi, na vuni kena veitokonitaki tikoga na i le era vakayacora enai ka 19 ni siga?
A: E sega.

Q90: Na yaragi qo e nanumi tiko ni volia mai e dua e dau caka bisinisi rogo levu i Viti, a tukuni tiko me kauta mai eso na yaragi ka soli vei iratou na tiko i Palimedi me vakaraitaka tikoga na nona veitokoni ni ka e vakayacori tiko i Palimedi?
A: E sega.

Q91: O bau raica se kil na kena vakayacori tiko na vuli vakaivalu e loma ni Parliament Complex vei ira na civilians?
A: Martial arts ga.

Q92: O bau raica na drill se weapon training?
A: Vata kei na drill.

Q93: O rawa ni talanoataka mada na kenai tuvatuva e veimataka, na cava e dau yaco ni sebera ni tekivu na vuli vakaivalu?
A: E sega sara tu ga ni dua na programme e tu.

Q94: O sega ni bau rogoca ni dua na gauna ea tau tiko kina eso na vosa ni veivakaungeti vei ira mera dau beca na lewa?
A: E sega.

Q95: Na ka au via tukuna tiko o au, e sega ni so na gauna o rogoca ni instill taki vei ira na tiko i loma ni Palimedi eso na revolutionary ideas, vakasama ni revolution, ena gauna era biubiu mai kina mera laili tomanu na veika esa yaco tu i Palimedi?
A: E sega saka.

Q96: O bau kilo e dua na kena navuci mea vesu o Commander ni mataivalu ni Viti ena gauna ea kele mai kina i Nadi?
A: Segi.

Q97: Oa vakaramacalataka enai ka 19 ni siga, ni ko a rogoca ni dua na PM vou ena kacvaki ena 10 na kaloko, enai ka 19 ni siga, oa rogoca mai vei nai tukutuku qo?
A: Na source esa tukuna vei au.

Q98: O rogoca ga enai ka 19 ni siga, se na siga cava o rogoca kina?
A: Ena mataka laialai ni 19 ni siga.

Q99: Ena Operation Room, oa vakau tukutuku tiko ena Keba?
A: Au a tiko ena intelligence. Eso nai tututuku au sa tukuna oti, esa vakau tiko ena Keba.

Q100: Na fax?
A: Na fax, e sega.

Q101: Ena loma ni complex, e dua na ka na levu ni tututuku e vakau tiko i cake; tututuku ni veivakarerei, na kena number ni fax e lako sara mai ena nomudou Operations Room, o vakaitai ena kena volai na threat oya?
A: E sega.

Q102: Na Operations Room e ka lailai, e tiko kina na Int kei na Operations, o cei e nonai tavi me vakauta tiko nai tututuku qo? Ocei e cakava tiko mai na loma ni Operations Room?
A: Nai tututuku cava saka.

Q103: Okoy na threats kei na so na ka me biuta sobu ena mataivalu.
A: Au sega mada ni bau raica e dua nai tututuku ni threat me vakau mai na ....

Q104: Corporal Vosabeci, enai 18 ni siga dou a veitalanoa ena nomu vale vata kei iratou nomu operatives, eratou sa kila tiko kina ni na dua na ka ena yaco ena siga Vakaraubuka, mai na nomu assessment madaga oiko mai na bose osa lako kina, na yaca ko sa rogo mai qo, e tutuni me sa na mai Commander.
A: Keitou a sa vakadeitaka tiko ni na rawa ni dua na ka ena yaco. Neitou rai kece vaka intelligence operatives, keitou sa namaka tiko ni na dua na ka ena yaco ena siga e tarava. Okoy ni oya e keitou a veivosaki kina, me keitou dui tutu ena vanua keitou dui tu kina balena na conclusion kece ni neitou assessment keitou sa kila tiko ni na dua na ka ena yaco.

Q105: Oiko na ka taucoko qo oso brief taki nomu CO tiko kina?
A: Au a brief taki koya ga ko a yaco e liu, ka sa kila tiko okoya na yacandrau ko sa tutuni oti, ni sa tiko ena loma ni mataivalu eso beka era sa saga tiko, e qai lako tiko na veitalanoa, era lai talanoa tale mai eso i tupa me balena na ka e yaco tiko i loma ni mataivalu, e lai basika tiko mai kina na posting e caka vei Commander Teleni, esa ra vaka era beci tiko kina eso era tiko i na Keba. Nai tututuku ya e sega ni lako mai i loma ni mataivalu, nai tututuku ya e lai lako tale mai tupa, okoya era solia mai vei keitou nai tututuku.

Q106: Oiko tutuna oiko ni matakai lailai ni 19 ni siga, erau qai back down kina o Lt. Col. Balekadoroko kei Lt. Col. Tarakinikini?
A: E sega ni matakai ni ka 19 ni siga, e matakai ni Vakaraubuka ena ka 28 ni siga, ena vula o Epeleri, na march i liu. E qiritaka yani vei au okoya ea kauti au ena bose ni 4 na kaloko ena matakai lailai ni siga Vakaraubuka erau sa vakasuka kina orau na lewe rua.
Q107: O cai e qiritaka vei iko, qo na bose ga ni Nationalist Party qo?
A. Sir.

Q108: Na bose ni Nationalist Party, erau sa vakasuka orau qo?
A. Na kena mataka ni siga me caka kina na march, ko sega ni dodonu me yaco kina na ....

Q109: E bau dua tale na yaca o rogoca e vakaitavi ena dua na vuaviri se okoya ga na yaca ko tukuna mai, e dua tale na turaga ni valu e senior ena loma ni mataivalu?
A: E sega.

Recalled On 13/09/00:

Cpl. L. Vosabeci, after having been duly reminded of oath earlier taken, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q110: Cpl. Vosabeci, you are required to come back today to present the report which you have indicated. Do you have the report with you now?
A: Yes, Sir.

Documents tendered as Exhibit "F".

Q111: You have various documents here attached to your report. Where were these information collected from?
A: From the Labour files and computers.

Q112: The files you are talking about is the Fiji Labour party files and the computers in the Government office?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q113: We need to have time to review this report and should the need arise, we will call you up again. I understand just by scheming through the report that the report is quite straightforward and we may not be required to call you. You have put your assessment. From all the information here, this report is specifically done by you and your assessment on the whole matter?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q114: We will look at that in that context. Your assessment of that and also the information that has been provided for in folios A to H. We will look through it and should the need arise, we will call you. I doubt that should be necessary.

Do you wish to add anything else?
A: No, Sir.

[L. VOSABECI]
Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
WO1
Member
FIfty-NINTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 23956 STAFF SGT JOSEPH MORRIS

Staff Sgt Morris, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Staff Sgt. Morris, you understand the reason for the Board of Inquiry. What we need to do now is to have you present those documents.

(Documents tendered and marked as Exhibit "A").

EXHIBIT "A": LIST OF RETURNED WEAPONS FROM THE PARLIAMENT COMPLEX

Can you go ahead with the presentation of those?

A: Sir, the documents I have just handed over to you includes the summary of receipt of 1MS weapons that we received from the period 19th May until todate, 5th September. The first page is the summary of all weapons that we received. The total weapons received and we managed to produce a list of the missing weapons which we assumed are missing at this moment, Sir. It also includes the summary of receipt of weapons accessory and the ammunition which we received from the period 19th May to the 5th of September. The last is the list of weapons yet to be returned from 1MS or we assumed missing as of todate, Sir. Also attached is all the packing lists and the returns that I submitted to my commanding officer which they requested.

Q2: Staff Sgt. Morris, you have an indication of the weapons that were surrendered, a total of 76, look at page 2, a total of 76 weapons surrendered from the Parliament complex?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q3: Is there any record to confirm the amount that was taken by the rebels and what was taken by Stevens. Do you have a master copy of all the weapon holdings of the 1MS unit. Do you have any list of the direct split of the weapons that were taken into the complex and what was taken by Stevens?

A: I do not have any record of it, Sir.

Q4: Do you have a record of the ammunition that was surrendered from the Parliament complex? Do you have any master copy of all the rounds that were issued by the RFMF to the 1MS?

A: I do not have it, Sir. We are only involved with the weapons, Sir. The ATO will probably answer your question, it is the Ammo wing. They are in charge of all the ammunitions that are issued. They may probably have the records of the ammunitions issued to all the units, Sir. The 2IC Ammo Wing is Sgt. Ramatau, Sir.

Q5: Who is the head of the Ammo Wing?

A: It is the OC, Sir.
Q6: Who is the OC?
A: Major Tuiwainunu, Sir.

Q7: Major Tuiwainunu is the OC and Sgt. Ramatau is the 2IC?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q8: Noting from the summary you have given, on the 7th of August, you stated that a pistol was returned by Private Soko. Who personally gave the weapons into the armoury?
A: I do not know who received it but the weapon is physically with us.

Q9: It was not given in person by Soko to the armoury? It was by a third person?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q10: On page 2, you have a total of 25 weapons still missing?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q11: Where is the master record of all weapons? Where is it kept?
A: We got it in our armoury, Sir.

Q12: Is there any master copy in the logistics up at headquarters?
A: No, Sir.

Q13: The indication is that there are 25 weapons still missing from the unit and the breakdowns are given there?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q14: Staff Sgt. Morris, look at your summary that you have given us, there were some ammunitions returned. If you look at your instruction on 15th July, where are the ammunitions kept? Where are they at the moment?
A: At the moment it is in our armoury, Sir. We have a special room in which we stored all those weapons and ammunitions that are turned into Parliament and from a separate list, Sir.

Q15: On the next two pages you have the returned of weapons, you have two signatures, the packer and there is another signature, Can you identify those two signatures? Look at form 766, you have two signatures, you have the authority number and just below that there are two signatures.
A: Do you mean the demand form, Sir?

Q16: It is a packing list from stores from 1MS.
A: It is dated 9th July.

Q17: Yes. These lots of weapons that were brought from the Parliament, can you just identify those two signatures? Have a look at this to make it easier.
A: One is mine which I signed it wrongly and the other is Stevens, Sir.
Q18: That signature, what is it acknowledging?
A: That form, Sir, it is a packing list, one of our forms used by the logistic stores for receiving weapons or issuing. That signature certifies that he was the one that turned in the weapons to us. That is what it means by that, the packer, Sir.

Q19: Staff Sgt. Morris, before we let you go, do you have anything further to add in relation to your field of work and also to this Board of Inquiry?
A: Sir, in relation to this list which I compiled, I would like to explain a little bit about how I come out with these missing weapons which we assumed missing. Firstly, as you know, Sir, 1MS is a self accounting unit, we as the force armoury logistics, we do not have any access to a self accounting unit except through authority by headquarters Land Force to conduct a stocktake or to check their weapons, Sir. The list which I compiled and which is with you this morning is the list which we assumed are the weapons that are missing and comparing with our master record with the weapons that they turned in and the discrepancies which the ones we assumed missing, Sir. That is all, Sir.

[J. MORRIS]
Staff Sergeant

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
WO1
Member
SIXTIETH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 21269 SSGT MAIKELI B KAUMAITOTOYA

Ssgt Kaumaitotoya, after having been duly sworn on the Bible, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: When did you join the 1FMS Unit?
A    In 1987.

Q2: 1987?
A    Sir.

Q3: When the Unit started?
A    When the Unit started.

Q4: When did you leave the Unit?
A    Two weeks ago I have been transferred to LSU Maintenance.

Q5: SSgt, this Board of Inquiry is to inquire and seek evidence and information on the activities involving the takeover of Parliament on the 19th of May. What you need to do now is to give to the Board your knowledge or your involvement on whatever happened prior to the 19th - the planning, preparation or anything for this mission; what you know and what you are involved in on the 19th and after the 19th until such time that you were transferred down from the 1FMS to the Maintenance Unit.

A: Ni bera na vuaviri e na i ka 19 ni siga, au se qai lesu tu mai e na dua na 1FMS exercise mai Vanua Levu rua na macawa. Ni vosota niu sa sega ni numu rawa na tiki ni siga. Keitou lesu mai e na macawa ru mai Vanua Levu; exercise mai Labasa, Vunikodi, Tawake, Saqani yaco sara i Drekeniwa, na yasa ni Bay kei na loma ni toba oya. Keitou lesu mai oya au mai involve tale ena 1FMS Selection baleta niu draiva tiko ena lori levu. Au a mai draiva tale e na Selection for a duration of three weeks, I think. Keitou lako sobu i na Yasayasa vaka-Ra for the last phase, keitou lesu mai, yaco mai e na delana levu mai Serua, rauta na 11 na kaloko, sa taroana i lako lako o Mr. Steven. Sa taroana na convoy, kacivi keitou tautoko kece na lewe ni 1FMS me tukuna vei keitou ni sa coup-taki na Matanitu. Keitou nanuma o keitou me keitou lako tiko mai oya, me keitou sa lai storm sara i kea, sa mani vakasama o Mr Steven, tukuna okoya "Tou lako mada i na keba." Keitou sa yaco mai e na keba, sa qai ka ni kurabui vei au mada ga niu rogoce ni o ratou ga na lewe ni Unit koya eratou curuma na Parliament. Keitou tiko e na Unit, sa tukuni sara ni via raici keitou o Commander. Lako sobu yani o Commander lai vosa vei keitou e na veika sa yaco qai kerea ga okoya na support vei keitou na se tiko rawa.
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Tukuna okoya kevaka e dua se vou tiko e na loma ni Unit e duavata kei na ka e yaco tiko i tuda ia me kerea na nona leave baleta ni gauna e na via toso kina na Mataivalu me kakua ni dua tale me tiko i dakuna me vakaoososota na sasaga e na via cakava na Mataivalu. Tukuna okoya ni na veitalia na ka keitou na lai cakava i tuda, ia me na oti na vuavivi me keitou qai lesu tale mai loma.

Keitou sa mani veivosaki e na vuku ni veika sa mai tukuni vei keitou, keitou sa mani nanuma me keitou sa leave mada ga me keitou lai tu yani i tuda. Au a kerea gona vei Commander me keitou veivosaksi mada me sa na dua na kena matata me na qai tukuna vua o OC, Mr. Baleinamau. Keitou sa mani veivosaki e na siga oya, sa matata me keitou sa gade, keitou sa sign-taka taeuoko na leave apps., sa lako cake o Mr. Baleinamau lai raici Commander. Lesu mai o Mr. Baleinamau mai tukuna okoya ni tukuna o Commander me keitou se toka mada, me sa kakua tale ni dua e gade, me keitou se tiko mada ga.

Oti oya lako yani o Col Tarakinikini, lai vosa talega vei keitou, lai vakamacalataka okoya na ka sa yaco, lai vakayaloqaqatoki keitou ni kila okoya ni keitou na raigmalevutaki ena loma ni keba, lai vakadeitaki keitou. Tukuna okoya, na ka sa yaco, sa yaco, sa sega tale ni rawa ni caka kina e dua na ka. Sa qai vo ga me laurau e vei na vanua e toka kina na neitou dina.

Sa i koya beka ga oya vata kei na i yaragi koya na cache. Keitou vevosaki sa mani tukuni vei au me sa kau na cache, vata kei na SOP ni Unit ni dua na ka e yaco me dua na cache me tiko me standby. E ratou tiko e na siga oya o Mr. Bainimoli, Mr. Baleinamau. Oti keitou mani kauta sara i tuda e na siga oya na lori, lai kele mai e na daku ni bai, neitou back-gate. Au vakeleya ga mai kea, sa locd sara na i yaragi. Load oti ga na i yaragi keitou sa mani lako sara. Au lako, lai drop-taka na i yaragi i Bilo, lesu tale mai. Lesu ga mai, au sa mai vakeleu tu na lori levu e na Maintenance. Sa mani mai yaco toka i kea na noqu kila na cache. E levu na gauna au tiko voli ga e na Maintenance, oti au dau mai tiko i cake. Noqu lako mai cake, au sa mai tukuna vei iratou na tiko i cake ni sa lega na lori levu kina au a kauta kina na i yaragi oya, sa mani keitou lai vakeleia i ra. Au sa mani tukuna, Baleta ni tou sa yadravi va qo sa sega ni dua na betena vei au na noqu tiko ike, vinaka cake vei au meu sa lai tikoga i ra meu cakava tiko na neitou lori mai na Maintenance mai ra." Oya na ka e yaco me yacova na gauna e ratou vinakata kina mai na Palimedi me so na kateni se cardboard. A tiko voli e na neitou shed e vica na tikiti ni kateni lelevu. E rua na siga e kau kina na kateni oya, vakara na tirivu.

E na gauna sa mai suspend kina o Mr Baleinamau, sa mai OC vakatawa tiko kina o Steven, sa mai kacivi keitou sara ni vinakata okoya me interview-taki keitou yadudua. Na ka ga au tukuna vei Mr Steven, "Sir, na nodra curu na cauravou e na nodra tiko mai na
Palimedi e sega ni bale vei iratou. E ratou lako e na nodratou muri lewa. Being a soldier, you cannot do anything else, you just follow orders, ia na ka au via tukuna qo, na nodratou dui welfare na nodratou vuvale e dodonu me laurai tiko vakavinaka. Kena i karua, baleta ni sa nanumi tiko me cease-taki na kedratou i sau me yalovinaka sara me qai lai kerea ka vakamamasu e na vuna eratou lai tiko kina i kea, me kakua ni vakalolomataki na nodratou vuvale. Na kena i katolu ga ni sa vakatabui na nodratou veicuruyaki me laurai ga na kena sava na nodratou i sulu; oya na support ga au a kerea vei Mr Steven. Na kena qai activate-taki se sega, sa mai yaco toka ga i kea na neirau veitalanoa. Oti au gole mai ki na Maintenance me yacova na gauna sa mai tukuni kina vei keitou na i tukutuku. Levu ga na gauna au base tiko ga mai na Maintenance seu tu i vale (macawa rua), dua na gauna oya au macawa rua tu ga i vale au sega tale ni qai contact-taka tale e dua, au sa tu vata ga kei iratou na noqu veitinani. Sa i koya saka beka ga okoya vakacaca na veika au nanuma rawa ni ka au vakacaca.

Kena i oitoti beka ga na neitou lai veivosaki i Kalabu e na siga Vakarauwai kena macawa ka tarava, sa storm-taki kina o Kalabu. O ratou na lesu mai East Timor, keitou lai sota ga i kea, keitou veivakabulataki, keitou lesu tale mai.

Au vakabauta sa via koya saka beka ga oya me yacova na gauna au sa qai transfer sobu kina ki na Maintenance Unit.

Q6: Na gauna dou yaco yani kina i na keba, o cei a tiko kina? O iko tukuna ni nomudou yaco yani i na keba, dou se qai lesu tiko mai Yasayasa vaka-Ra, o cei a tiko e na Unit e na gauna oya?
A: Mr. Baleinamau, Staff Sgt Vakadranu. E sega ga ni matata vei au o Mr. Bainimoli.

Q7: O raici Sgt Maj Ravai?
A: Sega saka.

Q8: Rauta tiko ni vica na kaloko oya?
A: Oti tiko beka na vakasigalevu; 1.00 beka se 2.00, baleta keitou tiko mai Serua keitou sa rogoca na news e na 11.00 na kaloko, kena i balebale e na via dua veimama beka na auu mai kea.

Q9: O talanoataka o iko ni dou a qai brief-taki ena ka e yaco, o cei a qai brief-taki kemudou?
A: Au tukuna saka tiko o au niu lako yani au qai lai rogoca e na vanua ni neitou gunu ti na ka e yaco

Q10: Tou lesu tale mada; ni bera oya, dou sa biubiu mai Serua ena 11 na kaloko, yaco yani i loma ni keba. O sa vakamaclataka oti o iko i mada ni dou sa qai lai kila i kea na i tukutuku ni ka e yaco; o cei a brief-taki kemudou e na ka e yaco e na loma ni Unit?
A: Sega, oya saka ga na veitalanoa mai vei iratou na cauravou e na gauna ni gunu ti. Au qai lai kila kina ni o ratou ga na neitou cauravou koya e ratou a curu i loma. Na i tukutuku ni vuaviri keitou se rogo ca ga mai kea vei Mr Steven mai Serua.

Q11: Na gauna e lai brief kina o Commander, rauta beka ni vica na kaloko?
A: I cannot recall.

Q12: Na gauna e lako yani kina o Col Tarakinikini me lai brief, rauta beka ni vica na kaloko?
A: Sa yakavi sara, rauta beka na vitu na kaloko, au sa sega ni nanuma vinaka na gauna.

Q13: O iko a vakamacalataka ni o Col Tarakinikini a vakayaloqaqataki kemudou na tiko e na Unit e na gauna oya. Bau dua na ka e vakamacalataka okoya ni na duavata na Mataivalu e na ka e yaco?
A: Au sega ni vakabauta.

Q14: O cei a solia na directive me kau i tuba na i yaragi?
A: O OC Mr Baimimoli.

Q15: Na gauna a kau kina i tuba na i yaragi, a kau vakacava?
A: Box.

Q16: E so e kau, so e metali?
A: Sega, e kau taukoko.

Q17: E ra kau taukoko na i yaragi se vo tikoga e so e loma ni Unit?
A: E so e vo saka tiko mai.

Q18: O kila vakacava ni sega ni kau taukoko na i yaragi?
A: E ratou lako saka yani o Col Seruvatu se toka saka kina na vo ni yaragi.

Q19: Tukuna tale mada?
A: E ratou lai sevusevu saka yani o CO3, Major Sorby, Major Kafoa vata kei na dua tale na turaga ni valu au sega ni taura rawa na yacana.

Q20: Qo e na siga vata tikoga oya; ka 19 ni siga?
A: Sega, oya e na siga ka tarava.

Q21: Siga Vakarauwai?
A: Io.

Q22: Se vo tiko i kea na i yaragi?
A: Se tiko i kea - ena box.
Q23: O rawa ni vakamacalataka mada e so na yaca?
A: O ratou na selection e ratou a tiko.

Q24: Qo na selection koya a gole sobu i Yasayasa vaka-Ra?
A: Io.

Q25: Eso tale na yaca koya era lewe ni CRW makawa?
A: Bonefasio, Bainimoli ... 

Q26: Tamani?
A: Io.

Q27: Naiqama?
A: O Naiqama e lewe ni selection.

Q28: Tuiwailevu?
A: Tuiwailevu.

Q29: Leweniqila?
A: Leweniqila.

Q30: Oti oya dou gole sobu i Bilo?
A: I Bilo, saka.

Q31: Yaco ga i Bilo dou lai sobu taukoko, a vakasoburi sara i loma ni qara? 
   Sega, au vakasobura ga i cake; nodratou vakasobura i loma ni qara se vanua cava e ratou lai vakasobura kina, au sa sega ni kila. Keitou 
   cabe cake ga yani, sobu ga i kea, baleta na lori levu e sega tiko na 
   kena reverse light, au taqayataka tiko na noqu na reverse buto mai 
   baleta na matamata e rui qigo vata kei na gaunisala e ca tu.

Q32: Vica na kaloko dou yaco i Bilo?
A: Sa viavia bogi sara tiko.

Q33: O cei a qai secure-taka na dakai i kea, mai Bilo?
A: Bonefasio.

Q34: O iko ga o qai lesu e na lori?
A: O au duadau ga au qai lesu e na lori.

Q35: Bonefasio, Tamani, Tuiwailevu, Leweniqila, iko sega ni kilai 
   Naiqama?
A: Au sa tukuna oti saka ni okoya e tiko e na selection vei iratou na ka 
   vou e ratou lako mai.

Q36: O iko kilai Naiqama?
A: Sir.
Q37: Nomu lesu mai oya, o kauta na lori ki na Maintenance?
A: Sir.

Q38: Oti tale mai oya, nomu lai biuta tale na lori ki na Maintenance, bau dua tale na guana o lai kauta tale kina e dua na lori mo lai kau yaragi tale kina mai Bilo?
A: Sega saka.

Q39: O tukuna ni o lai pick-taka na cardboard, mai vei?
A: Neitou garage saka ga mai cake.

Q40: O a vakamacalataka talega e dua na bose a vakayacori mai Kalabu; qo na bose ni Unit, e vakayacori i vei?
A: Koronivuli saka ga mai Kalabu.

Q41: IFMS tae kokot; o ira na tiko i loma, i tuba?
A: Not all, Sir.

Q42: O cei a kaciva na bose oya?
A: Na ka ga e tukuni vei au ni o ratou na lesu mai East Timor e ratou na via mai sevusevu, sa mani tukuni me keitou lai sota ga yani i Kalabu baleta ni ratou tiko kina na majority vei keitou, me sa lai caka vata ga i kea baleta me rawarawa vei keitou. Ena dredre me keitou curu mai loma baleta ni keitou sa raimatalevutaki tiko mai na keba me keitou sa cakava ga e na dua na venue i tuba. Keitou a vakasamataka me dua na vanua me keitou lai cakava tani kina, me kua ni caka e na loma ni Complex, sa mani qai lai vakarogotaki vei Na Qase, sa qai mani tukuna o Na Qase ni rawarawa me keitou sa lako ga i kea.

Q43: O cei a liutaka na veitatanao koya e caka tiko oya?
A: O Waqaniboro vata ket Na Qase.

Q44: Bau dua na guana o draivataka e dua na minibus, lako e na loma ni Complex, kauta wawoki na tamata kei na ka kece vaka oya, pick-taki iratou na i matai ni lala koya eratou lako sobu?
A: Na i matai ni lala koya e lako sobu saka i vei?

Q45: Ni oti na nomudou lesu mai Bilo; o bau draivataka na minibus ki na loma ni Complex?
A: Sega, na GK 406 ga koya au kauta wawoki tiko.

Q46: GK 406 na cava?
A: Na neitou lori blue, na Twin Cab, Toyota Hilux.

Q47: Sa oti oya o draivataka wawoki tikoga i ke?
A: Io.

Q48: Na lori koya o kauta sobu e na nomu usa dakai, na cava na kena naba?
A: GL 015.
Q49: Staff Sgt, what was your appointment at 1FMS around the 19th of May?
A: I was appointed with the selection team.

Q50: What is your usual appointment in the Unit?
A: To assist Sgt Vakadranu in the transport, so Vakadranu oversees the Admin side while I look after the Maintenance side.

Q51: Whilst driving from the West back to Suva on the 19th, did you have any established comms. in the vehicle?
A: No, but the radio was working in the vehicle that Mr. Steven was driving, so he heard the news on the radio.

Q52: Whilst in the Unit at QEB, the Commander FMF spoke with Unit personnel; what time was this?
A: I cannot recall the time but it was in the morning, round about 9.00 or 10.00 o'clock.

Q53: Qo na i ka 19 ni siga se na siga tarava, Siga Vakarauwai?
A: Siga tarava beka baleta keitou sa bera tiko mai oya, sa qai tukuni vei keitou ni via raici keitou o Commander.

Q54: Oya na siga ka tarava?
A: Sir.

Q55: Whilst in the Camp, did you talk to the 1FMS personnel in Parliament or contact them through other means of communication?
A: Not until I took those cartons.

Q56: How many times did you visit?
A: Twice.

Q57: Both these occasions were when you took the cartons, on the same day?
A: Sir.

Q58: Oya na siga cava koya o kauta sobu kina na kateni - Siga Vakarauwai, Siga Tabu, Moniti?
A: Week days.

Q59: Kena i balebale e sega ni weekend ga oya?
A: Sega, sa rairai oti beka e macawa dua se macawa rua. E tukuni mai ni sa rui draki ca qai batabata na vanua oya. Kena i karua beka e dua na lotu e na dua na Siga Tabu.
Matai ni gauna o lako kina i na Complex e na i karua ni macawa, karua sa sega ni matata?

Karua sake e na Siga Tabu, dua na gauna ni lotu. E rau veitaravi tikoga, Vakaraubuka koya au kauta kina na i matai ni load. Oti ratou qai kerea tale mai me so tale yani na load kateni e na Siga Tabu.

Who directed you to take these cartons? Who gave you the instructions for you to take these cartons to Parliament?

The authority was given by the OC. The OC and Mr Bainimoli were usually the ones who gave authority at that time.

Were you present when the sevusesevu was presented by CO3 FIR, Major Sorby and Major Kafou?

Sir.

What was the nature of the sevusesevu; what was it for?

They said they just wanted to come down, present their sevusesevu and have grog with us.

Lesuva tale mada na i ka 19 ni siga nomudou lesu mai Nadi. O vakaraitaka tiko qori ni mai vosa vei kemudou o Col Tarakinikini. Vakadeitaka mada o cei a vosa e liu vei kemudou, o Commander se o Col Tarakinikini?

(Silence)

O iko a vakamacalataka ni rauta toka beka na 7.00 na kaloko e na bogi ni siga Vakaraubuka a vosa vei kemudou o Col Tarakinikini; donu?

Donu.

Kena siga ka tarava, siga Vakarauwai, rauta na ciwa na kaloko, vosa vei kemudou o Commander; vakamatatataka mada o Commander Land Force se o Commander FMF?

O Commodore Bainimarama sake.

Vosa vei kemudou okoya e na mataka lailai ni Vakarauwai?

Io.

Staff, na vu ni noqu taro baleta ni keitou nanuma ga ni o Commodore a qai yaco mai Viti e na mataka lailai ni Siga Tabu?

Ni vosoti au, e sega ni matata saka vei au na siga.

Sega ni vosa okoya vei kemudou e na siga Moniti, qai tukuna kina okoya me leave okoya e via leave?

Ni vosota, au sega ni nanuma vinaka na siga.
Q70: Na gauna sa tukuna kina o Mr Baleinamau me kau na i yaragi i Bilo, na cava na instruction a soli vei kemudou? Bau dua na brief a tukuni vei kemudou baleta na nomudou i tosotoso mai na keba i Bilo - dou brief-taki ena security se na road movement?
A: Sega.

Q71: Nomudou lako sobu oya, a liutaka tiko na i lakolako o Satini Bonafasio?
A: Sir.

Q72: Bau vakaiyragi tu okoya e na gauna dou lako sobu kina?
A: Au vakabauta.

Q73: Ena gauna dou yaco mai kina mai Nadi, me vaka ni dou sa yaco mai dou sa vakila ni dou sa raimatalevutaki tu e loma ni keba, a bau dua na gauna sa tekivu me issue kina na nomudou personal weapon me vaka na pistol ena gauna dou sa yaco mai kina?
A: Na personal weapon a tiko ga vei keitou e na neitou a gole sobu kina ki na Yasayasa vaka-Ra.

Q74: Nomudou dui personal weapons dou taura tikoga ena gauna dou a lako sobu kina i Bilo?
A: Sir.

Q75: Sega ni bau suka?
A: (Silence)

Q76: Kena i balebale ya nomu lako i Bilo ya o kauta tiko ga nomu personal weapon?
A: Au lako i Bilo oya, au sega ni vakaiyragi.

Q77: Gauna cava o vakasuka kina nomu personal weapon ki na armoury?
A: Noqu lako tu oya au sega ni kauta noqu personal weapon.

Q78: E dina ga ni o sega ni kauta sobu nomu i yaragi, o iko a sega ni vakasuka nomu i yaragi; na i yaragi se nomu personal weapon a tu ga vei iko; donu?
A: E sega saka, na i yaragi au qai mai draw-taka ga e na dua na yakavi, au sa sega ni kita rawa na tiki ni siga, au qai mai draw-taka ga e na neitou armoury baleta ni sa rogovaki yani i loma ni Complex that someone was going to storm the Complex so we were prepared for that.

Q79: Kena i balebale na tamata taucoko mai na Unit e ra tiko e loma ni Complex e ra draw-taka nodra dakai?
A: Koya ga e vo tiko oya.
Q80: Nomudou biubiu mai na keba mo dou gole i Bilo, dou a bau kele e na dua na vanua?
A: Sega.

Q81: Na gauna dou sa lako sobu tiko kina i Bilo, dou bau sobu tale ena dua na vanua me transfer-taki e so na i yaragi?
A: Sega.

Q82: Staff, na gauna a yaco kina na ka qo e na i ka 19 ni siga, o ratou na nomudou i lala ratou a vakayagataka e so na lori ni civilian - e nua beka na minibus vulavula, yaco i kea, lai kele tu i ra, e na gauna o curu kina e loma ni Palimedi, sega ni bau dua na gauna e tukuni vei iko mo draivataka mada na minibus oya mo lai kauta mai e dua na ka i tuba?
A: Sega.

Q83: Sega ni GK koya o dau draivataka tiko?
A: Sega, na GK au qai kauta sobu ga i kea e na noqu kau kateni, otherwise e sega ni dua na gauna meu draivataka kina e dua na minibus. Au qai mai rogo tida ngata ni ratou vakayagataka e dua na minibus.

Q84: Staff, there have been reports from the sentries at Laucaia Bay, they said they saw you drive this minibus - BJ 026, not on one occasion but on numerous occasions; what have you got to say to that?
A: I do not recall driving one mini-bus.

[Signature]
Staff Sergeant

[Signature]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[Signature]
Major
Member

[Signature]
Major
Member

[Signature]
Member

[Signature]
WARRANT OFFICER CLASS ONE
Member
SIXTY-FIRST WITNESS
STATEMENT BY MR INOKE Sikivou

Mr. I. Sikivou, after having been duly sworn on the Bible, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Mr. Sikivou, thank you for your willingness to come forward to the Board. We have had representations from a number of civilians, from a lot of soldiers and from all sectors of the community. We thank you for making time to be here, for this inquiry. What we need to do now if you could please relate to us your knowledge of what happened in the events in question in your own words and the way you would like to describe it, please go ahead.

A: If I may just go back to round about February with the activities of the indigenous rights group and the feedback that I was getting in my office. I had already warned Mary Chapman in February in my office that there was going to be a likelihood of a coup. From what I was hearing, the coup was going to take place when the President addresses the joint sitting of Parliament in July. Because I had no contact with the military, I advised Paki Kaivesu of Special Branch that such a thing was building up and if they could take the necessary preventative actions to advice the forces about what was being planned.

Coming straight to Thursday, 18th May, it was in the afternoon, Ratu Timoci Silatolu approached me for the key of the photocopying room. I asked him "Why?", he said that there was some yaqona and some yams from Kadavu that he needed to keep in that office. I was able to facilitate this request because our photocopying machine had broken down and we hardly use that office so I gave him the key of the photocopying room and I saw four sports bags being brought in. I did not pay much attention to it, but on Friday in the evening round about 6 o'clock, the seven soldiers who had carried out the coup earlier on in the day, were joined by another ten. This was when the four bags that were taken in as yams and yaqona were brought out and right there in front of me, arms and ammunitions were distributed to the 10 soldiers. As a civilian, I was really scared. It was more or less the first time that I had come in very close contact with guns and hand grenades that I only saw on TV. I wanted to make my way out, but I was stopped from going out of the Fijian Association Party Office.

Weeks leading up to the coup, there were often sessions going on in the office, this was after Parliament adjourns for the day, Adi Litia Cakobau came in, Ratu Rakuita Vakalalabure also came in, George Speight was forever there and from my office, I could hear mentions of Rabuka and mentions of Draunidalo. I never heard of Savua's name I am sorry, I never heard his name being mentioned. Mentions of what the President was saying, it was only on the morning of 19th May, round about 7.45 and I had asked Lt. Col. Jackson to get the print out of telephone numbers 305808 to see where Ratu Timoci and Ratu Rakuita were contacting that morning from about 7.30 to around about 10.30. It was a fax machine, and it does not have to go through the operator, it is a direct line and they were in constant contact with various
people using the phone that was located inside my office. I overheard conversations in which Ratu Timoci at 7.45 that day mentioned to someone over the other side of the phone that he was going to be Prime Minister that day. But he used the word "PM" and I had thought since he works for Telecom that may be he was going to be Post Master because the Post Masters are often referred to as PM. I did not realise that he was referring to himself, it was only when the coup took place that when his name was first brought up as Prime Minister that I related that and I remembered what he mentioned at 7.45 that day.

On Thursday, George Speight had wanted to see Ratu Coka. Ratu Coka wanted to evade George Speight, but George was a bit too smart, instead of just taking our word that Ratu Coka had left he went to the car park, located Ratu Coka's vehicle and he waited there for him. They stood there that day until about 8.00 to 8.30 just talking. Earlier on, I think it was about Tuesday, the same week leading up to 19th May that I heard George pleading with Ratu Coka because there is just a small partition in my office, I could overhear Ratu Coka saying "No" and "No" repeatedly, sometimes his voice was raised to "It has got to be constitutional ...". This is what Ratu Coka was saying from the other side of the room. But George was just murmuring, I could not hear what he was saying, so I did not really know, but George was there for two weeks, he was more or less coming everyday and he was always sitting in our office.

From what I have been talking about gentlemen, I had been regularly more or less on a weekly basis been advising Special Branch that things were not well in Parliament. I could feel tension building and that a parallel of 1987 was going to occur and I think those were the exact words that I had mentioned to Bola and Paki Kaivesu of Special Branch, I think two or three weeks before the coup. Before people just used to converse and discuss issues that were coming up in Parliament, irrespective of the fact whether anyone walks in or out, but events leading up to the coup, you could see people murmuring as soon as you enter. I felt very uncomfortable whenever I walked into the office and to have secrets amongst colleagues. Esa viavina okoya Colonel.

Q2: We would like to ask a few questions for clarification. You are the Research Officer for FAP?
A: Yes.

Q3: On 18th May, at 1400 hours when the bags were brought in, can you give us an indication of the vehicle that brought it in and if you know who were the other persons that actually brought in the bags?
A: Kevaka e vakaraiteki vei au na kedratou i taba o iratou na bilitaki tiko ena vaka:abote dynamite, oya e dua vei iratou. E dua vei iratou na gone ni Wainibuka e kotini porti tiko, tamata lalai toka ga, small in stature. Those were the two that brought it in. They came in a white twin cab. In the photographs, I could pick out, they were still amongst the seven that walked into Parliament. One of them, okoya na gone ni Nalawa, Ra identified himself to me as being from Nalawa, Ra, that is the fellow that was
responsible for the dynamite of G B Hari or Kasabias and the FEA power installation at Naboro.

Q4: We will get the photos of some other members we think who were involved there, but there were only two personnel and Timoci Silatolu, on the 18th, that brought in the bags.

A: Ratu Timoci was not even there when the bags were brought in. He had gone into the chamber and I was just waiting for them when they came in and two others, I did not quite see their faces, but those were the two that I remembered because they kept on coming back to the office for coffee late into Friday night.

Q5: Can I just recap that, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, 1400 hrs, four personnel came in a twin cab and you had indicated a white twin cab?

A: Yes.

Q6: They unloaded four sports bags, the colour of the sports bags, would it be green or black?

A: It was dark, it could be black. Oqo ko na sports bags eratou dau advertise rakaka vakalevu na Sports World.

Q7: And just a question on the bags, were you there on the morning of the 19th?

A: Yes, I was there at 6.30.

Q8: At 6.30, you opened the office, and those bags were still inside?

A: I did not check.

Q9: You indicated also that after the first lot went into Parliament, another 10 personnel came and they brought weapons and they were distributed right there in your office?

A: Yes.

Q10: Do you have any indication of time?

A: The office was empty because the others went to see the 6 o'clock TV One news so it would be round about the time when the news was going, between 6.00 and 6.30.

Q11: On the call made by Silatolu from the FAP Office on the morning of the 19th, do you have any time to this (when the call was made)?

A: Because my desk is here and the fax phone is just less than a metre away ....

Q12: Yes, the call about the PM at 7.45?

A: Yes, about 7.45 on Friday, 19th. No one else used that phone apart from Ratu Timoci from about 7.30 to 10.30. I know I wanted to send out some fax messages, I could not, because he was forever standing there and using the phone.

Q13: Prior to two weeks before the 19th of May, was Mr. Speight ever seen in Parliament?
A: Yes.

Q14: Do you know the nature of his visit?
A: I had assumed that he had arranged for Keni Vuidreketi to come and address members of Parliament on certain Bills that were being brought up in Parliament. Keni did come and I more or less assumed that this was part of it. He was always there, he became a familiar sight.

Q15: Sir, do you have any knowledge of any connections maybe in commerce or other areas, any connections between Mr. Silatolu and Mr. George Speight?
A: All I know is that they are good friends, George, Nata and Silatolu. Messages were left for Silatolu to call Speight, messages were left for either one of them, whoever came into Parliament to call Nata back on his mobile phone.

Q16: Let us just recap for a moment, on Thursday the 18th of May you have already stated to the Board that four sports bags were brought in and taken to your photocopying room. Were these the same bags that you mentioned that were opened publicly in front of you where weapons were distributed from?
A: Yes

Q17: When was that?
A: That was during the TV One news time, 6 o’clock on Friday evening.

Q18: How did you know that these were the same bags Sir?
A: Because that was when the office was opened, Silatolu had the key with him.

Q19: Can you just recap again on the number of people that were actually being issued weapons?
A: About 10.

Q20: These 10 were they all civilians or there was a mixture of civilians and soldiers?
A: They were all dressed civilian, but they were disciplined.

Q21: Was there any other occasion where bags or equipments were brought in and left in your office other than on this day?
A: I became very curious about the movements of that vehicle. We had freedom of movement around and within the Parliament Complex but we were not allowed outside the gate. Whenever that vehicle came in, I was very curious and there were quite a lot of bags being unloaded and CP 850 always preceded the coming in and Illisoni was always there.

Q22: This vehicle CP 850, the driver, was it the same person driving the vehicle at each time or you would not ....
A: No, the funny thing about it was that sometimes the bags were taken down to the bure. These were the ones that were delivered on Friday so the ladies at the bure would be able to know where those bags were taken to because they were taken down to the bure. Others were taken to a ground, na library, they were taken down the steps towards that way, that was in the evening on
Saturday: Again round about 9 o'clock or 10 o'clock on Sunday morning while we were waiting for our breakfast, again the bags came but always the same four-wheel drive.

Q23: This vehicle, CP 850, what type of vehicle was this? This was not the twin cab?
A: No, it is a sedan, it is bluish or greyish.

Q24: Can I just recap on the movement of those bags. The first indication was on the 18th at 1400 hrs, the first lot of bags came in, the next time you saw vehicles bringing those similar kind of bags was on Friday, you have any indication about the timings?
A: It was in the evening, e kau sobu ena bure.

Q25: On the same white twin cab?
A: The white twin cab, au sega ni kila e same se cava, but it was a white one. All the deliveries were made by a white twin cab.

Q26: That was the second time and this vehicle always preceded the coming in of the twin cab?
A: Erau dau lako vata tiko yani kci na ....

Q27: Okay, Friday was the second time, was there any indication of the time on Friday?
A: Oya me sa lai bogi toka na vanua.

Q28: Were any of those bags brought in on Saturday?
A: The bags were also brought in on Saturday, because it came on Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday. Let me tell you one thing, e sega ni lewe 17 from Friday, the number of security having weapons always increase in the evening. Eda sa dau rai ga yani va qo ena corridor balavu, esa security people ga. Nio rai yani ena car park, rai yani ena library, there would be about 10 at both gates, but then come morning, the number decreases and just the normal 10 to 12 walking around there, maybe one in each building and two or three at the gate.

Q29: Can I just go back to Friday night, when the weapons were brought in, just a rough indication of the time, say about 6 o'clock or 7 o'clock in the evening?
A: It would be past 7 o'clock because the news had finished, but it would be before Shortland Street at 8 o'clock.

Q30: It is from about 7.00 to 8.00?
A: Yes, between 7.00 to 8.00

Q31: On Saturday when more of the weapons were brought in, you have an indication of what time? On Friday, the weapons were brought in and taken to the bure. On Saturday, roughly, what time were the weapons brought in?
A: Ena via sigalevu tutu tiko, niu rai tiko ga yani va qo au kacivi Marika sara na noqu messenger boy, okoya kei na driver nei Ratu Pecel me rau raica ni sa
kau sobu ena dua na ka, au sa tukuna sara vei iratou me kua na yavoki vakaveitalia because we did not know what those people were up to.

Q32: So what is around midday?
A: Arcund midday, e kau yani va qo ina rara, between the Library and the Hotel Catering School, e tiko ira ya e dua na rara, au raica ga ni ratou sirova ira ya na bags eratou kauta mai.

Q33: No indication of how many bags, you actually cannot tell. On Sunday morning, do you have any indication of where the weapons were taken to?
A: They went past our office to where the hostages were kept, so it would be one of those rooms there, either the GVP or maybe taken up, we were not allowed into that area.

Q34: It was taken up the corridor towards the Parliament?
A: Not the Parliament building, but where the Indian hostages were kept. Oya na Fiji Labour Party Office, na ka ga eratou qai tukuna vei au oiratou na cauravou eratou veiqaravi tiko, the casual workers, that some of those weapons were taken up to the hill top.

Q35: Those bags were taken up to the GVP Office vicinity and also the Battery hill?
A: Au sega ni raica o au ya, eratou qai mai tukuna ga vei au na cauravou.

Q36: Was there any other time that you saw weapons being taken in, being brought into the complex?
A: Au sa tukuna ga o au, ena rua na kaloko ena siga Lotulevu, ko kau yani ena news time ena Vakarabuka, kau yani ena Vakarauwai, kau yani ena Sigstabu. Okoya ga ya au raica.

Q37: Mr. Sikivou, na ka tou na cakava qo, ena kau mai nai taba, if it is okay with you, what we will do is incorporate that into the evidence given here and just write it down, but we will show you and make an approach to you later on and show you those photos and if you can identify who came on what day, and we just incorporate it here, if that is comfortable with you?
A: Okay.

Q38: Mr. Sikivou, during this crisis from 19th May until Monday, at this period of time, did you see Mr. Speight or Mr. Silatolu or Mr. Nata carry any weapons with them?
A: No, they always have their mobile phones with them.

Q39: When were you allowed to move out of the complex?
A: Sunday evening round about 8.00 p.m. There was an order for all of us to come out at about 1.00 on Friday then round about 5.00, we were all called back inside. E keimami qai sasaga me keimami lako mai tuba, esa tabu.

Q40: You finally left the complex on Sunday?
A: About 8 o'clock.
Q41: And you never went back in?
A: No.

Q42: You were released by those inside to leave?
A: I managed to come out on the pretext of going to buy yaqona and cigarettes because by that time, they were really running low and by that time as well, they had not organised the people to come and visit. They ran low, there was no food. By Sunday lunch time, there was no lunch and dinner, there was no dinner as well. There was just no backup for either then baleta o iratou na i ko i vale ni kuro, they were just providing for the hostages, not for anyone else. That was strict instructions from Mary Chapman, the Secretary-General.

Q43: Being an employee of the FAP Office, prior to the elections and all, was George Speight a supporter of the FAP? Were you aware of any of those political meetings before?
A: No, the first time I heard of George was when the mahogany deal came up.

Q44: Mr. Sikivou, while in the Parliament Complex, when it was taken over by the people that actually took over, did you have any contacts with anyone in the RFMF?
A: No, but I was in contact with Special Branch.

Q45: Was your life ever threatened in the Parliament Complex?
A: Yes.

Q46: Could you please enlighten this Board on how you were threatened?
A: It was on Saturday evening, round about 8 o'clock, George came in with Silatolu accompanied by their security and George asked me to prepare a conference room for a high level meeting, those were his exact words, to sit 20 people. Present in the office were Lesavua's driver (former Minister for Sports), Lekh Ram Vayeshmoi's driver, Ratu Peceli's driver and the lady who had brought in Ratu Timoci Silatolu's change and toiletries. Getting that instruction from George, I told George in my exact words, "Point of correction, Sir, I take my orders from my Members of Parliament, not from you." I could see that George was very angry with me and then he quickly vanished and then he turned and consulted with Ratu Timoci, Ratu Timoci told me it was alright so immediately I got on the phone to contact our executive officer in charge of the casual workers to have two or three of his boys to come across and make the necessary arrangements.

Ratu Timoci and George had their office upstairs where SVT used to be, just above mine, they went up there and the news came on Radio Fiji again, flash news that they just received, inside information from inside sources in Parliament that they were going to have a high level meeting of about 20 people. Immediately four security officers came down, and both the two that had brought in their arms together with Jim Speight and another one came down, and Jim was the one that pointed the small gun ....
Q47:
The uzi?
I do not know, it is different from the others. He was always holding that. He pointed that right into my head and swore at me and he said "Who are you calling?"

I told him that I was given instructions to arrange for a high level meeting and "I am trying to get our executive officer but here is one of your boys answering from the other side."

I gave him the phone and they spoke, at the same time George and Ratu Timoci walked in, they wanted me to identify everyone that was in the room, but before I could complete that, he started looking at the lady that was there, he said "Are you Sai from Special Branch?" They really gave her the physical treatment and they took her out of the complex.

From that time, I was also trying to find a way to come out of the complex after having my mobile stolen and I was really scared.

Q48:
Mr. Sikivou, can you just give us an overall picture of how you felt the coup was organised, from your observation, from the first day until you left the Parliament Complex?

A:
There was nothing organised. It was haywire right from the very beginning. From day one, I told my staff to be careful, I told them that the military is not involved and George Speight has lost control, that was from day one.

The way these people were behaving, I told the ladies not to go outside to stay in and if ever they want to go out, because the kitchen facility was down at the bure, I said "Make sure you have some of the male parliamentary staff to go with you".

I knew what the 1987 one looked like, it was well organised, but there was chaos in there. You do not even know who was leading, Ratu Timoci had his own say, Ratu Rakuita had his own say, George was running the thing from PM's Office, the Labour Office.

In a couple of meetings that were held at the FAP Office, Jim and Bill the two security officers said that everything had to go through them, had to be approved by them so they had a lot of meetings, but nothing really came out of it.
No one could make decisions in there and there was always "let's wait", what that meant, I do not know, maybe you give it to some fourth formers at QVS to organise a coup, they could have done better.

[MR. I. SIKIVOU]
Civilian

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class 1
Member
SIXTY SECOND WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 26650 CPL. KAMINIELI VOSAVERE

Cpl Vosavere, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Can you explain to the Board your involvement of the events on the 19th May, if you were involved prior to the 19th May and also explain the incident until when you went to the hospital?

A: Prior to the 19th of May, I was involved in the squadron exercise that was going on in Vunau Levu. I came back to Suva and I took a few days off. On Friday the 19th at about 8 o'clock I made a call to the office to say that I would be going to the hospital. Knowing that the march was on at about 10.30 a.m., I went to the hospital. When I returned from the hospital, I got another call at about 10.00 a.m. or may be after 10. Anyway before that, I called the Ops at the camp to say that I will be late as I was going to the hospital and also because of the brief that we normally have every Friday morning. At about 10 o'clock, I had a call from Sgt. Tikotani. He said that my name was on the list and I was part of the VIP protection team. From there, I know something was going to happen because the march was on and I was part of the reaction Team. So, thinking that the call was in relation to the VIP, maybe the President or the PM, I went along. I know on the 19th, it would be a hectic day because usually when you get a briefing that something is going to happen everyone is aware of his duties. I had to carry my mobile with me. The officer who called me said "we are expecting you and everyone is ready to move". That was when I moved down. Anyway, at the meeting place, I saw they were just waiting and I was a bit skeptical when I saw some civilians around but when I saw the Old Man's car, I met the Old Man there. The reason why I was skeptical is because we usually have our own procedures when we meet at a place and also I saw some people I did not recognise. Then we went up to Parliament. When we got into Parliament, then I realised that something was wrong. When I got in I was a bit hesitant, going through the whole thing, I have not decided to go into the Parliament complex. Everyone was sort of hyper, I just jumped to make sure that nothing went wrong. I had thought that when the squadron was there, the rest of the military was going to come in. I heard this from other senior guys. Between 2 pm to 3 pm I heard that other people had come in also.

Q2: Cpl. Vosavere, I will ask you a few questions. Who was involved in the VIP training?

A: 1FMS, Sir.

Q3: Was this part of the normal cycle of training selection or was it retraining?

A: I think it was part of the normal cycle of training.

Q4: What happen when you arrived in camp?

A: I did not go into the camp, I had called Ops that I will be coming in late as I was going to the hospital.
Q5: You missed the brief on Friday morning and at 1000 hours you had a call?
   A: Yes, Sir.

Q6: Then where did you go?
   A: I went down to the Maritime.

Q7: Who were present at the meeting place?
   A: I cannot recall.

Q8: Who were present at the maritime?
   A: I was there for approximately 15 minutes. I could recognise the old man's car when I walked in. Tikotani was there and Soko was there also.

Q9: What was the old man's vehicle number?
   A: I did not recognise it.

Q10: Was George Speight there?
     A: The first time I saw him was at the Parliament. Someone told me that that was George Speight. Most of the civilians were in balaclavas.

Q11: How many civilians were there?
     A: I am not sure, Sir, may be 5 or 10.

Q12: When you left the maritime, how many vehicles were there?
     A: I can recall that I was in the third vehicle.

Q13: Can you recall the vehicles that were there?
     A: Two vans and a four wheel drive.

Q14: Major Ligairi was there, the mini bus then the van?
     A: Yes, Sir.

Q15: Any other vehicle behind it?
     A: I cannot recall.

Q16: Who else was in the minibus with you?
     A: Nduaniwai and 4 or 3 civilians.

Q17: Were there any civilians there?
     A: Yes, Sir.

Q18: You went through the back gate of the complex, you got off and what happen?
     A: We were rushed to the Parliament chambers.

Q19: You went into the chambers?
     A: Like I said, I was a bit hesitant, I was looking around all the time. I thought that something would go wrong. I was a bit hesitant.
Q20: Can you recall those people who went into the chambers?
A: I cannot recall them, Sir.

Q21: After the initial take over, what were your duties inside the complex?
A: I was the security officer. There were a lot of people moving around.

Q22: Were you the security for the hostage or the security around the perimeter?
A: I was the security for the passage to the Parliament chambers.

Q23: Did you enter the operation room at any time?
A: Which operation room, Sir?

Q24: The one in the complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q25: Who was in charge of the operation room?
A: Dakai was there.

Q26: At any time during the whole operation, did you leave with any group to go out of the complex? This is one.
A: No, Sir.

Q27: Can you please explain this incident?
A: Prior to this incident, there were two incidents. The first one was when Captain Suliano from Ops called me and asked for my assistance if I could help. There were these civilians beside the road jumping across the gate. There were some soldiers there and he asked if I could go and speak to those people who were going to go across. The second incident at the check point where I met the ground commander, Sgt. Bakawa. Those were the only two incidents when I left the Parliament complex.

Q28: Can you explain about this incident from the start?
A: I was standing outside the perimeter and I was watching some soldiers coming close to the perimeter.

Q29: From which side was this?
A: Near the PTC, Sir.

Q30: Where the ground is?
A: Yes, Sir. I did not bother much because the soldiers were running away. And then one of the guys yelled out "E dua sa davo." So, when I came up to the plantation on the other side of the road towards Suva Grammar parallel along Vuya Road, the civilians, may be 50 of them jumped out of the fence and rushed out. I just came out of the plantation and I saw three soldiers running on the other side where the Government quarters were beside the PTC towards me.
Q31: Were these soldiers from 3FIR?
A: I could not make it out, Sir. I was on my way down towards the last building at PTC when I saw one of the soldiers, I could see from the block I was in, you could see through the louvers and I saw the soldiers were crossing. I saw one of them crouch the gun and by that time the crowd were about 20 meters away. You can imagine a crowd of civilians, something similar to the checkpoint incident. I just went over to the corner. I just left when I heard the shot.

Q32: That was the shot fired by 3FIR?
A: No, that was not. Then I just went to protect the civilians. While I was doing that, I heard one shot went past and then the second shot. The rest of the incidents, there were six of us, myself and five civilians. I could recall while I was lying on the ground, exactly I think there was one on my right ear and two when I jumped on the road, the rest when I was running around the building. Later on, I heard people were saying there are another three guys lying on the ground, there is another on the road, I was not aware of the rest. What I was trying to do was to get the hell out of there because I know my arm was very serious. I think I have to make it to Parliament, I was weak. Some civilians picked me up and then I was taken to the hospital.

Q33: For that whole episode, did you fire any shot from your weapon?
A: No. The next day when I was in hospital, I heard someone had said "I think the soldiers fired". There were three rounds.

Q34: Did you see any of the soldiers there?
A: I saw them there, Sir.

Q35: Can you recognise their face?
A: I cannot recognise their face. The rest of the people were lying on the other side, I could not see them.

Q36: For the whole incident, did you fire any rounds?
A: No, Sir.

Q37: When you arrive at the maritime, the other 1MS personnel present, were they all operatives? What was your responsible duty?
A: The troop NCO.

Q38: When were you issued with the weapons?
A: When I was with the rest of the guys at the maritime.

Q39: What weapons were you issued?
A: Pistol.

Q40: Subsequently did you receive any other weapons?
A: No, Sir.
Q41: That was your own personal issue?
A: Not my own personal issue but the one I normally used for training.

Q42: Who issued the weapon to you at the Maritime?
A: I cannot recall, Sir.

Q43: Can you state approximately what time you were issued with the weapons?
A: It was well after 10.

Q44: You used the word "hesitant", you said you were hesitant about the whole thing. What drew this feeling?
A: Of course we never conduct our exercise with the civilians but since Tikotani gave me a call and said that the Old Man mention my name and that I have to be there. All along, usually the guys looked up to me especially the young guys so I have to be there.

Q45: When it was said that a senior officer said that the military was in support, did you know the person who said that?
A: Everyone were saying that and that was how I came to know it.

Q46: Was there something that made you believe or substantiate that the RFMF was in support?
A: Of course when I saw the old man there, I know the army was in support. That was the only valid reason for me to come, otherwise I would not dare to come near the meeting place. If I disobey then probably later on I was going to be asked why didn’t you come?

Q47: The IMS personnel, were they carrying any other weapons other than their personal pistols?
A: The usual weapons that we got with the exception of the other option the pistols, MP5 I could not recall the others.

Q48: Uzi?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q49: Can you recall the others who entered the chambers?
A: I cannot recall that, Sir. I think there were about 8 or 9.

Q50: The day that you were shot, what happen to your weapon? When you were taken back inside Parliament, what happen to your weapon?
A: When I was lying there, I made the point to the guys who were responsible to return the weapon to Buka silica.

Q51: Did someone take your weapon when you were lying there?
A: One of our guys, Sir.

Q52: What was your weapon number?
A: I cannot recall.
Q53: Was that your personal issue?
A: The one that I used for training.

Q54: Did you say you return to Bukasila?
A: One of our guys returned it.

Q55: During your stay in Parliament, did you at any time enter the Ops room?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q56: Who was in command in the Ops room?
A: Dakai, Sir.

Q57: Spt. Vosavere, before the 19th, were you part of the surveillance team or the field operatives before the 19th? When you called on the 19th, whom did you speak with? I spoke with Mr. Bainimoli, he was the duty officer that day. I thought it might be appropriate to let him know that I was going to the hospital.

Q58: You said, you did not know exactly who went inside the Parliament chambers? Did you remember whether they were all civilians or all military or a mixture of civilians and military?
A: I was certain that there were some civilians.

Q59: Do you know Apenisa Rokotuqica? Did you see a civilian with a tattoo on his face?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q60: Did you see him on the first day at the maritime?
A: I cannot tell, Sir.

Q61: Was Mr. Baleinamau at the Parliament complex on Friday 19th May?
A: Yes.

Q62: Are you aware that some weapons were already cachet in the Parliament complex on Thursday night? These weapons were distributed on Friday night?
A: No, Sir.

Q63: Were you still being paid by the RFMF?
A: At one stage, I was not but now my wife said it was okay.

Q64: When you were in the Parliament complex, were you given any leave application to sign?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q65: Who authorised it?
A: Headquarters, RFMF and the procedure was for us to sign it.
Q66. Did you make any contact with anyone from the RFMF while in the Parliament complex or anyone from your unit?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q67. Whom did you contact?
A: Mr. Stevens.

Q68. Did you speak with Mr. Baleinamau?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q69. Cpl. Vosavere, did you remember the two soldiers that were shot on the first week, on Saturday at Vuya Road?
A: I remember that day. I have just gone out when I heard gun shots and I saw soldiers from 3FIR.

Q70. Do you know who shot them?
A: No, Sir. Later on, I found out that it was Mr. Rokoura and Private Degei.

Q71. You did not know who fired the shots?
A: No, Sir.

Q72. On Saturday the 20th and Sunday the 21st, did you see any assault bags being dropped into Parliament?
A: I did not see them coming in but I notice a couple of bags, I am not sure whether they came in on Friday or Saturday. I just walked in to have a cup of tea and I saw these stand by bags.

Q73. Where did you go and have your tea?
A: Where the kit bags were at the first building at the Parliament complex.

Q74. But you did not see it when they brought it in?
A: No, Sir. I just walked in for a cup of tea.

Q75. What was the colour of the bag?
A: Black, something like the standby bag.

Q76. This is the Parliament complex, there are 4 buildings there, this is the back gate and this is the front gate and you are talking about the building near the back gate, the administration block.
A: The first building on your right when you go inside the Parliament complex.

Q77. When you were in there, did you hear the ultimatum given by Commander for all soldiers to return to camp?
A: I am not sure, someone just told us that the Commander had given the ultimatum for us to go back to camp.
Q78: What was the reaction?
   A: I was confused unless a senior officer comes down and inform us officially
      that the Commander has given the ultimatum for us to return we would have
      believed it.

Q79: You were not given the ultimatum formally?
   A: No, Sir.

Q80: Were you aware of the mobs that went down to ransack the TV station?
   A: I was aware of that. I was watching TV in another building when the news
      came.

Q81: It was alleged that a member of IMS escorted the mob? Are you aware of
      that?
   A: I am not sure who went out, I think some of our guys but I am not aware
      which one.

Q82: Was there any names mentioned?
   A: No, Sir.

Q83: Were you at any time whatsoever part of the team that went and brought more
      weapons at Bilo or QEB?
   A: I am a driver but I was not called.

Q84: You know Kaumaitotoya, what was his role in the complex? Did you see him
      there in the complex?
   A: No, he was not there, he did not come.

Q85: What was Kalounivale's role in the complex?
   A: Security.

Q86: Were you ever at the Battery Hill with the sentry team? Were you ever at the
      front gate for sentry?
   A: Yes, Sir.

Q87: Were you ever at the back gate for sentry?
   A: No, Sir. I was along the passage.

Q88: The passage around the Parliament complex?
   A: Within the Parliament complex. I was pointed down to take the passage. The
      guy pointed at me and said "take the passage". I stood there for the whole
      duration.

Q89: Who gave you that task?
   A: Tikotani.

Q90: There was another incident, it was alleged that a gun was pointed at
     Makedra Chaudhry? Did you witness that incident?
A: I heard about it but I was not there. That was on Friday night towards Saturday morning.

Q91: What did you hear?
A: I heard some civilians pointed a gun at the former Prime Minister.

Q92: In the complex, were any civilians issued with weapons?
A: Yes, Sir, but that was during the early stages, in the first week or so. Later on then old man said not to issue any weapons to the civilians.

Q93: There were issues about the training of civilians at the Parliament complex? Are you aware of that?
A: I was aware of that. This was to instil discipline to the boys because they were getting a bit rowdy and it was hard to control them. This was to keep them busy and occupied because they were getting agitated and when anything happens they wanted to take the law into their own hands.

Q94: Was there any weapon training there?
A: No.

Q95: Any martial art training?
A: Yes

Q96: Prior to the 19th of May, were there any other meeting with any senior officers, planning or discussion for what was done on the 19th of May?
A: Well, I was there at the Church service on 14th May where some senior officers were present as well as the former Prime Minister, Rabuka. But there was no discussion on that topic, Sir.

Q97: When did you join the unit?
A: I had the selection in 1995.

Q98: Cpl. there is a lot of weapons still missing, are you aware of anyone with any of the weapons?
A: I am not sure if anyone from Parliament still got his weapons.

Q99: Did you hear the directives given by Major Ligairi for all weapons to be returned and the body guards to keep theirs?
A: No, Sir, I was in the hospital.

Q100: How many people actually went into the Parliamentary chambers?
A: I am not sure, may be 7 or 9, there were just a few.

Q101: You were not sure whether they were military personnel or civilians?
A: There was a mix but I can recall there were some civilians. I think Tikotani was the one who went along with George when he made the announcement.

Q102: Who was giving you the command at the complex?
A: I took it from my boss.
Q103: What was Tikotani's responsibility of the whole event?  
A: I think we looked up to him because he was the sergeant.

Q104: In the first few days, how was the issuing of weapons done?  
A: I had voiced my opinion with it. Initially, it was a bit unsafe but I think we had it under control. Later, then all weapons were being taken account of.

Q105: Before Bukasila arrived, who was in charge of the weapons?  
A: I cannot recall who exactly the person was but we just sort of walked in picked our weapons and filled in the forms.

Q106: Tony Celeasiga came in the afternoon? Was he in charge of the weapons? Later on, I think it was more organised and Sgt. Ravulo was sort of supervising it to make sure that everything was accounted for especially equipment.

Q107: Can we just go back. When you were at the maritime, who actually gave you the briefing on what you were about to do?  
A: Like I said I got my code on the mobile.

Q108: When you went to the maritime, there was a meeting there, someone gave you the briefing before you went in, who gave that briefing?  
A: It was through the call that I received. I only went in when I saw the old man there.

Q109: Who else was there?  
A: Nadiuniwai was there and I asked "what's going on" and he said that we have to get things as soon as possible.

Q110: Were you told exactly what you were going to do in Parliament?  
A: I was suspicious about that but I know that something was going on.

Q111: When you were at the Parliament complex, did you actually see the vehicle that was bringing in the weapons, Thursday, Friday or Saturday. Did you at any time observe the kit bags while it was being unloaded?  
A: I saw the kit bags but I cannot recall the number.

Q112: Which day was this?  
A: I cannot recall but they did not come at the same time.

Q113: You were not aware of the Thursday one?  
A: It was on Friday.

Q114: On Friday, when you went in with the initial group then you saw it?  
A: I saw one of the vehicles on Friday.

Q115: Was any of the CRW there?  
A: I cannot recall, Sir.
Q116: Did you see the three vehicles unloading those kit bags?
A: Yes, Sir. Not unloading I saw them parked, I knew they have been used. I could see one of the drivers going around.

Q117: Did you see the driver?
A: I think it was Staff Sgt Vakadranu.

Q118: Are you aware of drivers of other vehicles that brought in the weapons for the other days?
A: No, Sir.

Q119: Are you aware of the vehicles that brought in the weapons on Saturday?
A: No, Sir.

Q120: On Sunday morning?
A: From what I can recall in one of those trips they came back with the rations from headquarters, RFMF.

Q121: Did you still have a weapon?
A: No, Sir.

Q122: Who was issuing the sniper rifles in the complex?
A: I think there were quite a few there but were issued to the security guys.

Q123: Who were these security guys?
A: In one of the nights I was issued with it as I am a sniper too but the rest I cannot recall.

Q124: What about the parker hale?
A: No, there was no parker hale, it was just the M16. I think it was the colt.

Q125: Did you have any night vision?
A: Yes.

Q126: But no parker hale?
A: No.

Q127: But was there any in the Parliament complex?
A: No, Sir. Because the parker hale is a bit bulky to take around the vehicle.

Q128: Can you just confirm this, you said your pistol number was 351319?
A: No, Sr. I think it was 305319 or something like that.

Q129: When you were at the Parliament complex, did any one in the operation room talk to anyone within the RFMF?
Cpl. Vosavere we have finished with you for the time being but before we end this session, is there anything else you wish to say?

Sir, I wish I had a clear memory as I have said I find it very difficult to try and recall some of the details.

[ K. VOSAVERE]
Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
WO1
Member
Lcpl Rere, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Lcpl Rere, o a curu e na 1FMS Unit e na yabaki cava?
A: 1990.

Q2: Vakamacalataka mada na nomu vakaitavi e na ka e yaco e na i ka 19 ni siga ni vula o Me, kevaka o a vakaitavi e na vuli vakaivalu, so na planning balsta na ka e yaco, mai na i ka 19 ni siga me yacova sara na siga o march-in tale mai i loma ni keba?
A: Na i ka 19 saka ni siga au a sega ni tiko saka kina. Au a qai gole saka i kea ena i ka 22 saka ni siga, Siga Tabu. Au a gole saka ga i kea e na nei rau a kau kakana i loma, sa yakavi, oti au mani lai moce sara i kea, au saka lesu tale mai e na mataka lailai ni siga Moniti oya, keitou mai vesu saka kina mai vei iratou na ovisa. Keitou mani vesu keitou lai sogo sara tu kina e na CPS, gole saka yani i Major Caucau vata kei Col Tarakini kini, rauta tiko beka na 1.00 na kaloko e na bogi keitou sa qai sere tale mai. Oti saka mai oya, keitou sa gole sara i na keba i cake, i na office - Land Force, keitou lai dadabe tiko kina vakalai i ni bene i ni keitou sa qai gole ki na neitou complex i na keba. Tekivu saka mai o ya, au sega ni qai gole saka tale ki na dua na vana, au sa yadra saka tikoga mai cake.

Q3: Lcpl Rere, ni o rai mai cake qo, o na raica ni sega sara ni dua na gone lailai me dabe tu yani i ke. Na veivaqaqai qo, o iko na i ka 65 ni tamata. Na naba koya e tiko qori vei iko na Lance Corporal, o sa bau yacova oti o iko na full-kovalu; vakamatatakata mada na nomu i vakamacala.
A: E na i ka 21 e na nomu curu i loma oya i na Complex, o bibi mai kea, o qai lai vesu mai, o vesu mai vei, na cava o a cakava tiko e na gauna o vesu mai kina - vakamatatakata na vei ka kece o ya?
Au bibi saka mai Parliament e na mataka ni Moniti, au a kauta lesu saka mai na i tavatawa ni kakana - hot box, muri mai e na back-road mai Vatuvaqa, sa muri keitou saka mai e kea na ovisa, ena mua ni bulubulu mai yasama qo, ratou mai block-taki keitou kina, ratou mai kerea saka ma check-taki neitou bag. Keitou solia neitou bag, e sega ni dua na ka e tiko e na neitou bag. Sa mani ratou kaya sara me keitou kau sobu i na CPS, keitou sa mani veikau sobu i na CPS, tauri saka e so na neitou i tukutuku, ni tauri oti na neitou i tukutuku, sa mani tukuni me keitou se vakacegu toka mada i Totogo.

Q4: Oti o ya?
A: Keitou sa mani mai tiko yani i CPS na bogi ni siga Tusiti, sa qai gole saka yani o Major Caucau vata kei Col Tarakini kini me ratou sereki keitou mai. Keitou mani gole ki na keba i cake, rauta tiko na 1.00 na kaloko e na bogi. Mai kea, keitou gole sobu sara i na neitou complex i na keba. Tekivu mai
na gauna oya, sega tale niu qai gole i na Palimedi. Au sa yadra saka tikoga mai cake.

Q5: E vica vata na taro; ni bera mai ka 19 ni siga, o bau vakaitavi e na dua na vuli vakaivalu kei na veika kece vakaoya?
A: Sega saka.

Q6: O a tiko mai vei?
A: Au a leave saka tu, au a se qai lesu saka tikoga mai Sinai.

Q7: O qai tekivu tale e naica?
A: Au qai tekivu cakacaka saka tale e na Moniti me kena i ka 19 na siga Vakaraubuka.

Q8: Na macawa ni vuaviri?
A: Sir.

Q9: Ka 15 ni siga?
A: Siga Moniti saka.

Q10: Macawa taucoko oya o tikoga e na Unit mai cake?
A: Sir.

Q11: Na gauna o vesu kina oya, o vesu mai vei?
A: Mai na i bulubulu mai Vatuwaqa - e yasana mai qo.

Q12: O a vesu vata kei cei?
A: Ravai vata kei Naika.

Q13: Dua na dakai a vesu talega?
A: A vesu saka talega kina e dua na dakai.

Q14: Na calibre cava?
A: MPS, Sir.

Q15: Siga Tusiti; vica na kaloko a lako yani o rau o Col Caucau kei Col Tarakinikini ki na CPS?
A: Sa dua saka beka na kaloko e na bogi levu.

Q16: Me mataka lailai ni siga Tusiti se mataka lailai ni Vukelulu?
A: Mataka lailai ni Tusiti.

Q17: E na gauna o tiko kina mai na Unit mai cake, o bau veitaratara vata kei na dua e na loma ni Complex?
A: Sega.

Q18: O cei a tukuna vei iko mo kauta na kakana i loma ni Complex?
A: Au a gole saka ga i caka meu lai yadra e na siga oya, au sa mani donumaka na lori a vodo tiko mai kina o Ravai, sa mani tukuni meu vodo me keirau kauta sobu na kakana.

Q19: O cei a tukuna vei iko mo vodo e na loma ni lori oya?
A: O Ravai saka.

Q20: E levu na ka a yaco ni oti na i ka 19 ni siga mai Levuka, Korovou, Labasa, Savusavu, Monasavu; o iko bau vakaitavi e na dua na ka?
A: Sir.

Q21: Vakamacalataka mada?
A: Au a gole saka i Levuka.

Q22: Vakamacalataka mada na ka a yaco mai Levuka, na tiki ni siga?
A: Au sa guilecava saka na tiki ni siga au gole kina i Levuka. O au a qai tukuni saka ga vei au me keirau gole i Levuka, au sa mani gole i Levuka. Keirau lako yani sa kama tiko na vale, au mani lai tu i kea me yacova saka na nei tou gole saka mai.

Q23: Bau dua na i yaragi oka kauta i Levuka?
A: Dua saka na i yaragi.

Q24: Yaragi cava?
A: M16 kei na pistol.

Q25: E vica na M16, e vica na pistol?
A: Rua na M16, rua saka na pistol.

Q26: O gcle vata kei cei i Levuka?
A: O Cekaunitabua saka.

Q27: O ce: a tukuna vei iko mo lako i Levuka?
A: A qa. soli saka ga vei au na orders me keirau lako i Levuka.

Q28: O ce: a tukuna vei iko se o cei a solia vei iko na directive o ya mo lako i Levuka?
A: E tukuni saka vei keirau ni loko mai Palimedi na directive o ya.

Q29: O cei a tukuna vei kemudrau?
A: Au sega saka ni taura rawa.

Q30: O iko na Kovula. A soli vei iko mo Kovula baleta na nomu taledi ni veilutaki. Qori vaka ga o vakamacala tiko vua e dua na gone kalasi dua. Dua e solia vei iko na order oti o qai sega ni kila o cei a solia vei iko na order. Sa matata vinaka vei keitou na lewe ni Board na ka a yaco. Au na vakaruataka na ka au tukuna mai tuba oya. Qo na official inquiry. O sega
ni lako e na buca ni valu mo vesu, me tabu ni o soli tukutuku vei ira na meca. O cei a solia na directive mo lako i Levuka?

A: Na ka saka ga a tukuni vei keirau me keirau gole saka.

Q31: O cei a tukuna vei kemudrau?
A: E sega ni tukuni vei au o cei e solia mai. E tukuni ga ni lako mai na i tukutuku mai na Palimedi me keirau gole saka i Levuka.

Q32: O cei a tukuna na i tukutuku oya?
A: O Satini Mala saka a tukuna mai.

Q33: Mala?
A: Cakaunitabua saka.

Q34: O kila na siga cava drau a gole kina i Levuka?
A: Au sa guilecava saka.

Q35: Drau lai macawa vica se siga vica i Levuka?
A: Macawa dua saka.

Q36: A cava a caka mai Levuka?
A: Na vakamakama saka.

Q37: Drau a vakaitavi e na vakamakama?
A: Sega saka.

Q38: Bau dua na gauna a vanataki na dakai mai Levuka?
A: Sega saka.

Q39: Sa tiko e vei na dakai e na gauna qo?
A: Se suka lesu saka i na armoury.

Q40: Gauna drau tiko kina mai Levuka, caka tiko na veitaratarara vata kei ira na tiko e na loma ni Palimedi. O cei a solia vei kemudou na directive mai Levuka mai na loma ni Palimedi, dou a report tiko vei cei?
A: Au a tu wale saka tu ga i kea. Au a sega ni kila e dua na veitaratara.

Q41: O cei e i liiuli ni operation mai Levuka?
A: O Satini Lotawa saka.

Q42: Where were you on the 19th of May?
A: I was at home.

Q43: Where at?
A: Munankoso Housing.

Q44: When you returned to camp, were you issued with your personal weapon in camp?
A: No, Sir.
Q45: The MP5 that was taken from you, Ravai and Naika at Vatuwaqa, who took the weapon off you?
A: They took the weapon from us.

Q46: Who, the military or police?
A: The police at CPS.

Q47: How did you go to Levuka?
A: By boat.

Q48: From where?
A: We boarded the bus from here, got off at Natovi and caught the ferry from there.

Q49: Who paid for the journey?
A: We paid our own fares.

Q50: Where did you stay in Levuka?
A: At the PAFCO.

Q51: You said that you were there, Cakaunitabua and Lotawa. Were some other persons with you in the factory?
A: There were some workers there.

Q52: Was any policeman with you?
A: No, Sir.

Q53: Did you go to Kalabu School when the members of the Unit were there?
A: No, Sir.

Q54: Na Unit cava o sa tiko kina e na gauna qo?
A: Au sa post-taki saka ki na HQ LFC. Au se attach saka tiko vei iratou na MP.

Q55: Bau dua na gauna a musu na kemu i sau, e na gauna o vakaitavi tiko kina mai Levuka, se na gauna o a vesu kina vei iratou na ovisa?
A: Sega saka.

Q56: E na gauna o sa post-taki kina ki na HQ LFC, na cava a tukuni vei iko mai na nomu Unit (1MS) na vu ni nomu post-taki yanu ki na Unit oya?
A: Na ka saka ga a tukuni vei keitou na vakaitavi e na veitokoni ena ka ka vakayacori e na i ka 19 ni siga, tukuni saka vei keitou me keitou sa na post-taki ki na vei Unit tale eso - 3FIR, LSU, HQ.

Q57: E na nomu rai o iko ni so e se tiko ga e na nomu Unit makawa, na 1MS era veitokoni talega e na ka e vakayacori e na i ka 19 ni Me e ra sega ni post-taki tani mai na Unit oya?
A: Au sega saka ni taura rawa.
Q58: Vakacava na nomudou veimaliwai, o kemudou dou sa post-taki tani mai na Unit vata kei ira e ra se tiko e na nomudou Unit makawa?
A: Neitou veimaliwai saka e vinaka tu.

Q59: Vakacava na nomudou veimaliwai o kemudou na post-taki tani mai vakaraki iko kei ira na lewe ni Unit vou o sa lai tiko kina qo; vakacava na veimaliwai i kea?
A: Na vanua keitou sa dui lai post-taki saka kina, e tu eso keimami sa veimaliwai, e so e ra sega ni taleitaka saka na neitou post-taki saka yani. Sa rawa ni laurai saka e na nodra i vukivuki, nodra i vosavosa, au sa raica oti sara talega i kea na nodra sega ni taleitaki keitou e na neitou post-taki yani ki na Unit keitou lako saka yani kina.

Q60: Sa bau dua na gauna e dua na threat se dua na i vakarau kaukauwau e vakayacori vei iko e na nomu Unit vou qo?
A: E sega saka. Na Unit saka au tiko saka kina qo, e levu e taleitaka na noqu veimaliwai.

Q61: Cpl Rere, na cava sara mada a tukuni vei kemudrau mo drau lai vakayacora i Levuka?
A: A tukuni saka ga me keirau lai raici Lotawa. E sega tale ni dua na ka e tukuni me keirau cakava.

Q62: Na nomudrau yaco yani i Levuka, na i vakasala cava sa qai tukuna vei kemudrau o Satini Lotawa?
A: Keirau yaco yani e kea e sega tale ni dua na ka e tukuna vei keirau o Satini. Keirau lako ga keirau lai tu vata tu ga kei koya.

Q63: Bau dua na gauna e ra kila na lewe ni vanua ni tiko vei kemudrau na i yaragi?
A: E ra sa rogoca saka tikoga.

Q64: Tou lesu tale mada mai ki na nomudou Unit makawa. Bau dua na gauna o tiko kina e na loma ni nomudou Unit makawa, se bera ni o lako sobu i Levuka; o bau rogoca ni vakarau kaba yani e so tale na lewe ni Mataivalu me lai kabata na nomudou keba se nomudou Unit mai na Queen Elizabeth Barracks mai cake?
A: Noqu tiko saka mai cake oya, au sega saka ni rogoca e dua na ka vaqori.

Q65: Bau dua na gauna sa tekivu issue kina vei kemudou nomudou dui personal weapon?
A: Segu saka.

Q66: Na gauna dou a vesu kina vata kei Ravai, a vesu vata kina e dua na MP5; a cava na vu ni nomudou kau i yaragi tiko kina?
A: Keitou sega ni kauta mai na i yaragi oya me lai vakayagaaki e na dua na vanua; a kau saka ga mai na i yaragi oya niu qai lai kila i CPS ni tukuna o Ravai ni sa tukuni mai ni MP5 oya me kau cake i na armoury, e leqa tiko na kea firing pin.
Q67: Dou se qai vakasuka lesu tale tiko i cake?
A: Keitou se qai vakasuka lesu tiko i cake.

Q68: Nomu goloe i Levuka, o tukuna o iko ni ka e tumu nei kemudrau mo drau lako, drau lako vei Lotawa; a sega tale ni dua na ka a tukuni me baleta na nomudrau lako?
A: Sega saka.

Q69: Ia a cava na vu ni kena kau tiko na i yaragi?
A: Keirau a lako saka ga i kea me keirau lai support vei Lotawa.

Q70: Oya sa oti kina na vakamakama?
A: Sa oti saka.

Q71: The day this weapon was confiscated at Vatuwaqa, were you carrying ammunitions?
A: No, Sir.

Q72: What vehicle were you travelling in - BV 917?
A: Sir.

Q73: The date that weapon was confiscated was the 22nd of May?
A: It was on a Monday, Sir.

Q74: This is what the police took from you, Ravai and Naika (Board Member reads)

"1 MP5 Machine Gun - S/N B30761
1 Magazine containing 30 rounds; and
1 Magazine containing 20 rounds".

Why were you carrying that weapon if the firing pin was bad?
A: There were no rounds in either weapons.

Q75: Where were these rounds?
A: There were no rounds there, Sir, I just know the weapon.

Q76: Na lori nei cei qo, na BV 917?
A: Na ka ni Unit saka.

Q77: Kovula Rere, o iko vakaitavi e na kena takeover-taki na PAFCO?
A: Sega saka.

Q78: O iko vakaitavi e na dua na vakacaca se na vakamakama mai Levuka?
A: Sega saka.

Q79: O ce: a qai vakasuka na dakai koyara kau i Levuka?
A: A vakasuka saka o Satini Cakaunitabua.
Q80: O ira na lewe ni vanua koya e ra dau vakaitavi e na kena tauri na PAFCO, e ra lewe ni vanua mai na tikina o Lovoni, e dina oya se sega?
A: Sir.

Q81: Nomudou tiko i kea, na communication cava a vakayagatakasi ena veitaratara kei ira na tiko e na loma ni Complex?
A: E sega saka ni dua na comms. e tiko vei keitou.

Q82: Dou qai veitaratara vakacava?
A: Na vanua mada au tiko kina o au, e sega ni dua na vanua meu veitaratara rawa kina.

Q83: Ka 22 ni siga dou vesu kina, dou sere e na mataka lai lai ni siga Tusiti. Mai na siga Tusiti oya na i ka 23, siga cava o drau qai lako kina i Levuka - oti toka e dua na macawa?
A: Au sa guilecava saka na date.

Q84: Na gauna koya a vakacacani kina na TV Station, o a se tiko i Suva oya?
A: (Silence)

Q85: Sigatabu, na weekend ka tarava?
A: Au sega saka ni taura rawa.

Q86: O iko nomu sere ga mai e na Police Station, o sa mai tu ga e na Unit me yacova na gauna e tukumi tale kina vei iko mo lako i Levuka?
A: Sir.

Q87: When you went up to HQ, you said you went to see Land Force Commander?
A: We returned from CPS with Major Caucau, Col Tarakinkiniki. We went to Land Force Office, had a bowl of grog then we went to our complex.

Q88: Who was in that office?
A: Col Tarakinkiniki, Land Force, Sgt Naitaka, Ms Druavesi. Also there was another Lietenant whom I do not know his name.

Q89: What was said in the office?
A: Nothing was said, Sir. We were just asked to have a bowl of grog then we left.

Q90: Na i ka 31 ni siga na kena kau sobu na kakana ki na Complex mai ra, na kakana cava a kau sobu?
A: Rice & curry, Sir.

Q91: Hot box?
A: Sir.
Q92:  O iko vakaitavi ena kena vakavodoki na i yaragi e na siga Lotulevu, na i ka 18 ni siga ni vula o Me?
A:  Seqa saka.

Q93:  O iko vakaitavi ena kena vakavodoki na i yaragi e na i ka 19 ni siga?
A:  Seqa saka.

Q94:  Siga Vakarauwai na i ka 20 ni siga, o iko a vakaitavi e na kena vakavodoki na i yaragi koya a kau sobu i Bilo?
A:  Seqa saka.

Q95:  O iko a tiko ena keba e na gauna a vosa kina o Col Tarakinikini ena i ka 19 ni siga, rauta toka beka na 7.00 na kaloko e na bogi?
A:  Seqa saka.

Q96:  O iko a tiko ena Unit?
A:  Seqa saka.

Q97:  O iko a tiko ena Unit ena gauna e lako yani kina o Commander ena mataka lailai ni siga Moniti?
A:  Seqa saka, keitou a se tiko ga kina mai na CPS.

[P. RERE]
Lance Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
WO1
Member
SIXTY-FOURTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 23749 LCPL EPELI GAUNAVOUIVUDA

Lcpl Gaunavouivuda, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Kovula, na cava na nomu cakacaka ena loma ni 3 ni mataivalu?
   A: O au na Intelligence Operative.

Q2: Vakamacalataka na nomu vakaitavi ena ka e yaco ena 19 ni siga, na ka kece me baleta na vuaviri, na nomu vakaitavi oiko, ocei e vakaitavi vata kei iko kei na cakacaka o cakava i loma ni Palimedi.
   A: Ena i 19 ni Me, au a lako vata mai kei ira na tayabe, eratou tayabe mai na Nationalist Tako Lavo Party. O koya saka ya e lai yaco ena neitou lai curu ena Palimedi enai ka 19 ni siga.

Q3: Ocei a tukuna vei iko nolai vakaitavi ena tayabe o ya?
   A: Au a task-taki mai vei neitou CO.

Q4: Vakamacalataka mada na tayabe, oti ya o yaco i Valelevu.
   A: Keitou lako saka mai na tayabe, yaco saka mai Valelevu, esa tukuni e kea ni sa caka na takeover, au sa qai lako mai kea yacova sara na noqu lai curu i Palimedi.

Q5: Mai na matamata mai Valelevu, dou gole cake ena complex?
   A: Mai na matamata i Valelevu, au sa qai cici me yacova sara i Palimedi.

Q6: O curu i Palimedi?
   A: Au qai curu i Palimedi esa wawa tu mai kina na neitou source.

Q7: Vakamacalataka mada na nomu yaco yani i Palimedi, na cava ea caka?
   A: Ai curu i Palimedi, esa bogi, au sega ni taura rawa na gauna. Au lako ga yani me vaka niu intelligence operative, na ka ga au vinakata, au sa curu yani kina ya meu lai kauta mai.

Q8: O curu i loma, na cava o qai cakava tiko i loma?
   A: Au wili files kei na vakarorogo telephone calls.

Q9: Ena loma ni Operation Room?
   A: Intelligence cell.

Q10: O cei na nomudou liiuli ena ka ni Int i loma ya?
    A: E sega ni dua na neitou liiuli baleta ni keitou kila ni keitou intelligence operatives.

Q11: O cei nai liiuli ni operations?
    A: Au sega ni kila.

Q12: E bau dua na gauna o biuta na complex mo curu i tupa?
A. E sega saka.

Q13. Ena gauna cava o qai curu i tuba?
A. Au qai curu i tuba ena matakau lai 14 ni July.

Q14. Vaka macalataka mada o iko na cakacaka cava o cakava i loma ni Int cell oya?
A. E levu ga na gauna au rogoce na telephone, au vakawili ka tu na files i loma ya.

Q15. Na files cava soti e tu i loma ya?
A. E levu na nodratou files na People's Coalition Party.

Q16. O cei a compile taka taucoko na files kece ya?
A. E levu sara.

Q17. Qori na files ko ya kau mai na FIS dou vakawili ka tiko?
A. Sega, qo eso ga na nodratou ka ga na Coalition e tu i loma ya.

Q18. O cei a compile-taka na file ya?
A. Au sa sega ni taura rawa okoya e cakava.

Q19. O a vakaitavi ena security, na yadra?
A. E sega, eso na gauna au yavoki ga au lesu tale i loma.

Q20. Oiko a Int Operative ni 3FIR, o soli tukutuku tiko ihe ena gauna o a tiko kina i loma ya?
A. Au a soli tukutuku tiko mai vei iratou na nei toun intelligence clerks.

Q21. E dua a tukuna vei iko mo lako i loma ya? E dua e direct takin iko mo lai cakacaka i loma ya?
A. Sir.

Q22. O cei?
A. Na neirau cakacaka saka ga esa tukuni kina me keirau lako i loma.

Q23. Ocei a tukuna vei kemudrau?
A. Neitou lako i loma, keitu sa qai veitaratara mai kei na neitou CO me tukuni ni keitou sa tiko i loma.

Q24. Mo vakaraitaka mada ike na vanua e tiko kina na Int cell?
A. (Witness stood up to indicate). O ratou na Indian hostages tiko i ra, o keitou i cake.

Q25. Na hostages kaidia?
A. Sir.

Q26. Eso na gauna nio tiko i loma ya, o vakau tukutuku tiko i loma ni mataivalu, na threat?
A. E sega.
Q27: E dua na fax ea tiko ena loma ni Int room se operation room?
A: E tiko na fax.

Q28: Ena loma ni Int?
A: Sir.

Q29: Ocei e qai vakau threat tiko mai ena loma ni Int?
A: Au sega ni taura rawa. Au sega talega ni kila na kena operate taki na fax.

Q30: Ocei e task taki kemudou ena loma ni Int cell? E must e dua me solia tiko na directive, na cava me caka, et cetera?
A: E sega, e veicalati na gauna ni neitou tiko ena cell.

Q31: Vakacava mada o Lt. Dakai?
A: Ea decommission taki beka o koya.

Q32: Kua ni leqataka ya, o Dakai e cava nonai tavi i loma ya?
A: Baleta ni keitou veicalati, au sega ni kila na ka e cakava tiko o koya.

Q33: O Col. Mua?
A: Sega, o Col. Mua e sega ni dau lako mai vakalevu e kea.

Q34: E bau dua na gauna o raici Director SB?
A: Au a raici Director SB ni a lako yani.

Q35: Vakavica?
A: Vakadua ga.

Q36: A cava lai cakava o koya i loma ya?
A: Au sega saka ni kila na gauna e lako yani kinà.

Q37: E curu okoya ena loma ni Int cell se Ops Room?
A: Noqu raici koya e tu ga i tuba.

Q38: You said you were answering phone calls in Parliament, did you receive any calls from officers from RFMF?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q39: Can you name the officers that called?
A: Lt. Col. Tarakini'kini vakalevu sara, au taura na calls au solia ga, au sega ni ciqoma na ka e tukuna mai.

Q40: Who did he want to speak with?
A: Elevu na gauna eran wiritalanoa kei Na Qase.

Q41: Who else?
Q42: This Int and the operations cell in that building, how is it partitioned?
A: E sega ni partition, e keitou sega ni kila e levu na ka ni operations, e levu na ka e ka taka ga na qase, e relay kecega vei na qase na ka e baleta na operations.

Q43: This is the whole room, were you both located in the same room, Ops and Int?
A: Na partition e tiko. Esa dede na neitou tiko ike, au sa qai kila ni office nei Rajend ko keitou tiko kina, au sega ni kila na office ko tiko kina o na qase.

Q44: Can you name the people who were with you in the cell, how many of you?
A: Corporal Vosabeci, Dakai, Cakau.

Q45: O Cakau cava qo, o Satini se o Kovula?
A: Kovula Cakau.

Q46: How did you address Mr. Dakai in your cell there, in the complex?
A: Keitou sega ni address taki koya, baleta ni keitou sa kila ni sa de-commission taki.

Q47: What did you call him?
A: Gun

Q48: The documents you retrieved from the complex, did you retrieve some documents from the office?
A: Na documents taucoko esa soli vei Kovula Vosabeci.

Q49: Prior to 19th May, were you involved in any assessments done?
A: No, Sir.

Q50: Were you aware of any attempts to overthrow the Government?
A: Na mataka ya esa qiri mai vei au o Lagi e tukuna mai vei keitou ni so na staff officers ena veisautaki kina na Prime Minister. Au sega ni kila ocei na staff officer.

Q51: O Vosabeci e qiri mai vei iko ena mataka lailai ni siga Vakaraubuka?
A: E tukuna saka mai vei keitou o koya ena mataka ni siga Vakaraubuka, e qiri yani.

Q52: E qiri mai vei o koya?
A: E tukuna yani o koya vei keitou baleta na neitou brief mai na neitou safe house ena siga Lotulevu na vanua me keitou lai tiko kina ena gauna ni tayabe. Baleta ni sa build up mai na tayabe ni 28 kei na 29 esa neitou vakabauta, e keitou sa raica ena yakavi ni siga Lotulevu ni na rawa ni caka e dua na takeover ena 19 ni siga. Ena mataka ya esa qiri yani vei keitou o Lagi.

Q53: E rauta ni vica na kaloko ya?
A: Ena mataka lailai ....
Q54: Ena vitu, walu, ciwa ....
A: Au sega ni taura na gauna, au se tiko mai ra, esa qiri yani o koya, esa tukuna o koya me ....

Q55: E vica na kaloko o biuta na Keba mo lako sobu na tayabe?
A: Au lako sobu rauta toka na 7 na kaloko ena mataka lailai, se mataka lailai sara au sa lako, au sega ni taura rawa na gauna.

Q56: E vica na kaloko oo curu i loma ni Keba, QEB ena mataka lailai ni siga ya, 19 ni siga?
A: Au biubiu saka ga mai vale.

Q57: O yaco i na Keba e vica tale na kaloko?
A: Au sega tale ni qai lako i na Keba. Au biubiu ga mai vale, keitou sa lako sara, keitou sa dii lako ga, sa dii kil ga na vanua me keitou ....

Q58: Ena gauna cava ea qiri yani okoya vei kemudou? O dou a tiko ivei? Na gauna e vakamalataka okoya ni mataka lailai ni siga Vakarauubuka ena caka na veisautaki ni PM. Ena 6 na kaloko o biubiu mai vale, ena 9 na kaloko e caka kina na march, domu?
A: Ena veimama ni 9 na march.

Q59: Ena vica na kaloko i loma ya ea qiri vei kemudou?
A: Okoya ea qiri saka mai ena mataka lailai.

Q60: Vei iko i vale?
A: Io saka.

Q61: Kenai balebale ni bera na 6 osa taura na qiri mai vale?
A: Io saka.

Q62: E vakamalataka okoya ni na veisau na PM?
A: A sa tukuna mai vei koya na nona source.

Q63: Okoya ga na source dou lai sota i Palimedi, o koya ga ya?
A: Io saka.

Q65: Na source qo e tiko ena Tako Lavo Party?
A: Au sega ni kila saka.

Q66: Kovula, ena gauna oo tiko ena loma ni Parliament Complex, o bau rogoca ena dua na veitalanoa se dua e cavuta ni vuaviri ya e vakaitavi tiko kina na mataivalu se veitokoni kina na mataivalu.
A: Io saka.

Q67: O rogoca vei cei?
A: Au rogoca ni tukuna o Na Qase.
Q68: O kila na siga cava e tukuna kina o Na Qase?
A: Sega maka.

Q69: Oya se qai tekivu ga na vuaviri se sa dede toka na kena vakayacori na vuaviri?
A: Esa dede toka, esa oti e dua na macawa.

Q70: O rawa ni vaka samataka na vosa cava sara mada e cavuta okoya?
A: Tukuna okoya "Na veitokoni e lañi tiko mai cake".

Q71: E dua tale drau a tiko vata e rogoça na vosa ya? Ea vosa raraba okoya se a vosa vei kemudou na sota?
A: Au kila ni keitou lewe levu, e lako mai okoya e tukuna ni veitokoni esa lako tiko mai, na kedatou kakana ena vakabutari tiko mai cake. Okoya saka ya.

Q72: O rawa ni vakadeitaka mada ena vica na kaloko ea curu kina ena loma ni Palimei?
A: Au curu ena Parliament Complex ni sa voleka na 9 na kaloko se 10 na kaloko ena boqiqi ni 19 ni Me.

Q73: Kenai balbakale ni oti mai na tayabe oga gole ivela?
A: Au a tu ena tayabe, au mai wawa tiko i tuba, keitou mai gunu yaqona tiko i tuba me yaqona ni neitou curu i loma.

Q74: Dou a gunu yaqona tiko i tuba vata kei cei?
A: Levu sara na tamata ko ra lako yani ena tayabe.

Q75: Gunu yaqona ivela?
A: Ena Parliament Complex i tuba baleta ni ra dadabe tu ikeu e levu na tamata.

Q76: Ena gauna o tiko kina ena loma ni Parliament Complex, tekivu nai ka 19 ni siga, o bau rogoça eso na yaca ni turaga ni valu e na Keba ni cavuti na yacdra ni oira qo era sa vakara vei vutakti ena loma ni maatvalu?
A: Sega maka.

Q77: Ena gauna cava ea qai musu kina na kemui sau?
A: E musu saka na kequi sau ena otioti saka ni veisaumi ena vula o Me.

Q78: Ena gauna cava e cegu kina na nomu vakau tukutuku ena 3FIR?
A: Nai tukutuku esa lako yani mai vei keirau, na contacts esa lako mai, esa sega ni rawa, me keirau sa compile ga me yacova sara ni oti, me keirau qai kauta kece mai.

Q79: O cei e vakadewataka yani nai tukutuku ya?
A: O Kovula Laverua.

Q80: O bau vaqqa se cava a musu kina na kemui sau kevaka sa vakadewataki yani vei-si ko nai tukutuku ya?
A: Au sega ni kila se cava ea musu kina na kequi sau baleta ni keirau a task taki i loma, au sega ni kila e dua nai tukutuku me baleta saka qori.

Q81: Kovula, otioti ni taro, ena siga cava ea vakayacori kina na veibulu ena loma ni Parliament Complex?
A: Na veibulu keirau a lako mai ena mataka ya i tuba me keirau kauta mai na ka i loma, o au qai lesu tale ena 1 na kaloko vata kei na noqu lewe ni vale meu attend-taka na veibulu.

Q82: O kila tiko na tiki ni siga cava?
A: Enai ka 14 ni vula o July.

Q83: Nomu a tiko ena loma ni complex, oa vakayaragi?
A: Na qase e tukuna ga "na yaragi esa tu qori".

Q84: E bau dua na gauna o taura dua na yaragi, ka vakayagataka?
A: Au taura ga na yaragi baleta meu cover taka tiko kina na noqu cover.

Q85: Na yaragi cava?
A: Na uzi.

Q86: E bau dua na gauna oa curu i tuba ena dua na mission, nona lauvana na ovisa ya se dua tale?
A: Saga saka.

Q87: Were you at any time assigned a sentry duty at the complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q88: Kovula, nai ka 18 ni siga, dou a veivosaki ena vale ko vakatoka tiko qori na safe house, o kemudou kece na lewe lima na operatives.
A: Sir.

Q89: Ia mai na bogi ni siga dou veivosaki kina ya mo dou lako ena march, dou sa kila tiko na ka esa na yaco ena siga tarava?
A: Sega, na neitou assessment ga ni intelligence e keitou raica ni sa build up tiko mai na tayabe ena 20 mai Lautoka kei na 28, me qai yacova na 19 esa tositoso cake sara. Au sa kila ni assessment keitou cakava ena yakavi ni siga Lotulevu ena safe house, keitou sa vakila tikoga ni na dua na takover ena siga Vakaraubuka. Keitou sega ni vakadeitaka sara, yacova sara ni sa qai tukuna vei keitou o Lagi.

Q90: Era gauna osa curu kina i matamata i Palimedi enai ka 19 ni siga, o raici iratou na IMS eratou sa duri tu ike?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q91: E sega ni dua vei iratou o raica ikca nomu curu yani i loma, oratou na taura na Palimedi?
A: Sega, Sir. "Au a lako tu ena bogi. -Keirau lako ga yani, sa lako sara i loma, au sega madaga ni kilai iratou na tiko i tuba."
Q92: O tukuna oiko nio gunu yaqona tiko, oti ya ena bogi o qai curu i loma?
A: I tuba.

Q93: Ia a sega ni dua vei iratou a tu i tuba ya, oratou na yadra tu?
A: Sega.

Q94: Ena gauna cava ao curu kina i loma?
A: Mœi na 9 na kaloko kina na 10 na bogi.

Q95: Ia na gauna cava ao gunu yaqona kina i loma?
A: Ni se yakavi.

Q96: Okoya qori au taroga tiko, ena gauna o curu kina ena matamata i Palimedi, ena vica na kaloko?
A: Ena 9 na kaloko kina 10 na bogi.

Q97: E vica na kaloko o qai curu ina complex i loma, loma ni vale i loma?
A: Keitou lako ga yani, keitou sa lako sara i loma.

Q98: Ia o gunu yaqona ena gauna cava?
A: Ni via rauta toka na 5.

Q99: Kenai balebale o gunu yaqona tikoga i tuba?
A: Ia i tuba.

Q100: Ia na nomu curu yani qori, o sega ni raica e dua vei iratou na 1MS ni duri tu ike?
A: Mai na vanua keitou debe tiko kina ya, au sega ni rawa ni tauri iratou rawa.

Q101: Okay, o sa lako i loma, lai curu ena rumu mo dou lai cakacaka kina, e sega ni dua vei iratou o raica ike?
A: Na qase se ocei?

Q102: O na qase ga e tiko i loma.
A: Ena gauna osa raici Major Ligairi kina i loma, na cava e tukuna vei iko?
A: Jo, au sa raica ga au sa kila na mataivalu sa tiko, esa vakaitavi.

Q103: Ocei e qai tukuna vei iko mo lako ike a mo lai cakacaka vei iratou nio iko o Int Ops ni 3FIR?
A: Au sega ni lai cakacaka vei iratou. Au lako ga ike a me baleta ga na ka keirau lakova tiko ya baleta ni keirau a task taki ga ena Labour, People's Coalition kei na kedra kilai oira na staff officers era vakaitavi, qo na ka keitou se vinakata makawa tikoga.

Q104: Mai na nomudou source, o dou sa taura rawa ocei e vakaitavi?
A: Sega.

Q105: Eso na yaca?
A: E sega.
Kovula, o bau kila ni sebera ni caka na tayabe ena 19 ni Me, e dua na bose ea vakayacori tiko ena dua na vale voleka vei Shah mai Laucala Beach?
A: Sega, Sir.

Q107: O kila e dua na turaga na yacana o Joe Waqabaca?
A: Sega, Sir.

Q108: O sega ni kila tiko ni turaga qo e secretary ni Nationalist Party?
A: Sega, Sir.

Q109: Golevi tale mada na taro esa tarogi oti vei iko nio cavuta tiko o iko na ka ga drau a vaqara tiko nai tukeniku me baleti iratou na People's Coalition vata kei cei soti na turaga ni valu, nomu vosa iko na staff officers, era vakaitavi tiko ena kena sagai me vuaviritaki na matanitu?
A: E sega ni staff officers, na kena rawa ni caka na vuaviri.

Q110: Na kena rawa ni caka na vuaviri?
A: Na kena rawa ni caka e dua na ka me na kataki kina na ka esa lako saka tiko, na neitou raica tikoga mai na tayabe vata kei na so na bosebose e caka tiko mai qo, keitou a tiko mai kina.

Q111: Daru lesuva mada na bosebose o se qai cavuta ga qo. Ena loma ni bosebose qo, o sega ni bau rogoca eso na yaca ni turaga ni valu e cavuti kina?

Q112: O rawa ni cavuta mai eso na yaca era a tiko ena loma ni bose?
A: E se yabaki sa oti sara.

Q113: Na cava na nomui tutu vakalotu?
A: Daununau.

Q114: E dua na ka o vunitaka tiko mai vei keitou?
A: E sega.

Q115: Oiko na kovula, oiko tiko na Int. Na tamata e tiko ena Int e kasa na nona vakasama na veika kece. Ena yabaki sa oti, vula sa oti, se yabaki 10 sa oti, e dua na bose e lai talanoataki na ka e sega ni vinakati ena loma ni mataivalu, e bau dredre saraga me keitou vakabauta nio sega ni kila ocei a tiko ena loma ni bose ya.
A: E sega ni mataivalu, na matanitu.

Q116: Oa sega ni kila ocei e tiko ena loma ni bose ya?
A: Eso au kila era a tiko ena bose ya. Na bose kacivi raraba e keitou lai cover taki.

Q117: Na bose ni Tako Lavo?
A: Na bose ni Viti National Workers Union.
Q118: O rawa ni cavuta mada eso na vei turaga kilai levu era a tiko kina?
A: Au kilai Taniela Tabu, ea caka na Town Hall na bose qo kei levu na cakacaka vakamatanitu vakataki Monaihumu.

Q119: Kovula, oe tiko talaga ena dua na bose ka ra tiko kina eso era vakaitavitaki ira tikc ena Interim Government qo?
A: E sega.

Q120: Kovula, ea bau levu na gauna o dau vakaitavitaki iko mo lako mo lai monitor taka na bose, o drau dau lako kei Kovula Vosabeci?
A: Io saka, vakavica ga. Ia levu na bose i yasayasa vaka Ra, au sa lako ga kina.

Q121: Kovula Gaunavouivuda, na dina ni ka o talanoataka nikua ona kila taudua tikoga oiko. E dua na ka o sebera ni vakaraitaka oiko ena loma ni investigations qo?
A: E sega saka.

[Signature]
[E. GAUNAVOUIVUDA]
Lepi

[Signature]
[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[Signature]
[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[Signature]
[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[Signature]
[H. MACOMBER]
WO1
Member
SIXTY-FIFTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 26577 LCPL SAKEASI TIVIKA

Lcpl Tivika, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Kovula, ena yabaki cava oa curu ena 1MS?
A: Au a sega saka ni lewe ni 1MS, au a lewe ni 3FIR. Au a suka saka ena 1998.

Q2: O iko a vakaitavi talega i loma ni Palimedi?
A: Seg a saka.

Q3: O iko bau kila e dua na ka me baleta na vuaviri?
A: E sega saka.

Q4: O a vakaitavi ena dua na ka me baleta na vuaviri?
A: Au vakaitavi saka mai Korovou, au veitokoni saka vei ira na tauri Korovou.

Q5: O ira na lewe ni vanua?
A: Sr.

Q6: Vakamacalataka mada.
A: Ena siga e tauri saka kina o Korovou, au qai yaco mai Korovou ena mataka lalai ni siga ya esa oso tu na tamata i Korovou. Au sa qai mai veitokoni tu ga na dadabu tu i tuuni na gunu yaqona. E va saka tiko mai ya me yacova na gauna esa mai sign taki oti kina na amnesty mesa vakasukai tale na veiliutaki vei iratou na ovisa.

Q7: Ocei a solia tiko na directive, e dua e solia vei iko na directive mo vakaitavi ena ka e yaco mai Korovou?
A: E sega saka. Au sega ni kila saka okoya e solia na directive, au tu saka tu ga ike me baleta na veitokoni ga kei na gunu yaqona.

Q8: O cei na liuliul ni operation mai Korovou? O cei e nomudou i liuliul?
A: Na i liuliul saka ga ko tiko mai Korovou na siga ya o Varenava.

Q9: Eta aura mai vei o koya na nona-directive?
A: Au sega saka ni kila se kauta mai vei na nona directive, na ka ga au kila ni control tiko e kea o koya.

Q10: Kovula, na nomu tiko mai Korovou, o bau raica e dua na lewe ni 1FMS mai Korovou?
A: Au sega saka ni tauri iratou, au sega talega ni kilai iratou.

Q11: E bau vakacaca madaga o bau rogoca e dua na veitalanoa ena batini tanoa, ni so vei iratou e tiko i Korovou?
A: Seg a saka.

Q12: Bera ni yaco na ka oqo, Kovula o iko a tiko na 3?
A: Na vuaviri Sir?

Q13: Io.

Q14: I vei na nomuni koro?
A: Mai Namau, Sawakasa.

Q15: Nomu tiko i Korovou ya, o bau rogoca se o raica, se tukuni vei iko ni so na yaragi e kau mai Labasa mai vakayagataki tiko i Korovou vei kemudou na tiko i Korovou se oira na tauri yaragi tiko i Korovou?
A: Au segu saka ni kila e dua na veitalanoa ni yaragi e vakau mai Labasa se ivei tale na vanua.

Q16: Ia na yaragi mai vei era taura tu oira na tu i Korovou?
A: Au segu sara ga ni kila se kau mai vei na yaragi ya.

Q17: O iko qai iako yani esa vesu tu na Police Station?
A: Esa tauri oti tu o Korovou ena gauna au a yaco yani kina na matak a lai lai ni siga Vakarauwai, rauta ni 10 na kaloko.

Q18: Esu vesu tu o Korovou, esa tikoi vei ira na lewe ni vanua na yaragi?
A: Sir.

Q19: You did not go to Labasa to bring the weapons?
A: No, Sir.

Q20: Na cava nona i tavi o Vecenadavui?
A: Au segu saraga niu taura rawa, au raici koy a saka ga mai kea, au segu ni kila na cava na nona i tavi ike.

Q21: Cpl. Tivika, e rawa ni o vakamaca talaka mada na nomudou a lako ena van ki Natovi?
A: Na va a va vodo kina ni siga o ya e hire taki. Era vodo kina e so na pasidia mai Naiviuca me lesu tale mai ka gole tale ki vale. Eratou a vodo mai na pasid a kei na nodrato i yaya. Eratou laki sobu ki Natovi ka keirau lesu tale mai. Na kena veikauyaki tale na taga o ya, au segu saka ni qai kil a.

Q22: Na mataqali van vakacava dou a vodo kina?
A: Na minibus, saka.

Q23: O celi so a vodo tiko ena minibus?

Q24: E roka vulavula na minibus?
A: Au segu saka ni kila.

Q25: O Jim cava?
A: O Jim Speight.
Q26: Which place in Natovi did they get off?
A: At the jetty.

Q27: At that time, was there anyone in the jetty?
A: I do not know, Sir.

Q28: E rau vodo mai vei?
A: Mai Naivicula.

Q29: What time was it?
A: It was about 6.30 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.

Q30: Who made the arrangement?
A: I do not know, Sir.

Q31: When those two got off, where did you go?
A: I went back home, Sir.

Q32: Do you wish to say anything?
A: No, Sir.

Q33: Do you know any other weapon around the Korovou area?
A: No, Sir.

[S. TIVIKA]
Lance Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member
Cpl Railumu, after having been sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: O curu e na 1FMS e na yabaki cava?

Q2: Gauna qo o sa post-taki i vei?
A: 3FIR.

Q3: Vakamacalataka mada na nomu vakaitavi e na veika e yaco e na i ka 19 ni siga ni vula o Me?
A: Na i na 19 ni siga o ya, au a tu kina mai veikau vata kei iratou na Officer Cadet ni Niusiladi, keitou qai lesu mai e na siga Lotulevu e na macawa ka tarava. Oti e macawa dua, na Moniti e na i karua ni macawa, au sa qai lako soub kina i Palimedi.

Q4: Moniti na i karua ni macawa, ka 29?
A: Sir, qo na Siga Tabu koya a yaco kina na vakacaca e na TV Station, kena Moniti. Au yaco ga yani sa kacivi au mai e dua na neitou i tokani, solia vei au e dua na i yaragi, sa qai mani tukuni meu security fu ga i loma. Tekivu mai na gauna o ya au cawiri tu kina e na perimeter me yacova sara mai na gauna e sa mai suka kina na i yaragi, me sa suka lesu tale i na keba.

Q5: O a yadra tiko evei e na loma ni Complex?
A: (Map shown to witness who then indicated on map)

Q6: Dakai cava o a vakayagatakai i loma o ya?
A: Dua saka na uzi.

Q7: O cei a brief-taki iko e na nomu dau cakacaka i loma o ya?
A: Ena veibogi sa dau handover ga mai ena veika me dau caka e na siga.

Q8: Bau dua na gauna o biuta na Complex mo lako i tuba - o gade i vale se o lako vata kei na dua na i lala i Grammar se na i lala koya ra lako i na TV Station?
A: Sega

Q9: O iko vakaitavi ena kena kau i loma na i yaragi e na siga Lotulevu?
A: Me vakasaka au kaya oti, e na siga ni vuaviri au a tu mai veikau. Na ka kece i muri oya au sega ni kila e dua na ka.

Q10: Kovala, e tiko na timi koya e nona ga na perimeter guards?
A: E ra tiko na civilians, keitou lewe vica ga keitou veivuke tiko vei ratou.

Q11: O cei soti e nomudou tiko na guard-taki ni perimeter?
A: Au kilai au tikoga vata kei ....

Q12: Tukuni kemudou mada na lewe ni 1FMS, koya mada ga au via kilia?
A: Keirau lewe rau ga keirau dau operate ena siga.

Q13: O iko vata kei cei?
A: O au vata kei Lasekula.

Q14: E na bogi?
A: E na bogi, e dau mai handover ga e dua na civilian baleta ni levu ga na gauna keitou sa lewe lailai, keitou sa dau veivuke ga va na veitimi. Keitou na tiko mai cake, keitou sa dau tikoga mai cake.

Q15: Ratou sa dau yadra ga e ra na civilian?
A: Sir.

Q16: Ni ratou yadra na civilian ratou dau vakaiyaragi?
A: Sega, o ratou na ka ga e ratou dau tara rawa tu.

Q17: Sega ni dau soli vei iratou na i yaragi?
A: Sega.

Q18: Ena nomudou dau yadra tiko e na siga eso na vuli vakaivalu e dau caka ena loma ni Complex me vaka na drill?
A: Sir.

Q19: Na vuli cava tale o raica ni vakavulici tiko vei ira na civilian?
A: Na ka ga au taura rawa na drill ga e dau vakayacori tiko o ya.

Q20: Vakacava na martial arts, hapkido?
A: Na martial arts koya e dau veituberi tiko kina o Tonawai.

Q21: O cei e dau veivakatavalici tiko e na drill?
A: Na drill e dau veivakatavalici tiko kina o Poese.

Q22: Vakacava na weapon training?
A: Na weapon training au sega mada ni taura rawa.

Q23: E liu se malumu, ia voleka tiko ni dou sa biubiu mai, era sa dau vesu tiko voleka i matamata na motoka vei iratou na dau yadra tiko i matamata. O kilia na ka e tukuni mai loma me caka se nodratou lewa ga o iratou na yadra tiko ova e na matamata?
A: Qori, Sir, au sega sara ga ni taura rawa.

Q24: Baleta o iko sega ni dau yadra i matamata?
A: Sir.
Q25: Na cava na gauna e taura kina e dua na gauna balavu me oti kina na nomudou exercise mai veikau vata kei iratou na Officer Cadet ni Niusiladi, mai na gauna oya kina gauna o lai curu kina i na Palimedi?
A. Au mai vakasavasavataka saka toka ga na noqu i yaya ni lesu mai veikau e na keba, au sa raica me vakamamacataki vakavinaka, vale laca, na i suwai, sa vinaka na noqu i yaragi au sa qai gole sara.

Q26: Na gauna o lako kina i na Palimedi, a dua mai na nomu Unit a tukuna mo lako sobu se na nomu nanuma ga vakataki iko?
A. Balsta ga ni ratou sa tiko kina o ratou na noqu i lawalawa, sa mani lomaqu meu sa la kolo sobu ga.

Q27: Na gauna o sa la kolo sobu kina, sa lai tekivu soli na nomu I yaragi ena gauna o yeida tiko kina, o bau rogoca na veitalanoa e na vuku ni vuavirii, o rogoca kine ni veitokoni tiko kina na mataivalu?
A. Dua saka ga na ka au raica saka ni levu na turaga ni valu mai na nodatou keba saka era dau la kolo tiko yani i ra. Koya oya e vaka e tukuna tiko vei au ni so na veitokoni e la kolo tiko mai.

Q28: O cei soti na turaga ni valu o bau raica ni curu yani i loma ni Parliamentary Complex?
A. Au raici Col Caucau, Col Tarakinikini.

Q29: Dua tale?
A. Koya saka ga oya.

Q30: E na gauna o a tiko kina e na loma ni Parliament Complex, a bau musu na kemu i sau?
A. Sega saka.

Q31: O veisaumi tu ga?
A. Sir.

Q32: Ia o kana tiko vakacava e na loma ni Parliamentary Complex?
A. E ra dau kaci saka ga mai na lewe ni vanua e na vanua e ra vakasaqa saka tu kina.

Q33: E sega ni dua na routine me oti ga na yeida, sa tiko ga na vanua o lai kana kina?
A. So na gauna e ra sa vakaraautaka ga o ira na veiqaravi tu ena loma ni Palimedi.

Q34: Vakacava o ratou na vo ni lewe ni nomudou Unit, o kila na vanua e ratou dau kana tiko kina?
A. Mataqali vata sara ga koya au sa vakamasala kina oya.

Q35: Segs ni o bau domuya e dua na kakana e kau yani mai na keba?
A. Segs.
Q36: In the Parliament Complex, did you handle any other weapons?
A: No, Sir, only the Uzi.

Q37: Are you sure?
A: Sir.

Q38: You see this; this is the register that was in the Parliament Complex. This register shows six places where you signed for different weapons. Do you want to see?
A: Sir.
(Shown to witness)

Q39: The first Uzi you are talking about:
"Railumu, butt no. 6710946;
Railumu, colt - butt no. 8904 with two magazines;
Railumu, M16 A2 with the launcher - butt no. 81992, 8199321 with two magazines;
Railumu, pistol - butt no. 315321 high powered".

E dina oya se sega?
A: E dina saka, ia na yaragi oya ni oti ga na kena vakayagataki e na dua na siga, au vaskusa lesu tale. Ia na uzi ga, levu ga na gauna au laiko yani, sa soli mai vei au.

Q40: That is why I asked you - were you given any other weapons in the Complex, your answer was "no". Going back to the duties you did in the Complex; were you only assigned parameter duty?
A: Sir.

Q41: Did you have any other duties?
A: No, only along the parameter and inside the Complex - carpark, etc.

Q42: Is it true that you have four-duty teams in the Complex?
A: No.

Q43: Four teams?
A: No.

Q44: Sorry, three teams?

Team 1 - Celesiga, Serukasari, Tamani, Sovaki, Taylor, Raiova, Vasutoga, Vonokula, Ratradrada, Sanila and Vulaki.

Team 2 - Kolikoli, Raivalu, Railumu, is that you?
A: Sir.

Q45: "Liganivai, Ledua, Roko, Liganivai, Poe, "Saukururu, Kuboutawa."
Team 3 - Sokiveta, Tawake, Kini, Vasu, Madrai, Tabua, Illimoira, Degei, Racrodro, Kama, Nawaqa and Navuani. Roving parameter is Ravulo, Alex and Paji; is that not true?

A: Sir, that list was just being put up, but not actually followed. Guards kept changing. Na list qori e biu wale sara tu ga, e tiko na tasking.

Q46: E veiveisa tu ga?
A: Sir.

Q47: You see, although the duty changed, the list we have here, the first duty is checkpoint, second is OP Battery Hill, third one is back-gate and hostages. The listing changes but it contains the duty?
A: E tiko saka ga na list, yaco na gauna sa tiko saka ga koya e raici iratou na hostages. E sega ni mani vakamuri sara tu na timetable qori.

Q48: The pistol that you were issued with; where is that pistol now?
A: I have returned it.

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[ M. RAILUMU]
Corporal

[ J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
WO1
Member
Pte Lasekula, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Private Lasekula, ko a curu ena 1MS ena yabaki cava?
   A: 1993 saka.

Q2: Vakamacalataka mada na nomu a vaka i tavi ena vuaviri oqo, na kena a caka na vuli vakaivalu kei na veika kece?
   A: Au a sega saka ni kila e dua na ka baleta na vuaviri. Ena gauna eya yaco kina ra ka oqo, au a course saka tu mai ATG. Au tu saka tu mai ekeya sa rogo saka ni sa caka na vuaviri ka mani tukunci vei keimami me kua ni dua e lako ki tuba. Au a mani vakamuria saka ga na SOP. Au a mani kereya saka vei iratou mai ra me'u report ga vei iratou mai cake. E a cicivaki au saka na lori mai ATG. Eya gole saka ga mai au mani kereya sara vei iratou meu sobu ga e vale meu veisau kina civilian meu qai gole cake kina keba. Erauou a laiki drop taki au i vale, sa yakavi sara au qai gole cake kina keba.

Q3: Vakamacalataka mada na ka e yaco ena nomu kila me baleta na vuaviri?
   A: Au sega saka ni kila kina e dua na ka.

Q4: Ena vica na kaloko o qai yaco kina keba ena i ka'19 ni siga?
   A: E voleka toka saka na wa'i ena yakavi.

Q5: Ko a kila e dua na ka baleta na vakavakaraou me baleta na vuaviri?
   A: E sega saka.

Q6: Ena nomu yaco yani e loma ni keba, e bau dua na briefing a bau soli vei iko me baleta na ka e yaco?
   A: E sega saka ni dua na briefing e caka.

Q7: O cei eya tiko ena nomu unit ena keba ena gauna o ya?
   A: O iratou saka ga o Mr. Baleinamau saka.

Q8: Na cava o qai cakava ena loma ni unit?

Q9: Ena siga cava ko a lako sobu kina ki ra?
   A: Ena siga Vakaraubuka saka voleka na tini ena bogi.

Q10: Ko a kauta na nomu i yaragi?
    A: E sega saka.

Q11: Ni o yaco ena lomâ ni Palimedi, o cei eya 'brief taki iko? 
    A: E sega saka ni dua e brief taki au.
Q12: O lako i vei ena nomu curu i loma o ya?
A: Au a curu saka ga e matamata.

Q13: Na cava tale e qai yaco?
A: Au lako sakaga i loma o ya, au raici ira saka era sa tiko e loma ni Palimedi, e sega ni soli vei au e dua na brief se cava. E dua na mata gunu yaqona ea caka tiko e kea, au laki dabe tu kina ka'u gunu yaqona tu.

Q14: Na i tavi cava ko a qarava e loma o ya?
A: Ni sa oti saka e rua na siga na noqu tiko e kea, keitou sa qai tu saka tu ga ena perimeter. E tukuni me keitou tikoga ena perimeter.

Q15: O ya ni oti e rua na siga?
A: Io seka.

Q16: Ena siga Moniti o sa tekivu yadra ena perimetre?
A: Io saka.

Q17: Ena perimeter evei?
A: Wavokita saka ga na bai ena loma ni Palimedi saka. Ena yasa saka ga ni bai vata kei ira na lewenivanua.

Q18: E dua tale na sotia eya yadra vata kei iko ena nomu gauna ni yadra?
A: Au kila saka ga ni o au ga vata kei ira na lewenivanua.

Q19: E dua tale na sotia eya yadra vata kei iko?
A: Au sa guilecava saka.

Q20: Ko a bau vakaitavi ena kena sobu na i yaragi ena siga Vakaraubuka?
A: E sega saka.

Q21: E bau dua na dakai e soli vei iko ena siga Vakaraubuka?
A: E sega saka.

Q22: Ena noqu yaco saka yani ena Siga Vakaraubuka eya sega ni soli vei au e dua na ka, eqai soli vei au ena siga Moniti.
A: Io saka.

Q23: Na dakai cava?
A: Na MP5 saka ga.

Q24: O bau vakaitavi ena yadra e loma me yadravi ira na vesu?
A: E sega saka.

Q25: Bau dua na gauna o curu i tuba?
A: Ena noqu curu sakaga mai tuba ena noqu lako mai meu sa lako ki vale.

Q26: Ena siga cava o ya?
Ena i ka 3 ni siga ni vula ko Jiune.

Q27: Baleta na cava?
A: Au sa via lako saka ga.

Q28: Baleta na cava, vakamacalata mada, na cava na vuna? E dua e tukena vei iko se o iko ga vakataki iko?
A: Sa noqu lewa sakaga vakataki au meu sa lesu saka tale.

Q29: Ena siga Moniti, o vakaitavi ena kena sobu na dakai ena mataka lai lai en vitu na kaloko?
A: E sega saka.

Q30: O bau raica na kena curu e loma na lori e kauta yani na dakai?
A: E sega saka.

Q31: Kovula, ena vica na kaloko ko a biubiu mai kina e ATG mo gole ki nomu vale mo luki veisau ena siga Vakaraubuka na i ka 19 ni siga?
A: Au sa guilecava saka ena vica na kaloko au gole kina. Eya tukeni ga me kaimami sota kece ena hall mai ATG. Keimami se tu ga e kea, au sa mani kerekere vei Mr. Vuniwaga, au sa vakamacalata saka vua na SOP ni unit. Oti o ya eratou sa qai kauti au saka ena nodratou lori.

Q32: E dua tale mai na nomu unit drau a course vata tiko mai ATG?
A: O au tau dua saka ga.

Q33: Na cava na vuna o mai dede tiko kina e vale ka vakavuna na nomu qai yaco tu kina ena nomudou unit mai cake ni sa voleka tu na wahu?
A: Au gole saka e vale, au mai veisau, au vakayakavi, au sa qai gole saka i na keba.

Q34: Ena yakavi tiko ga ni Vakaraubuka o ya ena nomu tiko mai na nomudou unit, o bau rogoce e dua na brief se dua na vosa eya laki tauta yani o Lt. Col. Tarakinikimi ena nomudou unit ena yakavi ni siga oya?

Q35: O sega ni kila na cava e laki tukena?
A: Au sa guilecava saka na ka e laki tukena.

Q36: O vakaraitaka ena Board ogo ni a tiko ena nomudou unit ena siga o ya na nomudou OC o Mr. Baleinamau. Drau a bau veitalanoa?
A: E sega saka.

Q37: Ena nomu gole sobu kina Parliament complex, e dua drau a gole vata?
A: E sega saka, o au tau dua saka ga.
Q38: Ena gauna o vakaitavi taki iko tiko kina ena perimeter guard, o dau yadra ena siga se bogi?
A: Na tu saka e keya sa yadra saka tu ga, siga lai bogi. Cegu saka ga vakalailai, kieitou sa wavoki saka tuga ena perimeter.

Q39: Ena gauna ni nomu cegu, o cei o dau hand-over vua?
A: Au sega saka ni hand-over vua e dua. Ena gauna ni cegu, au gole sakaga meu laki cegu toka vei ira na vakatumuloa era tiko e keya. Vakacegu ga vakalailai, gunu yaqona oti, au wavoki saka tale ena perimeter.

Q40: Ena nomu toka e keya yacova na nomu lesu tale mai, o iko sa kila vinaka ena noda bula vakaivalu ena gauna eda dau lako kina i yadra, e tu na gauna me da yadra kina, tiko na gauna meda veisau yadra kina. Eu bau vakatu o ya na kena cicivaki tu na nomudou yadra ena perimeter?
A: O au saka mada ga e sega ni dua e kaya vei au na noqu yadra mai na vica na kalcko meu suka ena vica. Au sa wavoki saka tuga vakai au. E sega saka ni dua e brief-taki au.

Q41: Ena nomu yadra tu o ya, o drau bau sota kei Kovula Kalounivale?
A: E sega saka.

Q42: Ena gauna o vakacegu kina, o biuta tu evei na nomu dakai?
A: E tiko saka ga vei au.

Q43: Ena nomu biubiu mai ena i ka 3 ni siga ni vula o Jiune, o vakasuka vei cei na nomu dakai?
A: Au sega saka ni vakasuka vua e dua, au kauta sakaga, au laki biuta ena vanua era biu tu kina, oti saka ga au sa gole.

Q44: E dua o tatau vua mai na Parliament complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q45: Private Lasekula, au vakabauta e dua beka na ka o raica e loma oya ka vakavuna na nomu lako? E rawa ni o vakamalataka mada vei keitou na cava na vuni nomu lako me vaka ni ra tu na nomu i tokani, dou cakacaka yata?
A: Na vini noqu sa lako saka ga ni sa rogo yani ni sana lai caka e so na ka vei ira na neitou matavuval. O koya o ya na vuni noqu lako mai meu sa gole sara baleta na noqu garauna na noqu matavuval.

Q46: O kila na vanua a rogo tiko kina ni threat taki tiko na nomu matavuval?
A: Na i talanoa saka ga era tukuna tiko na lewe ni vanua e loma o ya. Au rogoca, au vakasamataka, au sa mani gole sakaga i vale.

Q47: Era sega ni tukuna oira se ko cei ena laki vakayacora vei ira na i tovo kaukauvwa ogo vei ira na nomudou matavuval?
A: Au sega saka ni kila, e rogo saka ga yani na i talanoa ni o keitou na tiko e keya ena dua na ka ena laki čaka vei iratou na neitou matavuval. Oti, au sa mani gole saka i vale.
Q48: Ena gauna o biubi mai kina ena i ka 3 ni siga, o bau kila e dua tale mai na nomudou unit e biubi mai tale ga mai kina?
A: E sega saka.

Q49: O bau raici Kovula Buadromo?
A: E sega saka.

Q50: Ena gauna o biuta mai kina na Palimedi ena i ka 3 ni siga, o bau veitaratara tale kei ira na tiko ena Parliament complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q51: Ko a bau report ki na keba?
A: Au gole saka ga mai o ya, au vakadodonu saka ki vale.

Q52: Ena gauna cava o qai gole tale kina ki na keba?
A: Sa oti saka e dua na macawa na noqu tu e vale, eratou sa qai qiri saka ga yani ena keba meu sa mai cakacaka ga ena keba. Au sa mani gole saka.

Q53: O a bau sainitaka e dua na gauna e dua na nomu leave application?
A: Io, na leave application a kau saka yani.

Q54: O bau kila ni ko vakalewena se o sainitaka?
A: E tukuni saka ga me vakaleweni ka sainitaki saka.

Q55: Sa mani o sainitaka sa qai kau lesu tale mai?
A: Io saka.

Q56: O bau kila se o cei a solia na i vakaro?
A: E tukuni saka ga ni kauta saka yani o Col. Caucau.

Q57: Private Lasekula, ena gauna oqo na unit cava o tiko kina?
A: Au tiko saka ena 3FIR.

Q58: E tukuni vei iko na cava na vuni nomu post taki ena 3FIR?
A: E sega saka ni macala vei keitou se na cava na vuni neitou post taki kina 3FIR.

Q59: E rawa ni ko dou vakamatatatata mada vei keitou na i tovo ni nomudou veimaliwi ai na nomu unit vata keiratou na 3FIR?
A: E da raica sakaga ena matadra na cauravou ni se bera ni ra taleitaki keitou saka tiko.

Q60: E so na gauna o dou bau vakila e so na veivakaduiduitaki e caka vei kemudou ena gauna dou tiko kina oqori ena 3FIR mai vei ira na veiliutaki?
A: Au se bera saka mada niu bau raica e dua.

Q61: Private Lasekula, o tukuna ni rua na siga o laki tuga ni se bera ni soli vei iko e dua na i tavi?
A: Io saka.

Q62: Ko a curu ena siga Vakaraubuka, ena siga Vakarauwai, o bau raica e dua na twin cab vulavula e curu yani e loma e vakasoburi mai kina e so na assault bags se kit bags loaloa ka ratou dau vakayagatakana na assault team?
A: E sega saka.

Q63: Vakacava na siga Tabu?
A: E sega saka niu raica e dua na ka.

Q64: Ena i ka 27 ni siga ena ka a yaco i Vuya Road vata kei iratou na 3FIR ena check-point, oya o sa tiko kina e loma. E rau a mavo kina e rau na 3FIR, e dua na turaga ni valu kei na dua na Private. Ea tukuni ni so veikemudou a lako vata sobu mai vata kei ira na civilians era lako sobu mai oya?
A: Au sega saka ni kila kina e dua na ka.

Q65: Vakacava na kena smash taki na TV station ena bogi ni siga Tabu?
A: Au sega saka ni tiko kina.

Q66: E tukuni ni lewe dua se rau era lako vata kei ira na i lawalawa civilians ka ra lako xina TV station?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q67: O bau raica ni issue taki vei ira na civilians na yaragi?
A: Au sega saka ni raica na kena issue taki na dakai vei ira.

Q68: Ena gauna dou dau yastra kina ena perimeter, o iko vata kei Railumu, o iratou talega na civilians eratou vaka i yaragi?
A: Au sega saka ni raica vei ira e dua na civilians me vakai yaragi.

Q69: Private Lasekula, where did you pick up your weapon from the complex? where was the weapon located in the complex? You have seen the map there, can you identify them?

(Witness identified various points on the map).

When you went to pick up those weapons, was there any other IMS personel there?
A: No, Sir.

Q70: Did you return the weapon any time?
A: Na gauna saka ga au sa gole kina i vale, au sa qai laki vakausuka.

Q71: At any time, did you sign for this weapon?
A: Io saka.

Q72: Whom did you sign it from?
A: E tu saka ga e kea na i vola. E sega ni dua e tiko kina. Au sainitaka ga na i vola kau taura mai na dakai.
Q73: Have a look at this register? Is your name on this register?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q74: Is your signature there?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q75: Is that your signature?
A: Yes, that is my signature.

Q76: Who wrote the names on the register?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q77: Did you write that name?
A: E sega saka.

Q78: Was the name on the register when you went to pick up the weapon?
A: Au la ko saka ga, au sainitaka na noqu signature e kea.

Q79: You are not telling us the truth?
A: Au dina saka.

Q80: Raica na mawe ni liga, e dua ga na tamata e voila taukoko na ka oqo. E dua e solia vei iko na dakai, o iko qai saini ga. O cei a solia vei iko na dakai?
A: E sega saka ni dua e solia saka vei au na dakai.

Q81: C cei a vola na yacamu eke?
A: Au sainitaka saka ga na yacaqu.

Q82: O iko ga o vola na ka oqo?
A: E sega saka, au saini saka ga.

Q83: Qui kilai vakacava na naba ni dakai oqo?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q84: E tu ga qo na pepa, tako o iko o taura na dakai, o sainitaka ga na yacam, o cei e qai vakalewena na naba ni dakai eke?
A: Au vola saka ga na naba, au sainitaka saka kau kauto na dakai.

Q85: Ia o cei e vola na yacam?
A: Au sega saka ni vola na yaca.

Q86: O bau raici Satini Ceelasiga ena vanua e tiko kina na i yaragi oqo?
A: E sega saka.

Q87: Ena gauna o sainitaka kina na yacam, e bau so tale na yaca e sa sainitaki tu?

Q88: O bau raici Satini Ravulo?
A: E sëga saka.

Q89: E sëga ni dua e tu e kea?
A: E sëga saka.

Q90: O òei e dusia vei iko na vanua e tiko kina na i yaragi?
A: E sëga saka ni dua e vakaraitaka vei au. Au a sarasara saka ga, au gole saka
yani ka mani donumaka na vanua e tiko kina na i yaragi. E sëga saka ni dua e
vakaraitaki vei au ni tiko ekeya na i yaragi.

Q91: E sëga ni vakaraitaka vei iko o Mr. Ravaí?
A: E sëga saka.

Q92: Kera i balebale na vanua e tiko kina na i yaragi e sëga ni secure-taki tu?
A: Au sëga saka ni kilá.

(Witness stood down)

[W. LASEKULA]
Private

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
SIXTY-EIGHTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 29063 PTE PAULIASI VAKACERETAI

Pte Vakaceretai, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Ko a curu ena unit ena yabaki cava?

Q2: Vakamacalataka mada na ka o kila me baleta na vuaviri kei na nomu vakaitavi talega ena ka yaco?

Q3: Vakamacalataka mada na ka o kila baleta na ka ogo? Keitou sega ni rawa ni wawa eke me tolu na macawa. Sa yaco ga e keya?
A: Oti e dua na siga, ena siga Vakarauwai, au lesu tale mai ena mataka cake. Au gole mai oya, au qai kila ni ratou sa tiko mai ra na unit, au sa mani gole sobu talega.

Q4: Private Vakaceretai, oiko sega ni tamata'ulukau. Na taro e dodonu sara tuga. Keitou sa oca na Board na mai dabe tiko vakaqoo. E dua na taro e tarogi tale vua e dua na tamata, o sega ni tamata ulukau o iko, na taro ogo, na cava o kila me baleta na vuaviri, na ka e yaco, na nomu vakaitavi, mai na kena i tekivu me yacova na gauna o sa mai dabe tiko kina e loma ogo?
A: Ena noqu yaco sakaga i sakeba ena noqu lesu saka mai na yasayasa Vaka Ra, a3 rogoca ni sa involve tiko na unit mai ra, au sa mani gole sobu. Au sa laki tu era ena ka ni security ni veika sa yaco tiko mai Palimedi ena siga oya.

Q5: Sa yaco ga e keya? Tou rawa ni dabe me yacova na mataka, na ka o vakaraitaka tiko oqori e vakaga na tamata ulukau. E dua na kakacaka dredre ksmarni mai kakava tiko ogo. Au tukuna vei iko mo vakamacalataka na ka o kila me baleta na ka ogo? O lesu mai ena siga Vakarauwai e loma ni keba, o cae i brief taki kemudou e loma ni keba ena ka e yaco?
A: E sega saka ni dua.

Q6: Mai na loma ni keba, o tuikuna ni ko a lako i vale?
A: Io saka.

Q7: E donu tiko o ya?
A: Io saka.

Q8: C lesu tale ena loma ni unit ena siga Vakarauwai?
A: Ena mataka laiiai saka.

Q9: C cei e tuikuna vei iko mo gole sobu ki na complex?
A: O au saka ga.

Q10: Ena nomu yaco ena loma ni complex, o cei e brief taki iko ena ka mo laki cakava ena loma ni complex?
A: E sega saka ni dua e brief taki au saka.
Q11: Ena nomu yaco ena loma ni complex, o cei e tavaki iko ena loma ni complex?
A: O iratou saka na selection, gone vou saka.

Q12: Au vinakata na yaca ni tamata a tavaki iko?
A: E sega saka ni dua e tavaki au, eratou a dadavo tuga ena loma ni complex.

A: Ena loma saka ni complex.

Q14: Ena loma ni complex e vei? O yadra ena perimeter, o yadravi ira na kaivesu e loma oya, o yadra ena matamata i muri, i liu?
A: Keitou na roving saka.

Q15: Na roving evei?
A: Ena loma ni perimeter e loma saka.

Q16: Na roving e vei, mai na matamata e muri kina matamata i liu?
A: Cowiri wavoki saka ka sota ena matamata.

Q17: O ccwiri taka vakadua na complex?
A: Io saka.

Q18: O cei na nomudou iliuli ena nomudou mata yadra?
A: E sega saka ni dua na noqu i iliuli, keitou veisau tuga.

Q19: O yadra vata kei cei e loma o ya?
A: Vata kei Lasekula.

Q20: O cei tale?
A: O Ratulu.

Q21: Private Vakaceretai, e rawa ni o gole mai mo mai raica na i taba oqo ka mo tukuna vei keitou na i tavi cava o qarava tiko e loma o ya? (Witness was shown the photographs on the wall).
E bau so na civilians o dou yadra vata tu e issue vei ira na i yaragi?
A: E sega saka.

Q22: Daru levava tale mada na i ka 20 ni siga ena nomu yaco yani ena nomudou unit i cake. O tukuna ni o yaco yani ena mataka laiain, o bau raica se rogoca e dua ra vakavodo i yaragi eya caka tiko?
A: E sega saka.
Q23: O sega ni raica na lori levu ka dau draiva tiko kina o Kaumaitotoya ni kele tu ena back gate?
A: E sega saka.

Q24: O drau sota kei Satini Bonefasio ena mataka ni siga o ya?
A: E sega saka.

Q25: O sota vata kei iratou na selection?
A: O iratou saka ga na gone vou.

Q26: O bau kila e so na yaca vei iratou na gone vou oqori?
A: Feoko, Raileqe, Nasou vata kei Ratu.

Q27: O dou bau dau veitalanoa?
A: E sega saka.

Q28: Na gauna o biubiu kina na cava eratou dau cakava tiko o iratou?
A: E ratou tiko saka ga ena complex.

Q29: O sega ni bau raica e dua na i yaragi se ka vakaoya e vakavodoki?
A: E sega saka.

Q30: What weapon were you issued in the Parliament complex?
A: M203, Sir.

Q31: Was that weapon issued to you throughout at the time you were in the Parliament?
A: No, Sir.

Q32: Did you change your weapon?
A: Yes.

Q33: How many rounds did you have for the M203?
A: One magazine, Sir.

Q34: How many rounds did you have for the grenade launch?
A: Two, Sir.

Q35: Can you have a look at this. What are you commonly referred to in your unit? What is your nickname in the unit? Did they call you "Pau"?
A: Polly, Sir.

Q36: Also Pau?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q37: Is your name on that list?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q38: What weapon did you draw that day?
A: M203, Sir.

Q39: How many rounds?
A: Two Mags, Sir.

Q40: How many rounds for the launcher?
A: Six.

Q41: It does not tally to what you said earlier?
A: No, Sir.

Q42: How many rounds did you fire from the M16?
A: I did not fire any rounds.

Q43: M203?
A: I did not fire any rounds.

Q44: On the 20th, how did you go down to the Parliament?
A: By bus, Sir.

Q45: When you arrive there, who was the first soldier you met?
A: Na Qase, Sir.

Q46: Did you speak with him?
A: No, Sir.

Q47: Did you shake hands with him?
A: No, Sir.

Q48: Who did you meet after that?
A: Raulumu and Lasekula.

Q49: What were they doing?
A: They were guarding the perimeter.

Q50: Did Lasekula have a weapon with him?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q51: What weapon did he carry?
A: M2C3, Sir.

Q52: And Raulumu?
A: Uzi, Sir.

Q53: This is the 20th of May?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q54: Did you talk to them?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q55: What was your conversation?
A: Change guard, Sir.

Q56: In the complex, did you hear of an ultimatum given by Commander that all soldiers should return to QEB?
A: No, Sir.

Q57: When did you move out of the complex?
A: On the 4th week, Sir.

Q58: Did you remember the date?
A: It was on Sunday.

Q59: Was it still June or was it getting into the month of July?
A: I think it was the first week of July.

Q60: Where did you go when you move out?
A: To the village, Sir.

Q61: Why did you move out of the complex?
A: To go and see my parents, Sir.

Q62: The unit was still committed there at the complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q63: Can you tell us about your code of conduct in the unit? What do you know about the code of conduct that exists in 1MS?
A: I do not know, Sir.

Q64: You do not know any code of conduct?
A: No, Sir.

Q65: Are you allowed to give names of members of the 1FMS?
A: No, Sir.

Q66: Is that your code in the unit?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q67: Pau, ena gauna o laki kauta mai kina na nomu M203, eya issue vei iko na nomu M203?
A: E sega saka.

Q68: O lako ga yani o tomika mai?
A: Io saka.

Q69: O tara vata mai kei na rua na magazine, eno na 40 millimeters o tara mai? Io saka.

Q70: Na cava e tukuni vei iko me nomu cakacaka e loma? Meu dau yadra saka tuga ena perimeter.

Q71: Mai vei cei? O cei e tukuni vei kemuni nina curu yani i loma? O a brief taki ena gauna a issue kina na nomu i yaragi se sa bera ni issue na nomu i yaragi? O Railumu saka ga.

Q72: Na cava e tukuna o Railumu? Me keitou yadra saka ga na perimeter.

Q73: Na cava ena lako mai ena perimeter? Na nodratou security saka ga na hostage.

Q74: E secure-taki mai na ono na 40 millimeters oya? Mai vei ira na lewenivanua se na mataivalu e tuba? Au sega ni kila saka.


Q76: Ena gauna cava drau qai sota kina kei Lasekula? Ena bogi saka ni Vakarauwai.

Q78: 

A: 
(Silence)

[Signature]
[P. VAKACEREITAI]  
Private

[Signature]
[J. N. B. EVANS]  
Lieutenant Colonel  
President

[Signature]
[A. MOHAMMED]  
Major  
Member

[Signature]
[T. GUCAKE]  
Major  
Member

[Signature]
[H. MACOMBER]  
Warrant Officer Class One  
Member
Pte Qicatabua, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: O a curu e na 1FMS ena yabaki cava?

Q2: Yabaki sa oti?
A: Sir.

Q3: Vakamacaalataka mada eke na nomu a vakaitavi e na ka a yaco mai na Complex mai na kena i tekivu me yacova na nomu sa mai dabe toka qo eke?
A: Na i ka 19 saka ni Me, keitou a lesu saka tiko mai e na training ni "sea survival" mai Makuluva. Lesu saka mai e na matakai lati oya, mai sava saka na i yaya ni waqa, oti oya keitou mai tiko ena complex, caka na debr ef, oti ga oya au sa gole sara i vale. Au tiko saka ga mai vale, au mani rogoca ni sa caka na vuvariri ena Vakaraubuka, Sigatabu sa qai lomaqeu meu lako sobu mai ki na complex. Au yaco yani i na complex, vakadeitaka tale vei au o Mr. Baleinamau ni sa caka na vuvariri. Oti oya au mani lesu tale i vale. Kena siga Moniti, sa mani lomaqeu meu sa gole tu ki na Palimedi. Au lako ga yani i matamata, curu sara i loma, au lako sara vakadua ki na dua na office e tiko e na bottom floor ni dua na complex e tu oya mai na Palimedi, e tiko kina o Na Qase. Au lako yani i kea, au mani vakaraitaka vua niu sa yaco mai, sa mani ciqomi au saka i kea o koya. Au tikoga i kea, sa mani tukuna okoya vei au meu wavoki tu mada i tuba, toka i tuba o ya, au vakararai tu, au vakaraica tu na tamata era sa tu i kea, oti au mani lesu tale mai, keirau mani mai tiko vata ga e na rumu e tiko kina o koya. Oti sa mani tukuna okoya meu vaqara e dua na dakai meu sa lai yadra tu e na parameter. Au lako ga yani au lai vaqara e na dua na rumu era tu kina na dakai, au mani tara ekeya e dua na noqu dakai, oti au sa mani lako meu lai yadra. Au lako oya, ia ka va ni macawa au sa lesu tale i vale. Au lesu tale i vale oya me yacova na gauna e tukuni kina na march-in i na keba. Na gauna sa oti kina na storm caka mai Kalabu, au sa mani rogoca e dua na i tukutiku ni tukuni me keimami gole kece mai ki na complex, me mai vosa kina o Commander. Keitou mani march-in kece mai, au sa mani yaco mai e na kena Vakaraubuka. Noqu tiko ga mai na complex oya me yacova na noqu lako mai qo e na yakavi ni kua.

Q4: Koya na vuli vakaivalu mai Nukulau kei Makuluva; vica na kaloko dou qai yaco mai ki matasawa mai na Maritime?
A: Au sa sega ni vakasamataka saka na gauna.

Q5: A sega ni dua a tavaki kemudou i kea me brief-taki kemudou e na ka e yaco?
A: Segsa saka.
Q6: O iko a sega ni gole vata kei iratou na i matai ni lala koya ratou a gole sobu ki na Parliament Complex ira e na i ka 19 ni siga?
A: Sega saka.

Q7: Dua ga mai nomu Unit a tukuna ni o iko a gole vata kei ira na i matai ni lala cra a gole sobu ena vuaviri o ya, o iko a vakaitavi?
A: Sega saka.

Q8: Na i yaragi cava o a vakayagataka e na loma ni Palimedi?
A: Na colt, Sir.

Q9: Bau dua na gauna o vanataka na colt o ya i loma ni Complex se i tuba?
A: Sega saka.

Q10: Bau dua na gauna o a lako vata kei na dua na patrol se dua na gauna o a curu i tuba?
A: Sega saka.

Q11: Na nomu curu i tuba o ya e na i ka va ni macawa, o a kauta vata kei iko i tuba nomu i yaragi?
A: Na noqu lako saka mai, au a lai biuta talega e na vanua au a taura saka mai kina.

Q12: Daru lesuva tale mada na nomudou exercise mai Makuluva, na i ka vica ni siga e oti mai kina na exercise o ya?
A: Mataka saka ni Vakaraubuka.

Q13: Mataka lai lai ni Vakaraubuka mai ka 19 ni siga?
A: Sir.

Q14: Dou cabe mai vei?
A: Keitou cabe saka mai e na Maritime.

Q15: Dou cabe mai e na Maritime mai Lauca la?
A: Sir.

Q16: Dou sega ni cabe mai na Range?
A: Sir.

Q17: A vica mada na 4-men teams koya ra tiko mai Makuluva?
A: Au sa sega ni vakasamataka saka.

Q18: Is, o vakadetaka tikoga qori ni nomudou biubiu mai Makuluva dou mai cabe tauccoko mai na Maritime?
A: Sir.

Q19: Rauta na vica beka na kaloko dou sa cabe mai e na Maritime?
A: Au sa sega ni vakasamataka saka na gauna.
Q20: O kilai Liganivai - Mokani?
A: Io saka.

Q21: Drau a tiko vata e na mataka ni siga o ya?
A: Sir.

Q22: O cei soti na member se lewe ni nomu 4-men team o iko?
A: O au saka ga, o Liganivai, ....

Q23: Vakadeitaka, o Liganivai mai Mokani qo?
A: Sir, au sa sega ni vakasamataka sara ga.

Q24: O kila nomudou i liiu?
A: Mr Dakuliga saka.

Q25: O Mr Dakuliga talega e cabe mai e na Maritime?
A: Sir.

Q26: Nomudou cabe mai e na Maritime, o cei a tavaki kemudou tiko e kea?
A: Sega saka ni dua.

Q27: Dou qai lako mai vakacava mai na Maritime ki na keba?
A: E na lori saka.

Q28: Na lori o ya e sega ni dua e draiva tu kina?
A: Na draiva saka e tiko.

Q29: O cei gona?
A: Staff Sergeant Vakadramu.

Q30: O sega ni bau raica e so na civilian ni ra tu e kea?
A: Sega saka.

Q31: Dou sa yaco mai e na keba, o sa tukuna o iko me vakayacori e dua na debrief me baleta na nomudou vuli vakaivalu mai Makuluva?
A: Sir.

Q32: O cei a vakayacora na debrief?
A: O Mr. Dakuliga saka.

Q33: E na gauna sa oti kina na debrief o ya, o sega ni bau rogoca ni tukuna o Mr Baleinamau nomudou se tikoga o ya ni na vakayacori tale e dua na exercise wale tikoga o ya?
A: Sega saka.

Q34: O iko o lako mai na keba se o tu ga mai na Maritime?
A: Au a lako saka i cake.

Q35: O Liganivai?
A: Sir.

Q36: Na vu ni noqu tiko qo balela ni tiko vei keitou e dua na i tukutuku ni o kemudrau tarega drau a vakaitavi e na i matai sara ga ni curu ena loma ni Palimedi?
A: E sega saka.

Q37: O a sega ni vakaitavi kina o iko?
A: Seg a saka.

Q38: Na cava na vu ni nomu biuta mai na Parliamentary Complex mo sa gole i vale?
A: Au sa via lako saka ga i vale.

Q39: O bau vakasamataki ira na nomu i tokani koya e ra tu o ya?
A: Seg a saka.

Q40: O sa via lako ga i vale?
A: Sir.

Q41: Na Unit cava o sa tiko kina e na gauna oqo?
A: Au se tiko saka ga e na 1FMS.

Q42: Na cava na nomu appointment ena 1FMS; o iko e dua tarega vei ira na field operatives?
A: Seg a saka.

Q43: What was asked by Major Gucake, statements we have heard in this inquiry that members of 1FMS who said that you went with the first team that entered the Complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q44: Why would they give your name if you were not there?
A: I do not know.

Q45: You said you went on leave - home. The statement given here was that no one was granted leave on the day, no one was allowed to leave the complex?
A: I was allowed to go on leave.

Q46: Was anyone else allowed to take leave?
A: I do not know, only me.

Q47: Who gave you the permission?
A: CC, Sir.

Q48: Who is your OC?
A: Baleipamaun.
Recalled on 21/09/00:

Q49: Nomudou a lako i Makuluva, dua na veitalanoa a caka e na ka e na yaco e na i ka 19 ni siga o a tiko kina o iko?
A: Sega.

Q50: O a raica na kena kau na i yaragi e na siga Lotulevu, na i ka 18 ni siga, o a raica?
A: Sega.

Q51: O ci a tiko e na nomu timi mai Makuluva? Au na tukuna vei iko na yaca ni tamata kece a tiko mai Makuluva; Dakuliga, Naika, Tawake, Soko, Ledja, Qicatabua, Saukururu, Serukasari, Sokiveta, Ratu, Nawaga, Naivalu, Liganivai, Cama - o iko sa dede na nomu tiko e na Unit o ya. O sega ni qai curu ga e nanoa.
A: Mei vakasaamataka mada.

Q52: Ni o dou dau toso vaoya, e dau vica na tamata dua na timi?
A: Va.

Q53: E va ga na tamata, o lai dua na macawa i kea o qai sega ni kilua na yacadra?
A: Dua saka ga au nanuma rawa o Sokiveta.

Q54: Au na tarogi iko tale; o iko a vodo e na siga Vakaraubuka ena i matai ni lala e ra ako sobu?
A: Sega.

Q55: Vica vata na witness e ra sa basika i ke, e basika mai na yacamu ni o iko a dua vei ira na i matai ni curu e na loma ni Palimedi?
A: Sega saka.

Q56: Gauna cava o qai lai curu e na loma ni Palimedi?
A: Monti.

Q57: When you were at Makuluva on the night of the 18th of May, were you told to fill some magazines with ammunition?
A: No, Sir.

Q58: What time did you leave Makuluva?
A: About half-five.

Q59: Which Zodiac were you in?
A: No. 2, Sir, I was the coxswain.

Q60: What if I tell you that the Zodiac at 5.30 was half-way between the Range and Makuluva?
A: Can you repeat your question, Sir?
Q61: I am telling you that at 5.30 when you say you left Makuluva, the Zodiac was in between the Range and Makuluva, that you left the Island earlier than that?
A: That is what I could think of, I cannot remember exactly, maybe half-five.

Q62: When you left Makuluva, where did you go to?
A: I stopped at the Range.

Q63: Did you go to the Rewa Delta?
A: No, Sir.

Q64: The rest of the witnesses, in your Zodiac there were 11 people, correct?
A: I do not know the number.

Q65: So I am telling you, could that be correct?
A: No.

Q66: What if the other members have said that you left Makuluva and drifted towards Rewa Delta landing, what do you have to say to that?
A: No, Sir.

Q67: When you were returning, did you meet Lt Dakuliga somewhere?
A: No.

Q68: What if I tell you that Lt Dakuliga said that he met you half-way, between the Range and Makuluva Island?
A: No, Sir.

Q69: Trooper Qicatabua, na i matai ni gauna o mai soli tukutuku kina i ke, o tukuna ni dou cabe mai na Maritime?
A: Sir.

Q70: Ia qo o sa tukuna ni o dou cabe mai na Range?
A: C ratou saka na kena vo e ratou cabe mai kea.

Q71: E vakaivei?
A: E dua saka tiko vei au na Zodiac.

Q72: Io?
A: Au lako saka mai au kila niu cabe mai e na Maritime.

Q73: Keitou sa taura oti na i tukutuku ni waqa ruarua rau cabe i na Range, ia o lko lai cabe i na Maritime. Siga cava o cabe kina i na Maritime?
A: Siga vata tikoga.

Q74: O cei soti a sobu e na Maritime?
A: O au saka ga au kauta mai na waqa.

Q75: Na waqa duadua ga?
A: Sir

Q76: Na i karua ni waqa?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q77: Vakacava kevaka au tukuna vei iku Qicatabua ni o lasu tiko?
A: Sega ni rawa saka niu lasu.

Q78: Dua tale na ka o via vakamacalataka?
A: Sega saka.

[ E. QICATABUA]
Private

[ J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
WO1
Member
SEVENTIETH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 29657 PRIVATE RAILEQE

Pte Rai'eqe, after having been duly sworn on the Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: O a curu ena IMS ena yabaki cava?
A: Ena yabaki saka ga qo.

Q2: Vakamacalataka mada na ka o kila me baleta na ka ea yaco, na vuaviri, mai na kena tekuva, na ka o kila o iko vata kei na nomu vakaitavi na ka kece me baleta na vuaviri?

Q3: O iko a tiko ena Keba ena gauna lai brief o Lt. Col. Tarakinikini enai ka 19 ni siga?
A: Sir.

Q4: Ena gauna o a tiko kina ena loma ni Unit mai cake, e bau dua na gauna oe veitaratara vata kei ira na tiko ena loma ni Parliament Complex ira?
A: Sir.

Q5: Na telephone kei na fax?
A: Sir.

Q6: O iko a vakaitavi ena kena vakavodoki na yaragi ena siga Vakaraubuka?
A: Sir.

Q7: Ena siga Vakarauwai?
A: Sir.

Q8: Ena Sigatabu?
A: Sir.

Q9: Ena gauna o a cakacakaka kina i loma ni Unit, o bau raica na kena vakavodoki na yaragi (dakai)?
A: E sega.

Q10: When you went to the West for the selection, who was in charge of the selection?
A: Mr. Stevens.

Q11: When was the first time you heard of the overtaking of the Government?
A: On Saturday morning.

Q12: Did you return with the selection team from the West together?
A: Sir.
Q13: Were you with the selection team when they stopped at Serua to discuss about the overthrowing of the Government?
A: Sir.

Q14: Did you hear of the overthrow there?
A: No.

Q15: Which vehicle were you travelling in?
A: A renault.

Q16: On Saturday, what time did you return to camp?
A: 8 o'clock in the morning.

Q17: When you returned to camp, did you meet the other members of the 1FMS?
A: Only the selection team.

Q18: Who was in the selection team? Who did you meet there?
A: Mr. Stevens.

Q19: Who else?
A: Only Mr. Stevens.

Q20: Did you see Feoko there, in the complex that day?
A: Yes.

Q21: Did you meet Tunidau?
A: No.

Q22: The statements we have heard here, the evidence and which has been witnessed is that you and Feoko helped in the loading of weapons from the armoury to the truck in Sukanaivalu Rd?
A: No.

Q23: Did you at any time go to the Parliament Complex?
A: No.

Q24: Privete Raileqe, au via tomana walega na taro esa taroga o Major Aziz, na tukunuku keitou sa taura rawa tiko o keitou, au vinakata meu vakadeitaka nio vakaitavi oiko na kena vakavodoki na yaragi ena Renault ena siga Vakarauwai. Ea vakausukasuka tiko na Renault mai na nomudou matamata i muri, drive tiko kina o Staff Kaumaitotoya. O kila na vakavodo yaragi e caka tiko ya?
A: Sega saka.

Q25: Drau a sota kci Scrgcant Bonefasio ena siga Vakarauwai?
A: Sega.
Q26: Ia, na siga Vakarauwai Private Raileqe na cava oca cakava tiko ena loma ni nomudou Unit mai cake? Vakamacalataka mada nomu yaco yani ena 8 na kaloko ena mataka hailai kei na ka o cakava.
A: Ena 8 na kaloko keitou sa qai lai debrief taki kina me baleti koya e pass, e fail ka tukuni kina ni sa involve na Unit ena tauri kei Palimedi

Q27: E lewe vica vei kemudou e pasi, e lewe vica e fail?
A: Keitou rawata kece, keitou lewe 8.

Q28: O iko ena gauna qo o tiko ena Unit cava?
A: lMS.

Q29: Ena gauna sa oti kina na nomudou debrief ya, na cava tale e qai caka?
A: E tukuni vei keitou me keitou tu ga ena complex.

Q30: O cei a tukuna vei kemudou?
A: Mr. Stevens.

Q34: Ena gauna oya tu kina ena complex ya, o sega ni raica na gauna ea dola kina na armoury, kau i tuba na kisi me sa tekiwai vakavodoki na dakai ena lorry lavu?
A: Sega.

Q32: O sotavi Feoko?
A: Au sotavi koya ga ena gauna ea vosa kina vei keitou o Stevens.

Q33: Ena rua na kaloko ena siga Vakarauwai tikoga ya, o a tiko iivei?
A: Tu mai na bure.

Q34: Ena bure?
A: Sir.

Q35: Ena gauna o a tiko kina i bure, oa sotavi Feoko ena bure?
A: Sega saka.

Q36: Tuiwailevu?
A: Sega.
Q37: O cei mada e rawa ni vakadinadinataka na nomu tiko i bure ni oti na vakasigalevu?
A: Au sega ni vakasamataka.

Q38: Kila ga u iko ni o tiko na bure?
A: Sir.

Q39: Private Raileqe, e dua tale na ka o via tukuna ike?
A: Sega saka.

Q40: On that day (Saturday), did you help in any loading at all?
A: No.

[Signature]
[RAILEQE]  
Private

[J. N. B. EVANS]  
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]  
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]  
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]  
WARRANT OFFICER CLASS ONE
Member
SEVENTY-FIRST WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 29661 PRIVATE FEOKO GADEKIBUA

Pte Gadekibua, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Ko a curu ena unit ena yabaki ga oqo?
A: io saka.

Q2: Vakamacalataka mada na ka o kila baleta na vuaviri mai na kena i tekivu? Na ka o kila kei na gauna o vakaitavi taki iko kina?

Q3: Ena siga Vakarabuka, o bau vakaitavi ena kena vakavadoki na i yaragi ena loma ni lori?
A: E sega saka.

Q4: Siga Vakarauwai?
A: E sega saka.

Q5: Ena kena vakavadoki na i yaragi, eya kele e muri na lori ena Sukanaivalu Road? O bau vakaitavi ena kena vakavadoki na i yaragi ka tiko ena box?
A: E sega saka.

Q6: Ko a tiko e vei ena rua na kaloko ena siga Vakarauwai?
A: Au a gole saka i vale. Au a kerekere saka vei iratou meu gole tale mada i vale meu lai raica e dua na ganequ.

Q7: E bau dua na gauna o curu i na complex mai ra?
A: E sega saka.

Q8: Do you know Sgt. Bonefasio?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q9: Did you see him on Saturday in your unit?
A: In the morning, Sir.

Q10: What time did you leave for home on Saturday?
A: At 12 o'clock, Sir.

Q11: Which gate did you go out from?
A: The back gate, Sir.

Q12: Private Feoko, ena nomu tiko ena nomudou unit mai cake, o bau sotavi Leweniqila kei Tui Wailevu ena mataka ni siga Vakarauwai o ya?
A: Io saka.

Q13: Na cava eratou a cakava tiko?
A: Eratou instructors saka tiko ni selection.

Q14: O bau raica na nomudou Renault, na nomudou lori levu o dou kauta mai Nadi?
A: Ena mataka lailai saka oya, au sega saka ni raica na lori. Keitou a tu kece sara tu ga i Bure. Eya tukuni me keitou wawa saka tikoga i Bure.

Q15: E sega ni o raica na lori ena loma ni nomudou complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q16: O sega ni vakaitavi ena kena tosoi na i yaragi mai na nomudou complex me kau xile ena dua na vanua?
A: E sega saka.

Q17: O beu raici nomudou OC, o Mr. Baleinamau ena nomudou complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q18: The fact is that Sgt. Bonefasio has said that you had assisted in the loading of the weapons, you have said no. Someone is lying. We will find out.
A: Yes, Sir.

Q19: What I have to tell you is that if we find out that you are lying, you will subject yourself to criminal charges and then you are subjected yourself to court martial.
A: Yes, Sir.

Q20: Edua na ka o via vakamacalataka tale eke?
A: E sega saka.
SEVENTY-SECOND WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 20981 LT-COL RATU V S VOLAVOLA

Lt. Col. Ratu V.S. Volavola, after having been duly sworn on the Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Nai naki ni Board me laurai na nodra vakaitavi na sotia ena vuaviri ea vakayacori ena i ka 19 ni siga ni vula o Me ena yabaki tikoga qo, o rawa ni vakamacalataka na ka me baleta na veika e yaco mai na kenai tekivu?
A: Au a tiko i loma ni Palimedi ena gauna a curumi kina na Palimedi ena noqu i tutu vaka lewe ni bose lawa ena gauna oya, e dua na ka veivakurabuitaki na nodra curu mai na cauravou. Tekivu, ea vakaraitaka o George Speight ni sa vakayacora e dua na civilian coup, ia na noqu vakaraica toka na i varagi kei na kedrai rairai, au sega ni kila e dua vei iratou na cauravou, ia au kila ga ni ra rairai vaka sotia, na kedrai rairai kei na nodrai vukivuki. O koya na ka au kila me baleta na ka e yaco enai ka 19 ni siga. E noqu vakadinadina ga ena gauna e vica na instructions esa lako tiko ena loma ni vica na aua keimami dabe tiko ena loma ni Palimedi, neimami curu mai tuba, au sa qai raica eso na mata, esa qai devei au ni ra sotia. Ia, au sega ni kila na yacadra, au kila ga na mata. Au kila ni ra sotia me vaka na noqu bula tu ena mataivalu ena du na gauna balavu. Au kila ni ra sotia, au vakayadra yani, era vakayadra mai vakaivalu, era vakasakasaka.

Q2: Eso nai taba era tiko qo, oni qai rawa ni raica. O ni rawa ni kila vakacaca e vica e curu yani enai matai ni gauna?
A: Au kila ni ratou lewe ono se lewe vitu.

Q3: Ena gauna ni a tiko kina ena complex i ra, ni a veitaratara kei na so na turaga ni valu ena loma ni mataivalu mai QEB se o bau rogoca e dua na ka?
A: Noqu tu e kea e sega saraga ni dua na noqu veitaratara mai na Keba ni Mataivalu. Au kila ga ni ra sa march-in tiko eso na turaga ni valu ni reserve ena OTS ena yakavi ni siga Vakarauwai, au a nanuma meu gade mai kina, ia au mani sega ni gole mai kina, e sega ni dua na veitaratara.

Q4: O rawa ni raica mada na i taba qori? E tolu ga e tiko qori, vei iratou na matai ni curu i loma ni Palimedi.
A: Au sega ni place taki iratou rawa na cauravou qo.

Q5: Nia sega ni rogoca e dua na ka mai Palimedi me baleta na kena digitaki na turaga ni valu me na liutaka na mataivalu?
A: Io, au a rogoca. Nai matai ni gauna ea caka kina na bose ya, au a bau toka ena bose ya, e dua saka na ka au a taraqo eliu "E tu iwei nai tosotoso ya me baleta na mataivalu se tu vata kei na mataivalu se sega?". Na ka e qai cavuta mai o Ligairi, e sega ni sauma mai o
George Speight, e sauma mai o Ligairir e kaya o koya ni "Ni sa caka tiko na kena veivesaki, e dodonu me macala e dua na ka ena gauna lekaleka ya." Oya ena bogi ga ya se na mataka ni siga ka dua, esa na matata kina na vanua e tiko kina na mataivalu ena tosotoso ya. Ia na mataka lai lai ni siga Vakarauwai, au a qai rogoca tikoqa ni rau a lako yani ike na ena bogi e rau na turaga ni valu i na Keba, o Tarakinikini kei Vatu. Ia, au sega ni vakadinaidinataka baleta niu a sega ni raici rau. Au mani taroge se cava na vuna erau lako yani kina, e mani tutuoni gona ni rau sa digidigi tiko mai loma ni Palimedi o Vatu me liutaka na mataivalu, me nonai vukevuke o Tarakinikini.

Q6:
E dua saka na ka na nodratou curu yani na lewe ono se vinu se walu na sotia ena i matai ni gauna ea caka kina na vuaviri, ea bau vakaitavi eso na civilians se o George Speight ena matai ni curu?

A:
Io, eratou a curu yani na cauravou, sa oti ya, esa qai curu yani o Speight. O Speight e dara e dua na sulu vakataga, sote liga balavu, viavia light green tiko, e dua toka vua e dua na cap, dua toka vua na sunglass. Au a sa dau raici koya tu, au sega ni kilai koya vakadua ni ya o George Speight. Okoya gona esa qai tekivu vakamacalataka tiko ni o ya na civilian coup, era vakayacora ga na lewe ni vanua me baleta na lewe ni vanua. Esa dua na gauna dede toka au sa qai raici Ligairir ni curu yani, ni rai yani okoya au sa qai vakadinaidinataka ni dua na connection e tiko ena mataivalu. E muri, e sega ni macala e cava e curuma tu yani o Major-General. E curu ga yani, e sega ni dua na vosa, lai rai ga e lesu tale mai tuba. O ratou beka ga ya ko ratou curu yani i loma ni Palimedi ne keimami se tiko i loma ya.

Q7:
Sir, o rawa ni vakamataataka, esa via oti toka na vakasigalevu, na gauna e curu yani kina o Major-General baleta na vuaviri e qai caka ena loma ni 10 kina 11 na kaloko, o ni rawa ni kila na gauna ea curu yani kina o Major-General?

A:
Io, na kena duidui ena gauna esa oti kina na vakasigalevu, e keitou tiko ga na mata i taukei, ni sebera na vakasigalevu ya, e keimami se tiko taukoko. Au tovolea meu vakasamataka mada na gauna ea curu yani kina, baleta na gauna esa oti kina na vakasigalevu, keitou se rawa ni veilakoyaki. Au vakabautha ni se sega, baleta ni keimami se dabe sara tikoga ena neimami dui dabedabe, e sebera ni dua na galala e soli vej keimami me baleta na neimami veitosoyaki, curu yani o Major-General, io au sa vakabautha, au confirm-taka ya.

Q8:
Kemuni o ni rawa ni confirm-taka na nodratou curu yani na sotia, e dua e vanavana?

A:

Q9:
Sir, whilst in Parliament, did you hear of an ultimatum given by Commander RFMF for all service persons in the complex to return to QEB? Were you aware of that?
A: No, I was informed when I turned up to Camp with invitations from some army officers.

Q10: When did you return to camp, Sir?
A: On the 6th of June. I know the date definitely, it was a Tuesday.

Q11: Sir, were you in the complex when there was a representation from RFMF for senior officers to ....
A: Yes.

Q12: What was the nature of the visit?
A: I think they came to show that what they have done and generally, the same feeling that was inside there was with the Army also. They supported the cause but now that the Army has taken over, they are asking for Speight's group to abide by what the Army was going to do.

Q13: On the same token, there were clips from the television of yourself, Sir, addressing the personnel that were present in the complex. Could you just tell the Board the nature of that address?
A: Na tiko i loma ya, e dua nai tavi bibi ni tiko i loma ya, me keitou dau vakaraitaka na veika kece e veivosakiti tiko ena committee e cake ko cicivaka tiko na tosotoso i loma ni Palimedi ena gauna oya. Au mani digitaki meu kenai liulu. Keitou lewe tolu na turaga, na veika kece e dau veivosakiti mai na loma ni Palimedi se mai na loma ni veivosaki e cake ena vetai cake, na lawalawa nei George Speight and his group, me dau vakadewataki vei ira na lewe ni vanua. E se qai caka beka ga vaka tolu se vaka va, keitou sa vosatali mai vei ira na turaga era tu ike. E tukuni va qo, kevaka ena via vakavanuakiti na ka e dodonu na veivosaki kece me vakayacori mai na dela ni teveli nei Speight me na qai kau yani vei ira na turaga me lai vakasavui ikei nai tukutuku. Ke ra vakadonuya se ra sega ni vakadonuya, esa qai vakasavui vei ira na lewe ni vanua e tautuba, e kea sa qai mai mudu kina nai tuvatuva e caka tiko qo.

Q14: What is your assessment of the organisation of this coup that was conducted, as a military officer, was it properly organised or was it just an ad hoc move?
A: I think it was not properly organised even though some thoughts had been put behind this. I think in the first few meetings, Speight admitted that one of the plans was wrong. That was to take the President and the Government House, that plan failed. From there, he started to recognise that something was wrong with his planning. Secondly, was the support of the military, which from the first meeting, I had queried. I personally queried Speight, "Where do we stand as far as the military is concerned?" Ligairi said, "We will know very soon, there is negotiations going on." The following morning, when we had another meeting, I asked again, "Where do we stand as
Sir, would you be able to explain to us the organisation structure that existed in the complex with these events?

A: Speight had a group of men, we were sworn in on early Saturday morning. We were the people that were discussing what was going on in Parliament and there was a group of chiefs that all these things had to be approved by them. If they disapprove of it, then it is back to Speight's group to find another solution. When it is approved, then the message is taken down to the tents. In the complex, they were separated into two areas. One area is out of bound to everyone except Speight's group, the top people, that is run by Ligairi at the Labour Party Complex and the Parliament chambers where the people were held as hostages. This was out of bound to everyone except us. We were specifically told that even though we were army officers that no instructions would be entertained by the men, only from Ligairi. We did not bother and we had no business with those guys. At least we were told, they were only hearing orders from Ligairi.

Q16: Who made this brief, Sir?
A: Ligairi.

Q17: Sir, did you at any time, during your stay in the complex, visited the Operations and the Int Cell that was located in there?
A: I did not go inside, I saw them inside. I went into the Labour Party Office, we had some meetings there with Speight but just in the main room. I never went into the Int cell. It was heavily guarded.

Q18: Sir, o ni rawa ni vakamacalataka mada oira na dau bose tiko (na caucus), oira na tiko i loma ni caucus ya, era dau bose tiko kei Speight?
A: Au kilai keitou vinaka na lewe ni Palimedi. O au, o Rinakama ena FAP, o Rakuita, o Leweniqila, o Silatalou kei na kena vo o Speight, o Duvuloco, o Savu, o Manasa (turaga ni Kadavu, e qasenivolu). There were a few lawyers there. Bukarau was there, Vodo was there, Qarikau was there and also Kitione Vuataki. Eratou lako tiko mai vakalevu ena legal issues, eso na gauna eratou sega ni dau tiko, ni ratou tiko, eratou dau tiko sara ena bose ya. O Sausauwai, o Meli Loki, o Konataci, o Mua. Some of these people just come in and out, ni ra sa bera ga, era sa bera baleta ni ra tiko e tautuba e na nodra dui vale.

Q19: Was there ever a time where people interpreted what was said in George Speight's group's meeting, where this was interpreted to the public and where the interpretation was done deliberately to mislead the vanua?
A: E Vica na tiki ni pepa e soli mai me vakaraitaki vei ira na vanua me vaka na ka me baleta na security council nei Mahend Chaudhry, na
documents ena activities era cakava tiko e sega ni vakairaitaki and unproven and the documents about the little India in the Pacific. Na ka kece qo, e soli na instructions me vakamacalataki vei ira na lewe ni vanua, qo na ka e rawa ni yaco kevaka me cici tiko na matanitu qo.

Q20: E vakacava saka na nodra ciqoma nai tu tutuku qo na vanua?
A: E dua na ka na nodra rawa.

Q21: Karua saka ni tarto, o nia vakasamataka beka na matai ni bose ni Great Council of Chiefs ni ratou a propose-taka yani, there was 10 resolutions, o ni se tiko saka i Palimid i ya, o ni vakasamataka na 10 na resolutions ea ciqomi by George Speight's group?
A: E sega ni ciqom. E ciqomi ga nai ka tini, oya me dola tu ga na gaunisala ni veitalanoa vata kei na Great Council of Chiefs or their nominees, okoya ga ya e ciqomi. Na kena vo taucoko, vakauasivi mai na kenai matai kei na kenai karua, e sega. Na kenai matai, na kena soli na veitokoni vei koya na Peresitedi o Ratu Mara mai vei ira na turaga ni noda vanua, na turaga bale kei na marama bale. O ya sa sega ni vakadonui, esa vinakati saraga me biu tani o Ratu Mara, oya nai le mai loma. Na kenai karua me boko laivi na Constitution, eratu gadvrana na Bose Levu Vakaturaga me dikvei ga na Constitution, kau laivi na tikina e nanumi me ca, me maroro na kena vo. Tekivu ike esa rubbish-taki na document ya.

Q22: Was there any dialogue established between the complex and the main camp as to what was to transpire and how the problem was to be resolved; the RFMF and the complex?
A: If there was, I would not have any knowledge because the military arm of the complex was directly under Ligairi where direct link elsewhere, we do not know. The only connection was in the first few days, where the organisation was going to put in a new Commander and a deputy otherwise there is no connection, I am not aware of.

Q23: My next question is directed to the control of the civilians that were in the complex, what we have heard in the course of our inquiry that basically the control was quite loose, what we want is your comment on that.
A: As I said, we were directly involved with the planning of day to day activities. All these things outside of Parliament (outside the complex) are directly under Ligairi and his group. They run the security, they run everything outside. I do not know how they eat, but when I go around I see them having loco and food there.

Q24: Sir, my next question, no malice is meant in this question, I am not trying to direct it personally at you. The question is directed towards your returning to camp, what made you return to camp?
A: It is a long story. I contemplated on returning home from the day the policeman was killed. I was totally against this violence. We did not know that it would go that far. The President was in charge of
everything at that time, we were under the Emergency Decree. One of the things that he did was stopping the local media from entering the complex. There was no news on the TV from inside the complex and the only thing we heard from the complex was attacks by some people outside especially Dakuvula that led to the burning of the TV station. That night the planning for the burning of Suva took place, I had decided to leave. We were brainstormed with what to do, to show Ratu Mara that even though he was the head of the Government and in total control of the Army, Police and the Civil Service that the vanua was much stronger than him. The vanua could do anything in Fiji that Ratu Mara cannot stop. That was not the only plan, my heart really rejected it. The plan was to destroy Suva, starting from the President’s home and to go under the mask of the mass to march through the city. Ladies would be singing hymns with the men behind and the boys with the guns. They would just walk and disrupt every check-point. At that time, the police were manning the check-points. Just disrupt all the check-points, chase all these boys away and just marched through Suva and they would destroy Suva.

At the same time, there were some people in the complex, I am referring to Lewaqai, a good friend of mine, but he had the press button in the West. At the same time he pressed the button, they started the burning in the West. There was no control in the North, they did not have any particular guy who was there. Very suspicious people coming in and out of the complex. They came in a car, had special meetings with these guys, I do not know what goes on. At one time, I asked someone "Who are these guys?" and he said "These are the most dangerous people, they are doing a lot of damages outside." I do not know who they were. This led me to show the group that I was going to march out. I was frightened. My heart was telling me that this was not what we were praying about. I almost got beaten up that day.

On that night, God intervened there and there was a big rain so the march was cancelled and even in the West, the rain poured down. One day or two days after that, the military took over. I did not make any decision at all to come into the military. I said "This is betraying the cause." I saw what was going on around Parliament. Once I was confronted by two girls who were crying about what happened to them that night, they cannot identify people, but they were gang raped. Later on, I advised them to go home, "What are you doing here?" In the evening, you see them again with lipstick coming again. There was a kind of a magnet in there. Anyway, when the military came in, that was a very happy day in the complex, everyone hugged each other. Those army officers were very popular inside but later on what happened, that brought the difference again. I knew I was in the negotiating team that came to the camp for the first time after the Great Council of Chiefs meeting. We had a good talk with the Commander and the Commander said, after all the banging in his
office from Speight's group, and no one else from the Army was there, only the Commander and the group from Parliament led by Speight. He said "Okay, what do you want? Let us make a deal." The deal was that to let the GCC appoint a lineup to form the Interim Government, with Commander as Head of State. In return, GSG to release all hostages, weapons to the army, etc... He said "I can present some yaqona to my officers and they will accept it." That did not happen. The RFMF officers did not accept it. On the next day when we came over here at OTS, it changed. I was sitting over there, I did not come to the meeting, we were having kava. The negotiating team came to say that something is wrong. The Commander changed his mind. That was a Thursday meeting. When I left OTS, I did not go back to the Complex. On Tuesday morning, I was later told, it was announced that all officers to report in on Tuesday before 3:00pm. Early that morning, my brother Peni, who is also an army officer rang me up and he said "You are the eldest in the family, I know you can make your own decision but I think God will help you make a decision." I did not even know what he was referring to. He said "We love you and we know that you are going to make the right decision." Later on, Tuida rang me up with the same kind of thinking "Bro, I hope you will make the right decision today." I said to myself, what are these people referring to? At about 9 o'clock, Col. Waqanisau rang me up again. All these three officers rang me up in one day. He said, "Why don't you come up?" I thought he was just inviting me to have morning tea and talk. I said "Oh, I will get the boys in Parliament." I rang up Buks and Rakuita, I said "We have been invited up there, the Commander has cancelled the talks, so why don't we just go and talk officer to officer, maybe we will have some kind of understanding". They said, "Okay, okay we do not have any transport" so I rang Jerry that I had my transport and those two in Parliament wanted transport, so I went up to QEB. When I was up there they told me that no one responded from Parliament. I started ringing their mobile phones again, no one responded. I was in the camp then I saw all the familiar faces and they said, "Why don't we go and get your uniform?" I said, "Oh I came here for a talk" but later on, I thought I made the right decision as an individual. I left Parliament on Thursday, I did not go back until that Tuesday morning when I was called up to QEB.

**Q25:**
Sir, my next question is directed towards the activities you talked about, the burning of Suva and the recurring activities in the West. You said the group had planned, can you mention the group that basically caucus this thought up?

**A:** Yes, the caucus.

**Q26:**
The caucus you had earlier mentioned?

**A:** Yes, but only one or two people were talking. You want me to mention people by name?
Yes. We have a lot of names and you are the 72nd witness.
Yes, it has nothing to do with the army personnel, this is concerning the people running it inside. I got the shock of my life when this gentleman, Mr. Maika Qarikau proposed the plan. I said, "Do you know what you are talking about?" He said, "There is no other way, this is the only way. We have to do this." There were people there who were for the proposal.

Q28:
Those people that were coming inside for meetings that were doing the activities (burning, et cetera) outside, were you aware of the names of those people? Did you recognise any of those people coming in?
A: No.

Q29:
Sunia Cama?
Sunia Cama comes there and supplies food. Na kana ike, era kana ga e na nodra du keba na yadrava tu na bai ni Complex. O keitou na tiko i loma, keitou kana vata kei ira na vesu tiko. E special, vakarautaki mai vale ni kuro, vakarau na kedra na hostages kei na keitou. Eso na gauna e supply o Sunia Cama, cart lunch, very beautiful lunches. Sunia Cama has been a regular visitor. E sega ni dabe vakadua ena dua na bose i loma ya. Na set up ya, na SVT complex i cake vata kei na FAP i ra, i cake ya na muana sara i muri, oya e keitou tiko kina e vica vai keitou na MP's kei Bukanaru. Ia na rumu nei Leader of the Opposition, ya e tu kina o Duvuloco kei iratou na Nationalist elements. Ikega e tu kina na vale ni sili kei na vale lalai, na vanua ga ya e keimani vakayagataka kece tiko na tagane. Ia ni da curu yani ikega, eda kila saraga ni break na veivosaki, e vaka e dua na veivosaki renevaki e dau caka tiko i loma ya. Au clash vaka vica kei Duvuloco ena so na ideas e kauta mai. E dua na gauna esa katakata sara na neirau veivosaki. Oti esa qai kacivi au mai tautuba "Taiqiu dou vakarorogo mai, laiva mada me oti na noqu veivosaki." Au va ga qa, "Sega, ke sa cala ga vei au, au sa tukuna ga ni cala." Esa dau va ga qa okoya, "Bau vakarorogo mada, sa sega ni rawa e dua na ka qo kevaka o dou ia tikoga va qa." Okoya gona ya, ni keitou dau curu i loma ya, e dau tiko ikega eso na chiefs, okoya esa brainwash-taki ira safa tikoga qa. These people, jacket loaloa, cap, sunglasses, curu tiko ga mai ena rumu ya, tautuba tale, era sega ni yacova yani na vanua keitou veivosaki tiko kina.

Q30:
Whilst in the complex, did you hear of who had instigated the whole coup? Who had masterminded the coup?
A: I had a grog session with Speight, e tukuna ga okoya that he came in the last minute. He never mentioned anything. They met with Ligairi for about 40 minutes, they made their contacts before entering Parliament. That was as far as I knew.

When I had a grog session with Duvuloco at one time, I asked him, "Who planned this thing?" He said, "Hey-Tailevu, you mean until now you still don't know", meaning that they were the ones that
planned it. I said, "Yes, I don't know, who planned it!" It was like that. I know George Speight mentioned that that morning of the Parliament session, he saw his father wearing his tie, getting ready for the session, he said to him, "Dad, today I will be taking over Parliament." His father was so surprised. He said, "I will be taking over Parliament today, just be warned that I will be coming into Parliament." His dad was so surprised that he just said, "Take care son, take care son." That is another comment.

Another comment that one hour or two hours just after the coup, Major-General entered Parliament and had a session with Speight. The first thing he asked Speight and this was what Speight said, "Why did you do it?". Speight laughed, laughed and laughed then he said "What do you mean asking me that question, only two people here did this thing, only you and me. You did not complete it, I will complete it." That was what Speight said, but I do not know so apart from that, I do not really know anything else.

Q31: Sir, ena gauna ea caka kina na vakacaca ena TV station, o ni se tiko saka i loma?
A: Io.

Q32: O ni a raica na gauna era a lako sobu kina na mob, ena gauna era a lako kina ya?

Q33: Ni a rogoca talega ni a so vei ira na 1MS se so vei ira na sotia vakayaragi era a lako vata kei ira na mob ya?
A: They always. Na 1MS e lako vata tu ga kei ira na crowd. Ena dua na gauna au a lako vata kei ira. Au lako ga vata kei ira ena dua na check-point e toka ena mata ni Suva Grammar School, that is the first confrontation with the military because the military had put up a barbed wire to block the people from coming into Parliament. Speight decided to go down there so we decided to go along. Era veitaui liga na caurvou, esa qai o Speight vata kei so na 1MS i muri. Ena yasani gaunisala levu qo, na Vuya road, o ira talega na sotia era lako tiko, era vakayaragi tiko. It did not even attract any attention because of the crowd in the middle of the road. E lai veicoqacoqo kei iratou na platoon qo, e sega ni dua e mavaq e kea, eratou sa warning shots mai na sotia, era lako ga yani oira qo, lave na vale ni laca, cavu laivi na barbed wire, esa qai caka e kea na veivosaki, "Eda kai viti vata, na cava era tarovi tiko kina o ira qo?" E vinaka niratou malumu tu ga na sotia, e sega ni dua na ka e caka vei iratou. O koya ga ya au bau lako kina.
Q34: Sir, just one question. You have seen these personnel carrying weapons, the 1MS in the complex, from your own assessment, were they geared up for any engagement with the RFMF if the need arise?

A: E dua na briefing, e vakarauta kina o Ligairi e tukuna o koya, "The only thing au vinakata vei ira na tu qo i tautuba, au vinakata ga o au meu taura na yalodia, me ra vakabauti au, unconditional." That is why they were having training. He said, "Because these boys here, if I train them to be soldiers, they will be better than the soldiers up the camp. Ena gauna era sa na ready kina, no worries about the weapons, I can arm everyone around here, I can even arm all the officers inside here. We can overcome the Army camp." O ya ga na statement au se qai bau rogo ca toka nona vakaraitaka ni nona kaukauwa e toka e kea.

Q35: Sir, e dua na veitana oea caka i loma ni Keba, the promise that was made by the Commander in closed doors just the negotiating team from the Parliament complex with the Commander, RFMF. O ni rawa ni vakamatatataka na ka ea tukuni ena bose ya? What promises were made?

A: I am trying to refresh my mind. Na ka ya au sega ni cavuta kina i lio ya, na topic e cover-taki o ira na vesu tiko kei na yaragi. I know the outcome was very acceptable to the gang in Parliament, e marautaki sara vakalevu ka caka na kena gunu yaqona ena bogi ya. E levu na ka ea yaco tiko, au sa sega ni vaksamataca vakavinaka. Just give me a lead.

Q36: There were some concessions made with George's selected line-up.

A: Right, in return that George to comply with all conditions. The Commander had proposed to let the GCC to select its line-up to the Interim Government. The condition was for GSG to surrender all weapons to the Camp, release all hostages, etc. Eda kila levu tu ena gauna ya ni ka bibi e gadeva na mataivalu, na kena vaksakai na yaragi vata kei na nodra serek kieve o ira na vesu tu. E na kauta cake na veiyalavalatqo na Commander, for him to convince his Army officers. George readily accepted it and everyone else too, e dua na ka e sega ni taleitaka tale o Duvaloco who was not in the group that went to Camp, he was in the complex. Generally, we were very happy with what Commander had decided. As I said, the following day when we came here, OTS, esa duatani tale na tunev.

Q37: From the incidents of May 19th until today, we have seen that there has been a rift that has been established and this is concerning the military and as to the people outside, its more so the indigenous people. What is your recommendation to mend this rift? How could we go about it?

A: It is very hard to answer that because during this crisis, we thought we had all the answers but when we followed an option, we found it to be okay so any option we take depends on how we go about it, the circumstances we do not know, but I think what we are doing now is the right thing unless we go through this cleaning up process, we
cannot reconcile at the end of the day because this is what we have been telling the people. You only have the reconciliation when you know that some people have accepted responsibility and tasked for it so I think we are on the right track. We were a little bit worried when the chiefs were meeting in a couple of days ago, the decision they were going to make, I think at the end of the day, the chiefs made a wise decision to follow the judiciary, to leave it to the judiciary, and then after that, we can take it on from there. It is a long way but people will have to be taught to be told. People do not know what is going on.

Q38: Finally, Sir, have you had any conversations with Col. Vatu or Lt. Col. Tarakinikini as to their roles?
A: Yes, not Filipo, I have not had a talk with him. Yes, Vatu is a very close friend, I went with him on PR to Kadavu. At several times, he mentioned about his role when he was asked to be the Commander of the Army and very specific, I heard the story first hand from him about that.

[RATU V S VOLAVOLA]
Lieutenant-Colonel

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colone.
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Cass One
Member
SEVENTY-THIRD WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 27936 CAPT AMELIA DAMUNI

Capt Damuni, after having been duly sworn on Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Captain Damuni, you understand the reason for this Board of Inquiry. Can you explain in your own words your involvement and what you understand in what was taking place in Parliament? Your name was given contacting those that were in Parliament. Can you specify the nature of your calls and who were they made to and your involvement with those in the complex?
A: It was Mr. Dakai, Sir.

Q2: What was the nature of the calls?
A: I was trying to tell him to come back with the good intention thinking that he would realise that his defection to the Parliament was not in line with what the institution is for. The was the main reason of my being contacting him.

Q3: Were you also feeding him the information of what was happening in the camp?
A: No, Sir.

Q4: Captain Damuni, the next question is directed to what we have heard in this Board. It is alleged that you were distributing leaflets in the camp that were produced in the Parliament complex. Have you got anything to say to that?
A: That is a baseless and false statement.

Q5: Did you at any time distribute any leaflets or propaganda materials in camp?
A: No, Sir.

Q6: When Mr. Dakai left the complex, did he come and stay with you at your residence?
A: We had kava together with CO 3FIR and the rest of the boys at TAC Headquarters and he came and slept at home for the night.

Q7: What date was this?
A: This was the day before the funeral.

Q8: Where are you residing?
A: 237 Nicolls Place, Muanikau.
Q9: Captain Damuni, can you please enlighten the Board on your current role at HQ Land Force?
A: I am SO Co-ord.

Q10: Can you describe what SO Co-ord means? What do you normally do?
A: I am the staff officer to the Chief of Staff Land Force. I actually coordinate any visits and any other tasks directed from the Chief of Staff Land Force.

Q11: Have you ever being tasked by the Chief of Staff to gather statements of people that have been put into custody by the army?
A: No, Sir.

Q12: Were you not involved in the gathering of statement from Lt. Baleinamau?
A: No, Sir.

Q13: Was your residence ever damaged by the people residing in the Parliament complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q14: Is it true that you contacted some people within the Parliament complex to ensure that your residence was not trashed or damaged by the people within the Parliament complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q15: Captain Damuni, we have heard reports that you have been passing on information to people within the Parliament complex, information such as various conduct in the Chief of Staff's role?
A: No, Sir.

Q16: Captain Damuni, am I correct in saying that you are married to Captain Damuni, the current ADC to the President?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q17: Did you at any time relay any information which you may have obtained from your husband to any third person?
A: What kind of information, Sir?

Q18: Information concerning the security, the matters appertaining to the May 19th events.
A: No, Sir.
Q19: Before the Board is done with you Captain Damuni, do you have anything further to say. Should we require you, we will recall you.

[A. DAMUNI]
Captain

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
WARRANT OFFICER CLASS ONE
Member

CONFIDENTIAL
SEVENTY-FOURTH WITNESS
28358 PTE SIMIONE VUNITABUA

Pte Vunitabua, after having been sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: O a curu e na 1FMS e na yabaki cava?
A: Yabaki sa oti saka.

Q2: E ra gauna oqo, o tiko evei?
A: Au tiko saka mai cake?

Q3: E vei?
A: 1FMS.

Q4: O sa tiko ga e loma ni 1FMS?
A: Sir.

Q5: Vakamacalataka na ka o kila baleta na vuaviri, na nomu vakaitawi, na ka o raica?
A: Na ca e baleta na vuaviri, au sega saka ni kilia kina e dua na ka baleta na kena i tuvatuva.

Q6: Na i ka 19 ni siga o ya o a tiko evei?
A: Au a tiko saka e na selection team. Keitou biuti Namatakula saka mai, keitou yacova mai e dua na delana i kea, keitou qai kilia e kea ni sa caka e dua na vuaviri.

Q7: Oti oya dou sa mai tiko e na keba, o cei a brief-taki kemudou baleta na vuaviri, o cei a qai vakamacalataka mai na Unit mai cake?
A: Keitou qai yaco saka mai e na yakavi o ya, sa tukuna o Mr Steven me keitou sa gole mada i vale e na yakavi ni siga Vakaraubuka.

Q8: O a sega ni tiko ena dua na briefing a solia o Col Tarakinikini e na bogi ga ni Vakaraubuka?
A: Segat saka.

Q9: O a qai basika tale i na keba ena Siga Moniti?
A: Segat, siga Vakarauvai saka.

Q10: Bau cu a gauna o curu e na loma ni Parliament Complex?
A: Sa oti saka e dua na macawa.

Q11: Sa siga cava o qai curu kina i loma?
A: Siga Lotulevu saka.

Q12: Na i ka 25 ni siga?
A: Sir.
Q13: O ya oti na macawa ni vuaviri macawa tarava?
A: Sir.

Q14: O cei a tukuna vei iko mo lako sobu i ra?
A: Au a talai saka meu kauta sobu na ration. Au kauta saka ga au lai biuta i loma, sa sega ni rawa niu curu mai tuba. Sa tukuni okoya sa na curu mai tuba, sa na vesu, au sa mani tu saka ga i loma.

Q15: O cei a tukuna vei iko o ya?
A: O ratou na yadra saka e na check-point.

Q16: Mai na Unit mai cake, ena Siga Vakarauwai, o a vakaitavi e na kena vakavodoki na i yaragi ena lori levu?
A: Sega saka.

Q17: Vica na kaloko o qai basika tale i na keba e na siga Vakarauwai?
A: Bera saka na walu.

Q18: O a tiko i vei ena rua na kaloko (1400 hrs) ni oti na vakasigalevu ena siga Vakarauwai?
A: Au sa guilecava saka.

Q19: A caka tiko na vakavodo e na 2.00 na kaloko. Na tamata tauoko ena loma ri Complex e ra vakavodoka tiko na i yaragi. Na i yaragi e ra tawa tu e na loma ni kisi se box, ra sa qai cola ena gaunisala i muri, ki na Sukanaivalu Road, o ikoi o a tiko evei e na gauna o ya?
A: Au sa sega saka ni nanuma rawa.

Q20: Na i tavi cava o qarava ena loma ni Complex mai ra?
A: Security saka.

Q21: Security i vei?
A: Au lai body guard saka.

Q22: Body guard vei cei?
A: Vei Speight.

Q23: O cei a solia vei iko na i tavi o ya?
A: O au saka ga.

Q24: Sega ni rawa ni dua e lako tu ga yani e lai bodyguard sara, na must dua e solia vei iko na order - o iko lako i kea lai bodyguard?
A: Au lako saka ga yani, au sa lai tu i loma o ya, au raici Speight ga ni sa lako mai e sega ni dua e muri koya mai, au sa mani muri koya saka tu mai.

Q25: Yaragi cava o vakayagataka tiko i loma o ya?
A: Uzi vata kei na dua na pistol.

Q26: Evei na Uzi koya o a vakayagataka e na gauna qo?
A: Sa suka saka mai.

Q27: Na pistol?
A: Sa suka saka.

Q28: Na cava na naba ni nomu pistol?
A: Au sa sega saka ni nanuma rawa.

Q29: E dua na directive a solia o Na Qase i loma o ya. Na gauna me suka kina na i yaragi e na i ka 13 ni siga, body guards taucoko me ra maroroya na nodra pistol?
A: Sa soli saka mai.

Q30: Na gauna sa suka kece kina na dakai, sa qai tukuna o Na Qase, me o ira ga na bodyguards me ra maroroya na nodra pistol.
A: Au sa solia saka mai vei Tuivanuavou. O koya a lako yani, au sa solia saka mai vua.

Q31: Tuivanuavou cava?
A: 1FMS saka.

Q32: Na gauna e suka kina na i yaragi, o iko maroroya tikoga na nomu pistol?
A: Sa suka saka.

Q33: Sa suka na i yaragi, kau cake i na keba, nomu pistol ni bodyguard e tiko ga vei iko. Na gauna cava o qai solia kina vei Tuivanuavou, ka 13 ni siga a suka kina na i yaragi?
A: Ka 13 saka beka ga ni siga.

Q34: O Tuivanuavou a tiko i vei?
A: A ratou lai kauta saka mai na i yaragi.

Q35: O iko qai solia vua?
A: Sir.

Q36: Na cava o a solia kina nomu pistol vei Tuivanuavou ni a tukuna o Na Qase ni tukuna o koya me ra maroroya kece na bodyguard nodra pistol?
A: Sa lomaqo saka ga me sa suka, sa mani suka kina.

Q37: O iko rogo ca na ka e tukuna o Na Qase - bodyguard kece me ra maroroya nodra pistol?
A: Sega saka.

Q38: Pte Vunitabua, what weapons did you carry in Parliament?
A: Uzi.

Q39: Did you carry any other weapons?
A: No, Sir.
Q40: At any time did you carry a M16A2, what is called the M203 - grenade launcher?
A: No, Sir.

Q41: At any time did you carry a support weapon?
A: No, Sir.

Q42: Take a look at this list.

(Handed to witness)

Is that your signature?
A: Sir.

Q43: That's yours?
A: Sir.

Q44: Read what you signed for there?
A: Support.

Q45: What does that mean?
A: Sir, au sega saka ni tara e dua na support weapon.

Q46: Then why did you sign there? Nomu signature qori?
A: Sir.

Q47: Na dakai cava e volai tiko oya koya o sign-taka?
A: E volai saka tiko oya na "support". E sega saka niu tara e dua na support weapon.

Q48: Who else was with you guarding George Speight?
A: O au saka, o Soko vata kei Naisara.

Q49: Did you accompany him to meetings?
A: Sir.

Q50: Did you go out of the Parliament escorting him?
A: Sir.

Q51: Where to?
A: Ratu Iloilo's residence.

Q52: E rawa ni o vakamatatataka e na board qo na kena issue-taki na yaragi e lo na ni Palimedi - e caka vakacava?
A: Au lako saka ga yani au raica na yaragi sa tu, au tara saka ga mai e rua na pistol vata kei na rua na mag, na uzi vata kei na 4 na magazine.

Q53: O sega ni sign-taka e dua na i vola se ḍua e issuetaka vei iko ḳa dakai?
A: E sega saka ni dua e issue-taka.
Q54: E toqai tu vakacava na nomu signature e na i vola koya e sa vakaraitaki o ya vei iko?
A: Au sega saka ni vakasamataka rawa na sign koya e tu o ya.

Q55: Ia e rawa ni o vakadinadinataka ni nomu signature o ya?
A: Sir.

Q56: O sega ni vakasamataka na siga koya a soli kina vei iko na support weapon o ya?
A: E sega saka ni dua na support weapon au tara.

Q57: Na ka e vinakati me matata i ke Vunitabua se o lai sign tu vakacava e na i vola o ya kevaka e sega ni dua na support weapon o tara?
A: Au sa sega saka ni rawa ni vakasamataka na signature koya e tu e na i vola o ya.

Q58: Ia na gauna o taura mai kina na pistol kei na uzi koya o cavuta tiko qo, o a sign-taka na i vola?
A: E dua saka ga na i vola e tu I kea, au lako ga au sign-taka au tara saka mai na uzi vata kei na pistol.

Q59: Vakacava na gauna ni nomu cegu; e biu i vei na nomu i yaragi?
A: Keirau moce vata tu.

Q60: E na gauna cava o qai biubiu mai kina mai na Palimedi?
A: Na gauna saka a sign-taki kina na Muanikau Accord.

Q61: O gole sara i vei?
A: Au gole saka i vale.

Q62: Gauna cava o qai lako mai kina i na keba?
A: Siga Vakaraubuka saka.

Q63: Vakamacalataka mada?
A: Au 'ako saka ga mai, au mai tu i vale, kena Vakaraubuka ga au report-in sara i na Complex.

Q64: Nomu report-in yani oya me yacova mai qo o se tiko ga e na IFMS?
A: Sir.

Q65: Bau dua na gauna e na nomu tiko e na loma ni Palimedi a musu na kemu i sau?
A: Sega saka.

Q66: Nomu bodyguard tiko vei George Speight, Bau dua na gauna o raici koya ni vakaiyaragi?
A: Sega saka.

Q67: E vei soti na vanua ni bone drau a lako vata kina kei George Speight, o sa cavuta oti na i tikotiko nei Vice President - Ratu Iloilo, dua tale na vanua?
A: Na keba saka.

Q68: Dua tale?
A: Koya saka ga oya.

Q69: Dou cakacakataka vakacava na nomudou handover o kemudou na bodyguard?
A: O au saka, keu yadra mai e sega ni dua e tiko vei Speight, au sa vakamuri koya tu, gauna ga au sa oca kina, au sa lako sara.

Q70: Gauna cava rau dau bodyguard kina o Soko vata kei Naisara?
A: O au veisiga meu raici Speight ni sega ni dua e muri koya, au sa tu ga au vakamuri koya.

Q71: Kena i balebale oya e sega ni dua na handover dou dau cakava o kemudou?
A: E sega saka.

Q72: Bau dua na gauna o vanataka kina nomu i yaragi?
A: E sega saka.

Q73: O baunai raica ni issue vua e dua na civilian e dua na i yaragi se o raici ira na civilian e ra tauri yaragi e na gauna era lewe lailai kina se ra mai yadra vata kei kemudou?
A: Sega saka.

Q74: E na gauna rau a mavoa-kina e rua na lewe ni 3FIR mai na checkpoint koya e tiko e na Vuya Road; e dua na turaga ni valu vata kei na dua na private, o
bau kila na siga oya (qo na Siga Vakarauwai, 27 ni siga)? E rau lauvana kina; dua e lauvana na tabana kei na dua e lauvana na yavana mai va na crowd koya e lako mai oya?
A: Au tiko saka ga e na loma ni Palimedi.

Q75: O iko kila o cei a vanai koya?
A: Sega saka.

Q76: Sega ni dou veitalanoataka?
A: Sega saka.

Q77: Balsta ni sa sega ni soli vei ira na civilian na i yaragi, sa na dua ga vei kemudou e na vana i koya; se vakaeevi?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.

Q78: Vakacava na gauna koya a lai smash-taki kina na TV Station, qo na Siga Tabu na i ka 28 ni siga, koya a mai mate kina na ovisa; a so vei kemudou a lako vata kei na mob koya era a lako sobu i ra; o bau kila e dua vei kemudou a lako vata kei ira na i lala era lako oya?
A: “Au tiko saka ga e na loma ni Palimedi.”

Q79: O sega ni raica ni dua vei kemudou a lako vata kei iratou?
A: Sega saka.

Q80: Na gauna era lesu mai kina?
A: Au sega saka ni kila. Au tu saka ga i loma, au sega ni kila na nodra lako, au sega ni kila saka tale na nodra lesu mai.

Q81: Na gauna o qai lai tekivu bodyguard kina, mai na siga o lai curu kina i loma?
A: Au curu saka ena siga Lotulevu, na i ka 25 au qai lai tekivu bodyguard ni sa yakavi sara toka ni Vakaraubuka.

Q82: Ka 26?
A: Sir.

Q83: Ni ra dau lako i vakacaca vakaoya e na TV Station baleta ni o bodyguard tiko, o kila na ka oya e cava, e lako mai vei Speight se vei dua tale, e tukuna mai më lai caka?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.
Q84: Ni bera ni o lako, dua tale na ka o via tukuna?
A. Noqu qai lako saka mai bure, sa basu saka noqu kato, sa yali saka eso na noqu military issue, sai koya saka ga o ya.

[S. VUNITABUA]
Private

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
SEVENTY-FIFTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 20993 LT RATU GEORGE CAKOBAU

Lt Cakobau, after having been duly sworn on Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: You understand the purpose of this board, it is to find out the involvement of all RFMF personnel in the activities of the takeover and the activities associated with the taking over of Parliament on the 19th of May. Can you relate to the Board your involvement and your knowledge of what took place?
A: On the 19th of May, (I was a Senator then) I was a Member of the Senate Select Committee on Taxation, we were sitting on that day discussing the Tax Bill in the Small Committee Room when one of the wardens in the Chamber ran into the room and cried out to me, "Ratu, Ratu, the army is in the Chamber", and I said, "Cool down, cool down". I asked, "How did you know it is the army?" He said, "They all have guns". I told him, "No, you just can't describe the army like that having guns. Are they in uniform?" He said, "No, they all wear balaclavas." I said, "Okay, okay" then he left.

We did not leave the Small Committee Room until they started closing the gates and then I came out, walked down towards the Opposition Office and that is when I saw Major Ligairi. I saw him standing by the bure, just at the entrance. I went straight past him down to the Opposition Office and I came back, back into the Small Committee Room. The next thing I heard was that we were told to vacate all offices, and we all came out from the Parliament buildings.

Q2: During the whole episode, did you attend any of the caucus meetings of those in Parliament or those who were in control of Parliament - the takeover group?
A: Yes, Sir, I did, as a member of the BLV Sub-committee.

Q3: Can you relate to the Board when the BLV Sub-Committee was sent down by the Boise Levu Vakaturaga to pass on the message to those in the Complex; who was in the meeting from the Complex side?
A: At first the Committee went down there, there was a crowd represented the members in Parliament. There was Duvuloco, George Speight, Col Bukarau. There were others who were there whom I could not recognise that day.

Q4: After these various meetings, did you at any time from then on, join in with the group in the Complex?
A: After the meetings, we normally come back to the FAB Office, then from there we disperse, then I would normally go back and just have a bowl of grog with them then leave afterwards.

Q5: At any time, were you part of the negotiating team that was coming out of the Complex to come and meet with the army?
A: No, Sir.
Q6: At any time did you enter the Operation Room in the Complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q7: Who was in the Operation Room when you entered the Operation Room?
A: The main players were there, Major Ligairi, Eroni Lewaqai, Bukarau, Duvuloco, Savu.

Q8: What was the nature of your visit to the Operation Room?
A: You have to go through the Operation Room in order to get to the negotiating room.

Q9: Can you indicate on the chart there where the negotiating room was?
A: The negotiating room is at the end of the Government Members building as you come down from the Chamber, that is the first building that you get to. Underneath is where the hostages were kept. Top floor is where the negotiating room or the negotiating room was. The first door that you see as you climb up the stairs is the Operation Room, where Major Ligairi usually stays.

Q10: So we pass through the Operation Room to get to the Negotiating Room?
A: We go through that way or through the balcony, Sir.

Q11: When did you get out of the Parliamentary Complex?
A: That was when we stopped doing the negotiations at the Parliament Complex, we started having it at the Vice President's bure.

Q12: How many weeks after May 19th?
A: Just after the BLV Council, we went down. About three times that I attended the meetings down there.

Q13: When you left the Parliamentary Complex, where did you go to?
A: Straight to Mokani Village, Sir.

Q14: One of the key-players you mentioned by the name of Savu, which Savu is this?
A: This is Viliame Savu.

Q15: Were you present in any of the caucus meetings of George Speight and the group?
A: No, Sir.

Q16: Did you go into the Parliamentary Chamber where the hostages were initially kept?
A: Yes, I did, Sir. I went there to convey Brigadier Naitatikau's loloma to his wife, Sir. That was the only time I entered the Chamber, Sir.

Q17: Did you see the armed personnel that were in the Chambers?
A: Sir.
Q18: Could you identify any of them?
A: No, Sir.

Q19: Subsequently, did you come to know any of them; who they were?
A: Not by name, Sir, especially George Speight's bodyguard because he was always around George Speight. When we were negotiating, he was always in the room all the time.

Q20: Can you just take a look at the photographs in there? (Photographs shown to witness) Can you identify someone there?
A: This one, Sir, (indicating) he was always with George Speight all the time.

Q21: Can you identify any of them that were in the Chambers when you went to convey the message?
A: No, Sir.

Q22: Did you speak with Major Ligairi on any occasion in the Complex?
A: Yes, Sir, only once when I went and asked him for permission to visit the hostages in the Chamber.

Q23: In your normal discussions in the Parliamentary Complex, was there any mention as to who orchestrated or who was the leader of the coup?
A: No, Sir.

Q24: Was there any mention of how the 1FMS got involved?
A: No, Sir.

Q25: When did you come back for military duties again?
A: Just a week after when the Accord was supposed to be signed - from Friday evening to Saturday morning, and it came to a deadlock; that was when I pulled out from those meetings, Sir. The week after that, I marched-in, Sir.

Q26: Were you part of the Great Council of Chiefs team that actually went across to the Parliamentary Complex to present the ten resolutions?
A: Sir.

Q27: While presenting these resolutions, was it accepted or rejected by the members of George Speight's group?
A: Certain parts of resolutions from the Great Council of Chiefs was accepted.

Q28: Could you please enlighten the board on which parts of these resolutions?
A: The last part, Sir, where it said that these negotiations be opened between George Speight's group and the BLV, Sir.

Q29: So all of the ten-point resolutions were not accepted?
A: To them, because they rejected the idea that the President still stays on and just change certain parts of the Constitution, not the whole thing.
Q30: During the early days of the coup, did you hear someone mentioned that the military was behind the coup?
A: No, Sir.

Q31: Did you hear of Col Vatu and Lt Col Tarakinikini's names being mentioned, one to be the Commander of the RFSM and the other to become the Chief-of-Staff?
A: Sir.

Q32: Would you enlighten the Board on how you came about this?
A: That is when we were down at the FAB Office and those in Parliament produced their line-up for the Government and also for the Commander's Office.

Q33: Do you know the date when this was taking place; was it Friday the 19th of May or Saturday the 20th?
A: No, Sir, it was after the takeover.

Q34: How far after the takeover is this; one week, two weeks?
A: One week after the takeover, Sir.

[RATU G. CAKOBAY]
Lieutenant

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member
SEVENTY SIXTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 24622 SGT TONY CELEASIGA

Sgt Celeasiga, after having been duly sworn on Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Satini, ena gauna cava o a curu kina ena 1MS?
A: 1987, ena gauna se CRW saka kina.

Q2: Kemudou a tauyavutaka na Unit qo?
A: Io saka.

Q3: Vakamacalataka mada na ka o kila baleta na vuaviri, na kena vakavakarau, na vuli vakaivalu kei na veika kece, na nomu vakaitavi kei na ka o kila.
A: Na vuli saka ena loma ni CRW, eratou kila tikoga o iratou na cicivaka tiko.

Q4: Talanoataka mada na ka o kila baleta na vuaviri qo vata kei na nomu vakaitavi o iko ena veika e yaco?
A: Na vuaviri, au a sega sara ga ni kila kina e dua na ka. Au a vakayagataki ga kina. Me vaka niu sotia, au vakarorogo ena lewa, au kila ni sa donu vinaka na vanua e gole mai kina na lewa, sai koya saka o ya.

Q5: Vakamacalataka mada na i ka 19 ni siga?
A: Keitou tiko saka mai Nadi na selection team, au a lewe ni selection team saka tiko. Keitou suka tiko mai ena gauna keitou sa yacovi Korovisilo saka beka, ena dua na vanua oya, sa rogoca mai o Mr Stevens e liu ni sa yaco na vuaviri me vaka ga ni a vaka retio tikoga o koya e liu. It was a civilian coup. Au kurabuitaka mada ga vakalevu ni sa yaco na vuaviri. Au a sega sara ga ni namaka ni sa yaco na vuaviri.

Q6: Ni o dou lesu mai na Unit, na cava e a qai tukuni vei kemudou? E dua e a brief-taki kemudou ena Unit ena ka e yaco?
A: Keitou lako saka mai, keitou kerea me keitou brief-taki.

Q7: O cei e qai brief-taki kemudou?
A: O WO1 Bainimoli saka.

Q8: Ni oti o ya?
A: E tukuna saka o koya ni sa involve na Unit. Me vaka ni keitou se qai lesu tiko mai Nadi, e tiko na i sulu duka ka sa oti talega e dua na macawa na neitou biubiu tu mai na neitou dui matavuval. Keitou sa kerea saka me keitou sa gole mada ga i vale me vaka ni keitou sa qai yaco ga mai. E sega tiko ni matata vei keitou na kena laki involve tu na Unit?

Q9: Ni oti o ya na cava e qai tukuni vei kemudou?
E tukuni saka vei keitou me keitou sa gole i vale, me oti e dua na aua me keitou qai lesu tale mai.

Q10: Ena siga e tarava?


Q11: O qai lesu tale i nakeba ena vica na kaloko ena siga Vakaraubuka?

A: Au sega saka ni taupa domu na gauna, ia es buoto ga.

Q12: Ko a tiko ena gauna e brief kina o Lt. Col. Tarakinikini ena bogi ni Vakaraubuka?

A: Au tiko saka kina.

Q13: Na cava ca tukuna o koya ena brief o ya?


Q14: Erauta beka na vica na kaloko na nona brief o ya?

A: Me vaka au sa tukuna saka oti, ea sa buoto tiko na siga Vakaraubuka o ya. Ena via rauta tiko na loma ni bai ni vitu na kaloko ena yakavi kina valu na kaloko.

Q15: Na cava eya yaco ena siga Vakarauwai na ka 20 ni siga, na siga e tarava?

A: Ena siga Vakaraubuka vata tikoga o ya, keitou sa toso kina i ra.

Q16: O cei e tukuna vei kemudou mo dou gole i ra?

A: Ena gauna au qai gole yani kina, sa lako oti yani e dua na quick brief vei iratou na cauravou me vaka niu a bera mai. Eya lako tale mai e dua na order nei OC vata kei WOI Bainimoli. E tukuna saka o koya ni sa yaco na coup, sa involve na Unit ka sa tiko i ra o Naqase ka sa vinakati me keitou laki vakaitavi ena security ena loma ni Palimedi.

Q17: O cei ea solia na order mo lako sobu, o Bainimoli se o OC Baleinamau?

A: O rau ruaru saka.

Q18: Ena gauna o lako sobu kina ki Palimedi, na cava a nomu i tavi e loma o ya?

A: Me vaka saka ga sa tukuni mai na order mai cak e me keitou laki vakaitavi ena security.
Q19: O yaco yani o security o vei?
A: Ena siga saka o ya, eya sega ni matata vinaka na i tuvatuva ni ka e tukuni mai me vaka ni sa yaco na coup ka sega talega ni dua na ka e vakamatatataki mai. Keitou sa yaco ira sa qai laki vakamatatataki na vanua me keitou curu kina.

Q20: Ena nomudou yaco ira o ya, o cei ea solia vei iko na directive mo laki yadra e kea se cava na nomu i tavi mo laki qarava?
A: Era sa tiko saka kina e vica na neitou caurauvou, keitou sa laki curu maliwai ratou. Keitou familiarise mada ga ena loma ni bai ni complex.

Q21: Ko a laki yadra e vei, matamata, se ena perimeter?
A: Ena perimeter saka ena i matai ni gauna.

Q22: Ni sa oti o ya?
A: Keitou lako saka me laki organise vinaka na lewe ni mata yadra sa qai lako na shift.

Q23: O qai yadra e vei?
A: E veiveisau tikoga na i lakolako ni yadra. E dua saka na mata yadra i matamata, e dua ena perimeter, edu saka e yadravi ira na hostages.

Q24: Na mata yadra cava o dou yadra tiko ena Battery Hill?
A: Au yadrava saka tikoga na perimeter (shift bases), wili kina na Battery Hill.

Q25: Ena siga Vakaraubuka na i ka 19 ni siga ena nomu a yaco tale yani ena nomudou Unit mai cake, me vaka ko a vakaraitaka oti ni talai iko sobu o nomudou OC, o Mr. Baleinamau vakatalega kina o WOI Bainimoli. Ena nomu tiko voli mai cake o ya, e bau dua na gauna o rogoca ni dua vei rau e cavuta ni sa vakarau veisau na veilutaki ena loma ni mataivalu?
A: Io saka.

Q26: O ya ena siga Vakaraubuka tikoga o ya?
A: Io saka.

Q27: E rawa ni ko vakamatata taka vua na Board na veiaka o rogoca ena siga oya?
A: O koya saka ga au rogoca ni sa na vakarau veisau na i liiliu ni mataivalu ka vakakina na Chief of Staff.

Q28: O cei a brief?
A: O Baleinamau saka.

Q29: Vakamacalataka na ka e tukuna o koya?
E tukuni saka ga mai ni sa na dabe o Col. Vatu me sa na Commander ka Chief of Staff o Lt. Col. Tarakinikini ke me rau sa na vakatikori ena bogi tikoga o ya.

Q30: E rawa ni o vakadeitaka, ena bogi tikoga ni Vakaraubuka o ya?
A: Io saka.

Q31: E sega ni bau so tale na nomu i tokani e tu wavoki tu ena loma ni nomudou Unit e rogoca tale ga na vosa e tauca tiko oqori o nomudou OC?
A: E tiko saka.

Q32: O bau kila tiko eso mo vakadeitaka ena nomu i tukutuku oqori?
A: Eratou kila saka tikoga oratou. Sa viavia yali tale vei au me yacova mai na gauna oya, na mata ni tamata talega, au sa sega ni tara rawa.

Q33: Daru lakova maka na gauna daru sa gore sobu kina. Ena nomu gore sobu o iko vata kei cei drau a lako sobu kina Parliamentary complex?
A: Nai lakolako saka ena bogi oya e dua saka ga na team ena neitou vakasama ni sa involve na Unit. Keitou vakasama ni ra sa tiko kece mai ke a o ira na gone baleta ni keitou a bera mai ka sega ni matata vinaka na brief ea soli. Sa neitou vakabauta tauoko saka ga ni sa involve tauloko kina na Unit. Keitou na gole tiko ena siga o ya, na noqu nunuma tiko ni sai keitou saraga na i otioti ni group me keitou gole yani.

Q34: Vakadeitaka maka dou a gole sobu vata kei Satini Naika?
A: Au sa sega saka ni tara rawa na lewe ni team ea lako sobu i ra.

Q35: O cei na nomudou draiva?
A: Na neitou draiva saka o Paul.

Q36: Na draiva o Staff Sgt. Vakadranu vata kei na dua na four men team ea lako sobu?
A: E viavia vaka saka toka oqori.

Q37: Satini, na cava na nomuni tavi ena loma ni squadron? Na ka o specialised kina?
A: Au sniper saka tiko.

Q38: Vakadeitaka na SOP ni squadron, ni toso na i tosoto ni four-man team o ya, na nomudou assault bags sa kau sobu tale tikoga?
A: Io saka.

Q39: Na dakai cava ko a vakayagataka?
A: M16, A2 vaka telescopic sight.

Q40: Vakadeitaka na nomu lako sobu ena siga Vakaraubuka, ko ya kauta na nomu kit bags vata kei na nomu i yaragi?
A: Io saka.

Q41: O kemudou taukoko na lako o ya?
A: Au vakabauta saka ni o keitou taukoko baleta na gauna au sa gole mai kina ena lecture room, eratou sa dui draw taka na vo ni nodoratou kit o iratou na vo ni cauravou.

Q42: Sgt. na yaragi kece e issue vei iko ena nomudou se bera mai se o ya na nomu personal issue ga.
A: Na noqu personal issue ga.

Q43: O cei a tiko ena nomudou armoury mai na Unit o koya a issue taka na i yaragi?
A: Au sa sega ni taura rawa tale saka ga na cauravou o koya a issue taka tiko na i yaragi.

Q44: Ko ya sainitaka na i yaragi ni se bera ni o dou lako ena complex?
A: Au sega saka ni taura rawa au sainitaka se sega.

Q45: Sgt. e bau dua na gauna ko a bau vakaitavi ena kena issue taki na i yaragi ena loma ni Palimedi vei na nomudou cauravou ka ra qai muri tiko yani?
A: Vei iratou saka ga na neitou cauravou.

Q46: E rawa ni o vakamata taka mada na gauna cava ko a tekivu issue taki yaragi kina mo in charge e kea?
A: A tiko saka vakalaiai kina o WOJ Ravai Ena gauna saka o ya sa gole kina i tuba o koya. O au duadua saraga au sa bau senior tu vei keitou na tiko e keya ena siga o ya. Sa mani noqu i tavi meu control taka na i yaragi, au raica ni ratou junior kece oya. Au sa leqataki ira talega na lewenivanua era tiko e kea. Sa mani noqu i tavi meu record taka tiko na i yaragi kei na noqu control taka tiko na i yaragi.

Q47: Bau dua na gauna dou a veitalanoa kina me vaka toka oqo o koya e vinakata na i yaragi me lako ena rumu o ya sa tu kina na i vola me laki sainitaka na yakana ka kauta mai na i yaragi se ena veigauna kecega e dua e vinakata na i yaragi o vola tiko e keya o iko me o raica ni sainitaki na i yaragi?
A: E sega ni au a tara tiko na i yaragi ena veigauna kece sara yacova ni lako tale yani e dua tale o Bukasila.

Q48: Sa qai take over o Bukasila?
A: Io saka.

Q49: Satini, ena nomu tu ena loma ni complex, e bau dua na gauna e a vanataki na nomu dakai?
A: E sega saka.
Q50: Nai yaragi cava eya tiko tale vei iko, au sa kila ni a tiko vei iko na nomu sniper, na nomu pistol, e dua tale na i yaragi ea tiko vei iko?
A: E dua na .45, Sir.

Q51: Ni ko a tiko e loma o ya, n hau threaten-taki vei ira na lewe ni vanua?
A: E sega saka.

Q52: E dua na gauna e a musu kina na kemu i sau?
A: E sega saka.

Q53: Na kemudou kakana e kau tiko yani i vei?
A: E kau saka tiko mai cake.

Q54: O rawa ni vakamatatataka i cake i vei?
A: E kauta sobu tiko yani na neiout lorry saka.

Q55: Kena i balebare oya ni o tukuna tiko o iko ni kau tiko yani ena loma ni keba mai Nabua?
A: Io saka.

Q56: Satini, ena gauna cava o qai biuta mai kina na Parliament Complex?
A: Au biuta saka mai kea ena i ka 25 ni siga ni Juine ena Siga Tabu.

Q57: E rawa ni ko talanotata k moda ki na Board na cava na vuni nomu biuta mai na Parliament complex, o biubi mai o gole sara kivei?
A: Ena noqu a tiko e loma o ya, e sa qai tekiyu na ka oyo, au sa talai noqu lewe ni vale me sa gole i nakoro. Me yacova na gauna o ya, keirau sega ni veitaratara tale. Au leqa taka tu se vanua cava sa tiko kina. E yaco dina e nakoro se dua na vanua e tao tiko kina. Au sa tu e kea sa laki balavu na tiko au sa vakila mai sa leqa tiko na i tosotoso. Sa yaco na stress e loma o ya. Au kilo ni dua na i tutu ni leqa keimami sa tu kina. Au sa mani vagonara e dua na vanua meu kunea kina na vakacegu. Au mani gole mai tuka ena i ka ruasagavulu ka va saka, au qai curu saka tale yani ena i ka ruasagavulu ka lima. Au a gole mai au mai raica e dua na neiout Turaga bete me vaka niu lotu katolika. Ea mai solia vei au e dua na counselling me vaka niu a sa tu saka tu ena i tutu ni stress ena gauna o ya. Sa mai advise taki au o koya, au sa raica ni sa dodonu vinaka na nana advise, ena bogi koya au sa mani sega ni moce kina ena complex. Au sa laki moce i vale, o rau na noqu i tabutubu, e rau tiko i Nadawa. Au sa vakasamataka vakabalavu toka me vaka ni keimami tiko e keya e dua na ka e sa laki kaukauva e keya na comradeship vei ira na neiout cauravou. O ira na cauravou gone era tiko e keya me vaka ni u senior NCO, sa laki tuburi au na loloama vei ira na cauravou e ratu e keya. Edua na ka dredre vei au meu biuti ira na cauravou mai kea. Keirau mani veitalanoa ka sa vakamacatalaka vei au o koya na noqu priorities mai na situation sa yaco tu o ya. Au sa mani vakasamataka vakabalavu toka ena bogi o ya ena gauna au sa laki moce kina. Au sa yadra ena siga cake kau sa vakadeitaki au meu sa na tahuva laivi ga mai ena
loma ni bai ena Parliament complex. Au sa mani gole saka ga au laki kauta mai na noqu i yaya.

Q58: Satini, na nomu curu mai tuba o tatau vei dua mai ni loma ni Parliament Complex?
A: Io saka.

Q59: O cei?
A: Vei Staff Sergeant Ravulo saka. Au sa vakamacalataka saka ga vua niu se laki raica na noqu lewe ni vale.

Q60: E vakacava na nona reaction o koya vei iko na nomu lai tatau vua?
A: Au kila ena gauna o ya, e dredsre i'a, au kila ni ra na understand taka na cauravou baleta ni o ira era lako tiko ena nodra duv vuval ena loma ni complex era lako i veisiko tiko yani. Au duadua ga na noqu lewe ni vale e sega ni lako yani me tekivu sara mai na gauna ni crisis.

Q61: Satini, na nomu biubiu mai na nomu i yaragi, o vakasuka se o kauta tiko ga mai vakataki iko?
A: Au a handover taka saka vei Ravulo kei Bukasila.

Q62: E wili kina na nomu sniper kit?
A: Io saka.

Q63: Satini, ena nomu tiko ena loma ni Parliament complex, o bau rogoca ni dua na veitalanoa e cavuti tiko kina ni mataivalu e tokona tiko na vuaviri se vakaitavi tiko na mataivalu ena vuaviri o ya?
A: Me vaka ga au sa kaya oti, ena kena qai tekviva na ka oqo, sa tukuni ni na veisau na i liilu ni mataivalu ka sa tu kina na neitou vakaniuini, au vakabauta vei iratou kece na cauravou ni na vakatalega na 1987.
Sa na oti ga sa na curu mai na mataivalu. Sa laki yaco tiko e muri, sa laki kau tiko mai na kakana, keitou vakaniuini tiko kina ni se tiko ga na support. Ia, niu sa vakaraica tiko na veitalanoa, au kila ni sa dua na ka sa cala eke.

Q64: Satini, na nomu biubiu mai na Parliament complex, o bau laki vakaitavitaki iko tale ena so na ka me lako vata kei na veika e vakayacori tiko mai na Parliament complex?
A: Au a gole saka mai na i ka 29 saka au sa qai biubiu saka meu gole ki nakoro. Au sa yaco i vale e rau sa qai vakadeitaka o rau na noqu i tubutubu ni o watigu e sa tiko mai nakoro. A mai talanoa e dua na tacigu ni sa tiko mai nakoro o watigu. Au mani vodo waqavuka ena i ka 29 kau biubiu e Nausori. Au gole saka i nakoro, ia au sa nanumi ira tu mai na cauravou ena loma ni complex.

Au sa laki tiko i nakoro, sa laki tarai au sara vakabibi na stress ena veika au sa sotava. Au sa tiko e nakoro, au sa rogoca ena walesi ni sa tauri na mataivalu kei na niteseni ni ovisa mai Nasavasavu. Au
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Meu vakadeitaka sara mada na i ka vica ni siga e tauri kina na siteseni mai Savusavu. E na i ka ciwa ni siga ena siga tabu. E na i ka 10 saka ni siga au sa qai rogoca na walesi ni sa tauri na siteseni kei na keba ni mataivalu mai Savusavu mai vei iratou na wekai keitou ga o iratou na kai Sovatabua. Au sa qai bula madaga ena dua na vanua meu qai gole yani kina, au sa qai vakarogoca toka ena walesi, au kurabui sara. E na yakavi tiko ga ni siga o ya, sa lako yani vei au e dua na i tukutuku i nakoro. E ratou sa gadrevi au o iratou na tiko mai Savusavu meu laki veivuke vei iratou. Au sa mani vakasamataka vakabibi, e vaka au sa laki leqa talega ni neitou tauni ga mai Cakaudrove ka veigaravi tiko ena yasana o ya o Savusavu. Sa laki tauri na kaukauwa vei iratou na mataivalu ka ratou kaya o iratou na ovisa, au kila ni sa na dua na vanua ca sara e sa na tiko kina na kena maroro ni lava ena loma ni vanua o Cakadurove ka vakabibi na kena maroro ni tauni o Savusavu.

Au sa mani vakasamataka, keirau veitalanca vata kei na noqu, lewe ni vale ena bogi o ya, au sa mani kaya meu sa na toso ga baleta ni o au sotia, au saumi tiko. E dina niu sa laki curu mai vei iratou na rebels, au vakabuta ni tavi levu au rawa ni cakava e kea, meu laki control taki ratou na rebels meu lai liase vei iratou na ovisa kei iratou na mataivalu.

Q65:
Ena gauna cava e qai oti kina na nomu vakaitavitaki iko mai Savusavu?
A:
Au qai gole saka e keya ena i ka 11 ni siga, ena gauna saka sa handover taki kina na i yaragi, handover na siteseni kei na veika kece.

Q66:
O cei na ililiiu ni operation tauccoko mai Savusavu?
A:
O Tevita Vakalalabure Junior saka.

Q67:
Ena vica na kaloko ena siga Vakaraubuka o biuta kina na keba mo gole sobu kina complex?
A:
E naik ka 19 ni siga.

Q68:
Ena vica na kaloko?
A:
Au sega saka ni rawa ni vakadeitaka ena vica na kaloko.

Q69:
E sa vosa oti o L.t. Col. Tarakinikini ena viti, oti dou qai vodo ena lori cava?
A:
Au sega saka ni kila e dua na veitalanoa ni lori saka, sa tukeni saka ga ni sa kele tu na transport mai yasana ka dua e kele tu mai na matamata keitou vakayagatake tiko mai yasana ka dua.

Q70:
Na transport cava?
A:
Na lori saka mai na Palimedi.

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Q71: E dua ga na nomudou lori se lori saka mai na Palimedi?
A: E dua na ka loaloa ka nona beka na Minister for works.

Q72: Oqo Satini, e dua na Toyota landcruiser o koya dou vodo kina oqori?
A: Io saka.

Q73: A draiva tiko kina o Staff Sgt. Vakadranu?
A: Io saka.

Q74: Ena gauna o lako sobu kina i Palimedi, na kena sobu na dakai ena siga Vakarauwai voeleka na vakasigalevu, o raica se o vakaitavi na kena sobu na dakai ena loma ni complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q75: O kila na kena kau yani?
A: E sega saka.

Q76: Ena mataka laiilai ni siga Tabu ena ciwa kina tini ena kau e loma na i yaragi?
A: E sega saka. Au qai raica saka ga sa bini tu ena loma ni rumu.

Q77: Ko a curu ki loma ena siga Vakaraubuka?
A: Io saka.

Q78: O sega ni raica ena siga Vakarauwai?
A: E sega saka.

Q79: Na cava o cakava tiko ena siga levu ni siga Vakarauwai?
A: Ena gauna saka o ya e se laiilai tu kina na security ena loma ni complex ka sega talega na moce vei keitou. Sa neitou i tavi tuga na roving wavoki tu ga ena loma ni complex.

Q80: Na nomu roving oya o sega ni kila na kena sobu yani na i yaragi?
A: E sega saka.

Q81: Sgt. Celeasiga, when you returned from the selection from western, you were told of the take over inside between Korovisilou and Serua. Did you have a briefing down there?
A: We have no idea that our Unit was involved. It was announced that it was a civilian coup. Mr. Stevens was our team commander.

Q82: Were you all told that a coup had taken place?
A: Yes, Sir. We were told on the way.

Q83: It was just you or all the members were there?
A: All the members, Sir.
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Q84: Where were you sitting in the truck, at the back, or you were gathered on the road?
A: Only Mr. Stevens had the radio on, we were following at the back. He stopped on the way and briefed us.

Q85: Did he come at the back of the Renault and brief you?
A: Yes, Sir. He briefed us (seniors) in between trucks.

Q86: Who gave you the leave to go home after you returned from Nadi?
A: They told us that we were not going anywhere but we told Mr. Stevens that we were to take our dirty staff at home. So, he asked WOI Bainimoli for us to go home and leave our staff there. On the way home, we were just at the gate, when the OC called out that we have to be back in an hour's time.

Q87: Satini, vakadeitaka mada ena gauna e tukuna kina o nomudou OC ni sa na vakarau veisautaki na vei utaki ena mataivalu ni rau sa na tiko kina o Col. Vatu kei Lt. Col. Tarakinikini, o ya ena gauna sa vosa oti kina vei kemudou o Lt. Col. Tarakinikini ena bogi ni Vakaraubuka se se bera?
A: Sa vosa oti saka kina.

Q88: When you were in Parliament, when you said you took the initiative of accounting for the weapons that were issued, did you have a register?
A: Yes, Sir. I handed it over to Bukasila.

Q89: Just have a look at this exercise book, this is the photocopy of the exercise book. Can you identify that?
A: I was not using this one because I was there only for a short period of time.

Q90: What book you were using?
A: It was a foolscap.

Q91: The weapons that were issued, were they personal weapons or anyone could draw out any weapons that was located there?
A: I was only drawing out my personal weapons.

Q92: What about the other members of the 1MS?
A: The others were not personal weapons. I am sorry, I am a sniper so my personal weapon is a sniper rifle probably the others have their own personal weapons.

Q93: Can you recall the people that were present in the briefing conducted at the camp when you were told that Col. Vatu would be the Commander and Lt. Col. Tarakinikini would be the Chief of Staff?
A: Sir, I cannot remember.
Q94: You cannot recall any other people that were there?
A: No, Sir.

Q95: How many ammunition were you issued with?
A: There were plenty of ammunition.

Q96: How many did you carry with you at anyone time when you were on duty?
A: I cannot remember the exact number.

Q97: Did you carry them in mags?
A: As a personal staff, I carry them in my duffle bag.

Q98: Who issued you with the kit in camp before you left for Parliament?
A: I am trying to recall, Sir, but I cannot remember. It is blur to me what happened that day. It happened so fast.

Q99: From what I can gather from you, the only thing that is blurred is the name. Sergeant, you have been with this team for the last 10 years, you have been operating with them, you do not know their names but you would know their family names.
A: Sir, the picture is blurred to me because of that day, the 19th. I did not expect to go that early to the complex. All I believe that day that we were there as complex security. As in the briefing, I was so surprised, it seemed like a dream to me.

Q100: When you went to the Parliament complex, did you have all the groups in the morning?
A: Only the heads, Sir.

Q101: Were you one of the heads?
A: I used to then I was busy with the security duty.

Q102: The group that you attended, who conducted that?
A: The old man.

Q103: What we are asking you we know, I am telling you that code of conduct in your Unit does not apply when you appear for the Board of Inquiry.
A: I understand, Sir.

Q104: Ena nomu solia na i tukutuku oqo, ko a vosa bubului ena i Vola Tabu?
A: Io saka.

Q105: O kila na vanua e tiko kina na i yaragi ena gauna oqo?
A: E sega saka.

Q106: E so na i yaragi e se tiko ga e tuba?
A: E sega saka.
Q107: O sega ni kila e dua e maroroya tiko na i yaragi?
A: E sega saka.

Q108: In your normal discussion in the Parliament complex, were you told of the members that went to the chambers from 1MS?
A: No, Sir.

Q109: There was no discussion at all?
A: No, Sir.

Q110: Satini, ena i ka 27 ni siga ni vula ko Me ena siga Vakarauwai, o koya na incident e yaco i Vuya Road vua na check point ena 3FIR. O koya a mava a kina o Mr. Rokoura vata kei dua na private, o vakasamataka na siga Vakarauwai o ya?
A: Au vakasamataka tiko.

Q111: O kila o cei e vana Mr. Rokoura kei na Private oya?
A: Ena siga saka o ya au a yadra tiko kina mai na Battery Hill. Au sega saka ni kila o cei a vanavana.

Q112: Satini, I have been through the sniper’s course, na ka au raica e yaco vei Mr. Rokoura e dua ga na sniper e rawa ni cakava o ya. Apart from you being issued with the personal weapon, the sniper rifle, o cei tale e keya e tiko vua na sniper rifle?
A: Na sniper rifle e tiko ga vei keitou na sniper.

Q113: Au taroga tiko o cei tale na snipers e tiko e loma o ya?
A: Au nanuma tiko ga e lewe rua.

Q114: O cei so na yacadrau?
A: O Ben Naduaniwai kei Alex Alava.

Q115: O a tiko ena Battery Hill ena gauna oya?
A: Io saka, e donuya ena gauna au curu mai ki tuba, au lesu tale i loma sa yaco na veivana o ya.

Q116: O kila na vanua e rau tiko kina o Ben kei Alex?
A: O Ben saka keirau a curu yani i loma ni complex ena siga o ya.

Q117: O Alex?
A: Au sega saka ni kila na vanua ea tiko kina.

Q118: Ena i ka 28 ni siga ka smash taki kina na TV station o koya e mate kina e dua na ovisa. A tukuni ni so vei kemudou e lako vata kei ira na mob era a lako o ya ka laki vakayagataki kina na i yaragi ena dakuni nona vale na Peresitedi lesu mai ka mai lauvana na ovisa. O kila o cei a lako vata kei ira na i lala ka laki vakacaca o ya?
CONFIDENTIAL

A: Au kila vinaka tiko na siga oqori, eya donuya tale tikoga na noqu shift ena Battery Hill. Au sa rogoca na nodra vosavosa mai gaunisala.

Q119: Ena gauna e lauvana kina na ovisa, dou rogoca tiko e cake?
A: Keitou rogoca saka tiko na rogo ni gasau.

Q120: Ena gauna e oti kina o kila o cei e lakovata kei iratou?
A: Keitou yadra saka tiko ga i Battery Hill ka sega ni dodonu me keitou biuta mai na post ena gauna vaka o ya.

Q121: Au kaya mada ena siga ka tarava ena nomudou veitalanoa ga?
A: Au sega saka ni kilo o cei saka.

Q122: O kila ni dua vei kemudou a lako vata kei ira?
A: E sega saka.

Q123: E bau dua na gauna o bau vakayagataka kina na dakai mo vana?
A: E sega saka.

Q124: Sgt. Celeasiga, you heard the shots that day, did you enquire what was those shots about?
A: Our radio at that time was not working and we are not to leave the post as the priority was the hostages.

Q125: I understand that. Subsequently did you enquire what happen, who fired the shots, which place was fired from?
A: That was what we heard from the civilians they smashed the TV One but I do not know who fired the shots.

Q126: Would you agree with me it is human nature when events such as this happened we asked questions more so when we are soldiers.
A: I know, Sir.

Q127: And you did not do any of those things?
A: No, Sir. There were authorities down below who were supposed to look into those matters. We were concentrating on the securities.

Q128: Who were these authorities?
A: Inside the operation. Col. Evans, Sir.

Q129: I thought, so. E bau dua na gauna o curu ena loma ni operation room ena loma ni complex?
A: Io saka.

Q130: O cei a tiko i loma?
A: Sir, e dua na ka e yaco tiko e Palimedi e vaka e sa laki rua tiko na operation room e kea. E qai lega tiko kina na veitaratara vei iratou na civilians kei iratou na monitor taka tiko na Unit.
Q131: E rua tiko na operation room?
A: E sega ni rua, e dodonu me dua ga, ia sa vaka me laki rua tiko. Eratu sa via laki control taka tale e dua o iratou na civilians.

Q132: O cei na nodratou iliiliu se o cei e control taka tiko na nodratou operation room na civilians?
A: Au sega ni rawa ni vosa ekeri, e dua ga au dau raica kina vakalevu o Tikotani.

Q133: Na nomu curu ena operation room, o bau raica e loma eso nai yaya mai na FIS?
A: Au sega saka ni raica na kena kau mai se yaya cava ko ya.

Q134: O bau raica e dua na reijo e monitor taki tiko kina na veitalanoa mai na keba ni mataivalu?
A: Au sega saka ni raica se kila.

Q135: O bau raici Staff Naita?
A: Meu na tukuna vakadodonu, na tamata era tiko e kea, au sega ni kila tiko na yacadra.

Q136: Satini, na vanua e dau distribute taki kina na i yaragi na armoury e rawa ni o tuckkê mada mo vakaraitaka ena dua na blue print ka tiko oqo? (Witness was shown the photographs on the wall)

Whilst you were in the complex, did you hear of an ultimatum given by Commander for all soldiers to return to QEB?
A: I heard, Sir.

Q137: Where did you hear it from?
A: From the radio.

Q138: Did you discuss about this returning back to camp?
A: Yes, Sir. We were just waiting, we were just obeying orders. I remembered I did mention it but there wasn't any support from members present at that time.

Q139: If you were given orders to return to camp, would you have done so?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q140: You said you were obeying orders, would you obey an unlawful order?
A: At the situation, Sir. It is only a matter of safety.

Q141: The question is very simple? Would you obey an unlawful order?
A: Sir, the situation at that time, it is so difficult to answer that question.

Q142: Ena nomu curu ena loma ni operation room, o cei ea tiko e loma?
A: O iratou na tiko e kea, e levu vei iratou au sega sara tu ga ni kila na yacadraratou me yacova tiko mai oqo.

Q143: E dua o kila e loma ni operation room?
A: Au kilai Na Qase saka ga vata kei Col. Mua.

Q144: E dua tale mai na Unit? O iko curu ena Unit ena 1987, na i tovo ni nomu veitalanoa tiko eke, au raica na nomu intellectual level e toka sara e cake, keya sega e sega ni soli vei iko na naba oqori. O cei so na 1FMS a tiko e loma ni operation room?
A: E tiko saka ga o iratou na veisau tiko e loma e kea, o Vosavere saka.

A: Me vaka au sa tukuna oti, keitou concentrate tikoga ena complex security. E ratou tiko na team eratou tiko e loma.

Q146: Who was on duty with you in the perimeters? Can you identify any of them?
A: With my group. Au na vakasamataka mada vakamalua.

Q147: Did you see your name on the list?
A: Yes, my name is there. O iratou saka ga na Engineers.

Q148: You are identifying them as Engineers?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q149: There is no where there Engineer is written is it?
A: All of them are Engineer personnel, Sir.

Q150: So you know them?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q151: There is no where there that is written that they are from the Engineers?
A: Yes, Sir, I believe you.

Q152: Do you know them?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q153: Satigi, e dua na ka o via vakamacalataka tale e ke?
A: Au via vakaratika ga na noqu a vakaitavi taki au ena siga au a lako kina o ya e vu ga mai ena noqu a vulica na bula vaka i valu, au rogoca

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ga na lewa e tau mai, au vakamuria ga na kena i lakolako ga e dodonu me vakamuria e dua na sotia. Au sa laki tiko e loma sa yaco na leqa, au sa kila na vanua au sa tu kina na vanua saka oya au sa pull out saka mai kina. Na noqu lai involve i Savusavu baleta ga ni au a sotia, e dina beka niratou sa vakamalumalutaki na lawa dina, o au na noqu responsibility na vuna au lako i curu mai kina vei iratou na yasana ka dua meu control taka na nodratou i tosotoso me vakabulai kina na loma ni tauni o Savusavu kei na kena tamata. Sa kena levu saka.

[T. CELEASIGA]
Sergeant

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
Capt. S. Colati, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Capt. Colati, your appointment in the RFMF is as transport officer, is that correct?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q2: Throughout the whole episode from the 18th or the 19th of May, could you give the Board a background on the issue of fuel to the 1MS personnel in the Parliament Complex?
A: Yes, the 1MS as you know has seven vehicular units allocated to them. Out of that seven, only three of the vehicles were operative namely BV 917, BV 079 and GK 406. The other four were off the road. They have been compensated with three other rentals to supplement their vehicles.

Q3: Can you give us a vehicle fleet that was in operation prior to the 19th?
A: Yes, Sir, I will give you this note.

Q4: The data given to us will be entered as Exhibit B. This is correct we have the vehicle numbers in this data plus the dates, this figure goes up to June.

(Document tendered and marked as Exhibit "B")

EXHIBIT B: 1MS VEHICLE FLEET NOS. & DATES

A: What about the figures in July?

Q5: There were no refuelling of those vehicles, 1MS after the 20th.

A: Until the whole of July?

Q6: Yes, Sir.

A: No more refuel?

Q7: Yes, Sir.

A: Todate?

Q8: They are being given fuel under the directive of Headquarters.

Q9: This is what month, they started refueling, was it September or last month August?

A: August.

Q9: So whole of July, no fuel?

A: Yes, Sir.
We also have some information that you were involved in the planning of the coup, is this correct and the feeding of information to the Parliament Complex?

A: No, Sir.

Vehicle GL 015, a renault truck, the green one, we have information which was given to this Board that on the 20th of May, that vehicle was used by the 1MS. Could that be possible?

A: I believe so. The vehicle was down at the maintenance and on about that day, the vehicle was recovered from the Suva Cemetery, it got bogged down in that area.

Q12: The vehicle GL 015, does it have a Running Instruction for that period, the RI?

A: The RI is controlled by the Unit.

Q13: When you use the word 'controlled', would I be correct in saying that they keep the RI after the completion of a month?

A: Yes, Sir.

Capt. Colati, how long were the rental cars that were given to the 1MS, how long did they remain with the Unit?

A: Since four of those vehicles were off the road, the rental cars were later handled by Mr. Tuivanuvou and Capt. Stevens. They worked not for the 1MS group which is in Parliament, but they were with us, the Military.

Q15: These rental cars were with the members of the 1MS that were in QEB, were they there before the 19th of May or after the 19th of May and how long were they there for?

A: After the 19th of May.

Q16: Do you know from what date to what date?

A: I am not quite sure.

Q17: Are they still with the Unit or have they been returned?

A: Actually, they have been returned and renewed with new vehicles from the rental company.

Q18: Sir, did you ever get a call from Parliament while you were up at the Transport?

A: Yes.

Q19: Can you say who is it and the nature of the call, Sir?

A: On the 1st of June, I was tasked to carry out the audit of the other ranks mass and Mr. Waqainiboro is the manager of the other ranks mass, he was in Parliament. To compile my report, I have to call him in many cases to explain to me the state of the mass. He was in Parliament then.
Q20: Anyone else, Sir?
A: No, Sir.

Q21: Mr. Colati in your May listing, there are five vehicles there, DK 493 (rental), CI 469, DP 772 (rental) and two other civilian vehicles, DK 726 and DH 299.
A: Actually some of those civilian numbers are acquired vehicles. After the 19th of May, apart from the 48 vehicles that we have in the military, I was tasked by our CO to go around to other ministries and asked for vehicles to supplement us during the state of emergency. That is when those civilian vehicles came in.

Q22: The Maintenance Unit, does it come under your Unit?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q23: Do you know who authorised the release of GL 015 on that particular day?
A: To my knowledge, any vehicle that is sent down for maintenance is not supposed to be used unless satisfied that it is road worthiness and return to the transport then we will reallocate the vehicles to the company.

Q24: For the time being, Captain Colati, we have no further questions. But before that, do you have anything else you wish to say?
A: No, Sir.

[ S. COLATI]
Captain

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCARE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
SEVENTY-EIGHTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY PRIVATE 29526 PENIJAMINI VALEBULI (Res)

Pte Valebuli (Res), after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Private Valebuli, o rawa ni vakamacalataka na ka me baleta na vuaviri na veika kece e yaco ena i kai 19 ni siga?
A: Ena siga Vakaraubuka, ena siga e yaco kina na vuaviri, e dau tekivu na bose au dau tiko e loma. Ena siga Vakaraubuka talega au a veisoliyaka tiko e dua na note meratou sainitaka saka na Opposition members na baleta na Bill me veivosakitaki ena mataka ni siga Vakaraubuka. Ena siga o ya, na noqu kote eya biu tiko mai ra baleta ni dodonu me vaka kote tiko ena noqu tiko koya. Sa curu yani o Speaker, au qai curu mai tuba meu mai kauta na noqu kote ena Hansard oti au qai lesu cafe tale yani. Ena noqu gole yani sa oti na masu ka sa vosa tiko o Deputy Prime Minister, o Tupeni Baba. Au sa laki dabe, ni se qai viavia tolu na mimiti se va na mimiti na noqu dabe, eratou sa basika yani o George Speight vata kei Bill.

Q2: Ena vica na kaloko?
A: O ya sa voleka na tinikadua se sa via oti toka na tinikadua ena mataka ni siga Vakaraubuka. Rau sa lajiva sara yani na bar me rau sa lako yani e loma, sa tukuna tiko yani o George Speight ni ratou sa taura na mataniu ni sa civilian coup. Sa tukuni vei Tupeni Baba me dabe, sa tukuni vei Speaker me sa vagalala o Speaker vata kei iratou na Opposition members. A qai sauma tale tiko mai o Speaker na vosa nei George Speight, sa tukuna tikoga o George Speight me tu meratou lako i tuba. E rau se veita tikoga sa vanataka na dakaic Tikotani. Matai ni vanataki ni dakaier au se veivosaki tikoga o Speaker vata kei George Speight, dede ga vakalailai karua tale ni warning shots.

E na i karua ni warning shots, dede vakalailai kacakote tale e dua na warning shot e tautuba. Sa mani lako yani o Ratu Inoke ena yasai Speaker, eratou sa mani veikau sara i tuba. Eratou sa curu o Speaker vata kei iratou na Opposition wili kina o iratou na independent. Ena gauna o ya sa laki kautu au mai kina o Ben Naduaniwai. Sa vakatalai au sobu mai meu lako mai e yasai Prime Minister e ra. E nanuma o koya de tiko vei au na dakaier. Au sa mani tukuna lo vua e sega vei au na dakaier, au sega tale ga ni body guard vei Prime Minister. Tukuna o koya meu dabe i ra, sa dede toka na neitou tiko e kea, eratou sa tukuna me ratou sa vesu, sa lako sara mai dua e boi loaloa, dola sara na bag e tiko e dakaier ka tauri mai kina na handcuff eratou vakayagataka, na tapes ni P&T.

Eratou a tekivu vesuka na ligai Prime Minister, sa toso sara yani sa tukuna sara o George Speight meu sa lako mai tukuna o Ben me sa kauti au sobu mai meu sa taura e so na straps meu vesuka kina na ligadratou. Tukuna saka o koya, luvata mada na nomu kote me rawa ni o confirm taka vei au ni ko sega ri vakadakai. E sega ni dua na dakaier e tiko vei au. E dodoka tiko vei au na cakai, yacova niu luvata na noqu kote, au mani kolotaka tale yani vua. Au sa
man i lako sobu mai. Keitou vesuvesu mai o ya, sa bera toka na neitou veivesu, au kila ni ratou sa via vakatotolo taka o iratou.

Eratou tukuna ni sa rui berabera na noqu toso. Eratou mani kauta tale mai na ovisa ka dabe tikō e liu na mace bearer rie keirau mai veivesu vata. Keitou sa qai lewe tolu na veivesu tiko. Era sega ni vesu kece e so ga vei ira, e levu ga e ra vesu era Cabinet ministers. Era sa vesu yaduda tiko era sa kau sara yani e na vanua e dau dabe tiko kina o Secretary-General i ra. Na rug e tiko e kea e dabe tiko kina o Edward Blakelock, na Secretary ni House of Reps. E dabe taudua tiko o koya ena siga o ya. Era sa laki tuva tu e matana, e ra dabe tu e keya me yacova ni ra sa vesu kece yani. E rua na mataqali tapes e ratou kauta mai, e dua e ka balavu ka rauta vinaka na liga, sa oti o koya o ya, sa qai vo o koya e ka lalai.

Na ka lalai keitou saga me vesu kina na ligadra sa sega ni rawa. Sa qai vakavuna mera sega ni vesu kece na ligadra ena siga koya. Sa ra vesu rawa ka sa kacivi tale o au meu sa lako tani tale mai, keitou sa mai tiko ena vanua eratou dabe tiko kina na staff. O au, o Dikaca, o Eddie, o Serei kei Aggie. Keitou sa qai vesu vata tiko e loma. Ni sa laki oti na tinikarua, sa oti e dua na auwa na neitou dabe e keya, sa sogosogo tu na chamber, katakata na loma ni chamber, eratou sa kerekere na Turaiga ni Idia meratou gunu wai, o Prime Minister sa via gunu wai. A kacivi au tale mai o Bill, meu mai vakagunuvu iratou ena wai. Au mani lako ga ma, au taura na joke nei Leader of the Opposition ka toka e matana, au taloca na wai ka vakagunuvu ira kece na i lala ka ra vesu toka e ra. Oti au lako tale i dabe. Au toka e keya a kau yani o Shiu Sharan Sharma, na Minister for Works, eya tu e tuba ena gauna e caka kina na bose, e sega ni tiko e vale ni bose. Eratou tukuna na staff ni a dro tale ga i tuba o koya, qai kaci yani o Silatolu, qai tukuna vei iratou na CR e tautuba ni o Shiu Sharan Sharma, e dua talega na meba. Eratou sa ū e loma, sa qai kau yani o koya. Erau kau vata yani kei Rajendra Chaudhry, na luvei Prime Minister vakacelu. E rau dui lakolako yani. Keitou sa tu e keya, sa dede na neitou tu e loma sa qai lako yani o Ligairi, e vosa tiko o Ligairi na vanua keitou dabe tiko kina e caka ena nona vosa tiko vei ira na members, keitou sega ni rogocra rawa, e vosa toka ga e ra. Vakalalai sa tukuni me keitou sa tu me keimami sa lako i tuba. Keimami sa lako kece e tuba, keimami se tuga ena mata ni chamber, sa tukuni tale me keitou sa wase, o keitou na kai viti me keitou sa lesu tale mai, mera lako ga na kai idia kina nodra conference room ena Government office i ra.

Keimami sa lesu tale mai e loma, ka keimami sa lesu tale ga mai kei na dua na neitou staff gone ni idia o Jabir Khan. Keirau orderly ruana tiko e loma. Keitou sa mai tiko e keya, eratou qai raica tale o iratou na CR ni se tiko ga na neitou gone ni idia ogo vata kei keitou. E ratou sa qai kauti koya tale me laki vesu ga vata kei iratou na kai idia. Keitou sa qai tikoga vakakata keitou na i taukei e loma. Sa dede sara na neitou dabe toka e keya, sa lako na gunu yaqona e loma, keitou gunu yaqona tiko, sa sigalevu, lako yani o PM vakacelu o Rabuka e gole yani me tarogi Speaker ga. Ea curu ga mai ena katuba levu ni chamber e muri, tarogi Speaker ga e kea ka keitou tukuna ni se tiko ena office. O Prime Minister vakacelu vata kei nona body guard o Jerry.
E rau curu vata tale ena katuba e yasana o ya. Au sa lako vei Speaker e rau mani sega tale ni lesu mai.

Keitou mani tiko e keya ena siga Vakaraubuka kece oya, keimami vakayakavi, sa yakavi ni Vakaraubuka sa tukuni”me laki kau mai na veisau era sa qiritaki e so me sa laki kau mai na nodra veisau. Ena sigalevu ni Vakaruwai sa tukuni me sa qiritaki na nodra veisau na members me kau mai. Ni sa yakavi, au sa qai kereke, vakacava meu laki veisau mada mai. Au sa qai kereke tiko vei Bill meu laki veisau. Sa qai tukuna o Bill me keirai qui lako vata ia meu vaqara ga mai e dua na lori. Au lako qui dua na neiouto draiva e tiko e keya, au kerei koya kau tukuna me laki veisau mai. O au vata kei na butler nei Prime Minister e dua na turaga ni Kadavu ka via laki veisau tale ga mai. Keitou kauta mai na lori me keitou lako mai, na neiouto lako o Bill na nona dakai e kauta tikoga mai. Keitou yaco e kea, au a gole mada i sili, ia a mani tukuna o Bill meu kauta ga mai na noqu i sulu ia meu qui laki sili ga i Palimedi. Au sa mani kauta ga mai na noqu i sulu au lesu mai. Au lako, laki sobu rawa o koya ena i sirosiro i Laoqere, ea sobu ena Bus Stop.


Keitou toka ena bogi ni Vakaruwai, keitou gunu yaqona tiko mai kea, lai bogi kece o ya, keitou sa toki mai ena mata ni office vei Speaker, keitou sa mai gunu yaqona tu kina. Keitou toka e kea ena yakavi ni siga Vakaruwai, sa kacivi o Bill me lako sobu mai ra, lako sobu o Bill i tuba, qai lesu tale yani o Bill sa laki vosa vei keitou. Qai tukuna kina o Bill, e sa vakamacalatako tiko ra i naki ni coup, baleti keda na i tavei, sa qai tukuna o koya kevaka ena kaba mai na mataivalu se na sotia ena kaba mai ke, dou na mate rawa i liu na
hostage, keitou na qai veivana i muri. O ya na ka e tukuna vei keitou o Bill e loma.

Q3:
A:

O kemudou na cava?
O keitou na staff vata kei iratou na hostages. O ya na gauna eratou sa lako kina na Fijian Association Party, ratou o Col. Volavola.

Q4:
A:

O ya o iratou na hostage kai idia?
E sega o iratou na hostage kai viti. Keitou sa rogota cacavukavuka toka vei ira na toka e keya ni ra sa vakara na la goke i na sotia. Au rai toka sa tekivu na cola kit bags i cake ena Battery Hill, ena dakai e sega ni se biu e tuba, e se tawa tu ga ena kato balavu ka ratou sa tekivu cola cake tiko. Oti koya sa laki buto, keitou sa gumi yaqona tiko, eratou sa tekivu gole yani e so na cauravou era la beka mai Wainibuka ka kauti ira mai o Duvaluco. Sa qai sagai me boko na walkway kece ni chamber qai dua na boy ni Navosa baleta e vosa tiko vakayasyasa vaka ra, keu raica na kena i taba, au rawa ni kila. Qai mai taroga tiko o koya se o cei e kila na boko ni cina ni mai tarogi au ti. E tukuna oratou na walkway kece oqori e automatic ga, ni buto ga sa waqa na cina. Ena gauna e sega kina, e off ga vakataki koya. Au tukuna e rawa ni o cakava me off, au tukuna ni sega ni rawa na rawa. Eratou qai qiritaki na PWD ka ratou mani lafo mai. Oti eratou sa tukuna meu lafo i matamata meu laki waraki iratou na PWD. E lako yani na PWD qai kau yani o Whippy, e TF talega o koya na draiva, na turaga levulevu. Eya draivataka mai na lori ni PWD, eratou lewe va sa lewe lima na lako yani kina.

Au mani lako sara meu laki kauta mai na ki kece ni kani livaliva e toka e keya, e toka vata kei na neitou security room, ena admin e ra. Au lako meu laki kauta mai na ki, au sa duri ena matani katuba, au lako ga yani au dolava e boko tu na cina. Au dolava yani, au raici Sgt. Major Raval e dabe toka vaka oqo. Au raici Naisara ni dabe toka, o ratou ga oya e dei toka na mataqu vei iratou ni ratou CR makawa toka ka ratou tiko e keya. Au mani kereya vei iratou na ki me vaka niu talai mai me mai kauta. E ratou solia mai na ki, au raica tu na daka ni sa bini tu ekeya. Au raica tiko ni sa nodarata armoury sara tikoga na vanua e tiko kina na daka. Au kauta ni ki laki dola na livaliva ka off taki kece na walkway kece ni Palimedi. Au taroga tale na cauravou ka vosa tiko vakayasyasa vaka ra se na cava e boko kina, e kaya o koya ni mataivalu e tukuna ni na kaba mai. Au tukuna se vakacava na security, a mani tukuna o koya na security e cake oqori, e ratou sa vakadabera kina e dua na daka levu, era sa yadra kece e yasa ni bai o ira kece na chief, au taroga sua, eratou lewe levu, e kaya o koya io. Na bomb talega esa na bau ena yasa ni bai e kaya o koya.

Oti cya mani biuti au o koya ka lako. Au sa gole tale i cake, sa via oti na ciwa, voleka na tini sa taqiri sara na talevoni ena vanua keitou tiko kina. E ratou tukuna mai na ambulance dou qiritaka mai sa lako yani, sa tarovi tiko ena dua na check point, sa sega ni vakadonui me lako yani. Keitou sega ni kila na veivosakitaki ni ambulance oqo. Keitou veivosaki tikoga, au kaya sara, tukuna vei iratou na checkpoints me ratou dolava meratou lako ga mai. Eratou tukuna mai e vica na ambulance eratou vinakata. Au tukuna tiko ga
yani dou vakauma mai e tolu se va. Oti au biuta ira na talevoni. Au curu e tuba, kau tukuna vei Soko ni ambulance e qiritaka ka tukunu me lako mai. E tukuna o Soko, meratou tarogi mada o iratou i yasana oya. Na gauna e tukuni kina i yasana o ya, eratou gai via suspett mai o iratou de so na talevoni e vakaayagataki tiko i yasana oqo. E curu ga mai e dua na boy oqo, ia o koya e dau lakolako tiko yani i Palimed, e curu yani e vakadakai tale tikoga yani. Ena gauna e vosavosa kina veikeitou, keitou debe vata toka kei iratou na neitou staff, au sa vakabutuki iratou me kua ni levu e coqai koya. Au sa leq a taka tiko ni civiliian o koya qai toka vua na daka. Kevaka e CR, edatou rawa niu ngeivosaki vata. Eya mani taroga o koya na talevoni. E tu ga e keya e taqiri na switch board, sa mani tekiyva cavaucavu saraga o koya. E cavaucavu ga mai na wa kecega ni talevoni mai keya, bini na talevoni kece e tiko e keya e cavuta kece mai o koya.

Na gauna eratou qiritaka kina na ambulauce, au kila eratou vakaayagatake beka ga na vodaphone se talevoni beka mai yasana ka dua. Ena gauna oya sa cut off kina na neitou veitaratara tiko. Keitou sa mani gunu yaqona tuga e keya lai oti tale na mataka lailai, oti na tolu na kalo, keitou rogoca ni sa kacivakai tale mai ni keitou na release taki. Keitou veirayaki yani i tuba, eratou sa lako mai eratou sa tukuna e so nomudou i lala eratou sa lu, io o kemudou talega mo dou sa lalo. Oti eratou sa lako mai na neitou i lala, au qai nanuma tiko na mace ni se tiko voli ena loma ni chambers.

Au sa qai cici cake tale mai. Au cici mai, au sotava e dua na gone e tautuba, e vanua buto na vanua e duri tiko kina, au tarogo vua e vei o Bill. E koya o koya ni tiko sara e loma. Au tukuna vua dolava na katuba, au taura mai na mace, e sega ni kila o koya ni tiko e keya na mace, na mace e unuqita tiko o Bill. O dreta ga mai na mace opori meu kauta, kua ni tukuna vei Bill. E colava ga vei au na katuba, au curu, au kauta mai na mace. Au kauta mai ena safe vei SG, au biuta ga e loma ni safe, au lokataka na safe, au sa cici saraga mai tuba. Au vodo sak a ena neitou lori ena mataka ni siga tabu oya, au sa biuta mai kina na Palimedi.

Q5: E rauta na vica na kaloko oya?
A: Ena mataka lailai e na loma ni bai ni tolu kina va na kaloko.

Q6: O ira na tiko e loma, na matai ni CRW beka se oira na i lala era curu i loma, o rawa ni tukuna na yacadora vata kei na kedra i wiliwili me vaka o kilai ira?
A: Liu o George Speight, Tikotani, Ben Naduanwi. O Speight e gole ga mai sa mai duri tu e matai Speaker vata kei Bill, o Ben e cover taki keitou mai muri oqo. Ena nodratou lako mai eratou curu kece ga mai.

Q7: O ira na kena vo?
A: Na kena vo era sa tu ga mai katuba, ratou lako cake me ratou laki switch off taka na ka ni recording mai cake.

Q8: Nai matai ni curu i loma, e vica na tamata e curu i loma? O George Speight, Tikotani kei Ben Naduanwai, E tolu eratou curu sara ga i loma.
A: Kei koya na boy loaloa ka tukuna tiko mei veivesu, au sa tu ekeya, au sa qai raici koya ni lako mai ena public gallery kina loma ni chamber. Na kena bar o koya e wavoki toka eke. Au sa tu ekeya, sa qai kaba mai o koya me rika mai ena loma ni chambers.

Q9: E dua tale? E vica eya lako cake?
A: E ratou qai tukuna saka vei au o iratou na tiko mai cake, e dua na sotia e lako yani ki cake qai cemuri iratou mai ra.

Q10: Kena i balebale, dua i cake, va i ra.
A: Vata kei dua tale au tukuna tiko ni gone ni Rotuma, na boy damudamu lekaleka.

Q11: O iko kilai Buadrome, e boy raba vaka na gone ni loma?
A: E dua ga na boy ena gauna keitou sa mai dabe toka kina ena gauna sa via melemu toka kina ena yakavi, keirau veitalanoa tiko kei Sokoko e dabe tiko vakatikitiki o Cama, keitou a intake vata saka ena 1987 mai Nasiniu.

Q12: E vaka dakai tiko?
A: E sega saka.

Q13: Me tou lesvua tale mada; George Speight, Tikotani, Naudaniwai, na boy balavu oya kei na dua e tiko e cake, oya sa lima.
A: E dua tale e tiko i ra.

Q14: Oya sa kena i ka ono. Ena gauna cava o qai raica kina ni curu o Vosavere?
Koitou se vesu tikoga o ya, keitou se bera ni veitalatala me lako o ira na kai idia, e wavoki tu ga e tuba, e curu ga mai ena katuba ena yasana oqo, rau veivosaki kei Bill ka curu tale ki tuba. O Jim Speight e sa mai dabe toka ira. Na mobile kece eratou tawana ena kava ni benu ka sa laki biu tu i muri. Lako o Jim Speight mai vakatabaka toka na vodaphone. Ena gauna oya sa dreke wavoki tiko kina o koya na bag loaloa.

Q15: E sc na CRW se sotia, o raica i tuba, o kilai ira ka rawa ni tukuna na yacadra?
A: E dua ga e tiko e matamata ka tattoo tiko na yadrena.

Q16: O tukuna ni ko a raica Cama e dua na TF, eya wavoki se yadra tiko e tuba?
A: Keitou tiko e vale ni bose e curu yani o koya ka laki dabe tale tu ena gallery.

Q17: E vakadakai?
A: E sega saka.

Q18: Tukuna tale mada na gauna eya curu kina e loma o Major-General Rabuka?
A: E rauta beka na vica na kaloko?

Q19: Ni se bera na vakasigalevu se oti na vakasigalevu? O tukuna niratou curu i loma o Speight ena 11.00 a.m?
A: Ena gauna saka keitou sa vakasigalevu oti kina. O koya vata kei na nona body guard.

Q20: O rawa ni vakamacalataka na vanua eya tiko kina na armoury? Confirm taka e tiko ena admin block?
A: Ena admin block i ra, na security room.

Q21: E na nomu curu i loma oya o raici Ravai vata kei Naisara ka o raica talega na dakai? E tiko ga ena loma ni bag loaloa oya?
A: Io saka.

Q22: Private Valebuli, do you know Sgt. Naisara?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q23: Did he enter the chambers at any time?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q24: What time did he come in?
A: Au guiiecava saka meu vakarnaitaka na gauna eya lako yani kina o Naisara. Ena gauna keitou sa vesu kece sara kina, e so era se dabe tikoga ena nodra i cabedabe, ena gauna oya o iratou na CRW eratou sa taura na domo ni sote nei Naisara, dodoki tiko vua na dakai o Naisara e cola tiko yani na i taba. Eya laki veitaba yani o koya i loma.

Q25: Who was the person holding him?
A: One of the CRW.

Q26: Not those CR people inside the chambers?
A: No, Sir.

Q27: E vakayagataka o koya na video camera?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q28: Do you know Major Ligairi?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q29: Was he at any time in the chambers?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q30: What time did he enter the chambers?
A: O Major Ligairi e sa via oti saka e rua na auwa, e sa dede saraga na neitou dabe tiko ena loma ni chambers, sa qai curu yani o koya.

Q31: What did he do when he enter the chambers, did he speak with someone?
A: E curu ga yani, laki vosa vei ira na members ka ra dabe tiko, keitou veiyawaki toka ka keitou sega ni rogoca rawa na cava e kaya.

Q32: You said you left the complex on Sunday, did you go back to Parliament House after that?
Q33: On Saturday, did you see any weapons been brought into the Parliament complex?
A: Friday afternoon.

Q34: Where was these weapons unloaded?
A: Au sega ni raica na kena sobu, au raica ga na kena sa kau mai baleta niu tu e cake oya, au sega ni kila na lori. Eratou taura mai na kit bags kei na so tale na ka, eratou kauta ena loma ni armoury. Na ka au kila kina ni dakai baleta na bag vata ga koya, eratou kauta cake i Battery Hill.

Q35: Who was carrying that bag on Friday? Can you identify any of the person?
A: Au sega ni taura rawa baleta ni ratou tiko mai ra ka keitou tiko e cake.

Q36: E rauta na vica na kaloko oya?
A: Oya se yakavi siga, e se bera sara ni buto. Oti na ono, vitu.

Q37: Whilst in chambers, did you speak with any of the members of the CRW?
Did you speak with Soko?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q38: Do you know Private Soko?


Au lako mai ra, au taura na ki, au raica ni ratou kana tiko, eratou mai kana tikoga ena armoury. Au taroga sara na kemudou kakanou e kau mai vei. E tukuna o Soko, oqori e kau ga mai na keba. Au raica talega na ka ni kakana e na keba e tawo tiko kina na kedratou.

Q39: Where was the Prime Minister's body guard, you said you were mistaken for
the bodyguard?
A: Ena gauna eratou curu yani kina o iratou oqo, o iratou na bodyguards eratou dabe tiko ena kedratou maliwa na gone vuli ni FIT. E rua na gone ni Viti ka dua na gone ni idia. E dua tale na bodyguards e tiko e cake. E ratou cemuri vata mai cake, o irau na tiko e loma oqo, ena gauna eratou sa suka kina na
gone vuli ni FIT, eratou sa tu ka lako vata ki tuba. Ena nodratou sa lako kina sa qai vo tuga na bodyguards kai idia. Sa qai mai duri tiko okoya.


Q40: Private Valebuli, o iratou na bodyguards nei Prime Minister, o bau kila na mataqali level ni training cava e tu vei iratou ena nodratou cakacaka vaka bodyguards?


Q41: E na nomu toka e keya, mai na Vakaarubuka, Vakarauwai me yacova na gauna o sere kina, au kila ni o raica toka sa nodratou operation oiratou oya, e rawa ni o talanoataka mada vei keitou na cava na nomu rai me vaka ni o sota na kena cicii va na operation me vaka eratou vakaitavi tiko kina o iratou oqo ena kena vuaviritaki na Palimedi.

A: Keitou sa tiko saka ena siga Vakaarubuka, Vakarauwai, keitou mai gunu yaqona tiko eratou tukuna tiko o iratou na nei tiko security e vaka e sega ni organise vinaka na ka e ratou cakava baleta eratou lako mada ga yani mai matai ni ka eratou sega ni kilai keitou na staff o koya e dodonu me keitou tiko e loma, eratou sega ni kilai ratou na meba ni Palimedi.

E ratou sa qai taroqa tale tiko o cei oqo, o koya e Minister ni cava. Au sa qai tukuna oqori e sega ni minister, o ira oqori era backbenchers. Au mai toka e keya, au raica na vanua era kau dakai tiko mai kina ena gauna e mai caka tiko kina na kana, sa rui veiyawaki na vanua era tiko kina na dede ni veivosaki eratou cakava tiko, au kaya kina ni sega ni organise taki vinaka na ka eratou cakava. Au sa vakila toka ena Vakaarauwai baleta na Palimedi e vanua levu. E dua ga na vanua laigai keirau dau cover taka, ia oqo e sa spread sara tuga na vanua eratou tu kina.

Na nodratou armoury e yawa sara mai, na vanua ni kana e tiko vata na armoury e keya. So era kana toka ena mata ni katuba. Na nodratou curu yani e sega mada ga ni dua e special tu yani me lako yani me laki veivesu. O ira kece na lako yani oya era vakadakai kece, eratou vaka pistols kece yani. E vaka uzi tikoga o Ben. Na dakai e dodo toka ga, keirau laki kau mai kei na ovisa me keirau veivesu baleta ni keirau galala tiko. E sega madaga ni dua na special vei iratou meratou lako mai me caka na cakacaka oqo.

Q42: Ena gauna drau a gole kina vata kei Satini Tikotani, ena bogi ni Vakarauwai mo drau laki veisau, drau bau veitalanoa ena loma ni lori? E bau so na ka e talanoataka vei loko e na nomu dou gole tu oya? Dou bau veiwali se dua na ka dou talanoataka tu?
A: Keitou sega saka ni bau veitalanoa e loma ni lori, au tukuna ga meu sili, tukuna okoya me kua me pick taki ga mai na noqu i sulu, o koya ga oya na veivosaki keitou cakava e keya.

Q43: E raua na vica na kaloko o dou lako kina mo laki veisau mai?
A: E se siga levu tu ni siga Vakarauwai, rauta na 4 na kaloko kina lima na kaloko ena yakavi.

Q44: Private Valebuli, o tukuna ena gauna e ratou curu yani kina ki loma, e ratou vaka pistol ga, o Ben ga e vaka uzi. E sega tale ni dua vei iratou oya e tiko tale na nona dakai levu me vaka na MP5?
A: Okoya e vaka balaclava tiko e curu yani i loma e vaka uzi yani.

Q45: Ia o iratou na storm yani ena loma ni chambers?
A: Na uzi talega, na .9mm e vakayagataki tiko vata kei iratou keitou a vesu vata. E dua tale na boy au kaya tiko ni boy damudamu, e dua tale ga vua na pistol, o Naduaniwai ga na uzi e tara tiko.

Q46: O Tikotani, na gauna e vana kina, e vica na dakai e taura o koya, e dua se rua?
A: E rua saka na dakai.

Q47: E pistol ruarua?

Q48: O tukuna ena gauna o talanoa tiko kina ni dua e vakadodoka vei iko e dua na uzi, o koya a tarogi Paul Manueli. Au rawa ni lesuva tale mada na nomu statement, na cava o koya?
A: Na turaga oqo e dau lakolako tiko vei Navuso, vei Duvuloco ena yabaki sa oti. Au dau raici koya vei iratou na party oya. Au kidacala niu siro sobu yani e taura tu mai e dua na uzi o koya ka mai tarogi au e mata ni chambers e ra. E kaya, "O Col. Paul Manueli e tiko?" Au tukuna vua me kua ni dodoka mai vei zu na dakai, qai tukuna o koya meu galu. Au sa mani galu ga niu kilia ni civil an o koya.

Q49: Na turaga oqo o kilia ni civilian, o se bera ni raici koya vakadua ena gauna o tiko kina ena keba se o kilia ni sotia?
A: O koya e civilian.
Q50: Ena gauna e kau yani kina e loma o Satini Naisara vata kei na video camera, ekauta tiko ga yani oya se lili tale tiko vua e dua na i taba?
A: Na video camera ga.

Q51: O sega ni raica na kena sobu yani ena siga levu ni Siga Vakarauwai na daka?
A: E sega saka.

Q52: Vinaka vakelevu, e dua na ka o via talanoataka ni se bera ni o lako?
A: E sega saka.

[P. VALEBULI]
Private

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
Pte Tuivonovono, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Ena gauna cava ko a curu kina ena mataivalu?

Q2: Vakamacalataka mada na nomu vakaitavi ena vuaviri?
   A: Ena gauna ogo au sa tiko mai na koro kau cakava tiko e dua na bisinisilailai oya na qoli. Au lesu mai ena qoli ena siga Vakaraubuka, au sa rogoce ni sa caka na coup. Ena siga Moniti, ni oti ga na cakacaka e vale, au sa gole sobu sara ki na Palimedi meu laki rai. Au a gole yani au laki raici ira mai na koro era tiko e keya, ia au sega ni lako i moce, au dau lako ga i moce i vale. Au a bau laki vakaitavi talega ena yadra ena matamata.

Q3: Ena gauna cava o curu kina ena Palimedi?
   A: Ena siga Moniti, 22/5/00 kau lesu tale ki vale ena matakina siga Tusiti.

Q4: Ena gauna cava tale koya lesu kina ena Palimedi?
   A: Ena i ka 26 ni siga.

Q5: Na cava na nomu i tavi ena loma ni Palimedi?
   A: O au saka, au sega ni dau laki tu vakadua, au dau lako ga yani, au lesu tale mai. Au a vakaitavi ga ena yadra ena matamata oya e vaka va ga.

Q6: Ko a tiko e vei ena loma ni complex?
   A: Au dau gunu yaqona tuga ena shed ni yasana o Tailevu, so na gauna ena shed ni yasana o Burebasaga, au sega ni dau tiko vakadua e keya.

Q7: Ko a bau vakai tavi talega ena kena tauri vakaukauwu na siteseni mai Korovou?
   A: Au a lako e keya me baleta na vanua, ni ra sa vakaitavi na noqu koro ka vakatalega kina ni sa rogoce na vosa ni vanua.

Q8: Na cava na nomu i tavi ena kena tauri na siteseni mai Korovou?
   A: Au dau yadra ena loma ni tauni.

Q9: Ko yadra ena vei cei?
   A: Me kua ni dua na vakacaca ena loma ni tauni.

Q10: Ko a bau tauri e dua na i yaragi?
    A: Io saka.

Q11: O tauri mai e vei?
A: Na i yaragi saka ga era a vakayagataka tiko na sotia mai Korovou.

Q12: Nai yaragi cava ko a vakayagataka tiko?

Q13: O tauru mai vei na i yaragi?
A: Au a tauru mai ena dua na loma ni rumu.

Q14: E vica na i yaragi eya tu e keya?
A: Au sega ni kila e vica, ia oqo na nodra i yaragi ga na sotia era a tiko e keya.

Q15: O qai lako ga mai vakacava?
A: Au rogo ca saka ga ni sa kacivaki na yacaqu, au sa gole sara i na keba, au lako i soli au.

Q16: O kila tale e dua na sotia eya bau vakaitavi ena kena tauri na siteseni mai Korovou?
A: Au sega ni kila tale e dua, o au kilai au duadua ga.

Q17: O sotavi Varinava ena loma ni Parliament Complex?
A: Au a raici koya e loma.

Q18: E dua o sotava ena loma ni Parliament Complex, o bau sotavi koya mai Korovou?
A: E sega saka.

Q19: Do you know Cpl. Tivika?
A: Io saka.

Q20: Did you meet him there?
A: Io saka.

Q21: Who else did meet over there?
A: Varinava.

Q22: When you left the Parliament Complex, did you return your weapon?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q23: Do you know the person you returned the weapon to?
A: I do not know.

Q24: Is it one of the CRW?
A: Yes.

Q25: Have a look at that photograph? Is that the man you return your weapon to at the complex?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q26:  Ni se bera ni o gole, o via vakamacalatakaka e dua na ka?
A:  Au via tukuna ga niu sega ni kila e dua na ka me baleta na ka oqo, au a gole ga e keya me baleta na veitokoni ni vanua.

[N. TUTVONOVO]  
Private

[J. N. B. EVANS]  
Lieutenant Colone.  
President

[A. MOHAMMED]  
Major  
Member

[T. GUCAKE]  
Major  
Member

[H. MACOMBER]  
Warrant Officer Class One  
Member
EIGHTIETH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 27220 LCPL SIMELI SOVAKI

LCpl Sovaki, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Lcpl Sovaki, o tiko e na Plant Troop?
A: Sir.

Q2: Vakamacalataka na nomu vakaitavi e na veika kece e yaco.
   E na Siga Vakaraubuka saka na i ka 19 ni siga, au a gole sobu i tauni.
   Au a cakacaka tiko ena workshop, au sa guilecava ga na aua,
   oti au gole sobu i tauni. Au lesu mai e na yakavi, au sa raica ni sa
   vakavodo tiko na lori, au sa mani lade i loma. Sa mani gole na lori
   au sa mai gole sara yani i na Palimedi; sa i ko ya saka o ya.

Q3: Vakamacalataka na cakacaka cava o cakava e loma ni Palimedi me
    yacova na gauna o curu lesu tale mai kina e loma ni keba.
    E na Palimedi, e noqu cakacaka tikoga na yastra me yacova mai na i
    ka 11 ni siga ni vula ko Jiulai, au biubiu tale kina mai na loma ni
    Palimedi kau lesu mai kina i vale baleta nai tukutuku a lako yani me
    baleti iratou na noqu gone e ratou vuli tiko i RSMS.

Q4: Tukutuku cava a lako mai vale?
A: Dua e form 7 tiko, dua e form 6 ka dua e form 2 tiko e Samabula. E
    lai vakamatatatataki vei au na ka e baleta na nodratou vuli. Sa i ko ya
    saka o ya.

Q5: Na nomu a tiko mai na Parliament Complex, o iko a liutaka tiko e
    dua na mata yadra e na Battery Hill; donu se sega?
A: Sega saka.

Q6: Dou yadra tiko i vei e na loma ni Complex?
A: Au dau yadra tiko i Battery Hill, so na gauna au yadra i matamata.

Q7: Matamata cava?
A: Matamata saka mai vaqo i Veiuto.

Q8: Vuya Road?
A: Io saka.
Q9: Dakai cava dou dau vakayagataka me ka ni yadra?
A: Dau vakayagataka saka na Uzis.

Q10: Na gauna o yadra kina e na Battery Hill, o cei na nomudou i liliu ni mata yadra?
A: Au kilai au saka tikoga i kea.

Q11: O cei e dau yadra tiko e na Battery Hill?
A: Noqu yadra tu i loma ya, e dau veisau tiko na noqu vanua ni yadra. Dua na siga au yadra i matamata, siga tarava au yadra tale i yasana ka dua, oti au yadra tale i Battery Hill.

Q12: O cei e dau yadra tiko e na Battery Hill, sotia se civilian?
A: Au kilai au saka tu ga ikea ni gauna au lai yadra kina meu lako yani kina lesu mai.

Q13: Bau dua na gauna o vanataka nomu dakai?
A: Sega saka.

Q14: Na mata yadra i cake i na Battery Hill, o cei na nomudou i liliu na mata yadra?
A: Au kilai au saka tikoga i kea.

Q15: Dua tale na Engineer a yadra vata kei iko i cake ya?
A: Sega saka.

Q16: Dua na witnesss se qai oti ga o ya, Lance Corporal Vasutoga, se qai vakamacalataka oti ga oko ya ni oko ya e dua na i liliu ni mata yadra, Engineer ga e dau yadra tiko i kea. Nona mata yadra qo; Vasutoga, Tamani, Taylor kei Vulaki. Na gauna e dau caka kina na veisau yadra, o iko na i liliu ni veisau yadra se mata yadra o ya.

Q17: How many of you were on duty in Battery Hill?
A: Au kilu saka tiko ga ni o au tikoga au yadra\’iko. E levu tale tu, ia au kilai au tikoga.

Q18: I know you knew yourself. All I am asking for is the number?
A: Au sega saka ni kila.
Q19: You do not know?
A: E sega.

Q20: Can you count?
A: Yes, I can count.

[S. SOVAKI]
Lance Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
EIGHTY-FIRST WITNESS
STATEMENT BY LCPL 26851 APETE TAMANI

Lcpl Tamani, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Kovula, o iko e dua na lewe ni Plant Troop?
   A: Ilo saka.

Q2: Vakamacalatake mada na nomu vakaitavi ena vuaviri ogo? Nai tavi cava o qarava kei na ka kece, mai na kena i tekivu me yacova na gauna o lesu tale mai ena loma ni keba.

Q3: Na ka e dodonu mo vakamacalatake o ya na nomu vakaitavi kei nanomudou gole sobi mai ena Palimedi, na i tavi cava o qarava e loma o ya me yacova na gauna o lesu tale mai kina ena loma ni keba.
   A: Na noqu lako o au sara ga, e sega ni dua e tukuna vei au baleta ni’u duavata tiko ena i naki ni vuaviri.

Q4: Ko a vodo vata kei ira na i lala ena i ka 26 ni siga ni vula o Me?
   A: Ilo saka.

Q5: Ni se bera o ya, dou a veitalanoatakana na nomudou lako?
   A: E sega saka.

Q6: Na veitalanoa wale ga, sega ni veitalanoa na group se cava? Oqo o kemudou na Plant troop, e vica na tamata era sa tukuna oti ogori.
   A: Ilo, keitou a veitalanoa ga me baleta na cakacaka. Na veitalanoa ni lako e kea, e sega ni dua e tukuna me keitou lako.

Q7: Nai tavi cava o qarava ena loma ni complex?
   A: Meu yadravi iratu tu ga na hostages me baleta na nodra curu mai tautuba mera gole i sisili se susua. Au kauti ira mai ka kauti ira lesu tale ki loma.

Q8: E dua tale na i tavi ko a qarava i loma o ya?
   A: E sega saka.

Q9: O bau yadra ena dua na gauna e tuba ena perimeter se i matamata?
   A: Ilo saka, au a matamata.

Q10: E a bau dua na gauna o yadra ena Battery Hill?
    A: Ilo saka, au a yadra kina.

Q11: Na nomudou matayadra ena Battery Hill, o cei e liiliu ni mata yadra?
    A: O au ga na i liiliu ni mata yadra.
Q12: Ena gauna o tiko kina ena Battery Hill, o iko na i liiliu ni mata yadra. O ira ga na Engineer era dau yadra tiko ena Battery Hill kei na so na gauna o ira na civilians? E donu o ya?
A: Na civilians e gole eke e o ira ga na sarasara.

Q13: Era sega ni laki yadra?
A: lo saka.

Q14: Ena gauna o laki yadra kina ena Battery Hill, o iko na i liiliu ni mata yadra. O cei soti na lewe ni nomu mata yadra?
A: Au sa sega ni vakilai ira na lewe ni noqu mata yadra.

Q15: Kovula ni o rai vaka ogo, e sega ni dua na gone vuli e tabe tiko i cake ogo. O ira ga era sa qaseta oti na bula vakaivalu. E lewe vica vata na Engineer era sa lesu ogo, era talamataka o cei e yadra e ke se ki kea. E matata na ka e yaco tiko eke. E dua na ka e laurali ogo nira yadra tiko i cake o ya oira ga na Engineers. Oira ga na Engineers era vakaitavi, o ira ga na Engineers mai na plant. O sa yabaki sese ena Plant troop, ka sa soli vai iko e dua na naba ni ladi kovula. O qai tukuna tiko ni o sega ni kila ira na lewe ni nomu mata yadra ni o iko na i liiliu ni matayadra. O ira ga na Engineers era tiko ena Plant troop, osa qai sega ni kilai ira tale. E donu o ya?
A: Vata kei iratou saka ga na tiko mai cake, oiratou na CRs kau sega ni kila na yacadra.

Q16: E vica vata na CRW era sa lako mai ki ke. Keitou sa kila na yacadra, na nodra i tavi eloma o ya kei na veivanua taucoko. O cei dou dau yadra vata ena Battery Hill?
A: O Lt. Dawai, Sir.

Q17: Ko a qai tukuna ga eke ni o’iliiliu ni matayadra. E dua na iliiliu ni matayadra ogo o L/Cpl. Vasuitoga. E sa tukuna oti o ko ya na yaca ni tamata era dau yadra vata ena nona mata yadra. O iliiliu ni mata yadra se dua ga na lewe ni mata yadra?
A: Au lewe ni mata yadra ka so na siga keitou dau veisau me’u i iliiliu ni mata yadra.

Q18: Ena gauna o iliiliu kina ni mata yadra, o cei a lewe ni nomu mata yadra?
A: O ko ya saka au sa tukuna o ya vata kei iratou na lewe ni CR, ka’u sega ni kila na yacadratou.

Q19: Au sega ni taroga tiko na CR, o ira ga na nomudou ena Engineer.
A: Na Engineer ga au kila o Ratudradra.

Q20: Kovula, which weapon did you carry for sentry duty?
A: Au qai lako yani sa tukuni vei au me’u gole kina rumu me’u laki taura edu na roqi i yaragi.

Q21: Did you sign for your weapon?
A: No, Sir.
Q22: Did anyone give it to you?  
A: No, Sir.

Q23: When you brought the weapon back from your duty, did someone receive it?  
A: No, Sir.

Q24: Did you get the same weapon every day?  
A: Yes, Sir.

Q25: Where were these weapons kept?  
A: I do not know, Sir.

Q26: You know the Parliament Complex, which building?  
A: It was in the first building because they told me to go and get my weapon there so I went and took it.

Q27: When you were on duty at the main gate, did you check the people coming in and going out of the complex?  
A: Yes, Sir.

Q28: Was there any attempt made to take the weapons in or out of the complex?  
A: No, Sir.

Q29: What about the civilians, were any of them carrying weapons?  
A: No, Sir.

Q30: Where did you stay in the complex?  
A: Speaker's office.

Q31: Am I correct in saying that all the Engineers were in the Speaker's office?  
A: Yes, Sir.

Q32: Where did you have your meal?  
A: They have a canteen there.

Q33: Was it only for the Engineers or other troops as well?  
A: Other troops, Sir.

Q34: Your change of clothes, did someone bring it to you or you wore the same clothes all throughout?  
A: took my own clothes, Sir.

Q35: Did anyone bring your clothes to you, your family or anyone else?  
A: No, Sir.

Q36: Were you paid whilst you were in the Parliament House?  
A: No, Sir.

Q37: Were you arrested?  
A: No, Sir.
Q38: Kovula Tamani, ena i ka 27 ni siga ni vula o Me, o yadra tiko e vei? O ya ena siga Vakarauwai, dou a lako e kea ena i ka 26 ni siga ni vula o Me, o kemudou a jako ena siga Vakaraubuka.
A: Au a sega ni yadra tiko.

Q39: E sega ni o yadra tiko i Battery Hill se i matamata?
A: No, Sir.

[A. TAMANI]
Lance Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class 1
Member
EIGHTY-SECOND WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 29159 SPR WILLIAM TAYLOR

Spr Taylor, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Sapper Taylor, you are a member of the Plant Troop?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q2: You went down to Parliament on the 26th of May in the truck. Is that correct?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q3: Give us a brief outline of your involvement prior to the 26th of May and on the 26th of May when you went down, the functions inside the Complex, what you were doing inside the Complex and what you were responsible for? When did you return or leave the Complex any time you left the Complex, plus the point in time when you returned to Engineers at the camp.
A: When I went into Parliament, it was of my own doing and no-one else. It was what I believed in. In Parliament, I was mostly on guard. I left Parliament on the 11th of June and was at home.

Q4: You went on the 11th of June or July?
A: Sorry, I left on the 11th of July.

Q5: Why did you leave on 11th July?
A: Because we were told to vacate the premises.

Q6: By whom?
A: What was going around was to leave the premises.

Q7: News was going around?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q8: This was the ultimatum given by the Military?
A: Yes.

Q9: You had heard the ultimatum given by the Military to leave?
A: Yes, Sir, on the radio.

Q10: Then you left?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q11: What did you do at home?
A: Nothing.

Q12: Going back to the 26th of May, casual discussions were being made on the side by the Plant Troop to go down and support the people at the Parliament Complex, as we have already heard by a number of witnesses. Were you a member of that group that had the casual talk for the group to go down to Parliament?
A: There was no casual discussion to say to go down. It was of our own free will.
Q13: Can you explain your role in the Parliament Complex? You say you were part of security.
A: Just on guard, that is all.

Q14: On guard where?
A: At the gates.

Q15: Were you also on the security detail to protect the hostages?
A: No.

Q16: Were you ever a member of the security detail or the security elements that went up the Pte of Battery Hill?
A: No, Sir.

Q17: So right throughout your stint you remained a security only at the main gate? The main gate and the back gate.
A: When did you come back into camp (RFMF)?
A: When we left Parliament. I left on the 11th and marched into Nabua on a day or two days after.

Q18: What happened when you marched in? Who did you report to?
A: The CO, Col. Raravula.

Q19: What were you told to do?
A: To return back home and wait until all arms were returned.

Q20: What was Major Savua’s role in the Parliament Complex?
A: I do not know.

Q21: Who was in command of the security at the Complex?
A: I would not know.

Q22: Who was in overall command of everyone in the Complex?
A: I would not know.

Q23: Do you know anything that was happening in the Complex?
A: No.

Q24: What were you securing at the main and back gates of the Parliament Complex?
A: Just checking people and vehicles coming in and going out.

Q25: Who gave you the brief on that task?
A: There was no brief given.

Q26: Who gave you the brief to check the civilians coming in and out?
A: It was just from the previous handing over, that is all.
Who else did guard duty with you at the main gate?

Their names?

Yes.

I would not know.

Were they also CRW or Engineer personnel?

It was a mixture. It was mostly civilians.

At any time, did you have engineers also there?

No.

So every time you were on sentry duty, you never had any other engineers with you?

No.

Whist on duty, did you at any time work with another Engineer soldier at any security duty?

Yes.

Can you name that Engineer soldier?

Radiodro.

Were you, at any time, on duty with Lance Corporal Vasutoga?

At Parliament?

Yes?

No.

Were you, at any time, on duty with Vasutoga at Battery Hill?

No.

What would you say if we told you that Lance Corporal Vasutoga had said here that he was on duty with you and that you were a member of his team at Battery Hill.

So?

I am asking you and you are here saying that you were not a member of his team. One of you is lying. We have had evidence from so many. You are the seventh engineer that has been here and the 28th person appearing before this Board of Inquiry. We can talk with you until the cows come home or the hens go to nest. Information given by people prior to your involvement is massive. At the completion of this, we will go to the police records that has photographs of everyone everywhere. I know, I am aware of that. We will get your photographs and everything that was published. You do not see school children sitting here. We are all senior people. When people come in and give their statements, we can tell where they are coming from; whether they are holding back information or lying. Evidence was given earlier that you were a member of the team that provided security detail at Battery Hill and members of your group were, Vulaki, Tamani and Vasutoga. Sometimes you pulled security detail on Battery Hill. How long have you been an engineer in the Plant Troop?
In that nine years, you would know every single person in that Plant Troop?

A:

Yes, Sir.

Q41:

You are telling me that you do not know the members of those in your Plant Troop when you go on security detail? You had never, at any time, went on guard duty with the persons I had named earlier? Have you, at any time, went on guard duty at Battery Hill with Vulaki, Tamani and Vasuitoga?

A:

Sir.

Q42:

Yes? It is a difficult job we are doing here. There are six Board of Inquiries, which will eventually end up at eight, that will take weeks and months. Were there any discussions on how you give your statement with your Engineer group before coming in?

A:

No, Sir.

Q43:

The Board is almost reluctant to continue further questioning with you, because of your lying. Your credibility as a witness does not hold good for you in the future. As this unfolds, they will know whether you are lying or not. It is easy. There are documented evidence lying all over the place. People who have been doing this have been in this ball game. How old are you?

A:

30, Sir.

Q44:

People involved here have been in this game before you were even born? You know, your credibility as a witness is not too good. Just by our questioning techniques and the information we already have has established that you are lying. We will go back now and, hopefully, you will start telling the truth. Have you or anyone else taken part in any of the activities outside Parliament Complex apart from Battery Hill?

A:

No, Sir.

Q45:

Are there any other incidents that involved any of the RFMF personnel apart from the shooting? Did you or anyone you know of take part in any of those incidents?

A:

No, Sir.

Q46:

At any circumstance whatsoever did you fire your weapon?

A:

No, Sir.

Q47:

What weapon did you carry?

A:

Uzis.

Q48:

Sapper Taylor, while on guard duty at the gates, there were civilian personnel also there with you.

A:

Yes, Sir.

Q49:

Were they armed?

A:

Yes, Sir.
Q50: With what weapons?
A: M-16's.

Q51: And do you know whether these weapons were returned after your duration as a sentry or was it kept with them all the time?
A: Returned after our duration as sentry.

Q52: Returned to the same place or did you keep your weapon?
A: Returned to the same place we got it from.

Q53: When you returned these weapons, was there someone there to receive them?
A: No, Sir.

Q54: There was no person to sign it off or anything like that?
A: No, Sir.

Q55: And how was this room secured? Was there a padlock?
A: Just a door, that is all.

Q56: And how were the weapons stored?
A: On the table.

Q57: The civilians you mentioned that comes on duty with you at the gates, are they the reserves?
A: I would not know, but they are civilians. They were not regular force, they were civilians.

Q58: In civilian clothes?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q59: Were you on security duty on the 27th (the day after you went into Parliament)?
A: No, Sir.

Q60: What about on the night of the 28th?
A: No, Sir.

Q61: Were you in Parliament?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q62: You were not on duty at any of the gates?
A: No, Sir.

Q63: Sapper Taylor, you said there were some civilians who had arms.
A: Yes, Sir.

Q64: Was it only on one occasion that they had arms or was it a common practice for them to come on duty also with soldiers?
A: It was common practice.
Q65: Were the weapons you carried loaded?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q66: Was there a round in the chamber?
A: No, Sir.

Q67: Just loaded with the safety catch on?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q68: What were your rules of engagement when you came on duty?
A: Just to protect the civilians.

Q69: Protect them from who?
A: From whatever happens, if they get hurt.

Q70: When you were on sentry duty, you indicated that it was common practice that the civilians were on sentry duty and that they carried weapons at the main gate?
A: Yes.

Q71: Were armed civilians on duty also at Battery Hill?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q72: Were armed civilians on duty in other areas around the fence of Parliament Complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q73: Were armed civilians on duty in the cordon around the hostages?
A: I would not know.

Q74: What do you know of the security of the hostages? Who was responsible of the security?
A: I would not know.

Q75: Before you left Nabuni to go up to the Complex, was there anyone left behind in the Plant Troop?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q76: Did you get on the vehicle to go up to the Complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q77: Sapper Taylor, have you been to Lebanon?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q78: When you went to Parliament, you were given an Uzis?
A: Not given, it was just on the table.
Q79: When you answer yes or no, it must be a 'yes' or a 'no' and not 'sir'. I will just throw one question at you because you answered it with a 'sir'. I would like an answer 'yes' or 'no'. It was common practice that civilians were on duty and armed at the main gates and areas around the Complex?
A: Yes.

Q80: Were there any other weapons apart from Uzis in that room?
A: Yes.

Q81: You prefer an Uzi?
A: It was what was on the table at the moment.

Q82: No other weapons, just Uzis?
A: Yes.

Q83: Do you know how to use an Uzi?
A: Yes.

Q84: Or were there instructions given when you went to pick up the Uzis from the room?
A: We were told that it was just like any other weapon.

Q85: Just cock and then fire?
A: Yes.

Q86: Nothing else?
A: Yes.

Q87: Were you given any weapon training in the Complex?
A: No.

Q88: Did you see the weapons training that was done with the civilians in the Complex?
A: Yes.

Q89: Where in the Complex were the weapons training done with the civilians?
A: In the playground - the field.

Q90: There are various areas of the Complex that has a field. Which area are you talking about?
A: The field near the kitchen.

Q91: You are talking about the main Parliament Complex?
A: Going in from the back gate.

Q92: Coming in from the back gate, right in front of Parliament proper? At the head of Parliament, that hill?
A: No, at the back.
Q93: Not that field, but the field towards the China Club side? Also, the training done with the civilians, were there any other type of training done with the civilians?
A: I would not know.

Q94: Drill, martial arts, any other thing?
A: No.

Q95: Sapper Taylor, when you went to Parliament on the 26th, when was the last re-engagement you had with the army? How long ago?
A: '998.

Q96: In the Complex, did you get newspapers to read?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q97: Did you watch television?
A: No.

Q98: There was an order given by the Commander to the soldiers in the Complex that if they returned to camp, everything would be forgiven. Did you hear that order?
A: Yes.

Q99: My question is; why did you not comply with the order?
A: I thought of my comrades.

Q100: Were there any other reasons?
A: No.

Q101: I will raise an issue. Did you have any fear for your safety of being assaulted or things like that?
A: No.

[ W. TAYLOR]
Sapper

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
Capt Mario, after having been duly sworn on the Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Capt Mario, what is your current appointment?
A: Staff Officer (Pay), Sir.

Q2: We would like you, Capt Mario, to present the details of the pay that was given to all those that went into Parliament?
A: When the coup started, we were informed by Personnel Branch that a number of personnel had gone in and that we should cease their salaries. We ceased the pay of the group that went in with the Engineers, I am not too sure exactly of the date but the pay ending the 16th of June, we ceased pay for 11 Engineers and one soldier from 3FIR. The pay after the 16th of June,

The pay on the 16th of June, we then ceased one Warrant Officer from HQ and the following pay, just the first pay of July, we ceased another officer from HQ, and another NCO from 3FIR and then on the second pay of July, we ceased 3 personnel from the First Meridian.

Q3: Which serial are you referring to?
A: The first one is 3FIR.

Q4: 3 3FIR?
A: 3 3FIR, 11 from the Engineers and 3 from 1FMS and 2 from HQ.

Q5: That is it?
A: Sir.

Q6: No other pay was ceased?
A: No other pay, Sir. The termination dates, as I had previously mentioned are shown there. You will notice that the first termination dates were made on the 16th of June. That was the first group that went in from the Engineers, so we had 11 Engineers terminated on the 16th of June; one from 3FIR and one from HQ.

Their pay were reactivated on the dates shown, 25th of August; all 3FIR personnel, all the Engineers, 3 from the 1FMS and 1 from HQ, and then on
the first pay (the pay that had just finished), September, 3 personnel's were
terminated as shown there - 2 from IFMS and 1 from HQ. All these
termination dates and reactivation dates were based on instructions from
Personnel Branch.

(Pay details were tendered and marked as Exhibit D)

EXHIBIT D: PAY DETAILS

Q7: No other persons' pay was effected; those who went inside?
A: Sir.

Q8: You need to update this record, especially people who are currently on
detention and those in the cell. They have got their pay suspended; Ravai,
Naduaniwai, Soko. Can you check that and present that tomorrow?
A: Sir.

Q9: Capt Mario, who gave the instructions for you to terminate the pay of these
people only?
A: The instructions came from Major Turaga, Major Mara and Deputy
Commander.

Q10: The reason why I ask is because there were certainly more than the number
that you have here, that were inside the Parliamentary Complex. Why do
you terminate the pay for these people and not all of them?
A: These were the names that were given to us. The other names I will
confirm it to you tomorrow because they were included in the list but the
pay period had lapsed. I think Ravai was one of those also, but all these
were based on the instructions given by the Personnel Branch.

Q11: Was this the same instruction that led you to reactivate their pay?
A: Same instruction, Sir.

Q12: While other people who were inside the Parliamentary Complex are now
back at the RFMF never had their pay terminated?
A: Sir.
Q13: Why are the pay of these other three people; one from HQ RFMF, two from 1FMS are now being terminated again?
A: That I cannot answer, but the instruction is there. It came from Col Tuatoko.

Q14: To terminate their pay?
A: Sir.

Q15: Do you often query why the inconsistency?
A: No, Sir.

Q16: Why not?
A: We have always followed that policy that the Pay Office does not query the Personnel Branch's directive because I think we will be going into an area which we are not familiar with. It is best that we just stick to whatever instructions Personnel Branch gives to us.

Q17: Those instructions you said you got for other reactivation or cessation of pays, they come through the normal files that have been used in HQ?
A: Yes.

Q18: What files are you referring to?
A: I cannot recall the file no; 51/2 is the one to do with pay rates.

Q19: Would you be able to get us a copy of those instructions?
A: I will get a copy of all these.

Recalled on 13/09/00:

Capt Maric, after having been duly reminded of oath earlier taken, was re-interviewed as follows:

Q20: Capt Mario, you were asked to present some more details on the pay cuts. Can you present that now?
A: Sir, I have in front of me the first instruction received from the Personnel Branch dated 6th July and that instruction says, "Pay for Lt Baleinamau and WC1 Bainimoli were terminated with effect from 6th July"
The second instruction from HQ Land Force, Personnel Branch was for the cessuroff of pay 19th July to 6th August. This particular instruction - 28 of the 1st Meridian Squadron personnel were going to be terminated, and also on the same instruction, their pay was to be restored on the 7th of August; terminations from 19th July to 6th August and on also on the same instruction, the pay was to be restored on the 7th of August; terminations from 19th July to the 6th of August and on the same instruction they were to be they restored on the 7th of August.

Q21: Why was that gap?
A: I think you will have to ask the Personnel Branch. This was signed by Major Turaga. The reason, in answer to your question, Sir, I think it is best directed to Major Turaga. That instruction was dated 9th August.

On the last instruction, 15 days later - 24th of August, mentioned here are the 3FIR, FTG and Engineer Personnel. These are some of the personnel from 1FMS who were transferred to 3FIR. When they were transferred, the instruction was for the pay to be suspended. After the first termination, the second restoration then we have this last instruction which was for termination for 10 personnel from 3FIR, 1 from FTG, 3 from 3FIR and the remainder of the Engineers.

That, Sir, very briefly is the instructions we received from the Personnel Branch. That I have also summarised in these employment details.

(Pay details tendered and marked as "Exhibit D")

EXHIBIT D: PAY DETAILS

Q22: On the summary we have got, it shows certain individuals whose pay have been terminated since you had the instructions. Those pays that have been terminated reflect the persons who have been remanded in custody or charges are laid against them; is that true?
A: I think so, Sir. The third instruction; some of them could be imprisoned at that time but I am not too sure; that could be proven later on.
Q23: Under what circumstance do you normally cease people's pay?
A: We only cease the pay of any soldier if we are instructed from higher authorities, in this case from the Personnel Branch.

Q24: Don't you have within your pay regulations instructions within those regulations saying when you should cease people's pay or is there any instructions that you know of in all your years of service in the finance? Is there any instruction that you know of or is it just whoever the personnel directs?
A: In my capacity as to pay, there is standing orders for the termination of a soldier's pay or the stoppage but that will always come in the form of Routine Orders Part II.

Q25: That is where authority comes in but any reasons for that authority to be given; is there anything in the Finance? If you are not sure you can say you are not sure?
A: (Silence)

Q26: Are you going by the 1982 Financial Instructions?
A: Yes, I cannot recall exactly the actual reference but there is. There is a portion also in the PSC Constitution which stipulates the stoppage of pay.

Q27: Does any of those terms of reference that you have mentioned fall into the category of those people that you have actually terminated their pay?
A: I am not too sure. I will have to go and find out more about that.

Q28: Don't you normally check up on this, prior to ceasing people's pay?
A: Yes, I think we should have checked. Like I said we were just working from higher authorities in HQ, maybe we should have checked.

Q29: Why did you not?
A: I think at that particular time we were overworked and we did not follow up.

Q30: Are you aware of the legal implications of the actions taken?
A: Yes, but I think that will be answerable by my superiors because they were the ones who directed me.
Q31: Could you just inform the Board, Capt Mario, on your role in the Pay Office?
A: My role basically is to see that the soldiers are paid on time and to check that the pay-remunements is correct. In other words, their pay rates, allowances that they are supposed to receive and that is paid on time on that particular pay period.

Q32: What is your appointment in the Pay Office?
A: Staff Officer (Pay).

Q33: Usually one of the practices you adopted, if I am correct, before you had effected any deductions or any stoppages of pay, use to refer the so-called directive from HQ to the legal; is that correct?
A: Yes, on instances that we are not too sure of; the cases we are not sure of we normally send it up to the legal.

Q34: Are you aware of these stoppages be referred to the legal for their opinion?
A: At that particular time, no, Sir.

[P. MARIO]
Captain

[J. N. B. EVANS]  [A. MOHAMMED]  [T. GUCAKE]
Lieutenant Colonel  Major  Major
President  Member  Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
EIGHTY-FOURTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 25948 PTE SOLOMONE CAMA

Private Cama, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows.

Q1: O a curu e na IMS Unit e na yabaki cava?
A: Yabaki sa oti saka.

Q2: Se bera na i ka 19 ni siga, o a kila e dua na ka e baleta na ka e yaco e na siga Vakaraubuka oya?
A: E sega saka.

Q3: O a tiko i vei e na i ka 19 ni siga?
A: Au a tiko e na dua na Sea Survival Exercise mai Makuluva.

Q4: Nomudou lako e na Sea Survival Exercise, e vica na rubber dinghy a kau?
A: Tolu saka.

Q5: Na bogi ni siga Lotulevu na i ka 18 ni siga, a kau yani e so na i yaragi, o a raica na i yaragi koya a tawa yani ena taga?
A: Sir.

Q6: Na i yaragi cava koya a kau?
A: MP 5 saka vata kei na pistol.

Q7: Siga Lotulevu, e dua na veitalanoa a caka mai kea. O iko a tiko e na veitalanoa e na gauna a caka kina na veitalanoa me baleta na exercise ena vakayacori ena siga Vakaraubuka?
A: Segi saka.

Q8: Ena gauna e kau kina na i yaragi i Makuluva, o bau raica na kena tawa tiko na gasau e loma ni magazine?
A: Segi saka.

Q9: E na bogi oya, e biubiu mai Makuluva o nomudou Troop Leader, mai sobu i Viti Levu, dua na veitalanoa vata kei iratou i cake, me veisautaki na pick-up ni siga ka tarava - Vakaraubuka, nomudou biubiu mai Nukulau, dou a qai gole i vei? O cei a nomudou coxswain?
A: Au segi ni rawa ni cavuta saka e na vuku ni neitou SOP.

direct-taka, na i liuliu ga ni Mataivalu. E direct-taka na i Liuliu ni Mataivalu, na ka kece e tarogi e na loma ni Court of Inquiry qo e official.
O cei e nomudou coxswain ni waqa?
A: Au sega saka ni rawa ni cavuta.

Q11: Na yacamu e sa na biu e na list qo, dua vei ira na tamata e sega ni via soli tukutuku. Na gauna dou biubiu kina mai Nukulau, dou a qai gole i vei?
A: Keitou exercise tikoga. Na kece saka e yaco tiko mai e na bogi me yacova mai na mataka ni siga oya, o au e noqu vakabauta kece saka ga o au, Sir, ni se exercise tikoga.

Q12: Na gauna dou vodo kina i na Range, e vica na rubber dinghy e vodo e na Range?
A: Tolu saka.

Q13: Vodo taucoko?
A: Sir.

Q14: Loma ni lori?
A: Sir.

Q15: O cei a draivataka na lori?
A: (Silence)

Q16: O Vakadranu?
A: O Vakadranu saka vata kei Kaumaitotoya.

Q17: E dua se rua na lori?
A: Dua saka ga.

Q18: O rau ruarua rau a tiko i kea?
A: Sir, au sega ni vakadeitaka se o cei vei rau a draiva mai e na siga oya.

Q19: Ia o rau ruarua rau a tiko e na siga oya?
A: Au kila saka baleta ni o rau e rau neitou draiva tiko.

Q20: O cei a lai pick-up e na mataka lai lai oya; o rau ruarua se dua vei rau?
A: Au sega saka ni vakasamataka.

Q21: Tolu vakadua na rubber dinghy e vodo?
A: Sir.

Q22: Na i yaragi dou a kauta lesu tale?
A: Saka lesu saka tale ki na armoury.

Q23: C cei e kauta lesu tale i na loma ni armoury?
A: Keitou kila saka ga na neitou lai biuta saka ga i kea, na kena sava kei na kena suka tale.
Q24: O cou savata dou qai biuta tale i loma?
A: Io saka.

Q25: O gole sobu i na Palimedi vakavica?
A: Sigalevu saka ni ka 19 ni siga.

Q26: O cei e tukuna vei iko mo gole sobu i ra?
A: Noqu gole sobu i kea, Sir, o au dua dua saka ga. Baleta saka ni ratou sa tu saka i loma oya o ratou na neitou lewe ni Unit, sa vuni noqu gole sobu saka.

Q27: Vica na kaloko o gole kina i ra?
A: Rauta tiko na 1.00 ki na 2.00.

Q28: E vica vata na ka e yaco i tuba; na vanavana e caka mai Grammar, TV Staion, bau dua na gauna o curu vata kei ira na lewe ni vanua i tuba?
A: Segu saka

Q29: A cava nomu cacacaca e loma ni Palimedi?
A: Rua saka na vanua au yadrava saka i kea; vei iratou saka ga na hostages kai Idia vata kei iratou na kai Viti.

Q30: Bau dua na gauna o yadra i matamata se i Battery Hill?
A: Segu, vanua saka ga oya au dau yadra kina.

Q31: Gauna cava o qai biuti Palimedi kina?
A: E na yakavi saka ni siga a soli kina na i yaragi.

Q32: Gauna cava o qai lesu tale mai kina i loma ni keba?
A: Macawa saka a caka kina na storm i Kalabu, kena siga Moniti ni macawa ka tarava.

Q33: O iko a tiko e na brief koya e solia tiko o OC e na mataka lailai ni Vakarauabuka, me dua na exercise e vakarau caka, dou vakarau veisau mo dou gole sobu?
A: Ka 19 saka ni siga qori?

Q34: Na gauna dou sava daka'i tiko kina kei na i yaya ni exercise mai Makuluva, a tukuna o OC mo dou lai veisau ga vakatotolo (civilian), lesu mai me dua na exercise me lai caka; o a tiko e na briefing oya?
A: Segu saka, oti saka na noqu veisau au gole saka i ra. Au sili oti ga au a sa tatau sara. Recondition all my personal equipment.

Q35: Baleta na cava?
A: Au gole saka i vale me lai biu eso na i lavo. Via tini saka beka na kaloko au qai gole sobu saka i vale.
Q36: Gauna cava o qai rogoça na vuaviri?
A: Retio saka. Rauta saka 1100 hours.

Q37: Let us go back to the night of 18th May; can you tell us what form of meal you had on the night of the 18th; what did you have?
A: Ration pack, fish and whatever we had on that night.

Q38: Was any hot-box meal brought to you?
A: No.

Q39: We have heard evidence in this Board that there was instructions for magazines to be filled in; did you hear of any such instructions?
A: No.

Q40: The three Zodiacs you talked about. We have heard evidence that one coxswain for the Zodiac was Naika, second was Qicatabua; were you in one of these?
A: Yes.

Q41: Who was your coxswain; were you in Naika’s Zodiac?
A: Yes, I was in one of those two, Sir.

Q42: How many persons were in that Zodiac?
A: The Zodiac can accommodate 15 persons.

Q43: But there were only 14 of you in the exercise?
A: Yes, six in one and seven in one or whatever.

Q44: When you got into the Zodiac, were you put in teams into the Zodiac or any person can board any Zodiac?
A: Sir, we went out for a survival exercise and mostly, when we leave shores or go out for an exercise, mostly we go in teams.

Q45: That is why I asked you, you went out in team of four?
A: Yes.

Q46: When you went out, am I true in saying that the persons in the Zodiac with you were members of your team?
A: Sir.

Q47: What time did you leave Makuluva?
A: Some times between 11.00 to 12.00 at night.

Q48: When you left the island, where did you head to?
A: We came and floated around in the sea.

Q49: Did you land at the Rewa Delta area?
A: Yes, just at the side of it.
Q50: How many Zodias were there at that time?
A: Three.

Q51: Where was your Troop Commander at this time, Lt Dakuliga?
A: When we were floating there, they left in their Zodiac for clearance ashore.

Q52: Which shore are you talking about?
A: Rifle Range.

Q53: What time did you leave the Rewa Delta area for the Range?
A: 4.00 am.

Q54: When you were returning, did you meet Lt Dakuliga again before you arrived at the Range?
A: They were the ones who signalled us that the shore was clear.

Q55: What form of signal was given?
A: We just came and met him beside there.

Q56: We have got the Range here, Makuluva Island over there, what was the distance when you met him - halfway?
A: No, it was so close, about 500 metres something like that.

Q57: To the Range?
A: From the sea and where they were clearing the shore, they came to meet us.

Q58: How far would it have been from the Range, out towards sea?
A: Seven kilometres.

Q59: Did he conduct a brief when he arrived and did he brief you of what was going to happen?
A: No.

Q60: You just followed him in?
A: We just went in, the only thing we were waiting for was the truck to come in and pick us up.

Q61: Were you in the first lot that arrived at the beach in Laucala Bay?
A: No, we were the second.

Q62: Was Lt Dakuliga on the first one to land?
A: No.

Q63: When you arrived back at QEB and were reconditioning weapons, where was this taking place; in your Unit complex or in the shed?
A: The Zodiac in the shed and the weapons at the Complex.

Q64: This is beside the Warrant Officers and Sergeants Mess?
A: Sir.
Q65: After the reconditioning, did you go back to your Unit?
A: Sir.

Q66: This is before you went home?
A: Sir.

Q67: Did you see a light blue pick-up van parked in front of the Unit, not one of your vehicles, it may have been a new vehicle?
A: No.

Q68: Do you know your Int. Operatives?
A: Yes.

Q69: Do you know any of them?
A: Yes, we are all part of the Unit, Sir.

Q70: Did you see them there in the Complex that morning?
A: No.

Q71: When you took yourself down to the Parliament Complex, were you given a weapon?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q72: What weapon was issued to you?
A: MP5.

Q73: Did you sign for the weapon?
A: The weapon was just given to me but it was not signed.

Q74: Would you be able to tell us who gave you the weapon?
A: No, Sir.

Q75: When you returned the weapon, did you return it to the same person?
A: Sir.

Q76: Each time you drew the weapon, was it given by the same person?
A: Different person, Sir.
Q77: The first one who gave you the weapon, was it Pte Bukasila?
A: I cannot say that, Sir.

Q78: When you left the Parliamentary Complex, did you go to Kālabu?
A: No, Sir.

Q79: You went straight home?
A: Sir.

Q80: O vakaitikotiko mai vei?
A: 53 Vesivesi Road, Kinoya.

Q81: O kilā vakacava ni tolu na rubber dinghy dou a vakayagataka ena siga oya mai Makuluva?
A: E tolu saka.

Q82: E na gauna dou sa cabe mai kina e na Range, o ratou na tolu na rubber dinghy qo eratou sa vodo taukoko ena lori?
A: Sir.

Q83: E sega ni dua na dinghy a cici qai lai cabe mai e na Maritime?
A: Segu saka.

Q84: O kilā vakacava?
A: Au i tiko saka i kea.

Q85: O kilā vakacava ni a kau yani na i yaragi i Makuluva ena bogi ni Lotulevu?
A: E tukuni saka ni a mai pick-taki saka na hot-box e na bogi ni siga oya.

Q86: Ni mai pick-taki na hot-box oya, e sega ni kakana?
A: Segu. Na kena lai tukuni saka vei keitou na kena kau saka na i yaragi e na bogi ni siga oya, au kila tikoga ni keitou se exercise tikoga.

Q87: O csi e lai tukuna yani vei kemudou ni sa kau yani nai yaragi?
A: Neitou i liulu saka ga.
Q88: E dua na brief a caka taukoko vei kemudou se so ga vei kemudou a tiko kina?
A: E sega saka ni dua na brief me vakadei ni dua saka na brief dina baleta ni keimami dui tu tu saka tu ga.

Q89: E sega tiko ga ni se matata vei au se o kila vakacava ni kau yani na i yaragi ena bogi ni Lotulevu oya?
A: Me vaka saka ga na noqu tukuna oya, nodratou lai kau hot-box saka oya, ratou sa lai tukuna, "Na i yaragi sa tu qo mo dou vakayagataka", ia au kila tiko ga ni se exercise tiko me yacova sara na noqu qai mai confirm-taka niu sa rogoa e na retio e na siga ka tara na ni sa caka na coup.

Q90: Tukuna o iko ni o rogoa e na retio mai vale, ia e na 10.00 na kaloko o yaco mai i na nomdou Unit.
A: Sega saka, 10.00 saka na kaloko au biubiu saka mai na Unit meu gole saka i vale.

Q91: Nomu lako sobu i na Parliament Complex, o biubiu mai nomdou i na Parliament Complex se o lako tale mai ki na Unit?
A: Au gole saka tale mai i na Unit.

Q92: O cei o sotava e na loma ni Unit?
A: O ratou saka na vo ni neitou i lala e ratou se vo saka tiko.

Q93: Oti sa mani tukuni vei kemudou mo dou sa lako i na Parliament Complex?
A: Tukuni saka vei keitou me keitou dui vakasqara saka ga na neitou i lako loko i loma.

Q94: Oti ga sa tukuna nomdou OC, Mr Baleinamau mo dou lako sobu?
A: Sa tukuni saka ga qai dui vakatau vua, koya e via tiko se okoya e via lako sobu.

Q95: Mai na gauna o tiko kina e na loma ni Palimedi, o bau raica ni ra vakadakai na civilian?
A: Sega saka.
Q96: Sega ni o ira kece, e so ga?
A: Sega saka.

Q97: Au mean-taka tiko qo o ira na TF, Reserves?
A: O ira saka ga na TFs kei na Reserves.

Q98: A soli vei ira na i yaragi?
A: Sir.

Q99: Na weapon training; o bau raica nomu tiko i loma oya ni bau caka?

Q100: E sega na weapon training?
A: Au sega vakadua ni raica na weapon training me caka.

Q101: O ira na TFs kei na Reserves koya e soli qo vei ira na i yaragi dou kila vakacava ni o ka qo e TF se Reserve?
A: E levu saka keitou TOD vata saka.

Q102: Koya ga o ni kila mai na Middle East?
A: Sir.

Q103: Just take a look at this list? (Witness looks) Can you see your name on that list?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q104: Can you identify the weapon written there?
A: Yes, Sir, it is a colt.

Q105: Was that given to you?
A: Sir.
Q106: Just take a look at this signature?

(Witness looks)

A: Yes, that is mine.

Q107: Do you know whose signature is this?
A: No.

Q108: Am I correct in saying that there were occasions in the Complex where you signed for weapons?
A: For me, yes.

Q109: Is it not true that on the morning of the 19th, from the Unit you went direct to the Parliamentary Complex in a mini-bus?
A: No, Sir, by myself.

Q110: Is it not true that you were instructed by Lt Baleinama to go and change within ten minutes and were to report back to the Unit for an exercise?
A: That is true, Sir, but I was not there during his brief.

Q111: How did you know of his brief?
A: Because when I arrived they told me.

Q112: Who told you?
A: The rest of the Unit, Sir.

Q113: Most of the boys had moved out of the Complex?
A: Not all.
Q114. You testified earlier, from home you went down to the Parliamentary Complex?
A: No, I came back to the Unit, Sir.

[ S. CAMA]  
Private

[J. N. B. EVANS]  
Lieutenant Colonel  
President

[A. MOHAMMED]  
Major  
Member

[T. GUCAKE]  
Major  
Member

[H. MACOMBER]  
Warrant Officer Cass One  
Member
EIGHTY-FIFTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 24494 MAJOR JOHN PICKERING

Major Pickering, after having been duly sworn on the Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Major Pickering, can you relate to us what transpired on the 19th apart from what we heard on the news and all of that, you came on duty on the morning of the 20th?
A: That is right, Sir.

Q2: The events during your time of duty on the 20th, can you just relate to us and in relation to the events down at Parliament and what transpired in the operation cell, we will record you as being the senior operations duty officer. Can you relate to the Board what transpired during your term of duty there, from the morning 0800 hours on the 20th of May to the 21st of May?
A: On the 20th of May, I reported to Headquarters Land Force Command to the Chief of Staff, Col. Raduva, he then assigned me to the operations centre. I then went to the operation centre and reported to Col. Saubulinayau, he was the chief staff officer operations. Also in the Ops at that time was Major Naivalu who was the other senior operations duty officer. Lt. Col. Saubulinayau then told me and Major Naivalu to share the duties of senior operations duty officer, that our stint was to be a 24 hour stint. I then had a quick briefing with Major Naivalu on the current situation. Basically, what he was telling me was what was on the radio, that some soldiers from 1MS had partaken in a coup on the morning of the 19th. We then discussed what was happening and we both agreed that he take the first shift and I would take the next shift on Sunday. I left and reported in on Sunday morning and took over duty. At that stage, there was as I would say a lot of things happened that was a bit unconfirmed, and there was a lot of air of confusion up at the headquarters at Land Force Command and really what was ongoing down at the complex and who were all involved. Right up until my tour of duty at NATOPS, there was no order given on the confinement of 1MS personnel at QEB. Those who were in QEB and those who were also down at the complex. We were told to let them move freely in and out of camp.

Q3: On the 20th, once we have moved out of the QEB, were you present there?
A: I was aware that vehicles were being loaded up at the back of Sukanaivalu Rd and containers were being loaded onto the vehicle, I was not aware at that stage what was in those containers.

Q4: Were you on duty at that time?
A: I was still there in the morning, almost midday then I left.
Can you give a rough indication on the time when these things were being loaded?
A: I left round about midday on Saturday and on Sunday and the rest of my tours ....

Q6: No, on Saturday, 20th?
A: I think it was basically in the morning. I am not sure of the exact time, but before I left. I am not sure if it was weapons. I was just told that the 1MS boys were loading stuff into vehicles and driving it away.

Q7: Any indication of time, 8, 9 or 10 o'clock?
A: I cannot put a specific time.

Q8: But definitely before 12 o'clock?
A: Well I left before midday, so anytime in between.

Q9: The vehicle, what vehicle were they loading on in the morning?
A: I was told it was a big truck. A truck was seen reversing from Sukanaivalu Rd.

Q10: Were any orders given to the operation cell on that vehicle, the authority to take out the weapons?
A: No, Sir.

Q11: Were any directive given by the operations?
A: No, in fact throughout my duty there at Ops, I raised that question quite a couple of times because of the movement of the 1MS personnel, in and out of QEB at free-will. But for that specific question, no there was no directive from Ops to 1MS, but when I raised that question I was just told we were to just let them move in and out.

Q12: Who were you told this by?
A: I referred the matter to Lt. Col. Saubulinayau a couple of times. I asked him, what was our stance in allowing 1MS personnel movement in the army camp in terms of coming to get rations and refueling vehicles.

Q13: Where were you when you first heard of the incident of May 19th?
A: I was at the University.

Q14: You said you were on duty from the 20th to 21st, was there a brief at the end of your duty for senior officers? I am trying to compare with the practice that is being done now.
A: I think the brief for senior officers started a few days later. Like I said from the 19th to the 21st, there was still confusion and I think at that time the Commander was out of the country. I think the briefing for the officers started after he arrived. I believe there may have been one earlier on, but I was not there.
Q15: How long were you on duty at the operation centre for?
A: I reported in on the 20th and I departed round about July, about a week before exams began at the university.

Q16: Can you confirm to the Board that during the duration of the days that you were on duty, did the resupply of ration and refuelling of IMS vehicles continued?
A: It continued up until I think the last I knew of was when Sergeant Lotawa was in the team. He came up to me one day asking for approval for dry rations. I asked him what it was for and he said to take it down to the complex. I then referred it to Lt. Col. Saubulinayau and was told that it was not going to be approved. I told Sgt. Lotawa, that was the last time.

Q17: Were you aware of any reasons why the change in the stance?
A: No, in fact there was a bit of confusion to that order. At times we were told to allow movement, and then some times we were told to stop the movement. That was creating a confusion with us and also with the guys at the gate. I asked Lt. Col. Saubulinayau to clarify the issue, where exactly we stood because in my opinion, I believe there was a lot of confusion going on. No one was giving us direct orders on what to do. Sometimes when I raised the matter with Lt. Col. Saubulinayau, he would say, "No, just carry on, let them keep coming in now." 3FIR kept ringing me up asking "What was the stance?" so I kept referring back to them that we were told to let them in and sometimes the guards at the gate would ring us.

Q18: You were going to tell us your opinion?
A: My opinion was there was no clear orders on the stance to be taken with IMS.

Q19: This may be an unfair question, it is up to you whether you want to answer it or not, if you were in charge, what would you have done?
A: I would have restricted the movement of IMS personnel.

Q20: The ration?
A: The whole works.

Q21: Major Pickering, before we finish with you, basically what we really want to find out, do you have anything else you would like to add?
A: I just want to say it was a bit frustrating watching these people move in and out freely when you know what they have done and not only that, when you get reports that these very soldiers were also going around and threatening our guys at the check-points.
In one incident, there was a firing up of warning shots by one of these 1MS guys in a vehicle with some civilians. You get queries from the guys on the ground, 3FIR Ops, "What is happening? Why are these guys allowed to move?" It was frustrating, that was why I raised the matter with Lt. Col. Saubulinayau and when the orders came, we allowed things to continue, I just followed the orders. That is basically what I have to say.

[Signature]
Major

[Signature]
[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[Signature]
[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[Signature]
[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
EIGHTY-SIXTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 21260 COL. J.M. WAGANISAU

Col. J.M. Waganisau, after having been duly sworn on Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Sir, there was an Army delegation that went to visit in the complex. The Board understands that it was led by you. Can you give an indication on the nature of the visit, what transpired and the date of the visit?

A: That was on the very first week of the Army takeover. The Army took over on the 29th, that was on a Monday, holiday. Then it was on that week, I believe, the negotiation started. I was not a member of the negotiation team. It was the Commander and others who were in the Council because I was not a member of the Military Council. I think it was the Commander, Col. Tuatoko, Col. Vatu and may be Lt. Col. Tarakinikini. They were members of the negotiation team.

I was the Chairman of the Military Advisory Group and that was on Thursday on the first week. It was mooted in my Committee since the negotiation was the major focus during that week and the negotiation was really to do with the release of hostages. Like I said, I do not know what was the purpose of the visit but I am assuming that the delegation was focussed on the release of hostages. I think it was also based on trying to get George Speight and his team cooled down then eventually agreeing to some kind of arrangement to facilitate the release of hostages.

There was quite a cross section of expertise in my Committee where it was mooted that there should be a "Vanua visit" na Veisiko Vakavanua by RFMF to Parliament. Also some people down Parliament were saying that the Vanua is there and if the Army is wanting to negotiate, why can't they start where they should start, that is, a Vanua visit. The visit was very much based on that. I could not actually recall who actually came up with the idea in my Committee. I believe, it was Col. Cerewale and were apparently supported by other TF officers.

What came out strongly in my committee's discussion was that since the Vanua was there and (apparently it was also coming from Parliament) if the Army wants to negotiate with us why can't they start where they should start. So, the idea was actually taken up because everything has to be cleared with Headquarters, RFMF. I could not recall whether it was taken up officially but as far as I can remember it was not officially taken up. It was briefly discussed in the morning tea and then it was taken up in the meeting of the MAG again, the Military Advisory Group. It was more or less formalised and I think it is in the minute of the Advisory Group. Before it was taken up to the Commander, Col. Kadavulevu actually came around during lunch.
hour asking me to take a team to Parliament. Because I was aware of it, there were some initial discussions. Okay, who is preparing this, who is preparing that. Col. Vatu actually came into the focus, he was preparing the yaqona and I believe the kamunaga also. We took down one or two kamunaga.

MAG was actually tasked to represent RFMF on this Vanua visit which apparently I was tasked to take the visit. We had Col. Tarakinikini and Col. Tuatoko and also Chief of Staff Land Force, who were very much in contact with the people in Parliament. They actually took the lead so we followed. That was the initial discussion with regards to this. If I can go back to that.

During morning tea, it was discussed, then it was taken up in the MAG's meeting after morning tea. I think before it went up someone had actually given the okay somewhere along the lines. During lunch hour, Col. Kadavulevu, that is quite clear to me, came and asked me to take the group down to Parliament. We argued, I told him that he should go but he asked me to go so I said okay. I took the MAG group and we asked for some senior NCOs because we want the visit to be a cross section. The visit was really aiming at that, it is a Vanua visit aimed at trying to cool down the whole thing to facilitate the negotiation for the release of the hostages. If you like, it is just "ai sevusevu visit." That was all the idea behind it.

We went in there, we had the sevusevu initially somewhere in the verandah. That was the first time I entered the Parliament complex. Then we went up into another room in which the actual presentation was done. That is when the leaders were there, George Speight, the Vice-President (Ratu J. Seniloli) and few other chiefs. Those were the only chiefs that I know.

Q2:

A:

Sir, what was the reaction from the other side on the second sevusevu presentation with all the chiefs? To be quite honest, the army got a telling off. We were actually told off by the Chiefs. It was Ratu Joji Mara Kapaiwai, not only that but also another chief somewhere in the Colo-North whom I never knew before. The reception was generally good. Initially it was good. Well, the overall reception was good. It was only when people stood and spoke that actually belted the RFMF. There were only two of them otherwise the general discussion was quite good. And then the Vice-President who was actually at that point in time, was the President, Ratu Jope Seniloli.

George Speight did not speak because immediately after that, the team came up to RFMF. In fact, that was the beginning of negotiation. After that vanua visit on that very day, we were still down there, which was the plan that we stayed on and drink grog while George Speight and his team came up to RFMF for the beginning of
negotiation. So they came up with Col. Tarakinikini so we sat in for a little while with Chief of Staff Land Force before we came up otherwise the general discussion. Apart from two or three speakers, who actually spoke, they took that opportunity to really tell the army off during the acceptance of the table, the presentation of the Vakatale and what not. That is the time when we really got bushed up by the presenters.

I think the reaction was generally by the people, the view that we were almost doing all that at the point of a gun. Even when we did our first sevusevu, we had the security guard all around us with weapons. The securities were all along the corridors.

Q3:

Sir, just on the initial presentation that was done, we had evidence and it was actually reiterated by George Speight to the effect that RFMF had taken over what George Speight and his group had started. Was there any dialogue stated or any presentation made to that effect?

A:

During that visit? No. There was no dialogue. I think it was in the presentation of the kamunaga by Col. Cerewale through the normal presentation. I think he said, more or less requesting them to stand down, give up what they are doing but it all aimed at what I said initially. In the Vakavanua presentation like this, people come up with that kind of words to suit the occasion. I think that was what Cerewale was trying to do on that day. Thank you for doing this and now it is the army and we ask you please go back and release the hostages. I think it was all like that.

Q4:

When did you come back into the camp after May the 19th events?

A:

I came back on Tuesday, in fact we marched in, because there was a call up on Monday afternoon, that was a holiday. I was not there but someone called me. Well, I called the Officers Mess for something else and someone told me that I was the only Colonel absent from the camp. I asked what was happening, and he told me that there was an announcement over the air that we have to march in; all officers and other ranks. I went up on that Monday evening, and came back. On Tuesday morning, I went back in.

Q5:

There were some plans and moves for the removal of Commander from his position and appointment of Col. Vatu as Commander and Col. Tarakinikini as Chief of Staff. Are you aware of any such moves?

A:

Within the Army or from Parliament?

Q6:

Actually the plan came from Parliament, whether it had been discussed in the Army?

A:

The first I heard about it, was on Sunday morning when it was announced, the radio was operating 24 hours after the take over of Parliament. I had my ears screwed to the radio. That is when I heard and also that was when they announced the Cabinet line up in
Parliament. In it was the announcement on Col. Vatu taking over as Commander. When I was representing my Ministry as Acting Permanent Secretary then at the Permanent Secretary’s meeting that it was also announced. In fact during the meeting on that Sunday morning, Col. Tutoko and Col. Vatu came and in that meeting with the PSC, Col. Vatu said he was not aware of any moves to have him as Commander. He did not know, although it has been announced but he has nothing to do with it. I think if I remembered rightly, he mentioned that in the PS’s forum.

Q7: Is that Sunday the 21st of May, the Sunday of the coup?
A: Yes, it is the Sunday of the coup. But to have any knowledge prior to that, no.

Q8: Sir, the way RFMF handled the situation of May 19th more directed towards the mediation and the negotiation process, that have been adopted. Could we have done anything to better the way we handle the situation?
A: You mean during that one week period?

Q9: Throughout the period until todate, Sir?
A: I came into the negotiation half way through the negotiation. I felt that we did not handle the negotiation properly. The point is firstly, we never had a fall back position as far as negotiation is concerned because the negotiation was being headed by the Commander. So, the "Aye" or "Nay" is actually being present on that negotiation table, the man who says "Aye" or "Nay" actually sits there. I reckon that was one of the draw back. The other one is when you go into a negotiation table with a closed mind then you might as well do not go in to negotiate. That is what I notice also. The negotiation team went in there with the closed mind because we want to negotiate yet we going in with the military mind. You do not do that when you go into negotiation. We have to keep all doors open and then pursue whatever lines you want to pursue.

I said that because had we done away from those things, we could have achieved far much more, but because we went in with a closed mind, and because we did not have a fall back position as we have the number one in there, we actually allowed the Army to go that low and to have given in so much concession before we finally achieve anything. Had we went in there with the open mind, we could have resolved the problem very early in the peace rather than having to go right down to that level. When I say go right down, I do not know that happen to you people but for me every time I went home, I got the bashing from my wife and from my children, "what is the army doing, why can't you do this, why can't you do that" That happens because during the negotiation period, we allowed ourselves to go right down.
When I came into the negotiation team, I adopted different tactics. During the negotiation, if I find that there is a point that I need to discuss with the Commander, I would discuss. During the breaks, I would want to convince the Commander. I would first discuss with Lt. Col. Tarakinini, "what about this? Okay, I will go and try to convince the Commander." Then after I had managed to convince the Commander when we went back in into the negotiation table, the Commander would have a different view which would make things easier.

In the last week of the negotiation, I was asked by the Commander to take over the negotiation, and I used the tactics that if they came up with something that I did not have the mandate to say "Aye" or "Nay" I would go back to the Commander. In the last round of our negotiation, we did that. Unfortunately, the damage is already being done, we have given in so much. So, those are things which we could have done better at our negotiation. We could have done a little bit better by the way we handled our negotiations.

Secondly, I think, this is my analysis, I was listening, and as soon as I heard that there were people allowed into the complex, I said finished. It would be very difficult to do anything now. I think they did not allow people in until Sunday morning if I could recall. So we had Friday until Sunday morning in which the complex was empty, all they have are the hostages and only a few people with arms. They may have weapons in there but there is no one there to use weapons. I felt that something could have been achieved in that period. But as soon as I heard that people were being allowed into the complex, I said now its going to be a long drawn negotiation. So, I felt that something could have been done in that direction. We were slow to react and seal off or even storm parliament.

I think the third one is right throughout that period my concern was that I do not want to see the Army being dragged into somewhere it should not be. In other words, to me the priority was the institution, the integrity of the institution and I never wanted to see the Army been embarrassed. In fact, I was professing that if worse comes to worst, we storm. In fact I told the Commander if worse comes to worst, we storm. But we are not going to allow this Army to be dragged into the gutter and being ridiculed and embarrassed by any Tom, Dick and Harry. In the end like I said, that was the assessment at that point in time. Then at the end, when you achieve something without a bloodshed, I said, oh Jesus, just as well we did not storm. To me actually as a Military Officer, I was saying if we have to sacrifice lives for the sake of the institution, let us do it. That was what I was saying. If we have to make sure that the name of RFMF remains up there at the expense of some lives, good, let us go ahead and do it including Parliamentarians. That was the way I was looking
at it. To answer your question, yes, may be we could have done a little bit better during that negotiation.

Q10: One of our terms of reference is the involvement of any RFMF personnel as to the planning or involvement of the May 19th event. My question to you, Sir, is are you aware of the involvement of any RFMF officers or soldiers other than those implicated or known of that was directly or indirectly responsible for planning or the execution of May 19th events.

A: I have never heard of any involvement prior to the 19th of May but I have heard and I have been briefed because the very thing that came to my mind I was asking how come so much weapon went into Parliament. This is before the return of weapons, before they start publicising the number of weapons and ammunitions to be returned to QEB. I was asking myself because during the period, I got threaten five times at home, I had five calls altogether. They stopped threatening me when my wife answered the fifth threat and she told off the man who was threatening me on five occasions when I was not at home. But during the negotiation, they were saying that they having enough weapons because at one point I had a clash during the shoot out at check point in which a couple of cars were shot down by the sentries, that was the first shoot out at check point. Mua called the RFMF and he told me off so I told him off too. He even told me that they had enough arsenal there to blow up the RFMF, all camps throughout Fiji. Out of that I kept asking myself how come so much weapons went in and I kept asking myself that. Then I again asked the same question during a meeting of the Military Council in which I was roped into, I was not a member of the Council but I had to be co-opted into the Council.

I kept asking but no one seems to be able to give me the answer. Three things I was asking, firstly, who approved the movement of weapons?; when was it moved? I was told, it was on a Sunday morning or Saturday afternoon, although the coup took place on Friday. My next question was, how much weapons and ammunitions, no one ever gave me the correct answer. No senior RFMF officer in camp, no one could give me the answer. How many 1MS personnel in there, no one could give me anything. So, during the period no one managed to give me any figures at all.

Firstly, how many 1MS in there; secondly, how much weapons do they have, thirdly, when was the weapon moved out of QEB. I kept asking those questions but no-one could answer them. My concern was if weapons were moved out of QEB on Friday afternoon, Saturday afternoon, obviously someone must have authorised the movement of weapons. And if not, my question is how come those weapons moved out of QEB without the knowledge of RFMF when the coup had already taken place two days earlier. As soon as we knew that weapons and we that 1MS people are there. Someone
should have done something. Through discussions here and there, people mentioned names, even at the RFMF. If I have to release information, an officer in 1MS briefed me. I had to call him and said "brief me on what happened" because I could not get anything from upstairs. He told me the whole incident.

The first load was approved by headquarters, RFMF, he actually verified with RFMF whether it was really approved that weapons go out. HQ RFMF said "yes", so it went out. Before they were to come back for the second load, this army officer used his own initiative headed and drove out with those weapons and he kept the weapons outside. Names were mentioned. Now, on the strength of that, as Chairman of the MAG, I wrote a memo to Commander, RFMF, I said basing on this and rumors in town that some people over here were involved, I want this investigated. Just that, I want this to be investigated. Who approved the movement of weapons from RFMF to the Parliament complex because had it not been for that we would not have been looking for weapons now. Because someone made a wrong decision that RFMF and the whole of Fiji is now in a mess running around looking for weapons. It all boils down to that: unauthorized approval given to 1MS by senior officers.

Would it be alright if you reveal the names?
The names that were given to me were Col. Tarakinikini and Col. Tuatoko. Because of that I had to write a memo to Commander, and he must have written to Land Force because Col. Tuatoko. He wrote back to the Commander and copied to me saying that he agreed with my view that the incident should be investigated in order to keep RFMF transparent but before that happens, I or the MAG should come up with names. My point is what should be investigated, as to who approved the movement of weapons from QEB after the 19th does not need to start with names. You can start an investigation on that, how come these weapons moved out of this and who authorized it and you will get it. I still have the copy of the letter with me.

Yesterday, I called checking out if there have been names mentioned with regards to the movements of weapons out because if names were mentioned, then I will rest my case. I do not have to reply to that. That is all I want to do. But if names were not mentioned, then I need to write to the Commander telling him what I need to tell him basing on that allegation.

Thank you, Sir. I just want to clarify a point. That meeting of the MAG group that went down, was that the week following the coup week or two weeks after?

It was the week following the coup week.

So, it is Thursday, the 25th?

That is right.
Sir, my question may seem a bit unfair but I believe it is for the betterment of the RFMF and the future of the RFMF and its members and of the institution.

I believe, Sir, when you came into the RFMF on the day that you were called in, you might have found a difference in the Officer Corp. The people were rapidly promoted maybe, and the people that were then members of the family of the so called Officers Corp the elite corp of the Army. Do you feel, Sir, that from when you left, until now that there is a big difference in terms of the Officer's views towards the institution and how the institution should run.

The answer to that is "yes", there is totally a big difference unfortunately. I find that, this is my own assessment, I think other reserve officers should back me up on this. I find that there was a total, if you like, a lot of division in the RFMF Officer Corp for example. That was quite noticeable. Prior to that, officers from camp who are now and again would interact or they would call me just to discuss other things and next thing the discussion would lead into the bad, if you like, working rapport or relationship in RFMF. The Officer Corp was no longer what used to be like before. Then you were sort of spilling over into a core division because there are officers. There was a division in the Officer Corp, then it sort of branches off into corps differences. The infantry, the engineers, the navy, et cetera. That is something we have heard from outside. Officers discussing, and people were discussing that, people who have the interest of RFMF at heart. They were concerned, we have some senior officers in the Army saying this, "what is happening". That actually existed. The answer to that question is yes, when I came back I saw that there was totally a division within the Officer Corp which apparently further resulted into the splitting up of corp here and there.

In the first two weeks of the Operation, it remained so obvious. I know it came from the junior ranks that they were happy that retired senior officers were now back in camp. While they are happy, they said that "it is good that you are back because you are now back into the fold and hold the Army together otherwise this Army is really going different". These are the views of junior officers and other ranks. I could sense some elements of rejection in there. I could sense that we were being rejected by some senior officers. Whether we were rejected, that is my own assessment, I felt some elements of rejection and resentment. Whether we were resented because we came in and try to do this and do that which we were not.

Because of that I had to call in some officers, I had to call in Col. Kadavulevu, Col. Vatu and Lt. Col. Tarakinikini, I sat them in my Committee and I said "look, let's get something quite clear". These group of officers are just here to advise, we are not here to take over your role as Commanders. You command men, you make decision,
that is yours" That must be clear right from the word go. We did that, we brought in the senior officers, we sat them there and we spoke to them. We are not here to take over anything from you people. We just marched in to help and to advise you people, whether you take heed of our advice or not, that is your business. But please do not go away with the notion that we are here to take over your appointment as Chief of Staff or whatever. I did that because I wanted to make sure that they are not actually looking at us as if we are party to this and party to that, we are not.

I certainly agree, the answer to that as I already mentioned, yes, there were some resentments in camp. If I have to be quite honest, the resentment virtually stamped from the fact that you have a naval officer commanding the Army. That is where the whole thing starts. Everytime, I spoke to a senior officer, and he expressed that there are as I mentioned some disgruntled officers in camp. There was only one advise I used to give them "look, please, when you are not happy, get out of the Army, do not stay on in the Army and be a disgruntled officer. Leave that institution alone." That is the advice that I kept giving the senior officers and I have spoken to two senior officers who spoke to me and expressing their disagreement with what was happening in the handling of decision making. I said, "Please, if you are not happy, get out." Do the honourable thing like I did, get out, do not remain in the Army and be a disgruntled officer because you will destabilise the institution. The answer to your question is "yes".

Q15:
A:

Apart from what you mentioned, Sir, do you recommend any other solutions to resolve these differences?

Before I left we had a list of what we want done. It was aimed at reorganising RFMF. We look at what should be done for the Officer Corp. What should be done for the senior NCOs and for the other ranks and we also had general. There were a few things that we have listed, MAG should have a list of all that. I was actually in the process of trying afterwards to elaborate on those and then submit it to Commander. In order to reorganise RFMF after all this is done and forgotten, let us go back to this. Officer Corp should be like this. Senior NCO should be like this, other ranks should be like this. In one of those, apparently, we did not list it on the Board, but we had to include it in writing.

Firstly, an army officer must always be the Commander of RFMF, that is first and foremost.

Secondly, I even recommended and I even wrote to Commander, RFMF, let us start with this, we want to get back into this. Bring back your chief of staff to be co-located with you. Bring back your strategic headquarters to be co-located with you. Land Force Commander, get out of that together with his chief of staff. Get out of that headquarters. And you speak direct to your chief of staff. I told
Commander that, you speak direct to your chief of staff. Do not go pass your chief of staff because this is where the resentment starts. You speak to your chief of staff, your chief of staff will them speak to the Commander Land Force. I even wrote to Commander on that. Can we start with this and then they kept coming back with the excuse that infact Tuatoko did not accept that quite well and he said they were located up there for practical reasons because you have all the files and everything. I said "look, this is very important, I am talking from command point of view. You go back to where you were, the chief of staff comes back into his position, the strategic headquarters below so that the Commander and the Chief of Staff.

As it is now, there is a lot of disagreement/resentment because the Commander is talking direct to you as Land Force Commander and you being spoken to by the Commander, you would use your other hat on your unwritten appointment as Deputy Commander, use that and continue to speak direct to your people and you excute this without informing Strategic headquarters. You have two senior Colonels who actually spent the whole period when everyone were running around negotiating this, these two senior Colonels were very much involved with the PR, Public Relations. In fact, they were the two most senior colonels in the RFMF and because they were being bypassed, and they obviously disagreed with every thing that was happening. They only involved themselves with the public relations, something that could have been done by senior NCOs. But we have the two most senior colonels and we feel that, that happens because of the present arrangement they were being bypassed.

I also called Tuatoko down here one day when we were here trying to discuss this. I told Tuatoko "look this must happen, you move back and Tuatoko said, "well, people are not performing." I said "look, that is an attitude that we do not want, you move, if Commander and Chief of Staff cannot speak to each other then one must go."

My answer to that is if we had to start, that is the way I want it done. So, I mentioned, to the Commander and the two other things that we had listed in that listing that we wanted to elaborate on them afterwards and submit to Commander. Things that we felt should be looked into when we moved into the 5th phase of the operation I think, re-organisation of the RFMF. We felt that we terribly need to do that if we have to get back. That include general activities, you go to the Mess, you hardly see anybody in the Mess. Only a group of officers were patronising the Mess. That is where the whole thing should start. We have a Mess for Officers, you go in there, you bashed each other, and it all ends there. The next day, you go back to your unit and and you continue commanding. That is not happening, this is a sign of that. Before, the Mess used to be patronising by officers, spearheaded by senior officers. Now, it is no longer the case. People buy and take home. Officers said that "we are not patronising
this Mess, because if you come to this Mess, you are being looked at as an evil man. That's not on. To me, that is something that never happen before, it is happening now.

To me, the most important one are the Commanders, that is probably where the whole thing should start. Commanders, who ever is the Commander of a particular unit or whatever, must be strong to speak frankly to the officers and his men. I think we loosing on that a little bit. I think RFMF should go back to that. I know there are strong officers and strong commanders but I think everyone should be like that. You know where to draw the line. This line belong to my men, this is belong to my commander. We are unable to do that. So what I am saying is come back to officer training. In that listing of our recommendations, there is a lot that we listed in as far as the officers training are concerned.

Q16: Sir, we thank you very much for your contribution, before we round it off, do you have anything else that you would like to put before the Board?
A: I have nothing except I was wanting to have a general session with officers in camp before I went back. Unfortunately, I was summoned to leave the Army and go and start a new Ministry but if there is anything that RFMF should be emphasising on now is really the unity. I am now heading a Ministry of National Reconciliation and Unity. I do not think we will achieve any unity, I do not think, we will achieve any reconciliation, I do not think so if we continue as we are.

I was telling my MAGs "okay, fine, let this Board of Inquiry complete their various jobs even identifying the culprits. Whilst there are people who actually needed to pay for whatever acts they committed, I think what we need to do now is rebuilding RFMF and I do not think we can rebuild RFMF after bashing each other’s up first.

What I mean is if after the Board of Inquiry, and every culprit would have his head in the noose, and you try to rebuild RFMF, you will find it very, very difficult. Although I am always tough on discipline but I felt this is a very difficult period for RFMF. I said that because politics can disintegrate, church can disintegrate, the Vanua can disintegrate, Government can disintegrate, not the Army. If the Army disintegrates, that is the end of Government/country. Perhaps after identifying all the culprits in all these Board of Inquiries, may be the Army should relook at what should we do next. Should we go into executing everybody, should we relax a little bit and come back and try to reconcile in order to start the army from a good base then move ahead.

After having said that, I know for sure that there are people who need to pay for their actions, but what about others? At some point, I mentioned names but you have to understand that there was a
different situation at that particular point in time. It is easy to make assessment now when the condition is right. It is very difficult to make assessment at that particular point in time, so I think it is all a matter of give and take.

Reconciliation is a very difficult thing because it means forgiving each other. You reconcile, it means someone who did wrong against someone but my concern is the army, we have to start from a good base then we have to rebuild the army again, get back the good working rapport, the good relationship, the good comrade, the *esprit de corps* that used to be in RFMF before, let us go looking for that again.

I reckon that the best place to start is when all is done, may be reconciliation should take place rather than killing each other. May be we start with the reconciliation.

[J.M. WAQANISAU]
Colonel (Retired)

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
EIGHTY-SEVENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 28879 COL DR J B SENILAGAKALI

Col Dr Senilakagali, after having been duly sworn on Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q: On the 19th of May, you understand the events that took place. The question that involves you is really your knowledge of anything that happens or any conversation that could be linked to this. Could you enlighten the Board if you have any knowledge of any conversation between military officers that are linked to the removal of the President or any information that is linked to the takeover of Parliament on the 19th of May?

A: I was told by my son the day before the takeover that there was going to be a march in Suva on the 19th and my wife being a Fijian wanted to go and join the march and I said, "It would be risky for you to go." My wife then told me that one of our children, Manasa had told her not to go to Suva because there were plans after the march to burn some shops. This was the day before the coup.

When the coup took place, I was in my office at QEB. I heard it from the radio so we were all taken by surprise. There was an announcement by the Education Department to the parents and guardians about their children. I left the office at about 12.30 and drove to the Grammar School. What struck me was the traffic jam along Ratu Mara Road, Grantham Road; there were a lot of cars on the road. I went down Edinburgh Drive to the Grammar School, there were a lot of cars and a lot of people moving around, but all the children were kept in the Tennis Court.

When I arrived there, my grandson had already left so I came back, had a quick lunch and went back to the Office. It was through the news in the evening that I learnt that some soldiers were involved in the takeover. I never heard any discussions about the takeover at the camp prior to that date. I followed the events of the 19th, 20th and the 21st from the news items. As the news came through, I realised that the CRW personnel were involved.

On the 29th of May (which was a public holiday) I was in the Office whole day although it was a public holiday, then I came home. I was called by Col Raduva to come up to QEB at 8.00 in the evening. This was about 4.30 when they rang me again to come up so I went up to QEB. I went to his office and he was not there. I was told that he was with the senior officers at the Officers' Mess so I walked up the Officers' Mess, I saw a lot of senior officers in the Mess. Commander and Col George Kadavulevu came and met me before I reached the Officers' Mess, and Commander briefed me of what had happened the night before and the evacuation of the President and the family the same morning. I asked Commander about the safety of the President and I was assured that he was safe with the family and that they were going to be seen again by the senior officers at 8.00 and they would proceed to Lakeba in Lau; I was happy with that.
As we walked down, Commander took a few steps ahead. Col Kadavulevu told me, "Remember what I told you two months ago", I said, "Yes, and I have not forgotten it". I told him, "So getting rid of the Tui Nayau from Government House is nothing new, that has been on the planning board for the last two months because you had asked me to ask the people of Lau to ask him to stand down." Col Ratu Kadavulevu had asked me two months before the takeover, to ask the people of Lau to ask the President to step down. He even told me it would have been nice if he stepped down after the celebration of his 80th birthday.

I told Col Kadavulevu that there are only two people in Lau who could go and talk to the Tui Nayau - His Excellency the President on that issue. I told him, "As far as I am concerned, it is completely out of protocol for me even to mention that to the Vuanirewa Clan, so I did absolutely nothing about it. I was taken to Commander's Office and Col Radua came in. He told me that Commander wants me to come up with a list of people to form an advisory body to him, a Council of Advisors so we sat down and drew up several names. I told him there were 22 ministries. I said, "In a situation like this, it is better to have a small number of ministries because economically, it will be very tight in the future", so we came up with about 12 or 13 names. Some of the names that I had mentioned on that list that day are actually in the present Interim Government."

The next day Tuesday, 30th, there was a meeting again and I understand from what I was told that the list we had prepared was thrown away and a new list was presented by the Commissioner of Police, so I kept a very low profile since then, but as the days went by, more names of CRW people came to light.

One day, I asked the girls there, "Where's my favourite soldier - Apaitia Waqaniboro, I haven't seen him." They said, "He's in Parliament House." I asked, "What is he doing there?" They said, "He's part of Speight's group." It was only then that I realised that some senior people in the army were involved. I did not want to talk about it.

When they had the first shooting, the doctors at the Hospital called me. There was another incident where they worked the whole night until early morning. When I went at 8.00 o'clock, the surgeon that was on duty that night, Dr. Eddie MaCaig just came out of the Operating Theatre and I still remember what he said, "Dr Jona, what shall we do in this type of cases. We have no experience at all of gun-shot wounds", I said, "Yes, it has never happened before" but as more casualties came in, they were able to cope up with the situation. I was going to the Hospital practically everyday to see the soldiers who were admitted.

My interest was on the members of the Scheme who were admitted to the Hospital. My concern was the death benefit in the event of death, and I was hoping all the time that nothing serious was going to happen in the loss of lives to most of the members of the Scheme because it would mean a lot of
payments to be made and at the end of the year no profit shall be available to members. That was my biggest concern, so I was going to the hospital practically everyday.

One day, they rang me early in the morning; this was after the Kalabu shooting. By then, the doctors were becoming experts in dealing with gunshot wounds because there were a number of cases there again.

One of the soldiers who was hurt in the first shooting, Kaminieli had actually asked the surgeon specialist for him to be treated overseas, so when I met the Head of the Surgical Unit, Dr Praveen Kumar, he mentioned that to me.

I told him, "My policy is this, if you recommend him to be sent overseas, I will make the arrangement but if you are able to treat this problem here, that is entirely up to you, but it is a professional decision by you." He said, "No, I will be able to do it." I said, "Well, if that is the case then it is your decision, i.e. not mine. I will only act once you've made the recommendation.

I went back to the Office and I consulted DALS, the Director of Legal Services, Lt Col Caucau and he said, "Our policy has exclusion clauses, and one of the exclusion is, if you got injured in the pursuit of any illegal activity you cannot have the benefit provided by the Scheme", so when I showed that to him, he said, "Right, that rules him out, so my concern was the number of people who were getting injured. There were two deaths but they were Reserves. They were not members of the Army Medical Scheme.

There has been a lot of talk about the Reserves coming on board the Scheme. When the announcement was made for the Reserves to march in to camp, I went in to see the Chairman of the Scheme, Col Tuatoko, so we discussed the membership of all the people that were coming in. I was told that they would be in for 10 to 14 days so I advised him that it would not be worthwhile to bring them on board the Scheme because of the admin. work involved. That was the decision which was not received very well by a lot of senior staff officers up at the camp. Commander was aware of this decision. If we had taken them on board, the Scheme would have paid death benefits to the soldiers who died.

When the situation went on and about a month later, I made a recommendation to the Committee for the Reserves to come on board. This was not accepted again and then I appeared before the Think Tank Committee where I was asked the question, why Reserves were not on the Scheme, so I explained to the Think Tank group the decision made by the Commander and the Committee's refusal to accept my recommendation. I told them, "Commander can still overrule the Committee's decision because he is the Trustee. I cannot do anything. If you feel very strongly about it, make your views known to the Commander, the Commander will make the final decision. He is the only one who can overrule the Committee." I told them that it was not my decision, it was a collective decision of the Army Medical Scheme Committee of which the Land Force Commander is the Chairman.
Kaminieli had tried very hard to be sent overseas. He is still at the Hospital now.

Is that Vosavere?

That is right, Kaminieli Vosavere. But the surgeons there have assured me that there is no point in sending him overseas because they are going to do all the repair work necessary.

I was told by the Director of the Fiji Red Cross Society, Mr John Scott, who rang me up one day that Vosavere's mother had been to see him for the Red Cross to send the son overseas for medical treatment. At that time I was still the President of the Fiji Red Cross Society, so John Scott told the mother to come and see me. I am still waiting for the mother to come and see us at the QE3.

There were other CRW personnel who were involved and who were admitted to hospital. I made it a point to go and see them. When they were admitted, the hospital did not note their Regimental Nos. What I was doing was to go in, ask the soldier's full name, came back to the office, look for the Regimental No. through our records and we knew exactly who was in the Scheme and who was not in the Scheme, so we were able to determine or give some idea as to how much money we were going to lose if people start dying from gun-shot wounds. But up until now, there has not been any deaths of members as a result of this political upheaval.

The deaths of the two Reserves were called in but not Members of the Scheme. The management of these soldiers were heard after they were discharged from the hospital yet to the responsibility of the Chief Medical Officer. If some of them needed special equipment or special branch which are not available at the George Mate Medical Centre, the Scheme would provide that.

One of the CRW boys who was shot in the shoulder needed a special sling, so the Scheme bought one for him. Those were the type of assistance the Scheme was providing.

I was not told about the number of people, the names of the CRW people and the Army people who were involved in this. I saw a lot of it on TV and I read a lot of it in the papers, but as the political crisis went on and on, I became very concerned at the involvement of the RFMF personnel.

Of particular concern to me was the fact that they were still on the payroll and as a result they continued their membership of the Army Medical Scheme and because of that they are still under the Scheme. Up until now, they are still on the payroll.

We were checking the print-out yesterday and they are still on the payroll and as such we are obliged to give them the benefit under the Scheme's policy.
could not tell and no one advised me of those in the hospital whether they were part of the takeover and therefore classified as "injury" or "disability" resulting from the pursuit of illegal activity, or soldiers who were actually manning the checkpoint areas were performing their duties as directed by the army. They do not lose out on the benefits, so in those cases, when the hospital rang and asked me that the soldiers wanted to be admitted to the paying ward, I said, "Under the Scheme policy, yes" but not those we knew were there as a result of injuries resulting from the pursuit of an illegal act. I think until now, only Kaminieli is still in the hospital, and I think he will be there for some time because he will still have to have his nerve graft done.

I was very familiar with the coup of 1987 although Rabuka said on the first day of the coup that he had abrogated the 1970 Constitution. Legally, he did not. He did that about five and a half months later when the decree was finally put in place declaring Fiji a Republic.

One thing that really surprised me was the abrogation of the Constitution by the Commander. I had a bit of argument with the legal people next door. I told them that I was not in favour of that. It could have been nice to introduce the Emergency Decree and keep the Constitution aside, just play around with time, it will give you proof to manoeuvre things as you go about because in situations like this, it is very unpredictable what is going to happen.

With the Great Council of Chiefs, George Speight sitting there at the Parliamentary Complex, there were a lot of players; it was totally different from the 1987 coup; the Army, the Great Council of Chiefs support, the Deuba Accord, the meeting at the Government's Bure in Lautoka on Monday, the 4th.

The Decree declaring Fiji a Republican State, that was about five and a half months from the first coup whereas this one here so I did not agree with that. I made my views known to the legal people who were in the Office that day that I was most unhappy that a decree has been put in place.

Q3: Sir, can we just go back to the Scheme policy for its exclusion clause of coverage of membership of injuries arising out of illegal activities; which policy are we referring to here, is it the charter or the policy covering us through the insurers?

A: No, it is our own Scheme policy where there are exclusions, and this is a common thing with all the insurance companies in Fiji. We are more flexible than most of them, just like they do not cover dentist, we provide dentist. I presented a table to the Committee yesterday, and I said, "This is one exclusion which is common to all; disability resulting from the pursuit of any illegal act," this means you don't get any benefit out of that. It is the Group's Medical Policy.

Q4: Could you get a copy of that policy?
Yes, it is in our policy, you could get a copy, so when this happened I went to see DALS and that was DALS' advice.

(Scheme Policy Document tendered and marked as Exhibit "G")

**EXHIBIT G: RFMF GROUP MEDICAL SCHEME POLICY DOCUMENT**

Sir, that is a group scheme, it is different from the group life plan which is death, that is insured with the insurer. Under the Insurance Act, we cannot do that.

Q5: On the knowledge of the burning on Thursday, were there any indication where Manasa got the knowledge of the burning or did he indicate it to you?
A: He belongs to a United Club or something like that.

Q6: Is he affiliated to any political party?
A: No, I think his source was actually from a very senior ex-officer of FMF. I did not want to know about it but I heard him talking to his mother. When I heard that I was a bit disappointed.

Q7: Sir, who was this senior officer's name?
A: Col Draunidalo.

Q8: The meeting time that you had with Commander you had first indicated that it was at 8.00 p.m. at night when you were called for the senior officers' meeting?
A: That was the first notice that came to me to come up at 8.00 o'clock at night. They changed that and rang to come up at 5.00.

Q9: Just going back to the conversation that transpired between you and Ratu Kadavulevu as to a request for His Excellency to step down from the high office; could you tell us the medium that was used for this conversation; whether it was by phone or a face to face conversation?
A: The Colonel came to my office one day and asked me if we could just take a walk so we just walked from my office down to the hospital and back again, and it was a very private talk. I was very surprised and from then I suspected that there was something brewing but I never suspected that there was a plan for the takeover of the Government. I thought it was just a Kubuna-Tovata rivalry but I made it very clear to Col Kadavulevu in my position as a "kaisi" in Lakeba, that I do not have a right and I will never do it - approach the President and ask him to step down.

Q10: So on the same token, your conversation with Col Kadavulevu you think he was sincere in what he asked you?
A: Well, it bothered me from that day, and I tried to go back on the history. Even I went and read about R A Derrick's history of Fiji - the history of Lau, Ma'afu, the Vunivalu Ratu Seru Cakobau; it kept bothering me so when he reminded me on the 29th at QEB; "Do you still remember what I told you two
months ago?" I said "Yes". I told him this has been in the planning stage for some time. I was very surprised.

Q11: Can we go back to the advice given to you by the Director Army Legal Service in regards to soldiers who were injured during the events of the 19th of May and onwards. In regards to the clause that you mentioned; those injured in the pursuit of illegal activities were not entitled for any benefits from the Medical Scheme; were these soldiers still paid by the RFMF?

A: Yes, until now. When I asked DALS, "I find it very strange that they are on the other side of the camp and they are still being paid." This is what DALS told me, "They are there to look after the interest of the hostages so that Speight's people would not touch them." These were the very people who walked into the Parliamentary Complex. It is difficult for me to understand this but as events unfolded, I became more suspicious of the army's involvement in the whole thing.

Q12: Is Vosavere still a member of the Medical Scheme?

A: Well, he is still being paid because for Regular Force membership is compulsory, so if you are still getting paid by the army, we get the premium or the deductions so all we do is look at the print-out.

Q13: Sir, let just delve a little bit on the case of the Reserves. Was Pte Weleilakeba, the soldier who died in the Sawani shooting a member of the Medical Scheme?

A: No.

Q14: What is the difference between a Reservist who marches into the Army Camp and gets paid by the Army and the Reservist who marches in and goes for a TOD to the Middle East?

A: To me there is really no difference, you are called for duty and you march in. The members of the Regular Force automatically become members, so when this happened I went to see the Chairman and discussed it with him, and I think at that time they thought that everything was going to be settled and everyone goes home after two weeks. I said, in that case, we are talking about more than a thousand people and the admin. work involved would be so great and then after two weeks they go home again and we will discontinue their membership, so I said, "I will have to buy at least 3 filing cabinets, so we decided that it was not worthwhile, but that was on the assumption that this was going to last not more than 14 days but then the scene completely changed.

Q15: So when the scene changed, did you review the situation and come up with suggestions?

A: That is right. I reviewed the situation and made another recommendation that they all come on board, pay half the premium so that they are covered and not the family. That was not accepted by the Committee. I put in another one yesterday and it was accepted that it will be optional to the Reservists, but if they want to come on board, yes. That was a policy decision by the Committee yesterday on my recommendation. What in fact had happened,
when I was called by the Think Tank Group, I told them that I had made another recommendation but was not accepted by the Committee, and I said, the only alternative left now is for you to write directly to Commander, and Commander will direct that, so at the meeting yesterday, there was a paper again from Col Waqanisau of what happened, so we discussed that and we agreed yesterday but for Reserves, it will be optional for them. If they want to come on board, they will come on board.

We were getting a bit concerned because of the increase in the cost of drugs in Suva, Lautoka, Nadi and I knew all along that the increase was due to drugs that were being given to Reserves, but I had mentioned to the Chairman that we can absorb that from our fund but now they have the choice, if they want to come on board now, they will come on board.

Q16: Can we go back to your discussion with Members of the Army Legal Service in relation to the abrogation of the Constitution by the Commander? Who in particular in the Army Legal Service did you mention this to or you aired your views to?

A: I think Major Lomaloma was there. At that time there were a lot of legal people in the early days and I remember a Sunday when I went there, even Buka was there. I said, "Buka, you belong to the other camp; what are you doing here?" He said, "Oh no, we have to put our heads together but by then the abrogation was already decreed. I was telling them of our experience in the 1987 coup.

Q17: What was the reaction of the legal people when you mentioned this to them?

A: I do not think they took my words seriously.

[Signature]
[Dr. J. B. Senilagakali]
Colonel

[Signature]
[I. N. B. Evans]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[Signature]
[A. Mohammed]
Major
Member

[Signature]
[T. Gucake]
Major
Member

[Signature]
[II. Macomber]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
EIGHTY-EIGHTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 23109 COL SAMLUELA VEILEOE RADUVA

Col Raduva, after having been duly sworn on Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Col Raduva, you are the 88th witness, we have been through various Government ministries, we have been to Nukulau, we have been to the prison at Korovou, we have viewed tapes, we have talked to many in the course of this Inquiry. What would you like you to do now is if you can give a statement of what you knew about the events leading up to the 19th then after that we would like to ask you questions.

A: Before the 19th of May, we were doing scenarios on the marches that were happening and the last scenario that we did was in the other room regarding the march, that was on Friday the 12th of May. There was a march on Friday the 19th, we did a presentation regarding how we were going to conduct ourselves preparing for any eventualities coming out of the march.

When the events of the 19th took place, we were all taken by surprise. I was taken by surprise although we were doing the scenarios and how to counter any eventualities but the events of the 19th of May took me by surprise. The march had started and we went up for morning tea, and whilst at morning tea the PSO came over with his mobile phone and said to Land Force Commander that there were some people with weapons at the Parliament Complex although the march was on in the main street of Suva but in our discussion over the other room, our counter-coup was then CRW and then Land Force Commander called us in the conference room and told us of what has happened that there were people at the Complex and when we gathered at the conference room, the word came over that the Parliament has been taken, and then our counter-coup was to use the CRW then we asked around for the CRW, and word from Saki was that they were on training, conducting a selection and then after a while, Ligairi came into the room then we sat down. The topic of the discussion was to look at ways of the counter message. But as we sat down, Ligairi took the floor and said, "We are there!" Land Force Commander said, "What do you mean 'we are there'?" He said, "I and some of the boys".

I looked at him and said, "What is happening here" and then Land Force Commander and Ligairi went over to see the President and we waited. The phone rang and it was Vakalalabure. He said, "Now I am appointed Minister of Home Affairs, you are to look after security." I was the one that picked up the phone, I said "That's our normal job to look after security" and then I put down the phone and then a few minutes later, Rabuka called. I did not know it was him at first, I thought it was Col Waqanisau by the sound of his voice. He said, "Where's Col Tuatoko?" I said, "They have gone down to the President with Ligairi." He said, "I'm here at Government House and they are not here yet" and I said, "Well they've left already."

The sad thing was, the very Unit that was planned to take the counter measures for any eventualities was the Unit that carried out or used for the
events of May 19th. I had difficulty understanding what took place. It was mentally difficult and I still cannot understand clearly what really is taking place.

Q2: What was the nature of what Ligairi told the conference on the 19th of May, can you recall?
A: I cannot recall the exact words but I think it was something like, "Keitou sa taura tu qo na Matanitu. O au qai tukuni ga vei au ni sa vo e dua na aua me vakayacori. Keitou sa waraki kemudou tikoga qo. Keitou sega ni vinakata na confrontation.

Q3: Was that put in the form of a threat? Did you read it as a threat "we don't want confrontation"?
A: To me it was a threat.

Q4: Can you briefly highlight the nature of the visit to the President?
A: I could be wrong here, I think it was for Land Force Commander to really understand what is happening from the Commander-in-Chief.

Q5: Just a point of clarification; in the Board we have been given evidence especially to the effect that a lot of meetings transpired between Lt Col Tarakinikini and Lt Baleinamau. Could you briefly tell us the nature of these briefings and the meetings that took place?
A: We were in the same Office as Col Tarakinikini but I was never in the meeting, I was inside the room but never in the meeting. About the 3rd or the 4th meeting (I am not quite sure), Lt Baleinamau said, "Loloma tu mai vei iko o Na Qase." I said, "Okay, vinaka!" but I was never in the meeting.

Q6: On Friday afternoon, evidence was given by Capt Stevens here of the 1FMS, he said, he was called before yourself, Col Tarakinikini and Land Force Commander where he was specifically told not to be involved in any preparation or anything to do with the events that transpired in the Complex and that he should keep away. Could you confirm whether such statements were made and what was the reason behind such statements?
A: When the Land Force Commander came back from the President, he said, "These are the pillars that we are going to work on: no confrontation, no bloodshed, everything within the law, solidarity for RFMF" and those were the pillars that we worked on until now.

Q7: After the takeover, a lot of weapons were taken out of the 1FMS Complex and taken to Parliament, the Board has been told that approval was granted from HQ for these weapons to be moved; are you aware of any authorisation for these weapons to be moved, if so what was the nature of such authorisation?
A: I am not aware of any authorisation. My understanding is that, when Parliament was taken and it was confirmed that some of the soldiers from 1MS were there, we rang 1FMS and Lt Saki Tuivanavou came up, we asked him, "How many have you got down there?" He said, "About 12". Because they have their own armoury, we asked him, "Where is the key to the
armoury" and he said that the key was not with them so when Col Tarakinikini went over on Friday, he came back and said, "There is no weapon." I am not aware of any authorisation for the weapons to be moved from 1FMS.

Q8: We were told by members of the 1FMS that were in the Parliamentary Complex that they were given leave applications to sign and those leave applications were taken by DALs, are you aware of any directive to DALs or why the 1FMS persons were made to sign leave applications?

A: The only leave application that I am aware of is the one noted by Commander to Lt Baleinamau for Lt Baleinamau to take leave. That is the only leave application that I am aware of:

Q9: But not to the other members who were present in the Complex?

A: I am not aware of that.

Q10: One of the concerns that the Board has to look into is the issue concerning the termination and continuance of pay for 1FMS persons who were involved in the events of May 19th who were continuously being paid. Can you enlighten the Board as to why the pay was terminated and reactivated at different periods?

A: As far as I know the pay was terminated because they were on an unauthorised deployment, if you like, and then the pay was again reinstated because the Commander had said that they are in there to secure the hostages, that is as far as I know.

Q11: Throughout the whole event, pays of some of those involved were never cut but the directive for the resumption of pay and all that, who was that decision being made by?

A: It was being made by Land Force Commander.

Q12: Were you aware of any plans or rumours going around of the appointment of Lt-Col Tarakinikini as the new Chief of Staff and Col Vatu as the Commander of RFMF?

A: The faxed came to us on the evening of Friday, 19th from Parliament saying that Col Vatu will be the Commander and Col Tarakinikini being the Chief of Staff.

Q13: Were these officers, to your knowledge, approached as to the so-called appointments?

A: I do not know.

Q14: What was the reaction of HQ RFMF when that was received?

A: I can only speak for myself here, when the events of 19th May took place, there was a lot of comparison for me. I was comparing it with the events of the previous coup and we heard of a lot of people who came up to Parliament, a lot of those that marched and some of the senior officers too. Draunidalo and others were in Parliament, maybe at the gate of Parliament, this we heard
over the radio. I did not really take any notice of whoever was in command. It is the institution of RFMF that has to be kept safe.

Q15: We believe there was a presentation or a traditional sevusevu made in the Parliament Complex on the 29th. Were you a member of the delegation that went down?
A: In the evening of the 29th, yes.

Q16: Could you enlighten us as to what was the presentation for and what was said in this presentation?
A: After the events of Saturday the 27th - the first shooting, on Sunday, Seavula died, we thought, this is going to slip down into anarchy, it is best that we must save the situation so maintain the doctrine of necessity that eventuated on the 29th. On the 23rd to the 24th or 24th to the 25th, I am not quite sure of the dates, but I am referring to the first GCC meeting at RFMF where there was a 10-point resolution to be given to the dissidents at the Parliament Complex, and they virtually rejected all that, and they rejected the proposal from the GCC Committee, and then we said, "Well, if they reject it, we must save the country from anarchy" and that was what happened on the 29th.

The presentation on the night of the 29th was to tell them, "This is what you wanted - His Excellency the President has been removed, the Constitution has been abrogated, you must release the hostages." The hostages were the No. 1 concern for us and then the return of the weapons. That was what the presentation was all about.

Q17: In this presentation, were words mentioned to the effect that the RFMF was condoning the activities of May 19th and as such they were taking over from what had started from May 19th?
A: Not condoning. That is not what transpired. It was a situation-saving phenomenon.

Q18: We have heard evidence that what was said in the presentation was; the President has been told to step down, as you said the Constitution has been abrogated, the Army has now taken over, we agree with the cause but not the means - the way it was done, but in that presentation, the Army had indicated that they agree with the cause and the plight of the indigenous Fijians but not the way it was done - the overtaking of Parliament and that was how it was put across, and that martial law is in place and Army has resumed control and for them to release the hostages. That was done in order that the hostages be released and control within Fiji be re-established again; that was the way it was put across.
A: Yes.

Q19: Were you aware of any officers or staff of HQ providing or transmitting information to the people in the Parliament Complex of what was transpiring in the camp?
A: That I do not know.
Q20: Were you aware that any of the things that transpired in your office went down, because we have confirmed reports from inside that a member of your O-Group was sending information down and things that transpired in your Office where that particular staff officer was present and it has been named. We have called that Staff Officer here before and also it was given by Lt Dakai. Were you sure at any time that the information that was passed on in your conference was received by the other end?
A: Not in my office. But there was a list drawn up by Land Force Commander and presented to us at about 11.00 o'clock. By 2.00 o'clock we had the list faxed to us.

Q21: Do you know who were present at that conference?
A: It was the Land Force Command conference.

Q22: Were any of your Staff Officers present there?
A: My Staff Officers, before Commander Lesi came, it was Major Turaga. We used to go together to the Conference and when Commander Lesi came, it was Commander Lesi and myself on that particular ex-list.

Q23: Were members of your staff had access to that ex-list?
A: They would have because it was circulated to all the Units. I do not know who typed it.

Q24: One issue that was raised in the Board is the reaction of the RFMF as to the events that transpired on the morning of May 19th and the (what I would say) inability or the impression the soldiers and the officers thought of HQ not doing anything basically to quell or move towards what transpired. Could you basically give us your impression of what you thought had happened and whether what I have said is correct and to what extent?
A: What is happening is a political problem and we established with the Land Force Commander that a military solution will be wrong to try and solve the political problem. In my own understanding, if we resorted to military option and there was bloodshed the blood shed will be between the parties made up of Fijians versus Fijians and when that happens Fijians are going to kill themselves and then when things normalise, the international community will want the country back in the world order viz-a-viz democracy, and democracy is merely the politics of number - majority rules.

Way back into the history of our land and the indigenous population, it was round about 1876, immediately after session Ratu Cakobau was invited to New South Wales and when he came back from the visit, his son (I think it was Ratu Nailatikau) caught measles from New South Wales and this disease spread, claimed about 40,000 Fijians and leaders at that time thought that the Fijian race was a dying race and then came the events of 1911 and then 1943, 1944 which took away from this land young Fijians who could have assisted in building up the Fijian population, so when we discussed how to address the problem, we were not merely looking at the problem but we were looking into the future to try and resolve this, and the release of the hostages gave it another turn.
When I made my initial statement, I said I still could not understand what is happening because in a hostage situation you would not want to release the hostages but they have released the hostages, I said, "What is happening here?" so that is why we took a soft option.

Q25: Earlier on you mentioned that the reason why the military took over the Government was that because the 10-point resolution that was proposed by the GCC was rejected by George Speight’s group. How do you know that the 10-point resolution was actually rejected by George Speight’s group.
A: From the newspaper, from the Commander, from the O-Group.

Q26: The O-Group was headed by the Commander?
A: Yes

Q27: The reason why I ask is because we have received evidence given in this Board by Mr Speight himself who said that the 10-point resolution was never rejected by their group, it was the military that actually rejected that and that is why it took over Government.
A: The paper published on Friday evening after the second day, I am not quite sure of the dates and the day but after the last day of the meeting it was a two-day meeting, I think, the Committee went down, and the next morning at our next O-group, it was rejected.

When we went down to the Parliamentary Complex on the evening of the 29th, they were quite happy because some of the things that they objected to in the 10-point resolutions was provided for by the RFMF and they were quite happy but after the second negotiation at PTC, they blamed us of "kanabuta". We were there with the Great Council of Chiefs Committee and we were almost on the verge of coming to an agreement but that did not materialise on the 29th when we initially met. My understanding was, that they rejected the 10-point resolution.

Q28: On the first week after Commander came back, you may understand that there was a parade there and we were told that the pay of the people who went in there was to be ceased but this did not eventuate and when the Engineers went down, their pay was stopped but they were doing the same duties as the CRW who were down there. They were going on duty at the gate, Battery Hill and other places in the Complex, why is that?
A: The Commander had said that the 1FMS personnel were securing the hostages, that is why he said that their pay should be continued.

Later, Commander and Land Force Commander decided, according to the Minute that was coming to me that they were not to be paid when they leave Parliament Complex to when they marched into 3FIR after being apprehended, that is the period that they were not paid.
Q29: So the decision to actually stop all the pays and the decision to stop the pay for the Engineers came from Land Force Commander?
A: It is from Commander RFMF.

Q30: Was there at any time after May 19th assurance given directly or indirectly of RFMF support to the 1FMS that were in the Parliamentary Complex?
A: No, I am not aware of any assurance.

Q31: Do you know of any serving officer who had been implicated or had any part in the events of May 19th?
A: I am not quite sure of anyone being implicated on the events of May 19th but when we attended the funeral service of Pte Waqavonovono, who was still in Lebanon we were along the second line to the senior officers who were right beside the grave.

After the ceremony proper, Col Savua turned around and said, "Hey, Filipe, you were the topic of our discussion this morning. Someone said that you were going to conduct a coup. You took up the whole session of our discussion" so I am not sure if a serving officer is implicated but that is what I heard.

Q32: What is your interpretation of what Commander said, that they were down there securing the hostages?
A: Our primary concern was the safety of the Prime Minister and the rest of the hostages. My interpretation for that is, that no hostage loses his life.

Q33: Is it not ironic that the very people you entrusted to secure the hostages were the very people who went in first, held them hostage and made threats to the hostages life?
A: That is what I mean when I said that when some hostages were released, it gives a new twist to it. Some Ministers were released on Saturday, the second day of the hostage crisis so when that happened, I think it was after Col Naivalurua had a discussion with Ligairi in there.

Q34: These people were securing the hostages from whom, Sir?
A: Much later, words came out that that there was some animosity, the mataivalu vanua. CO3 was briefing our conference that Ligairi was sworn at when a Tailevu boy was injured. They said, "What's the use of keeping the weapons here and not giving it to us" according to CO3, Col Seruvakula, they could hear, according to CO3, where the swearing was coming from.

Q35: Was it true, Sir, that that was at a very much later stage? By that time, you had enough 1FMS people in there, weapons, rations, pay still continue so the
interpretation by these soldiers was that the RFMF was actually supporting what they were doing.

A: RFMF was not supporting, RFMF never supported. What has happened has happened because there were hostages in there. It is very easy to be wise in hindsight but during the fall of war, when everything and all things are not clear, we will just have to make do with what we think is right. It could be wrong in hindsight but for Commander to give them the role to secure the hostages, I would agree to it.

Q36: The reason why I said that is because soldiers who have appeared before this Board said that by receiving their pay, by receiving rations from HQ RFMF to them that is an indication of the RFMF's support of what they were doing. Yes, to them that could be an indication but for us it is not "support", it is merely the hostages.

Q37: Is it not ironic, Sir, that we have used these CRW or 1FMS soldiers for purpose like - they have done an illegal act and then we have used them for security purposes of the hostages, and in retrospective, we have come back and rearrested them and then we have subsequently charged them for treason.

A: That is what I mean when I said initially that I do not really understand what is happening, I cannot match it.

Q38: Just saying the words of one of the soldiers, "we feel betrayed by the RFMF". On that same token, he said, "Because of the activities that had transpired"?

A: That is what I mean when I said that I cannot match it, it is not clear, I do not understand it. May I also say that one of the 3FIR Intelligence Operators, Gaunavouivudá was in there and then CO3 said that he has gone over to the other side. My understanding of the moles, as we call them, is that they would do things that we might say from a safe distance, "that is wrong", but for him put in that position, he would not want to compromise his position and he will do things that seem wrong from our safe position. That is why I said initially that what is happening now is unclear to me, I do not understand it.

Q39: Can we go back to what was mentioned earlier on the different perceptions of what took place where the RFMF HQ in view of the situation that they were actually there securing the hostages because of the hostage situation. The soldiers' view was that the RFMF was actually supporting them by paying them and giving them rations, etc. Do you not think, Sir, these different views here have further widened the rift between the command elements of the RFMF and the soldiers, the people on the ground?

A: They left the Parliament Complex and they went over to Kalabu. Along the way they raided two mini-market places, and whilst at Kalabu they raided shops and other shopping outlets. I think that could be one of the reasons why the Commander has taken the course that he is taking, I am not quite sure.
Sir, but on the same token, on Friday when they all marched back into camp, the evidence given before this Board was that Commander actually spoke to them and said that he has forgiven them, putting them back into uniform and posting them to different units and that is why I said what I said and sort of leads up to what Major Aziz asked - forgiveness has been mentioned, they are back in uniform, and now you are sort of reversing decisions that were actually made on that day?

A: I am not trying to reverse decisions.

Q41: No, Sir, I mean the command element?

A: I am not trying to reverse decisions but I am just offering reasons but I would think that the best person to ask to give the reason is the Commander himself.

Q42: During the course of questioning, I know what would seem to you that unfair questions were asked to you, maybe you are not the person that should have answered them but it is good to see that someone holding such a senior appointment to get your views, I think it is beneficial in that respect. What has happened and what has transpired in that confusion, you really cannot escape it, I am sure we all can't and the psychological effect it has is unique to that time. We had one presentation by one senior Colonel about problems within the RPF, as an outsider coming in and sitting there, problems within the chain of command - the officer core; did you also see there are problems within the officer core that could have had an impact on the way things were handled in the initial stages throughout the whole event? Could you just comment on that it is quite important?

A: I was told by Capt Damuni that I am suspected that I was over the other side, for George Speight, and I asked, "Who told you?" He said, "CO3". I went to CO3 and I asked him, "Capt Damuni told me that you told her that I am with George Speight, he said, "No, Narawa told me", then I went to Mr Narawa. Mr Narawa said, "No, I did not tell anyone." There is a lot of suspicion. We have been fed by lies, and the sad thing is, senior officers have believed the lies.

My philosophy in life is to think of the good things that are godly and embrace goodness, and try and do good all the time, that is my philosophy. I will try and walk the straight and narrow path, and in doing so, I realise that people will view what I do from two basic angles; the negative angle and the positive angle. I do not worry about the negative angle. What I worry about is what I believe is right and I do it, the values and the virtues we try and inculcate in the army, especially amongst officers. We must hold the high moral ground and these things will not happen; bickering, back-biting - all these things will not happen only if we hold the high moral ground.

Q43: Sir, do you wish to say anything else before we round off?
A:

I just want to thank you gentlemen for having me here to try and put some clarifications in what has happened. No one is the winner here, we are all losers. We have our families, people have lost their jobs and children have missed school, we are all losers.

[S. V. RADUVA]
Lieutenant-Colonel

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[B. GCARKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
EIGHTY-NINTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 21475 COL. RATU G KADAVULEVU

Col Kadavulevu, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as fellows:

Q1:

Sir, can you relate to us your knowledge of what transpired on the 19th. We know what transpired on the 19th but your involvement if any, prior to the 19th, the events that took place of the takeover in Parliament of the 19th and afterwards. Once you have given your statement, we will then ask questions.

A:

Thank you gentlemen, on that day the 19th I was not in Suva, I was giving presentations to the Nadi Jaycees at ten o clock in the morning and the Lautoka Rotary Club at two o clock in the afternoon. I left Suva that morning at about five o'clock, quite, cool morning. I was not aware of what was happening in Suva until about 11.30 am after my presentation at Nadi when I went up to camp and the boys told me that something was happening in Suva.

I rang up Tuatoko in Nadi and asked him what was happening. He told me that the President rang him up and advising him of what was happening. So, I asked him whether he wanted me to be back in Suva, basically he said that since I was in Nadi and I was just about to go into Lautoka to proceed and complete that and come back to Suva. I got into Lautoka to brief the Lautoka Rotary Club. By the way both briefings were to be done by the Commander but since he was in Norway or somewhere, a directive came down that I had to present these two papers to the various agencies.

I got into Lautoka, my first advice to the congregation which is basically all businessmen that I was not aware of what was happening in Suva and I ventured not to answer questions just because I do not know. I left Lautoka at about 5.45 p.m. I drove back to Suva and got to Suva at about 9.00 p.m. That is basically what I know about the 19th. What happened after that is history.

Q2:

A point of clarification. You are the eighty ninth witness that have been called here. We have recalled approximately 15 witnesses. We have been through various sections of the Police Force that gathers information and we have sipped through what they have. We also have tapes on events and interviewed all sectors of the community to involve those in the Parliament complex. A lot of information has been passed to the Board in such a state of confusion, some of them may have been of meetings that have taken place, have been true. Some of them just had been report of meetings. I am sure you are aware of all the information that was going left, right and centre...
during that whole episode, the whole even associated with the 19th of May takeover.

Sir, did you make a statement to anyone in asking the President to step down? Was there any remarks made by you to any member of the RFMF about requesting the President to step down?

My understanding is that the general discussion that happened probably on the 29th or 28th that we asked the President for the executive power and the general feeling was that before we do that to advise the President not to give it. In that way, his integrity of how he had conducted himself for the last 50 years would remain intact.

But some how or another, he swept that aside and said, no, I will give it to you. It was after that then Commander went and asked them in a traditional way. That was the context of that. But the general feeling was for us to be able to implement, to address the climate that was in the country then. We have asked the President to step aside while we do what we have to do.

Like I said, before we did that, the advice that was given to Rabuka to the President was that "don't approve it but we did it. The channel he said, I will give it to you if some of the advice was illegal, I do not know.

Q3: Sir, we had a number of indications and people that come before the Board over the involvement of certain people and also the people of Tailevu involved in mapping out what actually took place on the 19th of May, the take over of Government. Sir, were you involved in any of these roles with the planning and the take over?

A: I was not even aware of the take over as such but I have noted the various marches that had happened in Suva two weeks before that and the 19th. Once again your statement said that the people of Tailevu and Naitasiri for convenience basically because they were near Suva. If it was done in Lautoka, your allegations that the people of Ba and Nadroga so the allegation that the people of Tailevu, I take that but on the context that they were probably the nearest people who would have been able to assemble and do the work. Whether I knew about it, I was not aware of it, I only know that there were two marches.

Q4: Were you involved in any of the planning or the meetings with George Speight and the group that took over?

A: I have not met Speight, I only met him way back in 1976 when he was selling computers to the RFMF, that was the only time I knew about him.

Q5: You were never involved with him?
A: No. I was not aware that there were meetings.

Q6: Sir, we do not know what is the nature of it but would you like to enlighten the Board the comments made to Dr. Senilagakali two months ago, the approach made to him by yourself, Sir, to ask the President to step down. Can you enlighten the Board on the nature of that conversation, whether that conversation took place?

A: There were scenarios that people talk about. I worked in strategic and that is my job to look at various scenarios and the scenarios that we talked about, was the various options that would in a way address the issues. I probably might have mentioned to you the military take over of Parliament but these are all scenarios that are part of what I do in strategic. Probably I talked to him but we had definitely discussed various scenarios of how we should address the situation in Parliament. Like I said it was just scenarios that are part of one's job.

Q7: Sir, I take it that the conversation with Dr. Senilagakali for him to approach the people of Lau and ask the President to step down. That one was as a result of the various provincial people coming up and battering the former President. I went on to a way of saying, I feel sorry for the President, and I said the people of Lau should also feel sorry for the President, the way he has been battered about by various people. The best way for him is to retire properly, that was the context. It was just as a result of the various press and individuals and political parties hitting the President. I felt sorry for what he has done and he was not willing to retire. As a person, I felt that if the Qase ni Vanua could approach him and ask him; look we are tired of people battering you. You are battered but we feel bad about it. That was the context of our discussion with Senilagakali. I feel sorry for him, if he does not want to retire at least someone should approach him and tell him; look we are uncomfortable with what the people are saying, we should go to the village and forget what the people are saying. That was the context of our discussion. I feel sorry for the man because he was battered for something he did not do.

Q8: Sir, did you hear of any moves by the serving army officers or former senior army officers attempting to take over the Army camp after the events of May 19th?

A: Well, I got back from Lautoka on Friday night. Saturday, I came to camp, I assembled all the strategic branch officers and discussed what was happening. Monday, when I came in someone told me that one or two officers decided to come through the gate on Friday to come into camp, I do not know what time. That was what was said, like I said it is only hearsay, as I was not at the camp.
Q9: Would you be able to name the officers who are implicated?
A: I think it is unfair for me to say that because it is only hearsay. Probably the person you should talk to is Alfred.

Q10: Was he the person who mentioned the names to you?
A: No, he did not mention any names but he was in camp but he had reports of people who wanted to come in. I am a third party in this. I was not in camp.

Q11: After the events of May 19th, we have heard in this Board that there were some differences that exist among the Officers Corp, it was some dissatisfaction amongst the officers. Did you see that at the camp or was it evident?
A: I did not notice any difference. We went on board from the 19th and 29th and after the 29th I was the member of the Military Council with the officers because I was limited to the type of people that I was ever to talk to. I was not aware of it. I run a very small branch, the strategic most of the officers I have worked with are seniors, previous warrant officers or senior NCOs and have worked with me when I was a platoon commander in 1972, 1973.

Q12: Sir, there is also allegations that some service personnel, this is including officers, warrant officers and soldiers were passing on information to the Parliament complex. Are you aware of any information that was relate or any persons that may have relate that information.
A: No, I am not aware of any.

Q13: Sir, thank you for your time and before we round this off, would you like to say anything further?
A: Yes, my closing comments are basically on the night of the 19th when I came back from Lautoka. I got home and a family member of mine was at home that night. He wanted to see where I stood in what was happening and I told him straight out. My position in 1987 has not changed. I stood against Rabuka in 1987, I stood against anything that is illegal. I told him my position and that was it. What I believe in 1987, I still believe in it now. So he went out. I was not home on the morning of the 20th. All the bouses were closed when I came back from Lautoka and I was running around trying to fill my car that morning. I got home at about 10 a.m. when I heard that some people came to look for me in civilian cars.

Q14: Sir, was there any approach made for you to take over as Army commander?
A: I think basically, they know where I stood so they kept out.

[RATUG. KADAVULEVU]
Colonel

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
NINETIETH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 21680 COL. S.U. DRAUNIDALO

Col. S. Draunidalo, after having been duly sworn on the Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1

Sir, before we proceed we thank you for being present here, I know you are very busy being a Commissioner and by right I think I should be sitting there and you should be up here. We have brought this to the attention of those in command that it is unethical in the Officer Corp to have junior officers enquiring senior officers. That was brought to their attention and we the Board feel very uncomfortable, however we were told to proceed. I know it is difficult but what transpired on the 19th, we understand what transpired, although it is hard to do but someone has to do the job. But thank you for making time to be here.

Sir the events of the 19th of May, can you please inform the Board on any knowledge that you have prior to the 19th of May and the events that took place on the 19th of May. That is the coup proper, not the march.

A:

I think it is important that I state that where I am in the Civil Service, I am required for the gathering and analysis of all intelligence in the Government. I am the Divisional Intelligence Officer. The Chairman is of course, the Minister for Home Affairs and if he is not there, the Permanent Secretary deputises. Membership includes the Commander and the Commissioner of Police. There were alot of papers produced at a meeting about a month or two months before this. The meeting was at Home Affairs, we knew about the march that was public knowledge as you understand and of course the permission to march comes from the District Officers office. There was also in that meeting someone had said that ex-servicemen were going to be part of the march and conduct some nasty things in the streets.

If you read the Minutes of that meeting, I raised that we should find out the centre of gravity of the grouping and let us get the names of the perpetrators. Because it was giving the ex-service men a bad image. They took note of that, it was quite a very good meeting and the Commander was there. He came to see me straight afterwards, and so did the Commissioner of Police. What they did about it, I never got to hear until the events of May 19th happened and it happened entirely in a different way. It did not come from the street, it happened at Parliament House.

I did not know anything at all planned by the CRW to take place at the Parliament House, nothing at all. In hindsight though when I think about the soldiers who were there and having just left the Regular
Force three years, hardly three years, in a lot of ways, it create a confusion in my mind. They were out there on a flank and no one knew that the Army was involved, the CRW was involved until much later when the Permanent Secretary for Home Affairs, Major-General Konrofe told me that Whiting had come over the air and said that the CRW was involved. Does that answer your question, Mr. President?

Q2: Sir, can you inform us of the nature of your conversation with those in the Parliament complex and if you had entered the Parliament complex and the nature of your visit?

A: When it was unfolding, it was interesting for me to find out what the Army was going to do. The events of 1987 came back to my mind. When Rabuka did it, I read in his book, "No other Way" that he had done it to avoid the total breakdown of law and order and all other things that we probably witnessed this time. Because of the lack of leadership, and that no one was doing anything about the situation. So those were some of the things that went through my mind. Now I am going to address your question. Do you have a specific name that you want me to answer with my conversation in Parliament?

Q3: No, just any conversation made and what was the nature of the conversation?

A: Then there was this march-in. I was under no choice to march back into QEB. I still have two more years. When I left, I had five years active reserve. When they advertised I answered the call. When I came back to QEB, I was part of a Think Tank Group made up of colonels. We were trying to find out at that time our stance. The first meeting I attended, the Commander said we support the cause. I am a strategic thinker and operator too. When that comes across to me, I know what it means to me. We were going to develop strategies that would enable that. I heard also, I do not know whether it was the Commander or other members of Officers who said "accept the method." I did not say to anyone what I am telling you now, I know of no other method. So my job being with the colonels in that group, there were quite heated arguments over it and what we were to do.

My view was always and I stated in that meeting and it must be in the Minutes of that meeting. We need to speak to all the stakeholders. It is no point not talking to the soldiers; we are now trying to disown because of what they have done, they're part of the solution because they have been made out to be the problems. We have done this work many times overseas, we speak to everyone. And right here at home, we just seem to lose all those hard earned experience. Where did they go? Quite disappointing in a way too. There was clearly and this is my personal view, there was lack of leadership. We could not resolve
that, a group of armed people, who mainly our own guys. This was in the first week.

In the second week, when they started to allow in civilians, I knew clearly this was late. "This thing was going to be soon out of their hands. It happened. We were encouraged in that meeting to use all our contacts in Parliament to try and arrive at something because we were negotiating at that time. So, there was the negotiation team, there were people like me who knew those guys and to call them. I spoke with Gun and I spoke with Ligairi. Put it this way the first contact was made by Gun, he called me in camp. E ratou kerea de rawa ni qarauni na checkpoints baleta ni sa vakadredretaki tiko na nodra veilakoyaki. So, I took the opportunity to ask him, I said "Gun who is in charge there? " Tukuna ga vei au o koya ni tiko e kea o Na Qase, o Waqaniboro kei na so tale na cauravou e tukuni vei au na yacadra au sega ni kila, ia au rawa ni raica na matadra, au kila. Also Mua called me much later e na dua na gauma e a caka kina na veivana because we change tact at one stage.

I would like to have this on record very clearly the concept of the operation was "no confrontation" and the strategy they developed they tightened up the noose. That cannot be logical. The soldiers could not be blamed, they did what they have to do because they were told. I live about two clicks away from there. I used to visit the check point down the coast and the one in Muanikau. I never asked about the jokes and things that were going on, I just drank grog. It was clear in my mind that whatever the concept, what were the strategies, I did not think at the time that the soldiers understood them clearly.

Mr. President, those were the conscious that I had. It was to do mostly when they were requesting. At one time, I was promoted to go and negotiate on behalf of the Army. I had to go with the Commander and Jerry Waqanisau. One meeting and that was the last meeting I attended.

Negotiation is a reconciliation process. If you go in there to throw your weight or to tell people, it can never be. The situation was not a war, it was a political situation, and there were various incidences that happened. The first one was wrong, what George Speight and his people did. What we did, we have to answer, Headquarters, RMFM, whether it was right or wrong and the subsequent actions that followed were in my personal view not right.

During the negotiation, we wanted to introduce a legally tight position. Who was right and who was wrong when I thought a pragmatic approach would have resolved this matter into its second or third week. So, in the other negotiation, I did not wish to participate. Does that answer your question, Mr. President?
Sir, my question is directed to the Officer Corp that exist within RFMF. Sir, with your service with the RFMF, you had witnessed a relationship that existed amongst the ranks and what you have witnessed in the events of May 19th. Can you please comment on the differences that you have seen?

I think I have answered little bit but I will go ahead to answer your question. My personal view about the relationship in RFMF between officers since I left and came back in. When they dragged me out of QEB during my last day there, if someone was listening properly, I had said that when this day comes to an end, it will bring to an end my service in uniform to Fiji. I take my uniform service very seriously. I never came back to RFMF for any business or service until I walked back into camp for service after 19th May. I deliberately stayed away and I think it is the wrong place for me to elaborate in that direction but I will come back to the Officers Corp.

I think one cannot hide that the lack of leadership in RFMF has been for quite sometimes. That is my view at the top. I left as a Colonel general staff. I know training, I know operation. I had all the institutional training that an officer in the regular force to be a full colonel. Likewise, I think I had enough operations to have served RFMF in that capacity. I started to note that we were tilting at one stage, I gave my advice.

There was an intelligence report also and I got it. I was the first consumer of military intelligence as Colonel general staff. It was serious enough for me to go and see the Commander and talked to him about very important matters. I found out that nothing was being done about it and this have to start from him. I thought it was time to depart, I left but there were very professional officers in the next cadre and they are still there. But they are here and there.

RFMF is an institution, loyalty has to be one of the most important things, likewise morale but these things are earned. You cannot preach about it, you have to be there to do it. You must have a role model in the senior officers. When young officers come in, they know which way to go. It needs a leader. That is my answer.

Sir, my next question is, I am not questioning your integrity in anything. We have heard certain allegations to the fact that after the events of May 19th, there have been allegations directed that attempts were made by Col. Tikoca to take over the Engineers camp at Nabuni and yourself the QEB camp. Would you please comment on that?

I thought that would have been senseless if you were not part of the planning with those who planned this. We were no longer in uniform and you know the military, once you are out, you are out. It is the
people who command the people on the ground. I did not have any collaboration whatsoever with Tikoca and I doubt he any plans like that, he would have told me. The pleasure is not there, things have already been done, so no.

Q6:

A lot of allegations, left right and centre, Sir. We all know that the situation was very confusing. The Board is clearing the air on some of those matters and I think it is not only good for you but also for the institution that we actually proceed. We thank you for your contribution before I round it off, would you like to say anything else, Sir?

A:

May I put it to you do you have any more questions?

Q7:

Sir, just a question, I will take you back to what you said that the Commander said. You were for the course.

A:

We were for the course, RFMP.

Q8:

Could you please clarify to the Board, Sir, what this course was?

A:

This is a very good question because everyone said that. We were for the course not for the method. I heard it in the officers' meeting, I do not know whether any of you were there. My own thinking of it, not the Commander, I cannot speak for him when he said that. I will explain what I think. My interpretation of the course, the course is an indigenous course.

The Fijians aspirations, the blue print has the detail of this. People say that the Constitution is sufficient, it is enough to look after the indigenous interests, and it is all entrenched there. Fair enough, but you do not want it lying there, sleeping. They have to develop policies so that these things could be realized and that what needs to be done. They need to draw policies and that has to be done as strategic decisions, Prime Minister's decision and this Prime Minister is on the way to do it. That is my thinking.

Q9:

Was the course ever one where Fijians would come into confrontation with other indigenous Fijians?

A:

Because of the lack of leadership, I think and because there were a lot of people who were going around, people who were supposed to be leaders telling people that they had to do this but when these things happened they all disappeared. So, it was a confusion in the end and I
think the confusion create these things that Fijians were against Fijians.

[S.U. DRAUNIDALO]
Colonel

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member
Lt-Col. Tarakinikini, after having been duly sworn on the Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Lt. Col. Tarakinikini, the events of the coup of the 19th May which is the takeover of Parliament, were you aware of what took place on that day? Do you have any prior knowledge of what took place on the 19th?
A: No, I did not have any prior knowledge.

Q2: On the 19th, an offer was made for you to be the Chief of Staff and Col. Vatu to be the Commander, this was made by those in the Parliament Complex, can you confirm or deny that?
A: Yes, I confirm that that offer was made, a copy of that gazette was given to us in QEB that night.

Q3: Could you inform the Court who made the offer and whether the offer was accepted?
A: I presumed the offer was made by George Speight and his group because it came in the form of a gazette notice.

Q4: I understand this offer was accepted?
A: No, the offer was not accepted. Col. Tuatoko and Lt. Col. Raduva were with me that night so I told them, "No, this is illegal, this will not happen."

Q5: On the 19th of May, you had addressed the IMS at the complex, could you inform us of the nature of that address and what was said?
A: Okay, we were sitting in our office that night and there had been a number of telephone calls from Parliament especially from Ligairi trying to explain to us what was happening and that his sole concern was that we should not end up in a confrontation and then late at night at about 10 o'clock between 9 and 10 when he called up and he asked me if I could go and speak to the boys down at the IMS, I said, "What for?", he said "Well, their morale is very low" and he is worried that they might do something. I told Lt. Col. Raduva and Col. Tuatoko that I was going to go down just to find out what was happening down there because since the incident that morning, I did not actually go and visit or go and see the boys down in the complex, not that I needed to go, I had no official connection with them except that I was a former member of the Unit. Before I went down, Lt. Baleinamau came up and obviously Ligairi was in touch with him and then I went down with him and when I arrived, I saw that the door to the armoury was opened. The lock had been broken. When I arrived in the camp that afternoon, I had asked Lt. Col. Raduva and Col. Tuatoko about the security of the rest of the armoury and they said that it was okay and that I should not worry about it, everything was under lock and key.
and the key was with one of the officers. When I went down, I saw that the door was opened, the lock was actually broken. I looked inside and I saw that there were just a few weapons left from what I knew of their holding. Lt. Baleinamau said he will call all the boys into the room and then when they were seated, I went in and I basically told them that what has happened has happened, there is nothing much that can be done. I knew that there was the approval given that these boys should continue to take in rations into Parliament like Ligairi had requested to Headquarters and it was approved so I told them, "Whatever you do now, just continue to do it and we will sort this matter out once the whole crisis is over." That was basically the theme of my message to them that day, because I was conscious of the fact that a lot of those boys were recruited after 1987 and people seemed to think that the precedent was set in 1987. I knew that they did not really understand the political level of this crisis that they were merely obeying orders so in order to put their mind at rest, I said "Don't worry whatever you are told to do, just do it now as long as no one is hurt and once this crisis is over, we will sort out everything and tidy it all up." After that, I went back up and I reported that I was pretty disappointed that the armoury had been broken into.

Q6:

On entering the lecture room where you gave the discussion to the members, were there any boxes inside the lecture room or did you see any para bags in the lecture room?

A:

I cannot really describe in detail everything that was in that room. I went into that room focussing on the people, from what Ligairi had told me, my concern was something else might happened in the camp because the rest of their Unit was in Parliament, that was really what I was concerned with.

Q7:

Was there any indication given in that discussion that the Army was supporting the activities of those down at the Parliament Complex?

Was there any indication during your talk?

A:

The situation when I came into camp, I was told that Ligairi had been to the camp and had gone out again and then I got the impression that the boys from the 1MS were to continue to take in rations and come out again at that point in time. I guess the thing in the minds of all of us then that this thing was not going to take long, we were going to get it over and done with and no one saw that it was going to drag out that long. But whether the RFMF officially was condoning or supporting what was happening in Parliament, I think it will be unfair for me to say what my perception was, because there was nothing officially stated to me.

Q8:

No, when you gave the talk. Was there any indication that the Army was behind the activities down there given by you at that talk?

A:

No.
The nature of your discussions with Lt. Baleinamau, that numerous meetings in the office, can you tell us what was the nature of it? Basically, when this crisis started and I walked into camp that afternoon, from my knowledge of the situation like this and what I had been trying to teach here at the Officers School, my concern was the managing of the whole crisis and paramount in my mind was my concern that there was not to be any bloodshed, no confrontation between us and whoever is involved there, so there was no bloodshed. At the same time, I did not command any troops, I never commanded any troops since I came back from Lebanon and my biggest concern then was how we were going to negotiate the situation. I know that there is no training negotiator in Fiji, but from my knowledge and my training, I knew that I could do the job and when I first spoke to Ligairi, I could feel that his biggest concern was the fact that we might assault the police and if that was weighing heavily on his mind then it would lead to him maybe harming the hostages, maybe not him, but the people with him in Parliament. That was how I assessed the situation, so from that same afternoon when I went in, in the back of my mind, I had to establish a rapport because I knew that this thing had to be negotiated out and so that is how I looked at the whole thing. From when it started on the 19th of May, I could feel Ligairi trying to work at me, psychological thing, and I was trying to work at him. We both knew the game. There were people I was calling upon to try and work on Ligairi to give up and this included some talatalas, some Catholic priests which I send inside and Ligairi at the same time was trying to get me to do a coup inside, he was trying to encourage me. He said, "This system needs to be changed, these boys here, they are young boys for the future, I have worked with Rabuka in 1987 and when I talk to these people, there are no lies, they are very honest, very straight and you will really work well with these guys." But paramount in my mind, like I said, as a negotiator, I had to establish a rapport with them. I knew that he was using Baleinamau inside, if I let that out then my role as a negotiator was gone. When Baleinamau approached me and the line they were using was that they knew that my concern was for bloodshed. Baleinamau approached me a number of times that I should carry out a coup, if not Fijians were going to kill each other. I said, "Is there proof of that?" He said, "3FIR is planning an assault". I did not know what 3FIR was doing, at one point, I even went to the extent of asking the people at Nadi Airport to see if there were going to be any overseas troops coming in. There were some rumours one night that there were either Americans or Australians and my concern again based on 1987 was the Kiwis ended up in Norfolk Island and it was the aircraft failure that turned them around so my concern was because the 1MS squadron was inside there, that someone might asked the Australians to come in and assault and so I wanted to know if that was happening. The way the information was floating around campus there was mutual suspicion and the air was not conducive to a professional and effective military operation. While Baleinamau was approaching me, I went on along with that and
he thought that I was on their side so to speak but I knew that
everytime I went into Parliament if they knew that I was against them
then I was under threat. Everytime I went into Parliament I was under
threat, I could feel it. Even to one point, I went into Parliament I was
asked if I had thought of carrying out a coup inside. I said, "Well
carrying out a coup is no big deal but my problem is, I do not have
any troops under my command." I am just here trying to save lives
that we negotiate these things and we all work for the best interest of
this country and that was really the line I was taking throughout this
whole thing. In fact, twice I asked the Commander that I give up the
spokesman role because the two are contradictory and that is the
dilemma I was in. When I spoke out, I had to speak out against them.
I had to match George Speight because that is what we needed.
Someone had to match George Speight in the media to knock him
down as to show the public here and also the world that George
Speight was not smart as he thought he was. That role was quite
effective and also in my negotiating role, I was the only one from day
one who started the negotiations all the way to the end. People came
and went but I stayed on because I felt that if the negotiations broke
up or if it came to a stalemate and there was no way forward then
inevitably this thing would lead to uncontrollable bloodshed. While
Baleinamau was trying his best to work on me, I knew all along what
they were trying to do, they were really trying to undermine me and
when they knew that it was not going to work then they came out and
started accusing me of being with them. I knew all about it in order to
try and pull the rug under my feet. That was the way I saw the
situation.

Q10.
A:

Who nominated you as the RFMF negotiator?
As the RFMF negotiator, when it started off it was Lt. Col. Raduva,
myself and Col. Tuatoko. We went down to meet these people at the
Theological College, that was the first round of negotiations. After
that, I just stayed on and everytime people went to the negotiations
they took me along. When it ended up at the negotiating table, I
spoke my mind because from my experience in 1987, I could see
through these guys. I could see the lies they were spinning in the
name of the indigenous Fijian cause and especially George Speight
when he came on, I could see the line he was coming on, I had to
match him. That is how it happened. I asked the Commander that I
should give up the negotiation and either I become the negotiator and
not the spokesman or I become the spokesman and not the negotiator.
The Commander said, "Okay, you give up the negotiations", and that
same afternoon he called me up and said, "Come on, let us go and
meet these people", so it was. There was really nothing official but I
really was trying my best to plug the gaps. Even the spokesman role,
I really was not officially nominated to it because there was one day, I
could see the silence and the vacuum of information and of decision.
I assess the situation and then when one day FM96 called up and said,
"What is happening?" I said, "Well put it on, I will explain to the
nation what the hell is happening". That one was so effective that I again took on the role much like the negotiating role. I just came on the scene like I said, I knew our weakness, I knew I had taught it here and I did exercises here. I saw the gap from the legal side, the legal instruments that existed before the 1997 Constitution, I could see that even in that Decree, there was no legal arrangement there for us to be called out legally. Everything was based on a lot of loopholes. I had all that knowledge and that concern in the back of my mind and so I knew that if I did not step in that, the situation was going to deteriorate not by design but just by inactions so to speak.

Q11.

Did you at any time, prior to the events of the 19th of May were offered or asked by anyone to take over the military or to conduct a coup?

A.

No, never.

Q12.

Only after just ....

A.

It was only after that I knew they were expecting the Army to come through and the Army did not come through and then the whole thing fell through. Their tactics then was to try and put in the Trojan horse inside the RFMF to try and break us from within.

Q13.

There were some discussions made on the 22nd by Ravai when you had Ravai and Baleinamau, can you confirm this or deny it? When the positions were offered to you and Col. Vatu, you had indicated that Col. Vatu was shaking and was afraid to take over and you had given the directions to the CRW through Ravai to go out and continue to do what they were doing. You would provide the support from the 3FIR, one platoon and also from the Engineers, one platoon, can you confirm or deny this?

A.

Can you give me the question again?

Q14.

The question was on the 23rd you had a meeting with Baleinamau then followed by Ravai. Ravai had come out of the complex to come and meet you, after your discussions you had indicated that they wanted you and Col. Vatu to take over. Col. Vatu was shaking and he was frightened but you had reassured Ravai of the RFMF support and you would be responsible for sending one platoon down from 3FIR and one platoon from Engineers to go down and support those at Parliament. Can you confirm or deny this?

A.

I can confirm meeting Ravai. In fact, I went and got them from the Central Police Station that night and I debriefed them on the way up to camp, I debriefed Ravai because I wanted to know what was happening inside. The promising of platoons from 3FIR and the Engineers, no I do not have any command of any troops like I said.

Q15.

Sir, this goes back to the day, if you remember the day Private Waqavonovono was buried, the Board has heard evidence that a statement was made by the Commissioner of Police. He said to the
effect that your name had been brought up in meetings, that you were to orchestrate a coup, would you enlighten the Board about that? At the funeral when we were standing by the graveside, the Commissioner turned around to me and said, "You are being investigated for planning a coup," I said, "By whom?" he said, "By the Special Branch," so I said, "Oh good, it's good they are doing their investigations so the truth comes out." It was said in a joking manner. A few weeks later, Col. Tuatoko called me up, he had come back from a National Security Council meeting and he said that I had been a subject of that meeting, that I was actually planning a coup. I said, "That's not news to me, the Police Commissioner had already told me that and I hope the Special Branch can come up with some evidence." After the People's Coalition members were released from Parliament, they asked that I come and drink grog with them, Poseci Bune, Joeli Kalou, Lute Powell, Anup Kumar and a number of others. I went and drank grog with them. Poseci then related to me the story because I asked him, "You guys were suspecting me for planning a coup" and he said, "Yes", when the security situation started deteriorating, they nominated a Cabinet Sub-committee on Security headed by Poseci and in that particular meeting, they asked the Director Special Branch, "Is there going to be a coup?" He said, "Yes". They asked, "Who is going to carry it out?" He said, "Tarakinikini". I asked Poseci, "Okay, what evidence did the Special Branch give you to prove that?", I think Anup Kumar spoke up and said, "The information that went to Special Branch was actually from military intelligence". That was the thing that shocked me. The information he said came from the military intelligence. What disappointed me was that if the military intelligence was actually giving out this information then why have they not spoken to me?

Like I said, I was not in command of any troops, I was CSO Logistics doing my best to restructure the budget of the RFMF and I managed to do that, increase our budget by $6 million and at the same time to try and re-equip the 3FIR and the 1MS. I later heard that after the coup, people thought, "this is why he was trying to do all these", but that is all the information I found on that particular accusation.

Sir, if you go back to the 29th of May when the delegation from RFMF went to Parliament and presented a sevusevu, would you enlighten us as to that presentation and what was said and what was the nature?

On the 29th, this was when we took over, we discussed at the Commander's Office, the Colonels and a couple of Generals who were sitting in there, we had agreed that one delegation was to go down to the President and asked him to step down. Before the news got out, another group, Col. Tuatoko, Lt. Col. Raduva and myself, I do not know whether it was Caucau also, we went down to inform them traditionally. It was part of the negotiating thing to inform them traditionally and to say, "We have now taken over, give it up", that
was the whole thing. George Speight turned around and said, "No, we are not giving it up." It was decided at that meeting in the Commander's Office.

Sir, there has been mentions in the Board that words to the like were mentioned that "the RFMF was to continue what George Speight and his group had started"; was that true?

Like I said, this was really trying to unhinge them, trying to say, "Give it up, release the hostages and all, don't worry about the future of the indigenous Fijians and all", that is the nature of that approach, to try and approach them traditionally and to say, "Okay, the Army has stepped in now reluctantly because of the situation, so release the hostages and we will take care of the situation so to speak." Like I said, George Speight responded and told us to go off and he is not giving it up.

Sir, were you aware of weapons being taken into Parliament after the first group had gone in on May 19th?

No.

Specifically, authorisation has been given from Headquarters Land Force.

No, I am not aware of it. When I arrived into camp that day, I think it was closer to 3 o'clock because I was sitting my exam at USP that day, at about 12 o'clock we were told to drop our pen and give in whatever we were doing. Then I rushed off to pick up my daughter and with all the traffic jam, I eventually got home after 2 o'clock. I think I got into camp at about 3 o'clock or after 3 o'clock and Col. Tuatoko and Lt. Col. Raduvu was in there and I asked them, "What is happening?" and so they briefed me, and then after I knew that the 1MS squadron was in there I said, "Okay, what else is happening down here, are they all there?" They said, "No, it is only Ligairi and a few of them, the rest of the boys are not all with them." I said, "How about the weapons?" They said, "The weapons are all locked". I said, "Are you sure?" They said, "Yes, and the key is with one of the officers, Shayne Stevens." I said, "Okay, fair enough", so we just sat there and started our own brain-storming and the analysis of the situation, it was not until I went down and spoke with them then I saw the armoury was secure but broken into.

Sir, my next question is just to clarify a conversation that transpired between you and Capt. Stevens, this is the night after the UNIFIL draft arrived from Lebanon. We have heard evidence that you contacted Stevens and he was basically reprimanded for speaking with the IMS and telling them to stay away from Parliament. He said you had reprimanded him, could you please enlighten us as to what conversation transpired?

A: That I reprimanded him for ....
Q21:

For telling the IMS personnel to stay away from the Parliament Complex. The guys that were returning from the lift, pulling them aside and talking to them.

Okay, I got it. Throughout this crisis, I had a big concern that the Army itself was going to be split. I could see like there were groups working, not singing from the same song-sheets so to speak. Shayne was off doing things, I thought Commander Land Force was the one in charge of all the troops. When I saw these things happening, my concern was that there were so many weapons floating around and emotions were high, these guys were organising special groups without our knowledge. That is what I spoke to Shayne about, but reprimanding him for keeping the guys out of Parliament, no. My main concern was, I saw the situation and I was worried that someone was going to do something stupid. There were so many people trying to be cowboys so to speak. In fact, I had particularly advised against moving the check-points and that led to the shooting. When the shooting happened that day when Rokoura, the other boy from Bua got shot and the journalist, I really blew my top in the conference that day. The emotions were still high and we had to bring it down to a point we would then segregate the people and eventually isolate the centre of gravity so to speak, but unfortunately I seemed to be at least, in my assessment, the only one thinking like that. Lt. Col. Raduva and Col. Tuatoko said the same thing too. There was no point in trying to confront because Ligairi was assuring us that the hostages were not going to be harmed and we took his word for that. We were trying our best to calm emotions on our side. That seemed to have been the pattern, the way the crisis was going on. We sat there long hours into the night worrying with the way things were going, with the way some orders were being given directly down to the tactical units and the Commander Land Force was being cut out. That in our understanding of the military command was certainly not conducive to military effectiveness.

Q22:

Sir, my next question, I would like your opinion on this, what we have heard on the Board is that after the events of May 19th in the morning, a few days after that, there seemed to have been a lack of clear directive, leadership, command and control of the whole situation. Can you please enlighten the Board on this?

We get into the heart of the matter right now. I can state in my own assessment, we were caught with our pants down in this crisis and we were lucky we got out the way we did. That is all I can say really because we were trying our best to reorganise the force along a proper command structure. We had worked here in the Officers School on the Defence White Paper, there were a lot of arguments here and eventually we got to the Commander then, Ratu Epeli Ganilau. He totally agreed with what we did and I went off to Lebanon and I was told that it was going to be done. When I came back after 1998, nothing was done so I went and pleaded with Ratu Epeli to at least get to the Minister. We got to Col. Manuelli two weeks before the
elections and he approved what we had suggested in principle. That is what he said. I thought that that was the green light. We were really to go forward but much to my great disappointment, people tried to dilute it, people did not really understand it, people shoved it down for the wrong reasons and all. We ended up with a half-cocked solution which people thought would work and that was what was happening. One month we had the Strategic Headquarters on the old building, the other month they were down to where they are now. My biggest concern really, sitting and watching all these, there was no real interest of professionalism in the organisation. There was none of that, there was more the personal agendas. When this thing happened, all these things came to the surface. Like I said, we were lucky we got out the way we did because in my opinion, this is my own personal opinion, it is just that, and people will challenge it. I think what is needed now is a self-less effort to take ourselves back to professional standards and we have really got to be honest with ourselves. The standards had been diluted and right now we are operating more like a gang rather than a military force, that is the sad fact. If people are saying that there was an absence of command in that few days, the Commander was certainly away. There was an acting Commander and from what I saw of him, close up, he was trying to do his best under the circumstances, but you cannot cross the start line and hope things will work if you have not been investing in your organisation, well before that. That is what happened, when the start line was crossed then everyone expected this A one organisation to be there. It was not there from the start.

Q23:

My next question is directed to the IMS as a Unit. The question has been the security of weapons and the deployment of forces and also determined by the use of personnel in a situation such as May 19th. As a former member of the Unit, Sir, what would you recommend basically as to improving security of weapons and how could we avoid it, if any of the similar events?

A:

In the Defence White Paper, the counter-terrorist role should go to the Police that is what it says, when the Police are ready, that role should go to them. From my experience now, in 1987 I was very naive but I learned a lot then and now in hindsight, I am learning even more from the experience back in 1987 and when that Unit was started. I look back at it now, and it was basically a private Army that was being raised in our midst right under our nose. We did not recognise it for what it was. After 12 months in the Unit, I was offered to go to Afghanistan and I jumped at it. That was our first observer mission and I went. When I came back, someone told me, "You know you were actually taken out of that Unit" and I said, "No, I do not believe that" and now it is only in hindsight that I look back and I see there is some truth in that because after the appointment of the new Commander, I approached Naivalu when he was appointed Deputy and I said, "That Unit can only be commanded by you or me right now, so now that you are there, I think I should be given command of
that Unit in addition to what I am doing now so that I can at least control it". Eventually, the word came back to me and it says "No, that arrangement remains". My heartache is how come with such a Unit directly under operation command of Strategic Headquarters as it should be was commanded by a Lieutenant of that calibre. The failure for us really is the fact that under our very nose, our weapons and our men were taken out under someone else's orders. Prior to this coup when Col. Tuatoko told me that I was the subject of the National Security Council meeting, he also told me that people outside were asking for me to go out and head the security operation for the ACP meeting. I told Col. Tuatoko, "I would be most willing to do that, you get the clearance from the Commander". He came back to me and said, "No, the Commander said you should stay". I believe that is why Ligairi was eventually recruited back to come and train our guys for that. I said, "We are here, we can do the job, we should be doing the job, why are we relying on this guy?" But nothing came of it. Those are the things when I look back at it, it is all water under the bridge, but I hope that we can learn from it and go forward because as far as I am concerned, we must look at functions. We are saying Meridian Squadron, counter-terrorism and strategic reconnaissance, we give the counter-terrorism to the Police when they are ready. When you look at strategic reconnaissance in our environment here in Fiji, that strategic reconnaissance if it is needed, can be done by a properly trained reconnaissance company. In that reorganisation that I had proposed, we had proposed that all our battalions, 3FIR and the 3 TF battalions that are to be raised must have support companies with a reconnaissance troop each so then you end up with three reconnaissance troops from each of the battalion and you have a reconnaissance platoon. If they are properly trained, then they should be much better, even much better than the standard that the Meridian squadron is at right now. There is a lot of height being said about the standards in the Meridian squadron, I know it, most of it is just in the figment of imaginations of people. The idea, if the selection is to be based along what the SAS had done, the SAS is picking soldiers at the age of about 26, young soldiers who have gone in at the age of 17, 18 so they have done about 7 years or 8 years of hard soldiering and then they come in. But with us, when we were recruiting initially in 1987, we were taking boys who had no experience at all so it ended up when I was in Lebanon, I was pretty disappointed with the standard of the Meridian squadron boys that were in my Unit. I was very disappointed. I have had numerous discussions on that with Shayne Stevens when he was there, he was my adjutant but right now, I feel the way forward for us is to eventually switch the role that we are giving this Unit to a properly trained reconnaissance troops in the support company of 3FIR and the three TF battalions. We will have enough people in there to do the reconnaissance job for us in our environment. I mean deep reconnaissance, how deep can you go in our country? We have the maritime patrols going out and then we have Viti Levu the biggest island, 100 miles across, you do not need
that much. If you have a properly trained support company, you get
the job done there.

Q24: Sir, my final question, are you aware of any serving officer or any
rank or any reserve officer that has been implicated or was involved in
the planning or subsequently the taking of Parliament on May 19th?
No, I would not know.

Q25

A. Sir, taking you back prior to May 19th, now you mention to the Board
that we were sort of caught with our pants down but was not
Headquarters RFMF or Headquarters Land Force or Strategic
Headquarters, were they not getting any intelligence briefs as to the
likelihood of what happened on the 19th of May?
I know for sure that planning had been done, the Commander Land
Force had started these study sessions again where we were studying
the military appreciation process and I believe as the security situation
began to deteriorate, the focus shifted on to planning contingencies to
try and counter any civil disturbances. But at that point in time, I
believe they were being informed. I sat on one conference where we
were briefed by the intelligence section, to me it was a very good brief
but rather higher pointing and made us a bit uncomfortable. I think if
we had gone with what they were saying, closer to 19th May, I think
there was a couple of sessions down here with that group, I was not
part of that group because two weeks before the 19th of May, I asked
for leave, so I took two weeks leave in order to study for my MBA
exams, those were the very first two Units that I was doing so I was
studying in those two weeks. I was not really in on all the briefings
that were happening but from the briefing that I had witnessed well
before the 19th of May, the Int boys were doing a good job. They
were telling us things that I think some of us did not want to hear, but
they turned out right really.

Q26: From what the intelligence people were informing you, Sir, was there
any preparation done by the RFMF as a whole?
No, I do not think that we were prepared enough because I had stated
immediately after the elections, that we were lucky we were not called
out because if we were called out, our bluff would really have been
seen there. I say that because we do not have enough radios to get a
rifle company fully communicating on deployment and that is why I
worked so hard to restructure the budget. I had this big argument with
Susana who was our staff officer Finance and the Ministry of Finance
and I told Susana that she did not know what the hell she was doing
and one day she cried. I think people did not like me because I had
made this woman cry but I said, "You know we are trying to do a job
here, put your emotions aside, we are trying to do a job". I called the
Ministry of Finance up at one of our budget meetings, and I said, "We
must have this restructured" and I remembered they said, "No, you
cannot have this" and I said, "Why?", they said, "The programmer
who did that programme has left us" and I blistered them. I think
there was a Indian lady and a Fijian lady there. The Fijian lady is a desk officer at the Ministry of Finance, I told her, "You are telling us now that just because the bloody programmer has left this country that we cannot do any changes" and I think I reduced her to tears at that meeting. I eventually went down to the Ministry of Finance and I convinced Sila Kotorbalavu, Sila was supporting me because when I was doing the reorganisation down here at the Officers School in 1997, I was in touch with Sila and I was telling him all the problems about RFMF's overspending and that we will sort it out once we are reorganised. Everything will be transparent and when this reorganisation did not take place inside here, I said, "Okay, I will try and get some progress wherever I can" that is why I worked on that budget. The budget was not my function but I took it, because I knew I was going to do something at least for the organisation. When we got those 10 activities as our budget is structured now, the Force Training group has its own separate budget, 3FIR has its own separate one, and 1MS, then the budget became transparent. I went to the Ministry of Finance and told them, "You see this separate Units have these different sets of functions and we need to invest in capital equipment" and that is why after a very long time we got money for our capital buying for buying radios at least, buying sniper weapons for the Meridian squadron because the sniper rifles we have had been spoiled by the Gurkhas and vehicles. It frustrates me that these things are there, these are the things that our organisation needs, but we are not putting the effort into it and that is why we were not structured.

Q27: Let us go back, Sir, to your opening remarks when you mentioned that there was no legal procedure in place for the legal call out of the RFMF. Can you elaborate on that please?

A: This was before the 1997 Constitution came out. The last Grade II course we did here was in 1996 because the one in 1997, we were not allowed to do it. That is when I asked Headquarters RFMF if we could do a proposal for reorganising the force because the Chief of Staff then Brigadier Konrote said that we cannot do the Grade II because these people are too shallow. I said, "That is the very reason we should go and train them to do their job". He said, "No, no". Eventually the Commander agreed with him and then I went and pleaded with them because we were not doing the Grade II course instead of closing the school down that we work on the reorganisation. We worked on it from June until October and November because I left in December to command the battalion in Lebanon. I could not go with the lift, I had to leave late and my predecessor in Lebanon had to be held back because we were waiting so I can present the thing to the Minister, but it did not happen, so I took off to Lebanon with the promise given to me that it would be done in my absence. But when the 1997 Constitution came in, that Internal Security Decree was done away with so I believe with the new Constitution, there was the framework in place. I have not studied it and the kind of detail that we did here because we did the terrorist exercise for over three days,
the panel included all the experts and that is how we came up with those things. There were a number of things and one of the things was that. Another recommendation in that was that RFMF senior officers did not know if it came to it, they did not know the mechanism of handling a terrorist incident in our own country in peace time and that needed training.

Q28: Sir, how did you know that the George Speight Group rejected the 10-point resolutions that was suggested by the Great Council of Chiefs?
A: I think they stated it at the Great Council of Chiefs meeting.

Q29: Because we have had people giving evidence to this Board which contradicts what the Army says, people from George Speight's group said that they have actually accepted the GCC's 10-point resolutions. That is the line they took after the whole thing. That is the tactics they were playing with us right throughout the negotiations. They said, "If you did not come in, we had actually agreed", but the truth of the matter is, I actually went in with the Great Council of Chiefs group after the GCC meeting, a sub-committee headed by Ratu Epeli Kanaimawi was told to go and tell George Speight and his group that this was the resolution and there was no doubt in the Great Council of Chiefs that these people were actually going to accept it. That was the first time I went into Parliament. I went with this group, in fact I was told to go by the Commander and take a truck and some boys to actually go and bring the weapons in. When we arrived, we did the presentation, I could see George Speight sitting with Ratu Jope, the Vice-President now, Mr. Silatolu sitting with Adi Litia. They went and sat down and the sevusevu was done, this was the Great Council of Chiefs sub-committee, I went in with them to collect the weapons because we were all optimistic that the weapons were going to be handed in. After they read the resolutions, they started saying and George Speight was the one saying, "No way, we are not accepting this". When they were saying that they were actually going to accept it, no that is not true, it is all in hindsight. They changed a lot of things, that is what I found negotiating with them. I have never seen people who can lie in your face, it is unbelievable.

Q30: Maybe this is a question that I should ask the Commander himself, but what made the Commander abrogate the Constitution?
A: I think it was the fact that you could not have a military government if that Constitution was still in place so if we took over, we are basically kicking out that Constitution by that very act. In hindsight we should have had better legal advice at that point in time. People told us afterwards "You could have taken over without the Constitution being abrogated", but I think it goes back to the 19th of May when we were waiting to be officially called out, nothing ever came. I told Col. Iutoko and Lt. Col. Kaduva until we receive a legal order, Suva can be guttered, we can rebuild Suva tomorrow, the State is still here unfortunately when you really look at it in the cold light of day but we
cannot go out because if we go out now, we are doing something illegal. The first request that came was the 200 unarmed reserves to go and beef up the manpower in the Police. I think it was the fact that there was this confusion but I think the bottom line is that maybe we could have had better legal advice from what I saw because I was discussing in the Commander’s Office when we decided that for the sake of the country, we had to take it over because the threat was very real. With the way the situation was going, they had killed the policeman and the mob enthusiasm that was prevailing around Parliament, we had no hesitation that if they had gone in and caught the President in the Government House, I think we would be talking about a different country now. It is easy to say in hindsight especially for them, I saw how they changed throughout the negotiations. They bloody lied to their teeth and framed people left, right and centre.

Sir, in relation to pay and ration of people that were in Parliament, now we have had people in front of the Board who said that while they were in Parliament, they still retain their pay, the RRFMF was still paying them, the RRFMF supplied rations to them and some were even given leave applications to sign while they were in Parliament, would you enlighten the Board of your knowledge of this or why these instructions came about?

No, I cannot enlighten the Board. I knew these things were happening I think it was part of the tactics that was being used even when they were told, the officers, their commission was going to be withdrawn and if they did not come out, to me, I personally feel and again this is my own personal opinion the tactics we should have been using was the military tactics. They are there, they are not working for us, they are on AWOL, cut all their pay and then we tightened the grip around them.

It was eventually my idea to put that military zone down because I was asked by John Baledrokadroka to come and help the Reserve Force so I went down and explained to them (Baledrokadroka and Commander Land Force), we sat down one night, “Okay, these are the steps we are going to take if eventually we are going to assault Parliament”, and I gave them the guidelines for the selection of the people to come into the Unit, how they were going to be trained, the kind of weapons that were needed and the stages to be followed and the military zone to be declared, the areas to be evacuated because of the weapons range and then once the danger area is all sterile, we could then move in any time at a time that we chose so I had actually explained that to John Baledrokadroka and Commander Land Force.

Eventually we worked on the plan, they had a plan where mortars and all were going to be used. This is how we were going to do it, take it in from Draiba Fijian School gate, bang the gate down and put in three assault teams and cut off where the hostages were held by fire from on
top of the truck with machine guns and I believe if we had done that, we would have succeeded.

The reason why I asked about this pay, ration and leave, Sir, because it has been interpreted by the soldiers that were inside the Parliament as a sign of support from the RFMF. Well I do not blame the soldiers for thinking like that but I was not the one making the decision so to speak, like I said, in most cases I sat off to the side and tried to be useful as the spokesman and negotiator.

Q33
A: We have nothing further for you, do you wish to say anything else?
No.

[F. TARAKINIKINI]
Lieutenant Colonel

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
NINETY-THIRD WITNESS

STATEMENT BY 22553 LT-COL MELI SAUBULINAYAU

Col Saubulinaayau, after having been duly sworn on Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Prior to the events of the 19\textsuperscript{th}, the HQ RFMF had been doing briefs of
events that would take place or the possibility of a coup taking place; were
you present in one of those briefs given by the Ints Staff?
A: I think I may have been in one of the briefs with Col Tuatoko.

Q2: What was your appointment then, Sir?
A: I was the CSO TRADOC, and I still am.

Q3: From what you saw, were there any preparations or measures taken by the
RFMF to put in place counter measures or anything at all?
A: We had started looking at scenarios and the Operation cell were tasked to
draw up plans, in any event, if something happens. There were no planning
dates for any of these events, they were just planning in general, if
something happens, then the reaction of the army.

Q4: When were you posted down as SO2 Ops?
A: I was not actually posted down. I actually took myself down there because
there was no one down there looking after Operations. I remember when
Col Baleoloko left, there was no one posted to act in his position
when he went to Sinai, so on my own initiative, I took myself down there
because John had actually came and told me just to keep an eye on his
officers down at the Operations, so every afternoon, I would normally walk
down to the Operation Branch and we were working on these plans and
reviewing certain scenarios.

Q5: When did you actually go down and took over?
A: On the 19\textsuperscript{th}, after our meeting with Col Tuatoko, Col Tarakini was told
to be down there, so as to oversee the Operation but he said that he
needs to go and pick up his wife, that was during the arson phase, so he
went to pick up his wife up from Telecom, I went down to the Operation Cell
and sat there and I have been sitting there ever since.

Q6: So on the 20\textsuperscript{th} of May (the day after), there was a whole batch of weapons
that were taken out from the vehicles and unloaded. Could you give us a
recollection of your knowledge on that and the weapons being taken out
and the approval?
A: I do not really know when the weapon was taken out but the LSU had
informed us that something was happening down at the IMS but we had
been instructed to leave them alone but I did not know that the weapons
were being loaded. The second time they had something behind the fence,
then 3FIR came around and cordoned the place; that was after the second
event.
The first incident you are referring to is on Friday or Saturday?
A: I think this was the Friday night.

That is the first incident?
A: Yes.

You are not aware of that?
A: No, the first incident I am talking about is that of Friday night. We were informed by LSU and then we were told not to do anything.

Who told you not to do anything?
A: This is from Land Force Command.

Do you have any recollection of the time?
A: I know it is in the evening, so I do not really know the exact time.

Before midnight or after midnight?
A: Well before.

On Saturday, the second batch of weapons were taken out; were you aware of that loading?
A: It was after 3FIR came and cordoned that place then I knew that something was happening down there, and they had established their checkpoints.

The assurance on Friday night when weapons were being taken out the indication that Land Force said to leave them alone; how did that information or directive come about?
A: It came about because of the initial directive that we were given; that there be no confrontation and that is why we were doing what we were doing at the initial stage - not to confront those people in Parliament, no bloodshed and we were not aware which side of the fence that those guys inside the Complex were in; whether they were on our side or on the other side.

At 1400 hrs, roughly after lunch on Saturday when the second batch of weapons were being taken out, did you actually witness from the verandah of Operations Unit the loading or had any glimpse of what was going down from there?
A: No.

Also on Saturday, when the weapons were being taken out, approval also was given by Land Force Commander?
A: That I do not know.

Throughout the whole event, we heard that the pay of some of the personnel involved were never stopped, the rations were still being issued; fuel were still being resupplied; those in the Complex coming in and getting resupplied from the Camp. If the Operation was aware of this, why was this not stopped, if not, who had given the directive not to stop and if there were any reasons behind that?
The ration and the fuel resupply came from the very initial first-day briefing that we had and we were told that these things should be allowed to carry on. This was the instruction of the Land Force Commander to carry on because of the policy that we had set ourselves; no confrontation, no bloodshed.

Q18: This is from the briefing on the 19th?
A: Yes, the morning of the 19th.

Q19: The morning of the 19th when the Unit commanders were having a briefing with Land Force Commander?
A: Yes, and from then onwards, it persisted for a few weeks or months.

Q20: If we could go back to the morning of the 19th, during that conference?
A: Which conference?

Q21: During the commanders conference?
A: We did not actually have a conference as such.

Q22: When you had a meeting on the 19th?
A: We had a meeting on the 19th, the reason why we had that meeting was because of the coup. The coup had already taken place and we had taken ourselves to the Land Force Commander to go and tell him so we just sat down and yawned and that was when Major Ligairi and Baleinamau came in.

Q23: So you were at the meeting when Major Ligairi came in?
A: Yes.

Q24: He had given indication in that meeting for no confrontation, no bloodshed. He had requested in that meeting that RFMF take no action or "do not confront"?
A: He had wanted sort of an assurance from us but I do not think it was given to him on that day. All that the Land Force Commander told us that he was going down to the President to inform him of what has happened and that some of our boys were involved and the stand of the RFMF.

Q25: That indication by Major Ligairi, was it seen as giving just a statement or a threat? In what perspective did you see it given in?
A: When he came over, he wanted to inform the RFMF of what had happened and he was looking for support from the RFMF. He had probably thought that whenever they do something, RFMF will automatically come behind them.

Q26: At no time during that meeting was there an indication by Ligairi that that was a threat, no confrontation?
A: No, not at all.
Q27: We have heard that after the events of May 19th, there were numerous messages sent to our fax machine in the Ops Cell mainly directing threats to personnel within RFMF; would you confirm this?
A: Yes.

Q28: Would you by any chance have any copies of those threats?
A: No, the procedure during those early days whenever anything was faxed from Parliament, it was for the operator not even to log, he was to pass that information directly to me, and I will tear it up. I did not even send that message up to Commander or Land Force Commander, probably when they realised that, they started using other fax machines within the RFMF, so every message that was coming to us from that fax machine, directly to me, I would take a look at it and just tore it up then into the rubbish tin.

Q29: Is there any reason behind it?
A: The whole reason is that, I know it was a propaganda machine that they were using. I did not want the soldiers to be reading all of this, so that was a way of stopping it and also not to allow the Land Force Commander or even the Commander to be intimidated by those messages and that was the reason. I told them and the Commander understood.

Q30: Were any traces made to the source of those threats?
A: I know it was coming from Parliament, that was known as a fact because I had worked around trying to find out where it was coming from, and it was coming from Parliament. The fax number is clearly stated on top.

Q31: It has been reported that during these events, numerous conversations were taking place between you and Lt Dakai in the Parliament Complex?
A: No. For me to call Dakai directly - no or for Dakai calling me directly - no. He normally wants to talk to someone else but in the process I picked up the phone and that was the only time we spoke. He tried and tried to avoid talking to me because he was part of my Operation Cell Planning Team so at no time did he call me directly or I call him directly.

Q32: On those threats or propaganda messages that were coming, if any cases to proceed after this, if by any chance later when you go back today you manage to find any copies, it is very important that we have them, if there is any. We need some evidence, without that, there is no evidence and if you have any knowledge of any of those threats, we would like that today, or tomorrow if possible but we will proceed with it.
A: On a number of occasions, there are two or three officers who normally call me up; one is Bukarau. On two or three occasions he had asked me to do a counter-coup and also Ligairi, that was on the 4th of July during the incident at Grammar. They had actually called me directly to do a counter-coup and I sort of encouraged them saying, "Yes, okay" and they asked me to call all the colonels and have a meeting. I said, "Okay, I will do that."

Q33: Was the RFMF prepared for the incidents that happened on the 19th of May and continued on until whenever it was resolved?
A: No.

Q34: Why do you believe this was not so, Sir?
A: There were a lot of indications; one, the Commander had left before that event. He had gone overseas and then the Chief Operation Officer had been tasked to go to Sinai to conduct the handing over and there was no training as such conducted within the RFMF even though they were conducting preliminary plans for any counter operations but there was no seriousness in preparing to do anything further than just planning.

Q35: Why was this, Sir?
A: I think part of the problem is that, unless the police handover power to us, we cannot react. We found that on the 19th, we could not react unless the police ask and they only asked (if I am sure) about 3 o'clock in the afternoon for us to be deployed into town and we could not move because of lack of transportation and we did not move until 6 o'clock because the bus companies were trying to transport students back home first before the buses were available for transporting the troops because there was no transportation.

Q36: To your knowledge, has the RFMF put in place measures to ensure that what happened on May 19th will not happen again?
A: We are putting in the process now measures to prevent that happening again. That is part of the planning that is going on now. The Force structure to be such that the event of May 19th is not to reoccur.

Q37: We have heard evidence in this Board by soldiers who were actually inside the Parliamentary Complex who continued to receive their pay, continued to receive rations from HQ RFMF and to them it was an indication that the RFMF was actually supporting what they were doing but apparently the view from the HQ RFMF is on the contrary, it was not. Would you like to comment on that, Sir?
A: I think the message that was passed to the soldiers in Parliament was incorrect because we told Lifagiri on that particular day that we were not in support of what he was doing and that message did not go down to the soldiers and even though Baleinamau was out there, he was sort of a liaison officer between the RFMF and those people. He comes in to our conferences in the morning and goes out delivering rations in the late afternoon or late morning to Parliament, and I think there was a wrong message being sent by these people trying to encourage the soldiers to maintain their status quo so that they will remain in Parliament. As for us from the very beginning we had indicated that we are not in support.

Q38: So if HQ RFMF or officers in the RFMF were not in support then why continue to pay the soldiers who were inside the Parliament Complex?
A: That is a directive that was given to us for the soldiers pay to be normal, provide them with rations and fuel because of the no confrontation policy that we had at the very beginning. Because what we were told was, the soldiers are there to protect the hostages then about the middle of the crisis
(after the 6th to the 8th week) then we found out that this guy cannot come out freely. When we want them to come out, they cannot come out and that is when we decided, "Okay, this is the time to cut their pay out".

Q39: We have heard evidence that when the pay was cut, only some of the soldiers that were there had their pay cut while the others had their pay continued right from day 1 until they marched back into RFMF; do you know why the differences?

A: For that, no, I do not really know. As from the Operation side, I just look after the movement of the soldiers and not the pay. All I was told when I attended the conference on that morning was that all pay were to be ceased.

Q40: This is directed towards the IFMS - how they operate and security of the weapons. The events of May 19th has raised questions as to the security of weapons in the Unit and the easy deployment and the use of the personnel from that Unit into activities and events such as May 19th. Would you comment to the Board as to how we could put in place measures to stop this from happening in the future?

A: I think a lot of us had known the problem with the IFMS a long time ago and we could not do anything about it. Even straight after the 1987 coup, we knew that majority of the people within IFMS were all Vanua Levu guys and their loyalty as such is to Ligairi and not to anyone else and anyone who comes in and does not like Ligairi, that officer is put aside so we were treating this guy Ligairi as if he is the only one who can prepare such a course even though we had our other young officers who have gone to America to be trained and had the skills to lead the Unit. They were not encouraged to be in the Unit. They were rather put on the side and I think that is a big mistake trying to portray that this particular course is something, that no one else can enter apart from a special group but when you are on a competition with them, say a shooting competition, they are not all that good. If you notice, Sir, the shooting teams that went to Australia, there were only two of them and they were at the very bottom of the list.

Q41: My next question is mainly directed towards after the events of May 19th, we have seen this souring relationship between the army and the general population, mainly the indigenous people. As an operational operator, what do you suggest the army should do to basically man these differences and what changes should we basically bring about?

A: There are certain things that we can do in the military; one is to stop beating all these civilians because we are not trained to interrogate them and that is what we are trying to pretend to be, and the only method that they are using is force, to try and get information out of these guys. There are other ways of getting information from these people. I think it is not the fault of the soldiers who are doing this. I tend to blame commanders and encouraging words given to these people. I think the task given to these people is to find all the weapons, the 30 or 40 missing weapons to be brought back into RFMF, and that is what they go for, whether they kill this
guy or what, it does not matter, and that is one - to stop brutality on the civilian.

The other one is to be seen to do what we are doing. Our mission at the very beginning was to protect the civilian population and the properties and it seems that we were going against what we are set out to do in that instance.

The other thing we could have done was to set up the things that the Fijian population had wanted instead of coming for about five minutes then running away and hide again, giving it to someone and then pretending that we are the ones actually running the Government but we are not. If we had run the Government for some time, and do what the Fijian population were crying out for then probably, they would have listened so what they had actually blamed us from the beginning from the 19th onwards was that you had done the coup in 1987, you have promised a lot, but nothing happened then now you wanted to takeover from George Speight again, they are not going to do the same thing and probably what had happened now is a living proof of what they are saying and that is why they are really not believing what we are telling them.

Q42:

Lastly, this question is directed to the relationship amongst officers in the RFMF. I think it is quite evident after and before the events leading up to the days before May 19th that there was a vast difference and a souring relationship amongst officers, it could be seen in their performance within camp?

A: Members of the Board know very well the relationship within the camp. We did not really like the Commander because he was from the navy, that is a simple fact. The majority of the green uniform guys did not like him, even the soldiers did not like him because he was the guy from the navy and we did not like that. I thought the event of May 19th brought us together, especially the senior officers but with suspicion for who was there and who was here and a lot of other things. I think after the event cooled down this thing will resurface and I think it is starting to come up again now so we are to be very careful on that one - the differences. It is just because of the simple reason, the uniform. If he had been in the army, people would have accepted it. A lot of people are whitewashing that now but we have to be very careful, I think it is starting to surface again, it is very prominent in the Melanesian group of people, I think from my experience in Bougainville. Whenever someone comes up to the top and be recognised, people started dragging him down, finding faults. We are very quick to criticise rather than support, and I think that is something we need to work on. It is not our fault, it is the fault of the system appointing him. He is there and we should work together and support him for the benefit of the organisation or the institution.

Q43:

This is more directed towards May 19th. Have you heard of any officer that may have been implicated or may have had a role towards the events of May 19th, either reserve or regular officer?
Not really, because there are few things that happened on May 19th, there was no requirement for me to actually explain to you because on the 18th, we were sitting in the Operation Room and we were working on this plan and I asked the Int guys, (there were two Int officers working with us at that time; Daki and Narawa), "What are the dates we are looking at?" And then Gun came quickly and said, "19th and then the 1st", that is when the ACP/EU to start meeting in Suva. From there I stopped the planning process and I started tasking the officers. Capt Wainibuli was to go to GCCC, just to go, sit and take a look. Late in the afternoon, I called Senior Superintendent Jahir Khan and asked him for permission for one of our officer to be at GOCC just to have a look if there is something wrong then liaises with us. Gun and his team were to be down with the protest march. There was to be another officer to be at Home Affairs and when the event took place on the 19th, myself and the Chief of Staff went up and saw the Land Force Commander and we were talking about the events and then the Land Force Commander asked, "Where's Steven?" so I called 1FMS to find out where Stevens was. They told me that he was in Nadi conducting their training but he was actually here in Suva conducting their training in Nukulau and then they asked, "Where's Na Qase?" so I was in the process of calling when these two came in - Baleinamau and Major Ligairi, so we quickly went into their conference room and sat down then Ligairi said "Now that things have happened, what are we going to do?" because the Counter Revolution Warfare Unit was supposed to counter any events in Fiji or any terrorist act so he said, "The boys are down there" and then we started to look at each other and wonder what had happened, so I asked him, "What is it for? You've done it once, what is it for now?" and I was very bold about it even though I saw in the other officers they were not in support but they did not express their feeling because CO3, soon after I had expressed that started shaking his head. Then the Chief of Staff said, "No, no, vamalua, vamalua." I said, "No, we are not trying to fight him or assaulting him on this. I just needed to clear the air. What was the whole purpose of them taking part?" then the Land Force Commander came in and explained what we were going to do. He was going down to the President and explained to him what had happened.

While that was taking place, my phone rang and I needed to go and take the telephone call downstairs (my office is downstairs), so I called the number, it was Col Draunidalo. He asked me, "Did you tell you anything?" I said, "No, what is it about?" Then he told me that he had informed Col Tarakinikini on Thursday night - the previous night. I did not know what it was about. Then after a little while I came up again, I did not tell anyone that he wanted me again. He wanted me to call him again, it was an urgent message for me to go and call him again. He told me of the things that were happening and then he was coming up with Tikoca, so I came by car to Col Tuatoko, I asked him, "Should we allow these two to come in?", Col Tuatoko said, "No" so I called the front gate and told them to lock the gate, I did not know whether they came up or not, that I do not know.
Q44: Was there any sinister implication in Col Draunidalo and Col Tikoca coming up to the camp?
A: This is just my thinking; I think the purpose probably was to come and takeover, just my analysing what we were trying to do from the information that he had passed the previous night, to let us know what is going to happen and for these two to come up and actually possibly takeover knowing their popularity or popularity when he was in camp, not realising that as soon as he walked out of the gate, people changed their minds.

Q45: One of the incidents that have been talked about a lot is the attempt on His Excellency. They said, shots were fired and then they had to evacuate. Could you enlighten us as to those things please?
A: That was on the 28th, Sunday night. We had received information that there will be two groups coming from Parliament; one going towards the TV Station and the other group was to takeover Government House so we had reinforced Government House during the day time by putting extra men at Government House, so when the crowd came down and went and destroyed the TV Station and when they were coming back started firing into the air and shouting, one of the security guards, Korovou called me up, and said 'His Excellency is worried and he is asking where are the soldiers, and I explained to Korovou to explain to His President not to worry. If he needs more soldiers we will send him more soldiers to try and protect him, so we did that. We sent a couple more soldiers down to Government House and I had instructed Korovou to tell the guards, "If anyone touches the fence, chop him down" to be exact, I actually told the guards, "If anyone touches the fence, drop him" so on Monday morning it was about 8.00 when one of the security guards came back and asked me for more weapons. We had discussed if His Excellency wanted to use the naval boat, he can use it so I actually told this guy, "Go and tell the Marama, if they want to leave, the naval ship is ready" not realising that he actually went and told the Lady, and the Lady told His Excellency and they quickly left. I did not know until the Navy called me up and said, "His Excellency is down at Walu Bay", so that is the story about that particular event, so when they left, I think it was on Monday, Joe Brown came back and asked me to call His Excellency for the ship captain to bring the boat back because His Excellency wanted to come ashore again, so we checked around and Commander Semi called the ship captain. The ship captain said, "No, His Excellency wants to know whether he is under arrest or can he leave for Lakeba?" Then I said, "Tell His Excellency he can go anywhere he wants with that naval patrol boat" and His Excellency indicated that he wanted to go to Lakeba so we said, "Okay, carry on" and the purpose of the boat being there is if anyone wants to come and do something in Lakeba. that was for additional protection.

Q46: One point for clarification; throughout the whole operation, from your perspective as the CSO Ops or acting in that capacity if it is not officially, we know all things in an Operation situation is controlled by Operations. Throughout the whole Operation, was it controlled by Operations?
A: In a way, yes, mainly controlled by Operation just on controlling the Units but not actually controlling the soldiers on the ground.

Q47: Did you at any time have any difficulty with others not in the Operations, controlling the Operations or has an impact that was detrimental to the Operations?

A: I had, on a few occasions, interference from Lt Colonels trying to dictate what should be done, who should not be arrested, who should be released, etc. mostly on the release.

We had people at the Police Station who call up for a particular guy or the vehicle to be released as soon as they were arrested, yes.

Q48: Lt Cols and above?
A: Yes, I do not think people below me could not interfere with what I am doing. It is only those my level and up because at the very initial stage, there were a lot of suspicion, a lot of it because one good example is that when Commander came in he did not use the Queens Highway. We had to take him around because of the suspicion that there was a party already to ambush him on the road.

[M. SAUBULINAYAU]
Lieutenant-Colonel

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major

[T. GUCAKE]
Major

Member

[H. MACOMBER]
WARRANT OFFICER CLASS ONE
Member

CONFIDENTIAL
NINETY-FOURTH WITNESS

STATEMENT BY 24497 LT COL ETUENI OIOLELE CAUCAU

Lt. Col. Caucau, after having been duly sworn on the Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Lt. Col. Caucau, prior to the crisis taking place, you were the Director of Army Legal Services (DALS) for the RFMF.
A: That is true.

Q2: Did you have any prior knowledge of the events that took place on the 19th of May?
A: Which event are we talking about?

Q3: The 19th of May, the events of the takeover at the Parliament Complex?
A: No.

Q4: On the takeover of the Parliament Complex by those in custody and others that are still at large, can you give to the Board the reasons for your going down to the Parliament Complex?
A: My first visit to the Parliament Complex was on Sunday, 21st I presume. The second visit was on Friday 26th, May I think and then again on Sunday, 28th, after that it would have been on Monday 29th at 2200 hours and Tuesday and some other times after that I cannot recall. Of course, in early July, the last round of talks were the negotiations in regards to the Muaniaku Accord.

On the first Sunday, the reasons I went in was to try and inform the 1MS guys of their service conditions there and then.

Q5: Were you tasked by anyone to do this?
A: I took the initiative on my own after consultation with the command element at that time because what I was worried about, we were not sure yet. At that point in time, everything was still a bit blurred as to what really was going on, my biggest concern was that natural justice was to prevail in as far as my perception that they were still soldiers misguided or soldiers who have gone astray. My second visit was with the Great Council of Chiefs when they took over their 10-point resolutions. The third visit was on Sunday, that was after the shooting incident on Saturday that resulted in the unlawful wounding of two of our members of the RFMF, Lt. Rokours and Private Drugu. The purpose of my visit there was to inform Whitting in regards to the rules of engagement, to impress upon him the need for them not to use human shields because we were of the opinion that the guys in Parliament who were actually running the show, so to speak, were not aware of what was happening by the mob and the rules of engagement and part of the negotiations team.
Q6: Afterwards?
A: Yes, afterwards commencing on the 31st, the first round of talks at Veitutu, PTC, which commenced at about 1600 hours.

Q7: Lt Col Caucau, the leave applications were taken by you?
A: No, they were not taken by me.

Q8: Never into the complex?
A: No, I took over the suggestion, I did not take any leave application forms.

Q9: But the suggestion was made by you, can you give us the nature of that suggestion?
A: What I had suggested was for them to fill in leave applications to cover them, what I was worried about is because of the severance of the pay that usually comes in that are usually conducted unilaterally for them to sign their leave application and take leave not that I was condoning what they were doing but from an administrative viewpoint because they had arms, the hostages were there, they were a bit pressed for their pay.

Q10: Lt Col Caucau, your capacity as the DALS and the bearer of the law and order banner within the RFMF upholding within the system, is that not seen as condoning the actions, any actions as such, any actions that are illegal cannot be condoned and is this not taking that leave application or taking that suggestion an action of condoning what had taken place that are unauthorised activity or illegal takeover from your perspective as the bearer of law and order and the flag carrier in the RFMF, is that not contradicting the office that you hold?
A: In the wisdom of hindsight, it may be perceived that way, but the circumstances prevailing there at that point in time with the safety of the hostages as our paramount concern and the need to refrain from any direct confrontation, the decision for them to sign leave applications, it was not approved, it was only signed. It was one of the options that we implored into and the Headquarters element were also informed of the actions prior to it being carried out. It was a very uneven playing field.

Q11: Lt Col Caucau, we had one presentation in the Board, you had a client to solicit the relationship or confidentiality of the information that a weapon in confidence was given to you under that umbrella was actually revealed and as a result, one of the soldiers is being charged. That weapon is used as evidence against that particular soldier, can you just comment on that?
A: Can you please repeat the question?

Q12: The question is, legal client-lawyer privilege information, the information was given to a member of the IMS under that umbrella that if we would return weapons, nothing would be said that is in
confidence, and when the weapon was returned, the weapon in question is a pistol that was used and was publicised and was reported to have on record, it was received with the name of the person that gave it in, it is a breach of that confidentiality, the trust that was given, could you comment on that?

By all means. The weapon in question was offered voluntarily without any undertaking whatsoever given and when the weapon was handed over to me, it was never brought to the knowledge of the Police, it was never brought to the notice of the Police that a weapon has been recovered from a particular soldier. I think you will understand the charge that arose, I was surprised when that soldier was charged with treason on the very same day that he returned his weapon because I had assured him that no charges will be brought against him in regards to the unlawful possession of arms. No charges have been brought against him in that respect. He has been charged with, I believe, treason. I do not have any evidence that I can prove that he committed the act of treason, and that was the result of Police investigations that were continuing well before he handed over the pistol to me. The reason he handed the pistol over to me was that he said he felt uneasy holding on to it. He had attempted to return it when they left Parliament and he was instructed not to return it so what he is saying that he buried it in Parliament, came out of the complex, then later on he went and recovered and then dumped it in one of his personal arms cache. All the time he was trying to return it to lawful authority. That morning when I came to speak to some members of the IMS who were in custody impressing upon them the need to have the weapons recovered, on my way out of the cell, he followed me voluntarily and indicated that he wanted to see me personally and after granting audience with him, he informed me of the pistol and I asked him whether he wanted to return it, he said, "Yes". Before we went, I informed the Commander Land Force that a weapon is to be recovered that same day and I gave the undertaking that no charges will be brought against him with regards to the weapon. I was indeed surprised to hear that he was charged with treason on that very same day.

In regards to solicitor/client privileges, I do not think that I have breached it in any way. These weapons I agree have been used to confirm a different matter in court but it has not been produced as an exhibit or as evidence in any court of law.

Q13:

Sir, can you go back to the morning of 19th May, I believe you were present in the march and you observed the march, you did an assessment on it, can you just give us an assessment and what you observed that morning?

A:

During that period, I was at the USP, attending the Professional Diploma in Legal Practice Course, our mid term break was to commence on that Friday 19th, we did not have any classes on that day, that day was earmarked for people who had assignments to catch
up with. The march was scheduled for that day, I personally wanted to go and confirm the number of people who were on the march. The personal reason for me was because the previous march that was held, there were conflicting reports in regards to the numbers, the Police said they were about 4,000 and the then Assistant Minister for Home Affairs put out a figure of about 1,000, I wanted to go in and confirm the actual number. There were rumours going around that there was going to be a disturbance, but we have been assured that it was going to be a peaceful march so I went down and decided to check out the exact number. I went and started counting, when it came up to 5,000 I started to feel uneasy, not accounting for the people who were going on the pavements and the people going in the beginning of the march. When the march passed me, I asked one policeman and he said the march would only end at the Albert Park. After that, word came around that they were going to give a petition to the President so I followed the march at the back. We went right up to GPH, when the news came back that Parliament has been taken, it did not make any sense to me. This guy I know his face, he came and was spreading the message that Parliament has been taken, it did not make sense to me. He was saying on the PA system "Ena gauna qo esa vesu tu na Palimedi", so I checked my mobile, I tried to call Ops to confirm, to verify the allegation, it was off, the network was just all jammed. I began to feel more uneasy then, I knew because it was very unusual, one cannot make any call out and cannot receive either. I had parked my car in Albert Park, on my way to my car, I met Dakai who had a mobile phone also. I asked him if I could use his mobile phone and he said it was not responding so I offered him a lift and I told him that I was coming up to QEB. We went together and decided to check Parliament just to confirm. This was after 10 o'clock, we came through Domain Rd to go up Draiba Fijian School way, the mob overtook us there, they went up. We went through Richards Rd, Duncan Rd, Service St and down Ratu Sukuna Rd, when we came down there we heard some shots at the junction. It was all blocked so we came up straight to camp. We came to camp at 11 o'clock. On my way up to the Commander's conference room, Ligairi was on his way out, by then it was mid morning.

Q14: When you passed Major Ligairi, was there someone else with him?
A: Yes, actually Commander Land Force came out with him. I cannot remember whether they boarded the same vehicle or not because Ligairi's car was parked on that site for another three or five days, his personal vehicle. At that point in time, I did not know who the perpetrators of the coup were. If I may just take you back one week earlier, the room next door, we were having Commander's brief, one of the options was the counter-coup and the IMS was supposed to carry out the counter-coup so when I saw him, I thought that that was part of the plan. He had come over to Headquarters to brief us or to be briefed in regards to the need for a counter-coup.
Q15: If I can take you to 19th May and the events afterwards, were you called by any army officers whether serving or who have left basically to influence or incite other army officers to resign and join the so-called course at the Parliament Complex?
A: Yes.

Q16: Can you elaborate on that please?
A: I had a call from Tevita Bukaru, while they were still in Parliament and during the course of our conversation he said words to the effect "Turaga Nite, I think the best option for you senior officers now is for a senior officers' mass resignation", he kept on pressing upon me the need for Commander to go. I did not want to dwell on the reasons behind this. He said, "Dont worry we will reinstate you guys" I just laughed it off. That was the only time I received it.

Q17: In this period of time, who was the main person giving legal advice to the Commander?
A: There was also Alipate Qetaki because all the time I would like to give an advice to the Commander, I was always informed by the Commander to double-check with Alipate Qetaki. He would say, "Has Qetaki vetted that?" because by then he was appointed into the Military Council. We tried to ask Commander who was the principal legal adviser and he said that I remain his military legal adviser, on legal matters pertaining to the State Qetaki was the main legal adviser.

Q18: Coming to the time when we abrogated the Constitution, and the appointment of Commander as the head of State on whose advice was the Constitution abrogated?
A: It was a collective decision, it was not a single advice. That was on the 29th of May when the situation prevailing at that time, we found that there was no other better option if we want to prevent the society from total destruction so to speak, the Constitution had to be abrogated.

Q19: The other concern is during the period, the 1MS personnel were in the Parliament Complex, they continue to receive their pay and at certain period of time their pay was terminated and then reactivated. Was at any time the advice of your office sought as to the legalities concerning the cessation of pay and the reactivation?
A: No, it was not until about two or three weeks ago that I had to inform the Commander that he had no authority to terminate any pay, that we did not have the legal provisions.

Q20: The period the 1MS personnel were in the Parliament Complex, were any of the personnel put on absent without leave or desertion at the status, never being classed as different than normal service?
A: No, the understanding was that their pays were not to be severed and they were to remain paid solely because they had undertaken to be responsible for the safety of the hostages. It was apparent that the
mob was getting out of hand, they were being held responsible for the safety of the hostages. The perception was that if their pay were severed then the lives of the hostages would be at risk.

Q21: The answer you have given is that the responsibility given to those service personnel in the complex, to provide security for the hostages. There are three issues here, one they went and took over Parliament, and then were given the responsibility of providing security and subsequently three of those personnel who had performed that duty had been charged with treason. How do you reconcile with the immediate answer you had given earlier?

A: Firstly, when it was bestowed upon them the duty to be responsible for the welfare of the hostages I am pretty sure it was not a collective decision, somehow we were just told that they were looking after the welfare and assuring the safety of the hostages. In regards to the taking over, it was slowly dripping in that they were not all involved in the takeover of Parliament, the initial takeover on the 19th of May. In regards to the treasonable offences, that is for the Police to decide because they are the ones who had collated information.

Q22: This concept is a military concept of safety security and the usage of IMS personnel. When we look at the Police Force, they are looking at the criminal element only and they are not considering these side issues which are attached to it. How would you make suggestion that we can basically bring the military concept and merge it with the Police investigation and the way they look at the criminal act in totality.

A: An act if it is criminal, it is criminal, any breach of the code of the military law that is why that double jeopardy is viewed differently in the service and in public.

Q23: I agree with you, Sir. This will lead to my next question. Is it not our gesture of allowing them to be paid, we have also heard of them being provided with rations, even hot boxes, is that not an indication of assurance and support from RFMF towards their presence there?

A: We have to explore into the reasons why they were being provided with meals, and the reasons why their pays were not severed. I think I have already stated that the decision was not an easy one to make, the decision for us to continue feeding them after the 19th, because at that point in time, with the little information that we have like the RFMF was of the opinion that if we did not feed them, then with the arms they have and with the hostages lives at risk, they can just go and obtain food from anywhere they want, the same with the pay.

Q24: Sir, on the evening of May 19th or 20th, were you aware of any arms being taken out of the IMS complex to Parliament?

A: On the afternoon of May 20th, I did not physically see any arms being taken out of the IMS complex. The report that I received was that some military equipment, some boxes were being taken out from the
IMS complex through Sukanaivalu Rd. I did not see it, but that was the information I received.

Q25: Were you aware of any officers other than the reserve, territorial or regular force, officers or other ranks who may have been implicated or played an active part either in the pre or post planning of the May 19th event?

A: I think it was in April that rumours were going around that some people were going to make a coup. There was going to be a coup in the military and that the Commander was going to be overthrown. I went and informed PSO about it that there were moves to takeover or remove the Commander. I was at USP then, so the least that I can do without creating any unnecessary suspense is to inform the PSO to beef up his security and surprisingly it was a month later that the coup happened. That source was a very reliable source and I am willing to inform who the source was.

Q26: Could you?

A: Yes, but you have to pay me. I can inform the source, but I will have to inform you off the record. I am willing to tell you who the source was, who told me that there was going to be a coup.

Q27: Would you be able to say on record who were the persons implicated in the overthrow of the Commander?

A: I did not know who were implicated, who were going to overthrow the Commander but all that I can say is that the news came from within camp that there is a plot to overthrow the Commander and the source was a very reliable source. I am willing to reveal the source, but I am afraid you guys will fall out of your chair.

Q28: If you feel at liberty to tell us now you can, if not we just proceed with the questions. You do not want to indicate it now?

A: No.

Q29: Lt. Col. Caucau, my first question is with regards to your conversation or the advice that you gave Dr. Senilagakali in regards to personnel covered by the medical scheme. We have had evidence submitted to this Board that you advice him that people who were actually in Parliament while conducting an illegal activity should not be covered by the medical scheme, is that so?

A: Wrong.

Q30: Could you elaborate on what transpired between you and Dr. Senilagakali about the medical scheme?

A: He came over to seek legal advice in regards to a member of IMS who was injured in Parliament. My advice to him did not differ from what was contained in the Army Medical Scheme Constitution which stated that members of the army medical scheme injured in pursuance of an illegal activity are not covered by the scheme.
Q31: Therefore on the 19th of May, you knew exactly that what was done in Parliament was illegal?
A: No.

Q32: On the 19th of May when the members of the IMS took over Parliament, you knew that that act was an illegal act. The whole world knew, you do not need to be a lawyer to know.
A: 

Q33: On the same token, having known that it was an illegal act yet you advised them to sign leave applications?
A: Yes.

Q34: Is that a sign of what has already been mentioned by members of the Board, is that a sign of condoning an illegal action?
A: Mr. President, I think I have already addressed this issue but if it will help you in your next question, the circumstances prevailing at that point in time, there are times when the truth is very ugly. The circumstances prevailing at that point in time, the unlevel playing field that we were playing in and the safety of the hostages being our paramount concern and without trying to breach the natural rights of the soldiers who at that point in time, we were seeing them as being misled trying to guide them back. That was one of the decisions we had to make to cover them.

Q35: In terms of what you said, you saw that they were being misled, were they being misled into participating in an illegal act?
A: That is what we were suspecting that somehow they were being misled into conducting what they did.

Q36: With that perception that you had, them being misled, how long did that continue for?
A: Until just recently when we came to know who were the real perpetrators because most of them I think you would have heard thought it was an exercise, going in thinking that it was an exercise. Some of them that I have spoken with have stated that when they went in, they thought it was an exercise not knowing that they were into the real thing.

Q37: So Sunday the 21st of May, you mentioned already that you went into the Parliament Complex again and you stated that you went to advise on the rules of engagement.
A: Yes.

Q38: What rules of engagement are we talking about here, Sir?
A: Firstly, to inform Ligairi that the concern that was raised by the Commander at QEB that civilians were being used as human shields and to impress upon them the fact that in that instant, none of the civilians were injured that our troops exercised a great deal of restraint
and self-control in order not to shoot because they have been given
strict orders not to shoot indiscriminately and the rules of engagement
at that point in time was the gradual use of force, the concept of the
gradual use of force. But unfortunately I could not meet with Ligairi.

Q39:
You mean to say there were actually rules of engagement drawn up by
both sides and these are the rules of engagement that both sides should
play to?
A:
I cannot comment on that because I would not know the rules of
engagement they were using on the other side.

Q40:
But what rules of engagement were you trying to impose on them?
Our rules of engagement, the gradual use of force.

Q41:
So you mention that people actually went down there to act as
security, to protect the hostages from whom?
A:
From people all over Fiji.

Q42:
I am talking about the 1MS, Sir. In your conversation with Dr.
Senilagakali regarding the medical scheme, it was mentioned to this
Board that he queried their pay.
A:
Pay?

Q43:
Yes. People were participating in illegal activities therefore they
should not be covered by the medical scheme yet the RFMF was still
paying them and the answer or the advice was given by the army legal
services was that they were being paid because they were providing
security for the hostages, is that true, Sir?
A:
I cannot recall the circumstances from which that conversation came
out because it could have been cited out of context but there was a
point in time that their pay was not severed. It was incumbent upon
them, the safety of the hostages like they were guaranteeing the safety
of the hostages, that man Ligairi.

Q44:
Guaranteeing the safety of the hostages in what way?
A:
That no harm will come to them, people were looking forward to
having them as barbecue.

Q45:
Was that the whole reason of the Parliament Complex being taken for
those people to be taken as hostages so that no harm should come to
them?
A:
I would not know what the real reason is.

Q46:
Sir, how would you know the difference between who was providing
security and who was threatening the hostages?
A:
The information that came to us, that arms were filtering out of
Parliament and that the civilians were in possession of arms and there
was a likelihood that the civilians who are in possession of arms
would not have the professionalism and the restraint so to speak,
would not be able to be in a better position to assess when not to use the weapons.

Q47: Sir, just a question which was raised earlier on the medical scheme, the fact is that we have deprived members of 1MS who got injured in Parliament and we have classed it as an injury arising out of an illegal act. But on the same token, we have continued to pay them and they have continued to be contributing members of the medical scheme, how do we reconcile this fact?

A: Whether or not they are contributing members of the medical scheme, that is beyond me. They are being paid and if they are contributing members, they would have been entitled, but the fact that that injury was in pursuance of an unlawful activity, that would have disqualified them.

Q48: Sir, this goes to the unaccountability of arms from the Parliament Complex. As I had mentioned earlier, this Board has been advised that there were five rifles and a pistol in the possession of the 1MS, are you aware of that? This Board has been advised on the recovery of the arms and ammunitions from the Parliament Complex, there were certain arms which were not accounted for. Yesterday we were told that there was five colts and a high powered pistol in the possession of the 1MS, were you made aware of this that they had possession of this weapon and it was not outstanding.

A: You mean they have been returned? Were they lost or what?

Q49: Yes, if you look at your list, there are the outstanding rifles we have put out, there are some for colts.

A: SMG 9mm colts.

Q50: Yes, there are five outstanding. Those are with the 1MS, they are not outstanding.

A: When this list was made, were they outstanding?

Q51: When was your list made, Sir?

A: This list was compiled around the period immediately after 13th of July.

Q52: Then I believe your list is correct because that was recovered after that 13th July, but have you been updated as to those recoveries?

A: I have not yet.

Q53: Similarly to the one high powered pistol, 9mm.

A: The only one that I retrieved from that client was ....

Q54: No, excluding that.

A: Do you know the serial number?

Q55: Yes, pistol 9mm high powered 315308, that is still outstanding.
A: Still outstanding here.

Q56: In our list, it has been said that it has been recovered. Can we have a copy of one of that?
A: Yes, I would like to give it to you. This copy is out of date.

Q57: We will put that down as Exhibit H, it also indicates the day that it was done.

Tendered and marked as Exhibit H.

Sir, my question is on Friday 26th you accompanied the GCC sub-committee to present a 10 point resolution to George Speight's group, was this 10 point resolution accepted by George Speight's group?
A: No.

Q58: How was this put across to you?
A: I was there.

Q59: What happened, did they verbally say no or wrote it on the board?
A: After all the traditional niceties has been completed and then one gentleman, Ratu Epeli Kanaimawi (he is from Taveuni), read the 10 point resolution to George Speight's group after he read it, then George Speight's group requested if they could be given some time to talk it through so they put their heads together in one corner and they discussed it, after a while they came back and said, "I am sorry we cannot give a decision immediately, these are very important matters that affect the cause that we are pursuing". Afterwards, they came out openly in the media and said that they have accepted it but they have not accepted it in its totality and a few days later it was thrown out.

Q60: Do you think that the actions taken by the RFMF on the 19th of May, actions such as continuous of pay, supply of rations, people giving them leave applications to sign, is this not a gesture that would have been interpreted by the soldiers as the RFMF condoning the actions that they had undertaken on the 19th of May?
A: I am sorry I cannot answer it for them.

Q61: I am saying, what is your view on that?
A: You might want to ask them that. Like I have earlier explained, the decision was made at that material point in time after considering the circumstances prevailing and with the paramount interest was the safety of the hostages and also to prevent an all out, a non-
confrontation stance, to prevent a situation where there would have been a full ethnic confrontation.

Q62

What is the relationship now within the RFMF or what is your personal view in the relationship now within the RFMF between officers and soldiers, the general relationship in terms of trust?

A:

In certain quarters, it has really been strengthened because we have been working together. Well for us we have been here all the time, people have gone all over the world and they have been watching television. For us who at times have been working 24 hours we have got to know each other, even these beautiful ladies we came to know them now better.

Q63:

Sir, as a former member of 1MS, I would raise this question mainly towards security of weapons, how they were utilised in the May 19th events, in your opinion, what could we do to better the security and moreso avoid the usage of such highly trained personnel to situations such as this?

A:

I think there are two limbs to your question. Firstly is the security and secondly the employment of trained personnel. I think it would have been a policy decision because I think the learned President of the Board would be in a better position to comment in regards to special forces being a special forces person himself. I am of the opinion that it would help if the service is limited, I would say 3 years in 1MS.

The first year you go in, you do your selection, your cycle and specialist training. The second year you go operational and then on the third year, you give back to the squadron what you have learned in those last two years. After the third year, you get posted to another Unit so that you do not lose your ceremonial duties. I think that would be a way of controlling the troops there. When we started in 1987, some guys are still there now. For them, the life is just within that complex. If you send them home, they would rather sleep with you than to go home.

In regards to security, you need a better camp and you have to relocate.

Q64:

Thank you very much, before we round off, do you wish to say anything further?

A:

Firstly, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the learned President and members of the Board for giving me the opportunity to come and at least give some evidence in your inquiry. I hope I have managed to throw some light on to some of the dark areas.
It was a awkward situation, firstly for me being a former founding member of the CRW and then holding the appointment of Chief Staff Officer Legal, I had to make some awkward decisions, the decisions were really awkward to me. You would know that if you were in that kind of Unit. You can get the person out of the Unit, but it is very hard to get the Unit out of the person so you will always have a soft place in your heart for them and also the indigenous cause but I think there are some much bigger fishes to fry than the guys in Nukelau. Thank you very much.

[Signature]

[E. Q. CAUCAU]
Lieutenant-Colonel

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
NINETY-FOURTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY MRS SEREI SENILOLI

Mrs. Serei Seniloli, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Mrs. Seniloli, what is your line of work?
A: I work as an Assistant Hansard Reporter.

Q2: On the 19th of May when Parliament was taken over you were the Hansard Reporter on duty? Is that correct?
A: That is right, Sir.

Q3: Can you relate to us the exact time when the soldiers walked in and their actions?
A: Sir, if I remember correctly it was about 10.45 a.m. That was according to my watch.

Q4: The event that unfolded when they walked in, can you relate that to the Board?
A: I remember I was writing on that particular day, Dr. Tupeni Baba was giving his address and I heard the loud thud on the floor. When I looked up, I saw a few armed soldiers, so I just put my pen down and there I was. I could remember seeing two people firing two warning shots, he tried the third one but could not. I believe there were soldiers surrounding the place.

Q5: Who was the first person to enter?
A: That is hard for me to answer because I was writing with my head down, I could hear the thud on the floor and I looked up, the place was surrounded.

Q6: Did you recognise anyone there?
A: The only person I recognised was George Speight.

Q7: You have indicated that only one person was firing the shots, who was this person?
A: I came to know later as Commander Bill because I saw him again in the newspaper and the TV.

Q8: Do you have an indication of how many personnel were inside?
A: I cannot be exact but there were about six people.

Q9: George would be the sixth one?
A: Presumably, yes.
Q10: Mrs. Seniloli, in your evidence, you use the words "a few armed soldiers". What gave you the impression that these personnel were soldiers?
A: The way they acted, professional.

Q11: You also said you identified a person as George Speight? Did you know him prior to that day?
A: Well, he appeared once before the Public Accounts Committee that was how I got to know him, not personally.

Q12: After the takeover, were you ushered out of the complex?
A: Are you referring to the day that we were released?

Q13: When were you released?
A: We were released on Sunday morning.

Q14: Was George Speight armed when he entered the Parliament chambers?
A: I am not sure.

Q15: Mrs. Seniloli, you were released on Sunday and then you went home?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q16: Do you wish to add anything further?
A: No, Sir.

Q17: Throughout that whole duration, from Friday to Sunday, you were all kept in the chambers?
A: No, Sir, not all. Are you referring to the Parliamentarians too?

Q18: Yes.
A: No, Sir.

Q19: When was the separation?
A: The separation took place on Friday, I am not too sure about the time.

Q20: Was it in the afternoon or midday?
A: Midday, Sir.

Q21: The Fijians remained in the Parliament chambers?
A: Fijians and part.
Q22: The Indians were taken down where?
A: To another building.

Q23: Do you wish to say anything further?
A: No, Sir.

[S. Seniloli (Mrs)]
Civilian

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
Mr Nalau after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1:  Luke, nomu cakacaka tiko i Palimedi, na cava o qarava tiko i kea?
A:  Au caretaker tiko ena loma ni Palimedi.

Q2:  Ena gauna e a caka kina na vuaviri, tauri vakaukauwa na complex, nai tavi cava o qarava i loma oya?
A:  Ena siga oya, au kau tape mai cake meu kauta sobu vei iratou na goneyalewa i ra. Okoya na gonetagane e dodonu me cakacaka tiko i kea, e sega ni mai cakacaka ena siga oya, au sa mani lai kacivi mai kina i tuba. Au dau sasamaki tu ga i tuba ena gauna ni bose tawoko, ia na siga oya au lai kacivi mai meu mai sosomitaka na gonetagane e sega ni mai cakacaka ena siga oya.

Q3:  Ena gauna e a curu yani kina i loma na lorry, o ira na curu yani i loma mera lai tauri ira vakaukauwa na tiko i loma ni chambers, o iko a raica ena gauna e a curu yani kina loma na lorry?
A:  E sega.

Q4:  Ena gauna o a tiko kina i loma oya, esa caka oti na vuaviri, nai tavi cava tale o qarava i loma ya?
A:  Esa qai tukuni vei au meu lose yaqona tu ga vei iratou na nodatou mai taukei eratou vesu tiko ena loma ni vale ni bose.

Q5:  Ni sa oti ya?
A:  Ena gauna eratou sa moce kina, au sa qai lako i tuba.

Q6:  Nai tavi cava o qai qarava?
A:  Au sa mani lako mai tuba ya, au vakadodonu sara i vale ni kuro, esa tukuni mai vei keitou ni sa sega tale na curu i tuba, esa sogo na matamata.

Q7:  Esa qai nomui tavi i loma ya, na veivuke ena vakaasaqa?
A:  Io.

Q8:  E kau tiko mai vei na kakana?
A:  Na kakana keitou vakasaqara tiko mai vei ira ga na veisiko.
Q9: Na vakasaqa dou cakavava tiko i loma ya, me kana ocei? Ocei me vakani?
A: Na ka ga e lai tukuni yani vei keitou i vale ni kuro, keitou vakani iratou na nodatou na vesu tiko kei iratou na CRW. Okoya saka ga ya keitou vakani ira tiko ena veisiga.

Q10: O rawa ni vakamacalataka na gauna ni kana?
A: Era dau gunu ti ena 11 na kaloko, era dau qai vakayakavi sara ena 7 na kaloko.

Q11: E bau dua na gauna e leqa na kakana i loma ya?
A: Sega.

Q12: E lako tu ga, era kana vakavina tiko?
A: Io, era kana vakavina.

Q13: Ena gauna cava o qai biubiu mai kina i Palimedi?
A: Ena gauna saraga era sa lako kina oira ena siga Vukelulu, keitou sa qai curu mai tuba me keitou sasamaki mai vale ni kuro.

Q14: I Luke, o cei e nonai tavi tiko me kauta mai na tapes mai na chambers vei iratou na goneyalewa i na Hansard?
A: E dua na gotegotani ni Kadavu, na yacana tiko o Kachi, e gotegotani lalai.

Q15: Ena siga ya e sega ni lai cakacaka yani o koya ni tauvimate, se cava?
A: E lako ena nona veilevai.

Q16: Luke, ena gauna e dau kau kina na benu, ocei e dau lai kauta tiko na benu i vale ni kuro, me kau tani i tuba?
A: Na benu ni vale ni kuro ena gauna esa tukuni kina vei keitou me keitou kakua ni lako i tuba, na benu kevaka o ni na lako i vale ni kuro ena gauna oqo, na baba sobu va qo i ra, keitou sa lai biuta tu ga kina.

Q17: Kenai balebale ya ni tekivu mai na 19 ni siga me yacova na gauna era lako tani mai kina i Palimedi, na benu e biu kece tu ga i ra ya?
A: Io.

Q18: E sega ni dua na lorry e lako yani me lai kauta mai e dua na benu?
A: E sega.
Q19:

Luke, vinaka vakalevu na nomu soli tukutuku, esa levu nai tukutuku e taura na Board of Inquiry go, au vakavinavinaka ena nomu solia nomuni gauna mo ni mai soli tukutuku ike. E dua tale na ka o ni via tukuna?
E sega

[Signature]
[L. NALAU]
Parliament Carataker

[Signature]
[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[Signature]
[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[Signature]
[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[Signature]
[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
NINETY-SIXTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY MS AGNES GIBSON

Ms Agnes Gibson, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Agnes, the Board understands that you were on duty as a Hansard Reporter on the date the Parliament was taken over on the 19th of May. What time did this occur, were you aware of the time?
A: About a quarter to eleven.

Q2: Can you relate to the Board what transpired?
A: The actual meeting started at about 20 minutes to 11:00. These guys came in at about a quarter to 11:00, George Speight and his men came through the front door, the main entrance. They told everyone to stay calm, sit down and to remain on their seats and that there was going to be a civilian coup. He started giving their terms and conditions and telling Chaudhry to sit down and his men started surrounding the place, going to all the door exits and closing them up.

Q3: We showed you one of the photos. Do you recognise George Speight as one of them?
A: Yes.

Q4: Also you recognise that photo (Ben Naduaniwai); do you recognise anyone else coming in initially into the Chambers from what you read in the papers later on?
A: (Silence)

Q5: How many went into Parliament with George?
A: There would have been about 6 or 7 of them, maybe. I do not know if they were the same ones that went upstairs because a couple of them went up. I am not sure if they were the ones from down below or whether there were others that came and we did not get to see them.

Q6: You remained in the Chambers until being released on Sunday morning?
A: Yes.

Q7: Do you recognise anyone else?
A: No, just those two, George and the other guy.

Q8: The much publicised photo was that of Commander Bill or Tikotani. Did he go in initially?
A: Yes, he did.

Q9: There were shots that were fired inside. Do you know who fired the shots?
A: Bill.
Q10: Do you know George Speight prior to May 19th?
A: Workwise - yes, not personally.

Q11: The other persons that were with him; have you seen them before this day - May 19th?
A: No.

Q12: When was the first time you laid eyes on them as they entered the Chambers; where were they when you first saw them?
A: Because we were facing the entrance so as soon as they ran in we got to see them.

Q13: You saw them running in?
A: Yes.

Q14: Who was leading?
A: I would have to say George was.

Q15: Can you recall who was the second person?
A: No, not really because the others just all came behind him in a big group.

Q16: Was George Speight armed?
A: I think he was.

Q17: How do you know that he was armed?
A: Because he had a pistol.

Q18: Holding in which hand - left or right?
A: I cannot recall.

Q19: But you are sure he had a pistol?
A: Yes.

Q20: Do you know Major Ligaiiri?
A: Yes.

Q21: Did he enter the Chambers?
A: He came much later in the day.

Q22: Did you also see Major-General Rabuka enter the Chambers?
A: Yes.
Q23: Did Major Ligairi, Commander Bill or anyone of them, in speaking to the hostages give any form of threat?
A. Most of the time we could not hear what they were saying so I would not really know.
NINETY-SEVENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 21697 COL. U.C.V. VATU

Col Vatu, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows.

Q1: Sir, for the Board it has been difficult to ask you to come especially you being much more senior. We have made this point up to those in Headquarters, however, someone has to do the job. I know it is a very unique occasion, when senior officers come before very junior officer and I think that should never ever be done.

Anyway I have been given the difficult task and I thank you for actually coming.

Sir, my first question is, do you prior to the 19th of May or on that date was involved in the discussion, planning of the events that took place in Parliament that day?

A: The answer to that is I was in Hawaii for a three months course and I came back in mid-April. I was not aware of any discussion or planning of the events as I was out of the country.

Q2: After the events unfolded at the Parliament complex, the offer that was made and the various meetings with those in the Parliament complex? Can you explain that?

A: On the morning of 19th May, after the take over, Ligairi came to meet us and he told us that he had given the approval for the CRW boys to execute the coup and that he would be responsible for that. After that, he left with Col. Tuatoko who was the Acting Commander.

They went to the Ministry of Home Affairs and I went back to my office. It was in the afternoon that I got a call from Ligairi offering me the appointment of Commander. I told him that I can command the Army but it must be legal. It must go through the legal process.

That night, after work, I went home. The CRW came for me and they said that Ligairi sent them. Ligairi wanted to speak to me. I only recognised Baleinamau. I went with them in a vehicle and they told me that they were taking me to Parliament.

When we came to the Suva Grammar Road, the Police had blocked off the road so we went around to the Draiba side and the Police had blocked that part of the road too.

We went back and they dropped me at home. I got off and Baleinamau said that he was trying to get a pass so that the vehicle can go inside the Parliament complex. I must say that during this whole time I was very uncomfortable.
I left home and went to the Officers Mess did nothing but just walked around. I went home again. When I arrived, my wife told me that the CRW came and I was not there.

Shortly after that they came back and told me that Ligairi wanted to speak to me. This time, we walked the back entrance of the CRW unit. I called a telephone number; it must have been a Parliament number and I spoke with Ligairi. He said that they were trying to get the Army involved. They were trying to solicit the officers to be part of the coup.

I told them it has to be legal, we cannot just go and be part of the coup. I came back home and got called twice more. The first time, I went to Col. Tuatoko's office. They had a letter faxed from the Parliament complex that I was appointed Commander and Tarakinikini as Chief of Staff. The letter was signed by George Speight. Again I must say that I was uncomfortable.

When I saw the letter, I was lost for words. I left the office and went home in the early hours. I was called up again; this time there was a gazette that I was the Commander and Tarakinikini to be the Chief of Staff. During our discussions we decided that if the President stays on then we as a force should be unified and show our allegiance to the President. We were firm on that.

On Staurday morning, Col. Tuatoko went down to meet PS Home Affairs and the President. However, the President said that he will take over the Government and he wants the total allegiance of the Force accorded to him. Col. Tuatoko told the President the whole RFMF was unified owing their allegiance to the President.

During the day, Col. Tuatoko came up and told us about what had transpired at the meeting. It was established there and then that we would be behind the President.

After that we went down, Col. Tuatoko and myself were to have a television broadcast and after that I was to have a radio broadcast. That was basically, how I was involved for the first two days of the coup.

Q3: Sir, for the record, what was your appointment before and during the time of the coup?
A: I was still the Director of Military Resources, the appointment I held before, during the coup up to now.

Q4: That is in Strategic Headquarters?
A: Yes, Strategic Headquarters.
Sir, who was in charge of the rations and pay within the RFMF?
A: As you know, we were in the process of changing from the old structure to the new structure. There were to be two different headquarters, Strategic Headquarters and Land Force.

In the old structure it was under me. We had moved across and the pay and rations were all under the Land Force.

Sir, there are two issues to be clarified? As you have stated, the appointment of Commander was offered to you by George Speight and his group. Can you give the reason if any why you did not accept the appointment?
A: I said, I will accept the appointment if it is going to be legal, to go through the legal process.

Sir, what was your reaction and also did you discuss the appointment with the Chief of Staff?
A: As I have stated, it would be accepted if it was legal, if it goes through the legal process then we would accept that.

My next question is if you accept the appointment as Commander, were you assured of full support by RFMF?
A: I cannot say that I will get the full support, I do not know whether I will get the full support of the RFMF. At that time, we do not know who was here and who was there.

Sir, was there any indication by you or were you approach at the time to incite other officers and other ranks basically to support George Speight and his group?
A: Like I said, I was away for the first three months and then really there was no time for all that.

What was your role after May 19th in the RFMF?
A: Col. Tuatoko, Lt. Col. Tarakinikini, Lt. Col. Raduva became part of the negotiation team. I was dropped out and I just carried on as Director of Military Resources and then I was told to head the PR team. However, I was a member of the Military Council.

Sir, are you aware of certain officers in the force who were involved in the planning, discussion of the events of May 19th?
A: No. I was out of the country, I really do not know if there was anyone involved in it.

Was there any discussion between you and Col. Tarakinikini of the proposal by George Speight and his group?
A: I was surprised, I do not know that Col. Tarakinikini's name was on the list because when I spoke to Ligairi there was no mention of it.
Q13: Sir, we thank you for giving your time to be here this morning, before we round off, do you wish to say anything else.
No.

Colonel

Lieutenant Colonel
President

Major
Member

Member

Warrant Officer Class One
Member
NINETY-EIGHTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY ADI KACARAINI KIKAU

Adi Kikau, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Adi Kacarain, on the 19th of May, you were in the Parliament Chambers?
A: Very briefly, I am the Editor of Hansard in Parliament responsible for parliamentary debates. On the morning of the 19th, I went into the Parliament Chamber after the bell rang to wait for Parliament to start that morning. It was actually delayed so it was at about 10.40 (20 mins to 11.00) when Parliament actually started. It was supposed to have started at 10.30 but there was a meeting, hence the delay.

The Speaker came in and the meeting started. The Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Tupeni Baba was at the time presenting his report on the Joint Sector Committee on Social Services and Legal and Consequential Legislation on the Social Justice Bill.

He was giving his report when at about a quarter to 11.00, there was a commotion in front of the entrance when I saw some strangers entered Parliament, they actually jumped over the bar.

As they jumped over the bar, there was a bald-headed guy that I will refer to as Stranger No. 1, came right up followed by other strangers and said to everyone to stay calm, "This is a civilian coup, a civilian takeover".

My first impression when I saw them I thought they were playing cowboys. They looked as if there was a game on but then I saw them with pistols. They were heavily armed. As they came, they spoke to the Speaker. The Speaker asked, "What is this?" Stranger No. 1 said, "This is a civilian take-over. Please, Mr Speaker, be calm" and Speaker said "This is silly, you can't do this." Stranger No. 1 then asked everyone to stay calm and listen to the instructions that he was going to give. I think, by this time, the Deputy Prime Minister who was still on his feet was told to sit down and stay calm. The Speaker got up and said to him, "What's the meaning of this?" He said, "Please, follow instructions, don't make things difficult and don't force me to shoot."

The Speaker was so furious and he said, "If you have to shoot anyone, you shoot me first", then he asked the Speaker to come out and leave the Chamber, and the Speaker said "No, I will not leave this Chamber without my Members.

At that point in time, Stranger No. 2 who was standing on the steps in front of me (between myself and the Speaker) turned and spoke to the Leader of the Opposition, Ratu Inoke and asked if they could stand up ad leave the Chamber. Ratu Inoke said "No, we will not leave the Chamber without the Speaker". At that point in time, I was sitting here (demonstrates) and that is
the Speaker's chair, Stranger No. 2 (later identified as Bill) was standing there, cocked his gun (he had a big rifle, whatever it is) and it got jammed, and at that time, I knew that they were serious, they meant business. Suddenly he drew out a pistol, and when he drew out his pistol, cocked it and the shell came flying to me, and I fired it. The shell came flying to me, and I started to scream as I was so scared and at that time too, my legs were shaking. I was so scared, I have seen guns, but it was never fired in front of me.

I looked around, all the other ladies were crying but something struck me. They just kept saying, "Sit down, sit down," somehow looking around expecting someone to come. That was what I gathered and because they were sort of waiting for instructions from someone, then they got everyone up then the Speaker left, the Leader of the Opposition and normally when the Speaker leaves the Chamber, the staff go out too, but we were so scared that I dare not move, so we were locked in there. Once they went out, the doors were locked.

We stayed in there and they started with the Prime Minister, tied his hands behind his back, brought him and sat him in front of the Speaker's Chair, and then the other Cabinet Members, the lady Cabinet Members' hands were not tied, then it went around to the other Members excepting for Ratu Tu'ukatiau and Silatolu; whose hands were not tied because at that point in time, Stranger No. 1 had asked Silatolu whether he was going to join the course and if he agreed, to stand up, so he stood up then he asked Ratu Tu'ukatiau the same question and asked that he be given time to think about it.

After a few more minutes, he went back to Ratu Tu'ukatiau and he said that he still wanted time, it was a big decision that he would need time so he sat, Silatolu walked out with Stranger No. 1 and we stayed in there.

By the time the Speaker and the Members of the Opposition went out with Ratu Inoke, all the doors to the Chambers were closed. We sat in there for some time and I wanted to get out so I asked to go to the toilet.

I got up to go and Adi Koila signalled me to ring her home to get someone to get her daughter from school. When I walked out I was ushered out by one of the soldiers.

I went out and I said, "Can you take me to the toilet?" As I walked out I said to myself, I have got to ring from somewhere, so when I went out to the toilet, I thought to myself and came out and said to him, "There is no toilet paper there". He asked, "What are you going to do?", I said, "We will go upstairs", so when I went up, I thought of the telephone in the Speaker's Chamber and his own toilet. The Speaker was sitting in his lounge with the President of the Senate. I walked in, looked out, I saw that the guard was not looking at me, I half-closed the door and I dialled the phone. I rang Government House and left the message with whoever answered to say that Adi Koila wanted someone to go and pick her daughter up and to tell Marian Blakeo lockdown that Eddie was in the Chamber and that he was fine. I did that, I could not get my
sister on the phone so I rang a friend of mine on her mobile and told her to get my sister and tell her to say that "I am fine". I came out, I did not go to the toilet, I came back and sat down.

After a while, we had lunch. We offered our lunch to those guys. Sorry, before I went to the toilet, Ligairi walked in. I did not know who he was. There was this guy, he walked in and by that time, the Secretary to the House, Eddie Blakelock was sitting next to me, he said, "So that's Ligairi". I asked, "Who is he?" and he said, "That's the SAS guy". I said, "What is he doing here?" He said, "He must have something to do with this". This is our discussion.

So when Ligairi walked in, he sat down, spoke to everyone and he said that he was responsible, he was the one doing this then he went out.

Not long after that, Major-General Rabuka walked in and he said that he was on his way somewhere when he heard over his car radio that there was a coup so he diverted and came our way and then said that he was going to negotiate to try and get us out of this and that he did not know anything, and he left.

When he left, I saw him go towards the Speaker's Chamber. That afternoon, we had lunch. After lunch, I was getting irritated with these guys who were hanging around because there were people around outside because the doors were opened again.

After that, I called Stranger No. 2, "Hey, lako mada mai ke." He asked, "Na cava?", I said, "O keitou na qai lako e na gauna cava?" Then he said, "Wawa, 4.00 ga na kaloko sa oti na ka qo!" Au kaya sara o au vua, "Oi, okay" so I waited, 2.00 o'clock, 3.00 o'clock, 4.00 o'clock, 5.00 o'clock, 6.00 o'clock, au sa katakata, I got annoyed and I called him again, "Hey, o ikol kaya vei au, va ga na kaloko keitou sa na lako, sa ono qo na kaloko". Then he said, "Wawa mada, dua na ka se cala tiko", then I said to him, "Who's the boss here?" He said, "Wawa, wawa", and I looked at him, I said to myself "Hey, I don't think these people here know what they're doing, there's some confusion."

Then later on in the evening, we sat around and I was getting annoyed because I was sitting there and not doing anything, not knowing what was happening. I did not move and in fact, the whole night I did not sleep. I sat in my seat just watching everyone.

Then Saturday morning, after breakfast, we were allowed to go and ring home for our clothes to be brought in, so our clothes were brought in. Saturday afternoon, we had lunch, we offered our food to them, they ate some and stared what was brought in, and then I asked him, "O kemudou, dou na qai kana vakacava?" Kaya e dua vei iratou, "O sega, dou kana ga" and we sort of felt bad because they were not eating and we had been with them and there was no food brought in for them, so we continued to offer our food and they said, "No, no, dou kana" but I think by that time, they were hungry so we said, "Look, you have this, we will get some more" so we got our food, two of
them who were there ate and there were others. Those two were there at that point in time when we had lunch so they ate.

Come dinner time, our food was brought, they did not have any and then we were talking, and I said, "How come these people are not having any meals brought to them?" and then we had dinner and we offered dinner and then they ate. By Saturday afternoon, we got a message saying that the army was going to invade and then they were going to have Australian assistance or something and that they were to move us to another venue. When they came to tell us, I think it was Soko and two other guys, they came and sat with us, and I asked them, "Why are you going to move us from here?" One of them said, "Well, we are looking for a different venue", I said, "Well, there is no other place, this is the only place that you can keep us. There is no other venue here" then when we were talking, I felt a bit relaxed and then I asked Soko, "O iko na gone ni vei?" Kaya o koya, "O au na gone ni Kabara". Au kaya sara, "O kemadou mada, na cava o kemudou" Kaya o koya, "O keitou na CRW - Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit." I said, "If you are the Counter Revolutionary Warfare then why are you doing this, you should be countering anything that is coming.

You should be protecting us. He grinned and said, "Yea, that's right", I said, "Tukuna sara mada mai vakadodomu vei au, "O dou lai lako mai vakacava e na ka qoka?" By this time, it was him and two other boys - there were three, and I think it was Adi Koila and Eddie who were sitting beside me, but Eddie was not really paying attention. I think he was dosing off to sleep then I asked him, "Are you part of the Army?" Kaya sara o koya, "We are at the Camp but we are a totally different Unit. We do not come under the Commander." I said, "How come you don't come under the Commander?" Kaya o koya, "Sega, o keitou na neitou training e dua tani. It was set up after the first coup, me caka kina na ka ni counter-revolution". Au kaya sara, "E caka vakacava na nomudou lako mai qo?", kaya sara o koya, "Why are you interested?" Au kaya, "Sega, au via kila ga, I want to know for my own peace of mind". Kaya o koya vei au (that was Saturday morning), "Mataka e na noa (meaning Friday morning), we had had breakfast, we were in our sulu and shirts, we were ready to go to lectures or to do the programme for that day, sa lako mai o Mr White. He came and said to us, dou lako dou lai veisau, get into your dungarees and boots" something to that effect.

"Soli ga vei keitou e (I cannot remember correctly), 15 or 30 minutes to go and change, not even time to say good-bye to our families." Au kaya sara, "Dou: sa lako ya qai cava?" Kaya o koya, "Keitou sa lako ga ya, keitou veisau, some of us our wives were home, some had gone to work, children had gone to school, keitou veisau sara ga keitou lako mai. Oti sara ga keitou sa lako mai, keitou curu mai sa tukuni vei keitou, "Tu qori na nomudou kato, take those bags, there's a van out there, get into it, the driver knows where to take you."
Au vaqo, "You mean to tell me o sega ni kila na vanua o lako kina, you don't know that you were on this assignment?" Kaya okoya, "Sega". I ask, "And how can you come in and bloody do this?" Va sara qo o koya, "Well, that's instructions because we do not ask questions." Naitou kakaka, keitou kakava ga na ka e tukuni vei keitou." I said, "You're bloody fools! If I was to do that, I'd ask whether any money will be paid to us, there is no insurance." He said, "When we signed the papers to join this Unit, we gave our lives and when we do a mission, if we achieve it, we go back alive, if we don't achieve our mission, we're dead."

Au qai kaya vua, "Kena i balebale, o iko sa lako mai qo, ke o sa mate sa o mate" o koya qai dredre tu ga. Au kaya tale, "And you know the risk that you took yesterday morning?" Oti sa rai tu vakabalavu o koya. I know he was in deep thought. Au kaya vaqo vei iratou na kena vo, "O kemudou qo dou galu tu ga, what's wrong with you, you can't talk?" Then I said to them, "I was here when Rabuka came in and the rumour that's going around here that you people met with him on Sunday on your last training. Tell me, is that true?"

He said, "Raica, e na veiyabaki taucoko, dau caka na reunion in coup. If the 14th of May falls on a Sunday we have it on that Sunday, otherwise it is done in the week, keimami dau lotu vata kece kina, it is sort of a reunion". I then asked, "But did you know anything about this?" He said, "Keitou sega kece ni kila ni keitou na lako mai ke." I said, "And when did you know? Kaya o koya, "When the van entered Parliament" so I said, "So you're actually here, ka o sa mate qo sa vakacava" sa galu tu o koya. O rau na kena vo, rau galu tulea.

The other thing that he did was he advised us, "If there is an attack or if there is any fire whatsoever that comes in tonight, what I'd like you people to do, you or whoever's here, tell the others, 'Just lie on the floor and stay quiet.' I cannot guarantee you if I can save your life but what you've got to do is, just lie down, stay still, someone can get hurt in the cross-fire."

Oti au sa va sara qo o au, "Hey, na ka qo e na caka dina?" Kaya o koya, "Au sega ni kila, but if anything happens, don't run, don't panic, just lie down." Au sa vakaraici koya tu, au sa sega ni vosa, sa vaka au via luluvu and then I said, "Okay". They he went. Adi Koila and I did not sleep; that was the second night. All Friday night, all day Saturday, Saturday night qo au se sega tikoga ni moce and then we went and set up the public gallery, and the others were sitting around; koya e moce tu, koya e talanoa.

A: about 1.00 (I cannot recall exactly what time) when Timoci Silatolu walked in and said, "Mahendra Chaudhry is unconscious." They called the doctor and that there is a form for them to sign if they want to go free, that they will go out as civilians to resign from their seats as Members of Parliament.

D: Tupe ni Baba met with the others and talked about it. He said that they were going to sign. Timoci Silatolu came to where the Members normally sit
and he looked up to the gallery because most of us were sitting in the public gallery and then he noticed me sitting there.

Then he asked, "Hey, 'Di Kaca, cava o cakava tiko ike?" Au kaya sara, "Ie, me cava tale meu cakava ike, au se vesu tu ga mai e na noa." Kaya okoya, "Oi, o cei soti?" Au sauna, "Keitou kee na staff. He did not say anything more, kept on talking with the other Members, then he walked out, then some time later Speight came in, then he asked if there were civilians who were not Members of Parliament in the Chamber, so I lifted up my hand and all of us, then he said, "We give you 5 minutes to get out of this place and get out of the Complex." I only went and grab my bag and walked out.

By the time we walked out, it was myself, Secretary to the House - Eddie Blaceelock, Agnes Gibson, Serei, Jone Lewanavanua (who has since passed away) and Mr Chaudhry's butler.

We walked out of the gate, there wasn't any transport but when I came out, I saw Jahir Khan and I asked him if he could get a vehicle to take us home. He gave us a vehicle so we were taken to our homes.

One thing I observed during the two days that I was in there was that the boys who were in there did not know what was happening; that is just my observation because there was no one inside there making decisions.

This guy Bill, each time there was something that the Members wanted through Dr Tupeni Baba, he would run out to the other buildings and go and say something and then come back, baleta ni o koya qai tukuna vei au niu tarogi koya, "A cava o lai vosa tiko kina vei iratou qo ni dua na ka e ratou vinakata, o cici sara o iko i yasana kadua, o lako tale i tuba, lai veivosaki tale mai kina; o lako tiko i vei?" Sega au lai tiko vei iratou i yasana oya. Au kaya sara, "A cava o lai tukuna tiko kina vei iratou i yasana oya", kaya o koya, "Sega, baleta o ratou na tiko mai yasana oya e ratou lewa tiko" so he would come back and tell them the result. Then he said to me, "But please don't tell this, kila kevaka e na kila na neitou boso na ka au cakava niu veikauyaka na i tukutuku ni ka eratou vinakata o ratou qoka me lai tarogi tale mai kea (sort of intermediary), I would get into trouble, I could be shot."

Au kaya vaqo o au, "And where do you actually stand?" Kaya okoya, "Au via vu kei kemudou talega but I don't know". He was confused. From there I assumed that they did not know who was their boss, who was dictating terms, and at Day 2, I heard from Soko that they did not know what they were to do till they got there, that confirmed to me that they did not know what they were going to do up until when they were brought in.

Baleta talega ni qai tukuni vei au ena yakavi ni Vakaraubuka oya, "4.00 ga na kalo ko sa oti".

Q2: If you can recall, how many shots were fired?
A: I think there were two.
Q3. Those who initially entered the Chambers, can you recall how many. Firstly, the person you referred to as Stranger 1, you later on identified him as George?
A. Yes.

Q4. Stranger 2, you later identified him as Commander Bill or Tikotani. How many others if you can recall that initially entered Parliament?
A. Seven (7) or eight (8) because at that time, I could not count straight, and if I tell you exactly 7 I would be telling a lie because I did not actually count - exactly 7, but from the crowd that I saw, I can actively visualise straightaway, it looked about 7.

Q5. Was Mr Speight carrying any weapon?
A. He had a pistol.

Q6. Did he point the pistol at anyone or was anyone threatened?
A. He swung his pistol around as he spoke, whether that means pointing at anyone in particular but it was going around.

Q7. Also heard in this Inquiry that there was a threat made to the extent that if there was any rescued attempt that the hostages would be shot, did you hear of this threat in Parliament?
A. I did not hear that but what the hostages were talking about at that time when I was there, was that hostages would be shot if there was something. I did not hear that from those boys but the Members were just speculating that we were going to be shot, then Adi Koila and I said, "You're going to be the prime hostage" but then we asked the boys and they said, "We couldn't do that, we can't just turn, point the gun at you and shoot you."

This conversation came about when I asked what to do and this guy was advising me to lie on the floor. That conversation arose because that came up, that question that you've raised, that he said, you lie on the floor and just stay down, you may get hurt in the cross-fire but we cannot shoot you.

Q8. The transcript of what transpired in the Parliamentary Chambers that morning, you have a copy of that in front of you there; would you confirm persons noted as Stranger 1 and 2 and those persons that you mentioned to the Inquiry?
A. Apparently, I compiled this transcript, this is correct; Stranger 1, Stranger 2.

Daily Hansard of Friday, 19th May, 2000 tendered and marked as "Exhibit I".

EXHIBIT I: DAILY HANSARD OF 19TH MAY, 2000

Q9. On the morning of Friday 19th, when Stranger 2 (who was later identified as Bill Tikotani) cocked his weapon, like you mentioned previously, you said there was a shell that ejected from his weapon; can you confirm whether it was an empty casing or is it a complete bullet group?
A: I cannot confirm that but all I can tell you that it hit me then it went on the floor and it sounded like a metal; it goes "Ting!". I do not know whether it is round or whatever.

Q10: Was the sound a solid thud or is it just a light sound?
A: Light.

Q11: Was that after he fired the shot or before he fired the shot?
A: Well I think it was before because he pulled it in front of me and it came this way (demonstrating) and the shot went up, it was almost simultaneous really. He had his back to me and when he cocked the pistol, it was pointed up.

Q12: Did it touch any part of your flesh that was not covered by any clothing?
A: No, na noqo domobula beka ga, I do not know, but I heard that it came and it fell. Whether it touched me or not, I do not know because I was in a state of fright and shock.

Q13: Adi Kacaraini, we have got the information we required. We thank you for your contribution. Before we round off, do you wish to add anything further? Identifying these people that came in, I can only identify Speight (Stranger 1), Bill (Stranger 2) and the one that I named "Bull-dog"?

Q14: Nadasaniwai?
A: Yes

Q15: Only those 3 were identified?
A: Yes, because they were close to me.

Q16: We thank you for your contribution and we thank you for making time to come and give evidence in this Board of Inquiry. We hope that at the end of it we can all come out with the appropriate finding.
A: There is something that I would like to say. I went to the Special Branch because they asked me to go and give a statement.

First of all, I refused because it was just fresh in my mind and I did not want to go through that trauma but when I refused, they said to me if I could identify people that I saw in the Chamber.

When I identified them, I identified about 7 or 8 but when I come to think of it, they asked me the question whether they were the people that were in the Chamber", I said, "Things have got to be specific" and I want to make it clear that the seven that I identified there were the seven that I saw in the Chamber but not the seven that initially entered; that has got to be clear, I could not identify the 7 or the 8 that entered.
But to be specific because you have asked me who I could identify, I could only identify those people, so there is a clear distinction between the two, entering and people that I saw, that might be of some help to you.

[ADI K. KIKAU] 10/10/100
Civilian

[J. N. B. EVANS] [A. MOHAMMED] [T. GUCAKE]
Lieutenant Colonel Major Major
President Member Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
NINETY-NINTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY MR EDWARD BLAKELOCK

Mr Blakelock, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Thank you for giving time from your busy schedule to come and give evidence in this Board of Inquiry. The Board of Inquiry is to inquire about events associated with what took place on the 19th of May.

A: Mr. Blakelock, can you give us your appointment on the 19th of May? On the 19th of May, in the absence of the Secretary-General to Parliament, I was Secretary to the House of Representatives inside the chambers. Usually, it is the Secretary-General and myself who sit inside the chambers but on that particular day she was away overseas attending a conference and I was acting in the post.

Q2: Mr. Blakelock, can you relate to us the events that took place on the 19th when you were in the chambers?

A: The House commenced sitting at about 10.40 a.m. We had quite a heavy agenda that morning. We had gone through items 1 to 4 without any problems. We were on item 5 of the Agenda which was the Report by the Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Sector Committee on the Social Justice Bill.

He was presenting his report and during the presentation of the report, the occurrence took place. That was about 10.45 a.m., I guess. The occurrence in the sense of armed men coming through the main entrance, jumping over the bar and interrupting the proceedings. They were saying that it was a civil coup. The one person that I recognised immediately was Mr. George Speight. He was wearing a cap and carrying a pistol.

There were other armed men, I think only one I cannot recollect was masked; all the others were not and in civilian attires.

They asked the Speaker to retire from the chambers saying that it was a civilian coup and that he refrains from doing anything. He asked them what this was all about. I think after the Speaker’s interjection, they also asked the Leader of the Opposition to also retire with his team of opposition members and also leave the chambers.
The Speaker said that he would not leave without his members and the Leader of the Opposition said, he would not leave without the Speaker. I think at that time, two shots were fired inside the chambers. The Speaker then exited the chambers with members of the Opposition and the Leader of the Opposition.

Following that, Mr. Speight asked the members who would wish to join his cause. First, he asked the then honourable Silatolu and he also asked the then honourable Ratu Cokanauto. I recollect that the then honourable Silatolu agreed with the cause but the then honourable Ratu Cokanauto had refrained from giving his decision but to decide later. He did not make his decision there.

The vodaphones were taken from the Members and at a later point in time, George Speight told his group to tie up the Members of Parliament with their hands behind their backs with straps. He then brought the then Prime Minister to the left hand side of my desk and other Members were brought later to both sides of the table.

Dr. Tupeni Baba resisted slightly but otherwise he complied. Members were kept in that state for quite awhile and then they were told after some discussions, asked all the Members to leave the chambers including the Secretariat.

At the main entrance outside, leading down to the steps Speight had asked only the Fijian Members and the Secretariat to remain and he led the Indian Members away probably to another building. So, we were brought back inside the chambers and I never saw the Indian Members again. We were brought back and straps were released and some discussions were held amongst the Members themselves.

I was not privy to those discussions, I only asked my group, my staff to sit together so that we are sitting as staff members as you know we are not politicians. I try to get them together so that we are recognised as the staff of Parliament and not politicians.

The politicians were talking amongst themselves probably as to their own decisions to be made and there were some negotiations done. People were going in and out. Someone asked for the tanoa to be brought in and yaqona was served.
At that point in time the person I recognise as Major Ligairi walked in and he spoke in Fijian. I did not hear what he said because he had his back to me. To my recollection, after talking to my staff, I think what he said was he was only brought in late and was brought in to help the situation and that it was his doing. It was a civilian coup and not a military coup.

At another point in time, later on, the former Prime Minister, Rabuka walked in with Mr. Speight and he mentioned that he was to be the mediator or negotiator and he wanted to see the Speaker. The Speaker was retiring in his chamber so he went straight into the Speaker's chamber. I do not know what they discussed.

After sometime, he walked back in. He sat with the group, he drank yaqona and then left. That was basically the first day and at the same time, we were just waiting as to what would happen. Things were on our path, nervous but not so intimidated at this stage.

Towards the late afternoon, we were told that we were going to be released. Of course, that did not occur until the actual release, our staff release was after midnight on Saturday, early Sunday morning after some negotiation between the group themselves. Basically that is in general what I experienced inside the chambers.

Q3: Can you remember how many people entered the chamber initially with George Speight?

A: I cannot put a direct figure on it but I know it is not a big group, I think not more than 10.

Q4: I am not talking about the people that were coming and going, the people that initially entered. Were you aware of it?

A: I cannot put a definite number, definitely I would say in my own perception not more than 10.

Q5: Mr. Blakelock before we round off, basically we got what we really wanted you here for and do you wish to say anything further?

A: Well, on our part, the Secretariat and staff, we were not intimidated in anyway. We were well looked after, had good meals. We were not tied up.
After sometimes we were released when George Speight realised that staff members were still sitting inside the chambers, so matters in terms of whether they were harassed or what, I did not see that.

Q6:

A:

The other question is when you were sitting there and they walked in, was the operation organised throughout from the start to the time you left?

It did not seem to be organised because there seems to be a lot of going back and forward in terms of talking on the mobile phones and discussing. It seems to me like it was not planned as such. I would have expected a planned manoeuvre.

[Signature]
[E. BLAKELOCK]
Civilian

[Signature]
[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[Signature]
[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[Signature]
[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[Signature]
[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
ONE HUNDREDTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 23513 LT COL JONE BALEDROKADROKA

Lt Col Baledrokadroka, after having been duly sworn on Bible, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Did you have any previous knowledge of the planning or the execution of anything in relation to the events that unfolded on the 19th of May?
A: No, I did not.

Q2: During the course of investigations, the Board has come up with one question on the reports, if you can just clarify that point; was any offer whatsoever made to you prior to the 19th of May from any outside elements to conduct an illegal activity, a coup or anything as such?
A: No, there was no offer whatsoever.

Q3: Was there any offer made after the 19th of May?
A: No, there was no offer whatsoever.

Q4: We thank you for your presence and your contribution, we know you are a very busy person, do you wish to add anything else in relation to the events of the 19th of May?
A: If it may so help the Board of Inquiry, I was the Chief Operations Officer prior to the coup. The events of the 19th if I can just summarise, to me it was a total surprise as I was not in the country at the time. I was in Sinai carrying out a hand-over. I left on the 16th of May and I arrived back in the country on the 5th of June.
Prior to that, on Friday the 11th of May, I had briefed the Commander and all the senior officers, in fact in this very room, on an Operation presentation as to the contingency the RFMF was preparing should there be any disturbance arising from the march on the 19th. The mission of that contingency plan was to close Suva down in case there was a disturbance on the 19th. That was briefed to the Commander on the 11th, and at this presentation were only senior officers plus all the commanding officers. The Commander left for Norway on the 12th of May and I subsequently left for Sinai on the 16th of May; that is all I can share with this Inquiry.

[Signature]
J. BALEDOBOKADROMA
Lieutenant-Colonel

[Signature]
J. N. B. EVANS
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[Signature]
A. MOHAMMED
Major
Member

[Signature]
T. GUCACE
Major
Member

[Signature]
H. MACHBER
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
Col Tuatoko, after having been duly sworn on the Bible, was interviewed as follows.

Q1: Various briefings were given by the Int people of the HQ RFMF prior to the events of May 19th, the takeover in Parliament. We have also heard from Col Baledrokadroka that the contingency plan was presented on the 11th of May. The question is, was RFMF prepared for the events of the 19th or what was the directive put out to the Units for the preparation on the event of the takeover?
A: The RFMF was not prepared for what happened on the 19th of May but the RFMF had contingency plans to control the city of Suva if the law and order situation would have gone out of control, and this was the result of a briefing given by Commander just before he left on his trip. He briefed us in this room and his intention was to close Suva down in case the law and order situation went out of hand, and on that intent, we worked out a contingency plan for the control of Suva.

Q2: Were you made aware of any plans of the takeover prior to its taking place on the 19th of May?
A: No.

Q3: There is a question here on the pay. There are various decisions that we need to clear up during the whole operation. There were people who were still getting paid while they were involved in Parliament, also the rations were taken down and fuel, to a certain extent, was given; what was the reason for this?
A: The intent was the safety of the hostages. The CRW people who were involved in the coup were directly responsible for the safety of the hostages so Commander RFMF decided that we continue to support them by providing them rations, providing them fuel and the question of pay remains; that was on the understanding that when everything was over, an inquiry would be conducted and then appropriate charges would be laid for individuals but that was by no means a sign of condonation of what was going on. It was all for the sake of the safety of the hostages.

Q4: This decision was given by Commander RFMF?
A: Yes

Q5: On the 20th of May, the whole batch of weapon was taken out of RFMF. Could you give us the reason behind the HQ RFMF allowing the weapons to be taken out, one truck-load was taken out on the 20th?
A: That was all part of CRW operations and nothing was condoned or permitted by RFMF. I was at a meeting at the President's Office when I was told that padre wanted to see me. When I came back from that meeting I was told about these weapons going out but that was all CRW activity.
Q6: The Board has received information that the okay or the directive was given by the Land Force Commander, you have just indicated that this is not the case. We have also received from the Senior Ops Officer that this was the earlier stance given on day one - on the 19th, no confrontation, continue with the rations as indicated by you, Sir, the rations, fuel and the pay continues. Could that order have been misunderstood because asking the Senior Operations Officer he had said that the directive was given, no confrontation, no bloodshed the meeting that took place on the 19th of May after the events and Ligairi came in and briefed; could that have been misunderstood?

A: By whom?

Q7: By the Operations, the directive that says no confrontation therefore no one questions the taking out of the weapons; could that order have been misunderstood?

A: I do not know, but the no confrontation intent has nothing to do with the taking out of the weapons, it is not connected. When I went to see the President on the 19th, he told me two things; first of all he did not want the escalation of the situation and he did not want any confrontation. I took that as my direction from him on how I was going to handle the situation at hand. When I came back and assessed the situation, I gave my orders the next day to the COs and that was my order, there should be no confrontation, no bloodshed, that we would remain within the law, and the unity of the Force was important, was vital and that was my intent as the Land Force Commander then to my officers based on the President's direction to me that there would be no escalation and no confrontation. That is the stance that we have taken throughout. When I made my assessment, to me it was not a matter of resolving the situation in Parliament. What was important here was the peace afterwards. We need that peace afterwards, and I think that assessment came out of the President's direction - no confrontation, no escalation because this was a social problem, a political problem and as far as I was concerned, it did not require a military solution and that is why I made those assessments. Winning the peace afterwards was more important to me than solving this militarily, and I think we are seeing that now in this period of reconciliation of trying to get things back to normalcy. It is much easier for us to now reconcile on the basis of negotiations. If we had put in a military solution, there would have been so much bloodshed that the reconciliation process now would have been very very difficult because we would be reconciling on bloodshed.

I am sure you all understand that people in Parliament were closely related to people in camp by way of blood relations. In Fiji we cannot avoid it. We are such a small society and we are so much interrelated through the vanua and through blood that really our solutions would have to look very deeply at how we would solve the problem.

Q8: Sir, were any offer made to you for a takeover after the events of the 19th of May, the leadership within the RFMF?
A. No. I am aware of the offer presented by the Major-General to the President for him to take over the military but that was not agreed to by the President.

Q9. Sir, the offer by Major-General to take over as military Commander, Sir the nature of discussions with Major Ligairi when he informed you of the events on the 19th. The nature of discussions with Major Ligairi, we have heard Ligairi's side of the story. There was also indication by Ligairi that no bloodshed, the nature of the discussions, the nature of the discussion, in your view was it to inform you or it was also a threat - no confrontation that was made?

A. I got a call from Savua up at the Officers' Mess, I am not quite sure of the time, but around 10.30, he had the information that there were armed people in Parliament. The next call I got was from His Excellency the President who also told me of the same thing, so I told him, "I cannot confirm that, we'll have to come back to you" so I called the officers to an Orders Group at the conference room. When the officers came in they sat down, and as I started my briefing on what I had got from Savua and the President, Ligairi walked in with Baleinamau and they sat down. So them being there, I took them as part of the team. When I started to brief the officers on the information I got, Ligairi intervened and said, "The armed elements in Parliament are the members of the CRW." I took that as him informing us of what was going on. He told us that he was only brought into the situation about 2 hours before and he only said yes because he thought that he was the only one who could control the situation and his request to us at the conference was to avoid any confrontation. That was even before I had gone down to see the President.

Q10. Were any threats made to you, and by whom?
A. There were no threats to me personally but my family received some phone calls.

Q11. Do you know where it was originating from?
A. No

Q12. Just going back to an earlier question that was asked about the authorisation of taking arms by 1FMS personnel to the Parliament; did you at any time authorised any weapons to be taken out?
A. No, I think you have to remember that 1FMS have their own armoury. That nature of their business is that they kept their weapons with them.

Q13. The reason why I asked is, the evidence given to the Board from various witnesses indication had been that the authorisation had come from Land Force Commander.
A. No, not from me.

Q14. Were you aware of any leave applications being signed by the 1FMS personnels in Parliament to cover their stay in Parliament?
A. No.
Q15: This is the offering of the appointment of Commander to Col Vatu and Lt Col Tarakinikini to be the Chief of Staff. We were told that the discussion had transpired in the office and you were privy to the information during that meeting. Could you tell the Board as to the nature of the briefing and what transpired?

A: I think that came out as a public announcement, that is where we learnt it from and in one of the morning briefings I told everyone that that was the case, but the George Speight group had already made an announcement that they would nominate Col Vatu as the Commander.

Q16: Was he questioned, Sir, as to his involvement?

A: Yes, I questioned him and he said that he was with the RFMF and that he knew nothing about the appointment being given to him.

Q17: Was Lt Col Tarakinikini present there?

A: Yes, we were all in that meeting.

Q18: Was there any time where the George Speight's group or the IFMS was given any assurance by RFMF of their support?

A: No.

Q19: Just going back to the reconciliation part that you spoke of, we have heard evidence given to the Board that the Commander had addressed members of IFMS personnel that were inside the Parliament Complex and he had forgiven them for what they have done and, they have apparently been posted to other units within the RFMF but another member of the said unit was also part of that audience that was in front of the Commander but apparently has been arrested and has been charged. The view is that, the RFMF is held responsible for the words spoken then by the Head of the RFMF and there is a view now that the RFMF is reneging on the promises that is made talking after reconciliation thus that is why Pte Alava was arrested and charged. Do you think that this trend will continue?

A: It could, I think what is happening here is that they are taking any sort of inaction on RFMF's part as condonation. That is a misunderstanding. Commander's intent for them to come back to the Force and be posted to units does not mean that that gives them immunity to the actions they have taken. I believe if all the weapons have been returned as agreed to under the Accord then what Commander said would have transpired because the immunity would have come into force and no one would have been charged. Under the circumstances, the hostages were all released but all the weapons were not returned. As far as RFMF is concerned, the conditions of that Accord has not been met and therefore the immunity decree does not apply and therefore all these investigations that we are doing and why people are being charged.
Q20: Sir, just before we round off, do you wish to add anything further to the Board?

A: On the question of leave, I think on Friday, after the release of the hostages, Commander held a meeting with the IFMS personnel. I had called a meeting and all those who attended that meeting were posted to units. I think there were several people who did not attend that meeting and they were taken as people who did not answer the call to come back to RFMF. One of them was Ravai who called me during the weekend telling me that he was not aware of the meeting and that he was officially on leave. That is the only time I have heard of a leave application being signed.

Q21: The reason why I had asked that question was because, a batch of leave applications have been taken to Parliament and members of IFMS were made to sign; are you aware of that?

A: I am not aware of that.

[A TUATOKO]
Colonel

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
Lt. Col. Seruvakula, after having been duly sworn on the Bible, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: You are still currently the Commanding Officer of the Third Battalion?
A: That is correct.

Q2: You understand the reason behind the Board of Inquiry?
A: Yes, I think I do, Sir.

Q3: Basically, the involvement of the 1MS and the other persons within the RFMF, as CO 3FIR, were you aware of any of the planning or the drafting of the plans for the coup?
A: As for the plans proper no, but whether there was going to be a coup, yes.

Q4: Can you please give us an indication of the knowledge that you have noting that you have an Int cell with you and you also have operations and the whole of Fiji being your area of operation. The question is, were your normal operations made aware of from your Int staff (Int operations and field operations), what was happening and the possibility of a coup and whatever.
A: I had intelligence operators out in the field since June, 1999 straight after elections because I felt then that the political situation was not stable. The operators started sending me signals in August, 1999 of inevitable signs of instability in the country. This was mainly to provide me with information so as to prepare the battalion for any unforeseen events that may come in months to follow. It was just to make sure that we were a step ahead of the instigators or whoever was planning to stage a coup. The operators kept on feeding me information from August and round about October, the coup was becoming a reality. It was not until three weeks before May 19th that the coup was very close, a week before, it was imminent. That was based on intelligence information coming to my office from my operators in the field.

Q5: Was this knowledge passed on to Headquarters RFMF and if so, were any actions taken by Headquarters RFMF, Land Force or Strategic?
A: We continue passing on information from the moment we started receiving, it took two months, June and July for the field operators to get themselves into places where we want them to be and that is amongst the organisations, where the information were likely to come
from. However, in about mid August, we suspected there was a mole so to speak, someone was leaking information out of the intelligence cell where I was reporting to. After feeding false information at the end of the month in October, we confirmed that there was someone in intelligence that was feeding information to people who were not supposed to receive intelligence information. It was then that we stopped informing Headquarters or through the Int cell, and we started going directly to the Commander himself. It was round about November and December when we made the next summary. This was when the Taukei movement started coming out strong and I felt that the Commander need to know some bits of information which we had.

Q6: You have indicated that you knew three weeks or one week before, was the Commander made aware of the reports that you were getting? Not the three weeks because the three weeks, this was when the report came from the operators that there were pocket meetings held in two separate safe houses in the city that are owned by IMS and certain groups were being seen to be in the so-called safe houses whether it was really a safe house that was our perception, the IMS will be able to determine that, however, we have questioned people and they have said so. I did not pass on that information to Commander, however, the week before the coup, that was 24 hours before he left for Norway, I told him that the coup was in a week's time from that day.

Q7: Lt. Col. Seruvakula, after the events of the 19th of May took place, the takeover, through the sources that you had and all your operators both in and outside the organisation out in the whole of the country, were you aware of any names of current serving RFMF personnel or people that had served in RFMF, senior officers involved in the events of the 19th of May?

A: No, as for the 19th of May, it was just Major Ligairi, Ligairi's name popped up two weeks before the coup. There was a connection to someone else which we could not determine until the afternoon of May 19th. The man who was with him.

Q8: Who was this man?

A: The name that came to us was the former Prime Minister, Major-General Rabuka. When I said I confirm, it was just my perception, it is not to say that it is substantiated but from signs both from Parliament and from the field operators inside the Parliament House and from my discussion with the gentleman when he approached me on Friday afternoon, I had very strong reasons to believe that he was part of the group.
Q9: Were any threats made to you before or after the 19th? I know there must have been numerous.
A: Yes, the responses from Parliament House was that I was to be snatched or picked up on Saturday 20th and the Commander on Sunday morning. When that failed, my little boy, the second son was a target to be picked up at the week when school started.

Q10: Do you know who made these threats and what measures did you take?
A: The information on the snatch came from Parliament House itself, from the operators we had in before they got cut off. That was confirmed. The measures I took, I did not leave the camp on that Saturday 20th but I put in place a plan on that same day to protect the Commander when he landed in Nadi. The snatch in Nadi was confirmed when the two vehicles with 1MS personnel inside were cut off but were able to escape the cordon in Nadi Airport at about 3 o'clock on Sunday morning, the 21st. As for myself, I had my soldiers with me, but my little boy had to go with one of the soldiers to school.

Q11: Were any offers made to you to take over RFMF or do you know of any offers that were made to other officers within the RFMF?
A: On the day George Speight was shot at the check-point, I cannot remember the exact date of that incident, Sir, however, in the afternoon, threats and counter-threats were made between 3FIR and the Parliament Complex (George Speight's supporters). I invited Mr. Timoci Silatolu who I believe was George Speight's deputy to come out and sort things out because there were threats of getting checkpoints shot and counter-threats were passed back to Parliament House so I invited him to come out of the complex. When he came out he insisted that Tevita Bukarau came with him. I said, "No, I just want to talk to you", but he insisted that Bukarau to be in the discussions and I said, "Well, fine". I thought that because he was a lawyer, he probably would like him to be present. We met in one of the Government houses at Muaniakau belonging to one of our officers. When we sat down to discuss, they explained to me what the plan was and they believed that I was being misled by the Commander and some senior officers and they believed that I should be with them.

It was during that conversation that evening that I was told that there was a simple solution to the whole crisis. The solution was for me to overthrow the Commander the next day and if I was to do that before 9 o'clock, the hostages would have been released at midday and I would have been made the Commander the same afternoon. The offer was made by Tevita Bukarau and supported by Timoci Silatolu. The witness to the discussions is in East Timor right now.
Q12: What were your actions after getting that offer and the indications given back to them?
A: I explained to them the importance of the oath of allegiance and the difference between my stance and Tevita Bukarau's stance. The difference between him and me is that he is no longer a serving soldier and I am a soldier. I am bounded by the oath of allegiance. It is unethical, it is not morally right for me to take my soldier's allegiance, to take their oath of allegiance individually saying that they will individually defend the country by offering their individual services. I have no right whatsoever to master the soldier's allegiance together to take them and lead them to do something that is morally wrong. That cut short that conversation and it killed that idea.

Q13: So you turned down that offer?
A: That is right.

Q14: Lt. Col. Seruvakula, there has been other times that you have had meetings with those members in Parliament, can you just give us a brief outline on the nature of all those meetings that you had?
A: Not so much meetings, mostly telephone conversations. I speak to Ligairi every morning and I say good morning to him and I say good night every evening. I wanted to have a fair idea of what his state of mind is or what he is thinking everyday. I had a very good idea of what was happening in his mind, I believe, in our conversations on the telephone. To the other members of the GSG, mainly Bukarau, Vakalalabure before he left the complex and the others, when there is something happening like the build-up inside the complex when there are indications that the mob (which we call the group that is inside the complex during the takeover) is about to move out of the complex, we talk to them. We try and maintain the non-confrontational stance the RFMF took during the crisis.

Q15: Were you aware of any senior officers within the RFMF that were also invited to take over the RFMF, your sources and your mode of information that you received from the Unit?
A: The reports, they are all unconfirmed reports of course, but there were two officers on Friday afternoon, 19th and on the days to follow and there was I believe, which when I started going down to the 1MS complex when there was a strong indication that there was an attempt to move all the remaining weapons to the complex. That is when I came across the two officers and there were indications from the same two officers. I believe they had some involvement on Saturday, on the attempt for the Commander to be picked up, there were snapshots of their actions which led me to believe that yes they supported the group.
Q16: Who were these two officers?

Q17: Sir, you mention about the weapons being moved out of the IMS complex, were you privy to noticing any of these movements?
A: The movements of the weapons that ended up at the complex, I have no idea as to when or how they got there, but I do know of the movement of the remaining weapons from there into hiding so I was part of the group.

Q18: These weapons we are talking about are the ones that were moved to Bilo?
A: That is right.

Q19: There was mention in the Board of the incident where you send a cut-off group to cut off the IMS, is this the same involvement or another incident?
A: If I can start from Friday afternoon, Capt. Stevens came back from the West and the former Government Ministers have been taken as hostages. We were in camp and they came to me looking for help. He said he went around looking for someone he could relate to so he came to me. He told me his concern then I asked him about the weapons, if they had taken away all the weapons and he said, "No, about 60 per cent of the weapons are still in the complex" and then I asked him, as to who has the keys to the armoury and he said Tuivanuavou had the keys then. I suggested to him that it would probably be safer to move the weapons away from the complex. It was a considerable amount of weapons and because of the unstable situation in the camp at that time, I did not suggest to him to move it to the main armoury because I was not sure. It was not until late on Friday afternoon when I established the support from CO Engineers, CO LSU and Commander Navy, it was not late until the night. On Friday afternoon, everything was pretty unstable. My armoury was full, I suggest to him that we move it somewhere else and we cache the weapons and the ammunitions.

On Saturday morning, at about midday at approximately 1300 hours, I established a check-point behind IMS complex because there was information that the IMS vehicles were seen in the area. The establishing of a check-point was questioned vigorously from the Headquarters as to why I have set up the check-point. I explained why, my concern is that the weapons have been taken out of the complex, because there was a gate there and at that time, I have already closed both gates (the main gate and the back gate) when the
coup took place on Friday. I send soldiers to secure the main gate and the back gate and told the MPs to get inside the buildings because we knew what was going on. By 10 o'clock all my soldiers already had live ammunitions in their position and inside the camp. There was an entrance which could have been used as an infiltration from inside the camp which is why I established a check-point. In establishing the check-point, we were able to cut off one of two vehicles that came in for the weapons that same day. One was GM 500 which is now one of the landcruisers up in camp and following the establishment of the check-point, there were vehicles coming in and out and just making quick u-turns when they were not aware of it. Obviously, I believe there were plans to remove the weapons on that day. Two senior NCOs came up in the day to try and move the weapons, we closed it. On the same Saturday afternoon, we arranged for a truck to be made available for Capt. Stevens, I cannot quite remember whether it was Saturday or Sunday when we gave the truck to Stevens and told the check-point to secure the removal of the weapons and the weapons were loaded on to the truck and they were taken out of the complex.

Q20: These two senior NCOs that were wanting to take the weapons, can you identify them?
A: Staff-Sergeant Paul Vakadranu and the other one was Ravai. Ravai was arrested on that same night when he came in for the weapons. I cannot remember the names but I can remember their faces.

Q21: You said you set the check-point behind the 1MS complex and there were people questioning your directive, who were they?
A: I was not questioned directly, but my Ops officer and my adjutant came to me and said, "Shall we remove the check-point?" I said, "No, why?" He said, "We have been questioned as to why we set up the check-point" and I said, "Well, that's my check-point, I am in charge of the security of the camp now, we will leave the check-point".

Q22: Can you give an indication of who actually questioned it?
A: It came on again and this time very vigorously as to remove the check-point, and that came from the two gentlemen I have just mentioned, Tarakinikini and Raduva.

Q23: Were you aware of any assurance given by RFMF towards the support of those persons that were in Parliament?
A: When 1MS have taken the hostages, they continue to take rations and I questioned that vigorously on the same afternoon as to why because I blocked it. I prevented them at the gate because during one of the ration runs, one MP5 was dug out of a pot of curry. I informed the Headquarters that the courier is not just a ration run, it is being used as
a weapon courier as well and other bits and pieces. I was told to just let it go because they were looking after the hostages, but the two officers, Stevens and Tuivanauvou kept on insisting right from the word ‘go’, no they were not protecting the hostages, they were part of George Speight’s game plan. That went on for a while, every time we try and put a block, the block is lifted for some reason or another.

Q24: All the blocks were coming from?
A: From the Land Force Headquarters.

Q25: Who in particular was it coming from?
A: From Col. Alfred Tuatoko.

I was confronted and told off a couple of times, but my concern was the weapons that were being taken. We then questioned if there was something that we needed to know, then we should be told because there was an air of suspicion that has been created amongst the members of the Force, the battalion, soldiers and the members of the staff, but there were little things like that. On that day, the conference on Saturday when I questioned the moving of rations, I was then called aside by Lt. Col. Raduva and Lt. Col. Tarakinikini. I was given a lecture on the plight of the indigenous people and why all these were happening. They said, "We should look at this differently, don’t look at this in the Western sense as a hostage crisis", which the way I was looking at it, "Look at it as a way for us, the Fijian people". I was not quite sure of what they were driving at, but they did not get straight to the point. "Unfortunately, we are officers, I understand where you are coming from but it is against the principle".

Q26: We go back to your opening remarks earlier on, you informed the Board that you were briefing the Commander on the possibilities of a coup and the possibility of events that led up to the 19th of May, what was the Commander’s reaction, Sir?
A: He said that he had discussions with someone, I am not sure whether it was the Commissioner or the Director SB, but if I can remember right, one of his comments was "Well, you guys better be prepared", I told him that we have been preparing ever since last year.

Q27: What sort of preparation was your battalion doing then, Sir?
The battalion was not preparing anything particularly for the coup, we set out a five year plan from last year and we were working towards the achievement of the first part of the five year planning which was to be achieved in December this year. We were on build-up training towards that and at the same time, there was a company doing the training, preparing for the battalion target. At all times, there was a
company preparing for internal security based on the information that was coming from intelligence.

Q28.
A.

How many intelligence operatives were inside Parliament?
Sergeant Epeli Voase, Corporal Viliane Laverua, Corporal Vosabeci and Private Gaunavouivuda

Q29.
A.

You started off with four, how many did you end up with, Sir?
The information were not forthcoming from the two left inside the complex, I was then informed by Sergeant Voase that they are to be cut off because the security by the GSG have been established. They have had a meeting and for those people inside to declare their interest whether they were there for the GSG or elsewhere then they are to leave if they were not with the course. It was at this stage that the two left, Corporal Laverua who was based with the Fiji Television Unit and Sergeant Voase. They both got out and they were both never allowed back inside the complex.

The other two were there, we cut off their pay so as not to compromise their positions and told Sergeant Voase that we will leave them there until the crisis is all over and we will determine as to what to do with them depending on the reports they come back with.

Q30.
A.

Sir, just on the severance of pay, were you aware that the other members of the RFMF that were inside the Parliament Complex continued to be paid by the RFMF right up to the very end?
I do and I cannot understand why.

Q31.
A.

The two soldiers, are they back in 3FIR?
They are back with me, but we will be talking with them at the end of this week. We will sit down for them to put cards on the table and we will take things from there.

Q32.
A.

Sir, we have had evidence given to this Board that there was an O group called by the Land Force Commander where he specifically mentioned to the senior officers present that the three pillars you would work on were "no confrontation, no escalation and no bloodshed", were you present in this O group, Sir?
Yes, I was.

Q33.
A.

What was your interpretation of these three things?
It is understandable because at that point in time, the complex, this is later on, because we have allowed the situation to drag on and the
civilians were beginning to locate themselves inside the complex and by that time, yes I would agree with the stance given the fact that there were civilians inside the compound, any escalation would result in unnecessary bloodshed with unarmed people inside the compound.

Q34: How was this interpreted to your men?
A: The same way.

Q35: Sir, just a point of clarification, you mentioned that you are viewing the situation from a Western perspective, could you please elaborate on that?
A: The hostage takers are enemies of the State or lawbreakers, but the fact that they have taken hostage of a Government was an act of treason. They were, in my opinion, enemies of the State at that point in time. The two gentlemen's explanation to me that morning which I just spoke about was totally different, the fact that I should not see it that way but see it as a plight of the indigenous people.

Q36: From the May 19th, what was some of the difficulties or the weaknesses you observed in attempting to rectify the crisis?
A: One of the main difficulties and a very frustrating aspect during the crisis was the fact that we were being reactive right throughout instead of being proactive. In one instance which I believe we could have been better positioned ourselves in a more positive posture rather than to wait for incidents to take place, was the setting up of a cordon. We were more or less doing our job with our hands tied behind our backs. We were told to do something but at the same time, we were told to take it easy on these guys inside the complex. At one stage, I was questioned by one of the check-points in one of the evenings when doing my rounds as to which side are we on, are we with the GSG or are we on the Army side because there were a lot of conflicting signals coming out from Headquarters. That was very frustrating not only for myself but also for the troops.

Q37: What did you see of the officers relationship during this crisis?
A: My immediate observation is that there were a lot of people sitting on the fence from Friday 19th. A good number of officers were sitting on the fence which was unfortunate because it trickled down to the soldiers and create a confusion amongst the troops. I believe that at some stage, there were people just waiting to see who was going to come out as winner at the end of the week.

When they drew the ticket whether George Speight will win it or the Commander will win it and then they will take sides which is unfortunate because as I said, it had a trickle down effect on the
soldiers. It frustrates the soldiers and you could sense that walking inside the Officers Mess, walk inside the meetings, there are people sitting there not talking directly, but were talking in veiled terms.

Q38: Sir, you mentioned that you were not prepared for the coup that took place, you said you prepared your battalion for an inevitable unrest but when I asked you, what preparation, you said you were not prepared for the coup.

A: Sorry, I misunderstood your question there, Major Guake. We prepared ourselves for the conventional task, but as I said, one of the companies was being trained specifically for internal security. That particular training was based on the intelligence report that was coming. As I said, the week before the 19th, the coup was imminent, we prepared ourselves for it having passed on information to the Headquarters. Although there was no direction given as to what to do or any course of action, we could understand that because names started coming out from the sources.

Q39: Sir, the check-point that you had ordered to be established near the IMS complex, was that direction given by Land Force or from your own initiative?

A: I used my own initiative because the gate was open and people were going in and out.

Q40: Did you have an opportunity to use your own initiative in other actions, for example, you just mentioned a cordon out at the Parliament Complex?

A: Yes, we had to do that because of lack of direction from Headquarters.

Q41: Did you establish a cordon outside the Parliament Complex?

A: We moved ourselves forward from where we were supposed to be and we pulled back the day before the nightfall, the night when the policeman was shot.

Q42: Lt. Col. Senuvakula, the support that you are receiving as a field commander, you have indicated that most of the actions were reactive, not proactive, so were you getting the necessary support that you needed from both the Logistics Unit and the command support that you need from Headquarters? As you indicated earlier, there was a lot of confusion and at times, a lot of contradicting reactions, which was the case?

A: I received logistic support from LSU, that was not a problem at all. In fact, the CO LSU went out of his way at times to accommodate my request given the limited resources the RFMF had at that point in time. From Headquarters on the first weekend and the first five or six
days from May 19th, I had a feeling that I was working against a brick-wall every time I tried to do something to put us in good stead for things to come. In placing a battalion in such a way that if the time has come to go and storm the Parliament and free the hostages, we would have been in a better position then. But every time I try to set a foot-hole, something else comes up and I was more or less told to move, I felt I was like on a moving platform. I could not have established ourselves, why I do not know.

Thank you for your contribution, before we finish, would you like to say something else?

On Saturday morning when I went into the complex, at one point in time I was concerned because one of the companies was about to assault the 1MS without my directions until one of the OCs asked me and I told him to back off and leave the place alone.

There was another incident on Friday night when the 1MS was about to be burned down, there were gallons of kerosene being assembled by some of the soldiers, I called the soldiers together on Saturday morning and spoke to them and told them that that is not the way to go, we have not fully established the situation so until we do, we will take actions, until then no one is to do anything until my further orders. That quietened down the soldiers so I made an effort on that Saturday afternoon about midday to go down to the 1MS complex to speak to the troops and just to find out as to what is going on. I do spend some time there to go and drink *yaqona* with the 1MS soldiers.

When I walked into the complex, I could feel straightaway the aura of discontent amongst the soldiers. On one side was Baleinamau and Bainimoli, and in the middle were the new recruits, in the background were those old horses who would not be part of it and on one side were those who were on both sides of the scale. When I walked in, the two officers were there talking to the soldiers, this was the day I established the check-point. I could feel straightaway that my presence there was not welcomed by those Parliament supporters. In fact, the two gentlemen were surprised to find me inside when they walked in. They asked me things and they left again.

Which two guys?
The two gentlemen that I gave their names. Later on in the night, I heard that they went and briefed the troopers of 1MS. I was told by one of the soldiers that spoke to one of the 1MS personnel, the briefing the 1MS had was that we, the battalion was to come into the complex on Friday afternoon. That was confirmed by one of us inside the complex. I was being blamed for coming into the complex on that Friday afternoon.
From my observation, the soldiers of the IMS that were there on Saturday when I went in, went into the complex after being briefed by Baleinamau. What I could not understand was that Baleinamau kept on going up to Headquarters and then getting support. Every time I go up and say something about Baleinamau for him to be stopped, I get a smack in the head and Baleinamau gets a kiss on the cheek, literally. That was very frustrating. He lied to me twice. He spoke to the Land Force Commander, he said that he lied and the Land Force Commander believed him. Everyone else in Headquarters seemed to believe him except Lt. Col. Saubulinayau and myself.

We were not surprised when he was found on the wrong side of the law. We believe that had we got the support from the Headquarters and cut off the IMS completely on Friday when we established the check-point, a lot of those IMS soldiers could have been protected. Had we slammed down the check-point and prevent any IMS personnel from going to the complex, they would have been protected. I believe we have lost some good soldiers by not being reactive.

[V. SERUVAKILA]
Lieutenant Colonel

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
ONE HUNDRED THIRD WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 21045 MAJOR-GENERAL S L RABUKA

Major-General Rabuka, after having been duly sworn on the Bible was interviewed as follows

Q1  Sir, the first question, did you have any prior knowledge to the events that took place on the 19th of May. Everyone was talking about it, the organising of the events that was unfolded on the 19th of May with George Speight?

A:  I was aware of the march, I was aware of some attempts to destabilise the Government. I was not aware that there was going to be the takeover of Parliament on the 19th. If I could elaborate on that. The Members of Parliament on the opposition side including one from the Government, Ratu Silatolu had approached me sometimes earlier and my advise to them was to get their numbers and do it within the Constitution, within the framework of Parliamentary process. I told them that if they were successful in that then we will be able to project to the international community that we have matured since 1987.

There were also social gatherings that I had attended because of the nature of those gatherings and as was prevalent in Fiji at the time most of it tend to gravitate towards the political situation we were in. The questions of change in Government had always been raised and I on my part had always try to approach directly, I would have said that I favoured a change in the Government. But the method of changing the Government I have always been saying should be in accordance with our own Constitution. One of those social gatherings was the church service and the subsequent yaqona session that was hosted by the Meridian squadron on Sunday the 14th of May. This one has been mentioned quite frequently.

In the welcome address, which I responded to and in my response I mentioned to the Meridian squadron with Ligairi back at that time whether he had formally completed the re-enlistment procedures or not, I was not aware at that time but I mentioned to them that they were then commemorating 13 years of existence. I drew the parallel between their development and a young child growing up in a family. At 13, the parents start to see traits of disobedience in the development of a child and I warn them that they should be aware of that development and that they should try and avoid having the rest of the forces blaming them of being too cheeky perhaps, and too proud of themselves and so on. It is a pity that the church service was not recorded but I believe most of those would have remembered what I said.

Col. Vatu was also at that church service. During the yaqona session after, I was surprised that Major Ligairi spoke quite a lot. In previous occasions, he had always remained quiet and he very seldom
volunteered information or views. At this one, on the 14th of May, he was quite vocal and I thought that just because he had been to the village and just come back in and was excited about the fact that we were together again but two years we had not met. We did not meet in 1999 and we just met this year. He said a lot about what he believed, about what the Government was up to and most of the things raised were things that the politician were using in the marches. That so many Bills had been drafted and some of them, more than 10 of them were perceived by the Fijians to be directed at weakening the Fijian positions. I mentioned to them at that time, that of those Bills that we the Fijians saw being aimed at weakening the indigenous Fijian position, none had been enacted. I highlighted that and that emphasise to me at least that the Constitution could work, we could make it work in our favour. I did not say at the time but there is such a thing as legislation that died by committee. They are committed to a committee of the House or a Joint committee of the two chambers of the House and they could just lie and die there. I did not mention that at the time.

But coming to the heart of the question whether I had any prior knowledge, I was party to an advise. I tendered an advice that the SVT was to try and organise a protest march at the time of the signing of the LOME Convention Successor. I pointed out to them at that time that the world leaders, the world press would be here and it would placed their protest march under the microscope of international attention and we would get a lot of mileage out of it if they had done that. I told them look you do it, you get a permit, well and good because you will get the attention. If you do not get a permit, you will still get attention because of the people that were going to be here at that time. But as far as illegally taking over the country, I could not support it and as a matter of principle I could not even encourage it because I had said immediately after the elections of May 1999 that the people have made their choice and I was not going to be party to any illegal overthrow of that Government. I made that clear in a joint meeting at the SVT headquarters attended by representatives of the Nationalist Party, I cannot remember whether there was anyone from VLV but PANU was represented. That is the general account of what I felt the discussion that might have taken place that might have implicated me during the time leading up to the 19th of May.

Q2: Do you have any current knowledge of serving officers, serving members or non serving members at RFMF that were involved in the planning of the events that took place on the 19th of May?
A: I do not know any at all until I walked into Parliament when I saw Major Ligaiiri and a young soldier whose mother is from my village. I do not know what name he goes by in the Army but his first name is Kilimo, I think it is Kilimo Ratu. I asked him what they were doing and he said that the old man told them to go down to Parliament and
look after the Members of Parliament. I was not aware of anybody who might have been involved in any plan. I was not even aware that there was a plan.

Q3: Sir, the establishment of the CRW which is now IMS, the need for that. You established the unit.

A: I raised the question with Ligairi who was then my security adviser. He felt that at that time, I was also of the opinion that we should develop the special forces type capability and I was going to capitalise on Ligairi's connection with the British Army. The rapport we had with the squadron in New Zealand, the SAS unit in Australia and I felt that we needed to protect, have the capability to protect, safeguard the elected Government. At that time, I was also thinking Fijian, because after the 1990 Constitution, the way we were going after 1997 I felt that we should have this unit that was specially trained, specifically selected and also appropriately equipped to be able to look after any elected Fijian government. At that time, you will recall, Mr. President, that there was an armed shipment that was intercepted on his way to Fiji. There was one that had come through so those things were at that time part of the way we thought and the possible scenario that we would have to organise, equip and train. That was why I supported the establishment of the Counter Revolutionary Warfare unit.

Q4: Sir, on the morning of May 19th, it was reported that you visit the Parliament complex, what was the nature of your visit?

A: I got a call from the Secretary to the Senate, Ms Matelita Nagatalevu to say that Parliament had been taken over. I immediately called His Excellency the President and told him if he needs anything I was available. At that time, there was a Prayer group, in fact the phone call came in the middle of the prayer. We were sitting there when the march went past, they were still praying when the PA put the call through, I offered my service to the President and after that I went to Parliament, that was about midday. When I went to Government House I told the President what I saw in Parliament. I saw the Speaker and the President of the Senate sitting in the Speaker's chambers drinking grog. I sat and drank a few bowls with them but the people I saw and the ones that I remember was this young chap, Apisai Tora's son and Ligairi and George Speight. I was not really aware of what the former Government MPs were doing at that time. When we spoke in the afternoon, the Acting Commander, the Commissioner of Police, PS Home Affairs, the official secretary to the President, I was able to tell them what I saw in Parliament. At that time too, the people had not gone into the Parliament, they were still outside the gate.

Q5: Sir, as you are the former Commander of the Army prior to 1987, you left the Army and you came back after May 19th, what was the relationship in the Officers Corp?
There was a strong feeling of what can we do. In fact that weekend was an Officer's training weekend. I came in on Saturday and on Sunday, I came in uniform. It was on Friday night that I had offered to the President, I said "Sir, if you need somebody to go into the Army as Commander at this time, I am prepared". But that was dashed, I think he got some fresh information on Friday evening so on Saturday morning, he said, he could not trust me. I said "Sir, if you cannot trust me totally, do not put me back there, I would rather stay as a civilian." In the discussion we had here at OTS Officers Mess, it was quite evident that, the feeling was; yes, we not really with the Government that had been overthrown but there was also not support for George Speight's group but I do not know how I can put it. I think the officers were just waiting for somebody to take control and get up and go and finish the thing. In fact one officer, Orisi Nawaqaliva, Captain Nawaqaliva said; "Sir, why can't we step in now and run the Government." I said, "well, we have the capability but let just play and see how these things go because we still have the hostages inside."

Sir, was there anything RFMF could do to better the situation? Before that, can I just go back. In the evening when I called the Acting Commander, he told me that they had established contact with Ligairi and they had continued to resupply, I do not know whether it was the ammunition resupply, strictly speaking it could not be resupplied because they have not started expanding any ammunition. I saw Waqaniboro who was at that time (GSM probably) outside. I told the Acting Commander, why don't you send this man in so that he becomes your link. I eventually hear that he became embroiled in the thing and became part of the group, how true that is, I do not know. I believe that the Military could have taken a more decisive step. In the few decisions we had later, I advised the Think Tank, I said "Why don't you make sure you get up to Battery Hill. Take that, if you looking at setting up a check point close to Parliament, you need to take that hill, Battery Hill. That is vital ground as far as that area is concerned." Draunidalo said not to do it, it is too offensive it looked too militant and may endanger the lives of the hostages. When I eventually heard that the shots fired from there were the ones that impacted outside Suva Grammar School, I said well, may be, we should have taken that and we would have been in better control of the junction. I felt that the military could have taken more decisive steps and expect some casualties from both sides. The isolation of the hostages, I believe it was such that it could effectively neutralise all the support that the rebels could have from the crowd, to the lower ground, the steps coming down to where Chaudhry was kept and the main Parliamentary chamber. You could effectively cover those by fire without aiming to hit anybody.

The other thing is that, we did not test out whether Ligairi was there for the rebel course or they are there genuinely as he told me at the
beginning to look after the hostages. It was worth the risk of letting them know that we were going to come in, we were going to release the hostages, we will try and minimise casualties. You look after them, the exit could have been done at the main gate with the others effectively cut off by fire. I was thinking about that, I felt that the military could have done something, the military credibility that we are trying to rebuild might not have been destroyed or eroded if they had done something like that. The British Army went and did it in Sierra Leone, they suffered one casualty but it is the thing that everyone expects the military forces to be able to do. That is all in hindsight.

Sir, we heard evidence given to this Board when members of the Officers Corp who are part of the Reserve Force marched into the camp, there seemed to be a rift or non acceptance by officers who are already in the Regular Force of their advise and what they thought that the RFMF ought to do. Did you witness this or would you like to comment on that?

I felt that it was directed at me at the time that is why I withdrew from negotiation. I felt that the Commander was embarrassed having a former Commander and a senior officer in rank being around so when I felt that I immediately told the Commander I should withdraw and then he said that yes, George Speight's group and the Council of Chiefs are being uncomfortable of you being here. The feeling came from the briefing that Col. Tarakinikini gave. I could tell from the way he was giving his briefing that he was not comfortable.

On the relationship between reserve officers and serving officers, it is something that we have always worked hard to try and eliminate but it is a reality. It is the reality that we must accept that there would be those professional jealousies and the reserve officers, no matter how senior they are, must accept that while they have been out of the Army, those coming up might have been exposed to better training methods through a better system and better military science and technology that they were not available when they were in the force. So, it is a natural thing to happen, it is something that we must be aware exists and something that serving officers of the day should always try and understand. Those of us who had left when we came back, we should not imagine that things were back when we were all in uniform as serving officers.

My next question is on reconciliation. Soldiers that were involved in the events of the 19th of May, the taking over of the Parliamentary complex, are now back in the RFMF. They were present when Commander RFMF actually spoke to them and according to them we assured of being accepted as part of the RFMF. However, there have been on going investigations by the Police where these soldiers who were assured of being taken back by the RFMF were charged and now there seems to be a lack of trust from the soldier's perspective on
members of the Officer Corp. Would you like to comment on this, or how to reconcile this on going problem?
I think if we are going to be seen as the final guarantor of law and order that was what the military have always said then you must be seen to be supporting the legal machinery that has been set up. If there has to be any reconciliation perhaps you should be looking and listening to the mitigating circumstances that they will have to present to the Court of Inquiry at their own Court Martial or whatever. At the end of that, you can still achieve reconciliation by not meting out the maximum penalties and say okay, we would go within the law and if charge them under the Army Act and if those charges are done there, then they serve their punishment and come back in. But I do not believe that there should be a short cut to try and absorb that right away. I think for the future, we need to clean up everything very, very clearly so that we do not fall into the same pit later on.

Sir, before we round off, would you like to say anything else?
I could not do very much during the destabilising phase and the active participation of the populace in opposition to Mr. Chaudhry because I gave him my word of support two weeks after he was sworn in. When the SVT started having this joint Fijian political party meeting, I knew that he was going to come up with something so I called him from the office of Mr. Patel, the owner of Dick Smith Electronics at Knolly Street. I called him and said "Prime Minister, do not worry about me, I know how difficult the job is, I will not be party to the group that is now trying to destabilise your Government.

In June, when they were looking for a Chairman of the Great Council of Chief, the Government National Security Committee met and the Disciplinary Service Committee chaired by Ratu Epeli Kanaimawi also met with the then Acting Permanent Secretary for Home Affairs, Commissioner of Police and Commander RAR. They decided that they needed someone to control the Council of Chiefs, they also felt that if someone has to start the trouble, it would be me. So, they wanted to put me in the Council of Chiefs to take me out of trouble and also to maintain a good control of the Great Council of Chiefs. Because of my position in the Council of Chiefs, I could not support any of the attempts to illegally overthrow Mr. Chaudhry's government. So, that was one of the things that held me back. I should not really say, "held me back" because I was not going to do anything anyway. We were beaten in an election, I said well let us see the whole effect of our own division and unfortunately we were only given one year. If we were given the full term that perhaps the people of Fiji would say, that they had a very rough five years. We do not want to go through the same five years again. So, in their selection of people to lead them politically into the future then they should be aware of what could go wrong if the choice was not properly and objectively thought out.
From the military side, I told Commander FMF before the military takeover that he should remember that there is always the military option. That is the last option if things do not turn out right, you can still do it. In the formulation of the 1997 Constitution, I was responsible for it. The nation decorated me for it. I was given the highest honour in the land, the Companion of the Order of Fiji and because of that, I could not support any action by very simple action to get rid of it. That is why I also maintain my position in the Council of Chiefs to support the President and his attempts to support the amendments, not the abrogation of the Constitution.

Those are some of the background information that might help, Mr. President, and in piecing together the information you have. The other one, I still do not know what is the Meridian squadron did on my estate, whether they went there to board their truck or they actually carrying out training there. If they were there as part of the plan, then perhaps I should have been told because I have been blamed a lot for it. That is something that you can add to the people in the future that when you conduct military training in privately owned property then at least the owner should know because they may have to answer questions, the same way I did because the Meridian squadron was seen passing through my estate.

[S L RABUKA]
Major-General

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 21347 MAJOR AMINIASI TURAGA

Major Turaga, after having been duly sworn on Bible was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Major Turaga, you are here before the Board in your official capacity in the line of work that you are doing at the RFMF. Can you state your appointment in headquarters, RFMF?
A: I hold the appointment of Staff Officer, Personnel at Headquarters, Land Force Command.

Q2: Major Turaga, do you understand the purpose of this Board of Inquiry, this Board of Inquiry is to inquire about the events that took place on the 19th of May, events preceeding that, all in association with the 19th of May on the taking over of Parliament. During the whole conflict, can you give us your information on why the RFMF was paying those involved in the complex, who made the decision to stop and reinstate the pay of those RFMF personnel at the Parliament complex and at what level?
A: In my area of work, I get instruction from the Chief of Staff and whether the instructions were verbal or written, I was to put it down on paper and that is what my line of work requires me to do. In simple terms, I work on the advise of the Chief of Staff who was my immediate reporting officer at the time.

Q3: Can you give the indication when the instructions that were written to cease the pay came from your office and under your signature. Can you give us the reason as to why it was terminated and reactivated. What was the reason behind the termination and the reactivation of it? The documents will be given to you to see them.

(Handed to Witness)

A: These instructions were did sign by me based on the annotations on file by the Chief of Staff and obviously from the Land Force Commander and Commander down the line that I was to issue instructions regarding pay for all those personnel serving 1MS who were alleged to be involved at that time whether they were in Parliament or not but they were out of camp and they were deemed to be absence without leave from the day they left Parliament, the 19th of July to the 6th of August which was the day that Commander RFMF's message over the radio that personnel were supposed to come back to camp. That is why those dates are there. From the 19th of May to the 19th of July as I understand it the Commander had mentioned in the Officers Mess that 1MS were not to be subjected to any suspension of pay as yet because they were there providing security to the people that were being held hostage. That is probably-
why those dates appeared in there and I do not have the documents pertaining to that.

Q4: Major Turaga, throughout the whole conflict, people's pay was not cut right throughout, some were and some were not. Where did you get the names to cease the pay and to reactivate. Where was the list given and who provided that list?

A: The list involving people from 1MS was provided to us by Capt Stevens who was then at that time the interim officer commanding the First Meridian Squadron when those people failed to turn up and a restructure was being done in the unit and a stocktake of all the personnel was supposed to be done, those who were absent and those who had turned up after the Commander's radio broadcast. A final list was being provided to the Land Force Commander, hence this list.

Q5: Major Turaga, Major Sorby came into the scene well after the conflict. The day the pays were ceased was well before Major Sorby became the QC. Who would have provided you with that list? The concern here is two lots of people, we had the serving members from the Engineers and serving members from the 1MS. In the course of the investigation, members from both 1MS and Engineers throughout the whole conflict never had their pay ceased. Who actually provided you with the list from the Engineers and 1MS?

A: I recalled a list came down from the Commander and the Land Force Commander. I recall receiving a list from the Land Force Commander with the annotations on it. I do not have them here. The list that came out from the Engineers was supplied by the Engineers themselves. I cannot recall who signed the letter but I believe that it could have come from the unit orderly room or the battalion 2IC which was Major Waqanisau who I spoke to almost on a daily basis.

Q6: Just going back on what you said that Commander said that members of 1MS were providing security for the hostages, can you recall the day he said that? How long after the 19th of May?

A: I cannot recall, the day.

Q7: Basically, one of things that you said that the pay was terminated because they were deemed to be absent without leave. Would your position change if I was to tell you that the Director of the Army Legal Service have got the soldiers in the Parliament complex to sign leave applications to cover that period?

A: I am not aware of that.

Q8: Would your position change then?
A: I think it would change having seen the leave application forms but in as far as the pay is concerned, I would agree that they were not working for the RFMF at the time that they have been out and basically that whoever works gets paid. That was the situation.

Q9: The normal practice is that a person who is supposed to be on leave, his name is to be published in the RO. Was that done?
A: I am not sure at this time whether this was done in this case.

Q10: My last question is, are you aware of the regulations for termination of pay, basically you cannot terminate the pay unless it is being directed by you.
A: I am well aware of that but we have taken precautions from a personal perspective. We would rather stop pay than having to pay people when they are not at work after 14 days or 7 days has lapsed.

Q11: I am just trying to verify whether you know the system that is in place?
A: Yes.

Q12: Going back to May 19th, when did you march back into camp for normal duties?
A: I came in on the 29th of May after the radio announcement calling for TF and Reserve.

Q13: There is one thing, an issue that has been addressed this morning is the leakage of information from headquarters, more so of the information of the discussion that transpired in O groups in the office and the same being transmitted to the soldiers in the Parliament complex. Were you aware of any information being transmitted or leaked out?
A: Not that I am aware of.

Q14: Did you encounter any situation where what has been discussed in the O groups or in conferences, the same information was related to the Parliament complex by a soldier in your division back to headquarters?
A: Not that I can recall.

Q15: Did you have any contact with any person in the Parliament complex?
A: No, I did not.
Q16: Were you approached by any persons in the Parliament complex to join the ranks and basically to incite officers and soldiers within RFMF?

A: Not after the 29th of May, the day I marched into camp.

Q17: Before the 29th May?

A: Before the 29th of May, I was outside the RFMF.

Q18: We have certain IMS soldiers who had participated in the events in the complex and have been posted to the Middle East. Are you aware of any soldiers that was involved?

A: I have just been made aware of that just a few days ago when I had a note from the President of the Board that we were to bring back someone who had some how mistakenly drafted overseas but in my belief I thought he was cleared by someone to go. I was not aware of who made the clearance though I presume my predecessor might have known or he was sitting on the chair that I am sitting on now. He was responsible for the drafting of personnel at that time and that is Major Mara.

Q19: Major Turaga, we have a conflict of interest here. During the events that took place on the 19th of May, the unit closest to that vicinity was 3FIR. We had some nasty experiences with the 3FIR and those in the Parliament whether civilians or IMS. Could you tell us why the decision was made to post IMS that were involved in the Parliament complex to 3FIR? Where did that decision come from?

A: To the best of my knowledge, this posting was signed by the Land Force Commander. It was indeed signed by the Land Force Commander and I had nothing to do with the posting of people from IMS to 3FIR.

Q20: Major Turaga, on that note, is it also part of your responsibility as a staff officer to advise your superior officers on such matters as posting and pays et cetera?

A: I do advise sometimes, but you must not forget that my advise can be over ruled.

Q21: On this occasion, did you advise the Land Force Commander or the Chief of Staff Land Force on posting matters?

A: I think the matter was very sensitive at the time and the Commander has a legal advisor, the Chief of Staff is there as well as the Commander Land Force. The decision in my view was appropriate at that time and my advice was not required in this instance I believe.
Q22: Major Turaga, can we just go back to prior to the 29th of May when you said you marched into RFMF, where were you before that?
A: I was on retirement, I stayed away from camp.

Q23: Major Turaga, were you at the march on the 19th of May?
A: Yes, I was.

Q24: Can you just relate to us the events related to that march and what transpired in the march.
A: I stood for Parliament, gentlemen on an SVT ticket then I participated in the march. When the call came on the 29th of May, I had to come back in uniform and that was when I severed all my political affiliations and I went back to camp. I did not get in touch with my party after that.

Q25: Can you just relate your participation on the march on the 19th of May and where did you end up? There were various groups, one went to Parliament and another went on the looting.
A: After the March, I came back to town and saw the town burning. I went back to my party headquarters and then I went home.

Q26: Major Turaga, were you ever inside the Parliament complex prior to returning to the RFMF?
A: I was.

Q27: Can you tell us the nature of your visit to the Parliament complex?
A: I think it was on a Thursday, I just want to see what was happening inside and that was it.

Q28: Did you meet anyone while inside the Parliament complex?
A: I did not speak to any of the prominent people there, I just want to go and have a look.

Q29: Did you speak to any members of the RFMF that were there?
A: I met one there, he knew me so he came to say hello. I cannot recall who he was however.

Q30: Did you speak with Major Ligairi?
A: No, I did not, I did not get a chance to speak to him.
Q31: Major Turaga, is it true that you were offered a cabinet post by George Speight and his group?
A: I was. There was no formal invitation though. It came about through the resignation of Mr Mitieli Bulanauca who was first offered a post earlier. He is also from Bua.

Q32: What was your reaction?
A: The offer came from the President of the Bua SVT Constituency Council since I stood for SVT. They were going to contact me so I had to wait. I stayed home waiting for their call, that did not eventuate. On the 29th, the call came for the reservers to march-in so I did.

Q33: If they called you before the 29th, would you take up the offer of that cabinet position?
A: I had to decide on that and given the circumstance, I cannot really say right now. Had I had the opportunity then I would have decided or I would have told them to give me a couple of days to think it over.

Q34: Whilst you were working at headquarters, were you aware of anyone that was involved with those in the Parliament complex where offers made and assistance was given?
A: I cannot really rule out the rumours that were going around but I cannot substantiate any truth in that. I felt the feeling is there and the suspicious is there but I cannot really get to the bottom of this.

Q35: Can you give us the rumours that you heard?
A: Things like some of the officers were involved and the normal things that everyone hears on a day to day basis but we cannot really substantiate these claims.

Q36: Just on the question of you being offered a cabinet position, were you told of the involvement of any other army personnel who was offered a similar position?
A: No. At the time of the offer, as far as I know, there was no army officer being offered another post in that cabinet. No officers from outside the force and neither from inside as far as I know.

Q37: Who made the offer to you?
A: The President of the Bua SVT Constituency Council which is Buli Rarivari who was our spokesman for the Buā Constituency and as I have said, there was nothing formal or written invitation.
Q38: My final question is in your position when you left camp, you have been quite actively involved with a lot of things, did you hear of any plans to get soldiers involved in the overthrowing of government et cetera?
A: No, absolutely not.

Q39: Major Turaga, do you have anything further to say?
A: No, Sir.
W/O1 Namoli, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Mr. Namoli, when did you join the IMS unit?
A: It was in 1987, Sir.

Q2: When you were in East Timor, were you in contact with those in Parliament?
A: No, Sir. Au a neitou i liului na tiko mai East Timor, keitou dau veitarataraga ena fax vata kei iratou na neitou vata kei na neitou nanuma ga e dau vakau mai ena CPF kei na ka eratou vinakata meratou vakavakaraun kina oiratou na lako yani vata kei na progress ni neitou cakacaka mai keya.

Q3: Mr. Namoli, e dua na fax eya taura mai loma ni Palimedi o comment kina o iko mo duavata ena ka e yaco e keya? A detrimental comment was made against the army personnel. That had your signature and that was the fax sent to those in the complex meaning to congratulate them and supporting them and that the Army must be severely dealt with if they step out of line. What is your comment to that?
A: E sega ni dua na fax au vakauta kina Palimedi, Sir.

Q4: Mai East Timor?
A: Io saka.

Q5: E na nomu lesu mai East Timor, o bau curu vakadua ena loma ni Parliament complex?
A: Au qai lako saka mai, sa oti tu na ka e yaco.

Q6: O tukuna ni o se bera ni vesu, o vakamavoataki, o sa qai vesu? O kila na vuna?

Q7: O bau vakatarogi i keya?
A: Au sega tale ni vakatarogi, au sa dretaki ga e tuba, au sa vacuvaculaki.

Q8: O cei a lako me laki kauti iko mai keya?
A: O iratou na 3FIR. O Davuiqalita e dua na kovula au raica ni dabe tiko e liu. O Staff Leiloma eya kauti iratou tiko yani. E dua na i lala eratou laki kauti au mai, e dua na i lala eratou sa tiko rawa tiko e ATG. Au davo saka tiko e valenibula me dua saka na vula, au sa qai suka.

Q9: Mr. Bainimoli, e bau dua na gauna o vakau i tukutuku se o bau kila na ka baleta na vuaviri, na kena plan taki?
A: Au sega saka ni kila e dua na ka.

Q10: Ena gauna sa caka oti kina na vuaviri, e bau dua na gauna o veivuke vei iratou na tiko ena loma ni Palimedi?
A: E sega saka.

Q11: Mr. Namoli, whilst you were in East Timor, did you at any time send any fax or any message to the Parliament?
A: No, Sir.

Q12: Did you ring any person in the Parliament complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q13: After you came back, there was a plan for those of you who returned from East Timor to meet the rest of the members of 1MS in Kalabeu. Did you make the arrangement or were you aware of the arrangement?
A: I do not know of any arrangement.

Q14: Did you go to Kalabeu?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q15: How did you come to know of this?
A: It was said that it came from Stevens and they organised it through the Army. That is why I went.

Q16: Who relate the message to you?
A: It was Stevens.

Q17: He told you?
A: The message came through him.

Q18: My question is who told you to meet in Kalabu?
A: I do not know but the message came through the telephone for me to go. I think it came from our complex.

Q19: Mr. Bainimoli, vinaka vakalevu na nomu mai soli iukutuku e ke. E dua tale na ka o ni via vakaraitaka.
A: Sir, au via vakaraitaka saka ga na ka sa vakayacori kevaka me ya rawa saka ga niu kau mai meu mai vakatarogi, na procedure sakaga vaka mataivalu, na respect e tiko kina, keya daumaka cake sara. Na gaunisala saka e muri e dua na scar levu esa tiko ena noqu family. O rau nuarua na noqu gone yalewa e rau sa tiko mai Nadroga ena gauna oqo. E ratou sa lewe tolu walega eratou tiko e vale. Ena dua na gauna balavu me na sagai iratou kina meratou lesu tale i vale. Oiratou na trauma organisation eratou sa lako tiko saka yani meratou laki veivuke tiko to bring my family back. O koya saka ga oya.

Q20: O sa kila tiko ni dua na BOI e lako tiko me baleta na nomu kisi?
A: Io saka.

[M. S. NAMOLI]
Warrant Officer Class One

[J. N. B. EVANS] [A. MOHAMMED] [T. GUCAKE]
Lieutenant Colonel Major Major
President Member Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
Sgt Lewalau, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: O curu ena Unit ena yabaki cava?

Q2: Vakamacalataka mada na ka o kila baleta na vuaviri?
A: On that morning, I was at the Airport doing my routine security check and at about 11.00 o'clock it was announced over the radio that some masked man had stormed into Parliament. After that, I rang the complex and I spoke with Mr. Bainimoli and he told me that some of our members had participated in the takeover then I went to Major Waqabaca in Lautoka. I asked him if he has already heard the news and he said so, so I tried to contact our Unit but comms. was cut off, so I then decided to stay at DEB and I was attached to their Intelligence Cell for the whole duration of the crisis.

Q3: Prior to the events of the 19th of May, did you have any prior knowledge of the takeover?
A: No.

Q4: Did you get any contacts from anywhere in the Parliament while you were away in DEB?
A: No.

Q5: Did you have contacts from any IMS personnel whether serving or retired about anything at all in relation to the activities or the takeover?
A: At one time when I came home, there was a note there for me to call a number. When I called it was Capt Maivalili. He told me that he has been trying to because there was a friction between Baleinamau and Mr Stevens and he told me that his main job at that moment was to try and reconcile the two, and at the same time, he also asked me to try and get 100 K2 firing pins from the DEB. Due to my good working relationship with the SFIR, I said that I cannot.

Q6: Did he say what he was going to use the firing pins for?
A: No.

Q7: The number that was given to you, do you have a recollection of the number that you dialed?
A: No.
Q8. You said you were in the Int. Cell in the DEB. Were you at any time briefed or became aware of any involvement of any officers, serving or in the TF that have taken an active part or had contributed to the events of May 19th?
A: No.

Q9: Whilst in the Western Division, were you ever contacted by members of IFMS to conduct any operation?
A: No.

Q10: Whilst operating in the Western Division, did any of the members of the IFMS or any officer or soldier contacted you requesting for information about the Unit or about any officer or personnel in the Western Division?
A: But one time, Mr Stevens when I was involved with the 5FIR, he asked me not to work with them. I was frustrated then I came and I said that we have been working with them for the past years. I do not know the reason why he told me that.

Q11: This was during the crisis?
A: Yes, during the crisis.

Q12: There was an incident where there were reports of a so-called assassination or an attempt to grab the Commander when he was returning from Norway. Were you aware of this?
A: I just came to know during the crisis when they were discussing that things were supposed to happen but for me, I do not have any knowledge about it.

Q13: Where was this discussion taking place?
A: In the Complex when we were having morning tea.

Q14: What was the nature of the discussion?
A: They were just saying that some officers came to the Complex and they asked if there could be a snatch team to snatch the Commander and I heard that Mr Baleinamau turned it down at the very last moment.

Q15: Did they mention the name of the officers?
A: No.

Q16: Were these the names of officers that you heard - Col Tarakinikini and Col Raduva?
A: Yes.

Q17: Col Tarakinikini and Col Raduva requesting that a snatch team go down?
A: Yes.
Q18: The persons that were discussing this in the Unit, can you name them?
   A: I cannot recall.

Q19: How did you know that it was Capt Maivalili who was trying to contact you?
   A: He told me that he was Capt Maivalili.

Q20: Are you sure that he was really Capt Maivalili?
   A: The voice, yes.

Q21: How many times did he try to contact you?
   A: Twice.

Q22: The first time was for the 100 K2 firing pins?
   A: Sir.

Q23: And the second time?
   A: He just wanted to follow-up the request that came, I think.

Q24: There was a Team Moses that existed in IFMS. Could you brief the Board of the so-called Team Moses?
   A: That was the code-name that Maivalili told me.

Q25: When he used that code-name "Team Moses" what did it mean to you?
   A: I do not know.

Q26: Who would not know who are members of that code-name?
   A: I only know Capt Maivalili.

Q27: Did you at any time come to the Parliament Complex in Suva?
   A: Never, Sir.

Q28: Did you stay in Fiji throughout the crisis?
   A: I went to Australia. I was trying to get out of this because of what happened and I asked my business partner if he could apply for my visa, and we went to Australia and I stayed there till the Kalabu crisis, that was when I came back.

Q29: Can you just inform the Board when was this morning tea taking place, when and where when you heard about the conversation which mentioned the names of those two officers?
   A: That was when I came back from Australia and I tried to visit the Complex, I could not remember the date. Whilst we were having tea, this discussion came up and I then knew that there was a team that was supposed to by that conversation, Sir.

Q30: This maybe in August or still in July?
   A: August.
Q31: You heard that Lt Baleinamau turned it down?
A: Yes.

Q32: Most members of the IFMS were involved in the taking over or later joined the people at the Parliament Complex. What made you stay away when the whole Unit was so-called "committed" to the Complex?
A: First, Sir, that they were hiding things from some of us, so when that happened, I thought, the best decision was to stay-put and do not be involved.

Q33: You said, "they were hiding things from some of us"; what do you mean by that?
A: Even I was at the Intelligence Cell of the Unit, and when that happened, I do not even have any information of the planning, etc.

Q34: They did not tell you all about that?
A: Yes.

Q35: Subsequently, after the incident, have you come to know of the planning?
A: No, Sir.

Q36: Do you have any knowledge of how the Unit got involved in the events of May 19th?
A: No, Sir.

Q37: How long have you been working in the Western side?
A: It has been about three years now.

Q38: Were you aware of any shipment or movement of arms through the Airport into Suva by Punja & Sons?
A: No.
Q39: Any movement of arms or persons alleged moving arms through the Airport into Suva?
   A: To my knowledge, no.

Q40: Sgt Lewalau, before we end this interview, do you wish to say anything else?
   A: No, Sir.

[S. LEWALAU]
Sergeant

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 25215 CAPT RATU S N RAYAWA

Capt Ratu Rayawa, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Did you have any knowledge of the events that unfolded on the 19th of May?
A: No, Sir.

Q2: On the 19th of May, we saw you going inside, can you just relate to us the reasons why you went inside?
A: Sir, on the 19th of May, I was actually inside Burns Philip Home Centre - Nausori Branch when I heard over the radio that a coup had happened, that there was a takeover in Government. It was around a quarter to eleven when I heard the news so I told myself that if there was going to be a coup then I have got to be actually in the picture or know about what was happening because of the 1987 involvement of the military I was actually in Fiji.

Sir, I came in on the 4th of May, and I did not know anything that was going on, and I thought this was another 1987 scenario. I boarded the vehicle and I headed directly to the place where I heard that the coup had happened; that was the Parliamentary Complex.

On my way, there were vehicles on the road running back towards Nausori. I arrived at the Parliamentary Complex, there were a lot of people standing on the gate. I knew that I was not able to go in. Actually I had a camera with me so I said to myself that I have got to try and make my way in to see for myself what was really happening in there and who was involved. I was still trying to make up my mind when the Chairman of the BLV, Major-General Sitiveni Rabuka came in in his pajero, so I said to myself, "This would be the way I will be able to go in so as soon as the vehicle went in, I said "hello" to him, he said "hello" back, and I followed his vehicle in, and because of the camera that I had, the people thought that I was part of the media so I was able to go in, followed the vehicle right in, Waqalevu was the driver, I went into the Complex. I was following the Chairman of the BLV all the way but as he entered some of the rooms, we were not allowed in. All cameramen were told to stop taking pictures only when ordered to so after that, I came back to where Waqalevu was parking, I stood with him there because the Chairman had to go and do some discussions, at that time he was the mediator or something. I went to Waqalevu and I knew that that was all that I needed to see. I went out again, back to Suva. In Suva, I took pictures of the riot and theft, I went back, round about 2.00 of the same day, I was at the National Operation Centre showing the video camera to the National Duty Officer who was Major Naivalu at that time. Little did I know that one of the guys who were sitting there was maybe deeply involved of which we heard after the events unfolded, was the GSM.
Waganiboro was sitting inside the National Ops at that very moment. Now I realise that maybe he was the one feeding information from where he was sitting concerning the coup that had happened. These are unconfirmed but just my personal assumption of the unfolding of events. I was showing the National Operation Duty Officer the shots that I took and then from then on, that was it, Sir.

Q3: Do you have a copy of the pictures that you took?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q4: If it is okay with you, the Board would like to have a copy of that?
A: That is okay, Sir.

(Copy of the video tape to be tendered will be marked as Exhibit 01)

EXHIBIT 01: COPY OF THE VIDEO TAPE COVERING THE MAY TAKEOVER.

Q5: Capt Rayawa, what was your line of work when this took place on the 19th of May?
A: I was on leave, I was not posted yet after my arrival from Kuwait.

Q6: On return, where were you posted?
A: That is what I had just mentioned - on return, I was told to go on leave, so that was actually the two weeks that I was still enjoying my leave. When I returned, I was told that I was going to be the SO Log up at the HQ LFC.

Q7: After your two weeks leave, you went back to HQ Land Force as SO2 Log?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q8: In your capacity there, did you hear or were you in contact with those people at the Parliamentary Complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q9: Did you hear of anyone within the Force that was in contact with those people at the Parliament Complex?
A: I think the only officer that I knew that was really having a lot of communication because we were there most of the time was the spokesman, Lt-Col Tarakinikini.

Q10: Whilst in the HQ, were you presented with any propaganda leaflets from the Parliament Complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q11: Did you witness any distribution of such leaflets or heard of anyone distributing leaflets?
A: Not only did I hear but I also saw that it was coming through a fax machine which was in the typing pool and clerks there were aware of the fax coming in.
Q12: When you went to the Parliamentary Complex, did you identify any persons in there other than the Major-General himself?
A: Yes, Sir, I identified Major Ligairi, Alava and Rava'i.

Q13: Anyone else?
A: The rest were civilians.

Q14: Subsequently the personnel you saw in the complex, did you come to identify or know who they were as time went by?
A: The military.

Q15: Military or civilians?
A: Yes, Sir, as it actually started unfolding, the lady that actually came and was almost giving orders of who to arrest was Mrs Ema Druavesi. She was there that morning, talking and saying things to the 1MS boys who were there at that time.

Q16: Did you identify any other civilians there?
A: Sir, actually when we were standing there, it was the daughter of the late President who came out to use the ablution, she was the other lady I saw.

Q17: After you left the Parliamentary Complex, did you go back in again?
A: No, Sir.

Q18: What made you carry a bigger camera that day, it is not normal for a person to be carrying it around?
A: As I came back from the Middle East, I was actually on my way to the village when I heard about this. I was going to buy an aerial to take to the village to my Dad and I had all the movies that I took from Kuwait with me and I was actually going to the village. When I reached Burns Philip Home Centre, I heard about the coup so the camera and everything were inside the vehicle so I brought it all back to Suva with me. I was thinking, how am I going to go in, I said, "If this is the opportunity for me to go in, perhaps I will to really know what is happening inside there."

Q19: Capt Rayawa, were you present at the press conference that was given by George Speight prior to the arrival or maybe after the arrival of Major-General Rabuka?
A: No, Sir.

Q20: How long were you actually inside the Parliament Complex?
A: I would say 30-45 minutes

Q21: I know you have already mentioned to Major Mohammed that you never went in again after that but we have heard reports that the name of Tui Noco was mentioned inside the Parliament Complex; would you like to elaborate on this?
A: Yes, Sir. The old man who is actually called the "Tui Noco", who has the title right now had a representative in the Bose Levu Vakaturaga by the
name of Ratu Iosa Damudamu. Ratu Iosa Damudamu, because of his involvement with the Bose Levu Vakaturaga were conceded by the tikina of Noco to be the sole representative of the tikina and wherever he goes, he takes the title “Tui Noco” with him, unfortunately for this man, he did not consult the rightful Tui Noco of all his actions after the 19th May coup so what has happened, he himself was approached by the headman from the tikina of Noco telling him “If none of you from Lomanikoro (which is from Nabudrau) will come and help us, we are going to leave you people and we are going to go ourselves because of our support” and let me actually emphasise here that these people from the tikina of Noco and part of the Rewan Yasana are nationalist people, and this is the influence of Butadroka. These people really agreed totally supporting concerning the cause of the coup, and every time now when this guy was involved, Ratu Iosa Damudamu, the name “Tui Noco” was used. He was using the name “Tui Noco”. Every time he was actually taking the people of the tikina of Noco to the Parliament, Ratu Iosa Damudamu was the man that was taking the same because of his affiliation with the Bose Levu Vakaturaga but my dad - the old man, was actually not in the Bose Levu Vakaturaga as he was always in the village so that is the story about the affiliation of the tikina of Noco and the people in the Parliamentary Complex.

Q22: Do you have anything else to add?
A: No, Sir.

[S.N. RAYAWA]
Captain

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member
Pte Ledua, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Yabaki cava o curu kina e na Unit?
A: Yabaki sa oti, saka

Q2: Se bera na vuaviri e na i ka 19 ni siga o bau kila se o bau taura e dua na i tukutuku ni na vakayacori na vuaviri?
A: Sega saka.

Q3: Na i ka 19 ni siga, o a tiko e vei o iko?
A: Keitou lesu mai na exercise oti oya au gole sara i vale.

Q4: Gauna cava o qai gole sobu kina i na Complex i ra?
A: Sigia Vakarauwai.

Q5: O cei a tukuna vei iko mo lako i ra?
A: Au curu ga vata kei ira na lewenivenua.

Q6: Bau dua e tukuna vei iko mo gole i ra?
A: Sega.

Q7: Vica na kaloko e na Vakarauwai o curu kina i ra ya?
A: Oti toka na vakasigalevu.

Q8: Na cava o lako i kakava i kea?
A: Au lako ga i sarasara tu au sa mani curu sara tu ena security.

Q9: E vica vata na security e tiko; security i matamata, security e na perimeter, security e na Battery Hill vata kei na security vei ira na hostages - kai Viti kei na kai Idia?
A: Battery Hill.

Q10: Dua tale na vanua?
A: Sega.

Q11: O bau yadra talega e na matamata ruarua?
A: So ga na gauna.

Q12: Vakacava vei iratou na hostages?
A: Sega.

Q13: Bau dua na gauna o lai yadra i kea?
A: Sega.
Q14: Gauna cava o qai biuta mai kina na Complex?
A: Na gauna e sa suka kina na i yaragi.

Q15: E na gauna qo o tiko e na 3FIR?
A: Io saka.

Q16: Is it true that you went for the Makuluva Survival Exercise?
A: Yes.

Q17: How many of you went for that exercise; would I be correct in saying 14?
A: Yes, I cannot recall the exact number.

Q18: On Thursday night, were you there when you were instructed to load the pistol with ammunitions?
A: Au sa guilecava sara ga.

Q19: What time did you leave Makuluva?
A: Se bogi tu ga keitou sa lako mai.

Q20: So it was still dark you got into the Zodiac, then where did you go?
A: Keitou lako ga mai, keitou mai kele tu e na dua na vanua oya me yacova na matakia.

Q21: Kele, j wai se voleka i Nukulau?
A: Kele tu i wai.

Q22: Vakaciriciri tu ga i wai?
A: Io.

Q23: In the morning, where did you land?
A: I na Range.

Q24: You were in the 2nd Zodiac?
A: Sir.

Q25: When you were coming back, did you meet Mr Dakuliga?
A: Yes.

Q26: It was half-way between the Range and Makuluva Island, true?
A: No, we met him at the Range.

Q27: You did not meet him out at sea?
A: No.

Q28: When you arrived at the Range, who was present there?
A: We arrived there then we waited for the pick-up.

Q29: Then the pick-up truck arrived later?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q30: Who was driving?
A: I have forgotten.

Q31: Do you know Vakadraru?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q32: Was he driving?
A: I am really confused now.

Q33: From there you went to camp?
A: Yes.

Q34: What did you do in camp at QEB?
A: Keitou yaco ga mai oya, re-condition, keitou sa dui lako sara.

Q35: What equipments were you reconditioning?
A: Keitou savata kecega na i yaya ni neitou training.

Q36: Nomudou dui personal weapon dou a kauta i Makuluva e na siga Tusiti. Bogi ni siga Lotulevu a kau yani kina e so na i yaragi, era a tawa tiko yani ena taga, o a raica?
A: Au sega ni taura rawa saka.

Q37: Did you see any boxes inside the Zodiac?
A: We had a lot of stuff in there.

Q38: Were boxes in there?
A: I could not tell because it was night time.

Q39: Na gauna dou cabe mai kina mai na Range, na nomudou Zodiac talega e cabe mai na Range se sega?
A: Io, e vakavodoki talega mai kina na Zodiac.

Q40: Vakavodoki ruarua?
A: Io, e rua e vodo mai kina.

Q41: E vica na Zodiac dou a vakayagataka tiko?
A: E tolu.

Q42: E sega ni rua?
A: E tolu, e rua keitou a vodo vata ena lori.

Q43: Rua e vodo e na Range, kena i katolu e lako i vei?
A: Kena i katolu e sega ni macala.

Q44: O Qicatabua a coxswain tiko e na dua, o bau vakasamataka?
A: (Silence)
Q45: O cei a coxswain mai e na nomudou Zodiac?
A: Naika.

Q46: Na gauna dou recondition oti ga kina oya, oti sa tuñi mo dou sa lako i brief, dou a gole sobu mai ena briefing i na Complex?
A: Io.

Q47: Dou a de-brief nomudou lesu mai na exercise?
A: Oti ga mai na exercise, keitou mai de-brief ena vanua ni gunu ti, oti ga oya keitou sa lai veisau, oti ga oya keitou sa curu tale mai me keitou mai brief.

Q48: O cei e mai brief vei kemudou; e sega ni o OC?
A: O CC.

Q49: Na cava e tukuna o OC vei kemudou?
A: Brief-taki keitou ga e na tayabe koya e vakara caka, me keitou qarauna na ka ena yaco.

Q50: Sega ni tukuna okoya me dua na vanua dou lako kina?
A: Sega, oti ga oya keitou sa dui gole sara ga.

Q51: Sa tuñi vei kemudou mo dou sa lako i vale?
A: Io.

Q52: Dua tale na ka o via vakamacalataka i ke?
A: Sega.

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[J. LEDUA]
Private

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[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member

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CONFIDENTIAL
-687-
ONE HUNDRED & NINTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 22756 SGT JONE VOSABALAVU

Sgt Vosabalavu, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Satini, e na i ka 18 ni siga, na macawa taucoko ni vuaviri, mai nai ka 15 ki na i ka 19 ni siga ni vula o Me, o iko a tiko ena keba, e dina oya?
A: Sir.

Q2: Ena loma ni macawa oya, o raica na kena kau i tuba na yaragi, mai na Moniti na i ka 15 ni siga ki na Lotulevu nai ka 18 ni siga?
A: Sega.

Q3: Ena bogi ni Lotulevu, eso na i yaragi e a kau i tuba, o raica na kena kau i tuba nai yaragi oya?
A: Sega saka.

Q4: O a tiko evei ena bogi ni Lotulevu, na i ka 18 ni siga?
A: Ena bogi ni siga Lotulevu, keitou a duty saka e na keba.

Q5: Ena bogi ni Lotulevu o raici iratou o Tikotani, Alava kei Naduaniwai ni ratou tiko ena Unit?
A: O Tikotani kei Alava au sega ni raici rau, ia e dua saka ga e dodou me duty, o Tikotani e a sega ni lako mai ena yâkavi oya. Oti oya e mani lako mai o Naduaniwai, keitou tukuna vua me vakacegu, off-duty okoya baleta ena gauna oya e lako kina na neiout selection, lako e dua na exercise i Makuluva. Keitou wase rua na duty me rawa ni keitou yadua na bogi, dua na group.

Ena gauna au yadra tiko kina o au, au sega ni raici rau o Tikotani. O Tikotani e dodou me lako mai me mai duty ia e a qiri mai, ia au sega ni raici rau o Tikotani vata kei Alava.

Q6: Ena siga Vakarabubuka, ena gauna e a soli tiko kina na briefing mo dou gole sobu ena dua na exercise, ni a tiko kina?
A: Sega saka.

Q7: Ena gauna e a gole sobu kina na lori, kauiti ira na lai curu i Palimedi, ni a gole sobu ena lori?
A: Sega saka.

Q8: Ni a tiko evei ena gauna oya?
A: Ena siga Vakarabubuka saka oya, ena matakai lai lai au a kerea vei OC ni dua na noqu personal admin, e mani sign-taka e dua na noqu leave pass, au sa gole. Au sa yaco saka i vale, au sa qai rogo ra ni sa yaco saka e dua na ka.
Q9: Ena gauna cava o qai curu e loma ni Palimedi?
   A: Vakadua saka ga noqu gole sou i kea, mai na Vakaraubuka,
      Vakaraunaiwai, Sigatabu, au a tiko mai vale au qai lesu mai na Keba ena
      siga Moniti. Au lesu mai kea, au sa mai cakava ga na noqu cakacaka
      va admin me baleta niu chief clerk ni Unit, au sega ni vakasamataka
      na date vata kei na gauna a tukuni kina vei au meu kauta soubo na
      leave applications me ra lai sign-taka taukoko mai o ira na tu i ra o ya.

Q10: O cei a tukuna vei iko mo kauta soubo na leave applications?
    A: O neitou OC. E tukuna okoya ni sa vakadewataka mai cake. E
       vakadua sara ga o ya na noqu gole soubo o ya, au kauta soubo na leave
       applications me ra lai sign taukoko mai, au lesu tale mai.

Q11: Ena gauna o tiko kina e loma ni Unit, o soli tukutuku tiko vei ira na
     tiko i loma, se veivuake vei ira na tiko i loma ni Parliament Complex?
    A: Na ka ga au kita o au, noqu vakaitavatiki au ena ka ni administration,
       e tukuni mai vei au meu type-taka na demand ni kakana kei na ka
       taukoko vaka oya o au vakava taukoko ya.

Q12: O cei e solia tiko mai vei iko na directive o ya?
    A: Na directive o ya e lako tiko mai vei neitou OC, o Mr. Baleinamau.

Q13: Mr. Vosabalavu, this is the occurrence book in the Unit, whose hand-
     writing is this? Can you identify this hand-writing?
    (Shown to witness)
    A: No.

Q14: When you reported for duty as it was stated here 1800 hours, what
     does your duty normally entail in the Unit? What do you come and
     do?
    A: Just receive phone calls, maintain security of the Complex.

Q15: Sgt Vosabalavu, na Unit cava o sa tiko kina ena gauna ogo?
    A: Au sa tiko saka ena 3FIR.

Q16: Na cava na vu ni nomu sa lako kina ki na 3FIR?
    A: Au sega sara ga ni taura rawa se cava au post-taki kina ki na 3FIR.

Q17: O sa taroga vua na nomu OC se cava na vuna o sa lako soubo kina?
    A: Segu saka.

Q18: Tukuni ga mo lako, o sa mani lako tu?
    A: Io, esa gole saka yani o Mr. Sorby, e sa tukuni vei au meu gole ki na
       3FIR, au sa mani gole soubo kina.

Q19: Ena siga Lotulevu (18th of May), mai na 1730 hours to 2000 hours, o
     iko a yadra kina?
    A: Sir.
Q20: Na nomu mata yadra qo, o Paul, Rava, o iko, Mateinaniu, Gaunavinaka vata kei Rere?
A: Sir.

Q21: O iko a duty mai na 2306 hours to 0200 hours, o vakasamataka o cei o hand-over vua e na mataka lai lai ni siga Vakaraubuka?
A: Au vakabauta saka ga o au ni keirau a duty tiko vata kei Cpl Mateinaniu.

Q22: O a sega ni duty ena bogi?
A: Io.

Q23: E dua tiko ga na mawe ni liga e volavola tikoga qo. E sega ni we ni liga i Vakadranu qo? Qo na nomudou duty roster o kemudou, o sa taura rawa se mawe ni liga i cei qo?
A: O Paul saka qo.

Q24: Ena next page, 2306 i cake na timing, e hand-over o koya vei iko, o taura rawa? E a hand-over vei iko o koya se sega?
A: Au sega ni vakasamataka.

Q25: Mai na 2306 hours to 0200 hours, e sega sara ga ni dua na ka o enter-taka o iko ena vanua qo, kevaka e hand-over vei iko - about three hours.
A: Au kilo ni a sega ni hand-over saka vei au o koya.

Q26: Baleta ni o tukuna tiko o iko ni o yadra ga ena yakavi, oti na 11 na kaloko o sa yadra kina o iko se sega?
A: Au kilo o au ni qai via rauta tiko beka na 12.00, au sa moce saka o au.

Q27: O cei qai hand-over vei Matalinaniu?
A: Ena gauna saka qo e man-taka tiko kina o koya na walesi, e dau levu na gauna e caka na exercise oya, e sa dau tukuna ga o koya, "Dou vakacegu, au sa na man-taka toka na ka taucoko qo". Au vakasamataka ni keirau yadra tiko kei Mateinaniu me yacova na gauna au vakacegu kina.

Q28: Rank cava o Mateinaniu?
A: Kovula, Sir.

Q29: E tukuna o Kovula me vakacegu mada na Satini, o kemudou na tiko i cake vua me qai man-taka okoya na ka o ya?
A: Sir, baleta ni okoya saka ga e kilu taucoko saka tu na ka ni walesi kei na ka va o ya.

Q30: Nomu saka ena mataka lai lai ni Vakaraubuka, o lako i vei?
A: Au kere a saka vei neitou OC ni dua saka na noqu personal admin meu gole sobu mada kina.
Q31: O iko a tiko ena nomudou Unit ena gauna e brief kina o Capt. Stevens ni sa OC vou okoya?
A: Io, au a tiko saka kina.

Q32: A sega ni taroga o koya o cei se vakamuri Na Qase tikoga, se dua se vakamuri Na Qase tikoga me tucake, a taroga o koya?
A: Io, e taroga saka o koya.

Q33: O iko a tucake?
A: Au sega saka ni tucake.

Q34: Na cava ga o qai post-taki kina ena 3FIR?
A: A sega saka ni taroga o koya ena gauna ni brief, okoya a interview-taki keitou yadudua saka ga. A taroga saka o koya vei au se vakacava kevaka e dua e mai OC tale, au qai tukuna saka ga vua, "Kevaka esa direct-taka o Na Qase me sa OC, okay, vinaka." O koya saka ga o ya na ka au tukuna.

Q35: The writing on the next page, just after your name was written, "hand-over duty", that is not your hand-writing, is it?
A: No.

Q36: Sgt. Vosabalavu, e dua tale na ka o via vakamacalataka i ke ni se bera ni oti na interview?
A: Au via vakaraitaka saka ga ni siga Vakaraubuka o ya, au a sega saka ni kila e dua na ka, au sa raica ni sa yaco na ka, i made up my decision at home, au sa nanuma meu sa na lesu ga meu sa lai kakava ga na noqu cakacaka vaka-administrator ni Unit. Na kena vo tuucoko tale o ya, au sega ni kila kina e dua na ka.

Q37: O curu ena Unit o ya ena yabaki cava?

Q38: Era gole sobu kece na i lala o ya, na cava o sega ni gole sobu kina o iko?
A: Au sega ni gole sobu saka baleta, kena i matai au a sega ni tiko saka ena gauna e a yaco saka kina na lako sobu. Na kenai kara, ena gauna au lesu sobu yani kina ena siga Moniti, au sa vakadeitaka e lomaq niu sa na kakava ga na noqu cakacaka vaka-administrator. Au sa mani tu saka ga kina i na Keba, au kakava tu ga kina eso na demand e lako mai, taipataka, vakabibi na ration demand.

Q39: The leave applications that were signed, where are they now?
A: I told the clerk who replaced me at IMS to just keep them, I have put them in a file.

Q40: Who was the clerk to replace you?
A: Corporal Lima.
Q41: Na vanua cava e tiko kina na leave applications?
A: E tiko saka ga i cake. Au tukuna saka vua ni dua na Cabinet oya e biu saka tiko kina, e file taki tu vakavina ka.

Q42: E na vanua cava e file-taki tu kina?
A: Ena kila saka okoya. Au sa na gole cake tale ga qo meu na lai check-taka talega.

[Signature: J. VOSABALAVU]
Sergeant

[Signature: J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[Signature: A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[Signature: H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member

[Signature: T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member
ONE HUNDRED & TENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 23570 CPL PONIANI NACAGILEVU

Cpl Nacagilevu, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Kovula, o a curu ena Unit ena yabaki cava?
A: Au a curu saka ena Unit ena yabaki 87.

Q2: Ena macawa ni vuaviri ko a tikoga ena keba. Ena macawa oya mai na siga Momu me yacova na siga Lotulevu na i ka 18 ni siga, o bau raica e dua na gauna e kau kina na i yaragi mai na loma ni unit?
A: E sega saka.

Q3: Ena mataka lailai ni siga Vakaraubuka, ko a tiko ena briefing mai vei OC me caka e dua na exercise?
A: E sega saka.

Q4: Ko e tiko evei?
A: Au e tiko saka ga ena office.

Q5: Ena nodra gole sobu na i lawalawa oya, ko a gole vata kei ira se sega?
A: E sega saka.

Q6: O a bau curu vakavica ena Parliament Complex kei na tiki ni siga ko curu kina?
A: Na ka ga au kila saka niu qarava tiko na ka ni admin kei na ka kecega ni Unit. Au lako ga mai na office i vaie sara.

Q7: E bai dua na gauna o curu ena loma ni Parliament Complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q8: O bau rogoca se kila se o vakaitavi ena kena vakasamataki na vuaviri?
A: E sega saka.

Q9: O a tiko evei ni rauta na 2.00 na kaloko e na siga Vakarauwai na i ka 20 ni siga, ni oti na vaka'sigalevu na gauna e kau tiko kina na i yaragi?
A: Au lako saka mai ki na keba - mai na office ga i na keba.

Q10: Na laave applications koya a kau sobu kina Palimedi, e tiko evei na leave applications ena gauna ogo?
A: Au sega saka ni kila baleta niu a sega ni tiko ena kena a kau sobu.

Q11: E nukuna o Sgt. Vosabalavu (e se qai vakana'daku ga qo okoya) ni o koya e a kauta sobu me laki sainitaki ka qai kau mai. E kila tiko o iko na vanua e tiko kina na leave applications?
A: Na ka qori e a mai vakatarogi tiko vei au. Au sega ni kila e dua na ka, au kila ni semaroroya-tikoga o Vosabalavu na ka oya.
Q12: Oti ogo mo drau laki veitalanoa me na qai kau mai. Keitou na vinakata me mataka laialai ni siga Moniti me kau mai na leave applications. Maroroya tiko keitou na qai tukuna yani se siga cava, kevaka e sega ni Moniti, Tusiti se Yukuqulu, me qai mai present taki i ke na leave applications kece koya a sainitaki ena loma ni Palimedi.

A: Ena gauna o tiko kina ena loma ni Unit mai cake, e bau dua na gauna e bau cu a e qiri mai vei iko ena loma ni Parliament Complex me kereca e so na ka. Mai na gauna oya me yacova mai qo, au sega ni tauru rawa e dua na ka.

Q13: E bau dua na gauna o soli tukutuku vei ira na tiko ena loma ni Parliament Complex?
A: E sega saka.

Q14: O via tukuna tale e dua na ka?
A: Sa i koya saka beka ga oya.

Q15: Keitou sa na qai waraka na leave applications oya.
A: Na gauna saka ga e vinakati kina me qai tukuni yani.

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[P. NACAGILEVU]
Corporal

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
ONE HUNDRED & ELEVENTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 29199 CAPT SHANE G N STEVENS

Capt Stevens, after having been duly sworn on Bible, was interviewed as follows:

Q1: Capt Stevens, when did you join the 1FMS Unit?
A: 1996.

Q2: Can you relate to the Board your knowledge of the events preceding and in relation to the takeover of Parliament Complex on the 19th or any prior knowledge to that event just before the 19th?
A: Sir, just before the 19th?

Q3: Just before the 19th or any time before; any information regarding the takeover that you knew about? When did you find out about the takeover?
A: On my way back from Nadi, Sir.

Q4: From then, can you relate to the Board what your actions were or your involvement or knowledge of whatever when you found out until this day?
A: 14-19 May was our final phase for the selection course which I was conducting in the Western side. We were supposed to have been picked up at 8.00 o'clock Friday 19 May near Momi Bay but our transport came late so around 1200 hrs, I decided to load everyone into the Renault truck and head back to Suva. On our way back to Suva, I was in the lead vehicle when I heard that there was a civilian takeover of Parliament.

On reaching the Western Border in one of the hills there, I stopped the convoy, called out my DS and I briefed them. I said that there has been a civilian takeover of Parliament and when we get to the Unit, we will stop outside the Camp first, send someone inside to go and see that the complex is clear before the whole convoy goes in because if there was a takeover of Parliament the Unit would also have been a possible target.

When we reached QEB, the main gate was closed, so we went around Sukanaivalu Road, stopped outside and I sent two of my senior NCOs to clear the Unit Complex. They came out saying it was clear so we entered the camp. When I came into camp I was briefed by ltr Tulivanavou that some of our Int Operators were involved with the takeover of Parliament. I asked him who all, he only knew Tikotani and Nadvaniwai. I said "Okay" then I went around looking for Baleinamau and Bainimoli. Baleinamau was up at HQ RFMF and Bainimoli was in the Ops Room. I was there when Mr Whiting rang. When I answered the phone, he asked, "Who's this?" I said, "Stevens", he then said, "Okay, may I speak to Bainimoli?" so I gave the phone to Bainimoli. When Bainimoli put
the phone down, he said, "Oh, that's from Na Qese. He is saying, no deployment of members of the Unit unless he says so. I just looked at Bainimoli and asked, "Where's Na Qese?" he said, "In Parliament". I went up to my room at the Mess and I stayed up there.

We arrived in camp after 1400 hrs from Nadi.

Prior to my going up to the Mess, I went into the armoury. I wanted to see what was taken out to Parliament. When I went into the armoury, I noticed some pistols, and uzi machine guns had been taken. There were just about ten pistols and ten uzis that were taken, then I went up to the Mess. I was there when Tuivanuvou called me in the evening saying, "These guys are planning to take some weapons out again. What do I do?" He had the key for the armoury. I said, "Wait!" I went straight up to Col Tuatoko and I told him, "Sir, the Unit will be taking out more weapons and ammunition and sending more men down."

And I explained to him, "The only men down in Parliament now are the Int. Operatives who never attend training or anything like that. The shooters (the guys who normally do all these anti-terrorists training) are with me (the senior guys in the Unit)." They were my DS on the Selection Course. Col Tuatoko then said to me, "Leave them!" I asked him, "Sir, you mean to say, let them take the weapons and ammunitions or what?" He said, "Yes", I said "Okay".

I left his office, I came out. I rang Tuivanuvou and said, "I've spoken to Col Tuatoko. He said to let them take the weapons." Between the time Tuivanuvou called me until Saturday around 1600 hrs (Friday evening to Saturday afternoon), more weapons went out. I cannot ascertain or confirm who actually took it out, I was not at the Unit but more weapons went out after that. I went back down to the Unit on Saturday afternoon. When I went down, I opened the armoury, there was also a spare key for the armoury so if Tuivanuvou had the keys with him, those guys still would have been able to open it. I went in to the armoury and I looked, there was a lot of weapons missing, more than what I saw when I initially checked on my return from Nadi.

On that same Friday night, while I was in the Officers' Mess in my room sleeping I was woken up by the bar-man saying that Col Tuatoko, Lt. Col Raduva and Lt. Col Tarakini wanted to see me.

Q5:
A:

Friday, 19th?
Sir. I spoke to Col Tuatoko around 7.00 that evening. This was almost 2300 hrs when I was called up to the Mess with Tuivanuvou. When I went up to the Mess, what they basically told me was, "You have nothing to do with what's going on. We don't want you to get involved with what's going on and keep away from what's happening down at the Unit." When asked, "Any questions?", I said "Yes, they
will be sending more ammunition, weapons and men out. Are you telling me that that's okay, to let it happen?" The answer was "Yes".

Lt. Col Tarakinikini was doing the talking.

He asked, "Is there any other questions?" I said "No, just that", so I got the picture clear from there, I kept out. I went back to my room.

On Saturday when I went and saw that more weapons were going, I went up to Col Tuatoko and asked him, "Sir, let me take over the Unit. He said, "No". I then explained to him the reason to take over the Unit or else they would be sending more men and ammunitions down. He said "No", so I went down, told one of my senior NCOs - Bonefasio. " The armoury was locked. There were weapons stored in the lecture room. I told him, "All those weapons, take them all out of camp and RV with me at Bilo." When I met him at Bilo on Sunday (the following day), I went up to CO 3FIR. I explained to him what I was doing and I told him that I wanted a truck to move the weapons. The Renault could not carry the amount of weapons that I had, and I asked him for a bigger truck. He gave me one of the Engineers' vehicles. The reason we moved from Bilo was because one of the civilians from Parliament (I do not know how he knew) came up to Bilo and said that he was sent from Parliament to ask what was happening with the weapons. The only other person who knew where the weapons were was Mr Baleinamau.

When the guy left, I quickly went to 3FIR, brought the vehicle, shifted the weapons to Togalevu Naval Base.

Q6: This was on Sunday morning?

A: On my return, Col Tuatoko called me up to his office. When I was sitting in his office with Mr Tuivanuavou, Commander called me into his office with Col Tuatoko, and in front of Col Tuatoko I told Commander, when I came back from Nadi initially only about ten pistols, ten machine guns had been taken to Parliament. Now, they have taken quite a few more, that could have been stopped had I taken over the Unit". I was talking to the Commander in front of Col Tuatoko. I went and asked him to take over the Unit and he said "No". Commander asked Col Tuatoko "Why?", then Col Tuatoko said something about HE not wanting any bloodshed, so Commander told Lt. Col Seruvakula "Any admin, Stevens needs (meaning vehicle and food) give it to him, and he said to report directly to him, so I asked him that I needed to move the weapons.

He rang Commander Navy and told him that we wanted to move in to Togalevu. We went in to Togalevu, I did not feel safe in Togalevu because the guys who were on duty there, did not know what was happening. They just heard "CRW guys in Parliament", they did not trust us so I told my guys, "We move again", so that
night, even though Commander Navy had sealed off the base and
allowed us to stay in there, I moved the guys out again, and ever
since that night, we kept moving, we were moving between
Wallabatu and Nadroga.

Every night we would move to different locations and I was getting
re-supplied from Lt. Col Driti through CO 3, Lt. Col Seruvakula.
We were feeding the boys until July 19th when I was told by
Commander to return the weapons.

Once when I went up to the Mess, I met Commander and I told him,
"Sir, a few senior officers are telling me to bring the weapons back
into camp." These were various times before I brought the weapons
in, and he said, "You're not to bring the weapons in until I direct
you to." The reason I did not tell any other officer in camp of the
weapons location at that time, was I did not know who to trust
amongst the senior officers then. Most of my senior guys who went
out with me to the bush went to East Timor, and the strength of the
guys who I could trust regarding the weapons started decreasing so
I told them, "The only other option we have is to cache the
weapons". We buried them. On July 19, the first lot were brought
in, July 25, the rest of the weapons were brought in.

I took over the Unit on June 20th as OC. When Commander
returned from his trip overseas, he told Col Tuatoko for me to be
posted as OC 1MS. Col Tuatoko wrote the instructions on that day
but it was not carried out until June 20th when I was able to go down
to the Complex. I explained to Lt. Col Seruvakula and Col
Tuatoko, "I'm not gonna go down to the Complex if Baleinamau is
down there" because the guys right now are listening to Na Qase
through Baleinamau, so he was controlling the Unit until June the
20th, that was a Tuesday, after a public holiday.

The Friday before that, he was banned from coming back into camp.
Most of the time I was out in the bush, I told Mr Tuivanuavou,
"Okay, Mr Tuivanuavou, you look after the guys out in the bush, I
will stay in camp and try and control the guys in camp." There
were two main sort of tasks that I was told to carry out by
Commander.

First one being the safety and security of the weapons that I had
outside, and the second one was to try and get as many guys I could
out of Parliament back into camp. There were threats from
Parliament directed to me and my men.

When lift 1 from Lebanon arrived, I was told by Commander to
speak to my guys before they came into Suva. I went to CO3, I
asked him if we could call Nadi. I was supposed to go down to
Nadi but I could not leave Suva. I did not want to leave Suva, so
CO 3 called Capt Tukairagga and told him if he could get my guys aside for me to talk to them.

I was in my room in the Mess that night when Lt. Col Tarakiniqikini called me and blasted me on the phone saying who was I to get those guys aside and speak to them. I did not know what was going on and stuff like that. I said to him, "Sir, I am the OC of the Unit now and I wanted to talk to them and make them understand what's going on."

I went up to Commander and I suggested that the unit needs a change in its command element. I went through my Admin CO who was Lt. Col Nukanabu. I told him before the events of May 19, in January this year. I told him to change the OC in the Unit because the way things were going on, people were attending their own meetings and stuff outside of the Unit. Lt. Col Nukanabu went up to Col Tuatoko, who was the Land Force Commander and told him about what I had asked him.

During a retreat, I was called in the Mess and Col Tuatoko said, "I've been told already by Lt. Col Nukanabu about you wanting to change your OC, we are looking into it", nothing eventuated.

Concerning the weapons list; on 27th May, I went down to the Unit, and wrote down the serial numbers of all the weapons; that were still in camp and the weapons that I had with me out in the field. Whatever serial number that was not accounted for, was what was in Parliament. That was towards the end of the first week of the coup.

I have compiled a list (and this is the only copy) of the weapons that I have with me plus what has been returned.

Q7:

Before you present that document, I will ask a few questions first. How can you be sure that 10 pistols and 10 uzis were taken out when you checked the armoury on Friday the 19th of May?

A:

Sir, I am not telling you the exact figure - 10, it was about that much. The reason I am saying that is because, we have racks in the armoury that have slots. Each weapon fits in the slot. When I walked in and looked, I wanted to see generally what weapon had gone. The slots for the pistol were the top rows which were half full. Some on the bottom row were missing, roughly around 10, and there were some uzis still left. We had 20 uzis altogether, some uzis were still on the rack, some have been taken. There was no weapon in the Lecture Room or anything there at that time. The only weapons that we had was what my DS took with them to Nadi.

Q8:

Can you be sure that only those weapons were taken out and nothing else from the armoury?
A.

At that time, Sir.

Q9: That was on Friday, the time?
A: That was around 1500 hrs, Sir. We got back to camp around 1400 that afternoon.

Q10: The weapons that were taken out on Saturday, you guys left, worked through that day, returned again on Saturday. Who packed the weapons?
A: No idea, Sir, when I went to the Unit, they were all packed already in ammo boxes.

Q11: You left on Friday, you were there in the Unit. When you returned from the Western Division, you arrived at about 1500 hrs and you checked the armory. When did you leave the Unit? You said that at that stage, there were no weapons in the boxes in the Lecture Room?
A: Sir, I did not say that. What I am saying was when I got in on Friday from the Selection Course in Nadi, I went into the armory when I was told by Mr Tuivanavou that some of our guys were involved, I wanted to see what weapons were missing. I found out that some pistols and uzi's were missing.

Q12: It could not have been there if only the ten were missing?
A: It could not have been in the Lecture Room, Sir.

Q13: No weapons could have been in the Lecture Room?
A: Sir, the only weapons in the Lecture Room then were my 303s that I got back from Nadi.

Q14: When did you leave the Unit on Friday?
A: Around 1500.

Q15: 1500 hrs you did the check, when did your return; the next day?
A: Around 1500hrs.

Q16: When did you return to the Unit again on the 20th, the next day? Saturday afternoon. Around 1500hrs when I went back and checked the armoury, more weapons had gone.

Q17: So before 1500 hrs the next day, you went and checked?
A: I got to the Unit around 1500 26 May. I went again and checked the armoury, more weapons had gone.

Q18: When did you find out about the loading of weapons?
A: Saturday, Sir.

Q19: Approximately, about what time?
When I went back to the Unit, Sir, in the afternoon around 1500 hrs the boxes were loaded in the Lecture Room. Some more weapons were discovered missing by then, most of the shelves were empty. That Friday night, I went up to Col Tuatoko when Tuivamaunu rang me saying, "These guys are planning to take out weapons." Between that time, Friday when Col Tuatoko said to me "Leave them, don't get involved", and Saturday was when the weapons were taken out. I do not know by whom.

Q20: On Saturday, you said you were aware of the weapons being taken out or being loaded?
A: The weapons that I took out? When I went into the Lecture Room, Sir, the weapons were in the crash boxes. The armoury was locked so I took those weapons that were in the Lecture Room, out.

Q21: The weapons in the Lecture Room, firstly you had 10 pistols, 10 uzis out. The weapons that were packed in the Lecture Room, those were the ones that you took out?
A: Yes, this was besides what went out between Fri 19th and Sat 20th May.

Q22: At 1500 hrs on Friday to Saturday at 1500 hrs, other weapons were also moved, these you were not aware of?
A: No, Sir, just looking at the weapons I had in the boxes and when I checked the armoury again, the shelves in the armoury were all empty. They could not have all fitted into what I took out.

Q23: Do you have the figures?
A: Sir.

Q24: That would confirm that the weapons were actually removed on Friday night also or between Friday night at 1500 hrs when you left till 1500 hrs on Saturday?
A: Sir.

Q25: Do you know who authorised the weapons to be taken out, or who gave the directive?
A: For which weapons, Sir? The ones which I took out, I am the one who told my senior NCOs to take them out.

Q26: Then HQ authorised that - Land Force or you just moved it out without any authority?
A: Sir, I went up to Col Tuatoko and told him, "Sir, they will be moving weapons out tonight - weapons, ammunition and men", this was on Friday. I said, "Let me take over the Unit" and he said "No".

Q27: So you, under your own initiative, moved the rest out on Saturday?
A: Sir.
Q22: That was packed?
A: Packed in boxes.

Q29: You did not know who packed them?
A: I do not know who did the packing, Sir, but I was sure that that would have been moved also to Parliament.

Q30: Can you give the names of those who were on duty that stayed behind in the Unit when you left at 1500 hrs on Friday night?
A: When I came back from Selection, Sir, I just called my Selection Team in, briefed them and told them to meet me again on Saturday morning and I went up to my room. We de-briefed on the whole Selection Course, picked who failed and who passed and I went up to the Mess. The actual guys at the Unit, I think Dakuliga would know who was down there.

Q31: Dakuliga was there?
A: He would know who was down there. Dakuliga and Mr Tuivanua’ou know who were down at the Unit because I sent my guys home that afternoon.

Q32: Do you have a copy of those weapons that were moved out on Friday when you checked?
A: Of the weapons that I took out on Saturday, yes. Of the remaining weapons, I copied the serial numbers of those in QEB, those in the bush with me and those in Parliament on 27 May.

Q33: Do you have a register for those weapons that were moved or taken out or none of these are recorded?
A: Sir, I recorded them all. I recorded what I took out on that day, 27th. I also recorded what was in the complex. There were still some more weapons in the complex. What was not in the complex and what was not in the bush with me was what was in Parliament.

Q34: Through your own investigations, your own knowledge, have you come to know who actually packed the weapons that were in the Lecture Room?
A: No, Sir, all I know is that WO1 Banimoli and Baleinamau were running the Ops down at the Unit. They were getting their orders from Parliament. The actual packing, I do not know who did that.

Q35: Can you present that document now?
A: (Handed to President).

EXHIBIT C: LIST OF WEAPONS & THEIR SERIAL NOS.

Q36: The outburst by Lt. Col Tarakiniiti, what was this in relation to?
Sir, he just called me that night.

Q37:
The night of?
A: This is when the Lebanon IFR draft arrived at the Airport.

Q38:
A: How about your speaking to them separately?
I was told by Commander to brief them on what was going on, get them on to my side, when Lt. Col. Tarakinikini called me that night saying who was I to bring them separately, talk to them and stuff like that.

Sir, I think you need to ask some people down at the Unit, because I think Lt. Col. Tarakinikini went down to the Unit on the 19th and gave them a brief.

Q39:
A: Yes, we know about that, on the 19th round about 700 pm. Just a point of clarification, these weapons that are kept in the armoury, you observed and saw that some pistols and uzis were missing?
Sir.

Q40:
A: The other weapons that are in the possession of the Unit like MP5, colts; are they just stacked up on the wall or were they put into some kind of boxes and left in the armoury?
They were all stacked up, Sir.

Q41:
A: On that day, did you see any of those weapons missing?
No, Sir.

Q42:
A: When you got back that morning, the team from Makuluva had also returned; were they still in camp at that time?
Sir, I did not know who went on that exercise to Makuluva.

Q43:
A: Was there any reconditioning of equipment or stores being done in the Unit when you arrived?
No, Sir, I was the training officer. I had taken out the whole lot of my senior NCOs to the Western side for the Selection. I do not know who organised the amphibious exercise which took the other half of the Unit out to sea.

Q44:
A: Am I correct in saying that the Makuluva exercise was not part of the training programme?
It was part of the programme, Sir, but not up till Friday. It was written up by Mr. Dakuliga. I gave him to run the rest of the Unit while I was running the selection.

Q45:
A: What was the date that that exercise in Makuluva was to start?
Sir, I can confirm that by bringing in the training programme. It was supposed to have started on Monday as a survival exercise. They were supposed to go out on a Monday. My instruction was to
go out on Monday and come back on Thursday. Probably that was changed, they went on a Tuesday, came back Friday.

Q46: Does this survival exercise involve the carrying of weapons and shooting?
A: No shooting, Sir.

Q47: Any weapons carried?
A: They did take their personal weapons with them.

Q48: Your training lot was part of the selection?
A: Sir.

Q49: That training was just a cycle training, those who went down to the Western Division?
A: No Sir, those were the remaining Unit personnel conducting the final phase of the selection course.

Q50: The weapons that you took away on Saturday to Bilo, can you explain how they were packed?
A: We have what we call crash boxes which we make ourselves, weapons were packed in these boxes. Some of the other weapons were put in black duffel bags. Those were all in the Lecture Room.

Q51: Was any weapons left lose in the truck or just stacked up in the truck?
A: No, Sir, everything was packed.

Q52: Did you carry any ammunition with you, out of camp?
A: Sir.

Q53: Where did the loading take place; where were these weapons loaded from?
A: The ones that I took out, I reversed the truck up to our back-gate and loaded it from there.

Q54: When you say back-gate, what do you mean?
A: The perimeter from Sukanaivalu Road.

Q55: Who was involved in the loading of these weapons?
A: Just my 4-men team.

Q56: Can you name them?
A: Sgt Bonefasio, Tamani, Tuiwailevu and Nagamu.

Q57: What about Leweniqila?
A: Leweniqila was still in the Unit. He packed it, he was supposed to go down to Parliament. They wanted him to go and do sentry duties when I pulled him out with me to the bush.
And driver Kaumaitotoya?

Kaumaitotoya, Sir, just dropped the weapons and brought the truck back.

New members that you took for selection to the West; were they also part of the loading team?

Sir, I just told my Sergeant, "You just get these weapons loaded and I will RV with you at Bilo", I went back up to the mess.

Do you, on that afternoon, recall any of your members that were in the selection present in the Unit, people like Ratu, Railege?

We have got two Ratus, Sir. One of them is qualified.

These are the eight that had qualified that went to the West?

The two Ratus that we have; one is Ratumainabouwatu, and one is just plain Ratu, we call them both "Ratu".

Were any of these personnel in the Unit?

All the selection boys had come back. They were waiting for me to tell them who had passed and who had failed.

What about Feoko, Tunidau, Railege?

Those were new boys, they were left down at the Unit.

Were they present when loading was taking place?

I did not supervise the loading, Sir. All I did was just tell the Sgt to get it all loaded and RV with me.

In the Unit when you draw weapons, there is a procedure of drawing and returning weapons. Do you have a register in the Unit?

Sir, all our registers, office files and stuff, when I took over the Unit, have all been removed. There was only the weapon register on the table when I went to the armoury to take a look. Those I took with me and kept.

Where is that register?

I have it with me, Sir. It is from that register that I got all my serial nos. for the weapons.

In the Unit, are there documents which basically assign specific weapons to individuals? Those are classed as personal weapons. Is there some kind of documentation to basically say that this weapon is basically assigned to this individual?

Only M16 A1 and A2 were assigned to individuals. The remaining Unit weapons weren't.
Q58: Is there a way where we could basically link a missing weapon to the individual it was assigned to in the Unit?
A: Sir, all the personal weapons have been returned; all the M16 A1s and A2s I have. The personal weapons were the ones allocated to the individuals. The specialist weapons like uzis, MP5s, SMG, colts, those things were only used, say for instance, where a house assault team would go, they will just pick it up and use it.

Q69: Can you just clarify this for me; pistols 9 mm High Power - are these personalised weapons?
A: No, Sir, they are normally used for training. When I entered the Unit, I noticed that pistols were allocated to various individuals and those ones were not touched but as I carried out training in the Unit whenever we went down shooting in the Range, we would just come and take out the first 10, everyone would use it.

Q70: This call on the night when you did the briefing of the 1st draft that had returned, you got a call from Lt Col Tarakini, this phone call was it in the Mess or through the mobile?
A: Mobile, Sir.

Q71: During the whole event on the 19th of May, did you contact Major Ligarii questioning as to the involvement of the Unit in the Parliament Complex?
A: I did not think he wanted to talk to me because the first Friday when he called, I answered the phone. I was the senior person down there and the training officer. Had he wanted something carried out or done, he should have spoken to me, but instead, he told me to give the phone to W01 Bainimoli for them to talk. That has always been the case at the Unit. He relies on his senior NCOs instead of the officers.

Q72: On the same token, did you discuss or converse with Lt Baleinama as to the events of May 19th on the involvement of the Unit?
A: Sir, I never got on with him, I did not speak to him.

Q73: Did you at any time enter the Parliament Complex?
A: Just once.

Q74: What was the nature of your visit?
A: I went on July 14th. I was told by HQ RFMF to go and pick up the weapons.
You said that there was a directive by Commander to make attempts of bringing back members of the IFMS to the Unit. Was any attempts made or you made representations to get these people back?

Sir, for example Saini Draft - Lutt 1, getting them off and talking to them down at the Unit. A lot of the men who were sent down initially were our new boys who had just passed out last year. They were the main bulk of guys that were sent down on Friday night to Saturday. Most of the senior members of the Unit I had with me.

Q76:

The threats that went to you, did it also go to other members of the Unit that remained behind?

Sir.

Q77:

What was the nature of the threat, and who was it made by (if you know)?

The only other persons who were threatened, Sir, were Mr Tuivanuavou and Sgt Touda. The thing was, the guys in Parliament wanted more weapons, and the bulk of the Unit weapons were with me.

Q78:

Do you know who the calls were made by?

Sir, it was done through my mobile phone, I just saw the number that was on it, I asked Capt Rokolui to confirm with Telecom if they could trace the no. He came back to me saying they could trace it, it was from a telephone in Parliament.

Q79:

How long have you been the training officer for the Unit?

Since 1996.

Q80:

When was the last time you did an exercise on hostage rescue?

Around February this year.

Q81:

Is that part of the normal training cycle within the Unit?

Sir.

Q82:

While conducting this training, do you actually come up with scenarios and was any of these scenarios involving the rescue situation within the Parliament Complex?

No, Sir, the exercise that I conducted was directed at our big shed in camp. We used that as our holding area and I used the shooting
range down the bottom as the hostage house, and then the assault teams would go from the holding area and clear the house. The only other area we used was the Nausori Airport which was shown to the new guys last year.

Q83: Your field operatives, in this case Tikotani, Naduaniwai, Vossavers, Buadromo, Alava; who are they responsible to within the Unit, who do they report to?

A: The Operation officers, Sir, and the OC.

Q84: In the situation we have here, they have been reporting to Baleinamau and Bainimoli? That is the procedure, Sir, to report to the Ops Officer and the OC. The OC takes out whatever information he has from them and whether he passes all up or some up and feeds the Ints up the top HQ.

The problem with those guys was some of them ever since I joined the Unit in 1996, they have never been back to the Unit. They have been Ints Operatives outside, I do not know whether they are actually Ints Ops or whatever, I do not know what tasking they were given.

Those guys that you have just mentioned were outside also. As a training officer, I had wanted them to come back to the Unit, say every four months or even at the end of every month, just report in and do some training in the Unit. Those guys never came back for training or anything.

Q85: Which means that you did not know anything about where they were operating from, the nature of their tasking?

A: Nothing, Sir. A week after the coup, that was one question that I asked Baleinamau and Bainimoli; why do they keep all these Ints Operatives information to themselves and they told me in front of Mr Tuivanuavou that I have nothing to do with the Ints Ops information that they gather. It is only for them to assess.

Q86: What was your reaction to this?

A: I just told them that we needed to know what was going on in the Unit as a whole. Without that, things would happen, meaning the event of May 19th. In other words, Sir, they were not controlled properly.
Q87: Can you enlighten the Board on the bond that the Unit is supposed to have amongst its members? Why I am saying that is because several people have been up here in front of the Board and they have been telling us how close members of the Unit are, there is a strong bond that links them to each other and it is much stronger than the bond that they have had in the Units that they belong to prior to joining your Unit.

A: Sir, after going through the selection process, you dislike certain things here and there that is going on in the Unit, but you would have a strong bond with all who passed the Unit's selection process.

The problem with the Unit was not everyone did the selection, and that is the problem we have till today. Most of the guys there were in the Unit when it was formed and they did not do any selection. They originally started up the Unit and those are the guys who are doing things their own way.

Q88: The reason I mentioned that was because within your training team, you have two senior NCOs; Sgt Bonefasio and Sgt Celeasiga, am I correct?

A: Sir.

Q89: And yet, one of them stayed with you while the other went into the Parliamentary Complex?

A: Sir, I had only one vehicle that day when I sent Bonefasio out to the field. Celeasiga had gone home. I sent the selection team to go home, take a break and come back Saturday morning. Bonefasio was still there when I went down so I told him to take the weapons out. Celeasiga was still down at the Unit. I told him to wait down the Unit, that I will go out and come back. I had only one vehicle. When I came back, Baleinamau had sent them out to Parliament. The same thing happened with the guys in East Timor. They came back, I told them, "Wait". I took one lot out to the bush, when I came back the next day to come and take the other guys, Baleinamau had sent them down to Parliament.

Q90: So what you are saying they were just obeying orders from the OC?

A: Sir.

Q91: Major Ligaii had only been with the Unit for three weeks. Who recommended him to return to the Unit? Was it through a submission from officers within the Unit to the HQ RPF?

A: Sir, I was just told by Commander that he will be coming back to the Unit for training. No one in HQ came and questioned me on the training down at the Unit throughout these years.
Major Whiting has never conducted any training in the Unit. I have been the one conducting the anti-terrorist training, the selection training, they brought him in for the selection course but he has never conducted a selection course. I have been the one conducting it ever since I joined the Unit. I have conducted the last four selections and training. All he has been doing ever since he came in was just sitting down in the office helping Baleinamau as OC. He would only give an opening address for a selection course, he would come and present it, but the actual writing of the training programme and the conduct of the training, I conducted with the men.

Q92:
In your own personal opinion how much of a stabilising factor is Major Ligairi in the Unit?
A:
Everyone respects him.

Q93:
The reason why I ask is because we have had people in front of the Board who have told us that if he was not present on that day, Friday May 19th, none of the boys that went to the Parliament Complex would have gone in. That is their version. I just want to gauge from you how much influence he has on the Unit?
A:
That is true, Sir.

Q94:
Going back to Lt-Col Tarakinikini, how much influence does he have with your Unit?
A:
I think the men only respect him because he is a former member of the Unit and his rank, but as far as having control of the men in the Unit, none, Sir.

Q95:
What about Lt-Col Tarakinikini's relationship with Baleinamau?
A:
I would not know, Sir.

Q96:
Have you worked with Lt. Col Tarakinikini before?
A:
Yes, Sir.

Q97:
Can you enlighten the Board on the nature of this working relationship?
A:
I was Adjutant 1FIR from 1997-1998. Lt. Col Tarakinikini was my CO.
Q98: Is it true that while working with him you developed a bond that you are really close to him?
A: A working bond - yes.

Q99: Can you just repeat the words that he said on the night of May 19th at about 2300 hrs up in the Officers' Mess?
A: Sir, this was talking to Mr Tuivanuavou and I; that we had nothing to do with what was going on, for us to keep out of it and not to get involved. At the end of that, he asked me if I had any questions. I only asked one question which was, "You mean to tell me, Sir, to let the men to be sent down with arms and ammunition?" The answer was "Yes". That was the end of our conversation.

Q100: As an officer, what did you deduce from all this conversation; were you adding any sums - one plus one or were you thinking things in your head?
A: They were all assumptions.

Q101: What were these assumptions?
A: I just assumed that Lt. Col Tarakinikini, Lt. Col Raduva and Col Tuatoko knew what was going on.

Q102: Did you share this assumption with any other officer?
A: Sir.

Q103: With who?
A: I told Col Tuatoko and Commander. I went up to Col Tuatoko's office, I told him, "Sir, some officers here you can't trust. He asked me, "Who?" and I named two officers. I do not have any evidence against them but I just named two officers, one was Lt. Col Raduva and one was Lt. Col Tarakinikini.

Q104: Was this after Col Tuatoko told you to let the weapons go on Friday?
A: This was when Commander had returned.

Q105: What was Col Tuatoko's reaction to that?
A: For Lt. Col Tarakinikini, he just shook his head, but for Col Raduva, he said, "No, I don't think so".
Q106

My last question, Cpt Stevens, presently there has been a restructuring (not really restructuring), but men from your unit have been posted out to other units. As a result of that, morale is probably low in the unit. Can you suggest a way to restructure the unit to ensure that a similar sort of thing would never happen again?

A:

Within the unit, most of the members are made up of people from Vanua Levu. That has always been the case from the beginning. The problem with that was, whenever I did training or a selection course, when it finishes I would pass seven guys, I will come back on the Monday and I would see ten guys sitting there, and I will ask where are the other three came from. One of my instructors would be from Vanua Levu, he would go and see Na Qase, and they will add on another three names. About 40+% of the unit are from Vanua Levu. That was one thing I was trying to break-up. I manage to do that when Waqaqiniboro was posted out of the unit.

The second thing was the command element in the unit. I had always stressed that we needed a Major appointment as the OC. Nothing eventuated down at the unit to that effect, and it was left there until the situation happened and we have one down there now.

Secondly, another point, Sir, concerning the restructure. Moeica was in the unit before, he has done the selection, so the guys get on with him. Salabogi is okay, he moves around. Right now the men in the unit do not get on with Major Sorby. I can see that with the body language and with the talk that has been going around there every day, they cannot say much now because of what has happened but that is the general feeling in the unit. With the rest of the guys gone out, most of the men that I have in the unit, Sir, were the ones that kept out of everything, they have been with me out in the bush and these guys have put all the blame on the Ints Operatives who were the guys who kept everything to themselves, carried this thing out and then got the whole unit involved.

As long as I stay with those guys in the unit, Sir, I would be able to control them but we need a whole restructure of the command element in the unit. The problem in the unit was the command element, not the men. When I say command element, Sir, I am meaning Warrant Officers up to the OC. The men in the unit, you give them any orders or anything to do, they follow it and they are good at it. It is just the command element which has been the problem ever since I joined the unit or even before that, that has never been changed or looked into.

Q107

Could you elaborate more on your conversation with Col Nukatubu in January, this was about things happening in the Unit on the Ops team,
like there were meetings and you talked about something like that? What actually did you tell Col Nukutubu?

A: I did not tell Lt. Col Nukutubu about Ops meetings. I just told him that the Unit command element (the OC) needed to be changed. The reason for that was ever since Baleinamau took over as OC last year, no one has ever been charged. I put a guy on for AWOL, nothing was done about it. I was doing the training in the Unit and looking after discipline. The Ints Operatives never reported on him which they used to do before, and things were just run in his own way with a small group of guys (senior NCOs) doing their own thing.

When the East Timor guys went out (the ones that went last year), they came to me and asked for equipment to be taken, and I said, "No, you guys will be issued there." They went to Baleinamau, they asked him and he approved it. They went, our training equipment was short. Things like that were going on and it was frustrating.

Q108 Why is the tension between your relationship, jow and Baleinamau and also Bainimoli?

A: Why, Sir, or what?

Q109 Why and what?

A: Sir, when I got into the Unit, there were few officers who had already been sent out of the Unit through this senior NCO group, Bainimoli, Namoli, Waqaqaboro and Liganiri. These guys were controlling the Unit and if there was anyone that went against how they wanted the Unit run, that guy would be sent out of the Unit. Capt Seru was sent out, Major Sorby was sent out, Moceica was sent out, that was the trend. Any officer who came in that went against what they wanted would be sent out.

When I went in, I started changing them. I started to sort out the discipline in the Unit and I will go straight to Na Qase and tell him what is going on in the Unit, what is wrong, what should be changed and most of it he agreed to. This was not welcomed by Baleinamau and Bainimoli, and instead of them talking direct to me, they would go straight to other senior NCOs and talk amongst themselves but they were afraid.

Q110 What is the nature of your suspicion of Col Tarakinikini and Col Raduva; was that indication given to Col Tuitoko?

A: Sir, like I said, I do not have any evidence.

Q111 Just from the way they have been talking to you in the Unit?

A: Sir.
Q112: On the code of conduct, one of the things we encounter in this Board is the reluctance by your IFMS members to reveal information in a formal inquiry. What is your training on it? What doctrines do you adopt towards such stances?

A: Sir, most of the guys who come in, their English is not that good and a lot of them are afraid to speak up. When they are afraid to speak out, I think they are being briefed already on what to refer to and what to say.

Q113: But is it part of your training to teach them as to the code of conduct that is to be adopted?

A: At the end of a selection course, we have a combat survival course and part of the combat survival course is the interrogation phase where we interrogate them at Naboro, whoever gets caught, and anyone who fails at the interrogation phase does not get into the Unit, and the only information we tell them to give is their name, rank and number, the normal soldier's information we should be giving. That is during either war situation or if they are out on Ints Ops tasking, and Fiji is small. What was being taught to them was all British-based and that is big. They were told, "If you get caught in a civilian job, you are not to talk, just give your name, rank, number or say that the Unit has no involvement, no officer told you to go and do that task."

Q114: Your selection group that passed on the 19th, what was the doctrine taught to them as to the code of conduct?

A: Sir, the 8 who passed out on the 19th have not been through our combat survival phase. That was the initial physical endurance phase - 3 weeks. After 3 weeks, they have a one-week break then the combat survival phase which includes the interrogation phase. After that combat survival phase, whoever passes it, passes the selection and they go through a six-month continuation phase where we teach them weapon training and stuff like that.

Q115: Through interaction or observance of events, was there any time or circumstances that made you believe that the RFMF was involved as to the events that transpired in the Parliament Complex?

A: Sir, the first three days of the coup, hardly any officers I would see up in the mess or walking around town, and the men did not know what was going on. We could sense that uneasiness in camp. The only persons that I saw when I went up that was doing something was Lt. Col Senuvaluva and Lt. Col Lthe. These were the only two people that I was talking to for my admin.
It was only after the Military imposed military rule that I saw the Officers Mess starting to fill up with people, people started coming up to camp. Before that you hardly saw anyone around. The only persons that I would see most of the time in the office was Baleinamau, Tarakinikini, Raduva; they were always in their offices.

Q116: What was the general feeling of the members of the 1FMS as to the involvement of the Unit in the Complex?
A: Sir, at the beginning I was asked to storm the Complex on the first day. I was asked by the men. When we went out to the field, one of the senior NCOs; Sgt Todua, Sgt Bonefiso, these guys told me, "Sir, we storm Parliament." That was how much they were against the guys that went in. The relationship there, Sir, these Ints Ops, they never get on with my shooters who are with me at work every day because these people keep to themselves. They do their own thing. You see them in civilian most of the time. Most of them are not doing any Ints work, no information was coming. They never get on with them, and they are the ones who dragged the Unit into this and the others got involved, and they started sending the young guys down; that was the general feeling. Tuivanuavou and Dakuliga are both new, they just joined the Unit last year. They do not know the politics that is going on in the Unit.

Q117: Do you wish to say any other thing Capt Stevens, before we round it off here?
A: Concerning the number of weapons that are missing. HQ LSU, including their CO has never been down to our Unit to check the armoury in the last 13 years that the Unit has been there. They have never been down there to carry out a 100% check, never. All they have been doing, I think, is just signing that they have checked. No one has ever been down there. Some of the weapons that they say are missing, I am asking them to give me evidence that the weapons were down there. Some of those weapons I have never seen them there, like the SLRs. We normally conduct, for our continuation course, different types of weapons, we train our men in there. At the end of that, we return them.

The last copy of them having their SLRs down at the Unit was in 1995, and I asked the armourer - Morris, "when did you last come and check here?" They said that they have never been down to our Unit, and I know that. Even the CO has never been to our Unit, no one, not even the Force armourer has ever been to the Unit to ever check how many weapons were there; what type of weapons were down there. They said that there was a sniper rifle missing. I told them, "Get me the paper work on the sniper rifle that is missing".
Until today, nothing has come down. The only other weapons that I know are missing were the ones that I have got down on the list I presented you with.

Sir, for those ones, for example, one guy from Tailevu (I do not know where he is) rang me saying he has got pistols and he wants to return them. After Col Caucau got the pistol from Soko and charged him for treason and sent him out, all those phone calls to me stopped. People have been calling wanting to return weapons but they are frightened now.

If he had just kept it quiet, Sir, most of the weapons could have been recovered. I have been getting a lot of weapons back. The SMG, colts I have got back almost a month ago, say a few days just after the storming at Kalabu.

What I did I sent my men out to check the different cache sites. We also have as part of our training programme where we put food and ammunition and go out and cache them. I have checked some of these old cache sites, I found the SMGs all still intact, still in the new plastic bags, still sealed, have not been used; the whole five. I took it back to camp, I informed Commander about it.

Q118:
 When you talk about the colts, 15 are supposed to be in the inventory, and there is 5 still outstanding?
 A. Those have all been recovered, Sir. Lt Col Rabukawaqa does not come and ask me what is going on.

Q119:
 Can we go through the list and see if you can identify what we have got back? The five colts that you are talking about, can you give us the numbers?
 A. Sir, there are only five colts missing and those I have got back.

Q120:
 Have you got the serial nos. there?
 A. Sir, I wrote them down on that list.

Q121:
 What other weapons have we recovered?
 A. Five colts and two pistols. There was a phone call from this guy, he told me he has got four pistols and he wants to return them, and I was supposed to meet him. After the incident with Soko I never got any more calls from him.
Q122: He got through on your mobile?
A: Sir, he called QEB and the guy in the unit complex gave my contact.

Q123: You can trace the number and you can easily get in contact with him.
A: Sir, it was a public phone in Nausori.

Q124: These two pistols that you said have been returned, were they Browning or High Power or whatever?
A: One was a High Power and one was a Browning.

Recalled on 21/09/00:

Captain Stevens, after having been reminded of former Oath was re-interviewed as follows:-

Q125: We have received the book which contains all the details from the 14th of May to the 4th of September which was recorded by you. You had indicated all files and documents had been removed. You gave that in your first statement. Do you know the locations of these documents?
A: No, Sir.

Q126: We are talking about the Int reports, operation reports, the reports that come in from field operatives, the weapon register, those are all missing. Do you know the locations of those?
A: The ops files are normally located in the ops room, Sir. When I took over the unit on the 20th of June, when I went down, those files went into their respective places.

Q127: We also accept the Disposition of IMS Personnel from the 15th to the 19th as given by you. We will accept it as Exhibit “K”.
Admitted and marked as Exhibit “K”.

The IMS Internal Training Forecast for the Year 2000 as presented by you is admitted as Exhibit “L”.
Admitted and marked as Exhibit “L”.
The Instruction for the Exercise in Vana Levu, Exercise Alfred is accepted as Exhibit "M".
Admitted and marked as Exhibit "M".

Sketch of the Location of the IMS unit layout is accepted as Exhibit "N"
Admitted and marked as Exhibit "N".

Q128: Do you have anything further to add?
A: No, Sir.

[S. G. N. STEEVENS]
Captain

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member
CONFIDENTIAL

ONE HUNDRED &TWELFTH WITNESS
STATEMENT BY 22868 STAFF SERGEANT PAULO VAKADRANU

Ssgt Vakadranu, after having been duly sworn by solemn affirmation, was interviewed as follows:

I joined the unit in 1987. I went through the normal procedures of selection. In the unit I went through the normal training and taskings as required by the Unit Standing Operating Procedures (SOP's) I was the Troop Sergeant. After 3 years, I was appointed Transport NCO. I have since held the appointment until 19 May. On 18 May, I was on duty at QEB, there was an exercise that evening, I was the Duty Officer. I, Ssgt Vakadranu, on Tuesday 16 May to drop off the troops at the Maritime Slipway. I was told the time of pickup was 0500-0530hrs. I was still at the camp, on 19 May at about 0900hrs when I was told to observe the march in Suva with WO1 Bainimoli.

We were based at Albert Park. I was the driver in the vehicle BV917 while I was dispatched with WO1 Bainimoli. I was just sitting in the car listening to the radio, after 10 minutes the Warrant Officer got back into the car and we went back to the camp. Before we reached Flagstaff the radio was on, we heard announced in the radio that the coup had taken place in Parliament. I told WO1 Bainimoli that we should head back to camp, we may be on standby. It was part of our role to be prepared in such events.

We reached camp, all the members of 1FMS were on full alert. The kits were ready. I could not ascertain what was happening or reasons behind the coup. All I heard over that our boys were down in Parliament. We were told to get our kits ready and be on stand-by.

Q1. Where were you on the 18th of May 00?  
A. I was in Camp.

Q2. Were you aware of the Int Operatives being present on the camp on that day?  
A. Yes, they were present and were on an Ops tasking.

Q3. Did you speak to any of them?  
A. No.

Q4. On the night of 18 May, the Board has heard that you drove Sgt Tikotani and Cpl Naduanivi to the Maritime where they met Lt Dakuliga. Can you confirm this?  
A. No, Sir. I did not drive them.

Q5. Where were the persons from Exercise "Blue Lagoon" picked up from?  
A. At the Rifle Range at approximately 0530hrs. I picked them up.

Q6. What vehicle was used to pick the member up?  
A. Vehicle GL007, Maintenance Unit vehicle.

Q7. What vehicle was used by selection team?
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Q8: When did SSgt. Kaumaitotoya go to Nadi?
A: When the Selection Team started their phase in Nadi. I am not sure of the exact date.

Q9: How many Zodiac's were loaded in the vehicle?
A: 1 x 15 men, 1 x 7 men; 1 x 3 men loaded into the vehicle, half-deflated.

Q10: When you arrived at Camp, did you see the members unloading sacks containing MP5's and pistol's?
A: No, Sir, I only saw them with their personnel weapons, M16's.

Q11: When did you go into the Parliamentary Complex?
A: On the night of the 19th May.

Q12: Before going to the Parliament, did you take other members of 1FMS to the Parliamentary Complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q13: Did you drive Sgt. Naika's team to the Parliamentary Complex?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q14: Did you drive Sgt. Celeasiga to the Parliamentary Complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q15: Who did you go to the Parliamentary Complex with?
A: I took the 1FMS person who had changed guards at the Parliamentary Complex in vehicle BV917. I cannot recall their names.

Q16: Who tasked you to take the people down?
A: Mr. Baleinamau

Q17: Could you recall the exact words of Lt. Baleinamau?
A: To take the boys and change the guards. I took them down but didn't bring anybody up.

Q18: On Friday 19, were you present in the Unit when Lt. Col. Tarakinikini arrived to speak to the members of the 1FMS?
A: No, Sir.

Q19: On the night of Friday 19th, did you transport any weapons with WO1 Ravai to Parliament?
A: No, Sir.

Q20: After dropping off the members in Parliament, where did you go?
A: Straight back to Camp.

Q22: When did you permanently move to Parliament?
The evening of Saturday, 20 May 00.

Q23: What made you go to the Parliament Complex or who made you go down?
A: I went there because the unit was there.

Q24: When did you come out of Parliament?
A: After 6 days in Parliament. I came out on Friday 26 May.

Q25: What made you come out of parliament?
A: My daughter was feeling ill, I came straight back home.

Q26: Did you go back into Parliament?
A: I got a call on Saturday 27 May from Col Naivalurua. He called home. He told me that he wanted to go and speak to Whiting (Maj Ligairi). He told me to come over to the married quarters. We went to the Parliament in his car. We went straight to the junction at the back gate of Parliament, stopped there. We then walked to Parliament. He went into a room with Maj Ligairi. They talked for about 30 minutes. We came out, went to Col Naivalurua's car. On our way back he told me that what we did was wrong, we were not suppose to be there. He left me at his house, I walked home. On Monday the 29th, I got into camp and stayed with Capt Stevens.

Q27: At the Parliament Complex, did you hear the conversation between Col Naivalurua and Maj Ligairi?
A: No, Sir.

Q28: Whilst in the Unit Complex and before going to Lebanon were you in contact with person(s) in Parliament?
A: No, Sir.

Q29: Did you go back at anytime into Parliament Complex after the 29th?
A: No, Sir.

Q30: Did you attend the funeral in Parliament?
A: Yes, Sir. It was only the funeral I attended.

Q31: Why did you attend the funeral?
A: I was told that the whole unit was to attend the funeral.

Q32: Who told you that?
A: Mr Baleinamau.

Q33: Is it true that only those personel involved in Parliament takeover were to attend the funeral?
A: Yes, Sir.
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Q34: What is the role of the 1FMS?
A: The role of the unit is to .......... (silence) .......... if there is any crises .......... (silence) .......... hijack, if families taken hostage and jungle, to secure this situations. If someone had taken over in a coup, in such situations we were to counter.

Q35: Sgt Vakadranu, do you have a written unit SOP?
A: Yes, it is kept with Lt. Baleinamau.

Q36: What is the characteristics of a soldier in your unit? Name three?
A: High standard of skills, alertness, and to face any consequences that may arise.

Q37: The reasons you went to Parliament were twofold: firstly, that the unit was there and secondly, Mr. Baleinamau had instructed you to go. If there was no instructions from Lt. Baleinamau for you to go to Parliament, would you still have gone?
A: No, I would not have gone.

Q38: The reason you went down was that you were following orders?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q39: Staff, did you hear or know of prior to May 19 of what was to happen?
A: I heard nothing, Sir.

Q40: Did you go out on the evening of May 18?
A: No, Sir.

Q41: Did you go out on the 18th of May after lunch?
A: No, Sir, I was in Camp the whole day.

Q42: Did you go to Parliament on Thursday the 18th of May?
A: No, Sir.

Q43: After bringing the Makaluva Exercise back to Camp, where did you go or what did you do?
A: I stayed in Camp, I was told to drive and attend to the march.

Q44: Saturday evening, did you take any weapons and cached them anywhere?
A: No, Sir.

Q45: Do you know any persons living in "Short Street" in Flagstaff?
A: No, Sir.

Q46: After returning from town, the troops had left for Parliament?
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A: No, Sir, some members were already in the Parliament. The new selection was in Camp. The OC, Lt. Baleinamau, was in Camp.

Q47: Do you know that he had returned from Parliament?
A: No, Sir.

Q48: When you went into Parliament were you issued with a weapon?
A: Yes, Sir, a Uzi.

Q49: When you came out of Parliament, did you know what the unit did was wrong?
A: After Lt. Col. Naivalurua told me about it, that I was wrong, I knew then it was wrong.

Q50: What reasons were you given for the unit's initial involvement?
A: I was never told of a reason initially of why the unit was involved.

Q51: What reason was given by Lt. Col. Naivalurua, as to why the unit was involved?
A: All he said was that we should not have done that and waited for the Commander to give the "Go".

Q52: Were you aware of any weapons being taken out of the 1FMS unit and taken to Parliament?
A: No, Sir.

Q53: Did you at anytime transport weapons into the Parliamentary Complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q54: When you returned from the Complex with Lt. Col. Naivalurua, did any of the other members of 1FMS accompany you?
A: Yes, Mr. Baleinamau, who had also accompanied us into Parliament.

Q55: Did Col. Naivalurua speak with members of 1FMS in the Complex?
A: No, Sir.

Q56: After leaving the Parliamentary Complex, were you or your family threatened in anyway?
A: Sir, but I don't know by whom.

Q57: What was the nature of these threats?
A: They would kill my family.

Q58: When did you go to Lebanon?
A: August.

Q59. Was there any arrangements made by you or any other persons for you to go to Lebanon?
A: Lt. Col. Scruvakula rang and informed me that there were certain positions available to be filled in Lebanon. I told him that I was willing to go. He told me to contact Capt. Tadj and make appropriate arrangements, medical and next Monday to attend RFL.

Q60: Was similar offers made to any other members of 1MS?
A: I would not know, Sir.

Q61: Who took the hot box for "Exercise Blue Lagoon" persons to be picked up at the maritime slipway?
A: I did. The hot boxes were picked up by Sgt Naika.

Q62: On the morning of 19th May, upon returning to the complex after the march, did you see a blue pickup van at the unit?
A: No, Sir, there was no vehicle present in the complex, ours was the only vehicle.

Q63: Were you aware of any weapons removed on Fri, 18th?
A: No, Sir.

Q64: What role did Sgt. Tikotani play in the May 19 takeover?
A: I know that he was a member that went down.

Q65: Was any brief conducted by Maj. Ligairi as to reasons behind the unit being in the Parliamentary complex?
A: No Sir.

Q66: In uplifting the exercise personnel on training in Makuluva, were you instructed of the change in pickup timings from 0530 to 0630hrs?
A: Yes.

Q67: What time did you arrive for the pickup?
A: At 0530. I wanted to be there before time.

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Q68: Were the exercise persons present?
A: Yes.

Q69: How was this zodiac conveyed to camp?
A: I made two trips to camp, because the zodiac were half-inflated. I took the 15 x men zodiac up first. Few persons went with me. No zodiac was picked up from the slipway.

Q70: When were you told by Col. Naivalurua that what the unit had done was wrong?
A: When we were coming back from Parliament.

Q71: Who was present with you and Col. Naivalurua in the vehicle?
A: Lt. Baleinamau.

Q72: What was Lt. Baleinamau's reaction?
A: He just sat and stared.

Q73: When did the threats to your family stop?
A: After the first call, I told the caller that if they wanted to kill my family, I would be beside them. I took necessary precautions, sent my children away. My wife on the night of the threat slept in the house whilst I stayed in a lookout position.

Q74: Was this call coming from Parliament?
A: Yes.

Q75: Did you sign any leave application?
A: I signed one in QEB.

Q76: What was the reasons for signing such a leave application?
A: Precaution.

Q77: Precaution for what?
A: In case we were discharged.

Q78: Who gave you all these instructions and advice?
A: Chief Clerk, Sgt. Vosabalavu.
Q79: Do you wish to say anything else?
A: No, Sir.

[P. VAKADRIANU]
Staff Sergeant

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

We certify that all procedures and regulations pertaining to the Board of Inquiry Rules have been complied with and that all documents attached as exhibits are true copy of the original.

[J. N. B. EVANS]
Lieutenant Colonel
President

[A. MOHAMMED]
Major
Member

[T. GUCAKE]
Major
Member

[H. MACOMBER]
Warrant Officer Class One
Member